THE EQUALS , EQUALITY , AND THE EQUAL ITSELF 1

FRANCESCO ADEMOLLO

The Equals, the Equals Themselves,

Equality, and the Equal Itself*

At Phd. 74ab, in the course of his treatment of Recollection, Socrates

introduces the forms as follows 1 :

« “We say, I suppose, that there is an equal [ti ei\ n ai i[ s on] — I don’t mean a stick
to a stick, or a stone to a stone, or anything else of that sort, but something
different over and above all these things, the equal itself [ouj xuv l on lev g w xuv l w/
ouj d e; liv q on liv q w/ ouj d ’ a[ l lo tw' n toiouv t wn ouj d ev n , aj l la; para; tau' t a pav n ta e{ t erov n ti,
auj t o; to; i[ s on] : shall we say that there is such a thing or that there is none ?”
“We shall certainly say so, by Zeus”, said Simmias, “unquestionably”.
“And do we know what it is ?”
“Of course”, he said.
“Where did we get the knowledge of it ? Wasn’t it from the things we were just
mentioning : on seeing sticks or stones or other equal things, from these we
came to think of that thing, which is different from these ?” ».

To the student of Plato’s conception of the forms these lines are interesting
on two counts. First, they make the origin and meaning of the ‘auj t o; to; F’ idiom
particularly clear. « Start by considering a stick (say) that is equal to another ;
now ignore the stick, leaving just the equal, the equal by itself, the equal
itself »2 . Secondly, they also tell us that the equal itself, the form, is « an equal »,

*
Paolo Fait, Massimo Mugnai and David Sedley made very helpful comments on previous versions
of this paper. David Sedley also allowed me to read his forthcoming article on the same subject (Equal
Sticks and Stones, in D. SCOTT ed., Maieusis, Oxford forthcoming ; it is a pity that I learnt of the
existence of this when it was too late for me to take it into account as fully as it would deserve) and
engaged in further discussion. The audience in Pisa (especially Peter Adamson, Paolo Crivelli and
Christoph Helmig) were generous with suggestions and friendly criticism. To all, my thanks.
1
Here and in the following quotations from Phd. I have modified Gallop’s translation (D.
G ALLOP , Plato : Phaedo, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1975).
2
R. M. D ANCY , Plato’s Introduction of Forms, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004,
p. 268. Cf. G. E. L. O WEN , Dialectic and Eristic in the Treatment of Forms, in I D . ed., Aristotle on
Dialectic : the Topics, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1968, pp. 103-125 ; repr. in I D ., Logic, Science and
2 FRANCESCO ADEMOLLO

or « something equal » ; in other words, they contain an instance of the much

discussed self-predicative assumption that the F (or Fness) itself is F, whatever
that may mean 3 .
Socrates says at a11, and partly repeats at b6, that the equal itself is « over
and above » (parav ) and « different » (e{ t eron) from, i.e. not identical with,
particular, sensible equal things like sticks or stones. As we are going to see,
he means that the equal itself is different from every particular equal thing.
This can be viewed as an instance of a central tenet of Plato’s conception of
the forms : the F itself is different from every particular F. We may compare
Republic 476cd, where Socrates characterizes the philosopher as

« he who… believes in a beautiful itself and is able to see both it itself and the
things that participate in it, and believes neither that the participants are it nor
that it is the participants [ou[ t e ta; metev c onta auj t o; ou[ t e auj t o; ta; metev c onta] ».

Aristotle too, in his famous reports on the origins of Plato’s theory of forms
in Metaphysics, A, 6, M, 4 and M, 9, emphasizes that Plato took his forms to
be « different » from sensible particulars. E.g. at M, 9, 1086a37-b2 he says that
the supporters of the forms

« believed that sensible particulars are in flux and none of them is at rest, and
that the universal is over and above these and is something different [to; de;
kaqov l ou para; tau' t a ei\ n aiv te kai; e{ t erov n ti ei\ n ai] ».

At the same time, the claim, in the Phaedo passage, that the equal itself is
different from particular equal things is also — and indeed primarily —
subservient to the discussion of Recollection (72e-78b). In that discussion
Socrates concerns himself with facts that answer to the following, very
general description : X reminds Y of Z. At the outset (73cd) he states a complex
sufficient condition, to which he is going to advert in the ensuing argument,
of X’s reminding Y of Z. According to this condition (at least on a reasonable

Dialectic, Duckworth, London-New York 1986, pp. 221-238 (page numbers are cited from the
latter), p. 230 : « the word ‘equal’ is first introduced without the article ; then we are made to
think of it in context, ‘a stick… to a stick’ ; and then we are told to discount the stick and
concentrate just on the equal. It is as though Plato drew a ring around the word in its context and
told us to think of that, pointing to it — except that… he is concerned not with the word but with
what it stands for ». But the analogy with talk of the word ‘equal’ may prove misleading, and in
fact misled Owen himself, despite his own final warning : see below, section II.
3
For a valuable account of what self-predication had better be and perhaps really is, at least in
later dialogues like the Parmenides, see C. C. MEINWALD, Good-Bye to the Third Man, in R. K RAUT ed.,
The Cambridge Companion to Plato, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1992, pp. 365-396.
 THE EQUALS , EQUALITY , AND THE EQUAL ITSELF 3

way of understanding it), if Y, on perceiving X, recognizes it and also acquires

knowledge of Z, and Z is different (e{ t eron) from X and is the object of different
knowledge (i.e. knowledge of X does not carry with it knowledge of Z), then
X reminds Y of Z. So an element of this complex sufficient condition is
precisely that X be different from Z. (It is reasonable to suppose that this is
a necessary condition too, although Socrates does not explicitly say so). Now,
of course Socrates is interested in a specific case of recollection, i.e. in the
fact that particular Fs remind us of the F itself : in his own example, particular
equal things remind us of the equal itself. That is no doubt the primary reason
why in our lines he emphasizes that particular equal things are different from
the equal itself.
In the sequel, Socrates goes on to give an argument for this non-identity
claim (74b6-c6) :

« “… Or doesn’t it appear different to you ? Look at it this way. Don’t equal

stones and sticks sometimes, while being the same, appear equal to one but not
to another [a\ r ’ ouj liv q oi me; n i[ s oi kai; xuv l a ej n iv o te tauj t a; o[ n ta tw' / me; n i[ s a faiv n etai,
tw' / d’ ou[ ] ?”
“Certainly”.
“But now, have the equals themselves ever appeared to you unequal, or equality
inequality [auj t a; ta; i[ s a e[ s tin o{ t e a[ n isav soi ej f av n h, h] hJ ij s ov t h~ aj n isov t h~] ?”
“Never yet, Socrates”.
“Therefore”, he said, “these equals and the equal itself are not the same [Ouj
tauj t o; n a[ r a ej s tiv n , h\ d’ o{ ~ , tau' t av te ta; i[ s a kai; auj t o; to; i[ s on]”.
“They by no means appear to me to be so, Socrates” ».

The argument ultimately rests on Leibniz’s Law, i.e. the law that, if X is
identical with Y, then whatever is true of X is also true of Y, and conversely,
if something is true of X but not of Y, then X is not identical with Y. Somehow
or other, Socrates is arguing that the equal itself is different from (i.e. is not
identical with) particular equal things on the grounds that something is true
of particular equal things but not of the equal itself. What he says, however,
is notoriously problematic in several respects.
To start with, there is a difficulty, both textual and exegetical, at b7-9. tw' /
me; n i[ s a faiv n etai, tw' / d’ ou[ (« appear equal to one but not to another ») is the
reading of some MSS, whereas others read tote; me; n i[ s a faiv n etai, tote; d’ ou[ (i.e.
« appear equal at one time but not at another ») 4 . The latter reading has the

4
More precisely, the MSS of the b family read tw' / me; n ... tw' / d’, which is reported also by W
(as varia lectio) and Q supra lineam, whereas TWPQ, supported by Aristippus’ Latin translation,
read tov t e [i.e. tote; ] me; n ... tov t e [i.e. tote; ] d’. See E. A. D UKE , W. F. H ICKEN , W. S. M. N ICOLL , D. B.
R OBINSON , J. C. G. S TRACHAN eds., Platonis Opera, I, Clarendon Press, Oxonii 1995 for further
information and explanation of the sigla.
4 FRANCESCO ADEMOLLO

drawback that it brings into the text the awkward sequence ej n iv o te... tote; mev n ...
tote; d’ (literally « Don’t equal stones and sticks sometimes, while being the
same, appear equal at one time but not at another ? »). So, treading in the main
editors’ footsteps, I will assume that the former reading is the right one5 .
Once we have thus (rather hastily, I admit) settled the textual issue, we
have to face the fact that the whole sentence a\ r ’ ouj liv q oi me; n i[ s oi kai; xuv l a
ej n iv o te... tw' / me; n i[ s a faiv n etai, tw' / d’ ou[ … is ambiguous and admits of at least two
different construals, depending on how we understand the reference to
« equal stones and sticks », the datives tw' / me; n ... tw' / d’, and the verb faiv n etai. (a)
Socrates may be talking about pairs of stones or sticks that are equal to each
other and claiming that sometimes they seem equal to one person but not to
another. If this is so, then he is presumably « alluding… to familiar facts
about perceptual perspective, in particular the fact that a pair of equal objects
will look equal to a person seeing them from one standpoint and unequal to
someone looking at them from somewhere else » 6 . (b) Alternatively, Socrates
may be talking about single sticks or stones that are ‘equal’ in the sense that
they are equal to something (i.e. have, as we should say, the relational
property of being such that there is something they are equal to), and
claiming that they sometimes turn out to be equal to one thing but not to
another. On this construal, Socrates is not concerning himself with perceptual
mistakes or with any other epistemic matter ; he is just making a point about
the relational nature of equality 7 .

5
Tw' / me; n ... tw' / d’ is accepted, among others, by J. B URNET , Plato’s Phaedo, Oxford 1911, R.
L ORIAUX , Le Phédon de Platon, 2 vols., Presses Universitaires de Namur-J. Duculot, Namur-
Gembloux 1969-75, vol. I, pp. 139-143, D UKE ET AL . eds., Platonis Opera cit., C. J. R OWE , Plato :
Phaedo, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1993. For a defence of tote; me; n ... tote; d’ see W.
J. V ERDENIUS , Notes on Plato’s Phaedo, « Mnemosyne », IV, 11, 1958, pp. 193-243, at pp. 209-210
and S EDLEY , Equal Sticks and Stones cit. ; another recent supporter is D ANCY , Plato’s Introduction
of Forms cit., p. 267 and n. 22.
6
N. P. W HITE , Plato’s Metaphysical Epistemology, in K RAUT ed., The Cambridge Companion to
Plato cit., pp. 277-310, at p. 280. On sensible particulars and perceptual perspective cf. R., 10,
598a : « Does a couch differ from itself according to whether you look at it from the side or the
front or any other perspective ? Or does it not differ at all, but appears otherwise qualified
[faiv n etai de; aj l loiv a ] ? » (tr. after Shorey).
7
That the difference between the two construals affects also Socrates’ talk of « equal stones
and sticks » is, I believe, not generally appreciated (though see e.g. D. B OSTOCK , Plato’s Phaedo,
Clarendon Press, Oxford 1986, pp. 80-81). In fact, it is possible to conflate the two construals,
i.e. to interpret the « equal sticks and stones » as in (a) while interpreting tw' / me; n ... tw' / d’ and
faiv n etai as in (b). The idea will then be that a pair of sticks equal to each other sometimes turn
out to be equal to a third stick but unequal to a fourth one (see e.g. R. S. B LUCK , Plato’s Form of
Equal, « Phronesis », 4, 1959, pp. 5-11, at p. 6, n. 2). But here the reference to a pair of sticks is
redundant : one stick is enough (and indeed better, as we are going to see).
 THE EQUALS , EQUALITY , AND THE EQUAL ITSELF 5

At first glance it is not easy to decide between (a) and (b). Both can find
support in what the dialogues say elsewhere to contrast forms and particulars.
In particular, both are supported by Smp., 211a, where Diotima characterizes
the form of beautiful as

« not beautiful in one respect but ugly in another [ouj th' / me; n kalov n , th' / d’
aij s crov n ], nor beautiful at one time but not at another [ouj d e; tote; mev n , tote; de; ou[ ] ,
nor beautiful relative to one thing but ugly relative to another [ouj d e; pro; ~ me; n
to; kalov n , pro; ~ de; to; aij s crov n ], nor beautiful at one place but ugly at another in
that it was beautiful for some people but ugly for others [ouj d ’ e[ n qa me; n kalov n ,
e[ n qa de; aij s crov n , wJ ~ tisi; me; n o] n kalov n , tisi; de; aij s crov n ] ».

Here it is clearly implied that particular beautiful items differ from the form
of beautiful in being beautiful in one respect, or at one time, or relative to one
thing, or for (i.e. in the eyes of) some people, but ugly in another respect, or
at another time, or relative to another thing, or for (i.e. in the eyes of) other
people. More generally (if with some approximation), Plato seems to believe
that any particular F is F only in a qualified way — where any sort of
qualification will fit the bill.
To return to our passage, the dative soi (« to you ») in the c1 question
suggests that tw' / me; n ... tw' / d’ ou[ means « to one person but not to another » and
thus tells in favour of (a) 8 . Other considerations, however, seem to show that
(b) is in fact superior to (a) and that soi is to be discounted as a red herring.
First, (b) gives Socrates a better argument than (a) does. As we saw above,
the argument rests on Leibniz’s Law ; and the predicate that allegedly
discriminates the particulars from the form by being true of the former but
not of the latter is « appears equal to one but not to another ». But this predicate
crucially contains, on the (a) construal, a verb of propositional attitude, i.e.
« appears » ; and it is notoriously risky to have recourse to the Law in such
contexts. Arguably, Socrates’ argument will turn out to be either invalid or
valid but unsound, depending on whether « appears » is construed de dicto (or
‘opaquely’) or de re (or ‘trasparently’) 9 . By contrast, (b) seems to be able to give
Socrates a sound argument that goes roughly along the following lines :

8
It has also been argued that the adverb « sometimes » seems to fit with (a) better than with
(b) : surely it will always, and not just sometimes, be the case that, if a stick X is equal to another
stick Y, it is also unequal to a third stick Z ? But even if this is so, Socrates says « sometimes…
appears » ; and X need not always « appear » (i.e. turn out or show itself to be) equal to Y but
unequal to Z, because sometimes you may not be considering it at all, or you may be considering
it without comparing it with anything. Hence the argument misfires.
9
See W HITE , Plato’s Metaphysical Epistemology cit., pp. 282-283 and S EDLEY , Equal Sticks and
Stones cit. for some discussion.
6 FRANCESCO ADEMOLLO

(1) ∀x ((x is a particular & ∃y (x is equal to y)) → ∃z (x is unequal to z)) 10 .

(2) ¬∃z (the equal itself is unequal to z).
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
(3) ∀x ((x is a particular & ∃y (x is equal to y)) → x ≠ the equal itself).

Secondly — and more importantly —, the (a) construal of « equal stones

and sticks » as meaning « stones and sticks that are equal to each other »,
though seemingly much more natural than the (b) construal of the same
phrase as meaning « stones and sticks that are equal to something », is in fact
highly problematic. For if Plato were contrasting the form of equal with pairs
of particular objects equal to each other, then he would presumably be
viewing the form of equal as a relation instantiated by those pairs of objects.
But this approach to relativity, which has become standard in contemporary
philosophy, is not shared by Plato and Aristotle, who lack the notion of a
dyadic universal like being equal to and rather concern themselves with
relational properties like being equal to something and relational items like
what is equal to something. E.g. at R., 479ab, where Socrates is contrasting
forms and particulars as in our argument 11 , he says :

« What about the many doubles [ta; polla; diplav s ia] ? Do they appear any the
less half than double ? »,

where the « many doubles » are plainly not pairs of things that are double of
each other (there are no such pairs), but rather things that are double of
something. Or take Prm., 131d, where the example is even more directly
relevant to our passage :

« Will each thing, receiving a small portion of the equal [tou' i[ s ou], have
something which, though smaller than the equal itself, is such that by virtue of
it whatever has it will be equal to something [i[ s on tw/ ] ? ».

And if you open Categories 7, you will find Aristotle talking about the
characteristics of such items as « the larger » (to; mei' z on, i.e. what is larger
than something), « the double » etc. Indeed, one of Aristotle’s examples is
precisely « the unequal » (to; a[ n ison, 6b21-23) 12 .

10
For the sake of readability I omit to specify, here in (1) as in (2) and (3), that x ≠ y ≠ z.
11
At least, he is doing so on the passage’s traditional interpretation, which has been
disputed. But that controversy has no bearing on what the passage tells us about Plato’s
approach to relativity.
12
On Aristotle see M. M IGNUCCI , Aristotle’s Definitions of Relatives in Cat. 7, « Phronesis », 31,
1986, pp. 101-126, at pp. 101-105.
 THE EQUALS , EQUALITY , AND THE EQUAL ITSELF 7

Construal (b) fits in well with this overall picture ; and I count this as a
weighty reason for preferring it to (a) 13 . Hence in what follows I will assume
that (b) is the right interpretation of b7-9. Most of what I shall say, however,
could be reformulated so as to make it consistent with (a).

II

If we now turn to what Socrates goes on to say at c1-2, we might expect him
to ask : « By contrast, has the equal itself ever appeared unequal ? », or
something like that, thus introducing premiss (2). But the question he does
ask is a different one. Let me quote it again :

« Have the equals themselves ever appeared to you unequal, or equality inequality
[auj t a; ta; i[ s a e[ s tin o{ t e a[ n isav soi ej f av n h, h] hJ ij s ov t h~ aj n isov t h~] ? ».

This is a compound question, consisting of two simple ones which are

connected to each other by « or » (h[ ) . The two component questions are : (i)
whether the « equals themselves » have ever appeared to Simmias — or,
presumably, to anyone at all — unequal ; (ii) whether equality has ever
appeared to him — or, again, to anyone at all — inequality. On the face of it,
neither question is identical with the expected one. And yet at c4-5 Socrates
goes on to conclude that « these equals » (i.e. particular, sensible equals like
stones or sticks) and the equal itself are not the same, as though he had, after
all, just asked exactly the expected question — or perhaps an equivalent one.
What, exactly, is Socrates’ train of thought here ? That conundrum is the
subject of the remainder of this paper. Sections II–V deal with the former
question, about the « equals themselves » ; section VI addresses the latter
question, about equality.

So what are the « equals themselves », and what is their relation to the
equal itself ? This puzzling plural expression has, notoriously, a striking
parallel at Parmenides, 129b. There Socrates has just heard an argument of
Zeno’s to the effect that, « if the beings are many, they must be both similar
and dissimilar, and this is impossible : for it is not possible either for the
dissimilars to be similar or for the similars to be dissimilar » (127e). In reply
to this argument, Socrates (128e-130a) distinguishes between forms and
particulars and claims that there is nothing astonishing about the fact that

13
Of course this is also a reason for preferring (b) to any other construal according to which
the « equal stones and sticks » are equal to each other, like that of S EDLEY , Equal Sticks and
Stones cit.
8 FRANCESCO ADEMOLLO

one and the same particular may be both similar (to something, in some
respect) and dissimilar (to something other or in another respect). By contrast,
Socrates says, it would be really astonishing if the forms themselves should
turn out to possess contrary features in this way. This is the overall meaning
of Socrates’ reply ; but now read 128e6-129c1, with emphasis on b1-2 :

« Don’t you acknowledge that there is a form, itself by itself, of similarity [auj t o;
kaq’ auJ t o; ei\ d ov ~ ti oJ m oiov t hto~], and another form, contrary to such a form, i.e.
what is dissimilar [o{ ej s tin aj n ov m oion], and that I and you and the other things
we call ‘many’ partake of these, which are two ? And that the things that partake
of similarity come to be similar in the respect in which and to the extent that
they partake [ta; me; n th' ~ oJ m oiov t hto~ metalambav n onta o{ m oia giv g nesqai tauv t h/ te kai;
kata; tosou' t on o{ s on a] n metalambav n h/ ] , whereas the things that partake of
dissimilarity come to be dissimilar, and those that partake of both come to be
both ? And even if all things partake of both though they are contraries, and by
participating of both are similar and dissimilar to each other [e[ s ti tw' / metev c ein
aj m foi' n o{ m oiav te kai; aj n ov m oia auj t a; auJ t oi' ~ ], what’s astonishing about that ? For if
someone showed that the similars themselves come to be dissimilar, or the
dissimilars similar [eij me; n ga; r auj t a; ta; o{ m oiav ti~ aj p ev f ainen aj n ov m oia gignov m ena h]
ta; aj n ov m oia o{ m oia] — that, I think, would be a marvel ; but if one shows that the
things that participate in both of these are affected by both [eij de; ta; touv t wn
metev c onta aj m fotev r wn aj m fov t era aj p ofaiv n ei peponqov t a], there seems to me nothing
strange about that, Zeno — not even if someone shows that all things are one
by participating in the one, and that these same things are many by participating
also in multiplicity. But if he will demonstrate that this thing itself, what is one,
is many, and conversely that the many are one — at this I’ll be astonished » 14 .

At 129b1-2, where we should expect Socrates to say something about the

forms, we find him speaking of the (im)possibility that « the similars
themselves » may become dissimilar, or « the dissimilars [sc. themselves] »
may become similar. The parallel with Phd., 74c1-2 is evident 15 ; obviously we
must look for a single interpretation that will be able to explain both passages.

Now back to the Phaedo. Many scholars have chanced their arm trying to
guess what the « equals themselves » might be. Here I will refrain from giving

14
Gill-Ryan’s translation, modified (M. L. G ILL , P. R YAN , Plato : Parmenides, Introduction by
M. L. G ILL , Hackett, Indianapolis-Cambridge 1996).
15
The parallel might seem to extend even to the fact that a little below, at 129d3-4, Socrates
mentions « stones and sticks and that sort of things » as examples of particulars. But in fact, as
D. S EDLEY , Form-Particular Resemblance in Plato’s Phaedo, « Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society », 106, 2006, pp. 311-327, at p. 323 shows by quoting a number of passages, sticks and
stones are among Plato’s standard examples of physical objects.
 THE EQUALS , EQUALITY , AND THE EQUAL ITSELF 9

a complete doxography and limit myself to a brief discussion of the main

options on the table.
Some have supposed that Socrates’ plural expression refers to some plurality
of entities that are distinct from the form, the equal itself, but nevertheless
bear a close relation to it, in virtue of which the claim about the equals
themselves entails an analogous claim about the equal itself. In particular, the
entities in question have been identified with ‘immanent properties’ of the
same sort as the « largeness in us » and the « small in us » mentioned by
Socrates later on, at 102de (cf. 103b) 16 . But there are serious stumbling blocks
to the acceptance of this view. To start with, there is nothing in the passage’s
context to suggest it to someone who is reading the dialogue for the first time
(and is not reading it backwards). Again, it is perfectly unclear why Socrates,
instead of claiming outright that the equal itself has never appeared unequal,
should arrive at this via a claim about immanent properties. Finally, if this
view were right, the argument would risk yielding the unwelcome conclusion
that, in addition to the forms, we also recollect these immanent properties.
Other scholars have supposed that the phrase « the equals themselves »
must, despite appearances, refer to the equal itself, i.e. the form of equal. I
shall concentrate on one especially influential version of this view, leaving
other versions aside 17 . The idea, as it was set forth by Owen18, is simply that

16
For two different versions of the ‘immanent properties’ interpretation see B LUCK , Plato’s
Form of Equal cit. and M. V. W EDIN , auj t a; ta; i[ s a and the Argument at Phaedo 74b7-c5, « Phronesis »,
22, 1977, pp. 191-205. — Some once believed the « equals themselves » to be mathematical
entities — or, more precisely, pairs of mathematical entities such as the angles at the base of an
isosceles triangle : B URNET , Plato’s Phaedo cit., p. 56, R. H ACKFORTH , Plato’s Phaedo, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge 1955, p. 69, n. 2, etc. This interpretation (which presupposes
construal (a) of b7-9) fares even worse than the ‘immanent properties’ one, because it is open to
the additional objection that mathematical entities behave like sensible particulars in the
respect we are presently interested in : since it may take a demonstration to show that they are
equal to each other, they will sometimes seem equal to someone but not to someone else (e.g. to
someone not sufficiently versed in geometry). See J. L. A CKRILL , Review of H ACKFORTH , Plato’s
Phaedo cit., « Philosophical Review », 67, 1958, pp. 106-110, at p. 108.
17
One other version seems to be that of L. N. H EINDORF ed., Platonis Dialogi Selecti, vol. IV,
Berolini 1810, which is known to me only through a quotation in Verdenius (Notes on Plato’s
Phaedo cit., p. 210) : « multitudinis numerus adhiberi in his potuit, quoniam aequalitatis vel
similitudinis notio non unum continet, sed ad duo certe refertur ». This is now being revived by
S EDLEY , Equal Sticks and Stones cit. Another version is Geach’s (P. T. G EACH , The Third Man
Again, « Philosophical Review », 65, 1956, pp. 72-82, at p. 76) one, according to which the form
of equal is being conceived as consisting « of a pair of absolutely equal things ». This runs foul
of Socrates’ claim that forms are not composite (78cd). Note that these scholars too, like those
quoted in n. 16, must assume that the « equal stones and sticks » of b7-9 are equal to each other.
If my argument in section I was sound, that is a sufficient reason for rejecting their views.
18
O WEN , Dialectic and Eristic in the Treatment of Forms cit., pp. 230-231
10 FRANCESCO ADEMOLLO

Plato « takes the predicate ‘equal’ out of context in whatever form it has just
assumed, singular or plural ». In our Phd. passage Socrates has just been
talking about equal stones and sticks, in the plural (liv q oi me; n i[ s oi kai; xuv l a tw' /
me; n i[ s a faiv n etai, tw' / d’ ou[ ) . That, and only that, is the reason why he immediately
goes on to refer to the form as auj t a; ta; i[ s a, in the plural : « the plural is there
in the Greek only because it was there in the context from which the term
‘equal’ was lifted, and in that context the adjective had to be plural » 19 . And if
we now turn to the parallel passage at Prm., 129b1-2, we can see that there too
the phrases auj t a; ta; o{ m oia and (auj t av ) ta; aj n ov m oia occur immediately after a
reference to similar and dissimilar things, in the plural : « And even if all
things [pav n ta] partake of both though they are contraries, and by participating
of both are similar and dissimilar [o{ m oiav te kai; aj n ov m oia] to each other,
what’s astonishing about that ? » (129a6-b1). So we are able to explain both
passages at one blow.
I confess that this interpretation strikes me as very implausible. As I
understand it, it would make sense only if Socrates’ claim could be construed
as a metalinguistic one, concerning the word ‘equal’, which in Greek may take
various possible forms, including the singular i[ s on and the plural i[ s a,
depending on the context. E.g., if Socrates, immediately after referring to
« equal sticks and stones » etc. (74b7-9), had gone on to ask, « But what does
this word, ‘equal’, mean by itself ? », then he could have picked up ‘equal’ in
the very plural form in which it had just occurred. But this is clearly not what
Socrates does here ; nor does Owen seem to believe that it is (cf. n. 2) 20 . The
phrase auj t a; ta; i[ s a (where the plural i[ s a is not isolated, but agrees with the
plural article tav and the plural form of the intensive pronoun auj t av ) cannot but
refer to a plurality of items. Furthermore, Owen’s interpretation, like any
other interpretation according to which auj t a; ta; i[ s a refers to the form, fits
badly with the way Socrates expresses himself four lines below, at c4-5, in the
argument’s very conclusion : « Therefore… these equals and the equal itself
[tau' t av te ta; i[ s a kai; auj t o; to; i[ s on] are not the same » — where proximity to the

19
D ANCY , Plato’s Introduction of Forms cit., p. 271. This interpretation can be traced back at
least to M. V ALGIMIGLI , Platone : Il Fedone, Sandron, Firenze 1938 3 , p. 170.
20
B OSTOCK , Plato’s Phaedo cit., pp. 81-82 sees the consequences of this interpretation — and
espouses them. He claims that Socrates is talking about the meaning of the word ‘equal’ and
citing it from the previous context ; and he conjectures that « what Plato wrote, at least as his
first draft », was in fact auj t o; to; i[ s a e[ s tin o{ t e a[ n isav soi ej f av n h… (where the neuter article tov is the
typical Greek device for mentioning a linguistic expression), and that then « either Plato
himself, or some copyist after him more zealous for grammar, allowed everything to get
attracted into the plural ». This reconstruction is incredible (the same process can hardly have
occurred both in Phd. and in Prm. ; and Bostock’s Urtext does not have the required meaning).
But it gives an idea of what it would take to make Owen’s interpretation work.
 THE EQUALS , EQUALITY , AND THE EQUAL ITSELF 11

plural « these equals » does not induce Plato to substitute « the equals
themselves » for « the equal itself » 21 .

After this all too brief review of scholarly attempts to solve the puzzle, it
is now time for me to put forward an alternative solution. My solution is not
new ; I shall actually develop a suggestion that was advanced by Loriaux 22 and
seems to have received very little attention since.
I propose that we reason as follows. The phrase auj t a; ta; i[ s a must refer to
a plurality of equal items. But the only plurality of equal items that has been
mentioned in the argument so far, and the only one which Plato can trust his
readers to think of, is the plurality of particular equal things like stones and
sticks. Therefore auj t a; ta; i[ s a, « the equals themselves », are particular equal
things like stones and sticks — not, however, insofar as they are stones or
sticks or whatever, nor insofar as they, besides being equal (to something),
are also unequal (to something else), but just insofar as they are equal (to
something), i.e. considered in abstraction from any other feature they may
have. That is what auj t av contributes to the phrase’s meaning 23 .
Take a particular X which satisfies Socrates’ b7-9 account : it is, say, a
stick, equal in length to another stick Y but unequal to a third stick Z. Then
mentally strip X of all its features and characteristics — being a stick, being
wooden, being unequal, etc. — except being equal or ‘an equal’. At the end of
this process you will be viewing X just as a particular equal item, a particular
concrete instance of equality (which, to repeat, we are conceiving of as the
relational property of being equal to something). Then do the same with Y, Z
and any other particular that is equal (to something). Eventually, you will be
left with a collection of particular items which could well be described as ‘the
particular equal items, insofar as they are equal’ or ‘the equals, insofar as they
are equal’. Following Loriaux, I am suggesting that this is just what auj t a; ta;
i[ s a means — or rather what it implies, strictly speaking.
In the light of these considerations Socrates’ rhetorical question, « Have
the equals themselves ever appeared to you unequal… ? », boils down to the
following claim :

(4) The equals, insofar as they are equal, never appear unequal.

21
Cf. 74d5-6, e6-7, etc.
22
L ORIAUX , Le Phédon de Platon cit., vol. I, pp. 145-146.
23
In Loriaux’s words, « auj t a; ta; i[ s a désignerait encore les choses (d’où le pluriel), non plus
cependant en tant que choses sensibles, mais en tant qu’égales (d’où auj t a; joint à ta; i[ s a) ».
12 FRANCESCO ADEMOLLO

Some further paraphrasis (taking into account, among other things, that
« appears » here means ‘turns out to be’, as we have been assuming since § I
in accordance with construal (b) of b7-9) brings us from this to :

(4*) Everything equal, insofar as it is equal, is not unequal.

Now the stripping-off which we were envisaging a moment ago bears a

strong resemblance to the process of abstraction whereby you get at the
notion of the equal itself, auj t o; to; i[ s on, from the notion of a stick or stone equal
to another 24 . To be sure, the « equals themselves » differ from the equal itself
in a number of respects : the former are many and particular (when you look
at X and Y through the stripping spectacles, you are supposed to be still able
to see that they are two), whereas the latter is one and universal ; besides, they
are — I take it — not genuine entities that deserve a place of their own in
Plato’s ontology, but mere abstractions, whereas the equal itself is as firmly
existent as anything. Still, there must be a very close relation between
propositions about the equals themselves — i.e. about everything equal,
insofar as it is equal — and propositions about the equal itself. In particular,
it seems reasonable to suppose that something like the following holds :

(5) Everything equal, insofar as it is equal, is not unequal ↔ the equal itself
is not unequal.

That is to say, returning to the sort of formulation we have in the text :

(5*) The equals themselves never appear unequal ↔ the equal itself never
appears unequal.

Thus Socrates’ question about the « equals themselves » is actually

equivalent to (and sounds as tautologous as) the expected question about the
equal itself. Why not ask directly the latter question ? Presumably because
Plato hopes to make his point more effectively by contrasting particular equal
stones and sticks with the very same stones and sticks considered just in
respect of their being equal. If this is so, then the scholarly controversy about
the meaning of his words suggests that his hope is misplaced.

24
This resemblance saves us from having to suppose that the occurrences of the pronoun
auj t ov ~ have two distinct meanings within a few lines, i.e. in auj t a; ta; i[ s a (c1) and auj t o; to; i[ s on (a12,
c4). I am inclined to say that the meaning of the word is essentially the same in both phrases,
though it has two different applications.
 THE EQUALS , EQUALITY , AND THE EQUAL ITSELF 13

It will prove helpful to regard (5) as an instance of something more

general :

(6) Everything F, insofar as it is F, is (is not) G ↔ the F itself is (is not) G,

where, however, the implication from right to left will hold only if we assume
that ‘G’ does not stand in for those predicates that are ascribed to (or denied
of) the F itself qua form (e.g. ‘eternal’, ‘immaterial’ etc.).

There is a nest of problems here which I will touch upon only briefly. Look
at the two sides of (6). Is the way in which everything F, insofar as it is F, is
(is not) G the same as the way in which the F itself is (is not) G ? Does ‘is’, in
‘is (is not) G’, express the same logical relation in both sides ? Whatever Plato’s
answer may be, it seems that no, generally speaking the relation should not be
taken to be the same. More precisely, it seems that, if the left side turns on
matters of things having certain properties, the right side will rather have to
turn on matters of properties being related to other properties. E.g. we could
use (6) to infer from ‘Every father, insofar as he is a father, is an ancestor’ to
‘The father is an ancestor’. But the father — the universal father — is not an
ancestor in the same way as any individual father is ; among other things, the
father is not someone’s ancestor (it is not an ancestor of Callias or Coriscus),
just as it is not someone’s father. Rather, ‘The father is an ancestor’ means
something like ‘The father is a kind of ancestor’, ‘Being an ancestor is part of
what it is to be a father’, etc. By the same token, in (5) ‘The equal itself is not
unequal’ cannot mean ‘The equal itself is not unequal to anything’ ; it must
rather mean something like ‘The equal is not a kind of the unequal’, ‘Being
unequal is not part of what it is to be equal’, etc. 25
Yet ‘The equal itself is not equal to anything’, i.e. (2), is exactly what
Socrates needs in order to build up a sound argument based on Leibniz’s Law :
see section I. So it seems that the argument as he actually formulates it, i.e.
insofar as (2) is reached via the « equals themselves », is in fact not sound.

III

It has been objected to my interpretation of the « equals themselves » that

it arms Plato with an unPlatonic, and possibly antiPlatonic, conceptual tool.

25
Otherwise we should also be allowed to infer from ‘Everything equal, insofar as it is equal,
is equal’ to ‘The equal itself is equal’ in the sense in which this means ‘The equal itself is equal
to something’. And then we should be faced with an awkward question (see A RISTOTLE ’s De ideis
ap. A L . A PHR . in Metaph. 83.26-28 Hayduck) : what is the equal itself equal to ?
14 FRANCESCO ADEMOLLO

« If Plato thinks that, merely by use of the qua operator and/or some kind of
abstraction process, we have cognitive access to something, other than the
Forms, which escapes the compresence of opposites, how can he still consider
Forms cognitively useful as objects of dialectical inquiry (75c-d), or be the
least bit confident that our knowledge of equality is in fact knowledge of the
Form of Equal, rather than of ordinary sensible equality filtered with the qua
operator ? The thesis you are attributing to him sounds, that is, worryingly
like one that a nominalist might bring up precisely in order to challenge the
anamnesis argument » 26 .
This is a subtle philosophical objection ; but I suspect that it has little
exegetical import. The notion of particular equal things considered just
insofar as they are equal, or in respect of their being equal, seems to me a
fairly innocent and non-committal one. Granted, a nominalist might want to
exploit it and contend that, once Plato has helped himself to this notion, he
doesn’t need the forms any more. But I am reluctant to let our wish to prevent
this possible nominalist objection guide our interpretation — not least in the
light of the fact that the whole of the recollection argument contains serious
weaknesses anyway, as all interpreters recognize.
I also wonder whether Socrates would be shaken by the objection. As we
saw above (section I), he thinks he is able to state a sufficient condition for
X to remind Y of Z (73cd). It is by no means clear how Socrates or Plato can
be the least bit confident that this is a sufficient condition ; for it obviously is
not. Anyway, Socrates also thinks that this sufficient condition is satisfied
when we substitute ‘particular equal things’ for ‘X’, ‘we’ for ‘Y’ and ‘the equal
itself’ for ‘Z’ : once the condition is accepted, it just turns out that particular
equal things remind us of the equal itself (74ab, c). By contrast, I take it that
the condition is not satisfied if for ‘Z’ we substitute ‘particular equal things
insofar as they are equal’ ; for in that case X is not different from Z. Particular
equal things insofar as they are equal are not other entities over and above
particular equal things ; they are those very things, viewed from a special
perspective. Therefore a nominalist that wanted to use Socrates’ notion of the
‘equals themselves’ against him would first have to convince him that the
sufficient condition for recollection is not really sufficient, or is not really
satisfied when ‘Z’ stands in for ‘the equal itself’.
Finally, my interpretation harmonizes with some textual evidence from
other dialogues. But we shall come to that in section V ; now it is high time to
discuss the Parmenides parallel.

26
David Sedley, personal communication. The same objection had been raised by Peter
Adamson.
 THE EQUALS , EQUALITY , AND THE EQUAL ITSELF 15

IV

The same sort of interpretation as I have been expounding so far applies

also to the « similars themselves » and the « dissimilars themselves » of Prm.,
129b. There too we can suppose that Socrates is contrasting the fact that « all
things » are both similar and dissimilar to each other (o{ m oiav te kai; aj n ov m oia
auj t a; auJ t oi' ~ a8-b1) with the fact that insofar as they are similar they are not
dissimilar, and insofar as they are dissimilar they are not similar. These latter
claims are equivalent to claims about the forms of similarity and dissimilarity,
which were mentioned in the previous lines. Let us put the matter as follows :

(7) Everything similar, insofar as it is similar, is not dissimilar ↔ similarity

itself is not dissimilar,

(8) Everything dissimilar, insofar as it is dissimilar, is not similar ↔

dissimilarity itself is not similar.

We can again regard (7) and (8) as instances of a general schema fairly close
to (6) :

(9) Everything F, insofar as it is F, is (is not) G ↔ Fness itself is (is not) G.

The only difference between (6) and (9) is that in (9) the abstract expression
‘Fness’ replaces the concrete ‘the F’ to cater for the difference between the
abstract ‘similarity’ and ‘dissimilarity’, on the one hand, and the concrete ‘the
equal’, on the other. This difference is unimportant for our present purposes ;
for Plato seems to use indifferently both kinds of expression to refer to one
and the same entity, the form of F 27 .
Now we are confronted with a difficulty which had no parallel in the Phd.
passage. Immediately after claiming that it would be a marvel « if someone
showed that the similars themselves come to be dissimilar, or the dissimilars
similar », Socrates goes on to say that there would instead seem nothing
strange if one « shows that things that participate in both of these are affected

27
In this very passage Plato refers to the form of equal both by the abstract noun aj n omoiov t h~
(129a6, d8) and by the concrete phrase o{ ej s tin aj n ov m oion (« what is unequal », 129a2). Cf.
Euthphr., 14c tiv dhv . .. lev g ei~ to; o{ s ion ei\ n ai kai; th; n oJ s iov t hta… (« what do you say that the pious and
piety are ? »), and the alternation between to; kalov n (« the beautiful ») and to; kav l lo~ (« beauty »)
at Smp., 210a-212a ; between to; kalo; n auj t ov and auj t o; kav l lo~ at Hp. Ma., 292cd ; and between
auj t ov . .. kav l lo~ and ti auj t o; kalov n at R., 476c. NB : None of this shows that ‘the F (itself)’ and ‘Fness
(itself)’ are synonymous. But I won’t go into this here.
16 FRANCESCO ADEMOLLO

by both » (ta; touv t wn metev c onta aj m fotev r wn aj m fov t era aj p ofaiv n ei peponqov t a 129b3-
4). Here it is clear that the pair of items which are participated in and « affect »
their participants must be the forms of similarity and dissimilarity. But the
pronoun « these » (touv t wn) is naturally taken to refer to the items mentioned
last, i.e. the « similars themselves » and the « dissimilars [themselves] ». So it
may seem to follow that the « similars themselves » and the « dissimilars
[themselves] » are, after all, the forms of similarity and dissimilarity28 .
This argument is not conclusive ; for « these » can also be taken to refer to
similarity and dissimilarity, which were mentioned immediately before the
« similars themselves » and the « dissimilars [themselves] » 29 . This construal
is less natural at first glance, but is far from impossible : in the very Phd.
passage cf. 74c4 tau' t a... ta; i[ s a, « these equals », which refers, not to the
« equals themselves » of c1, but to the equal stones and sticks of b7-8 30 . In this
particular case, moreover, the difficulty is mitigated by two circumstances.
First, in the lines where the two forms were mentioned (128e6-129a8) they
were repeatedly said to be both participated in, in terms verbally very close
to those employed here (cf. especially a6-8 ta; de; aj m fotev r wn [sc. metalambav n onta]
aj m fov t era... aj m fotev r wn metalambav n ei... tw' / metev c ein aj m foi' n ). Secondly, on my
interpretation there is in any case a very close connection between talk of
similarity and dissimilarity and talk of the « similars themselves » and the
« dissimilars themselves » ; hence at b1-2 any reader will feel that reference to
the two forms is, so to speak, still in the air. By contrast, it is certainly very
unnatural to take the phrases « the similar themselves » and « the dissimilars
[themselves] » to refer to the forms ; and nothing really convincing has been
said to mitigate this, as I have been arguing. On balance, therefore, my
interpretation remains preferable.

As I anticipated at the end of section III, my interpretation also accords

with some textual evidence from other dialogues. Consider Protagoras 351ce.
Socrates and Protagoras are talking about the relation between being pleasant
and being good. At c2-6 Socrates asks the following question :

28
J. R IST , Forms and Intermediates in Plato, « Phronesis », 9, 1964, pp. 27-37, at p. 30, A.
T EFFETELLER D ALE , auj t a; ta; i[ s a, Phaedo 74c1 : A Philological Perspective, « American Journal of
Philology », 108, 1987, pp. 384-399, at p. 396.
29
R. S. B LUCK , Forms as Standards, « Phronesis », 2, 1957, pp. 115-127, at p. 118.
30
Cf. also (e.g.) A RIST ., APr., I, 4, 26b20, where ej p i; touv t wn must be independent of the
immediately preceding ou{ t w~ (b19) and refer back to b17.
 THE EQUALS , EQUALITY , AND THE EQUAL ITSELF 17

« Do you, like most people, call some pleasant things bad and some painful
ones good ? I mean, in the respect in which they are pleasant, in this respect
aren’t they good [kaq’ o} hJ d ev a ej s tiv n , a\ r a kata; tou' t o ouj k aj g aqav ] , regardless of
whether anything else will result from them 31 ? And, again, aren’t the painful
things, in the very same way, bad to the extent that they are painful [ta; aj n iara;
wJ s auv t w~ ou{ t w~ ouj kaq’ o{ s on aj n iarav , kakav ] ? ».

Protagoras does not quite seem to understand the question. First he replies
that he does not know whether he must answer as he takes Socrates to be
expecting, i.e. that « all the pleasant things are good and all the painful ones
are bad » (ta; hJ d ev a te aj g aqav ej s tin a{ p anta kai; ta; aj n iara; kakav ) . Then he
tentatively answers that « some of the pleasant things are not good, while on
the other hand of the painful things some are not bad, others are bad, and a
third class is neutral, neither bad nor good ». At this point Socrates tries to
make himself clearer (351d7-e3) :

« “Don’t you”, I said, “call pleasant the things that participate in pleasure or
produce pleasure ?”
“Of course”, he said.
“Then this is what I mean, whether they, to the extent that they are pleasant,
are not good ; thereby I’m asking you whether pleasure itself is not something
good” [kaq’ o{ s on hJ d ev a ej s tiv n , eij ouj k aj g aqav , th; n hJ d onh; n auj t h; n ej r wtw' n eij ouj k aj g aqov n
ej s tin] ».

Here Socrates seems to assume that the question whether things pleasant, in
the respect in which (or to the extent that, or insofar as) they are pleasant, are
good is equivalent to the question whether pleasure itself is good. Thereby he
seems to commit himself to another instance of (9). To be sure, « pleasure
itself » in this passage does not purport to refer to a form, whereas forms were
in play both in Phd. and in Prm. But this difference does not seem to be relevant.
Thus the train of thought which we are ascribing to Socrates in Phd., 74bc
and Prm., 129b (claims about the F, or Fness, itself framed as claims about
things F, insofar as they are F), besides being intrinsically reasonable, has
now turned out to have a neat parallel at Prt. 351e 32 . But our interpretation

31
mh; ei[ ti aj p ’ auj t w' n aj p obhv s etai a[ l lo (c5) : not « that is, if it results in nothing other than
pleasure » (P LATO , Protagoras, Introduced by M. F REDE , translated by S. L OMBARDO and K. B ELL ,
Hackett, Indianapolis-Cambridge 1992). See J. A DAM , A. M. A DAM , Platonis Protagoras, Cambridge
1893, p. 177.
32
P. W OODRUFF , Plato : Hippias Major, Blackwell, Oxford 1982, p. 155 quotes the passage in
the context of a treatment of self-predication. To my mind, his translation (« When I ask whether
the pleasure itself is good, then, I mean whether things are good insofar as they are pleasant »)
is imprecise.
18 FRANCESCO ADEMOLLO

accords with other passages too. I shall limit myself to one example, Laches
190e. There Socrates asks Laches what courage (aj n dreiv a ) is ; Laches’ first
answer is as follows :

« If someone were willing to ward off the enemies remaining in his position in
the order of battle and did not run away, rest assured that he would be
courageous [aj n drei' o ~] ».

The question was about courage ; the answer is about persons who are
courageous — and no one criticizes it for this reason 33 . Here as elsewhere,
Plato is plainly making the (obvious) assumption that a definition of Fness
can be framed as a definition of what it is for something to be F :

(10) Fness = df Gness ↔ for every x, x is F = df x is G.

The consonance between this and (9) should be evident. You can see it even
more clearly if you consider that (10) entails that

(11) Fness = df Gness → everything F, insofar as it is F, is G.

For if courage = df warding off the enemies etc., then everyone who is courageous
wards off the enemies etc. — and does so insofar as he is courageous.

VI

We must now, at long last, get back to Phd., 74c1-2, where we still have to
analyse the second part of Socrates’ compound question : « or has equality
[ever appeared to you] inequality ? » This clause too has been considered
problematic, for two reasons.
(i) It seems natural to think that here h[ , « or », means « or, in other words, »
and that Socrates regards this clause as merely a way of rephrasing in
different but equivalent terms the previous clause about the equals
themselves 34 . But, if this is so, then Socrates is mistaken. Both ‘the equals

33
Cf. D ANCY , Plato’s Introduction of Forms cit., p. 83 ; and see the whole of pp. 82-98 and 109-
114 on the relationship between claims about Fness and claims about every particular F.
34
D ANCY , Plato’s Introduction of Forms cit., p. 271 : « the two clauses are asking the same
question in two different ways ». In fact h[ = « or, in other words, » is less common in classical
Greek than you might expect. In Plato see, however, Cri., 50e, Phd., 85d (where h[ is deleted by
most eds.), Prt., 313a, Men., 95b (v.l. kaiv , which some editors print), R., 349e, Phdr., 249a. Most
of these passages are cited by W. J. V ERDENIUS , Notes on Plato’s Phaedrus, « Mnemosyne », IV, 8,
1955, pp. 265-289, at p. 279.
 THE EQUALS , EQUALITY , AND THE EQUAL ITSELF 19

themselves are unequal’ and ‘the equal itself is unequal’ are predicative
sentences ; and on any interpretation they are at least logically equivalent to
each other. By contrast, ‘equality is inequality’ is an identity sentence and does
not seem to be equivalent to any of the other two, even if ‘the equal itself’ and
‘equality’ refer to the same thing, i.e. the form of equal, as we are inclined to
assume. So the question whether equality is inequality 35 does not seem to be
equivalent either to the question whether the equals themselves are unequal
(which is what it is paired with in the text) or to the question whether the equal
itself is unequal (which is what we should expect in place of both questions) 36 .
(ii) In any case the fact that equality is not inequality is irrelevant to the
argument’s purpose, which is to spot some difference between the equal itself
(or equality) and particular equal things. Equality is not inequality, all right ;
but then any particular equal thing is not inequality, either 37 .
These things being so, is there anything we can do to clear Socrates of
confusion ? Is our interpretation of the « equals themselves » of any help ?
There is no doubt that, strictly speaking,

(12) Equality is inequality

is not equivalent to

(13) The equals themselves are unequal,

which we are interpreting as

(14) Everything equal, insofar as it is equal, is unequal.

For it is not the case that

(15) Fness = Gness ↔ everything F, insofar as it F, is G.

35
More precisely, of course, I should say « the question whether equality has ever appeared to
Simmias to be unequality » ; likewise in what follows I should say « the question whether the equals
themselves have ever appeared to Simmias to be unequal » and « the question whether the equal itself
has ever appeared to Simmias to be unequal ». I am trying to simplify matters as much as possible.
36
D ANCY , Plato’s Introduction of Forms cit., pp. 271-272 : « even if ‘the equal itself’ is
equivalent to ‘equality’, ‘is unequal’ is not equivalent to ‘is inequality’. Socrates must be
supposing that ‘the equal is unequal’ is tantamount to ‘equality is inequality’, but this cannot be
because the two claims are piece-by-piece equivalent, and it remains unclear what precisely
motivates the supposition ».
37
Cf. B OSTOCK , Plato’s Phaedo cit., p. 83.
20 FRANCESCO ADEMOLLO

This does not hold from right to left : if everything F, insofar as it is F, is

G, it does not follow that Fness = Gness ; for Fness might just be G. E.g., if
everything pleasant, insofar as it is pleasant, is good, it does not follow that
pleasure is the good ; pleasure is just good.
But ‘equality is inequality’ does seem to entail ‘the equals themselves are
unequal’. For the left-to-right half of (15) seems to hold :

(16) Fness = Gness → everything F, insofar as it F, is G 38 .

Now we should not forget that, in the particular case we are dealing with,
‘Fness’ and ‘Gness’, and ‘F’ and ‘G’, stand in for terms that are contrary to each
other : ‘equality’ and ‘inequality’, ‘equal’ and ‘unequal’. So a sentence like (14)
is very different from a sentence like ‘everything pleasant, insofar as it is
pleasant, is good’, even though they can be viewed as sharing the same logical
form. Suppose you are discussing with me and I assert point-blank that
‘everything equal, insofar as it is equal, is unequal’. Then it might be natural
to reply ‘Oh, so you believe that equality and inequality are the same thing’,
even though the logically correct reply (at least by Plato’s lights) would be ‘So
you believe either that equality and inequality are the same thing or that
equality is unequal’. For it is natural to assume that contrary items will always
be, as it were, on the same level as each other, neither being subordinated to
the other. Thus (12) and (14) go naturally together, although strictly speaking
they are not equivalent, because (12) entails (14) but not vice versa.
In our passage we might venture to suppose that Socrates (or rather Plato)
is clear about all this and that, therefore, the clause about equality and
inequality is not meant to be strictly equivalent to the one about the « equals
themselves ». If this supposition is right, then h[ might after all mean not « or,
in other words, » but rather « or even » ; and the meaning of the c1-2 question
might be captured by some such paraphrasis as the following : « But now,
have the equals themselves ever turned out to be unequal ? If you believe so,
you might as well believe that equality has turned out to be inequality ». And
if this is so, then there is no reason to think that the fact that equality is not
inequality is meant to entail that the equal itself is not unequal. If, instead, the
supposition is not right (as, sadly, it seems more probable to me), and
Socrates does mistakenly take the clause about equality and inequality to be
equivalent to the one about the « equals themselves », then my analysis should
at least have shown that the connection between the two seems close enough
to constitute a mitigating circumstance.

38
The only difference between (16) and (11) above is that here ‘Fness = Gness’ is not flagged
as a definition. But this does not seem to be relevant for our present purposes.