Civil Liberties Union v.

Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317

FACTS: Consolidated petitions are being resolved jointly as both seek for the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 (EO No. 284) issued by former President Corazon
C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.

EO No. 284 allows members of the Cabinet, their Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries to
hold other than their government positions in addition to their primary positions.

 Section 1: A Cabinet member, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary or other appointive

officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more
than two (2) positions in the government and government corporations and receive
corresponding compensation thereof.

 Section 2: If they hold more than the requisites of Section 1, they must relinquish the
excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank but in no case shall any
officer hold not more than two (2) positions other than his primary position.

 Section 3: At least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either
be a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary.

Petitioners are challenging EO No. 284's unconstitutionality as its provisions are in direct
contrast with Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution. According to the petitioners, the only
exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in
the Constitution namely: 1) the Vice President may be appointed as a Cabinet member under
Section 3(2) of Article VII; 2) The Secretary of Justice is and ex-officio of the Judicial and Bar
Council by virtue of Section 8, Article VIII.

Constitutional provisions:

 Section 13, Article VII: The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and
their Deputies or Assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided by the Constitution, hold any
other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, directly or indirectly, during
their tenure, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
interest in the conduct of their office.

 Section 8, Article VIII: Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO No. 284 is constitutional.

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative.

It has been held that in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A
doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times and the condition and
circumstances under which the Constitution was framed.

The legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions is to prevent government officials from
holding multiple positions in the government for self enrichment which is a betrayal of public
trust.

The provisions of EO No. 284 above-mentioned are in direct contradiction to the express
mandate provided by the Constitutional provisions (Sec 13, Art VII and Sec 8, Art VIII). The
Constitution, the fundamental law of the land, shall reign supreme over any other statute.
When there is conflict, it shall be resolved in favor of the highest law of the land. Thus, the
Court held that EO No. 284 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. As a result, DENR Secretary Fulgenio
Factoran, Jr., DILF Secretary Luis Santos, DOH Secretary Alfredo Bengzon and DBM Secretary
Guillermo Carague are ordered to immediately relinquish their offices and employment.

WHEREFORE, subject to the qualifications stated, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order
No. 284 is hereby declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.

 Constitutional Law 1: CH 2: 1987 Constitution; Supremacy of the Constitution (Textbook:

Cruz, Professor: Atty. Usita)
 Statutory Construction: CH 11: Constitutional Construction (Textbook: Agpalo, Professor:
Atty. Bathan)

RTC Makati Movement against Graft and Corruption v. Dumlao, 247 SCRA 108
CSC v. CA, 425 SCRA 394

Quimbo v. Gervacio, 466 SCRA 277

Petitioner Prudencio C. Quimbo, Provincial Engineer of Samar, was administratively charged for
harassment and oppression by Elmo V. Padaon (Padaon), a general foreman. During the
pendency of the case, he was placed under preventive suspension without pay. The Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman found Quimbo guilty of oppression and recommended that he be
―suspended from office for a period of eight (8) months without pay. This was approved by the
Ombudsman. The Court of Appeals (CA) found Quimbo guilty of simple misconduct only and
penalized him with suspension from office for a period of two (2) months without pay. Quimbo
filed a Motion for Modification/Reconsideration calling attention to the fact that he had been
on preventive suspension from March 18, 1998 to June 1, 1998 and praying that the order
under reconsideration be modified ―to take into account the period of his PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION of 2 MONTHS and 17 DAYS WITHOUT PAY as part of the final penalty imposed. The
Ombudsman clarified that ―preventive suspension is not a penalty but a preliminary step in
an investigation; and that if after such investigation, the charge is established and the
person investigated upon is found guilty warranting the imposition of penalty, then he shall
accordingly be penalized. Such was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the preventive suspension pending the investigation is a penalty.

HELD:

Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive

measure and suspension as penalty. The distinction, by considering the purpose aspect of the
suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have different ends sought to be achieved. Preventive
suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused
from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential
witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him.
If after such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty
of acts warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This
is the penalty. That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by
Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of
 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws. As stated in Sec. 24,
preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in office but is considered
to be a preventive measure. Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under
preventive suspension is not considered part of the actual penalty of suspension. So Section 25
of the same Rule XIV provides that the period within which a public officer or employee charged
is placed under preventive suspension shall not be considered part of the actual penalty of
suspension imposed upon the employee found guilty. Clearly, service of the preventive
suspension cannot be credited as service of penalty. To rule otherwise is to disregard above-
quoted Sections 24 and 25 of the Administrative Code of 1987 and render nugatory the
substantial distinction between, and purposes of imposing preventive suspension and
suspension as penalty.

Caniete v. Secretary of Education, 333 SCRA 849

Herman Caniete and Wilfredo Rosario are public school teachers at the Juan Sumulong HS QC. For
being absent on 20 and 21 September 1990, they were charged by Secretary Isidro Cariño, then
Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, with alleged participation in the
mass actions/strikes on said dates. Petitioners were placed under preventive suspension on 21
September 1990. --> eventually found guilty --> dismissed from service --> MSPB REVERSED:
Suspend only for 3m without pay -->CSC modified penalty: REPRIMAND ONLY --> found that
petitioners were only guilty of being absent on 20 and 21 September 1990 without the
necessary leave of absence, and not as charged by Secretary Cariño of participating in the mass
actions/strikes on said dates. -->They are automatically reinstated in the service without
payment of back salaries.
· Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the CSC resolution insofar as it disallowed the
payment of their back salaries. --> DENIED

ISSUE: WON PETS ARE ENTITLED TO BACK SALARIES UPON THEIR REINSTATEMENT (after they
were found guilty only of violating reasonable office rules and regulations and penalized only
with reprimand)? YES!

· Citing Gloria vs. CA - the public school teachers therein were either suspended or dismissed
for allegedly participating in the strikes sometime in September and October 1990. They were
eventually exonerated of said charge and found guilty only of violation of reasonable office rules
and regulations by failing to file applications for leave of absence. Thus, the penalty of dismissal
earlier imposed on them was reduced to reprimand and their reinstatement was ordered.
Moreover, this Court affirmed the payment of back salaries of said teachers explaining that
although "employees who are preventively suspended pending investigation are not entitled to
the payment of their salaries even if they are exonerated, we do not agree with the government
that they are not entitled to compensation for the period of their suspension pending appeal if
eventually they are found innocent."
· Thus, there are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged
with offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (1) preventive suspension pending
 investigation (§51) and (2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the
disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated
(§47[4]).
· Employee who is placed under preventive suspension pending investigation is not entitled to
compensation because such suspension "is not a penalty but only a means of enabling the
disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation." [7] Upon the other hand, there is
right to compensation for preventive suspension pending appeal if the employee is eventually
exonerated. This is because "preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive although
it is in effect subsequently considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and the administrative
decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence, he should be reinstated with full pay for the
period of the suspension."
· In Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, a public school teacher who was found guilty of violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations for having been absent without leave and reprimanded
was given back salaries after she was exonerated of the charge of having taken part in the
strikes.
· Given the substantial factual similarities of this case to Gloria, there is clearly no reason for
this Court to rule against the payment of back salaries to herein petitioners.

Huertas v. Gonzalez, 451 SCRA 256

SSS Employees Association v. CA, 175 SCRA 686

Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’s demands
concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with
prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court
issued a temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary
injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking
cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor
Relations Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that
the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to
strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners
from striking.

Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike

Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides
guarantee among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities
such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and
rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,
subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular
No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that “prior to the enactment by
Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in
temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation
allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.

In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as
“government employees” and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with
an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil
service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.

Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the
Public Sector Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of
injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court
for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

Legazpi v. Minister of Finance, 115 SCRA 418

Sevilla v. Gocon, 423 SCRA 98

Mendiola v. People, 207 SCRA 85

Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452

FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal
gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on
December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious
allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only stopped on
January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing
damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an
uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after
casting his vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd
at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this
election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada
“constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the
crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap,
after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him
not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the
lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to
discharge the duties of his office.

ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

RULING:

1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I EDSA II
exercise of the people exercise of people
power of power of freedom of
revolution which speech and freedom
overthrew the whole of assemblyto petition
 the government for
redress of grievances
which only affected the
government. office of the President.
intra
extra constitutional and the
constitutional and the resignation of the
legitimacy of the new sitting President that it
government that caused and the
resulted from it cannot succession of the Vice
be the subject of President as President
judicial review are subject to judicial
review.
presented a political involves legal
question; questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution
require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II,
and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The
issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve
the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.

2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were
present when President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing
material relevant issues—President Estrada is deemed to have resigned— constructive
resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his
leaving Malacañan Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was
going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President
(without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same
service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before,
during and after January 20, 2001.

3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R.
178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR
No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is
clear is that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress
has clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and
addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did
not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that
he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the
decision that Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot
be reviewed by this Court.

4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and
graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder
which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting
president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal
acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of
public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but
stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also,
since our justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally
enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that
Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has
influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the
cases against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case
would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more
concerned with justice and less with prosecution.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1, Estrada vs Arroyo Case Digest, Estrada vs Desierto Case Digest

Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, 356 SCRA 636

Facts: "That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR-
SANTIAGO, a public officer, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation,with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official
functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application for
legalization for the stay of the aliens in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13,
1988 which prohibits the legalization of said disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said
aliens are disqualified thereby giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the
Philippines was unlawfully legalized by said accused."

Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and
the other for libel, were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed, respectively, No.
91-94555 and No. 91-94897.

Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to "Redetermine Probable Cause" and
to dismiss or quash said information. Pending the resolution of this incident, the prosecution
filed on 31 July 1995 with the Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an order suspending petitioner.

On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the motion of the prosecution to suspend
her.

The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day preventive
suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines,
from any government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the Philippines
for the implementation of the suspension order.

Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction issuing suspension to petitioner.

Held: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs.

Ratio: The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent
public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal
and jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the statute provides:

"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any incumbent public officer against whom
any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.

In view of suspension NOT as a penalty

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension
upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is
found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension
as a matter of course, and there seems to be "no ifs and buts about it."

Thus, it has been held that the use of the word "office" would indicate that it applies to any
office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which
he stands accused.

The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension
proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to
determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the
offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or
pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence before the court
could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it
secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the
proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary
investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his
mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the
information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

In view of multiple petitions

"Petitioner next claims that the Amended information did not charge any offense punishable
under Section 3 (e) of RA. No. 3019 because the official acts complained therein were
authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau
of Investigation adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and
unmarried, minor children of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines
after December 31, 1983. She concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her
motion to quash the information (Rollo, pp. 25-31).
"In a motion to quash, the accused the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in
the information (People vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore, petitioner admitted
hypothetically in her motion that:
(1) She was a public officer,
(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in the
Philippines after January 1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in 'evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her official
functions.'

In view of RA 3019 and Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of
Congress to discipline its own ranks.

Section 16, Article VI of the Constitution — which deals with the power of each House of
Congress inter alia to 'punish its Members for disorderly behavior,' and 'suspend or expel a
Member' by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the
penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days — is unavailing, as it
appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which
is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter
is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of
Representatives."

In view of the power of the Court

Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that,
therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension
order.
Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided by the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court,
nevertheless, deems it appropriate to render this decision for future guidance on the significant
issue raised by petitioner.

In Re: Raul M. Gonzalez, 160 SCRA 771