Page 1 of 8

Republic of the Philippines

Region 10
Municipal Trial Court
Iligan City
Branch 1

ABC,
Plaintiff,
Civil Case No. _________
-versus- For: Ejectment

XYZ,
Defendant.
x---------------------------------------x

POSITION PAPER
(FOR THE PLAINTIFF)

PLAINTIFF, through counsel, to the Honorable Court, respectfully submit this

Position Paper in support of the arguments in the Complaint, thus:

PREFATORY STATEMENT

This is an ejectment suit filed under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Plaintiff ABC (Plaintiff) is in prior possession and an adjudged as co-owner

of the real property situated at Macapagal Avenue, Tubod, Iligan City in the
judgment made by the Court of Appeals in G.R. C.V. No. 1234 promulgated
on April 25, 2016;

2. Sometime in 2014, a contract of lease was executed by and between

Plaintiff and Defendant XYZ (Defendant) whereby the Plaintiff leased a
portion of the property to the Defendant, for a period of three (3) years and
renewable for 1 year;

3. The said parcel of land has been leased for the amount of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) only;
 Page 2 of 8

4. In 2017, the period of leased expired. Plaintiff made several verbal and
written demands to vacate the said property but the Defendant remained
and continuously in illegal possession of the said parcel of land. The final
demand letter was made on April 23, 2018 and received by the Defendant
on April 24, 2018;

5. The Defendant is unlawfully withholding possession of the subject land of

the Plaintiff despite last and final demand, to the damage and prejudice of
the Plaintiff;

6. Before the filing of the Complaint to the Court, the dispute has been referred
to the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Tubod but the parties failed to
arrive at an amicable settlement. A Certificate to File Action was issued by
the Lupon Tagapamayapa;

7. The Complaint for Ejectment is being filed within a period of one (1) year
from the last demand on Defendant to vacate the said property;

8. It was claimed by the Defendant that even though the lease contract is only
until March 2017, the total advances made by the Plaintiff covers rental
payments until February 2018;

9. Also, Defendant claim that Juan Family Corporation is the rightful owner of
the subject property and an agreement to renew the contract with the rightful
owner was under negotiation.

ISSUES

From the pleadings submitted by the parties, the following issues are raised for the
resolution of the Honorable Court:

I. Whether or not the Plaintiff has the right to institute the instant ejectment
case.

II. Whether or not Defendant, as mere lessee, can question the title of the
property leased by him from the herein Plaintiff.
 Page 3 of 8

III. Whether or not Defendant is unlawfully withholding possession of the

subject property.

IV. Whether or not the case should be dismissed for failure to comply with the
prior Barangay Conciliation.

PLAINTIFF’S POSITION AND ARGUMENTS

I. PLAINTIFF HAS THE RIGHT TO INSTITUTE THE INSTANT EJECTMENT

CASE

Section 1 and Section 2 of Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
“SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.— Subject to the provisions of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of
any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession,
by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person may at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or
persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them,
for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. (1a)

SECTION 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand.— Unless otherwise stipulated, such
action by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the
lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person
found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the
lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of
buildings. (2a)”1

Article 1673 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

“ARTICLE 1673. The lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any of the following causes:

(1) When the period agreed upon, or that which is fixed for the duration of leases under Articles 1682
and 1687, has expired;
(2) Lack of payment of the price stipulated;
(3) Violation of any of the conditions agreed upon in the contract;
(4) When the lessee devotes the thing leased to any use or service not stipulated which causes the
deterioration thereof; or if he does not observe the requirement in No. 2 of Article 1657, as regards
the use thereof.
The ejectment of tenants of agricultural lands is governed by special laws. (1569a)”2

1 Rule 70, Sections 1 and 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2 Article 1673, Civil Code of the Philippines.
 Page 4 of 8

In the case at bar, it is not disputed that a Contract of Lease for the real property
situated at Macapagal Avenue, Tubod, Iligan City was entered into between the parties
whereby Plaintiff ABC is the lessor while Defendant XYZ is the lessee. Plaintiff and
Defendant agreed that the contract was to expire on March 29, 2017. Clearly, when the
contract did expire, Plaintiff may judicially eject Defendant there from. However,
Defendant deliberately refused to vacate said property despite several demands by the
plaintiff and, as a result thereof, the latter was compelled to file an ejectment complaint
with the Honorable Court on June 28, 2018. The filing of the complaint for ejecment was
within the one (1) year period from the date of last demand, which was on April 23,
2018.

Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides for two forms of ejectment
suits, to wit: (1) forcible entry; and (2) unlawful detainer. In the case of Dikit vs
Ycasiano, the Supreme Court En Banc distinguishes the two actions as follow:
“xxx forcible entry is the act of depriving a person of the material or actual possession of a land or
building or of taking possessions thereof by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, against the will
or without the consent of the possessor; while unlawful detainer is the act of unlawfully withholding the
possession of a land or building against or from a landlord, vendor, vendee or other persons, after the
expiration or termination of the detainer's right to hold possession by virtue of a contract, express or
implied. In forcibly entry, the possession of the intruder of person who deprives another of the
possession of a land or building is illegal from the beginning, because his entry into or taking possession
thereof is made against the will or without the consent of the former possessor. In unlawful detainer the
possession of the detainer is originally legal or lawful but it becomes illegal only after the expiration or
termination of his right to hold possession of the land or building after termination of the contract of lease
for non-payment of the rents due or violation of the terms of said contract.”3

The book of the late Justice Regalado provides that:

“What determines the cause of action, whether forcible entry or unlawful detainer, is the nature of
defendant’s entry into the land. If the dispossession is not alleged to have taken place by any of the
means specified by Sec. 1, Rule 70, the action is a plenary action within the competence of the Court of
First Instance (Regional Trial Court) and may be filed even within one year from the dispossession
committed by the defendant.”4

In the case at bar, the complaint made out a case for unlawful detainer which is
one of the causes of action in an ejectment suit. The complaint clearly stated that the
Defendant was in lawful possession of the subject property by virtue of the Contract of
Lease entered between Plaintiff and Defendant. However, Defendant’s continued
possession became illegal after the expiration of the Contract on March 29, 2017.
Clearly, Plaintiff has the right to institute the foregoing ejectment suit in order to recover
his possession of the subject property.

3 G.R. No. L-3621, May 23, 1951

4 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Volume One
 Page 5 of 8

II. DEFENDANT- LESSEE IS STOPPED FROM ASSSERTING TITLE TO THE

PROPERTY LEASED AS AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF-LESSOR

Article 1673 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that:

“ARTICLE 1436. A lessee or a bailee is estopped from asserting title to the thing leased or received,
as against the lessor or bailor.”5

In VSC Commercial Enterprises vs CA, the Supreme Court has consistently held
that the private respondents, as lessees, who had undisturbed possession for the entire
term under the lease, are estopped to deny their landlord’s title, or to assert a better title
not only in themselves, but also in some third person, including the State, while they
remain in possession of the leased premises and until they surrender possession to the
landlord.6

While in Geminiano vs CA, the Supreme Court held that private respondents, as
lessees who had undisturbed possession for the entire term under the lease, are then
estopped to deny their landlord's title, or to assert a better title not only in themselves,
but also in some third person while they remain in possession of the leased premises
and until they surrender possession to the landlord. This estoppel applies even though
the lessor had no title at the time the relation of lessor and lessee was created, and may
be asserted not only by the original lessor, but also by those who succeed to his title. 7

Based on the above-mentioned jurisprudence, indeed, the relationship between

the lessor and the lessee does not depend on the lessor’s title over the property. What
is necessary is the agreement between the parties and the lessee’s undisturbed
possession of the over the property for the entire period of the lease. The lessee cannot
question the title of lessor over the property while there exists a lessor-lessee relation
between them. The lessee can only question the lessor’s title once he surrenders the
possession of the property to the latter.

And Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
“SECTION 2. Conclusive presumptions.— The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:

(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the
relation of landlord and tenant between them. (3a)”8

In the case at bar, the admission of Defendant of the existence of the Contract of
Lease between him and Plaintiff barred the former from assailing the latter’s title over
the subject property. The conclusive presumption under Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the

5 Article 1673, Civil Code of the Philippines

6 G.R. NO. 121159, December 16, 2002
7 G.R. No. 120303. July 24, 1996
8 Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court
 Page 6 of 8

Revised Rules of Court shields the lessor from being questioned by the lessee
regarding the former’s title or better right of possession. As long as the lessor-lessee
relationship between them exists, no proof can overturn this conclusive presumption.

According Feria and Noche , in an action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer,
the only issue is possession in fact, or physical possession of the real property,
independent of any claim of ownership that either party may put forth in his pleading. If
plaintiff can prove prior physical possession in himself, he may recover such possession
even from the owner, but, on the other hand, if he cannot prove such prior physical
possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry and detainer even if he should be
the owner of the property.9

In Dy Sun vs Brillantes, the Supreme Court held that the action for unlawful
detainer is based on the fact that the defendant leased the lands and refused to return
the possession thereof to the lessor upon the expiration of the contract. The question of
ownership is not necessarily involved in the case, and cannot be raised therein. The
lease being admitted, the law does not permit the lessee to deny the lessor’s
ownership.10

As stated in Paragraph 2 of Plaintiff’s Complaint and supported by documentary

evidence, Plaintiff was in prior possession and an adjudged as co-owner of the subject
property based in the judgment made by the Court of Appeals in G.R. C.V. No. 1234
promulgated on April 25, 2016. Clearly, Plaintiff can recover the possession of the
subject property.

According to de Leon, the contract of lease is an agreement whereby one person

(lessor) binds himself to grant temporarily the enjoyment or use of a thing or to render
some work or service to another (lessee) who undertakes to pay rent, compensation or
price there for. The lessor need not be the owner of the thing leased as long as he can
transmit its enjoyment or use to the lessee since ownership is not being transferred. 11

Granting arguendo, without however admitting, that Plaintiff no longer owns the
subject property, he can still recover possession of the property since the lessor need
not be the owner of the thing leased. It is only necessary that he has the right to
transmit the use or enjoyment of the property leased.

9 Feria and Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated, 2013 Ed

10 93 Phil. 175 (1953)
11 De Leon, Comments and Cases on Sales and Lease, 2014 Ed
 Page 7 of 8

III. DEFENDANT IS UNLAWFULLY WITHHOLDING POSSESSION OF THE

SUBJECT PROPERTY

Articles 1665 and 1669 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that:
“ARTICLE 1665. The lessee shall return the thing leased, upon the termination of the lease, as he
received it, save what has been lost or impaired by the lapse of time, or by ordinary wear and tear, or
from an inevitable cause. (1561a)
ARTICLE 1669. If the lease was made for a determinate time, it ceases upon the day fixed, without the
need of a demand. (1565)”12

In Umpoc vs Mercado, the Supreme Court stated that what determines the nature
of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought. In an unlawful detainer case, the
defendants possession was originally lawful but ceased to be so by the expiration of his
right to possess. Hence, the phrase unlawful withholding has been held to imply
possession on the part of defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other
source than a contract, express or implied, and which later expired as a right and is
being withheld by defendant.13

After the expiry of the term of the lease, the possession of the lessee becomes
unlawful and the lessor may bring suit for his ejectment even without prior notice. In the
case at bar, the continued possession over the subject property by Defendant despite
the expiration of the Contract of Lease on March 29, 2017 is unlawful. More so that
Defendant continuously refused to vacate the property even after Plaintiffs had already
sent him several notices to that effect.

IV. THE BARANGAY CONCILIATION WAS FAITHFULLY COMPLIED WITH

Section 12, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
“SECTION 12. Referral for conciliation.— Cases requiring referral for conciliation, where there is no
showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived
only after that requirement shall have been complied with. (18a, RSP)”14

Section 412 (a) of Republic Act No. 7160 provides that:

“SECTION 412. Conciliation.—

(a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court.— No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any
matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government
office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or
the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or
pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been
repudiated by the parties thereto.”15

12 Articles 1665 and 1669, Civil Code of the Philippines

13 G.R. No. 158166, January 21, 2005
14 Section 12, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
15 Section 412 (a), Republic Act No. 7160
 Page 8 of 8

In the case at bar, Plaintiff complied with the requirement of Barangay Conciliation.
Before the filing of the Complaint to the Court, the dispute has been referred to the
Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Tubod but the parties failed to arrive at an
amicable settlement. A Certificate to File Action was issued by the Lupon
Tagapamayapa.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, on the basis of all the foregoing, it is respectfully prayed that this
position paper be given due consideration in the resolution of this case and that
judgment be rendered in favor of the Plaintiff and against the defendant and all persons
claiming rights under him directing the latter to (a.) vacate the subject property and to
restore to Plaintiff the possession thereof; (b.) pay the unpaid rentals, attorney’s fees,
exemplary damages, reasonable rent, legal interest and liquidated damages; and (c.)
costs of suit.

Other reliefs that are just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.

Iligan City, March 12, 2019.

ATTY. ANNA BATUMBAKAL

Counsel for the Plaintiff
Gen. Aguinaldo St.,
Pala-o, Iligan City
Roll No. 1234
PTR No. PGI 123456/03-03-2015
IBP Receipt No. 1234567/1-09-2015
MCLE Compliance No. IV-123456
Valid from 1-29-2016 until 04-14-2019