Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481 (1970) PDF

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 035 Page 1 of 23
VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 481

Edu vs. Ericta
No. L-32096. October 24, 1970.
ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation

Commissioner, petitioner, vs. HON.VICENTE G. ERICTA,
in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First
482
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Edu vs. Ericta
Instance of Rizal, Br. XVIII, Quezon City, and TEDDY C.

GALO,respondents.
Constitutional Law; Police Power; State has inherent power

enabling it to prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and
welfare of society.—The police power is thus a dynamic agency,
suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the
conception that men in organizing the State and imposing upon
its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did
not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of
citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order
and welfare.
Same; Same; Valid Delegation of Legislative Power; Standard
must be set to avoid the taint of unlawful delegation.—What
cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to
make laws and to alter and repeal them. The test is the
completeness of the statute in all its terms and provisions when it
leaves the hands cf the legislature. To avoid the taint of unlawful
delegation, there must be a standard which implies at the very
least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle
and lays down fundamental policy.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari and prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant
Solicitor General Hector C. Fule and Solicitor Vicente A.
Torres for petitioner.
Teddy C. Galo in his own behalf.
Judge Vicente Ericta in his own behalf.
FERNANDO, J.:
Petitioner Romeo F. Edu, the Land Transportation

Commissioner, would have us rule 1
squarely on the
constitutionality of the Reflector Law in this proceeding for
certiorari and prohibition against respondent Judge, the
Honorable Vicente G. Ericta of the Court of First Instance
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000159c610b74811751e9f003600fb002c0... 1/22/2017
_______________
1 Republic Act No. 5715 (1969).
483
VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 483

Edu vs. Ericta
of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, to annul and set aside his

order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
directed against Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner
for the enforcement of the aforesaid statute, in a pending
suit in his court for certiorari and prohibition, filed by the
other respondent Teddy C. Galo assailing the validity of
such enactment as well as such administrative order.
Respondent Judge, in his answer, would join such a plea
asking that the constitutional and legal questions raised be
decided “once and for all.” Respondent Teddy C. Galo who
was quite categorical in his assertion that both the
challenged legislation and the administrative order
transgress the constitutional requirements of due process
and nondelegation, is not averse either to such a definitive
ruling. Considering the great public interest involved and
the reliance by respondent Galo on the allegation that the
repugnancy to the fundamental law could be discerned on
the face of the statute as enacted and the executive order
as promulgated, this Court sees no obstacle to the
determination in this proceeding of the constitutional
questions raised. For reasons to be hereafter stated, we
sustain the validity of the Reflector Law and
Administrative Order No. 2 issued in the implementation
thereof, the imputation of constitutional infirmity being at
best flimsy and insubstantial.
As noted in the answer of respondent Judge, respondent
Galo on his behalf and that of other motorists filed on May
20, 1970 a suit for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the
challenged Act as an invalid exercise of the police power,
for being violative of the due process clause. This he
followed on May 28, 1970 with a manifestation wherein he
sought as an alternative remedy that, in the event that
respondent Judge would hold said statute constitutional,
Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land Transportation
Commissioner, now petitioner, implementing such
legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of legislative
power. There was a hearing on the plea for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction held on May 27, 1970
484

Edu vs. Ericta
where both parties were duly represented, but no evidence

was presented. The next day, on May 28, 1970, respondent
Judge ordered the issuance of a preliminary injunction
directed against the enforcement of such administrative
order. There was, the day after, a motion for its
reconsideration filed by the Solicitor General representing
petitioner. In the meanwhile, the clerk of court of
respondent Judge issued on June 1, 1970 the writ of
preliminary injunction upon the filing of the required bond.
The answer before the lower court was filed by petitioner

Edu on June 4, 1970. Thereafter, on June 9, 1970,
respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration of
the order of injunction. Hence this petition for certiorari
and prohibition filed with this Court on June 18, 1970.
In a resolution of June 22, 1970, this Court required
respondents to file an answer to the petition for certiorari
and prohibition. Respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente
G. Ericta, did file his answer on June 30, 1970 explaining
why he restrained the enforcement of Administrative Order
No. 2 and, as noted at the outset, joining the Solicitor
General in seeking that the legal questions raised, namely
the constitutionality of the Reflector Law and secondly the
validity of Administrative Order No. 2 alleged to be in
excess of the authority conferred on petitioner and
therefore violative of the principle of non-delegation of
legislative power, be definitely decided. It was not until
July 6, 1970 that respondent Galo filed his answer seeking
the dismissal of this petition concentrating on what he
considered to be the patent invalidity of Administrative
Order No. 2 as it went beyond the authority granted by the
Reflector Law, even assuming that it is constitutional. In
the meanwhile, on July 2, 1970, the petition was called for
hearing with Solicitor Vicente Torres appearing for
petitioner and respondent Galo for himself. It was made
clear during the course of such argumentation that the
matter of the constitutionality of the Reflector Law was
likewise under consideration by this Court. The case is
thus ripe for decision.
We repeat that we find for petitioner and sustain the
485
VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 485

Edu vs. Ericta
constitutionality of the Reflector Law as well as the validity

of Administrative Order No. 2.
1. The threshold question is whether on the basis of the
petition, the answers, and the oral argument, it would be
proper for this Court to resolve the issue of the
constitutionality of the Reflector Law. Our answer, as
indicated, is in the affirmative. It is to be noted that the
main thrust of the petition before us is to demonstrate in a
rather convincing fashion that the challenged legislation
does not suffer from the alleged constitutional infirmity
imputed to it by the respondent Galo. Since the special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition filed by him before
respondent Judge would seek a declaration of nullity of
such enactment by the attribution of the violation on the
face thereof of the due process guarantee in the deprivation
of property rights, it would follow that there is sufficient
basis for us to determine which view should prevail.
Moreover, any further hearing by respondent Judge would
likewise be limited to a discussion of the constitutional
issue’s raised, no allegations of facts having been made.
This is one case then where the question of validity is ripe
for determination. If we do so, further effort need not be
wasted and time is saved. Moreover, the officials concerned
as well as the public, both vitally concerned with a final
resolution of this question of validity, could know the
definitive answer and could act accordingly. There is a
great public interest, as was mentioned, to be served by the
final disposition of such crucial issue, petitioner praying

that respondent Galo be declared as having no cause of
action with respondent Judge being accordingly directed to
dismiss his suit.
There is another reinforcement to this avenue of
approach. 2We have done so before in a suit, Climaco v.
Macadaeg, involving the legality of a presidential directive.
That was a petition for the review and reversal of a writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the then Judge Macadaeg.
We there announced that we “have de-
_______________
2 L-19440, April 18, 1962, 4 SCRA 930.
486

Edu vs. Ericta
cided to pass upon the question of the validity of the

presidential directive ourselves, believing that by doing so
we would be putting an end to a dispute, a delay in the
disposition of which has caused considerable damage and
injury to the Government and to the tobacco planters
themselves.”
There is no principle of constitutional adjudication that
bars this Court from similarly passing upon the question of
the validity of a legislative enactment in a proceeding
before it to test the propriety of the issuance of a
preliminary injunction. The same felt need for resolving
once and for all the vexing question as to the
constitutionality of a challenged enactment and thus serve
public interest exists. What we have done in the case of an
order proceeding from one of the coordinate branches, the
executive, we can very well do in the matter before us
involving the alleged nullity of a legislative act.
Accordingly, there is nothing to preclude the grant of the
writs prayed for, the burden of showing the
unconstitutionality of the act having proved to be as will
now be shown, too much for respondent Galo.
2. The Reflector Law reads in full: "(g) Lights and
reflector when parked or disabled.—Appropriate parking
lights or flares visible one hundred meters away shall be
displayed at a corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle
is parked on highways or in places that are not well-lighted
or is placed in such manner as to endanger passing traffic.
Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall be provided at all
times with built-in reflectors or other similar warning
devices either pasted, painted or attached at its front and
back which shall likewise be visible at night at least one
hundred meters away. No vehicle not provided with any of
the requirements
3
mentioned in this subsection shall be
registered." It is thus obvious that the challenged statute
is a legislation enacted under the police power to promote
public safety.
_______________
3 Sec. 1 of Republic Act No. 5715 enacted on June 21, 1969 amends
subsection (g) of Sec. 34 of Republic Act No. 4136 (1964).
487
VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 487

Edu vs. Ericta
Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the4

Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams,
identified police power with state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons
and property could thus “be subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
comfort, health and prosperity of the state.” 5
Shortly after
independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso, reiterated the
doctrine, such a competence being referred to as “the power
to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare
of the people.” The concept was set forth in negative terms
by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as
“that inherent and plenary power in the State which
enables it to prohibit all things 6
hurtful to the comfort,
safety and welfare of society." In that sense it could be
hardly7 distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v.
Mutuc with the totality of legislative power.
It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful
attribute of government. It is to quote Justice Malcolm
anew “the most
8
essential, insistent, and at least illimit-able
of powers," extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed
_______________
4 70 Phil. 726 (1940).

5 80 Phil 71. Cf. Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957).
6 Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660, 708 (1919). Earlier Philippine
cases during the same era referred to police power as the power to
promote the general welfare and public interest, U.S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil.
85, 94 (1910); to enact such laws in relation to persons and property as
may promote public health, public morals, public safety, and the general
welfare of its inhabitants, U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218, 225 (1915); to
preserve public order and to prevent offenses against the state and to
establish, for the intercourse of citizen with citizen, those rules of good
manners and good neighborhood calculated to prevent conflict of rights,
U.S. v. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245, 254 (1915). The term is of American origin,
having been first referred to by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibsons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat 7, 208 (1824) and explicitly identified as Maryland, 12
Wheat, 419, 443.
7 L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424.
8 Smith Bell and Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136 (1919).
488

Edu vs. Ericta
9
out “to all the great public needs." Its scope, ever-
expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to
anticipate the future where it could be done, provides
enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: “Needs that
were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in
the present with the well-being of the10 nation. What is
critical or urgent changes with the time." The police power
is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from
precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in

organizing the state and imposing upon its government
limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend
thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of
citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such
salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace,
safety, good order, and welfare.
It would then be to overturn a host of decisions
impressive for their number11 and unanimity were this Court
to sustain respondent Galo. That we are not disposed to
_______________
9 Noble State Bank v. Haske, 219 US 112 (1911).

10 Helvering v. Davis, 301 US 619 (1937).
11 Cf. United States v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 (1910); United States v.
Villareal, 28 Phil. 390 (1914); United States v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218
(1915); Churchill and Tait v. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580 (1915); Rubi v.
Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660 (1919); Smith BeIIand Co. v. Natividad, 40
Phil. 136 (1919) ; Lorenzo v. Director of Health, 50 Phil. 595 (1927); People
v. Abad Lopez, 62 Phil. 835 (1936); People v. Lagman, 66 Phil. 13 (1938);
People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 (1939) ; People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328
(1939); Pampanga Bus Co. v. Pambusco Employees Union, 68 Phil. 541
(1939); Manila Trading and Supply Co. v. Zulueta, 69 Phil. 485 (1940);
Pangasinan Trans. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 70 Phil. 221 (1940);
Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 70 Phil.
340 (1940); International Hardwood and Veneer Co. v. Pangil Federation
of Labor, 70 Phil. 602 (1940); Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726 (1940);
Tapang v. Court of Industrial Relations, 72 Phil. 79 (1941); Laurel v. Misa,
76 Phil. 372 (1946); People vs. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535 (1947); Primicias v.
Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71 (1948); Co Chiong v. Cuaderno, 83 Phil. 242 (1949);
People v. Isnain, 85 Phil. 648 (1950); Ongsiako
489
VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 489

Edu vs. Ericta
do, especially so as the attack on the challenged statute

ostensibly for disregarding the due process safeguard is
singularly unpersuasive. It would be to close one’s eyes to
the hazards of traffic in the evening to condemn a statute of
this character. Such an attitude betrays lack of concern for
public safety. How can it be plausibly alleged then that
there was no observance of due process equated as it has
always been with what is reasonable? The statute assailed
is not infected with arbitrariness. It is not the product of
whim or caprice. It is far from oppressive. It is a legitimate
response to a felt public need. It can stand the test of the
most unsympathetic appraisal.
Respondent Galo is of a different mind, having been
tumble to resist the teaching of many American State
Court decisions referred to in the secondary source,
American Jurisprudence, principally relied upon by him.
He ought to have been cautioned against an indiscriminate
acceptance of such doctrines predicated on what was once a
fundamental postulate in American public law, laissezfaire.
It is to be admitted that there was a period when such a
concept did influence American court decisions on
constitutional law. As was explicitly stated by Justice Car-
_______________
v. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 (1950); Tolentino v. Board of Accountancy, 90

Phil. 83 (1951); People v. De la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906 (1953); People v. Chu
Chi, 92 Phil. 977 (1953); Rutter v. Esteban, 93 Phil. 68 (1953); Ichong v.
Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957); King v. Hernaez, L-14859, March 31,
1962, 4 SCRA 792; De Ramas v. Court of Agrarian Relations, L-19555,
May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 171; Vda. de Macasaet v. Court of Agrarian
Relations, L-19750, July 17, 1964, 11 SCRA 521; Uichanco v. Gutierrez,
L-20275–79, May 31, 1965, 14 SCRA 231; Gamboa v. Pallarca, L-20407,
March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 490; Ilusorio v. Court of Agrarian Relations,
L-20344, May 16, 1966, 17 SCRA 25; Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel
Control and Inspection Board, L-19978, Sept. 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 336; Phil.
American Life Ins. Co, v. Auditor General, L-19255, Jan. 18, 1968, 22
SCRA 135; Morfe v. Mutuc, L-20387, Jan. 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424;
Alalayan v. National Power Corp., L-24396, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 172.
490

Edu vs. Ericta
dozo, speaking of that era: “Laissez-faire was not only a

counsel of caution which would do well to heed. It was a
categorical imperative
12
which statesmen as well as judges,
must obey." For a long time, legislation tending to reduce
economic inequality foundered on the rock that was the due
process clause, enshrining as it did the liberty of contract,
based on such a basic assumption.
The New Deal administration of President Roosevelt
more responsive to the social and economic forces at work
changed matters greatly. By 1937, there was a greater
receptivity by the American Supreme Court to an approach
not too reverential of property rights. Even earlier, in 1935,
Professor Coker of Yale, speaking as a historian, could
already discern a contrary drift. He did note the expending
13
range of governmental activity in the United States. What

is undeniable is that by 1913, laissez-faire was no longer
the dominant theory. In the language of Justice Jackson in
the leading 14case of West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette: ''We must transplant these rights to a soil in
which the laissez-faire concept or non-interference has
withered at least as to economic affairs, and social
advancements are increasingly sought through closer
integration of society and through expanded and
strengthened governmental controls.”
While authoritative precedents from the United States
federal and state jurisdictions were deferred to when the
Philippines was still under American rule, it cannot be said
that the laissez-faire principle was invariably adhered to by
us even then. As early as 1919, in15
the leading case of Rubi
v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, Justice Malcolm already
had occasion to affirm: “The doctrines of laissez-faire and of
unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of
economic and political theory, are of the past. The modern
period has shown a widespread belief in the
_______________
12 Cardozo, The Nature of Judicial Process, p. 77 (1921).

13 Selected Essays on Constitutional Law, p. 27 (1938).
14 319 US 624.
15 39 Phil. 660, 717–718.
491
VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 491

Edu vs. Ericta
amplest possible demonstration of government activity.

The Courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trail
after the other two branches of the Government
16
in this
progressive march.” People v. Pomar, a 1924 decision,
which held invalid under the due process clause a provision
providing for maternity leave with pay thirty days before
and thirty days after confinement could be cited to show
that such a principle did have its day. It is to be
remembered though that our Supreme Court had no other
choice as the Philippines was then under the United
States, and only recently the year before, the American
17
Supreme Court in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, in line

with the laissez-faire theory, did hold that a statute
providing for minimum wages was constitutionally infirm.
What is more, to erase any doubts, the Constitutional
Convention saw to it that the concept of laissez-faire was
rejected. It entrusted to our government the responsibility
of coping with social and economic problems with the
commensurate power of control over economic affairs.
Thereby it could live up to its commitment to promote the
general welfare through state action. No constitutional
objection to regulatory measures adversely affecting
property rights, especially so when public safety is the aim,
is likely to be heeded, unless of course on the clearest and
most satisfactory proof of invasion of rights guaranteed by
the Constitution. On such a showing, there may be a
declaration of nullity, but not because, the laissez-faire
principle was disregarded but because the due process,
equal protection, or non-impairment guarantees would call
for vindication.
To repeat, our Constitution which took effect in 1935
erased whatever doubts there might be on that score. Its
philosophy is a repudiation of laissez-faire. One of the
leading members of the Constitutional Convention, Manuel
A. Roxas, later the first President of the Republic,
_______________
16 46 Phil. 440.
17 261 US 525 (1923). The Adkins case was itself over-ruled in 1937 in
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 US 379 (1937).
492

Edu vs. Ericta
made it clear when he disposed of the objection of Delegate

Jose Reyes of Sorsogon, who noted the “vast extensions in
the sphere of governmental functions” and the “almost
unlimited power to interfere in the affairs of industry and
agriculture as well as to compete with existing business” as
“reflections of the fascination exerted
18
by [the then] current
tendencies” in other jurisdictions. He spoke thus: “My
answer is that this constitution has a definite and well
defined philosophy, not only political but social and
economic. If in this Constitution the gentleman will find
declarations of economic policy they are there because they
are necessary to safeguard the interests and welfare of the
Filipino people because we believe that the days have come

when in self-defense, a nation may provide in its
constitution those safeguards, the patrimony, the freedom
to grow, the freedom to develop national aspirations and
national interests, not to be hampered by the artificial
boundaries19
which a constitutional provision automatically
imposes.
It was not expected then when in a concurring opinion,
Justice Laurel who likewise sat in the Constitutional
Convention and was one of its leading lights, explicitly
affirmed in a concurring opinion, later quoted with
approval in the leading case of Antamok 20
Goldfields Mining
Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, that the Constitution
did away with the laissez-faire doctrine. In the course of
such concurring opinion and after noting the changes that
have taken place calling for a more affirmative role by the
government and its undeniable power to curtail property
rights, he categorically declared the doctrine in People v.
Pomar no21 longer retains “its virtuality as a living
principle."
It is in the light of such rejection of the laissez-faire
_______________
18 III Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Laurel

ed., pp. 173–174 (1966).
19 Ibid., pp. 177–178.
20 70 Phil. 340 (1940).
21 Ibid., p. 360. Cf. Leyte Land Trans. Co. v. Leyte Farmers and
Laborers’ Union, 80 Phil. 842 (1948).
493
VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 493

Edu vs. Ericta
principle that during the Commonwealth era, no

constitutional infirmity was found to have attached to22
legislation covering such
23
subjects as collective 24
bargaining,
security of25 tenure, minimum wages, 26
compulsory
arbitration, the regulation
27
of tenancy as well as 28
the
issuance of securities, and control of public services. So it
is likewise under the Republic this Court having given the29
seal of approval to more favorable 30
tenancy laws,
nationalization
31
of the retail trade, limitation
32
of the hours
of labor, imposition of price 33
control, requirement of
34
separation pay for one month, and social security scheme.

Respondent Galo thus could have profited by a little
more diligence in the scrutiny of Philippine decisions
rendered with not unexpected regularity, during all the
while our Constitution has been in force, attesting to the
demise of such a shibboleth as laissez-faire. It was one of
those fighting faiths that time and circumstances had
upset, to
_______________
22 Pampanga Bus Co. v. Pambusco’s Employees’ Union, 68 Phil. 541

(1939).
23 Manila Trading and Supply Co. v. Zulueta, 69 Phil. 485 (1940).
24 International Hardwood and Veneer Company v. The Pangil
Federation of Labor, 70 Phil. 602 (1940).
25 Antamok Goldfields Mining Company v. Court of Industrial

Relations, 70 Phil. 340 (1940).
26 Tapang v. Court of Industrial Relations, 72 Phil. 79 (1941).
27 People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328 (1939).
28 Pangasinan Trans. Co., Inc. v. Public Service Com., 70 Phil. 221
(1940).
29 Camacho v. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil. 848 (1948);
Ongsiaco v. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 (1950); De Ramas v. Court of Agrarian
Relations, L-19555, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 171; Del Rosario v. De los
Santos, L-20589, March 21, 1968, 22 SCRA 1196.
30 Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957).
31 Phil. Air Lines Employees’ Asso. v. Phil. Air Lines, Inc., L-18559,
June 30, 1964, 11 SCRA 387.
32 People v. Chu Chi, 92 Phil. 977 (1953).
33 Abe v. Foster Wheeler Corp., L-14785, Nov. 29, 1960.
34 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Social Security Com.,
L-15045, Jan. 20, 1961, 1 SCRA 10, Cf. Director of Forestry v. Muñoz,
L-24746, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183.
494

Edu vs. Ericta
paraphrase Holmes. Yet respondent Galo would seek to

vivify and resurrect it. That, it would appear, is a vain
quest, a futile undertaking. The Reflector Law is thus
immune from the attack so recklessly hurled against it. It
can survive, and quite easily too, the constitutional test.
3. The same lack of success marks the effort of
respondent Galo to impugn the validity of Administrative
Order No. 2 issued by petitioner in his official capacity,
duly approved by the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, for being contrary to the principle of non-
delegation of legislative power. Such administrative order,
which took effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on
reflectors in effect reproducing what was set forth in the
Act. Thus: “No motor vehicles of whatever style, kind,
make, class or denomination shall be registered if not
equipped with reflectors. Such reflectors shall either be
factory built-in-reflector, commercial glass reflectors,
reflectionized tape or luminous paint. The luminosity shall
have an intensity to be maintained visible and clean at all
times such that if struck by a 35beam of light shall be visible
100 meters away at night." Then came a section on
dimensions, placement and color. As to dimensions, the
following is provided for: “Glass reflectors—Not less than 3
inches in diameter or not less than 3 inches square;
Reflectorized Tape—At least 3 inches wide and 12 inches
long. The painted or taped area 36
may be bigger at the
discretion of the vehicle owner." Provision is then made as
to how such
37
reflectors are to be “placed, installed, pasted or
painted." There is the further re-
_______________
35 Sec. 2, Administrative Order No. 2.

36 Sec. 3, par. (a), Ibid.
37 Sec. 3, par. (b) of the order specifies the matter thus "(1) For two
wheeled motorcycles—One in front and another at the rear which shall be
installed, pasted or painted on the lowest tip of both fenders. (2) For three-
wheeled motorcycles One in front to be installed, pasted or painted on the
lowest tip of the fender and, two at the rear to be installed, pasted or
painted at the outer-most side of the rear end of the body of the vehicle. (3)
For Trailers with platform body irrespective of size, two at the rear to be
installed, pasted or painted on
495
VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 495

Edu vs. Ericta
quirement that in addition to such reflectors there shall be

installed, pasted or painted four reflectors on each side of
the motor vehicle parallel to those installed, pasted or
painted 38 in front and those in the rear end of the body
thereof. The color required of each reflectors, whether
built-in, commercial glass, reflectorized tape or
reflectorized paint placed in the front part of any motor
vehicle shall be amber or yellow and 39
those placed on the
sides and in the rear shall all be red.
_______________
the outer-most side of the rear end of the body. (4) For Trailers with
Stake or Van Body irrespective of size—Two in front to be installed,
pasted or painted 5 inches below the two upper corners of the body; and
four at the rear end of the trailer, two of which shall be installed, pasted
or painted 5 inches below the upper two corners of the rear end of the body
and the other two to be installed, pasted or painted 5 inches above the two
lower corners of the rear end of the body. (5) For Four-wheeled motor
vehicles 2 1/2 meter high or lower irrespective of weight—Two in front to
be installed at the outer-most side of the vehicle preferably at the outer-
tip of the front bumper or at the lower tip of the front fender; and two at
the rear to be installed, pasted or painted on the outer-most side of the
rear end of the body of the vehicle preferably at the outer tip of the rear
fender or bumper. (6) For four-wheeled motor vehicles 4 meters high but
not lower than 2 1/2 meters irrespective of weight:—Four in front, two of
which to be installed, pasted or painted at the outer-most front end of the
vehicle preferably on the outer tip of the front bumper or fender and
another two to be installed, pasted or painted, 5 inches below the upper
two corners of the front end of the body of the motor vehicles; and four in
the rear, two of which to be installed, pasted or painted 5 inches below the
upper two corner of the rear end of the body and the other two to be
installed, pasted or painted 5 inches above the outer-most rear end of the
body of the motor vehicle.”
38 Sec. 3, par. (a), clause 7, Ibid. The next clause reads as follows:
“Furthermore, whenever the load of any vehicle is indivisible such that a
portion thereof extends beyond the projected width or length of the
vehicle, the owner or driver of such vehicle is hereby required to place
reflectors described in Section 3(a) hereof nailed securely on the outer-
most tip of such load extending beyond both sides of the vehicle and/or two
such reflectors likewise nailed securely on the outer-most rear end of such
load.”
39 Sec. 3, par. (c), Ibid.
496

Edu vs. Ericta
Penalties resulting from a violation thereof could be

imposed. Thus: “Non-compliance with the requirements
contained in this Order shall be sufficient cause to refuse
registration of the motor vehicle affected and if already
registered, its registration may be suspended in pursuance

of the provisions of Section 16 of RA 4136; [Provided],
However, that in the case of the violation of Section 1(a)
and (b) and paragraph (8) of Section 8 hereof, a fine of 40not
less than ten nor more than fifty pesos shall be imposed. It
is not to be lost sight of that under Republic Act No. 4136,
of which the Reflector Law is an amendment, petitioner, as
the Land Transportation Commissioner, may, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, issue rules and regulations for its
implementation
41
as long as they do not conflict with its
provisions. It is likewise an express provision of the above
statute that for a violation of any of its provisions or
regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, a fine42
of not less
than P10 nor more than P50 could be imposed.
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine
of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its
legislaiive power to the two other branches of the
government, subject to the exception that local
governments may over local affairs participate in its
exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under
the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal
them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its
term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the
legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue
delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be
directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure
enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions
when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it,
and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex
economy, that may indeed be the only way in which (the
legislative process can go for-
_______________
40 Sec. 4, Ibid.
41 Sec. 4, par. 1, Republic Act No. 4136 (1964).
42 Sec. 56, par. 1, Ibid.
497
VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 497

Edu vs. Ericta
ward. A distinction has rightfully been made between

delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which
constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of
authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid
objection can be made. The Constitution is thus not to be
regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources
of flexibility and practicability.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be
a standard, which implies at the very least that the
legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays
down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of
complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It
indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which
legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the
executive or administrative office designated may in

pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate
supplemental rules and regulations.
The standard may be either express or implied. If the
former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The
standard though does not have to be spelled out
specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose
of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law,
clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is
sought to be attained as 43
in Calalang v. Williams is “safe
transit upon the roads."
This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by
Justice Laurel in a decision announced not-too-long after
_______________
43 70 Phil. 726 (1940). This Court has considered as sufficient

standards, “public welfare,” Mun. of Cardona v. Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547
(1917); “necessary in the interest of law and order,” Rubi v. Prov. Board,
39 Phil. 660 (1919); “public interest,” People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328
(1939); and “justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,” Int.
Hardwood v. Pañgil Fed. of Labor, 70 Phil. 602 (1940).
498

Edu vs. Ericta
the Constitution came into force and effect that the

principle of non-delegation “has been made to adapt itself
to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to
the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
‘subordinate legislation’ not only in the United States44 and
England but in practically all modern governments." He
continued: “Accordingly, with the growing complexity of
modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, there is a constantly growing
tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the
legislature
45
and toward the approval of the practice by the
courts." Consistency with the conceptual approach
requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority
non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute
when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed.
Our later decisions speak to the same effect. 46
Thus from
Justice J.B.L. Reyes in People vs. Exconde: “It is well
established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of
laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds
exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may
constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate
its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it
impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide
for the multifarious and complex situations that may be
met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is
that the regulation should be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction with it;47but conform to the standards that the
law prescribes x x x."
An even more explicit formulation of the controlling
principle comes from the pen of the then Justice, now Chief
Justice, Concepcion: “Lastly, the legality of Cir-
_______________
44 Pangasinan Transportation v. Public Service Commission, 70 Phil.

221, 229 (1940).
45 Ibid.
46 101 Phil. 1125 (1957).
47 Ibid., p. 1129.
499
VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 499

Edu vs. Ericta
cular No. 21 is assailed upon the ground that the grant of

authority to issue the same constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power. It is true that, under our
system of government, said power may not be delegated
except to local governments. However, one thing is to
delegate the power to determine what the law shall be, and
another thing to delegate the authority to fix the details in
the execution of enforcement of a policy set out in the law
itself. Briefly stated, the rule is that the delegated powers
fall under the second category, if the law authorizing the
delegation furnishes a reasonable standard which
‘sufficiently marks the field within which the
Administrator is to act so that it may be known whether he
has kept within it in compliance with the legislative
will.’ (Yakus vs. United States, 88 L. ed. 848) * * * It should
be noted, furthermore, that these powers must be
construed and exercised in relation to the objectives of the
law creating the Central Bank, which are, among others,
‘to maintain monetary stability in the Philippines,’ and ‘to
promote a rising level of production, employment and real
income in the Philippines.’ (Section 2, Rep. Act No. 265).
These standards are sufficiently concrete and definite to
vest in the delegated authority, the character of
administrative details in the enforcement of the law and to
place the grant of said authority beyond 48
the category of a
delegation of legislative powers * * *."
It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed
together with the Land Transportation Code. Republic Act
No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as
to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the
prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is
likewise a categorical affirmation of the power of petitioner
as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules
and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality
such fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has
been no abuse. His Administrative Order No. 2 can easily
survive the attack, far-from-for-midable, launched against
it by respondent Galo.
_______________
48 People v. Jolliffe, 105 Phil. 677, 686–688 (1959).
500

Edu vs. Ericta
WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition

prayed for are granted, the orders of May 28, 1970 of
respondent Judge for the issuance of a writ of preliminary

injunction, the writ of preliminary injunction of June 1,
1970 and his order of June 9, 1970 denying reconsideration
are annulled and set aside. Respondent Judge is likewise
directed to dismiss the petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed by respondent Teddy C. Galo, there being
no cause of action as the Reflector Law and Administrative
Order No. 2 of petitioner have not been shown to be tainted
by invalidity. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal,

Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo and Makasiar, JJ.,
concur.
Villamor, J., took no part.
Concepcion, C.J., did not take part.
Orders annulled and set aside.
A N N O T A T I O N POLICE POWER, DUE

PROCESS AND THE LAISSEZ-FAIRE DOCTRINE
The decision in the case of Romeo F. Edu, in his capacity as

Land Transportation Commissioner vs. Hon. Vicente Ericta
in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII and Teddy Galo,
L-32096, Oct. 24, 1970 reiterates the settled rule in this
jurisdiction of the preference of the principle of police
power due process clause over the doctrine of Laissez faire
in matters where the promotion of general welfare is
concerned.
Police Power Defined

Police power has been defined as the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good
order or safety, and general welfare of the people
(Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71; Ignacio vs. Elas, 55 OG
2162) see also People vs. Pomas, 46 Phil. 440 (Ermita-
Malate
501
VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 501

Edu vs. Ericta
Hotel vs. Mayor of Manila, L-24693, July 31, 1967; Rubi vs.
Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 600).
Origin of Police Power

The phrase was born out of the early conflict between the
Federal government and the several states of the United
States in the exercise of their respective powers under the
United States Constitution. The term came to be associated
with the residuary sovereignty of the several states to
enact legislation on matters of domestic concern, not
pertaining to national affairs. Gradually, statutes and
regulations were promulgated for the protection of health,
morals or general welfare of their respective citizens. The
term became understood to be the right of the State to
provide regulations to promote the morals, safety, and
convenience of the inhabitants (Willoughby, Constitution of
the United States, pp. 1766–1767).
Other Definitions
Power of the government inherent in every sovereign body

or power to govern men and things (License Cases, p. 583.)
Police power in a sense in another name of the power of
government (Mutual Loan Co. vs. Martell, 222 U.S. 225).
Police power is the power vested in the legislature by the
constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances,
either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the State and subject the same (Commonwealth
vs. Alger, 61 Mass. 53).
Basis of Justification of Police Power

Police power may be justified under two fundamental
maxims; Sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas (Use your
own property in such a manner as not to injure that of
another, [9 Coke 59]) and Salus populi suprema est lex (The
welfare of the people is the supreme law [Coke 139]).
502

Edu vs. Ericta
Its source is the social compact by which an individual part

with some rights and privileges for the common good.
Every citizen of every community in civilized society must
bear certain burdens imposed for the good of all (Barbier
vs. Connally, 133 U.S. 28, Malcolm, Philippine
Constitutional Law, p. 338).
Republic Act No. 4880 was enacted as a police power
legislation. It was enacted by virtue of inherent power of
Congress to legislate on matters affecting public interest
and welfare, as well as in pursuance of the constitutional
policy of insuring free, honest and orderly elections
(Gonzales vs. Comelec, 27 SCRA 835).
The Laissez Faire Doctrine and Police Power

It is a doctrine that government should not interfere with
commerce. The principle arose during the Industrial
Revolution as an economic doctrine emphasized in the
Wealth of Nations and Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.
In one way, the American Bar Association was
responsible for the writing of the doctrine in the American
Constitution (Corwin, Constitutional Revolution, p. 85). It
was in the Slaughter House cases (16 Wall. 36, L. ed. 915)
when the doctrine became more recognized. The Supreme
Court following the urging of the influential matters of the
American Bar and the lead given by certain State Courts
adopted the view that the word “liberty,” as used in the
14th Amendment intended to protect the freedom of
contract of adults in the ordinary employment, especially
when viewed from would be employers (Allegeyer vs. La.,
165 U.S. 578 [1897]; Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 [1898]
Twiss, Lawyers and the Constitution; How Laissez Faire
Came to the Supreme Court [1942] cited in Corwin, The
Constitution and What it Means Today, pp. 168–169).
The police power is the power of the State to promote
public health, safety, moral and general welfare. It has
been simply described as the power to govern men and
503
VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 503

Edu vs. Ericta
things (Charles River Bridge Co. vs. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet.

420; Slaughter House Cases, 316 Wall. 36).
Under the present day interpretation of liberty, property
and due process of law, this power is now confronted at
every turn by the court’s power of judicial review. The
Laissez Faire doctrine was translated by the American Bar
into the phraseology of Constitutional Law and gradually
embodied in the decisions of the court. In later cases, the
“due process of law” clause was invoked.
For a review of the U.S. decisions on the subject of
laissez faire, see Pacifico Agabin, “Laissez, Faire and the
Due Process Clause; How Economic Ideology Affects
Constitutional Development,” VLIV, Philippine Law
Journal, 709 (1969).
Laissez Faire and the Police Power Before the Philippine

Constitution
It has been said that the State cannot be deprived of its
right to exercise this power. The police power and the right
to exercise this power constitutes the very foundation, or is
at least one of the corner stones of the State. For the State
to deprive itself or permit itself to be deprived of the right
to enact laws to promote the general prosperity and welfare
of its inhabitants, and to promote public health, public
safety, or the public morals would be to destroy the very
purpose and objects of the State. The people themselves
cannot do it, much less their servants. Governments are
organized with view to the preservation of these things.
They cannot deprive themselves of the power to provide for
them. (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218 [1915]).
Act No. 2868 enacted by the Philippine Legislature in
1922 authorized the Governor General, with the consent of
the Council of State, or any cause resulting in an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn to issue
rules and emergency measures was held unconstitutional
and void by the Supreme Court. According to the Court the
Constitution is something solid, permanent and
substantial. Its stability protects the life, liberty and prop-
504

Edu vs. Ericta
erty rights of the rich and the poor alike. The Court thus
emphasized the private nature of the property whose price
was sought to be regulated (U.S. vs. Ang Tan Ho, 43 Phil. 1
[1932]).
The doctrine of protecting private property was later
enunciated in People vs. Pomar, 46 Phil. 440. Act No. 3071
passed in 1916 required employers to give maternity pay to
women employees. In declaring the law unconstitutional
the Supreme Court ruled that the Statute has deprived
every person, firm or corporation owning or managing a
factory, shop or place of labor of his right to enter contracts
of employment upon such terms as he and the employee
may agree upon. The law creates a term in every such
contract, without the consent of the parties. Such persons
are, therefore, deprived of their liberty to contract (Id., at p.
454, citing Adkins vs. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525;

Adair vs. U.S., 208 U.S. 161, 28 S. Ct. 277, 52 L. Ed. 436
and Coppage vs. Kansas, 265 U.S. 1 [1915]).
The Chinese Bookkeeping Act enacted by the Philippine
Legislature (Act No. 2972 [1920]) prohibiting merchants
from keeping in any language other than English, Spanish,
or any Philippine dialect was also held unconstitutional
and invalid. Resolving the appeal from the Philippine
Supreme Court decision, the United States Supreme Court
held that the law was oppressive and arbitrary. The Court
then took judicial notice that majority of the Chinese
merchants in the Philippines did not speak or write
English, Spanish or any of the local dialect. The U.S.
Supreme Court then ruled that this law would curtail their
liberty of action, and oppressive and damaging in the
preservation of their property. To the Chinese merchants
who brought the case, “the laws deprives them of
something indispensable to the carrying of their business
and is obviously intended chiefly to affect them as
distinguished from the rest of the community (Yu Cong Eng
vs. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500 [1926]).
505
VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 505

Edu vs. Ericta
The Supremacy of the Police Power over Property Rights

U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil. 104 (1910) was the first case
held by the Philippine Supreme Court. It was held that the
State not only has the authority under its police power to
make such rules for the protection of its citizens but it may
also regulate private business in such a way that the
business of one man shall not be a nuisance (Affirmed by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Ling Su Fan vs. U.S., 218 U.S.
302 [1910]).
In the same year a statute passed by the Philippine
Legislature prohibiting the slaughtering of carabaos for
human consumption without a permit from the municipal
treasurer was held valid for reasons of public interest (U.S.
vs. Toribio, 15 Phil. 1910).
The Supreme Court also sustained the principle that
there is no deprivation of property without due process to
shipping companies which are given additional burden of
carrying mail free of charge (De Villata vs. Stanley, 32 Phil.
541 [1915]; Board of Public Utility Commissioners vs.
Ynchausti, 251 U.S. 401, 40 S. Ct. 2773).
An ordinance authorizing the suppression of animal
disease was held valid. The quarantine, isolation and even
slaughter of cattle suffering from infectious disease have
been recognized under the general welfare clause
(PunzaIan vs. Ferriols, 19 Phil. 214).
An ordinance of the City of Manila compelling owners of
buildings to make connections with the new sewer system
was held valid for reasons of public health and safety (Case
vs. Board of Health, 24 Phil. 250).
A law limiting the sale of meat outside the town public
market and the sale of the fish in the streets of the town,
was held valid as a measure of protecting public health
(People vs. Sabarre, 65 Phil. 684). In the same manner, the
ordinance limiting the sale of tickets of theaters while
exhibiting moving pictures for the first time and excluding

from operation those not falling within the classification,
506

Edu vs. Ericta
was valid. It was held that too much crowding in theaters

is undoubtedly dangerous to public health and inimical to
public convenience (People vs. Chan, 65 Phil. 611).
The law prohibiting paying the sale of clandestinely
manufactured whisky and without paying the
corresponding tax was held valid. The aim of the law is to
protect public safety and health and the promotion of the
common welfare, and in the interest of the State (People vs.
Fernandez, 43 O.G. 2181).
The legislature may also prescribe the qualifications for
the practice of professions or trades which affect the public
welfare, public health, public morals, and the public safety
and to a point of revoking such right (U.S. vs. Gomez, 31
Phil. 218). The State may require drugless healers to pass
an examination in order to protect the general welfare of
the people, to protect them against the consequences of
ignorance and incapacity as well as the deception and fraud
(People vs. Ventura, 4 SCRA 208).
An ordinance requiring that buildings for theatrical or
cinematographic performances must be built of reinforced
steel and under such specifications of the City Engineer or
the Director of Public Works, was held valid for reasons of
public safety (Batisda vs. City of Baguio, 53 Phil. 553).
Effect of Police Power and Freedom of Contract and

Commerce
Laws passed in exercise of police power may often affect
commerce incidentally, but if the resultant burden is found
by the court to be on the whole justified by the local
interest involved, such laws shall be sustained. In other
words the court’s function in handling this type of case is
that of an arbitral body rather than of a strictly judicial
body (Parker vs. Brown, 317 U.S. 341). The problem of
reconciling the commercial and local interest has
frequently arisen in the field of motor transpor-
507
VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 507

Edu vs. Ericta
tation (California vs. Thompson, 313 U.S. 115). The State

may require all engineers operating within its borders, to
be tested for color blindness (Smith vs. Alabama, 121 U.S.
465).
Abandonment of the Laissez Faire Doctrine in the

Philippines
Several provisions of the Philippine Constitution have in
effect rejected the doctrine of the laissez faire. See Art. II,
Section 5 on the promotion of social justice; Art. XIV,
Section 6 on the regulation of the relations between
landowner and tenant, labor and capital in industry and
agriculture; Art. VIII, Section 26 on the emergency powers
of the President in times of war and national emergency;

and Art. VII, Section 2 on the power of the State to operate
industrial and means of transportation and communication
in the interest of national welfare and defense.
In applying the aforesaid provisions, the Supreme
Court-of the Philippines reversed a Court of Appeals
decision denying compensation to a laborer who was
drowned in trying to save a piece of lumber belonging to
the company (Cuevo vs. Barredo, G.R. 1278, July 19, 1937,
5 Lawyers Journal, 791 [1937]).
President Manuel L. Quezon who criticized the lower
Court’s decision declared in a speech that the philosophy of
laissez faire in the Philippines has been dead. It has been
substituted by the philosophy of government intervention
whenever the needs of the country require it (III Messages
of Manuel L. Quezon, 67 [1937]).
In Ang Tibay vs. CIR, G.R. No. 46496, 7 Lawyers
Journal 487) Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel declared that the
provisions of the Constitution “all evince and express the
need of shifting emphasis to community interest with a
view to affirmative enhancement of human values.” In
reiterating the objectives of the enactment of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, Justice Laurel added that “the
policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the
assump-
508

Edu vs. Ericta
tion by the government of the right of intervention even in

contractual relations affected with public interest.” In
1940, the Supreme Court reiterated Justice Laurel’s
opinion in the Ang Tibay case and sustained the validity
and legality of the creation of the Court of Industrial
Relations (Antamok Goldfields vs. CIR, 70 Phil. 340
[1940]). In the same year, the Court ruled that the right of
the employer to select and discharge his employees is
subject to the regulation of the State in the exercise of its
police power (Manila Electric Company vs. National Labor
Union, 70 Phil. 617 [1940]).
Laissez Faire as Bar to Regulatory Measures may not be

Invoked
The contention that the laissez faire concept is a bar to the
enactment of regulatory measures which undoubtedly
would result in the diminution of income and loss of
business does not occasion any misgiving as to the
conformity of the decision arrived at by the court with
controlling constitutional law principles. The policy of
laissez faire to a certain extent has given way to the
assumption by the government by the right of intervention
even in contractual relations affected with public interest.
The State may in order to promote general welfare may
interfere with personal liberty, with property and with
business and occupations. Persons and property may be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
State (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators vs. City
Mayor of Manila, 21 SCRA 449; Co Kiam vs. City of
Manila, 96 Phil. 649; Ermita-Malate Hotel vs. City of
Manila, 20 SCRA 849).
Police Power to Regulate Business with Public Interest and

Useful Occupations
For cases affected with public interest, see Dee C. Chuan
and Sons vs. CIR, L-2216, Jan. 31, 1950; Pangasinan
Transportation Co. vs. Public Service Commission, 70 Phil.
509
VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 509

Edu vs. Ericta
221 (1940); Government vs. Hongkong and Shanghai

Banking Corp., 66 Phil. 483 (1938); Luzon Stevedoring Co.
vs. Public Service Commission, L-5458, Sept. 16, 1953;
Manila Trading Supply vs. Manila Trading Labor
Association, L-5783, May 29, 1953; U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus,
31 Phil. 103 (1920); People vs. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328
(1939); Tolentino vs. Board of Accountancy, L-3062, Sept.
28, 1951; Physical Therapy Organization vs. Municipal
Board, 101 Phil. 1142 (1957); Co Kiam vs. City of
Manila,96 Phil. 649 (1955).
See Case vs. Board of Health, 24 Phil. 250 (1940); Fabie
vs. City of Manila, 21 Phil. 486 (1912); U.S. vs. Wayne
Shoup, 35 Phil. 56 (1916); U.S. vs. Lim Sing, 23 Phil. 424
(1912); Punzalan vs. Ferriols, 19 Phil. 214 (1911). See
however, Viray vs. City of Caloocan, L-23118, July 26,
1967, 20 SCRA 791.
The Promotion of the Esthetic Sense

Following the principle in a 1911 case in the United States
(Noble State Bank vs. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 [1911]) to the
effect that police power may be put forth in aid of what is
sanctioned by usage, or held by prevailing morality or
strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and
immediately necessary to the public welfare, the Philippine
Supreme Court sustained the legality a statute authorizing
the summary removal of any billboard offensive to sight
(Churchill vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580 [1915]).
Police Power for Public Safety and Order

Commonwealth Act No. 548 enacted by legislature
authorizing the regulation and control of the use of traffic
on national roads and streets was sustained by the
Supreme Court as valid (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil.
726 [1940]). The law was inspired by a desire to relieve
congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to
public safety.
Ordinance No. 4986 of the City of Manila and
Commissioner Medina’s Administrative Orders of 1946
allowing inter-urban buses to enter Manila which is a
privilege not given to provincial buses are valid exercise of
police power (Luque vs. Villegas, 30 SCRA 408).
510

Edu vs. Ericta
See also Lagman vs. Medina, 26 SCRA 442 and Lagman vs.
City of Manila, 17 SCRA 579).
Police power is broad enough to be exercised on the basis

of the economic need for the public welfare (Vda. de
Genuino vs. Court of Agrarian Relations, 22 SCRA 792). In
same case, the Agricultural Land Reform Code was held to
be justified by the right of the State to exercise its police
powers. Individual rights to contract and to property have
to give way to police power for the public welfare.
Police power may also be invoked by the State to
promote morality in public service. The Supreme Court
thus upheld the validity of the Anti-Graft Law (Rep. Act
No. 3019 [Morfe vs. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424]).
The privilege of operating a market stall under license is
always subject to police power for reasons of public policy
and public administration. Such privilege is not absolute
but revocable under an implied lease contract subject to the
general welfare clause (Aprueba vs. Ganzon, 18 SCRA 8).
—JUDGE JORGE R. COQUIA
Notes.—Delegation of legislative power.—As a general

rule, the functions of legislation may not be delegated by
the legislative to the executive department or to any
executive or administrative officer, board or commission
(Chinese Flour Importers’ Association vs. Price
Stabilization Board, L-4465, July 12, 1951). The exception
is when the Constitution itself authorizes delegation (Marc
Donnelly & Associates, Inc. vs. Agregado, L-4510, May 31,
1954, 50 O.G. 4269; Chinese Flour Importers’ Association
vs. Price Stabilization Board, supra).
But while the legislative cannot delegate power to make
the law, in the sense of exercising discretion as to what it
shall be, it can confer authority or discretion as to its
execution (People vs. Arnault, L-4288, Nov. 20, 1952, 48
O.G. 4805; Araneta vs. Gatmaitan, L-8895, April 30, 1957).
Congress may thus constitutionally delegate authority to
511
VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 511

Edu vs. Ericta
promulgate rules and regulations to implement legislation

and to effectuate its policies, and it may impose a penalty
for violation of such rules and regulations, punishable as
provided in the statute (People vs. Exconde, L-9820, Aug.
30, 1957).
Unlimited and undefined delegation of power to allow or
prevent an activity per se lawful is, however, invalid
(People vs. Fajardo, L-12172, Aug. 29, 1958). A statute
which vests arbitrary discretion in administrative officers
with respect to an ordinary lawful business, profession or
“appliance, or fails (to prescribe a uniform rule of action or
guide or standard for exercise of discretion, is void and
unconstitutional (Chinese Flour Importers’ Association vs.
Price Stabilization Board, supra).
There is no undue delegation of powers of legislative
powers as long as the legislature lays down a policy and a
standard is established by the statute in question to be
followed in its administration (Cervantes vs. Auditor
General, L-4043, May 26, 1952). This has been held to be
the case with respect to the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code providing that gains and profits shall be
taxable as income to the owner or to the person having
custody thereof, as the law is clear and the only discretion
reposed in the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is to

determine which of the two, the owner or his agent, should
and could have paid the tax (People vs. Arnault, supra).
Republic Act No. 5, authorizing the President, among
other things, to reorganize and make changes in
government-controlled corporations, and authorizing such
changes to promote simplicity, economy, and efficiency in
their operation, was held to have sufficiently fixed the
legislative standards and policy and did not constitute an
undue delegation of legislative power (Cervantes vs.
Auditor General, supra).
512
© Copyright 2017 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481 (1970) PDF

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Título original

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481 (1970) PDF

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 035 Page 1 of 23

VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 481

No. L-32096. October 24, 1970.

ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation

482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Instance of Rizal, Br. XVIII, Quezon City, and TEDDY C.

Constitutional Law; Police Power; State has inherent power

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING in the Supreme Court.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner Romeo F. Edu, the Land Transportation

1 Republic Act No. 5715 (1969).

VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 483

of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, to annul and set aside his

484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

where both parties were duly represented, but no evidence

The answer before the lower court was filed by petitioner

VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 485

constitutionality of the Reflector Law as well as the validity

final disposition of such crucial issue, petitioner praying

2 L-19440, April 18, 1962, 4 SCRA 930.

486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

cided to pass upon the question of the validity of the

VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 487

Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the4

4 70 Phil. 726 (1940).

488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in

9 Noble State Bank v. Haske, 219 US 112 (1911).

VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 489

do, especially so as the attack on the challenged statute

v. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 (1950); Tolentino v. Board of Accountancy, 90

490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

dozo, speaking of that era: “Laissez-faire was not only a

range of governmental activity in the United States. What

12 Cardozo, The Nature of Judicial Process, p. 77 (1921).

VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 491

amplest possible demonstration of government activity.

Supreme Court in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, in line

492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

made it clear when he disposed of the objection of Delegate

Filipino people because we believe that the days have come

18 III Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Laurel

VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 493

principle that during the Commonwealth era, no

separation pay for one month, and social security scheme.

22 Pampanga Bus Co. v. Pambusco’s Employees’ Union, 68 Phil. 541

25 Antamok Goldfields Mining Company v. Court of Industrial

494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

paraphrase Holmes. Yet respondent Galo would seek to

35 Sec. 2, Administrative Order No. 2.

VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 495

quirement that in addition to such reflectors there shall be

496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Penalties resulting from a violation thereof could be

registered, its registration may be suspended in pursuance

VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 497

ward. A distinction has rightfully been made between

executive or administrative office designated may in

43 70 Phil. 726 (1940). This Court has considered as sufficient

498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the Constitution came into force and effect that the

44 Pangasinan Transportation v. Public Service Commission, 70 Phil.

VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 499