PADUA VS.

ERICTA
FACTS:

1. The civil action in the case at bar is commenced by herein petitioner Padua in CFI Quezon City. Padua
sought to recover damages for the injuries suffered by his minor daughter caused by her being hit by a
truck driven by herein private respondents.

2.Trial of the case having been set in due course, Padua commenced presentation of his evidence and
testimony on direct examination.

3.On motion of defendant’s counsel, the previously scheduled hearing was cancelled, and Padua's cross-
examination was reset on Dec 17. However, the Dec 17 hearing was also cancelled, again at the instance
of defendants' counsel, who pleaded sickness as ground; and trial was once more slated to take place on
yet another date (Mar 6, 7 and 13).

4.The next cancellation of the hearing date was moved by

Padua’s counsel, alleging that

he had another hearing on March 6 in Tarlac and said court in Tarlac is anxious to terminate said case
and that the plaintiffs herein would have another 2 dates (March 7 and 13).

5. Plaintiff’s counsel took the additional step of sending his client's wife to the Court on March 6 to
verbally reiterate his application for cancellation of the hearing on that day. This, Mrs. Padua did. The
respondent Judge however denied the application and dismissed the case that day. Padua moved for
reconsideration but was denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE/S:

1.W/N the petition is meritorious

RULING:

1. YES. Under the circumstances, and in the light of the precedents set out in the opening paragraphs of
this opinion, the respondent Judge's action was unreasonable, capricious and oppressive, and should be
as it is hereby annulled.
2. The RTC ignored the fact that:

a. defendants' counsel had twice applied for and been granted postponements of the trial;

b. Plaintiff ’s counsel had filed a written motion for postponement five (5) days prior to the hearing
sought to be transferred, and this was the very first such motion filed by him;

c. The ground for cancellation was not entirely without merit: the counsel had a case in the Tarlac Court
scheduled on the same day, which had been pending since 1964 and which the Tarlac Court
understandably was anxious to terminate;

d. the Padua motion for postponement sought cancellation of only one (1) of three settings, leaving the
case to proceed on the two (2) subsequent hearing dates;
e. the motion had been verbally reiterated by plaintiff’s wife on the day of the hearing sought to be
cancelled

Disposition: WRIT of certiorari granted.

FLORES VS. PEOPLE

GR L-25769 | December 10, 1974

FACTS:

Petitioners, Francisco Flores and Francisco Angel, were accused for robbery. Information was filed in
December 1951. They were found guilty of the crime charged in November 1955. Notice of appeal was
file in December 1955. It was until February 1958 that action was taken by CA—a resolution remanding
the records of the case to the lower court for a rehearing of the testimony of a certain witness deemed
material for the disposition of the case. Such resolution was amended dated August 1959 which granted
the petitioners to set aside the decision so that evidence for the defense on new facts may be received
and a new decision in lieu of the old one may be rendered. The case was returned to the lower court
but nothing was done for about a year because the offended party failed to appear despite the 6/7
dates set for such hearing. Furthermore, when the offended party took the witness stand, his testimony
was characterized as a mere fiasco as he could no longer remember the details of the alleged crime and
even failed to identify the 2 accused.

The trial court instead of rendering a decision sent back the records to the appellate tribunal. 5 more
years elapsed without anything being done, petitioners sought dismissal of the case against them due to
inordinate delay in the disposition (from December 1955- May 1965). CA was unresponsive
notwithstanding the vigorous plea of the petitioners, its last order being a denial of a second MR dated
January 1966. CA’s defense is that the case was not properly captioned as “People of the Philippines”
and without “Court of Appeals” being made a party to the petition.

ISSUE: WON constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated.

HELD: YES. Petition for certiorari was granted. Orders denying Motion to dismiss as Motion to
Reconsideration are set aside and nullified. Criminal Case against petitioners was dismissed.

Constitutional right to a speedy trial means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.
An accused is entitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity. He cannot be oppressed by delaying the
commencement of the trial for an unreasonable length of time. The Constitution does not say that such
right may be availed only where the prosecution of a crime is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal.
It does not exclude from its operation cases commenced by private individuals. “Where a person is
prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense or the
manner in which it is authorized to be commenced”.

Technicalities should give way to the realities of the situation. There should not be too much
significance attached to the procedural defect (refer to CA’s defense). CA failed to accord respect to this
particular constitutional right amounting at the very least to a grave abuse of discretion.

SECTION 17: RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

US VS TAN TENG
FACTS

The sister of Oliva Pacomio (7-year old girl) discovered that the latter was suffering from a
venereal disease known as gonorrhea. Oliva related to her sister that in the morning of the
15th of September 1910, after she took a bath, Chinaman Tan Teng followed her into her
room and asked her for some face powder, which she gave him; that after using some of the
face powder upon his private parts he threw her upon the floor, placing his private parts upon
hers, and remained in that position for some little time.

The sister at once put on foot an investigation to find the Chinaman. A number of Chinamen
were collected together. Oliva was called upon to identify the one who had abused her. Tan
Teng was not present at first. Later he arrived and Oliva identified him at once as the one who
had attempted to violate her.

Upon this information Tan Teng was arrested and taken to the police station and stripped of
his clothing and examined. The policeman who examined the defendant swore that his body
bore every sign of the fact that he was suffering from the venereal disease known as
gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the
defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science for the purpose of having a scientific
analysis made of the same. The result of the examination showed that the defendant was
suffering from gonorrhea.

During the trial, the defendant contended that the result of the scientific examination made
by the Bureau of Science of the substance taken from his body, at or about the time he was
arrested, was not admissible in evidence as proof of the fact that he was suffering from
gonorrhea. That to admit such evidence was to compel the defendant to testify against
himself.

The trial court found Tan Teng guilty of the crime of rape.
ISSUE/S:

Whether the substance taken from Tan Teng, which indicates that he has gonorrhea, cannot
be used as evidence against Tan Teng on the ground that it is violative of the constitutional
injunction against self-incrimination.

HELD:

The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be
compelled to be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to
extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt. The main
purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of
prisoners before trial, or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or
declarations implicating them in the commission of a crime.

The doctrine contended for by appellant would prohibit courts from looking at the fact of a
defendant even, for the purpose of disclosing his identity. Such an application of the
prohibition under discussion certainly could not be permitted. Such an inspection of the
bodily features by the court or by witnesses, can not violate the privilege granted under the
Philippine Bill, because it does not call upon the accused as a witness — it does not call upon
the defendant for his testimonial responsibility. The evidence obtained in this way from the
accused, is not testimony but his body itself.

The accused was not compelled to make any admission or answer any questions, and the
mere fact that an object found upon his body was examined seems no more to infringe the
rule invoked than would the introduction of stolen property taken from the person of a
thief. (US vs Tan Teng, G.R. No. 7081, September 7, 1912)

VILLAFLOR VS SUMMERS
FACTS

Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. The trial court, upon motion of the
assistant fiscal, ordered her to submit to physical examination to determine if she was
pregnant or not. Villaflor refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination of
her person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination.
Thereupon she was found in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid
Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by the court.
ISSUES

Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to

determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights and that
portion of our Code of Criminal Procedure providing that no person shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.

HELD

No. The constitutional guaranty that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-
incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the
accused is permissible.

Perhaps the best way to test the correctness of our position is to go back once more to
elements and ponder on what is the prime purpose of a criminal trial. As we view it, the object
of having criminal laws is to purge the community of persons who violate the laws to the
great prejudice of their fellow men. Criminal procedure, the rules of evidence, and
constitutional provisions, are then provided, not to protect the guilty but to protect the
innocent. No rule is intended to be so rigid as to embarrass the administration of justice in its
endeavor to ascertain the truth. No accused person should be afraid of the use of any method
which will tend to establish the truth. For instance, under the facts before us, to use torture to
make the defendant admit her guilt might only result in including her to tell a falsehood. But
no evidence of physical facts can for any substantial reason be held to be detrimental to the
accused except in so far as the truth is to be avoided in order to acquit a guilty
person. (Villaflor vs. Summers, G.R. No. 16444, September 8, 1920)

BELTRAN VS. SAMSON

FACTS: Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his handwriting
as ordered by the respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that such order would be a
violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because such examination would give the
prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have gotten in the first place. He also argued
that such an act will make him furnish evidence against himself.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of
comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be
falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional
provision under examination.
HELD: The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and
forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of
submitting the latter for comparison. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or
the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and
attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to
determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except
that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels
in one's possession. We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity
between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen
of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. It cannot
be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting
is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a
municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his
handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to
the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the
constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but
such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional
privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.

CHAVEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Petitioner herein was charged of qualified theft of a motor vehicle,one Thunderbird car, with accessories
amounting to P22,000.

That this theft was committed when the petitioner with the help of one, Asistio have completed a deed
of sale of Thunderbird which belongs to Johnson Lee. Chavesz telephoned Lee and made an appointment
for the sale of Thunderbird with Sumilang as a introduced buyer.

As payment was made to Eugene’s restaurant in Quezon City, all of them then drove to the place. Chavez
and Sumilang, pretending to get the money for the perfection of sale of the Thunderbird car, left the two
Chinese alone, Johnson Lee and his brother.

When the two Chinese went outside to look for Chavez and Sumilang, they could no longer locate the
former and the Thunderbird car was also from the parking lot.

Nevertheless the Thunderbird was impounded however, it was already been repainted.

During the trial, the Fiscal Grecia presented Chavez as a witness. And despite of Chavez’s objection being
aware that the latter would be self incriminated, the Court sustained the stand of the Fiscal saying.

“What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel.”

“And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness stand including
the accused.”

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the petitioner’s statement against himself can be used to convict him.
HELD:
No. It is in the context that we sat that the constitutional guarantee may not be treated with unconcern.
To repeat, it is mandatory: it secures to every defendant a valuable and substantive right.

The court may not extract from a defendant’s own lips and against his will an admission of his guilt.

In reality, the purpose calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him.

In the case at bar, the petitioner did not volunteer to take the witness stand in his own defence; he did
not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed the right upon being called to testify.

There is not even a valid waiver of the privilege. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be certain and
unequivocal, and intelligently, understandably and willingly made.

Wherefore the accused is acquitted.

PASCUAL VS. BOARD OF MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS

Facts:

Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton filed an administrative case against Arsenio Pascual Jr.
for alleged immorality. At the initial hearing thereof, Gatbonton’s counsel announced that he would
present Pascual as his first witness. Pascual objected, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from
being a witness against himself. The Board of Examiners took note of such a plea but scheduled Pascual
to testify in the next hearing unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent
authority. Pascual filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners. The lower court ordered that a writ of
preliminary injunction issue against the Board commanding it to refrain from hearing or further
proceeding with such an administrative case and to await the judicial disposition of the matter.
Subsequently, a decision was rendered by the lower court finding the claim of Pascual to be well-founded
and prohibiting the Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the
complainant in said investigation without his consent and against himself." Hence, the Board appealed.

Issue:

Whether a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in administrative case can avail of the
constitutional guarantee not to be a witness against himself.

Held:

Yes. The case for malpractice and cancellation of the license to practice medicine while administrative in
character possesses a criminal or penal aspect. An unfavorable decision would result in the revocation of
the license of the respondent to practice medicine. Consequently, he can refuse to take the witness stand.
The right against self-incrimination extends not only to right to refuse to answer questions put to the
accused while on witness stand, but also to forgo testimony, to remain silent and refuse to take the
witness stand when called by as a witness by the prosecution. The reason is that the right against self
incrimination, along with the other rights granted to the accused, stands for a belief that while a crime
should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objective should not be
accomplished according to means and methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded to the
human personality. (Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners, G.R. No. L-25018, May 26, 1969)

MAPA JR. VS SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:
Petitioner herein was charged with violation of Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices.However he was
granted an immunity from suit by the PCGG related to the previous charges against him, provided
that he will testify as witness against the Marcoses in criminal proceedings in the United States
Vs Ferdinand Marcos, during the RICO, where Ferdinand Marcos and his wife, Imelda Marcos
were being tried for charges of corruption. All the expenses of Mapa were shouldered by the
PCCG when they flew to New York to testify against the Marcoses. During the trial, Ferdinand
Marcos died and La Bella, the American prosecutor dispensed the testimony of Mapa and thereby
acquitted Imelda Marcos. Since Mapa, was not able to testify, it was contended that the
immunity from suit of Mapa took without force and effect. However, the record shows that the
petitioners provided information to the PCGG relating to the prosecution of the RICO cases
against the Marcoses in New York. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the immunity given by the PCGG to Mapa is still in effect and force.

HELD:
Yes. Under Sec. 5, EO 14, the PCGG has the separate power to grant immunity to any person from
being prosecuted provided they will meet the conditions provided by the PCGG.

In the case at bar, Mapa was granted immunity from the prosecution or criminal case where he
is being tried, and the PCGG even shouldered all the expenses of Mapa when they flew to New
York to testify implying that Mapa was able to meet the conditions and the PCGG accepted the
information given by him (MAPA) to testify against the Marcoses during the RICO trial. Failure of
the petitioner to testify on the RICO can not nullify the immunity given to him by the PCGG since
the petitioner was able to satisfy the requirements both of the law and the parties’ implementing
agreements. Though the petitioners were not able to testify against the Marcoses in RICO, it can
be said that it not their own fault.

Wherefore, the petitioner must be acquitted on the basis of the immunity granted by the PCGG,
which under the law has the power to grant immunity.
TWO KINDS OF IMMUNITY CAN BE GRANTED:
1. Transactional Immunity - is broader aint he scope of its protection. By its grant the witness
can no longer be prosecuted for any offence whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction.
2. Used-and-derivative-use - a witnessed is only assured that his or her particular testimony and
evidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution.

SECTION 18: RIGHT AGAINST INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE

PHILIPPINE REFINING COMPANY WORKER’S UNION vs PHILIPPINE REFINING CO.

HILADO, J.:

On September 26, 1946, Case Ko. 32-V, Philippine defining Company, Inc. vs. Philippine defining
Company Workers' Union (CLO), was scheduled for hearing before the Court of Industrial relations.
Upon that date, said court renewed its efforts to effect a temporary settlement of the case before going
on the merits of the petition. A series of conferences with both parties was held by the court, assisted by
Atty. Paciano Villavieja of the Division of Investigation. Thereafter, considering the circumstances and
facts of the case at that stage of the proceedings, the Court of Industrial relations came to the
conclusion that, "for the welfare of everybody concerned, for the interest of the public", and because
the court might not be able to decide the case promptly, in view of the issues involved, the striking
laborers should be directed to return and resume their work in the Philippine defining Company on
September 27, 1946, at 7:00 o'clock in the morning, and the management of the respondent company
should accept them beginning that date? and it was so ordered by the court (Order Annex A, dated Sept.
26, 1946).
The order contained the following injunction:

"The striking laborers, pending the final determination of this case, are enjoined not to stage any strike
or walk out from their employment without authority from and without first submitting their grievances
to the Court. The Petitioning Company is likewise enjoined not to lay-off, dismiss, discharge, or admit
any new employees or laborers in its employment during the pendency of this case, without beforehand
notifying and obtaining the authority of the Court. The controversial points involved in the petition will
be heard by this Court at the opportune time." (P. 2).

In Case Wo. 32-V(7), Philippine refining Co., Inc. vs. Philippine defining Company workers' Union (CLO),
of the same court, under date of May 2,1947, pending final determination of the case, the petitioning
company filed with the court an urgent report to the effect that a strike was declared by the union at
the plant of the company in Manila starting at 7:OO o'clock in the morning of April 30, 1947. In view of
this development and of the other facts and considerations set forth in the lower court's order of July
24, 1947 (Annex D), it ruled that the strike staged by the union or by the workers of the company
therein mentioned on April 30, 1947, "is contemptuous and illegal because it is a violation of the law and
the order of the court. Consequently, as prayed for in the said report submitted by the company, the
court authorizes the said company to hire such of the striking laborers and employees and new labor
force, as in its discretion it may see fit". And pursuant to section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. I03, Atty.
Juan Maralit of the court was thereby designated to take charge of the contempt proceedings and to
present such action as might be warranted therein against the party or parties who might be responsible
for the violation of the law and the order of the court dated September 26, 1946. The court dismissed
the answer and counter-petition for contempt filed by the union against the company.
The court's resolutions of August 16 and September 15, 1947, denied petitioner's motions for
reconsideration of the foregoing orders, and these orders and resolutions are sought to be vacated and
reversed by the instant petition.

The crux of the instant petitioner's contention is stated in the three propositions submitted in the
petition under the heading "Reasons for the Allowance of the Writ", thus:

"I. That the order of the Court of Industrial delations dated September 26, 1946, enjoining the workers
not to stage a strike pending the final determination of the case,was issued without or in excess of its
jurisdiction and powers, for the same had not been issaed in accordance with Section 19,
Commonwealth Act 103, which is the only source of its authority, if it has ever any such powers, in
issuing such kind of orders.

"II. That the said order dated September 26, 1946, which is the basis of the subsequent order dated July
24, 1947, is null, void and invalid for it is an infringement of the constitutional rights and liberties of the
workers and is moreover repugnant to the constitutional inhibition prohibiting involuntary servitude in
any form.

"III. That the order of the Gourt of Industrial relations dated July 24, 1947, as well as the resolutions of
the Court denying the motions for reconsideration, are also invalid and contrary to law for they were
issued in violation of the due process clause of the constitution. There was no legal and fair hearing
made by the Court of Industrial delations on the issues arbitrarily disposed of and decided in said order
of July 24, 1947." (Page 6.)

The questions thus raised are substantially the same as those raised in G.R. No. L-1573, Kaisahan ng Mga
Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas vs. Gotamco Saw Mill, wherein judgment went against the petitioning
union. There the court's order for the striking workers to return to their work was made after hearing.
Likewise in the instant case. And as appears from the courtfs order of September 26, 1946 (Annex A),
the order enjoining a strike or walk out without authority from and without first submitting the
grievances to the court, was made after hearing consisting of a series of conferences with both, parties
"held by the court"; and that said injunction was required by the public interest is categorically stated in
the same order.

In our decision in G. R. No. L-1573, supra, we ruled:

" * * * moreover, section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, in providing for an order of the court for
the return of striking workers' authorizes such order, among other, cases, 'when the dispute can not, in
its opinion, be promptly decided or settled'. The provision says: '* * * and if he has already done so,
(struck or walked out), that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the court, which shall be issued
only after hearing when public interest so requires or, when the dispute can not, in its opinion, be
promptly decided or settled' (Italic supplied). In other words, the erder to return, if the dispute can be
promptly decided or settled, may be issued 'only after hearing when public interest so requires', but if in
the court's opinion the 'dispute can not be promptly decided or settled, then it is also authorized after
hearing to issue the order: we construe the provision to me that the very Impossibility of prompt
decision or settlement of the dispute confers upon the court the power to issue the order for the reason
that the public has an interest in preventing undue stoppage or paralyzation of the wheels of industry *
* *".
In the order of September 26, 1946, the Court of Industrial Relations, among others, based its decree
upon the ground that "the court may able to decide this case promptly, in view of the issues involved".

The power conferred upon the Court of Industrial Relations by Section 19 of its organic law to enjoin,
under the circumstances therein required, a strike or walk out, or to order the return of striking workers
and to correspondingly enjoin the employer to refrain from accepting other employees, unless with the
express authority of the court, and to permit the continuation in the service of his employees under the
last terms and conditions existing before the dispute arose, is one of the most important virtues of this
capital-labor legislation. It seems that in this respect our law has achieved an advance not attained by
the capital-labor legislation of other countries. And considering that this progressive enactment is
evidently aimed at preventing tn the public interest an undue stoppage or paralyzation of the wheels of
industry, the general welfare requires that it be upheld and enforced.

As to the contention that Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 is unconstitutional, we held in G. R.
No. L-1573, Kaisahan na Mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas vs. Gotamco Saw Mill, supra, that it is
constitutional. We said:

"* * * It does not offend against the constitutional inhibition proscribing involuntary servitude. An
employee entering into a contract of employment after said law went into efiect, voluntarily accepts,
among other conditions, those prescribed in said section 19, among which is the 'implied condition that
when any dispute between the employer or landlord and the employee, tenant or laborer has been
submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for settlement or arbitration, pursuant to the provisions of
this Act, and pending award or decision by it, the employee, tenant or laborer shall not strike or walk
out of his employment when so enjoined by the Court after hearing and when public interest so
requires, and if he has already done so, that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the Court,
which shall be issued only after hearing when public interest so requires or when the dispute can not, in
its opinion, be promptly decided:or settled. * * *" (Italic supplied). The voluntariness of the employee's
entering into such a contract of employment he has a free choice between entering into it or not with
such an implied condition, negatives the possibility of involuntary servitude ensuing, * * *".

Regarding the facts, this Court is not authorized to review them as found by the Court of Industrial
delations. (Commonwealth Act No. 103, Section 15, as amended by Commonwealth Act 559, Section 2;
Rule 44, Rules of Court; National Labor Union vs. Phil. Match Co., 40 Off. Gaz. 8th Supp. p. 134, Bardwell
Brothers vs. Phil. Labor Union, 39 Off. Gaz. 1032; Pasumil Workers' Union vs. Court of Industrial
delations, 40 0ff. Gaz. 6th Supp. p. 71).

However, Mr. Justice Briones thinks that we should expressly reserve our opinion on the constitutioniity
of the above statutory and reglementary provisions should it, in the future, become necessary to decide
it.

"Wherefore, the orders and resolutions of the Court of Industrial Relations assailed by the instant
petition are hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner. So ordered.

Moran, C. J., Parás, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

CONCURRING AND DISSSENTING

PERPECTO, J.:

We concur in the result of the decision in this case, but we cannot agree with the pronouncement
depriving the Supreme Court the power to revise findings of fact made by the Court of Industrial
Relations.

We are of opinion that such curtailment of the powers of the Supreme Court is violative of the spirit and
purposes of Commonwealth Act No. 103. The power of revision granted by the Supreme Court should
not be limited so as to deny relief to any party that may foundedly feel aggrieved by any substantial
finding of fact made by the Court of Industrial Relations. Many of the labor disputes that reach the Court
of Industrial Relations center on disputed facts, such as reasonable salaries, reasonable working
conditions, periods of rest, reasons for strikes or lockouts, injustice of the relations between employer
and employees, etc. The aggrieyed party must not be denied his day in court in the highest tribunal.

Validity of Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 is impugned on constitutional grounds, upon the
allegation that it is tantamount to authorizing involuntary Servitude. We cannot agree with the
proposition. Under said section, the question of involuntary work is not involved, but only the
workability of the settlement of a labor dispute contemplated by Commonwealth Act No. 103. When
workers on strike appear before the Court of Industrial Relations to seek remedy under Commonw.ealth
Act No. 103, they do so, on the assumption that the work in their employment were and are agreeable
to their conscience and dignity and, as a matter of fact, they claim the right to continue performing the
same work. Otherwise, they would not have resorted to strike, a means resorted to to compel the
employer and let them continue wording, but on conditions more agreeable to the workers. If the
strikers should feel that their work is in the nature of involuntary servitude, they would not resort to a
strike nor recur to the Court of Industrial Relations, but will simply resign and seek some other
employment.

When the strikers are seeking remedy under the law from the Court of Industrial Relations, the court
may impose such reasonable conditions, one of them being that provided by Section 19 of
Commonwealth Act No, 103, prohibiting strikes or ordering strikers to return to work. Those reasonable
conditions are considered as voluntarily accepted by the laborers, not only because it is expressly
provided in Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, but because it is a reasonable implementation of
the powers of the court to effectively settle a labor controversy.

If the laborers should feel that they are compelled against their will to perform something which is
repugnant to their conscience or dignity, they need not resort to any court action to seek judicial
settlement of the controversy, as they can resign from their work and there is no power that can compel
them to continue therein.

Orders and Resolution affirmed.

IN MATTER OF PETITION OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF SEGIFREDO ACLARACION

FACTS:
Segifredo L. Aclaracion functioned as a temporarystenographer in the Gapan branch of the Court of First
Instance ofNueva Ecija from October 1, 1969 to November 21, 1971. Thereafter,he was employed as a
stenographer in the Public Assistance and
CLAIMS: Adjudication Division of the Insurance Commission, where heis now working.After Aclaracion
had ceased to be a court stenographer, theCourt of Appeals required him to transcribe his stenographic
notes intwo cases decided by the Gapan court which had been appealed. Hewas declared in contempt of
court. It was ordered to arrest Aclaracionand to confine him in jail until he submits a complete transcript
of hisnotes in the said cases. ISSUE:Whether or not there was a transgression of the rule of “noinvoluntary
servitude”
HELD: No. Aclaracion's contention that to compel him to transcribehis stenographic notes would
constitute involuntary servitude is nottenable. Involuntary servitude denotes a condition of
enforced,compulsory service of one to another or the condition of one who iscompelled by force,
coercion, or imprisonment, and against his will, tolabor for another, whether he is paid or not. That
situation does notobtain in this case.Also untenable is Aclaracion's argument that the imprisonmentof a
stenographer who had defied the court's resolution for thetranscription of the notes constitutes illegal
detention. Theincarceration of the contemning stenographer is lawful because it isthe direct consequence
of his disobedience of a court order.

SECTION 19: PROHIBITED PUNISHMENT

PEOPLE VS. ESTOISA

FACTS:
Estoisa was for acquitted for homicide through reckless imprudence and convicted for illegal possession
of firearm under one information by the CFI of Lanao. The firearm with which the appellant was charged
with having charged with his possession was a rifle and belonged to his father, Bruno Estoisa, who held a
legal permit for it. Father and son live & in the same house, a little distance from a 27-hectare estate
belonging to the family which was partly covered with cogon grass, tall weeds and second growth trees.
From a spot in the plantation 100to 120 meters from the house, the defendant took a shot at a wild
rooster and hit Diragon Dima, a laborer of the family who was setting a trap for wild chickens and whose
presence was not perceived by the accused. Estoisa is assailing his conviction saying that the 5-10 years
penalty for illegal possession of firearms is cruel and excessive
ISSUE:
Won the 5-10 years penalty for the illegal possession of firearms is excessive.
HELD:
It is of the court’s opinion that confinement from 5-10 years for possessing or carrying firearm is not cruel
or unusual, having due regard to the prevalent conditions which the law proposes to suppress or curb.
The rampant lawlessness against property, person, and even the very security of the Government, directly
traceable in large measure to promiscuous carrying and use of powerful weapons, justify imprisonment
which in normal circumstances might appear excessive. If imprisonment from 5-10 years is out of
proportion to the present case in view of certain circumstances, the law is not to be declared
unconstitutional for this reason. The constitutionality of an act of the legislature is not to be judged in the
light of exceptional cases. Small transgressors for which the heavy net was not spread are, like small fishes,
bound to be caught, and it is to meet such a situation as this that courts are advised to make
recommendation to the Chief Executive for clemency or reduction of the penalty.
PEOPLE VS. ESPARAS

People v. Esparas (1996)

J. Puno
Facts:
Esparas was charged with violation of DDA for importing 20kg of shabu. After arraignmentand pleading
not guilty, she escaped from jail and was tried in absentia. She was found guilty andwas sentenced to
death. She remains at large at present. This is the issue.
Issue:
Whether the Court may proceed to automatically review Esparas’s death sentence despiteher absence.
Held:
Yes. In US v. Laguna (1910), the Court held that its power to review a decision imposingthe death penalty
cannot be waived either by the accused or by the courts. There, the Court said,mainly, that the judgment
of conviction (capital punishment of death) entered on trial is not final,cannot be executed, and is wholly
without force or effect until the cause has been passed upon bythe Supreme Court. TC acts as a
commissioner who takes the testimony and reports the same to theCourt with its recommendation. A
decision of TC does not become final unless and until it has been reviewed by the Court. An accused who
was sentenced with the highest penalty is entitled un-der the law to have the sentence and all the facts
and circumstances upon which it is founded placed before the Court, as the highest tribunal of the land,
to the end that its justice and legalitymay be clearly and conclusively determined. Such procedure is
merciful. It gives a second chancefor life. Neither the courts nor the accused can waive it. It is a positive
provision of the law that brooks no interference and tolerates no evasions. (The Court here applied Sec.
50, Gen. Orders No.58.

ECHEGARAY VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

Facts: The Supreme Court issued a TRO On January 4, 1999, staying the execution of petitioner Leo
Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of
the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also
encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.
Issue: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order on the
execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered .
Held: No. The respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the
President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after
conviction by final judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of
courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. The powers of the Executive, the
Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple
reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. For the public respondents therefore to
contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to
violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.
SECTION 20: NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT

SERAFIN VS. LINDAYAG

Facts: Plaintiff failed to pay a simple indebtedness for P1500 Carmelito Mendoza, then municipal
secretary and his wife Corazon Mendoza and therefore an estafa case was filed against her. Complainant
admitted complaint. Now complainant filed a case against respondent Judge for not dismissing the case
and issuing a warrant of arrest as it falls on the category of a simple indebtedness, since elements of
estafa are not present. Further she contended that no person should be imprisoned for non-payment of
a loan of a sum of money. Two months after respondent dismissed plaintiff’s case. (Judge here
committed gross ignorance of law. Even if complainant desisted case was pursued.)
Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation committed by the judge when it ordered the imprisonment
of plaintiff for non-payment of debt?
Held: Yes. Since plaintiff did not commit any offense as, his debt is considered a simple loan granted by
her friends to her. There is no collateral or security because complainant was an old friend of the
spouses who lent the money and that when they wrote her a letter of demand she promised to pay
them and said that if she failed to keep her promise, they could get her valuable things at her home.
Under the Constitution she is protected. Judge therefore in admitting such a "criminal complaint" that
was plainly civil in aspects from the very face of the complaint and the "evidence" presented and issuing
on the same day the warrant of arrest upon his utterly baseless finding "that the accused is probably
guilty of the crime charged," respondent grossly failed to perform his duties properly.

LOZANO VS MARTINEZ
FACTS:
Petitioners assail the validity of BP 22, also known as the Bouncing Check Law. BP 22 punishes a person
“who makes or draws and issues any check on account for value, knowing at the time of issue that he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank..”. It is aimed at putting a stop to the
practice of issuing checks that are worthless which causes injury to the public interest. Contentions on
the law are that: 1) it offends constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt; 2) it impairs
freedom of contract; 3) it contravenes the equal protection clause; 4) it unduly delegates legislative and
executive powers; and 5) its enactment is flawed because the Interim Batasan violated the prohibition
on amendments in the Third Reading
ISSUE:
Whether or not BP 22 is a valid law (police power)
HELD:
The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check, not the non-payment
of an obligation which the law punishes. The effects of issuance of a worthless check transcends the
private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large since putting valueless commercial papers in circulation can pollute the channels of
trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest. Hence, the enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of police power and is not in conflict
with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
There is no valid ground to sustain the contention the BP 22 impairs freedom of contract since contracts
which contravene public policy are not lawful. The statute does not deny the equal protection clause
since it only penalizes the drawer of the check and not the payee. Additonally, BP 22 does not constitute
an undue delegation of legislative powers. Contrary to the contention, the power to define the offense
and to prescribe the penalty are not delegated to the payee. On the last contention, the Interim Batasan
investigated the matter and reported that the clause in question was an authorized amendment of the
bill. With all the foregoing reasons, the constitutionality of BP 22 is upheld.

SECTION 21: DOUBLE JEOPARDY

IVLER VS. SAN PEDRO

FACTS: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
chargedbefore the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MTC), with two separate offenses: (1)
RecklessImprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline
L.Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage
toProperty for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to thespouses
Ponce’s vehicle.Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner
pleaded guiltyto the charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking
thisconviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for the second delict for placing him in
jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MTC refused quashal,
finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition forcertiorari while Ivler sought from the MTC the suspension of
proceedings in criminal case,including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial
question.Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because
of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.Seven days later, the MTC issued a
resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedingsand postponing his arraignment until
after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion
remained unresolved.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari when theMTC
ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless ImprudenceResulting in
Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent; and
2. Whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars furtherproceedings
in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the deathof respondent
Ponce’s husband.
HELD:
(1) Petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest himof
personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and
(2) The protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in
jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366
PEOPLE VS. OBSANIA

Facts: The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape before the Municipal Court of Balungao,
Pangasinan. He pleaded not guilty. His counsel moved for the dismissal of the charge for failure to allege
vivid designs in the info. Said motion was granted. From this order of dismissal the prosecution
appealed.
Issue: Whether or Not the present appeal places the accused in Double Jeopardy.
Held: In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the following requisites must have
obtained in the original prosecution, a) valid complaint, b) competent court, c) the defendant had
pleaded to the charge, d) defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial Judge upon the defendant's motion
to dismiss. The “doctrine of double jeopardy” as enunciated in P.vs. Salico applies to wit when the case
is dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense because his action in having the case is dismissed constitutes a waiver
of his constitutional right/privilege for the reason that he thereby prevents the Court from proceeding
to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him.
In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with the express consent of the
accused but even upon the urging of his counsel there can be no double jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule
113, if the indictment against him is revived by the fiscal.

PAULIN VS. GIMENEZ

Facts: Respondent and Brgy Capt. Mabuyo, while in a jeep, were smothered with dust when they were
overtaken by the vehicle owned by Petitioner Spouses. Irked by such, Mabuyo followed the vehicle until
the latter entered the gate of an establishment. He inquired the nearby security guard for the identity of
the owner of the vehicle. Later that day, while engaged in his duties, petitioners allegedly pointed their
guns at him. Thus, he immediately ordered his subordinate to call the police and block road to prevent
the petitioners’ escape. Upon the arrival of the police, petitioners put their guns down and were
immediately apprehended.
A complaint “grave threats” was filed against the petitioners (Criminal Case No. 5204). It was dismissed
by the court acting on the motion of the petitioners. Mabuyo filed a MOR thus the dismissal was
reversed. Thereafter, petitioners filed for “certiorari, prohibition, damages, with relief of preliminary
injunction and the issuance of a TRO” (CEB-9207). Petition is dismissed for lack of merit and for being a
prohibited pleading and ordered to proceed with the trial of the case. Hence, this instant petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the dismissal of 5204 was a judgment of acquittal.
(2) Whether or Not the judge ignored petitioner’s right against double jeopardy by dismissing CEB-9207.
Held: For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case must be without the express consent of
the accused. Where the dismissal was ordered upon motion or with the express assent of the accused,
he has deemed to have waived his protection against double jeopardy. In the case at bar, the dismissal
was granted upon motion of the petitioners. Double jeopardy thus did not attach.
Furthermore, such dismissal is not considered as an acquittal. The latter is always based on merit that
shows that the defendant is beyond reasonable doubt not guilty. While the former, in the case at bar,
terminated the proceedings because no finding was made as to the guilt or innocence of the petitioners.

The lower court did not violate the rule when it set aside the order of dismissal for the reception of
further evidence by the prosecution because it merely corrected its error when it prematurely
terminated and dismissed the case without giving the prosecution the right to complete the
presentation of its evidence. The rule on summary procedure was correctly applied.

ICASIANO VS SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:
The Tanodbayan conducted a preliminary investigation in connection with a complaint filed against
petitioner for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The complaint was dismissed
for lack of merit on the recommendation of the special prosecutor. Another complaint was lodged
against him for the same violation and a corresponding information was filed with the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not petitioner was placed in double jeopardy.
HELD:
NO. The dismissal by the Tanodbayan of the first complaint cannot bar the present prosecution, since
double jeopardy does not apply. A preliminary investigation is not a trial to which double jeopardy
attaches.
Petition is DENIED.

PEOPLE VS. BALISACAN

Facts: Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of Ilocos Norte. Upon being arraigned, he
entered into a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted y counsel. At his counsel de officio, he was
allowed to present evidence and consequently testified that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense. In
addition, he stated that he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities. On the basis of the
testimony of the accused, he was acquitted. Thus, the prosecution appealed.
Issue: Whether or Not the appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy.
Held: The Supreme Court held that it is settled that the existence of plea is an essential requisite to
double jeopardy. The accused had first entered a plea of guilty but however testified that he acted in
complete self-defense. Said testimony had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo
should have required him to plead a new charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be
entered for him. This was not done. Therefore, there has been no standing of plea during the judgment
of acquittal, so there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein.

PEOPLE VS. CITY COURT OF SILAY

Facts: That sometime on January 4,1974, accused Pacifico Sensio, Romeo Millan and Wilfredo Jochico
who were then scalers at the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, weighed cane cars No.1743,1686 and 1022
loaded with sugar canes which were placed in tarjetas (weight report cards), Apparently, it was proven
and shown that there was padding of the weight of the sugar canes and that the information on the
tarjetas were to be false making it appear to be heavier than its actual weight. The three accused then
were charged with “Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified document”. After the
prosecution had presented, the respondent moved to dismiss the charge against them on the ground
that the evidences presented were not sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Acting on the motion, respondent court issued its order dismissing the case on the ground that the acts
committed by the accused do not constituted the crime of falsification as strictly enumerated in the
revised penal code defining the crime of falsification which was charged earlier and that their case be
dismissed. People asserts that the plea of double jeopardy is not tenable even if the case at bar was
dismissed because according to them, it was done with the consent of the accused therefore waiving
there defense of double jeopardy. The accused on the other hand, reiterated the fact that the dismissal
was due to lack of merits of the prosecution which would have the same effect as an acquittal which will
bar the prosecution from prosecuting the accused for it will be unjust and unconstitutional for the
accused due to double jeopardy rule thus the appeal of the plaintiff.

Issue: Whether or Not the grant of petition by the court would place the accused Sensio, Millan and
Jochico in double jeopardy

Held: Yes the revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the
case has been dismissed earlier due to lack of merits. It is true that the criminal case of falsification was
dismissed on a motion of the accused however this was a motion filed after the prosecution had rested
its case, calling for the evidence beyond reasonable ground which the prosecution had not been able to
do which would be tantamount to acquittal therefore will bar the prosecution of another case. As it was
stated on the requirements of a valid defense of double jeopardy it says: That there should be a valid
complaint, second would be that such complaint be filed before a competent court and to which the
accused has pleaded and that defendant was previously acquitted, convicted or dismissed or otherwise
terminated without express consent of the accused in which were all present in the case at bar. There
was indeed a valid, legitimate complaint and concern against the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico
which was filed at a competent court with jurisdiction on the said case. It was also mentioned that the
accused pleaded not guilty and during the time of trial, it was proven that the case used against the
accused were not sufficient to prove them guilty beyond reasonable doubt therefore dismissing the case
which translates to acquittal. It explained further that there are two instances when we can conclude
that there is jeopardy when first is that the ground for the dismissal of the case was due to insufficiency
of evidence and second, when the proceedings have been reasonably prolonged as to violate the right
of the accused to a speedy trial. In the 2 requisites given, it was the first on that is very much applicable
to our case at bar where there was dismissal of the case due to insufficiency of evidence which will bar
the approval of the petition in the case at bar for it will constitute double jeopardy on the part of the
accused which the law despises.

ESMENA VS POGOY

Facts: Petitioners Esmeña and Alba were charged with grave coercion in the Court of Cebu City for
allegedly forcing Fr. Thomas Tibudan to withdraw a sum of money worth P5000 from the bank to be
given to them because the priest lost in a game of chance. During arraignment, petitioners pleaded “Not
Guilty”. No trial came in after the arraignment due to the priest’s request to move it on another date.
Sometime later Judge Pogoy issued an order setting the trial Aug.16,1979 but the fiscal informed the
court that it received a telegram stating that the complainant was sick. The accused invoked their right
to speedy trial. Respondent judge dismissed the case because the trial was already dragging the accused
and that the priest’s telegram did not have a medical certificate attached to it in order for the court to
recognize the complainant’s reason to be valid in order to reschedule again another hearing. After 27
days the fiscal filed a motion to revive the case and attached the medical certificate of the priest proving
the fact that the priest was indeed sick of influenza. On Oct.24,1979, accused Esmeña and Alba filed a
motion to dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether or Not the revival of grave coercion case, which was dismissed earlier due to
complainant’s failure to appear at the trial, would place the accused in double jeopardy

Held: Yes, revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the case
has been dismissed already without the consent of the accused which would have an effect of an
acquittal on the case filed. The dismissal was due to complainant’s incapability to present its evidence
due to non appearance of the witnesses and complainant himself which would bar further prosecution
of the defendant for the same offense. For double jeopardy to exist these three requisites should be
present, that one, there is a valid complaint or information filed second, that it is done before a court of
competent jurisdiction and third, that the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint
or information. In the case at bar, all three conditions were present, as the case filed was grave
coercion, filed in a court of competent jurisdiction as to where the coercion took place and last the
accused were arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or the information. When these three
conditions are present then the acquittal, conviction of the accused, and the dismissal or termination of
the case without his express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged. In the case, it was evidently shown that the accused invoked their right to a speedy
trial and asked for the trial of the case and not its termination which would mean that respondents had
no expressed consent to the dismissal of the case which would make the case filed res judicata and has
been dismissed by the competent court in order to protect the respondents as well for their right to
speedy trial which will be equivalent to acquittal of the respondents which would be a bar to further
prosecution.

PEOPLE VS. PINEDA

FACTS:
Defendants are charged with five criminal cases of murder by the City Fiscal. However, two of the
defendants moved to consolidate the five criminal cases into one and disregard the other four. Their
plea is that said cases arose out of the same incident and motivated by one impulse. The respondent
Judge approved the motion and directed the City Fiscal to unify all the five criminal cases, and to file one
single information and drop the other four cases. The City Fiscal sought reconsideration thereof. . The
respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider. Hence, City Fiscal, in behalf of the People, moved
this case for certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON the certiorari should be granted
HELD:
NO.
The question of instituting a criminal charge is one addressed to the sound discretion of the
investigating Fiscal. It stands to reason then to say that in a clash of views between the judge who did
not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant,
those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. In this regard, he cannot ordinarily be subject to dictation.
It should not to be understood as saying that criminal prosecution may not be blocked in exceptional
cases. A relief in equity "may be availed of to stop it purported enforcement of a criminal law where it is
necessary (a) for the orderly administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law
in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford adequate
protection to constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is
unconstitutional or was 'held invalid.' " Upon the record as it stands, the writ of Certiorari prayed for is
hereby granted.
PEOPLE VS. TAMPAL

Facts: Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, Samuel Padumon, Pablito Suco, Dario Suco
and Galvino Cadling were charged of robbery with homicide and multiple serious physical injuries in the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga with Hon. Wilfredo Ochotorena as presiding judge. However, only
private respondents, Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, and Samuel Padumon were
arrested, while the others remained at large.
The case was set for hearing on July 26, 1991, but Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Wilfredo Guantero
moved for postponement due to his failure to contact the material witnesses. The case was reset
without any objection from the defense counsel. The case was called on September 20, 1991 but the
prosecutor was not present. The respondent judge considered the absence of the prosecutor as
unjustified, and dismissed the criminal case for failure to prosecute. The prosecution filed a motion for
reconsidereation, claiming that his absence was because such date was a Muslim holiday and the office
of the Provincial prosecutor was closed on that day. The motion was denied by respondent judge.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the postponement is a violation of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of
their cases.

(2) Whether or Not the dismissal serves as a bar to reinstatement of the case.

Held:
In determining the right of an accused to speedy disposition of their case, courts should do more than a
mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.
What are violative of the right of the accused to speedy trial are unjustified postponements which
prolong trial for an unreasonable length of time. In the facts above, there was no showing that there
was an unjust delay caused by the prosecution, hence, the respondent judge should have given the
prosecution a fair opportunity to prosecute its case.

The private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy. In several cases it was held
that dismissal on the grounds of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar another
prosecution for the same offense, but in this case, this does not apply, considering that the rights of the
accused to a speedy trial was not violated by the State. Therefore, the order of dismissal is annulled and
the case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.

MELO VS. PEOPLE

FACTS:
Petitioner herein was charged with frustrated homicide, for having allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin
Obillo with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill, several serious wounds on different part of the body,
requiring medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days, and incapacitating him from performing
his habitual labor for the same period of time.

During the arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty, but on the same day, during the night, the
victim died from his wounds. Evidence of death of the victim was available to the prosecution and the
information was amended.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double jeopardy, but was denied.
Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the amended information constitutes double jeopardy.

HELD:
Rule 106, section 13, 2nd paragraph provides:
If it appears at may time before the judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court may dismiss the original complaint or information and order the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense, provided the defendant would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy,
and may also require the witnesses to give the bail for their appearance at the trial.

“No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense”. It meant that when a
person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any
other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or
identical offense.

The protection of the Constitution inhibition is against a second jeopardy for the same offense, the only
exception being, as stated in the same Constitution, that if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
“SAME OFFENSE” under the general rule, has always been construed to mean not only the second
offense charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first information, but also that the two
offenses are identical.

There is identity between two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense
would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other. This is called SAME-EVIDENCE-TEST. In this
connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the ESSENTIAL
INGREDIENTS of the former as alleged in the information constitute the latter; vice versa.

This rule however does not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first
prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the
first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent.Thus, where the accused was
charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured person dies, the charge for homicide
against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.

Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which
charges the character of the offense and, together with the fact existing at the time, constitutes a new
and distinct offense.

PEOPLE VS. ADIL

FACTS:
On April 12, 1975, Fama Jr., attacked Viajar by throwing a piece of stone upon his right cheek, inflicting
physical injuries which would require medical attendance for a period from 5 to 9 days barring
complication as per medical certificate of the physician. A criminal complaint for slight physical injuries
was filed against Fama Jr. on April 15, 1975, docketed as Case No. 3335. Meanwhile, Viajar filed another
complaint on July 28, 1975, docketed as Case No. 5241, for the same instance of throwing a stone but
this time for serious physical injuries because it left permanent scar and deformation on his right face.
The first case proceeded and Fama Jr. pleaded not guilty during arraignment. After several
postponements by the prosecution, Fama Jr.successfully sought dismissal of the first criminal case
invoking the constitutional right to speedy trial. Fama Jr. now moves for the dismissal of the second case
on the ground of double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the additional allegation of deformity in the information in Case No. 5241
constitutes a supervening element which should take this case out of the rule of identity resulting in
double jeopardy.

HELD: YES.
This rule of identity does not apply… when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the
first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused during
the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent Thus, where the accused
was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured dies, the charge of homicide against
the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.

[Here], when the complaint was filed on April 15, 1975, only three days had passed since the incident in
which the injuries were sustained took place, and there were yet no indications of a graver injury or
consequence to be suffered by said offended party. Evidently, it was only later, after Case No. 3335 had
already been filed and the wound on the face of Viajar had already healed, that the alleged deformity
became apparent. In other words, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, the plea of double jeopardy
of private respondent Fama Jr., cannot hold.

PEOPLE VS. RELOVA

FACTS:
Respondent herein is the judge who rendered the decision dismissing the petition of the prosecutor to
charge Manuel Opulencia in violation of Municipal ordinance S1 of 1974 for illegal installation of electric
wire do reduce electric consumption for his factory - Opulencia Ice Plant. An information however was
filed after almost 9 months. The responded herein then moved to quash the charges for grounds of
prescription, that since the violation is classified as light felony, only two months is given for
prescription.
The lower court granted the motion to quash. The prosecutor then, after the motion was granted, filed
another charge against the respondent company owner, on ground of theft. That according to the
prosecutor, illegal installation which is punishable under the municipal ordinance and theft of electricity
punishable under the RPC are different.
ISSUE:
Whether the dismessal fo the first case can be properly pleaded by the accused in the motion to quash.
HELD:
The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is
for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both
the first and second offenses ma be based upon the same act or set of facts.

But the protection against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an
ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently udner a national statude, provided that
both offenses spring from the same act or set of facts.
The first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, whereas the second
contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be
twice put to jeopardy provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charges is not
included or does not icnlude, the crime charged it he other case. The second sentence applies even if
the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance
and the other a violation of the statues. If two charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution under other.

In the case at bar, the Supreme held that the theft of electric current contended by the prosecutor is
indeed part of the offense charged under the municipal ordinance of Batangas, which is the illegal or
unauthorized installation of electrical wiring because immediate physical effect of the installation is the
inward flow of electric current into Opulencia’s ice plant.

The petition is dismissed.

MERENCILLO VS. PEOPLE

Facts: Juanito Merencillo was charged of violation of Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 and Direct bribery. Petitioner
demanded from private complainant Ma. Angeles Ramasola Cesar P20,000.00 in exchange for the
approval of the Certificate Authorizing Registration (CAR). Due to the repeated demand of the petitioner
and delaying the release of CAR, private complainant seek the help of the authorities. As a result,
petitioner was caught in the entrapment instituted by the police. After trial, the RTC found petitioner
guilty as charged. Petitioner appealed the decision to the Sandiganbayan which was denied affirming the
RTC decision. Hence, this petition for review of certiorari, contending that he was twice in jeopardy
when he was prosecuted for violation of Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 and for direct bribery.

Issue: WON the petitioner was placed in double jeopardy.

Held: No. Section 3(b) of RA 3019 begins with the following statement: Sec.3 In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following acts shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared unlawful: XXX XXX

One may therefore be charged with violation of RA 3019 in addition to a felony under the RPC for
the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or subsequent to being charged with a felony under
the RPC. There is no double jeopardy if a person is charged simultaneously of successively for violation
of the Sec.3 of RA 3019 and the RPC. The rule against double jeopardy prohibits twice placing a person
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The test is whether one offense is identical with the
other or is an attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether one offense necessarily includes
or os necessarily included in the other, as provided in Sec.7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. An offense
charged necessarily includes that which is proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of
the former, as alleged in the complaint, constitute the latter; and an offense charged is necessarily
included in an offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of
those constituting the latter.

A comparison of the elements of the crime of direct bribery defined and punished under RPC and
those violation of Sec.3 (b) of RA 3019 shows that there is neither identity nor necessary inclusion
between the two offenses although the two charges against the petitioner stemmed from the same
transaction, the same act gave rise to two separate and distinct offense.
SECTION 22: EX POST FACTO LAW AND BILL OF ATTAINDER
UNITED STATES VS. CONDE

Facts:
On December 30, 1915, Bartolome Oliveros and Engracio Liaco borrowed from Vicente Diaz-Conde and
Apolinaria R. De Conde the sum of P300. They obligated themselves to pay the defendants 5% per
month, payable within the first ten days beginning on January 1916.
On May 1, 1916, Act No. 2655 (Usury Law) took effect.

Issue:
Whether or not the defendants violated Act No. 2655.

Held:
No. If a contract is legal at its inception, it cannot be rendered illegal by any subsequent legislation. The
obligation of the contract is the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement if it is not
contrary to the law of the land, morals or public order. That law must govern and control the contract in
every aspect in which it is intended to bear upon it, whether it affect its validity, construction, or
discharge.
In the present case, making Act No. 2655 applicable to the act complained of which had been done
before the law was adopted, a criminal act, would give it an ex post facto operation.

An ex post facto law, is a law that makes an action, done before the passage of the law, and which was
innocent when done, criminal. Ex post facto laws are absolutely prohibited unless its retroactive effect is
favorable to the defendant.

The decision of the lower court is revoked and the complaint dismissed.

CONCEPCION VS. GARCIA