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6 Karen Green
could be deemed Frege’s legacy, and no-one has been more assiduous in
building on this inheritance than Dummett.
Dummett’s Frege. Philosophy of Language (1973) was the single most
important work to bring to the attention of philosophers the fundamental
place that Frege’s philosophy had occupied in the development of the ana-
lytic school. True, J. L. Austin had published his translation of Frege’s
Grundlagen der Arithmatic in 1950 [Frege (1950)], and this was followed by
Montgomery Furth’s translation of the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik [Frege
(1964)], but the philosophical significance of these works was made manifest
to a far wider audience by Dummett’s book. Here we publish for the first
time the English original of the preface which Dummett wrote for the Italian
translation, which came out in 1983 [Dummett (1983)]. In this preface
Dummett reiterates the foundational character of Frege’s philosophy, arguing
that in formulating his logic he contributed to the most fundamental part of
philosophy; that is, the ‘philosophy of thought’, the attempt the see aright the
nature and structure of our thought. In this preface one can see Dummett pre-
cisifying his claim that Frege should be interpreted as a philosopher of lan-
guage, in the light of criticisms of his book on Frege discussed in The
Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy [Dummett (1981)]. Dummett here makes
it characteristic of analytic philosophy that those who belong to this tradition
accept that it is not possible to explain how language functions, by making
use of a supposedly prior account of what it is to have thoughts. Explaining
how it is that language functions, and how language expresses thoughts by
means of words, is what is involved in the philosophy of language and will
‘simultaneously comprise a philosophy of thought’. He points out that on this
criterion there is some question as to whether Frege should be thought of as
an analytic philosopher, since he held both, that ‘there is no contradiction in
supposing the existence of beings who can think the very same thoughts as
we do without having to clothe then in sensible (e.g. spoken or written)
form,’ and that ‘we are incapable of grasping a thought save as expressed lin-
guistically or symbolically’. This complicates the attribution to him of the
fundamental assumption of analytic philosophers. Nevertheless, Dummett ar-
gues, in practice he analyzed the structure of thought by means of an account
of the structure of language, though, as he here confesses, it is not very clear
how he understood the relationship between the formal language he con-
structed and natural language, which he often characterized as defective.
In considering the relationship between natural language and formal
languages Dummett considers the view that a formal language makes clear
the structure that natural languages possess, and that it corresponds to a ‘deep
structure’ in Chomsky’s sense, that ‘actually represents the first stage in the
largely unconscious psychological process by which the speaker who utters
the sentence has come to form it in accordance with the grammar of the lan-
guage which he has “internalized”‘. He shelves this problem, commenting
Introduction: Dummett’s Legacy 7
that, ‘the problem lies at the heart of our current difficulties in explaining
what it is for someone to know a language’. As the contributions to this col-
lection attest these difficulties have not been overcome, yet it is central to
Dummett’s legacy that he has brought them to the fore.
In the United States, Frege’s legacy was taken up by Alonzo Church,
Rudolph Carnap and ultimately by Carnap’s student Willard van Orman
Quine, who, while he had inherited the method of linguistic analysis from
Frege, came to be diametrically opposed to him on metaphysical issues, ques-
tioning the Platonism about numbers and other abstract objects, associated
with Frege, as well as the coherence of notions of sense and intension as de-
veloped by Carnap.
In the late 1960s, Quine’s student, Donald Davidson, building on Alfred
Tarski’s work on truth definitions, argued that a theory of meaning for a lan-
guage could be given without recourse to obscure intensional concepts of
meaning [Davidson (1967)]. He proposed that by constructing a theory of
truth for a language one would, in effect, provide a theory of meaning for it.
For a decade or more during the 1970s and 80s, the Davidsonian program
was a central plank of Anglo-American philosophy of language, to be finally
overcome by new directions in semantic analysis, inspired by progress in the
formal semantics for intensional languages. By the end of the century
Quine’s qualms concerning the coherence of intensional vocabulary had been
swept away, and possible world semantics had acquired philosophical re-
spectability. But the philosophy of language was already waning, itself being
overtaken by cognitive science and new programs in the philosophy of mind,
and teleo-semantics, which attempt to analyze the content of thought directly,
rather than, as Dummett had prescribed, by way of the analysis of language.
Dummett’s legacy is intricately bound up with the central disputes in
philosophy of language that developed during this period, and partly flows
from his engagement with the works of his trans-Atlantic peers. One might
argue, perhaps too simplistically, that throughout his career, he has tried to
steer a middle way between Frege and Wittgenstein. He accepts, from Witt-
genstein that an account of meaning must be grounded in an account of the
use that we actually make of sentences, yet resists the radical conventional-
ism that he takes Wittgenstein to draw from this [Dummett (1959a);
(1993b)]. He rejects, also, the conclusions of the empiricist Quine, that a sci-
entific examination of the contexts of use and acquisition of language dem-
onstrate that there is no place for abstract entities, whether numbers,
intensions, or meanings, in a purified ontology that reflects the commitments
of empirical science. He argues, against Quine, that actual indeterminacy of
translation does not undermine the possibility of giving a precise account of
the meanings of expressions in those parts of the language where meaning
can be seen to be determinate [Dummett (1974)]. Thus meaning, and notions
such as truth in virtue of meaning, rejected by Quine, can be made scientifi-
8 Karen Green
cally respectable, and indeed need to be made so, if we are going to be able
to justify our deductive practice [Dummett (1973a); (1991a)].
During the seventies, he agreed with Davidson that the construction of
a truth theory for a language would be a central element in the construction
of a theory of meaning for it, but he denied that an adequate theory of mean-
ing centered on truth and reference would be able to do away with the con-
cept of sense. It would either already amount to a theory of the sense of
expressions of a language, or alternatively, need to be supplemented with one
[Dummett (1975a); (1976)].
What is most distinctive about the way in which Dummett has ap-
proached these questions within the philosophy of language is his application
of ideas derived from intuitionist philosophy of mathematics to them. In or-
der to develop a middle way, between the obscurity of Platonism, with its
immaterial abstract objects that are known through a puzzling faculty of in-
tuition, and the austere nominalist rejection of belief in anything that we can-
not see, hear, taste, touch or smell, Dummett proposes a moderate
constructivism in mathematics, and explores the applicability of constructiv-
ist notions of truth in other areas.
The development of Dummett’s views concerning abstract objects is
the subject of GEORGE DUKE’S contribution to this collection. He traces this
from Dummett’s early responses to Goodman and Quine, in which he argued
that Frege’s context principle dispensed with unnecessary worries concerning
the existence of abstract objects, to the later ‘tolerant reductionism’ developed
in Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics [Dummett (1991)]. As Duke points out,
the problem of abstract objects provides a paradigmatic case for Dummett’s
claim that metaphysical questions concerning existence can be resolved
through the construction of an adequate theory of meaning for our language.
It also sheds light on what Dummett requires of an adequate theory of mean-
ing.
Early on, Dummett suggested that, by introducing the context principle,
which changed the focus of determining meaning from consideration of the
meanings of isolated expressions to the truth conditions of sentences, Frege
had shown that it was sufficient, in order to accept the existence of some
class of objects, to show that expressions referring to them played the syntac-
tic role of proper names in true sentences. But this line of thought needed
modification for a number of reasons, not all of them dealt with by Duke.
Taken literally it licensed the introduction of fictional objects, as the entities
referred to in true sentences such as ‘Hamlet was indecisive’. It also resulted
in a fruitless search for a purely syntactic criterion for genuine proper names.
Thus Dummett came to the conclusion that it was not sufficient, in order to
demonstrate the existence of some class of objects, that singular terms refer-
ring to them occurred in true sentences, one had also to show how the exis-
tence of those objects was relevant for establishing the truth or falsity of the
Introduction: Dummett’s Legacy 9
sentences in which the terms featured. It is clear that the fictional object
‘Hamlet’ is irrelevant to the determination of the truth or falsity of the claim,
‘Hamlet was indecisive’, and so the truth of this sentence does not depend on
how things are with any putative fictional referent that might be assigned to
the name ‘Hamlet’. In order to establish the accuracy of the sentence we
need, rather, to read Shakespeare’s play. The case of fictional objects differs,
however, from that of numbers. For while it would be misleading to say that
Hamlet exists, it is not misleading to say that there is a prime number be-
tween nine and twelve. The ‘tolerant reductionism’ favored by Dummett ac-
cepts that a definition of numbers that reduces them to the extensions of
properties of equinumerosity does license existence claims for numbers, but
denies that this justifies us in treating numbers as independently existing ob-
jects. For reference to these objects does not play a direct role in the determi-
nation of the truth or falsity of the sentences in which they occur. Rather, the
numbers are constructs, and the truths that we express using them can be re-
duced to truths of higher-order logic. This licenses a constructivist under-
standing of the existence of numbers. For what justifies us in asserting, for
instance, that there is a prime number between nine and twelve, is that we
can prove it.
One feature of the constructivists that Dummett applauds is their atten-
tion to the notion of truth that applies within a domain of discourse. Con-
structivists identify the truth of a mathematical statement with the existence
of a proof for it. It is the fact that truth for mathematical statements consists
in the existence of a proof that leads the intuitionists to refrain from asserting
bivalence for mathematical statements; for there are statements which are
undecided, and which are such that we can have no guarantee that they ever
could be proved or disproved. Because the intuitionists have an independent
concept of the notion of truth that applies to mathematical statements, they
are able to give an account of the meaning of a mathematical statement in
terms of what would count as a canonical proof of it. A canonical proof is
one which is based directly on the meanings of the expressions in the state-
ment. Many actual proofs are indirect, but so long as one has specified what
would count as a direct proof of a statement one has laid down what has to be
the case for the statement to be true, and hence specified what it means.
ANDREAS KAPSNER offers a detailed outline of the intuitionist explana-
tion of the meaning of the logical constants, in terms of proof, in his contri-
bution to this issue. For Dummett, although one can study logics as algebras,
and provide various algebraic semantics for the formal languages studied,
such semantics are of little interest from the point of view of the theory of
meaning. In order for a semantics to contribute to the theory of meaning, a
connection has to be forged between the values assigned to expressions by
the semantics, and the use that is actually made by speakers of expressions of
that kind. In this respect, the core notion of reference for proper names is
10 Karen Green
happy to publish the Gifford lectures in which he continued to assert that the
central objection to the standard truth conditional account of meaning is its
circularity [Dummett (2006), p. 55]. And, in later works he moved beyond
verificationism, and spoke instead of a justificationist account of meaning.
The fact that Dummett had seen, prior to the publication of Davidson’s
seminal papers, that an account of meaning in terms of truth conditions was
implicitly circular, furnished him with an immediate objection to Davidson’s
program, or at least, with the observation that it required supplementation as
it stood. Tarski had been able to provide a truth definition, at least for a for-
mal language, by showing how to derive T-sentences of the form,
S is true iff p
compelled to accept once we understand the meanings of the words that ex-
press them. THOMAS MCNALLY discusses his critique of Wittgenstein’s radi-
cal conventionalism in his contribution to this issue. McNally’s paper focuses
on Stroud’s response to Dummett’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Remarks
on the Foundations of Mathematics and argues that there is a sense in which
Dummett and Stroud argue past each other, because they fail to distinguish
between logical and psychological compulsion. Stroud claims that Dummett
is wrong to attribute to Wittgenstein the view that we are free to choose how
we extend the application of a rule such as, ‘add 2’, he argues that Wittgen-
stein’s point is not so much that we are free to adopt a new convention, but
that we have no reason to think that we are logically, rather than merely psy-
chologically, compelled. McNally’s clarification of the distinction between
logical and psychological compulsion is useful. However, it does not under-
mine what he calls the ‘negative aspect’ of Dummett’s interpretation of the
Remarks, that is, the attribution to Wittgenstein of the rejection of logical
compulsion. Even if Stroud is correct, and Wittgenstein accepted that we may
be merely psychologically compelled to go on in a certain way, this is com-
patible with attributing to him the view that we should reject the idea of logi-
cal compulsion.
The middle path that Dummett tries to map out, between Frege’s Pla-
tonism and Wittgenstein’s radical conventionalism ties the objectivity of
thought to the social character of language, but has to explain how it is that
the conventions that society has laid down bring with them logical compul-
sion. Vague predicates offer, on the face of it, a severe challenge to the view
that words have, in general, determinate meanings, which logically compel
speakers to apply them in a certain way, if they are to be faithful to the con-
ventions that underpin language use. As with many of the problems that are
thrown up by the middle course that he has attempted to steer, Dummett is
here his own most profound critic, and in the paper ‘Wang’s paradox’ he sets
out in the clearest way imaginable the incoherence that is threatened by the
existence of vague predicates. Wang’s paradox, a version of the Sorites, or
paradox of the heap, involves the predicate ‘small’: 0 is small, if n is small,
then n+1 is small, therefore, every number is small. Vague predicates, for
which such reasoning holds, threaten a language with incoherence. Dummett
suggests that
herence, while accepting that natural language can (and must) function per-
fectly well with them. This would be one way of satisfying the two contrary
feelings that we have in relation to vague predicates, identified by Dummett.
However, it is not clear that this is an option available to Dummett, for it is
unclear how, on this conception of what we are doing when we construct a
formal language, we are enabling ourselves to see aright the nature and struc-
ture of our thought. We may just be replacing a flexible and messy medium
of thought and communication with another that is more rigid and narrowly
constrained.
During a long and prolific career, Dummett has contributed to many
other philosophical and social debates, which have not been touched on by
the papers published here. He pioneered debates on backward causation, pub-
lished seminal work on time and the reality of past, and challenged the
asymmetry of past and future [Dummett (1954); (1960); (1964); (1986);
(2004)]. Although his favored approach to giving an account of truth condi-
tions for a theory of meaning was initially verificationist, and later more
broadly justificationist, he toyed with the possibility of an alternative falsifi-
cationist approach. Recently, one of his past students, Ian Rumfitt has devel-
oped this idea, arguing that a falsificationist view would not result in the
rejection of classical logic as Dummett’s development of a justificationist
view does, and Dummett has acknowledged the plausibility of his arguments
[Dummett (2007); Rumfitt (2007)]. Among all this philosophy Dummett also
found time to campaign against racism, to publish on the theory of voting and
to become an opinionated expert on the Tarot.
The final paper published here is a personal account by CARLO PENCO
of Dummett’s interest in the Tarot, and of his arguments against those who
would attribute to the card game any validity as a means of divination, or ori-
gin in occult practices. Penco suggests that there is at some level a deep con-
nection between Dummett’s interest in the multitude of rules for the game of
Tarot, as it is played in the various regions of Italy and France, and his inter-
est in the rules of the language game. One might also observe, that there is a
connection between Dummett’s attitude towards those who invest the Tarot
cards with meanings which are quite unconnected to the social use to which
the cards were designed to be put, and his attitude to those who are extrava-
gant realists, and assign semantic values to the expressions of the language,
which are quite unconnected to the uses to which language was designed to
be put. Penco is certainly correct to suspect a connection between Dummett’s
fascination with the rules and history of this game of cards, and his fascina-
tion with the other far more complex rule governed activity that is language.
In both the discussion of the history of the card game, Tarot, and in the ex-
ploration of meaning, Dummett has attempted to avoid mysterious claims not
justified by the facts.
16 Karen Green
Department of Philosophy
School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies
Building 11
Monash University VIC 3800, Australia
E-mail: karen.green@monash.edu
REFERENCES
Karen Green
18
Introducción: el legado de Frege 19
ge, y nadie ha sido más diligente en el cultivo de esta herencia que el propio
Dummett.
El libro de Dummett Frege: Philosophy of Language (1973) ha sido la
obra individual más importante que llamó la atención de los filósofos sobre el
lugar fundamental que la filosofía de Frege ha ocupado en el desarrollo de la
escuela analítica. Es cierto que J. L. Austin había publicado su traducción de
Grundlagen der Arithmetik de Frege en 1950 [Frege (1950)] y que fue segui-
da por la traducción de Grundgesetze der Arithmetik [Frege (1964)] realizada
por Montgomery Furth, pero la significación filosófica de esas obras fue
puesta de manifiesto a una audiencia más amplia por el libro de Dummett.
Aquí se publica por vez primera el texto inglés original del prefacio que
Dummett escribió para la traducción italiana, que apareció en 1983 [Dum-
mett (1983)]. En este prefacio, Dummett reitera el carácter fundacional de la
filosofía de Frege argumentando que éste, al formular su lógica, había contri-
buido a la parte más fundamental de la filosofía, a la ‘filosofía del pensa-
miento’: el intento de ver correctamente la naturaleza y estructura de nuestro
pensamiento. En este prefacio, uno puede ver a Dummett precisando su afir-
mación de que Frege debería ser interpretado como un filósofo del lenguaje,
a la luz de las críticas a su libro sobre Frege que se discuten en The Interpre-
tation of Frege’s Philosophy [Dummett (1981)]. Dummett convierte aquí en
una característica de la filosofía analítica el hecho de que todos los que perte-
necen a esta tradición acepten que no es posible explicar cómo funciona el
lenguaje haciendo uso de una supuesta explicación previa de lo que es tener
pensamientos. Explicar cómo funciona el lenguaje y cómo expresa pensa-
mientos por medio de palabras es lo que está involucrado en la filosofía del
lenguaje y ‘comprenderá simultáneamente una filosofía del pensamiento’. Él
señala que, de acuerdo con este criterio, puede plantearse alguna reserva so-
bre si debe considerarse a Frege como un filósofo analítico, puesto que man-
tuvo tanto que ‘no existe contradicción en suponer la existencia de seres que
puedan pensar los mismos pensamientos que nosotros sin tener que dotarlos
de un ropaje (p. ej., hablado o escrito) sensible’ y que ‘nosotros somos inca-
paces de captar un pensamiento excepto en tanto que expresado lingüística o
simbólicamente’. Esto vuelve complicado el que se le pueda atribuir el su-
puesto fundamental de los filósofos analíticos. Sin embargo, argumenta
Dummett, en la práctica Frege analizó la estructura del pensamiento por me-
dio de una explicación de la estructura del lenguaje aunque, como él confiesa,
no resulta claro cómo entiende la relación entre el lenguaje formal que cons-
truye y el lenguaje natural que, a menudo, considera como algo defectuoso.
Al considerar la relación entre los lenguajes formales y los naturales,
Dummett contempla el punto de vista de que un lenguaje formal clarifica la
estructura que posee el lenguaje natural y que corresponde a una ‘estructura
profunda’ en el sentido de Chomsky, que ‘representa efectivamente el primer
estadio en el proceso ampliamente inconsciente por medio del que el hablante
20 Karen Green
O es verdadera si y sólo si p
mos esos significados podemos demostrar que las verdades aritméticas se si-
guen lógicamente. Puede ser una mera convención que el inglés use el sonido
‘five’ y que el español use el sonido ‘cinco’ para hablar del número al que
también se hace referencia mediante el numeral 5, pero una vez que sabemos
qué son los números y qué número significa este numeral (así como aquellos
a los que se refieren 2 y 7 y el significado de + y =), seremos capaces de ver
que 5+2 = 7 se sigue lógicamente. Frege pensaba que, a pesar de toda la con-
fusión que abundaba respecto del significado de los numerales –algunos su-
gerían que sus significados eran signos, otros que sus significados eran
imágenes mentales – él podría explicar lo que significan efectivamente tales
signos de una manera que demostraría por qué la aritmética no sólo parece
ser, sino que también es, un reino de verdades inexpugnables. De este modo,
el proyecto justificativo en el que Frege se embarcó exigía que lo que signifi-
can los signos numéricos fuera determinado. En la medida en que Dummett
permanece comprometido con la posibilidad de proporcionar una justifica-
ción racional para al menos algunos elementos de la práctica deductiva, tam-
bién está comprometido con el punto de vista de que algún significado es, o
puede hacerse que sea, determinado, y que podemos mostrar que algunas
verdades pueden justificarse a la luz de esos significados.
Así pues, aunque Dummett apela a Wittgenstein como la fuente de una
explicación del significado no-psicologista, hay otros rasgos de la filosofía de
Wittgenstein que se resiste a adoptar. En particular, el convencionalismo ra-
dical de Wittgenstein, tal como lo interpreta Dummett, es incompatible con el
pensamiento de que hay verdades lógicas que estamos obligados a captar, una
vez que entendemos los significados de las palabras que las expresan.
THOMAS MCNALLY discute su crítica del convencionalismo radical de Witt-
genstein en su contribución a este volumen. El artículo de McNally se con-
centra en la respuesta de Stroud a la interpretación de Dummett de las
Observaciones sobre los fundamentos de la matemática de Wittgenstein y ar-
gumenta que hay un sentido en el que Dummett y Stroud argumentan inútil-
mente, ya que no logran distinguir entre la obligación lógica y la psicológica.
Stroud afirma que Dummett está equivocado al atribuir a Wittgenstein el
punto de vista de que somos libres para elegir cómo extendemos la aplicación
de una regla como ‘suma 2’; argumenta que lo que Wittgenstein quiere decir
no es tanto que somos libres de adoptar una nueva convención, como que no
tenemos ninguna razón para pensar que estamos obligados lógicamente más
bien que en un sentido meramente psicológico. La clarificación de McNally
de la distinción entre obligación lógica y psicológica es útil. Sin embargo, no
socava lo que él denomina el ‘aspecto negativo’ de la interpretación de
Dummett de las Observaciones, esto es: la atribución a Wittgenstein del re-
chazo de la obligación lógica. Incluso si Stroud está en lo cierto y Wittgens-
tein aceptase que podemos estar obligados de una manera meramente
psicológica a continuar de una determinada manera, esto es compatible con
Introducción: el legado de Frege 27
dro que ofrece Davidson, sino que están implícitos en las convenciones socia-
les mediante las que los hablantes se consideran ligados. Con todo, Dummett
no ha aplicado esta intuición a la vaguedad. Esto es así quizás porque ha su-
puesto que si las convenciones socialmente aceptadas incluyen predicados
observacionales, esto introduciría incoherencia en el lenguaje. Si pensamos
que el significado determinado socialmente de los predicados observaciona-
les está determinado por las respuestas de los expertos individuales, entonces
el recurso a lo social no resuelve nuestro problema. Pero Burgess sugiere que
hay conceptos que el llama ‘intersubjetivos’ donde nos consideramos ligados
por un patrón de uso comunitario que determina por sí mismo los límites
grosso modo del uso correcto. Sin embargo, si Burgess está en lo correcto,
esto parece plantear un problema para la afirmación de Dummett de que al
concentrarnos en el carácter social del lenguaje podemos alcanzar significa-
dos determinados que puedan reemplazar al tercer reino de Frege.
Podría considerarse que la moraleja del artículo de Burgess, a la luz de
nuestra competencia con los predicados vagos, es que no se puede pensar en
un lenguaje formal que esté en relación con el lenguaje natural de manera si-
milar a la que el primer Chomsky afirmaba que está una gramática generativa
con la gramática superficial. Un lenguaje lógico coherente no debería pensar-
se como una ‘estructura profunda’ conocida implícitamente por cada hablante
individual que es competente en el lenguaje. Esto deja abierta la cuestión de
cuál es la relación entre un lenguaje formal, que intenta hacer explícita la va-
lidez de las inferencias que permite, y un lenguaje natural. De acuerdo con
una metáfora que usó Frege, un lenguaje formal se relaciona con el lenguaje
natural del mismo modo que el microscopio con el ojo. Sirve para un propó-
sito específico: revelar la estructura del razonamiento que tiene lugar dentro
de él, pero no es adecuado para muchos de los propósitos del lenguaje natu-
ral. Adoptando esta actitud estaríamos justificados para excluir los predicados
observacionales de nuestros lenguajes formales en beneficio de preservar la
validez y la coherencia, a la vez que aceptamos que el lenguaje natural puede
(y debe) funcionar perfectamente con ellos. Éste sería un modo de satisfacer
los dos sentimientos contrarios, identificados por Dummett, que tenemos en
relación con los predicados vagos. Sin embargo, no está claro que esto sea
una opción que esté disponible para Dummett, puesto que no se entiende bien
cómo, de acuerdo con esta concepción de lo que estamos haciendo cuando
construimos un lenguaje formal, nos facultamos a nosotros mismos para ver
correctamente la naturaleza y la estructura de nuestro pensamiento. Podemos
simplemente estar reemplazando un medio flexible e intrincado del pensa-
miento y la comunicación por otro que es más rígido y que está más estricta-
mente constreñido.
Durante una carrera larga y prolífica, Dummett ha contribuido a muchos
otros debates filosóficos y sociales que no han sido tratados en los artículos
que se publican aquí. Dummett fue un pionero en los debates sobre causación
Introducción: el legado de Frege 29
Department of Philosophy
School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies
Building 11
Monash University VIC 3800, Australia
E-mail: karen.green@monash.edu
REFERENCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS