Before the Civil Code was modified by the Family Code of the Philippines

which became effective on August 3, 1988, the vicarious civil liability of the
parents pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code was only alternative and
not simultaneous. This was exemplified by the Supreme Court in the case of
Romano v. Pariñas1.
ROMANO v. PARIÑAS
G.R. No. L-10129 APRIL 22, 1957

FACTS: Spouses Romano filed an action for damages in the amount of P10,
000 against Spouses Pariñas, the latter being the parents of Antonio who is
a minor. It was alleged that Spouses Pariñas allowed Antonio to drive a
motor vehicle having a passenger one Editha Romano, and because of his
lack of foresight and experience, the vehicle overturned resulting in the
death of Editha.

Defendants, in their answer, set up the defense that they never permitted
their son to drive any motor vehicle, if on the occasion alleged in the
complaint he drove a jeep, it was upon the persistent plea of Editha
Romano. They alleged that the accident, if it happened, was due to her fault
and negligence.

After filing their answer, defendant also filed a motion asking that Caridad
Donato, wife of defendant Crisostomo Pariñas, be dropped from the
complaint on the ground of misjoinder of parties-defendants, contending
that under Article 2180 of the new Civil Code, the father is primarily
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children, except only in
case of his death or incapacity when the mother also becomes answerable.

ISSUE: Whether or not dropping Caridad, mother of Antonio, from the case
pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code was proper.

RULING: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. It ratiocinated as

follows:

The legal provisions on which the action of plaintiffs is predicated are Articles
2176 and 2180 of the new Civil Code. xxx

It appears clear from the above that whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done, and this obligation is demandable not only for one's own acts
or omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible.

And one of the acts mentioned therein is "The father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother", answers for the damages caused by their
minor children who live in their company.

It is therefore clear that the responsibility of the father and mother is not
simultaneous, but alternate, the father being primarily responsible, and the
mother answering only "In case of his death or incapacity."

Since in the instant case the Father is both living and capable, as can be
gleaned from the allegations of the complaint, it follows that it is improper to
join the mother as party-defendant.

1
Pascual Romano and Juana Lleanza De Romano v. Crisostomo Pariñas And Caridad Donato De
Pariñas, G.R. No. L-10129, April 22, 1957
It is true that there is sufficient averment in the complaint that both the
father and the mother have allowed their son to drive a motor vehicle
without proper license or permit thereby imputing acts of negligence to both
of them. But from this it cannot be inferred that there is a cause for action
against the mother, for under the law her liability can of death or incapacity
of her husband.The lower court therefore acted properly in dropping her
from the complaint.

In the case of Exconde v. Capuno2, there were two issues involved. The first
issue focuses on the vicarious liability of heads of school or the city school’s
supervisor and the second issue focuses on the civil liability of the father for
the damage caused by his son.

As for the first issue, the Supreme Court upheld that the provision on
vicarious civil liability of teachers and directors applies only when the school
involved is an arts and trade institution and not just any academic
institution. If the student who acted negligently is a student of an academic
institution not classified as arts and trade, then the teacher nor the head of
the academic institution cannot be held accountable for the damage done bh
the student.

As for the second issue, the Supreme Court elucidated that a father can be
held jointly and severally liable with his son for the damage or injury caused
by the latter if it failed to prove that he exercised the diligence of a good
father in order to prevent the damage.

EXCONDE v. CAPUNO
G.R. No. L-10134 June, 29, 1957

FACTS:

Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was a member of the Boy Scouts
Organization and a student of the Bilintawak Elementary School situated in a
barrio in the City of San Pablo and on March 31, 1949 he attended a parade
in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in said city upon instruction of the city school's
supervisor.

From the school Dante, with other students, boarded a jeep and when the
same started to run, he took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver
sat on his left side. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and
two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidore Caperiña, died as a
consequence. He was only 15 years old when he commited the crime.

Dante Capuno was then accused of double homicide through reckless

imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperina and Amado Ticzon on March
31, 1949. After trial, Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime charged.

Sabina Exconde filed an action for damages in the amount of P2,959.00 for
the death of her son Isidoro Caperiña against Delfin Capuno and his son
Dante Capuno.

It was argued by the defendants that it should only be Dante Capuno and
not his father Delfin be held liable because at the time of the accident, the
former was not under the control, supervision and custody, of the latter.
This defense was sustained by the Court of the First Instance and, as a

2
Sabina Exconde v. Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno, G. R. No. L-10134, June 29, 1957
consequence it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay the damages claimed in
the complaint.

Before the Supreme Court, Exconde argued that the father is liable for the
damages in question jointly and severally with his son Dante because at the
time the latter committed the negligent act which resulted in the death of
the victim, he was a minor and was then living with his father, and inasmuch
as these facts are not disputed, the civil liability of the father is evident.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the head of the school or the city school’s supervisor be held
liable for the negligent act of Dante.

2. Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and
severally with his son Dante, for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro
Caperiña caused by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno.

RULING:

As for the first issue. The Supreme Court held in the negative. It
ratiocinated as follows:

The case comes under Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1
and 5, which provides:

ART. 1903. The obligation impossed by the next preceding articles is

enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom another is responsible.

The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live with
them.

xxx xxx xxx

Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any
damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under
their custody.

It is true that under the law above quoted, "teachers or directors of arts and
trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while
they are under their custody", but this provision only applies to an institution
of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution (Padilla,
Civil Law, 1953, Ed., Vol. IV, p. 841; See 12 Manresa, 4th Ed., p. 557).

Here Dante capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary School
and as part of his extra-curricular activity, he attended the parade in honor
of Dr. Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. And it was
in connection with that parade that Dante boarded a jeep with some
companions and while driving it, the accident occurred.

In the circumstances, it is clear that neither the head of that school, nor the
city school's supervisor, could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante
because he was not then a student of an institute of arts and trades as
provided by law.

As for the second issue: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. It
ruled as follows:
The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the
minor children who live with them, is obvious.

This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over

them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping
them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion
to their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct
and punish them in moderation" (Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code).

The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they
prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage(Article 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code).

This defendants failed to prove. Hence, Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno are
held jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff for the amount of damages.

In the case of Araneta v. Arreglado3, the Supreme Court held that parents
can be held vicariously liable in solidum with their son for the indemnity
award.

ARANETA v. ARREGLADO
G. R. No. L-11394, SEPTEMBER 9, 1958

FACTS:

Manuel S. Araneta and Benjamin Araneta, father and son, appeal from a
decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila (in its case No. 24322)
sentencing defendants Juan Arreglado, his wife, and his son, Jose Dario
Arreglado, to pay the former only P3,943 damages in lieu of the P112,000
claimed in the complaint.

On March 7, 1951, while plaintiff Benjamin Araneta seated atop a low ruined
wall bordering the Ateneo grounds, was talking with the other students of
the Ateneo de Manila. Dario Arreglado, 14 years of age and a former student
of the Ateneo, chanced to pass by.

Those on the wall called Dario and conversed with him, and in the course of
their talk, twitted him on his leaving the Ateneo and enrolling in the De La
Salle College.

Arreglado resented the banter and suddenly pulling from his pocket a
Japanese Lugar pistol (licensed in the name of his father Juan Arreglado),
fired the same at Araneta, hitting him in the lower jaw, and causing him to
drop backward, bleeding profusely. Benjamin was then taken to the school
infirmary and later to the Singian Hospital.

When he finally recovered, the gunshot wound left him with a degenerative
injury to the jawbone (mandible) and a scar in the lower portion of the face,
where the bullet had plowed through. The behavior of Benjamin was likewise
affected, he becoming inhibited and morose after leaving the hospital.

Dario Arreglado was indicted for frustrated homicide and pleaded guilty. But
since he was only 14 years of age when he committed the crime, the court
suspended the hearings pursuant to Article 80 of the RPC and ordered him

3
Manuel S. Araneta, Et al. V. Juan Arreglado, G.R. No. L-11394, September 9, 1958
committed to the care of Mr. Deogracias Lerma, under the supervision of the
Commissioner of Social Welfare conformably to Republic Act No. 47. Because
Arreglado observed proper conduct and discipline while on probation, the
court, upon recommendation of the Social Welfare Administrator, finally
discharged him on May 22, 1953, and quashed the criminal case.

Thereafter, on October 13, 1954, an action was instituted by Araneta and his
father against Juan Arreglado, his wife, and their son, Dario, to recover
material, moral and exemplary damages.

After trial, the Court of First Instance found that Dario’s father had acted
negligently in allowing his son to have access to the pistol used to injure
Benjamin Araneta, and sentenced defendants to pay P3,943, damages and
attorney's fees. The Aranetas appealed the amount of the indeminity award.

ISSUE: Is Article 2180 is applicable in the case at bar?

RULING:

The Supreme Court held in the affirmative and held the parents of Dario
liable in solidum for the indemnity award which was increased by the
Supreme Court in the amount of P18, 000. It held in this wise:

We agree with the appellants that the damages awarded by the lower court
for the injuries suffered by Benjamin Araneta are inadequate.

xxx

Still, taking into account the necessity and cost of corrective measures to
fully repair the damage; the pain suffered by the injured party; his feelings
of inferiority due to consciousness of his present deformity, as well as the
voluntary character of the injury inflicted; and further considering that a
repair, however skillfully conducted, is never equivalent to the original state,
we are of the opinion that the indemnity granted by the trial court should be
increased to a total of P18,000.

It is also the hope of the Court that the award in the present case will
remind licensed possessors of firearms of their peremptory duty to
adequately safeguard such dangerous weapons at all times, and to take all
requisite measures to prevent minors and other unauthorized parties from
having access thereto. Competent observers have recently called attention
to the fact that the growing teenage hooliganism in our society is principally
due to parent's complacency in and neglect of their progeny.

xxx

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed with the modification that
plaintiff Benjamin Araneta shall recover damages in the amount of Eighteen
Thousand Pesos (P18,000.00) from defendants Dario Arreglado and his
parents Mr. and Mrs. Juan Arreglado, who shall answer in solidum for the
payment of the indemnity, pursuant to Article 2194 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.

In the case of Salen et. al. v. Balce4, the Supreme Court held that

SALEN ET AL. v. BALCE

G.R. L-14414, APRIL 27, 1960

4
Severino Salen and Elena Salbanera v. Jose Balce, G. R. No. L-14414, April 27, 1960
 FACTS: Salen was the son of the plaintiffs in this present case. He
died from the wounds caused by Gumersindo Balce, the son of defendant
Balce. When the incident happened, Gumersindo Balce was still a minor
below 18 years of age, and was living with defendant Balce.

As a result of Salen's death, Gumersindo Balce was accused and later

on convicted of homicide. He was sentenced to imprisonment and was
ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased an indemnity in the amount of
P2,000.00. Upon petition of plaintiff-parents, the only heirs of the deceased,
a writ of execution was issued for the payment of the indemnity but it was
returned unsatisfied because Gumersindo Balce was insolvent and had no
property in his name.

Thereupon, plaintiffs demanded upon the father of Gumersindo, the

payment of the indemnity, but the defendant-father refused.

ISSUE: Is the father of Gumersindo Balce subsidiary liable to pay the

indemnity claim of P2,000.00?

RULING: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. It rationated the

following pronouncement:

While we agree with the theory that, as a rule, the civil liability arising
from a crime shall be governed by the provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
we disagree with the contention that the subsidiary liability of persons for
acts of those who are under their custody should likewise be governed by
the same Code even in the absence of any provision governing the case, for
that would leave the transgression of certain right without any punishment
or sanction in the law. Such would be the case if we would uphold the theory
of appellee as sustained by the trial court.

It is true that under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a father is
made civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if the latter is (1)
an imbecile, (2) an insane, (3) under 9 years of age, and (4) over 9 but
under 15 years of age, who act without discernment, unless it appears that
there is no fault or negligence on his part. This is because a son who
commits the act under any of those conditions is by law exempt from
criminal liability (Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2 and 3, Revised Penal Code).

The idea is not to leave the act entirely unpunished but to attach
certain civil liability to the person who has the deliquent minor under his
legal authority or control.

But a minor over 15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from
criminal liability, for which reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary
liability of his parents should he stand convicted. In that case, resort should
be had to the general law which is our Civil Code.

The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the pertinent
portion of which provides: "The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages caused by the minor
children who lived in their company."

To hold that this provision does not apply to the instant case because
it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations
which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while
for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand
subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would
attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. Verily, the void that
apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular
provision of our Civil Code xxx.
 The liability of parents under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code and
under Article 2180 of Civil Code was also explained in the case of Libi v.
Intermediate Court of Appeals5 (1992).

5Cresencio Libi * and Amelia Yap Libi v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, Felipe Gotiong
and Shirley Gotiong , G.R. No. 70890, September 18, 1992
In the case of Paleyan v. Bangkili6 (1971), the Supreme Court held that the
mother is held solidarily liable with her son pursuant to Article 2180 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. This case also emphasized that the only
exemption provided under said provision to relieve the parent from the
liability is when it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family which
was not proven by the mother in the instant case.

PALEYAN v. BANGKILI
G.R. No. L-22253 July 30, 1971

FACTS: Plaintiffs are the widow and children of Balos Paleyan,

who was killed by defendant Carlos Bangkili. At the time of the
commission of the offense Carlos Bangkili, a minor of 19 years,
was living with his mother, defendant Victoria Bangkili. As a
result of the death of Balos Paleyan and of the wounding of
another victim, Carlos Bangkili was accused of the crime of
homicide with less serious physical injuries in a Criminal Case
before the Court of First Instance of Mountain Province. On
November 21, 1960, upon his plea of guilty, he was sentenced
accordingly, but the decision made no pronouncement as to the
civil indemnity which should be paid to the heirs of the deceased.
On April 3, 1961 the plaintiffs filed the present action for
damages against Carlos Bangkili and his mother, Victoria
Bangkili.

In dismissing the complaint against Victoria Bangkili the trial

court held that under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code
Victoria Bangkili could not be held civilly liable for the criminal
act of her minor son, who was already 19 years of age at the
time he committed the offense; and that Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code was not applicable for it covers only obligations arising
from quasi-delicts and not to those arising from crimes.

ISSUE: Is Victoria Bangkili, who had the custody of her minor

son Carlos at the time the latter committed the offense, liable
with her son for the adjudged amount?

RULING: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative following

the decisions it laid in the case of Exconde v. Capuno, Araneta v.
Arreglado, Fuellas v. Cadano and Salen et.al v. Balce.

To cite the ruling made in Salen, the Supreme Court held:

It is true that under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code,

a father is made civily liable for the acts committed by his
son only if the latter is an imbecile, an insane, under 9
years of age, or over 9 but under 15 years of age, who
acts without discernment, unless it appears that there is
no fault or negligence on his part. This is because a son
who commits the act under any of those conditions is by
law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12, subdivisions
1, 2 and 3, Revised Penal Code). The idea is not to leave
the act entirely unpunished but to attach certain civil

6Linda Y Paleyan, for her own and behalf of her Minor children, namely: Teresa, Fortunato,
Venancio And Jose, all surnamed Paleyan, v. Carlos Bangkili And Victoria Bangkili alias Cuyoyan,
G.R. No. L-22253, July 30, 1971
 liability to the person who has the delinquent minor under
his legal authority or control. But a minor over 15 who acts
with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability, for
which reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability
of his parents should he stand convicted. In that case,
resort should be had to the general law which is our Civil
Code.

The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180,

the pertinent portion of which provides: "The father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible
for damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company." To hold that this provision does not apply to the
instant case because it only covers obligations which arise
from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from
criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while
for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or
mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage
caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the
damage is caused with criminal intent. Verily, the void that
apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is subserved
by this particular provision of our Civil Code, as may be
gleaned from some recent decisions of this court which
cover equal or identical cases.

The Supreme Court further said:

While the decision just cited referred to the subsidiary

liability of the father whose son had been sentenced to pay
civil indemnity in the criminal case, the reasons given by
this Court in applying Article 2180 of the Civil Code hold
true with greater cogency in this case, where the
allegations in the complaint show that herein appellee
(Victoria) was sued directly under the said provision, in
that she "failed and neglected to exercise the proper care
and vigilance over her ward and minor child and as a
consequence of such failure and neglect, the said Carlos
Bangkili committed the wrongful act herein complained of."

xxx

The appellee here agrees that Article 2180 is applicable in

this case, but submits that its application should be
relaxed, considering that her son, although living with her,
was already 19 years of age and hence mature enough to
have a mind of his own. This fact is not a legal defense,
however, and does not exempt the appellant from her
responsibility as parent and natural guardian. Article 2180
does not provide for any exemption except proof that the
defendant parent "observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage." There is no such
proof in this case.
In the 1977 case of Elcano v. Hill7, the Supreme Court held that the father of
can still be held liable despite the emancipation of his child by marriage
since the latter is still living with and dependent on the former.

ELCANO v. HILL
G.R. NO. L-24803, MAY 26, 1977

FACTS: The plaintiffs in the case at bar were the parents of

Agapito, who was killed by Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the
time of the commission of the crime yet still living and getting
subsistence from his father Marvin Hill. Reginald was prosecuted
criminally however, after due trial, he was acquitted on the
ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to
kill, coupled with mistake”. The plaintiffs filed an action for
damages against Reginald and his father however such
complaint was dismissed by the Court of First Instance Quezon
City. Hence the present appeal.

ISSUES: May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil
Code be applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the
undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of.
Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee
from his father, was already legally married?

RULING: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative and held

that Reginald’s father is still liable despite the emancipation by
marriage of Reginald since the latter was still under the custody
of the former. It ruled as follows:

xxx

Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's

emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty.
Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the
conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from
responsibility cannot be upheld.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon

emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under
Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the
minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article
399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or
absolute.

Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession

shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall
enable the minor to administer his property as though he were
of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber
real property without the consent of his father or mother, or
guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the
assistance of his father, mother or guardian."

Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article

2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,

7
Pedro Elcano and Patricia Elcano, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased
v. Reginald Hill, minor, and Marvin Hill, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor, G.R. No. L-
24803, May 26, 1977
 but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company."

In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although

married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from
him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually,
therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his
father, a situation which is not unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason

behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their
offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the
parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them
from causing damage to third persons.

On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in

providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not,
nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the
parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it
freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give
rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767,
776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action.
Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve
the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a
minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money
and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be
done by their minor married child without their consent. (Art.
399; Manresa, supra.)

Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty.

Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald.
However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age,
as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become
milling, subsidiary to that of his son.

In the case of Tamargo v. CA8, the Supreme Court held that parental
authority should not be retroactively be transferred or vested to the
adopting parents by reason of the grant of the pertition for adoption so as to
burden them with the liability resulting from the tortious act of the erring
child. Parental authority still rests upon the natural parents of the child since
they were the ones who has the actual custody of the erring child when it
committed the crime.

TAMARGO v. CA
G.R. No. 85044, June 3, 1992

FACTS: On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of

10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing
injuries which resulted in her death.

8
Macario Tamargo, Celso Tamargo And Aurelia Tamargo, V. Hon. Court Of Appeals, The Hon.
Ariston L. Rubio, RTC Judge, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; Victor Bundoc; and Clara
Bundoc, G.R. No. 85044, June 3, 1992
Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed by petitioner
Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner
spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents
against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's
natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic
incident.

In addition to this case for damages, a criminal information or

Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed against
Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was acquitted and
exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he bad acted
without discernment.

Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses

Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor
Adelberto Bundoc and this was granted on, 18 November 1982,
that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.

Adelberto's natural parents argued that with the result of the

foregoing petition for adoption, the adopting parents should be
the indispensable parties to the action since parental authority
had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the
successful petition for adoption was filed.

The Tamargos contended otherwise since Adelberto Bundoc was

then actually living with his natural parents at the time of the
incident, hence, parental authority had not ceased nor been
relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for
adoption.

ISSUE: Are Spouses Bundoc relieved of the parental authority

upon the grant of the petition for adoption in favor of Spouses
Rapisura hence, they cannot be anymore be deemed
indespensable parties to the action?

RULING: The Supreme Court held in the negative. It ruled as

follows:

xxx

It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of

shooting Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a cause
of action on quasi-delict against him pursuant Article 2176 of the
Civil Code. xxx

Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for
any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with
them pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. xxx

This principle of parental liability is a species of what is

frequently designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of
"imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a
person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also
for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain
relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental
liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties
and responsibilities of parents — their parental authority —
which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the
child. xxx

The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their
minor children living with them, may be seen to be based upon
the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such
parents. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated
child living with its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents
were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty
closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control.

Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon parental

authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the
discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. The
parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the
presumption can be overturned under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent the damage.

In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an

air rifle occured when parental authority was still lodged in
respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor
Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had
then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the
indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

The Court is not persuaded with the theory of Spouses Bundoc

that because a decree of adoption was issued by the adoption
court in favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental authority was
vested in the latter as adopting parents as of the time of the
filing of the petition for adoption that is, before Adelberto had
shot Jennifer which an air rifle.

In stating such, the Supreme Court is of the view that the

Bundoc spouses were therefore not free of any parental
responsibility for Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct.

As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis of parental

liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing
between the parents and the minor child living with them and
over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision
and control. Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-
enacted this rule:

Article 58 Torts — Parents and guardians are responsible

for the damage caused by the child under their parental
authority in accordance with the civil Code. (Emphasis
supplied)

Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has similarly

insisted upon the requisite that the child, doer of the tortious
act, shall have been in the actual custody of the parents sought
to be held liable for the ensuing damage.

Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental

authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages
caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated
children living in their company and under their parental
 authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by
law. (Emphasis supplied)

The Supreme Court did not upheld the idea that parental
authority was retroactively transferred to and vested in the
adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle
shooting happened. Retroactive effect, as stated by the Supreme
Court should not be given to the decree of adoption so as to
impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time
when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over
the adopted child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to
the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential
to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of
the adopted child.

In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had

been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to
burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not
have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since
they were at the time in the United States and had no physical
custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and
unconscionable.

Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the

philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious
liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental
dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura
spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact
subject to their control at the time the tort was committed. xxx

Hence, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent Bundoc

spouses, Adelberto's natural parents, were indispensable parties
to the suit for damages brought by petitioners.

In the case of Libi v. IAC9, the Supreme Court held that

LIBI v. IAC

G.R. No. 70890, September 18, 1992

FACTS: Respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of

Julie Ann Gotiong, an 18-year old, who died on January 14,
1979. Petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor
between 18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid
parents, and who also died in the same event on the same date.

Julie Ann and Wendell used to be sweethearts for more

than two years until December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up
with Wendell due to the latter’s sadistic and irresponsible
attitude.

For the first two weeks of January, 1979, Wendell kept

pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the latter
persisted in her refusal, prompting the former to resort to
threats against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in

9
Cresencio Libi * and Amelia Yap Libi v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, Felipe Gotiong
And Shirley Gotiong, G.R. No. 70890, September 18, 1992
the house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso prior to the date of
the incident.

On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each

from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a
Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner
Cresencio Libi (father of Wendell), which was recovered from the
scene of the crime inside the residence of private respondents.

Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the

circumstances surrounding the death of both minors, their
parents, who are the contending parties herein, posited their
respective theories drawn from their interpretation of
circumstantial evidence, available reports, documents and
evidence of physical facts.

Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their

daughter, submitted that Wendell caused her death by shooting
her with the aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun
on himself to commit suicide.

On the other hand, Petitioners, puzzled and likewise

distressed over the death of their son, rejected the imputation
and contended that an unknown third party, whom Wendell may
have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a
narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit
(CANU), must have caused Wendell’s death and then shot Julie
Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification.

As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed a

Civil Case for damages against the parents of Wendell arising
from the latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was

applicable in the case at bar to make petitioners (parents of
Wendell) liable for vicarious liability.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held in the affirmative and ratiocinated

the following pronouncement:

xxx Petitioners’ defense that they had exercised the due

diligence of a good father of a family, hence they should not be
civilly liable for the crime committed by their minor son, is not
borne out by the evidence on record either.

Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified

that her husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a
safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of
these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and
Amelita’s key is always in her bag, all of which facts were known
to Wendell. They have never seen their son Wendell taking or
using the gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful night
the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box.

We, accordingly, cannot but entertain serious doubts that

petitioner spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a
good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away.
Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the
keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around
or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other
key was.

The diligence of a good father of a family required by law

in a parent and child relationship consists, to a large extent, of
the instruction and supervision of the child. Petitioners were
gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently
supervising the activities of their son, despite his minority and
immaturity, so much so that it was only at the time of Wendell’s
death that they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent
and that Cresencio’s gun was missing from the safety deposit
box.

Both parents were sadly wanting in their duty and

responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of their
children who, for all they know, may be engaged in dangerous
work such as being drug informers, or even drug users. Neither
was a plausible explanation given for the photograph of Wendell,
with a handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof,
holding upright what clearly appears as a revolver and on how or
why he was in possession of that firearm.

xxx

The Supreme Court also throughly discussed the nature of

the liability of the parents in this wise:

xxx We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-

delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply
Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary liability of
joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or omission,
in this case the minor and the father and, in case of his death of
incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable.

Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not

subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides
that “(t)he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages."

We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for

felonies committed by their minor children is likewise primary,
not subsidiary. xxx
 Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, under the foregoing provision the civil liability of the
parents for crimes committed by their minor children is likewise
direct and primary, and also subject to the defense of lack of
fault or negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family.

That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily

respond for such damages is buttressed by the corresponding
provisions in both codes that the minor transgressor shall be
answerable or shall respond with his own property only in the
absence or in case of insolvency of the former.

Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article

2182 of the Civil Code states that "(i)f the minor causing
damage has no parents or guardian, the minor . . . shall be
answerable with his own property in an action against him where
a guardian ad litem shall be appointed." For civil liability ex
delicto of minors, an equivalent provision is found in the third
paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

"Should there be no person having such . . . minor under

his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be
insolvent, said . . . minor shall respond with (his) own property,
excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with
civil law."

The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their

minor children contemplated in the aforesaid rule in Article 101
of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil
Code has, aside from the aforecited case of Fuellas, been the
subject of a number of cases adjudicated by this Court.xxx
Parenthetically, the aforesaid cases were basically on the issue
of the civil liability of parents for crimes committed by their
minor children over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acted with
discernment, and also of minors 15 years of age or over, since
these situations are not covered by Article 101, Revised Penal
Code.

In both instances, this Court held that the issue of parental

civil liability should be resolved in accordance with the provisions
of Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the reasons well expressed in
Salen and adopted in the cases hereinbefore enumerated that to
hold that the civil liability under Article 2180 would apply only to
quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses would result in the
absurdity that in an act involving mere negligence the parents
would be liable but not where the damage is caused with
criminal intent. xxx

Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby

rule that the parents are and should be held primarily liable for
the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by
their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who
live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted
with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such
damages.

That primary liability is premised on the provisions of

Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages
ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or
over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without
discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under
15 years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over
but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be
imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability

shall be effected against the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and
Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve
upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the
mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian,
but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or
family friend of the youthful offender.

However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now,

without such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the
parents and those who exercise parental authority over the
minor offender. For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts
committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance
with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.

In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie

Ann Gotiong was caused by a felony or a quasi-delict committed
by Wendell Libi, respondent court did not err in holding
petitioners liable for damages arising therefrom. Subject to the
preceding modifications of the premises relied upon by it
therefor and on the bases of the legal imperatives herein
explained, we conjoin in its findings that said petitioners failed to
duly exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris familias to
prevent such damages.