G.R. No.
135150, July 28, 1999 LONZANIDA determined by law shall be three years and no
vs COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served
two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995
elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida
ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was
again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and
discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in
1995 was contested by his opponent who filed an
election protest. The court rendered a judgment
declaring the results of the said election last May
8, 1995, as null and void on the ground that there
was a failure of election.
In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again
filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San
Antonio and was proclaimed winner. Prior
proclamation, His opponent timely filed a petition
to disqualify him from running on the ground that
he had served three consecutive terms in the
same post.
The COMELEC found that Lonzanida’s assumption
of office by virtue of his proclamation in May
1995, although he was later unseated before the
expiration of the term, should be counted as
service for one full term in computing the three
term limit under the Constitution and the Local
Government Code. Hence, COMELEC issued a
resolution granting the petition for
disqualification
Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the
COMELEC resolutions maintaining that he was
duly elected mayor for only two consecutive
terms and that his assumption of office in 1995
cannot be counted as service of a term for the
purpose of applying the three term limit for local
government officials, because he was not the
duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May
1995 elections.
The private respondent maintains that the
petitioner’s assumption of office in 1995 should
be considered as service of one full term because
he discharged the duties of mayor for almost
three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few
months before the next mayoral elections.
Issue: WON petitioner’s assumption of office as
mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995
to 1998 may be considered as service of one full
term for the purpose of applying the three-term
limit for elective local government officials.
Held: No. Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution
provides that, “the term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
such officials shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was
elected.”
Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A.
No. 7160) restates the same rule, that: “No local
elective official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which
the elective official concerned was elected.”
The petitioner cannot be deemed to have served
the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was
ordered to vacate his post before the expiration
of the term.
Pursuant to the constitutional provision above,
voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel
the renounced term in the computation of the
three term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short
of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service. The
petitioner vacated his post a few months before
the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary
renunciation but in compliance with the legal
process of writ of execution issued by the
COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary
severance from office is an interruption of
continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did
not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
Penera, Rosalinda A. vs. COMELEC and
Edgar T. Andanar G.R. No. 181613 November
25, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondents were
candidates for mayor of the Municipality in the
last May 2007 elections. The former filed her
certificate of candidacy on the day before the
prescribed campaign period. When she went to
the COMELEC Office for filing she was
accompanied by her partymates. Thereafter, they
had a motorcade which was consist of two trucks
and ten motorcycles running around the
municipality convincing the residents to vote for
her and the other candidates of their political
party.
Due to this, private respondent filed a petition
against her alleging premature campaigning as
provided in the Omnibus Election Code Section 80
which says: “Election or partisan political activity
outside campaign period.--- It shall be unlawful
for any person, whether or not a voter or
candidate, or for any party, or association of
persons, to engage in an election campaign or
partisan political activity except during the
campaign period.” She argued that she is not
guilty since she was not yet a candidate at that
time and the campaign period has not yet started
when the motorcade was conducted.
While the petition was pending in the COMELEC,
she was voted as mayor and took her office
thereafter. The COMELEC Second Division decided
in favor of the complainant and found her guilty
of premature campaigning. Likewise, when she
appealed in the COMELEC En Banc, the previous
decision was affirmed.
Subsequently, she filed with the Supreme Court
which decided against her. It held that the
conduct of the motorcade is a form of election
campaign or partisan political activity, falling
under Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election
Code which says: “[h]olding political caucuses,
conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other
similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting
votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a candidate[.]”
Furthermore, it was held that she should vacate
the position. Now, she comes for a motion for
reconsideration using the same arguments.
ISSUE: Is petitioner guilty of premature
campaigning?
RULING: No. Any act is lawful unless
expressly declared unlawful by law. It is enough
that Congress stated that “any unlawful act or
omission applicable to a candidate shall take
effect only upon the start of the campaign
period.” So, it is lawful if done before the start of
the campaign period. This plain language of the
law need not be construed further.
Moreover, on the day of the motorcade, she was
not yet a candidate for. As what was decided in
the Lanot Case which says that prior to the
campaign period, even if the candidate has filed
his/her certificate of candidacy, he/she is not yet
considered as a candidate for purposes other
than the printing of ballots. Hence, she cannot be
guilty of premature campaigning for in the first
place there is no candidate to talk about. What
she did was an exercise of her freedom of
expression.
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO V. RAMOS 53 SCRA
559
FACTS:
This is an original action filed before the SC
acting as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. Miriam
Defensor-Santiago (DS) ran for presidency in the
1992 National Elections. She lost, but filed this
present protest against the winner, Pres. FV
Ramos.
Subsequently however, she ran for Senator in the
1995 Senatorial elections. She won and assumed
office as Senator in 1995. Considering this factual
milieu, the issues revolve on whether this present
electoral protest would still be valid, even after
the protestant has already assumed office as
Senator, noting that should she win this protest,
her term as president would coincide with her
term as senator, which she is now in. Now, in
1996, the SC as PET decides the case.
HELD:
There was abandonment of protest.
Yes. DS filed her certificate of candidacy to run for
senator without qualification or reservation. In
doing so, she entered into a political contract with
the electorate, that, if elected, she would assume
the office as senator. This is in accord with the
constitutional doctrine that a public office is a
public trust. In assuming the office of Senator,
she has effectively abandoned her determination
to pursue this present protest. Such
abandonment operates to render this protest
moot.
Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering the
protestant to inform the PET within 10 days if
after the completion of the revision of the ballots
from her pilot areas, she still wishes to present
evidence. Since DS has not informed the Tribunal
of any such intention, such is a manifest
indication that she no longer intends to do so.
FERNANDO POE, JR. VS. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
P.E.T. CASE No. 002. March 29, 2005
Facts:
In the 2004 election, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
(GMA) was proclaimed the duly elected President
of the Philippines. The second-placer in the
elections, Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed an election
protest before the Electoral Tribunal. When the
Protestant died in the course of his medical
treatment, his widow, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe
a.k.a. Susan Roces filed a motion to intervene as
a substitute for deceased protestant FPJ. She
claims that there is an urgent need for her to
continue and substitute for her late husband to
ascertain the true and genuine will of the
electorate in the interest of the Filipino people.
The Protestee, GMA asserts that the widow of a
deceased candidate is not the proper party to
replace the deceased protestant since a public
office is personal and not a property that passes
on to the heirs. Protestee also contends that
under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, only the registered candidates who
obtained the 2nd and 3rd highest votes for the
presidency may contest the election of the
president.
Issue:
May the widow substitute/intervene for the
protestant who died during the pendency of the
latter’s protest case?
Held:
Only the registered candidate for President or for
Vice-President of the Philippines who received the
second or third highest number of votes may
contest the election of the President or the Vice-
President, as the case may be, by filing a verified
petition with the Clerk of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the
proclamation of the winner.
An election protest is not purely personal and
exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee,
hence, substitution and intervention is allowed
but only by a real party in interest. Note that Mrs.
FPJ herself denies any claim to the office of
President but rather stresses that it is with the
“paramount public interest” in mind that she
desires “to pursue the process” commenced by
her late husband. However, nobility of intention is
not the point of reference in determining whether
a person may intervene in an election protest. In
such intervention, the interest which allows a
person to intervene in a suit must be in the
matter of litigation and of such direct and
immediate character that the intervenor will
either gain or lose by the effect of the judgment.
In this protest, Mrs. FPJ will not immediately and
directly benefit from the outcome should it be
determined that the declared president did not
truly get the highest number of votes.
ALDOVINO vs
FACTS
Is the preventive suspension of an elected public
official an interruption of his term of office for
purposes of the 3-term limit rule under Sec 8, Art
X of the Constitution and Sec 43(b) of RA 7160 or
the Local Government Code?
Wilfredo F. Asilo (respondent) was elected
councilor of Lucena City for 3 consecutive terms:
1998- 2007
But in Sept 2005, during his 3 rd term, the
Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for
90 days in relation to a criminal case. The Court
lifted the Sandiganbayan’s suspension order, so
he resumed his office
2007 election, he filed a COC for the same
position – petitioners sought to have the COC
denied since he had already served for 3 terms
COMELEC 2nd Division ruled in Asilo’s favor,
because they said Asilo failed to render complete
service for 2004-2007 term because of the 90-
day suspension order
COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider, so the
question was raised to the SC
ISSUES
WON preventive suspension of an elected
local official constituted an interruption that
allowed him to run for a 4th term.
Yes.
Court first discussed the 3-term limit rule. Sec 8,
Art X of the Constitution and Sec 43(b) of RA
7160 is almost the same thing except for some
minor differences in the wording. The first branch
of this provision fixes the term of a local elective
official and limits their stay to no more than 3
terms. “Term” here is a period of time during
which an official has the title and can serve. It is a
fixed and definite period. The second branch of
the provision relates to the provisions express
initiative to prevent any circumvention of the
limitation through voluntary severance of ties
with public office – though it doesn’t textually
state that voluntary renunciation is the only
interruption of service that doesn’t affect
continuity of service for a full term. ‘Renunciation’
also connotes abandonment, not something that
is acted on the official.
Interruption of office happens when the term
is broken because the office holder lost the
right to hold on to his office and cannot be
equated with failure to render service
What is preventive suspension? It is an
interim remedial measure to address the
situation of an official who has been charged
administratively/criminally, where the
evidence preliminarily indicates the
likelihood of or potential for eventual guilt or
liability. No position is vacated when a public
official is preventively suspended, which is
what happened to Asilo. Preventive
suspension, being a temporary incapacity to
render service during an unbroken term, is
different from interruption of service, which
occurs in the context of term limitation after
there has been a break in the term.
 Because the term was not vacated, the term
was unbroken. So Asilo cannot run for a
fourth term because the preventive
suspension is not considered an interruption
of an elective official’s term.
ARATEA vs COMELEC
FACTS:
Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D.
Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for Mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National
and Local Elections. Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo
(Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida
and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida’s
certificate of candidacy on the ground that
Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor
of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive
terms immediately prior to the term for the May
2010 elections.
Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false
material representation in his certificate of
candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath
that he was eligible for the office he sought
election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987
Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local
Government Code both prohibit a local elective
official from being elected and serving for more
than three consecutive terms for the same
position.
The COMELEC Second Division rendered a
Resolutionon 18 February 2010 cancelling
Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy.
Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC En Banc remained pending during the
May 2010 elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel
Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest number of
votes and were respectively proclaimed Mayor
and Vice-Mayor.
Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor
before Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of
Olongapo. On the same date, Aratea wrote the
DILG and requested for an opinion on whether, as
Vice-Mayor, he was legally required to assume
the Office of the Mayor in view of Lonzanida’s
disqualification.
DILG stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to
hold office by reason of his criminal conviction,
and as a consequence, his office was deemed
permanently vacant, and thus, Aratea should
assume the Office of the Mayor in an acting
capacity without prejudice to the COMELEC’s
resolution of Lonzanida’s motion for
reconsideration.
In another letter dated 6 August 2010, Aratea
requested the DILG to allow him to take the oath
of office as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In
his response, then Secretary Jesse M. Robredo
allowed Aratea to take an oath of office as "the
permanent Municipal Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales without prejudice however to the
outcome of the cases pending before the
COMELEC.
On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued
a Resolution disqualifying Lonzanida from running
for Mayor in the May 2010 elections. The
COMELEC En Banc’s resolution was based on two
grounds: first, Lonzanida had been elected and
had served as Mayor for more than three
consecutive terms without interruption;
and second, Lonzanida had been convicted by
final judgment of 10 counts of falsification under
the Revised Penal Code. Lonzanida was
sentenced for each count of falsification to
imprisonment of 4 years and 1 day of prisión
correccional as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day
of prisión mayor as maximum. The judgment of
conviction became final on 23 October 2009 in
the Decision of this Court in Lonzanida v.
People, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of
candidacy on 1 December 2009.
The manner of filling up the permanent vacancy
in the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales is dependent upon the determination
of Lonzanida’s removal. Whether Lonzanida was
disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code, or made a false material
representation under Section 78 of the same
Code that resulted in his certificate of
candidacy being void ab initio, is
determinative of whether Aratea or Antipolo is
the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales.
HELD: Antipolo, the alleged "second placer,"
should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s
certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In
short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All
votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus,
Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually
garnered the highest number of votes for the
position of Mayor.
The grounds for disqualification for a petition
under Section 68[1] of the Omnibus Election Code
are specifically enumerated.
A petition for disqualification under Section 68
clearly refers to "the commission of prohibited
acts and possession of a permanent resident
status in a foreign country." All the offenses
mentioned in Section 68 refer to election
offenses under the Omnibus Election Code,
not to violations of other penal laws. There is
absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68
that would justify including violation of the three-
term limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of
the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal
Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered
under Section 68.
On the other hand, Section 78[2] of the Omnibus
Election Code states that a certificate of
candidacy may be denied or cancelled when
there is false material representation of the
contents of the certificate of candidacy:
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code
details the contents of the certificate of
candidacy:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of
candidacy. ‒ The certificate of candidacy
shall state that the person filing it is
announcing his candidacy for the office
stated therein and that he is eligible for
said office x x x
The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment,
with the penalty of prisión mayor, disqualifies
him perpetually from holding any public
office, or from being elected to any public
office. This perpetual disqualification took
effect upon the finality of the judgment of
conviction, before Lonzanida filed his
certificate of candidacy.
The penalty of prisión mayor automatically
carries with it, by operation of law, the accessory
penalties of temporary absolute disqualification
and perpetual special disqualification. Under
Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary
absolute disqualification produces the effect of
"deprivation of the right to vote in any election
for any popular elective office or to be elected to
such office.” The duration of temporary absolute
disqualification is the same as that of the
principal penalty of prisión mayor.
On the other hand, under Article 32 of the
Revised Penal Code, perpetual special
disqualification means that "the offender
shall not be permitted to hold any public
office during the period of his
disqualification,” which is perpetually. Both
temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual
special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to
hold elective public office.
A person suffering from these ineligibilities
is ineligible to run for elective public office,
and commits a false material representation
if he states in his certificate of candidacy
that he is eligible to so run.
Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy
A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab
initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and
much less to valid votes.
As the Comelec stated in their February 2011
Resolution: Since Lonzanida was never a
candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San
Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him should
be considered stray votes. Consequently,
Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the sole
qualified candidate for the mayoralty post and
obtained the highest number of votes, should
now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales.
Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was
cancelled because he was ineligible or not
qualified to run for Mayor.1âwphi1Whether his
certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or
after the elections is immaterial because the
cancellation on such ground means he was never
a candidate from the very beginning, his
certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There
was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the
May 2010 elections - Antipolo, who therefore
received the highest number of votes.
Petition dismissed.
[1]
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. ‒ Any candidate who,
in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision by a competent court
guilty of, or found by the Commission of
having (a) given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or
corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that
allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received
or made any contribution prohibited under
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; (e) violated
any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261,
paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph
6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding
the office. Any person who is a permanent
resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country
shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived
his status as permanent resident or immigrant of
a foreign country in accordance with the
residence requirement provided for in the
election laws.
[2]
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy. ‒ A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by the
person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein
as required under Section 74 hereof is false.
The petition may be filed at any time not later
than twenty-five days from the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing, not later
than fifteen days before the election.
ATONG PAGLAUM vs COMELEC
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were
disqualified by the Commission on Elections in
the May 2013 party-list elections for various
reasons but primarily for not being qualified as
representatives for marginalized or
underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for
certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse
of discretion on the part of COMELEC in
disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said
party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the
guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court
remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the
Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines
which abandoned some principles established in
the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines
are as follows:
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are
disallowed, as has always been the practice, from
participating in the party-list elections. But, since
there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a
statutory prohibition, major political parties can
now participate in the party-list system provided
that they do so through their bona fide
sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate,
albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will
encourage them to work assiduously in extending
their constituencies to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-
defined political constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
when they were drafting the party-list system
provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners
deliberated that it was their intention to include
all parties into the party-list elections in order to
develop a political system which is pluralistic and
multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno
emphasized that the will of the people should
defeat the intent of the framers; and that the
intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987
Constitution, is that the party-list system should
be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the
party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the
“marginalized and underrepresented” or for
parties who lack “well-defined political
constituencies”. It is also for national or regional
parties. It is also for small ideology-based and
cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined
political constituencies”. The common
denominator however is that all of them cannot,
they do not have the machinery – unlike major
political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in
the legislative districts but they can acquire the
needed votes in a national election system like
the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for
marginalized representation, then the system
itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented
groups from running for a seat in the lower
house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list
representation should not be understood to
include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and
other sectors that by their nature
are economically at the margins of society. It
should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act
7941 includes, among others, in its provision for
sectoral representation groups of professionals,
which are not per se economically marginalized
but are still qualified as “marginalized,
underrepresented, and do not have well-defined
political constituencies” as they
are ideologically marginalized.
DIANGKA vs COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner Maimona Diangka filed a petition for
certiorari questioning the decision of COMELEC in
disqualifying her as candidate for Mayor of
Ganassi, Lanao del Sur. Petitioner was the wife of
the incumbent Mayor. Ali Balindong, the other
mayoralty candidate, filed a special action for
disqualification against Diangka and her husband
alleging that they committed 2 acts of terrorism:
* First, that they loaded the ballot boxes into
an ambulance then subsequently, through force
and threats, made the watchers of Balindong go
down from the vehicle.
* Second, that Diangka’s husband went to the
voting areas and caused a commotion that
prevented voters from voting.
In the results of the elections, Diangka emerged
the winner. COMELEC ordered the board of
canvassers to cease and desist from declaring
Diangka as mayor, but that order came in late
and still Diangka was declared mayor. In the
hearing for the disqualification, only Balindong
and lawyer appeared, hence COMELEC
disqualified Diangka. Diangka now assails the
decision via certiorari, meanwhile vice-mayor
elect Macapodi assumed the mayor position.
HELD: Diangka can be held liable for the two acts
of terrorism of her husband thus, she could be
disqualified by the COMELEC.
 1. COMELEC determined that Diangka was at
the front seat beside the driver in the ambulance
when the watchers of Balindong were made to go
down via threats. Her excuse that she did not
know nor was she in collusion with her husband
can not hold water. First, she admitted that she
requested that the driver, after they threatened
the watchers, drop her off at the school. Such
shows she had control over the driver. Second,
her mere presence in the ambulance shows that
she acquiesced to her husbands acts and hence
guilty also.
2. COMELEC determined that it was actually
Diangka’s husband who caused the commotion
which prevented the voters from voting. While it
was not actually Diangka who committed the
acts, she did not prove that her running was not a
mere alter ego of her husband who is in his 3
term as mayor. This together with her presence in
the ambulance makes her guilty of the acts of
terrorism in violation of the Omnibus Election
Code.
Note: Grounds for Disqualification (Section 68 of
Omnibus Election Code):
a) Giving money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the
voters or public officials performing electoral
functions;
b) Committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy;
c) Spent in his election campaign an amount
in excess of that allowed
d) Solicited, received or made any
contribution which are prohibited
AMORA vs COMELEC
FACTS:
On December 1, 2009, petitioner Sergio G.
Amora, Jr. filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.
To oppose Amora, the Nationalist People’s
Coalition fielded Trygve L. Olaivar for the
mayoralty post. Respondent Arnielo S. Olandria
was one of the candidates for councilor of the
NPC in the same municipality.
On March 5, 2010, Olandria filed before the
COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification against
Amora. Olandria alleged that Amora’s COC was
not properly sworn contrary to the requirements
of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice. Olandria pointed out
that, in executing his COC, Amora merely
presented his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) to
the notary public, Atty. Oriculo Granada (Atty.
Granada), instead of presenting competent
evidence of his identity. Consequently, Amora’s
COC had no force and effect and should be
considered as not filed.
Atty. Granada counters that while he normally
requires the affiant to show competent evidence
of identity, in Amora’s case, however, he
accepted Amora’s CTC since he personally knows
him.
Amora was victorious in the local elections. A
week later, COMELEC en banc granted Olandria’s
petition. Thus, this case.
ISSUE: WON petitioner should be disqualified by
presenting his community tax certificate as
competent evidence of identity in executing his
COC.
HELD: No. An improperly sworn COC is not
equivalent to possession of a ground for
disqualification.
Neither OEC and LGC provides for such nor can
the courts infer this as an additional ground for
disqualification.
Laws prescribing qualifications for and
disqualifications from office are liberally
construed in favor of eligibility. Competent
evidence of identity is not required in cases
where the affiant is personally known to the
Notary Public, which is the case herein.
The purpose of election laws is to give effect to,
rather than frustrate, the will of the voters.
FAELNAR vs COMELEC
FACTS:
Eugenio Faelnar filed his certificate of candidacy
for the position of barangay chairman during the
1997 barangay elections in Cebu. One day after
filing such certificate (april 9), a basketball
tournament was held in the sports complex
dubbed as, “2nd Jing-Jing Faelnar’s Cup” which
lasted until April 30, 1997. This gave rise to a
complaint for electioneering against petitioner
and Gillamac filed by Antonio Luy. It was alleged
that it was actually a form of campaign done
outside the official campaign period which should
start on May 1, 1997. 1. that there was a
streamer bearing the name of petitioner placed
at the façade of the venue. 2. petitioners name
was repeatedly mentioned over the microphone.
3. it was widely published in the local news paper.
4. a raffle sponsored by Gillamac was held with
home appliances as prize. It constituted an
election offense. Initially, Comelec en banc in a
Resolution resolved to dismiss the filing of the
case in the RTC. Antonio Luy moved for
reconsideration prompting the Comelec to
proceed with the filing of the case against
petitioner. Petitioner moved to quash on the basis
that the previous dismissal of the Comelec en
banc, was immediately final and executory. And
that Luy’s motion for reconsideration was a
prohibited pleading under Commission’s rules of
procedure.
HELD:
A Motion for Reconsideration is allowed in
election offense cases.
Section 1, Rule 13 of Comelec’s Rules of
Procedure states, “the following pleadings are not
allowed, …(d) motion for reconsideration of an en
banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except
in election offense cases…
It was also held that the Comelec en banc is the
one that determines the existence of probable
cause in an election offense. But it may also be
delegated to the State Prosecutor or to the
Provincial or City Fiscal but may still be reviewed
by the Comelec.
YASON vs HERRERA
FACTS:
On January 4, 1980 at 2:45 in the afternoon,
petitioner Yason filed his certificate of candidacy
for Mayor of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro with the
Municipal Election Registrar. On the blank space
in Item No. 4 indicating "Political Party/Group or
Aggrupation," he stated "Nationalists, (NP)."
Shortly afterwards, Yason had a change of mind.
A few minutes before midnight of the same day,
he went back to the municipal election registrar,
asked for the certified of candidacy he had filed
that afternoon, and erased the words and letters,
"Nationalista, (NP)." Over the erased items, he
typed "Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL)." The
same thing was done for Item No. 5, "state if
nominated by Political Party/Group or
Aggrupation" where the word "Yes" was erased
and "Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL)" typed
clearly as the answer. Both changes in Items 4
and 5 were initialed by Mr. Yason.
On the morning of election day on January 30,
1980, after the petitioner came to know from the
Certified List of Candidates furnished by the
COMELEC for posting in election booths and
guidance of citizens' election committees that
COMELEC had listed him in the official line-up of
NP candidates, he immediately disclaimed
knowledge of his having been nominated by the
NP provincial chapter
A day later, on February 2, 1980, Suarez filed with
COMELEC a petition for disqualification of Yason
as candidate for mayor. On February 13, 1980,
the COMELEC ordered the citizens' election
committee and the election registrar of Roxas to
consider all votes cast for Yason as stray and to
declare Lucio T. Suarez as duly elected mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not turncoatism is a ground for
disqualification.
Held:
In elections, the first consideration of every
democratic policy is to give effect to the
expressed will of the majority. It is true that
constitutional and statutory provisions requiring
compliance with measures intended to enhance
the quality of our democratic institutions must be
obeyed. The restriction against turncoatism is one
such measure. However, even as there should be
compliance with the provision on turncoatism, an
interpretation in particular cases which respects
the free and untrammelled expression of the
voters' choice must be followed in its
enforcement.
The various and numerous provisions of the
Election Law were adopted to assist the voters in
their participation in the affairs of the
Government and not to defeat that object.
(Villavert v. Former, 84 Phil. 756, 763). Election
cases involve not only the adjudication of the
private interests of rival candidates but also the
paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty
which beclouds the real choice of the electorate
with respect to who shall discharge the
prerogatives of the offices within their gift. They
are imbued with public interest. (Vda. de Mesa v.
Mencias, 18 SCRA 533, 538) The
disenfranchisement of electors is not favored.
(Lloren v. Court of Appeals, et al., 19 SCRA 110).
This is especially true where the majority of
voters are sought to be disenfranchised.
FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
Posted by kaye lee on 10:58 PM
G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989 [Naturalization;
Reacquisition]
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the
province of Sorsogon and assumed office in due
time. The League of Municipalities filed with the
COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo
on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen,
having been naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the
special and affirmative defenses that he was
naturalized as American citizen only to protect
himself against President Marcos during the
Martial Law era.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides that a qualified voter must be, among
other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines,
this being an indispensable requirement for
suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine

citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He
claims that by actively participating in the local
elections, he automatically forfeited American
citizenship under the laws of the United States of
America. The Court stated that that the alleged
forfeiture was between him and the US. If he
really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he
could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as
amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.