Volume 63 (2006): 203-214 | Theology IaaN | WaT. DICKENS Interreligious Dialogue Encountering an Other or Ourselves? Participants in itereligious dialogue encounter persons who ar, in some re spect, radically differen. Accordingly, appreciating the diversity among and Within the world's religions requires that we abandon the attempt to see others 8s culturally variant expressions of ourselves. The view of persons and of rel sion my argument presupposes is at odds with the one advocated by revisionist plualists such as John Hick. After identifying the weaknesses of Hick’s theory TTcommend an alternative that provides a firmer basis for respecting the ther as sch and enhances the possibilities of profound individval and communal trans formation through intercligious dialogue. Introduction As the fifth decade begins since the promulgation of Vatican I's declaration on the Catholic Church's relations with other religions of the world (Nostra Ae~ tate) itis fitting to reexamine how Christians should conceive of their partners in interreligious dialogue.’ One answer to the question is summed up in the aphorism “To know the other is to know oneself.” According to a widely held interpretation of this aphorism, reducing sectarian hostility among the world’s religions requires that religious persons learn to see one another as fundamen- tally the same. To highlight distinctiveness or emphasize the genuine alterty of cach of the world’s religions is to court triumphalist contempt of the other. Given the shameful history of Christians identifying religious differences and then distorting them, often with violent results, itis small wonder that the aphorism’ popular interpretation is compelling. Certainly, all religious per- sons must identify as false the differences among us that are mere caricature in order not to foment fear and enmity. I do not wish to dispute the wisdom of W. T Dickens holds a PAD in theology ffom Yale Univesity. The author of Hans Urs vor Balthasar’ Theologica Aesthetics: A Model or Post Critical Biblical Interpretation (2003), he cuetly an associate professor of eligous studies at Siena College, Loudonville, New York, and ‘dretor of Sienas Franciscan Center for Cathie Studies, T, See Vatican Council I Novia Actes Declaration om the Relation ofthe Church 1 Non Ohrisian Religions (1965). 203204 _W.T. Dickens a. this conviction. I do, however, have considerable misgivings about the idea that fundamental religious differences necessarily lead to misunderstanding and mistrust, or worse, Numerous scholars—primarily Christian theologians and philosophers of religion—disagree with me. They view radical religious difference as ine cently dangerous. It seems likely that their admirable goal to minimize interreli ‘gious hatred has prompted them to develop theories that interpret religious otherness as culturally variant expressions of a logically primary religious and ‘human commonality. But in so doing, they have in effect accepted the perva- sive fear of difference and backed it with theories of religion and of persons that claim to identify a basic sameness to each. As I hope to show, when the popu- lar understanding of our aphorism gets generalized into a dictate of equiva lence, then respect for the other as other is diminished: the distinctive features and, eventually, the very existence of religious traditions are threatened; and the ‘opportunities for profound transformation of oneself and one’s community through dialogue are limited. I will commend alternative interpretations of re- ligion, intereligious dialogue, and the aphorism that avoid these problems. The Standard Interpretation ‘There are several major variants of what I would call the standard, scholarly interpretation of the aphorism “To know the other is to know oneself.” Be- cause John Hick’s version is the most widely known and influential, I will re- strict my comments to his proposal. But the criticisms 1 make of it are applicable, with the necessary changes, to other, less widely cited versions (such as those of Wilfred Cantwell Smith and Paul Knitter). John Hick has repudiated the fundamentalism of his childhood, with its in- sistence that only the repentant evangelized Christian will enjoy salvation, He now believes that adherents of the world’s religions should abandon their re- spective tradition’s claim to superiority as immoral. He would have us instead adopt what he calls a pluralist view of religion. We should learn to see religions as more or less equally veridical responses to an unknowable ultimate reality. ‘The world’s religions are alike in providing more or less equally effective con- {exts within which to move or be moved from ego-centeredness to reality- ccenteredness. This ultimate reality, which Hick labels “the Real,” works together with the adherents of different religions to create socially and historically con- dlitioned texts, symbols, rituals, practices, doctrines, and polities. To use Hick’s ‘metaphor, the Real dons different masks in different cultures, allowing the lo- cals, as it were, to paint and repaint the mask to suit their unique, culturally con- ditioned exigencies. Because each religious tradition is an equally plausible and attractive response to the same unknowable Real, Hick has urged his fellow (Christians to reject the ancient claim that Jesus Christ is constitutive of salva- tion forall. He has likewise urged members of the world’s great living religions {o drop any doctrine that asserts a superior grasp on reality or a superior meansIntereligious Dialogue 205 of attaining such a grasp. Hick is convinced that all members of religious tradi- tions should adopt his revisionist-pluralist theory if they are serious about en- aging in dialogue that seeks mutual understanding, respect, and peace? Although John Hick should be applauded for recognizing that religions are shaped by their respective sociocultural settings and histories, there are several difficulties with his view of religion, especially if we seek to learn better to re- spect the other as such. Hick’s view of religion makes it difficult to criticize doctrines and practices ‘other than those claiming some sort of advantage over those of other religions. From Hick’s perspective, the main criticism non-Christians can legitimately make of Christianity is directed against its assertion of the constitutive role played in salvation by Jesus of Nazareth. That assertion violates Hick’s prin- ciple that all religions have a similarly reliable purchase, through their cultur- ally conditioned texts and traditions, on the Real. But there are a host of problems with the world’s religions that have litle or nothing to do with their respective claims to offer a superior encounter with ultimate reality and better ‘means of attaining human and planetary flourishing. If we were to follow Hick’s principle, it would be difficult to identify a basis for non-Catholics to criticize, for example, the Vatican's condemnation of artificial birth control Indeed, if Hick were right, it would be difficult to envision on what basis a Catholic could voice such criticisms. If all critique is invidious save that di- rected against supposedly spurious claims to preeminence, then what would be the reason for members of a given religious tradition to stay within that tradi- tion in order to address its shortcomings? Why bother staying within a reli- gious tradition in the hopes of amending it in some crucial respect? I think the revisionist-pluralist program is at considerable risk, therefore, of encouraging the abandonment of a religion by those critical of it, leaving behind only those with a blind allegiance to theit faith, That would do little to advance the cause cof mutual understanding and respect among members of different religious traditions, since critical selfappraisal is part and parcel of forthright dialogue. Itis not necessary to identify a universally credible basis for such intra- and interreligious criticisms. Indeed, the possibility of discovering such an acul- tural and ahistorical basis looks increasingly dubious as the modern era winds down. The very notion of a set of incorrigible beliefs that serve as the founda- tion from which others follow by logical entailment has been shown to be it- self implicated in culturally and historically conditioned judgments of truth nd intelligibility. 2 See the following by Joh Hick: “Religious Plralism and Absolute Claims.” in Religious Pluralism, e4. Leroy . Rouner (Notre Dame, IN: Univesity of Note Dame Press, 1984), 197 ‘An Interpretation of Religion: Hunan Responses tothe Transcendent (New Haven, CT Yale Uni: ‘ersty Press, 1989), 240, 252-96: A Christan Theology’ of Religions (Louise, KY: Westin ster Join Koon, 1995), 46, and “A Plralist View.” in More Than One Way? Four Views om Sabbatini a Pualistic World, ed. Denais L_ Oho and Timothy R- Philips (Grand Rapid: Zondervan, 1993), 80.