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Ong vs. Atty. Delos Santos, AC No. 10179, March 4, 2014 (RANZEL)
Atty. Rutillo B. Pasok vs. Atty. Felipe G. Zapatos, AC No. 7388, October 19, 2016(ANNA)
FACTS:
Atty. Felipe G. Zapatos was the Presiding Judge of the MTC, Tangub City where he
presided over a Forcible Entry case and another civil complaint was filed by Ronald
Rupinta for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale, Reconveyance of Ownership,
Accounting of Rents and Fruits and Attorney's Fees and Damages with Petition tor the
Appointment of a Receiver. The complaint was heard by Atty. Zapatos as a Presiding
Judge. Respondent suspended the scheduled hearing "motu proprio" for reason that there
was still affirmative defenses raised by the defendants, like the issue of lack of
jurisdiction which prompted the plaintiff to file a Manifestation and Memorandum which
made respondent to inhibit himself from trying the case.
Complainant was surprised when he received a Manifestation from the defendants that
they are now represented by respondent (Atty. Zapatos), the former judge who once
presided over the aforesaid case. Despite the warning of the complainant that the
appearance of respondent is highly illegal, immoral, unethical and adverse to the interest
of the public, respondent, being the previous presiding judge, continued on with his
appearance for the appellees by filing a Motion for Extension of Time to Submit
Memorandum. Complainant filed a Motion to Expunge from the Court Records the
Memorandum filed by the Defendants-Appellees through their counsel Ex-MTC and RTC
Judge Felipe G. Zapatos, on the ground that as the former presiding judge of the MTCC,
Tangub City, he is, disqualified to appear as counsel for the defendants
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Zapatos is disqualified to represent the defendants as a

former presiding judge of the case?
Ruling:
Yes. The respondent, in his capacity as the judge of the MTCC of Tangub City, presided
over the case before eventually inhibiting himself from further proceedings. His act of
presiding constituted intervention within the meaning of the rule whose text does not
mention the degree or length of the intervention in the particular case or matter. It is
also plain and unquestionable that Canon 36, supra, from which the canon was derived,
prohibited him as a former member of the Bench from handling any case upon which he
had previously acted in a judicial capacity. In this context, he not only exercised the
power to influence the outcome of the proceedings but also had a direct hand in bringing
about the result of the case by virtue of his having the power to rule on it.
The restriction extended to engagement or employment. The respondent could not accept
work or employment from anyone that would involve or relate to any matter in which he
had intervened as a judge except on behalf of the body or authority that he served during
his public employment.The restriction as applied to him lasted beyond his tenure in
relation to the matters in which he had intervened as judge.11 Accordingly, the fact that
he was already retired from the Bench, or that he was already in the private practice of
law when he was engaged for the case was inconsequential.
Sonia Decena and Rey Decena vs. Judge Nilo Malanyaon, AM RTJ-10-2217, April 8, 2013
(AMZIE)
Facts:
The complainants averred that complainant Rey C. Decena had brought an

administrative case in Regional Office No. V of the Civil Service Commission in Legaspi
City, Albay against Judge Malanyaon’s wife, Dr. Amelita C. Malanyaon (Dr. Amelita),
then the Assistant Provincial Health Officer of the Province of Camarines Sur; that
during the hearing of the administrative case on May 4, 2006, Judge Malanyaon sat
beside his daughter, Atty. Ma. Kristina C. Malanyaon, the counsel of Dr. Amelita in the
case.
During the trial, Judge Malanyaon coached her daughter in making motions by
scribbling on a piece of paper and giving it to his daughter. Judge Malanyaon also
proudly introduced himself and manifested that he was the "counsel of the respondent’s
counsel." When his propriety was questioned since he was a member of the judiciary, he
demanded that he be shown that prohibited him from sitting at the lawyer’s bench. He
insisted that he was merely "assisting" her daughter, who "just passed the bar", defend
the respondent, and was likewise helping the latter defend herself.
The complainants averred that the actuations of Judge Malanyaon during the hearing of
his wife’s administrative case in the Civil Service Commission constituted violations of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippines Judiciary.
Issue: Whether the actuations of Judge Malanyaon complained of constituted conduct

unbecoming of a judge
Ruling:
Yes.
First was Judge Malanyaon’s occupying a seat beside his daughter that was reserved for
the lawyers during the hearing.
Being an incumbent RTC Judge, he always represented the Judiciary, and should have
acted with greater circumspection and self-restraint, simply because the administrative
hearing was unavoidably one in which he could not but be partisan. Simple prudence
should have counselled him to avoid any form of suspicion of his motives, or to suppress
any impression of impropriety on his part as an RTC judge by not going to the hearing
himself.
Second was Judge Malanyaon’s admission that his presence in that hearing was to advise
his daughter on what to do and say during the hearing, to the point of coaching his
daughter.
Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits sitting judges like Judge
Malanyaon from engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to
clients. Section 11, Canon 4 (Propriety), of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule
5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct reiterate the prohibition from engaging in the
private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. The prohibition is based on
sound reasons of public policy,
considering that the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney
are inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion
and privileges of a sitting judge.
Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the Bench must accept that his right to
practice law as a member of the Philippine Bar is thereby suspended, and it shall
continue to be so suspended for the entire period of his incumbency as a judge. The term
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or to participation in court
proceedings, but extends to the preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a
litigation, the giving of legal advice to clients or persons needing the same, the
preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, and the
preparation of papers incident to actions and special proceedings.
Jessie R. De Leon vs. Atty. Eduardo G. Castelo, AC No. 8620, January 12, 2011 (TINA)
FACTS
De Leon accuses Atty Castelo with serious administrative offenses of dishonesty and
falsification warranting his disbarment or suspension as an attorney. Such was allegedly
committed by his filing for defendants Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu (in a Civil Case No
4674MN) of various pleadings despite said spouses being already deceased at the time of filing.
Atty Castelo’s explained in his comment that he prepared the initial pleadings based on
his honest belief that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were then still living. Had he known
that they were already deceased, he would have most welcomed the information and would have
moved to substitute Spouses decedents as defendants for that reason.
ISSUE
Whether or not Atty Castelo commit any falsehood or falsification in his pleadings in
Civil Case No 4674MN, thus violating the lawyers oath and code of professional responsibility?
RULING
NO. The statements that a lawyer may make in behalf of their clients that are relevant,
pertinent, or material to the subject of inquiry are absolutely privileged regardless of their
defamatory tenor.
The respondent directly stated in the answer to the complaint in intervention with
counterclaim and cross-claim, supra, and in the clarification and submission, supra, that the
Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were already deceased.
Even granting, for the sake of argument, that any of the respondents pleadings might have
created any impression that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living, respondent
cannot he held guilty of any dishonesty or falsification because the respondent was acting in the
interest of the actual owners of the properties and made clear at the start that the Spouses Lim
Hio and Dolores Chu were no longer the actual owners of the affected properties due to the
transfer of ownership even prior to the institution of the action. Also, he could not disclaim
knowledge that the Spouses were no longer living. His joining in the action as a voluntary
intervenor charged him with notice of all the other persons interested in the litigation.
Magaoaway vs. Avecilla, AC No. 7072, July 26, 2016(ROCHELLE)
FACTS:
The Complainants herein averred the following:
That a parcel of land has been mortgaged by the late Gavino Magaoay to the late Elena
Gongon in the amount of Three Thousand Nine hundred (P3,900.00) peso and the late
Gavino Magaoay was not able to redeeme the land because he died prior to the date of
redemption. That they have the right of ownership by virtue of right of hereditary
succession from the original patent holder, the late Gavino Magaway who is the
registered owner which was fraudulently reconstituted and fraudulently sold by virtue of
the falsified deed of sale fictitiously executed by the late Elena Gongon.That it was
Attorney Mariano A. Avecilla who duly prepared, notarized and manipulated the
Falsified Deed of Sale executed by Elena Gongon for a consideration of P30,000.00 as a
package deal in the preparation of the Falsified Deed of Sale. That Gavino Magaoay could
not have signed the request for issuance of separate titles and Public Land Survey Plan
in favor of the Ramiscals because he was unschooled and he died on December 3, 1963 so
that he was already dead for thirty (30) years at the date of the instruments which was
also used in the falsification and unlawful transfer of the aforementioned Transfer
Certificate Titles which was manipulated by Attorney Avecilla and his wife Loreta in
favor of the Ramiscals.
IBP Investigating Commissioner Manuel M. Maramba rendered his report and

recommendation whereby he found in favor of the complainants after giving more weight
and credence to their assertions than to the denial and explanation of the respondent;
and he recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one year,
and the indefinite revocation of the respondent's notarial commission.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation with
modification of the recommended penalty to suspension from the practice of law for one
year and disqualification from being commissioned as notary public for two years.
In the comment he submitted to the Court, the respondent contended that his
notarization of the three documents had not prejudiced anyone considering that the late
Gavino Magaway, the predecessor in interest of the complainants, did not repurchase the
property by April 30, 1960, that the complainants, assuming them to be the true legal
heirs of the late Gavino Magaway, who had died without issue, had nothing more to
inherit; that the sale of the property had been first made on August 5, 1992 by Efren
Vera Cruz, Sr. as the attorney-in-fact of Eleanor Gongon Flores; that on the same date,
Vera Cruz, Sr. had sold the portion of the property with an area of 8.479 hectares to
Angelito Ramiscal, Sr. and his family for P400,000.00; that on December 7, 1993, a
woman in her mid-30's, claiming herself to be an employee of the Office of the Registry of
Deeds of Isabela, had accompanied an elderly woman to the respondent's law office to
request him to notarize the ready-made deed of sale the elderly woman had brought with
her; that he had notarized the document out of pity and kindness for the elderly woman,
who had affixed her thumbprint on the document; and that the elderly woman turned out
to be an impostor.
Issues:
1. Whether the findings of the IBP are correct
Held:
The findings and recommendations of the IBP Board of Governors, being supported by
the records, are adopted.
The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangements in the execution of public documents. In this case, the respondent's affixing
of his notarial seal on the documents and his signature on the notarial acknowledgments
transformed the deeds of sale from private into public documents, and rendered them
admissible in court without further proof of their authenticity because the certificate of
acknowledgment constituted them the prima facie evidence of their execution. In doing
so, he proclaimed to the world that all the parties executing the same had personally
appeared before him; that they were all personally known to him; that they were the
same persons who had executed the instruments; that he had inquired into the
voluntariness of execution of the instrument; and that they had acknowledged personally
before him that they had voluntarily and freely executed the same.
The respondent's rather convenient assertion that an impostor had appeared before him
and affixed her thumbprint on the ready-made deed of sale and affidavit of non-tenancy
does not sway the Court. He should have demanded that such person first prove her
identity before acting on the documents she had brought for his notarization. The
objective of the requirement, which was to enable him as the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the deed of
sale and affidavit of non-tenancy were the party's free act and deed,18 was not to be
served as casually as he did. By not ensuring that the person then appearing before him
as the executor of the documents was really Elena Gongon, not the impostor, he clearly
did not exercise the precautions and observe the protocols that would have easily
insulated the performance of his notarial duties from forgery and falsification.
By his neglect, the respondent undermined the confidence of the public on the worth of
notarized documents. He thus breached Canon I of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, by which he as an attorney commissioned to serve as a notary public was
required to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for
the law and legal processes.
Sandy V. Domingo vs. Atty. Palmarin E. Rubio and Atty. Nicasio T. Rubio, AC No. 7927,
October 19, 2016B (JOY)
FACTS:
The complainant initiated a complaint for disbarment on April 11, 2008 against City
Prosecutor Rubio and Asst. City Prosecutor Rubio, stating that the refusal of the
respondents to comply with the order of the Secretary of Justice had caused the
complainant to remain behind bars for a crime that he had already been exonerated of,
thereby causing him and his family tremendous sufferings; that the respondents had also
withheld the filing at the DOJ of their already prepared motion for reconsideration, and
caused such filing of the motion only many months later; that upon resuming its
proceedings in the criminal case involving the complainant in early 2007, the RTC,
unaware of the appeal by petition for review of Lorna Bongalon in the DOJ, proceeded
with the case in issued on March 1, 2007. The order for the arrest against all the accused,
including the complainant. However, the complainant said that it could have suspended
such proceedings to give way to the exercise of review by the Secretary of Justice and
that the actuations of the respondents were unjust and absolutely prejudicial to him
because he was thereby forced to languished in jail.
The complainant further averred that such act of the respondents deserved to be disbar
or otherwise sanction for their ignorance of the law and misconduct for it violates thereby
the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of the respondents in respect of the filing of the motion for
reconsideration constituted a ground for disbarment.
RULING:
The court ruled in negative. The complainant’s reliance on Section 27 was obviously
misplaced. The observation of the Investigating Commissioner that the Secretary of
Justice was not the same as the superior court referred to by the rule was correct. As
such, the filing by the respondents of the motion for reconsideration was not a defiance or
willful disobedience to the lawful order of the Superior Court.
Moreover, the court stated that any complaint for disbarment or other disciplinary
sanction brought against lawyers that is based on frivolous matters or proof should be
immediately dismissed because its plain objective is to harass or get even with the
respondents. Lawyers are professionals bound to observe and follow the strictest ethical
canons, and to subject them to frivolous unfounded and vexatious charges of misconduct
and misbehavior is to do a disservice to the ideals of justice, and to disregard the
constitution and the laws to which all lawyers vow their enduring fealty.
Thus, the Court absolves respondents of the charges of gross misconduct and
dismissed the complaint for disbarment for utter lack of merit and substance.
Judge Jose Madrid vs. Atty. Juan Dealca, AC No. 7474, September 9, 2014 (ANGELICA)
Facts:
On Feb 7, 2007. Atty. Juan Dealca entered his appearance in a criminal case entitled
People of the Philippines v Philip William Arsenault, presided by complainant judge Jose
Madrid, to replace Atty. Vicente Judar. Atty. Dealca also moved that said criminal case
be re-raffled to another branch of RTC, considering the adverse incidents between Judge
Madrid and himself. Judge Madrid denied the motion on the ground that a case cannot be
removed from the Court due to “personal sentiments of counsel who was not even the
original counsel of the litigant”.
Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint in the Office of the Bar Confidant
citing Atty. Dealca’s unethical practice of entering his appearance and then moving for
the inhibition of the presiding judge on the pretext of previous adverse incidents between
them. Atty. Dealca asserted in his comment-complaint that Judge Madrid’s order
unconstitutionally and unlawfully deprived the accused of the right to counsel, due
process, and to a fair and impartial trial, that he exhibited bias in failing to act on the
motion to lift and set aside the warrant of arrest issued against accused, and that it
should be him who should be disbarred and dismissed from the Judiciary for gross
ignorance of the law.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Dealca’s contravened his duties as a lawyer.
Ruling:
No. In this case, the Supreme Court cites Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Canon 11: A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due the courts and to the
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.04: A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record
or have no materiality to the case.
All lawyers are thus bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts, and to
promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. It is the respect for the courts
that guarantees the stability of the judicial institution. It was incumbent of Atty. Dealca
to establish the ground of bias and prejudice in order to disqualify Judge Madrid from
participating in a particular trial in which the former was participating as a counsel. His
allegations of Judge Madrid’s partiality or hostility did not suffice, because the
presumption that Judge Madrid would undertake his noble role to dispense justice
according to law and the evidence and without fear or favor should only be overcome by
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. As such, Atty. Dealca clearly contravened
his duties as a lawyer as expressly stated in Canon 11 and Rule 11.04.
Louisito N. Chua vs. Atty. Oscar A. Pascua, AC No. 10757, December 05, 2016
(EDCARL)
FACTS:
The complainant accused the respondent of violating several provisions of the CPR for
allegedly submitting a comment/opposition in which he used foul language and insulting
words like “duped; to take advantage of the innocence of; his ignorance and abusive
manner; and foolishness” in reference to the complainant as one of the adverse parties
and “bungling” in reference to the trial judge.
The Investigating Commissioner found this as sufficient reason to render a

recommendation for the suspension of the herein respondent, which was verily adopted
and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in a resolution.
ISSUE:
Were the aforementioned terms and phrases offensive so as to validly suspend the
respondent for violating the CPR?
HELD:
NO. The SC reversed the IBP Board of Governors’ resolution.
Every lawyer is required to act with courtesy at all times, even towards the adverse
parties. This duty is clearly imposed by the Rules of Court which mandates lawyers to
"abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he
is charged."[20] Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reiterates
this duty by commanding that "[a] lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper."
However, the Investigating Commissioner did not explain or justify his conclusion
against Atty. Pascua, particularly to disclose why he considered the words and phrases of
Atty. Pascua adverted to as offensive and intemperate. Words and phrases like duped, to
take advantage of the innocence of, his ignorance and abusive manner, foolishness, and
bungling (even if the latter referred to the act of the trial judge) are of common usage in
our daily life. They should be understood by what they ordinarily convey. Admittedly,
they can at times be considered as off-color or even as abrasive, but their being so
considered depends on the specific context or situation in which they are used or uttered.
That they have synonyms or alternatives that are more orless expressive does not
warrant characterizing them as excessive, intemperate or offensive. To depreciatingly
generalize about them, as the Investigating Commissioner obviously did, is to
unwarrantedly relegate them to a negative light.
Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint on the Alleged Involvement and for Engaging in the
Business of Lending Money at Usurious Rates of Interest of Ms. Dolores T. Lopez, and
Mr. Fernando M. Montalvo, AM No. 2010-21-SC, September 30, 2014 (RANZEL)
Anonymous complaint is always received with great caution, originating as it does from a
source unwilling to identify himself or herself. It is suspect for that reason. But the mere
anonymity of the source should not call for the outright dismissal of the complaint on the
ground of its being baseless or unfounded provided its allegations can be reliably verified
and properly substantiated by competent evidence, like public records of indubitable
integrity, "thus needing no corroboration by evidence to be offered by the complainant,
whose identity and integrity could hardly be material where the matter involved is of
public interest," or the declarations by the respondents themselves in reaction to the
allegations, where such declarations are, properly speaking, admissions worthy of
consideration for not being self-serving. the anonymous complaint has to be dealt with,
and its veracity tested with utmost care, for it points the finger of accusation at two
employees of the Court for engaging in money-lending activities at unconscionable rates
of interest, with low-ranking employees of the Court as their targets.
FACTS: An undated letter-complain addressed to the Complaints and Investigation

Division (CID) of the Office of Administrative Services (OAS) of the Supreme Court
triggered this administrative matter. The letter complaint, purportedly sent by a
concerned employee who chose to remain anonymous, assailed the profitable money-
lending with usurious interest scheme engaged in by respondents Dolores T. Lopez, an
SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, and Fernando M. Montalvo, an SC Supervising Judicial
Staff Officer, both of the Checks Disbursement Division of the Court’s Fiscal
Management and Budget Office (FMBO).
It stated that the respondents had been involved in the money-lending activities
targeting the low-salaried employees of the Court like the drivers and employees of the
janitorial services; that such money-lending had been going on with the help of the
personnel of the Checks Disbursement Division of FMBO by enticing employees of the
Court to pledge forthcoming benefits at a discounted rate; and that around 300
Automated Teller Machine (ATM) cards were surrendered by the borrowers to the
respondents as collateral for the individual borrowings.
Lopez denied the allegation that she had lent money to around 300 court employees, and
that she had held their ATM cards in her custody as collateral; but admitted having lent
money to only about 20 personnel of the janitorial agency and to some low-ranking
employees of the Court, like the utility workers and messengers for a period of two years.
She said that she would receive only P10.00 for every P100.00 borrowed that she did not
consider as interest. She insisted that she did not require her borrowers to pay her the
P10.00 for every P100.00 borrowed because they voluntarily gave her the amount; and
that she did not engage in money lending because she did not offer to lend money to
anyone.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not Lopez and Montalvo are guilty of lending money with usurious
interest rates?
RULING: The respondents are both responsible fiduciary officers in the FMBO, the office
that is in charge of all the financial transactions of the Court, including the preparation
and processing of vouchers to cover the payment of salaries, allowances, office supplies,
equipment and other sundry expenses, utilities, janitorial, and security services, and
maintenance and other operating expenses, and the issuance of corresponding checks
therefor. The respondents discharge the delicate task of handling the payment of
employees’ salaries and allowances.
(Ruling on Montalvo) The complaint against Montalvo involvement in money lending was
not shown to be habitual, going on only as far as accommodating his friends during their
personal emergencies without imposing any interests. The statement in the letter-
complaint to the effect that both respondents have been in the forefront of syndicated
lending activities was not supported by any proof. It is notable that Montalvo firmly
denied the allegations against him, and that Lopez corroborated his denial.
(Ruling on Lopez) Ms. Lopez is guilty of lending money with interest which at most would
reach up to 10% of the total amount borrowed. While she denied that the loan is
somewhat like the famously known "5-6" loan.
She is the Chief of the Checks Disbursement Division that handles the preparation and
issuance of checks to court employees. It is beyond question that her official functions
consist of, among others, the supervision of office staff. This gives us the impression that
she took advantage of her position and abused the confidence reposed in her office, thus,
placing at risk the integrity of the division and the whole Fiscal Management and Budget
Office (FMBO). As an officer of the FMBO she can be privy of the benefits which may be
given. From there, employees can borrow and/or advance money from her and where she
may easily accede knowing that after all there will be benefits forthcoming.
Her actuation although not related to her official functions as division chief, has
undeniably fell short of the high standards of propriety expected of employees of the
Judiciary. It is considered as conduct unbecoming of an official of the Judiciary.
ISSUE 2: Did Lopez’s money-lending activities render her administratively liable?
RULING: Yes. "moonlighting" activities : Although many "moonlighting" activities were

themselves legal acts that would be permitted or tolerated had the actors not been
employed in the public sector, moonlighting, albeit not usually treated as a serious
misconduct, can amount to a malfeasance in office by the very nature of the position held.
In the case of Lopez, her being the Chief of the Checks Disbursement Division of the
FMBO, a major office of the Court itself, surely put the integrity of the Checks
Disbursement Division and the entire FMBO under so much undeserved suspicion. She
ought to have refrained from engaging in money lending, particularly to the employees of
the Court. We do not need to stress that she was expected to be circumspect about her
acts and actuations, knowing that the impression of her having taken advantage of her
position and her having abused the confidence reposed in her office and functions as such
would thereby become unavoidable. There is no doubt about her onerous lending
activities greatly diminishing the reputation of her office and of the Court itself in the
esteem of the public. She plainly disregarded the Constitution.
Misconduct in office refers to any unlawful behavior by a public officer in relation to the
duties of his office that is willful in character. The term embraces acts that the office
holder had no right to perform, acts performed improperly, and failure to act in the face
of an affirmative duty to act. The Court has invariably imposed commensurate sanctions
upon court employees found and declared to be violating Administrative Circular No. 5.
ISSUE 3: WON the Court unfairly selective in causing their investigation upon the
anonymous complaint but ignoring the "far more serious accusations" against
"employees, officials and justices even." Their accusation has tended to diminish the
public’s faith and confidence in the Court itself.
RULING 3: No. In ordering the administrative investigation of the respondents, the
Court was moved only by the most laudable of purposes.
The investigation would never be unfair because they would thereby be accorded the full
opportunity to be heard in order to clear them. The Court accords to Montalvo and Lopez
the reasonable opportunity to show because why they should not be disciplined or
otherwise sanctioned for their censurable statements.
They were not being singled out because the Court has always acted upon every
appropriate complaint or grievance – anonymous or not – brought against officials and
employees of the Judiciary without regard to their ranks or responsibilities, including
any of its sitting Members, the incumbent Justices of the third-level courts, and other
active judges of the first and second levels of the courts.
Verily, everyone who works in the Judiciary answers to the exacting standards of conduct
in order to maintain the integrity of the Judiciary and to preserve the esteem of the
public for the courts, for the very image of the Judiciary is inescapably epitomized in the
official conduct and the non-official demeanor of judicial officers and court personnel. To
accuse the Court of unfairness and discrimination was, therefore, censurable.
Ferdinand A. Samson vs. Atty. Edgardo O. Era, AC No. 6664, July 16, 2013 (ANNA)
FACTS:
Ferdinand A. Samson and his relatives were among the investors who fell prey to the
pyramiding scam perpetrated by ICS Exports, Inc. Exporter, Importer, and Multi-Level
Marketing Business (ICS Corporation), a corporation whose corporate officers were led by Sison.
Samson engaged Atty. Era to represent and assist him and his relatives in the criminal
prosecution of Sison and her group. Pursuant to the engagement, Atty. Era prepared the
demand letter dated July 19, 2002 demanding the return or refund of the money subject of their
complaints. He also prepared the complaint-affidavit that Samson signed and swore to on July
26, 2002.
In April 2003, Atty. Era called a meeting with Samson and his relatives to discuss the
possibility of an amicable settlement with Sison and her cohorts. He told Samson that they
could settle the cases with Sison and her group, with him guaranteeing the turnover to them of
a certain property located in Antipolo City belonging to ICS Corporation in exchange for their
desistance. They acceded and executed the affidavit of desistance he prepared, and in turn they
received a deed of assignment covering land registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
R-4475 executed by Sison in behalf of ICS Corporation.
absolute sale to enable them to liquidate the property among themselves. It took some
period of negotiations between them and Atty. Era before the latter delivered to them five
copies of a deed of absolute sale involving the property. However, Atty. Era told them that
whether or not the title of the property had been encumbered or free from lien or defect would
no longer be his responsibility. He further told them that as far as he was concerned he had
already accomplished his professional responsibility towards them upon the amicable
settlement of the cases between them and ICS Corporation.
When Samson and his co-complainants verified the title of the property at the Registry of
Deeds and the Assessor’s Office of Antipolo City, they were dismayed to learn that they could
not liquidate the property because it was no longer registered under the name of ICS
Corporation but was already under the name of Bank Wise Inc. Upon their urging, Atty. Era
negotiated as their counsel with ICS Corporation.
During the hearings in the RTC, Atty. Era did not anymore appear for Samson and his
group. This forced them to engage another lawyer. They were shocked to find out later on,
however, that Atty. Era had already been entering his appearance as the counsel for Sison in
her other criminal cases in the other branches of the RTC in Quezon City involving the same
pyramiding scam that she and her ICS Corporation had perpetrated.
Samson executed an affidavit alleging the foregoing antecedents, and praying for Atty.
Era’s disbarment on the ground of his violation of the trust, confidence and respect reposed in
him as their counsel.
Upon being required by the Court to comment on the complaint against him within 10
days from notice, Atty. Era several times sought the extension of his period to file the comment
to supposedly enable him to collate documents relevant to his comment. The Court granted his
request and allowed him an extension totaling 40 days. But despite the lapse of the extended
period, he did not file his comment.
Atty. Era alleged that the conclusion on April 23, 2002 of the compromise settlement
between Samson and his group, on one hand, and Sison and her ICS Corporation, on the other,
had terminated the lawyer-client relationship between him and Samson and his group; and that
on September 1, 2003, he had been appointed as counsel de officio for Sison only for purposes of
her arraignment.
The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBPCBD)

found Atty. Era guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests, for failing to serve
his clients with competence and diligence, and for failing to champion his clients’ cause with
wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion.
ISSUE:
Whether conflict of interest exist when Atty. Era started appearing as counsel for ICS
Corporation.
HELD:
Yes. There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or
more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty
to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client."
This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but
also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney
from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a
lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or
former clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving
the same or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if
the former client consents to it after consultation.
Contrary to Atty. Era’s ill-conceived attempt to explain his disloyalty to Samson and his
group, the termination of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent
an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is
that the client’s confidence once given should not be stripped by the mere expiration of the
professional employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do
anything that will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which the lawyer
previously represented the client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of the client’s
confidences acquired in the previous relation.
In this regard, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly declares

that: "A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him."
Nilo B. Diongzon vs. Atty. William Mirano, AC No. 2404, August 17, 2016 (AMZIE)
Facts:
In 1979 complainant Diongzon, a businessman engaged in the fishing industry in Bacolod

City, Negros Occidental, retained respondent Atty. Mirano as his legal counsel to represent him
as the plaintiff in a civil case then pending in the City Court of Bacolod City.
In November 1981, the complainant again retained the respondent as his lawyer in
relation to the execution of two deeds of sale covering the boats the former was selling to
Spouses Almanzur and Milagros Gonzales (Gonzaleses).
In January 1982, the parties herein signed a retainer contract for legal services that
covered legal representation in cases and transactions involving the fishing business of
complainant Diongzon.
In February 1982, the Gonzaleses sued Diongzon for replevin and damages, and sought
the annulment of the aforementioned deeds of sale. They were represented by Atty. Romeo
Flora, the associate of respondent Atty. Mirano in his law office.
It appears that the respondent Atty. Mirano eventually entered his appearance as the
counsel for the Gonzaleses against Diongzon. Therefore, Diongzon initiated this administrative
complaint for disbarment against the respondent by verified letter-complaint.
The respondent stated that Diongzon had been his client in a different civil case; that
Diongzon had never consulted him upon any other legal matter; that Diongzon had only
presented the deeds of sale prepared by another lawyer because he had not been contented with
the terms thereof; that he had not been Diongzon's retained counsel because the retainer
agreement did not take effect; that he had returned the amount paid to him by Diongzon; that
he had appeared for the Gonzaleses only after their evidence against Diongzon had been
presented.
The complaint was referred to the IBP for investigation. The IBP Board of Governors
finally recommended that the respondent be held guilty of conflict of interest for appearing as
the counsel for the "opponents of Diongzon with whom he had an existing lawyer-client
relationship, a gross violation of his ethical duties as an attorney.
ISSUE:
Was there an attorney-client relationship established between the complainant Diongzon

and Atty. Mirano that would make the latter guilty of representing conflict of interest?
RULING:
YES.
The lawyer-client relationship begins from the moment a client seeks the lawyer's advice
upon a legal concern. The seeking may be for consultation on transactions or other legal
concerns, or for representation of the client in an actual case in the courts or other fora. From
that moment on, the lawyer is bound to respect the relationship and to maintain the trust and
confidence of his client. No written agreement is necessary to generate a lawyer-client
relationship, but in formalizing it, the lawyer may present a retainer agreement to be
considered and agreed to by the client. As with all contracts, the agreement must contain all the
terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties.
In this case, the respondent presented such a retainer contract to the complainant, the
terms of which are stated below:
The CLIENT retains and employs the ATTORNEY to take charge of the legal matters of
the former in connection with his fishing business, and the attorney accepts such retainer and
employment subject to the following terms and conditions, to wit:
1. That the term of this contract shall be for two "2" years beginning February, 1982 but
is deemed automatically renewed for the same period if not terminated by both parties by virtue
of an agreement to that effect and signed by them;
2. That the compensation to be paid by the client for the services of the attorney, shall be
three hundred pesos (P300.00) a month;
3. That the attorney may be consulted at all times by CLIENT on all business requiring
his professional advice and opinion and when the ATTORNEY gives a written opinion, a copy
shall be sent to the CLIENT;
4. That the duties of the attorney in this retainer contract shall include consultations,
opinions, legal advices, preparations and drafting of contracts and other legal papers, and other
legal works, in connection with the business of the CLIENT, except those cases involving trials
in court, which if they are entrusted to the ATTORNEY, shall be subject to a new agreement;
The lawyer-client relationship between the parties was duly established beginning in
1979 and lasted until 1982. The respondent's claim that he returned the retainer fee did not
alter the juridical existence of their lawyer-client relationship. When the complainant consulted
him on the sale of the boats to the Gonzaleses, the respondent reviewed the contracts of sale in
the capacity of the complainant's lawyer, and even notarized the same. He became aware of the
details of the sale by virtue of the confidentiality generated by his lawyer-client relationship
with the complainant.
A conflict of interest exists when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two

opposing parties, like when the lawyer performs an act that will injuriously affect his first client
in any matter in which he represented him, or when the lawyer uses any knowledge he
previously acquired from his first client against the latter.
When he appeared in court for the benefit of the Gonzaleses to try the case against the
complainant, the respondent unquestionably incurred a conflict of interest. Having become
privy to the terms of the sale subject of the civil case, the conflict of interest became
unmitigated because the complainant had not expressly consented in writing to his appearing
in behalf of the Gonzaleses. It would have been more prudent for him to have excused himself
from representing either party in the civil case.
Bayonla vs. Reyes, AC No. 4808, November 22, 2011 (TINA)
Teresita T. Bayonla (Bayonla) and her uncle, Alfredo Tabada (Alfredo) were the
compulsory heirs of Paz Durban (Paz). The land which Paz co-owned was expropriated for the
construction of the Bancasi Airport. An expropriation compensation amounting to
P2,453,429.00 was to be paid to Bayonla and Alfredo. Thus, they engaged the legal services of
Atty. Reyes to collect their share in the expropriation compensation from the Air Transportation
Office (ATO), Cagayan De Oro City. They agreed that Atty. Reyes’ attorneys fees would be 10%
of whatever amount would be collected. In November 1993, Atty. Reyes had collected P1 million
from the ATO. Bayonla’s share, after deducting Atty. Reyes’ attorneys fees, would have been
P75,000.00, but Atty. Reyes had delivered to her only P23,000.00, and had failed to deliver the
balance of P52,000.00 despite repeated demands. Thereafter, on June 5, 1995, Atty. Reyes had
collected the amount of P121,119.11 from the ATO. Bayonla's share, after deducting Atty.
Reyes’ attorneys fees, would have been P109,007.20, but Atty. Reyes had handed her only
P56,500.00, and had failed to deliver the balance of P52,507.20.
Consequently, Bayonla charged Atty. Reyes with gross dishonesty, deceit, conversion,
and breach of trust. Bayonla alleged that Atty. Reyes should be disbarred for depriving her of
her just share in the expropriation compensation. In her comment, Atty. Reyes admitted that
Bayonla and Alfredo had engaged her legal services for the purpose of collecting their share in
the expropriation compensation; and that as consideration for her services, Bayonla and Alfredo
had agreed upon a 40% contingent fee for her.
Upon investigation, IBP Commissioner Navarro found and recommended that Atty.
Reyes be required to render an accounting or inventory of all the collected shares due the
Bayonla and remit to the latter the said amount of P44.582.66; and that until such time that
Atty. Reyes had complied with the aforementioned, she is suspended from the practice of her
legal profession. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved Commissioner Navarro’s
report.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Reyes is guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING:
YES. Conformably with the said canons of professional responsibility, the Court has held
that a lawyer is obliged to render an accounting of all the property and money she has collected
for her client. This obligation includes the prompt reporting and accounting of the money
collected by the lawyer by reason of a favorable judgment to his client.
Based on the records, Bayonla and Alfredo would each receive the amount of P84,852.00
out of the first release, and the amount of P121,119.11 out of the second release. Bayonla’s total
share from the two releases was P205,971.11. With Atty. Reyes being entitled to P82,388.44 as
attorneys fees, the equivalent of 40% of Bayonla’s share, the net share of Bayonla was
P123,582.67. Yet, Atty. Reyes actually delivered to her only P79,000.00, which was short by
P44,582.67. Despite demands by Bayonla and despite the orders from the IBP Board of
Governors for her to remit the shortage, Atty. Reyes refused to do so.
By not delivering Bayonla’s share despite her demand, Atty. Reyes violated the
aforestated canons. The money collected by Atty. Reyes as the lawyer of Bayonla was
unquestionably money held in trust to be immediately turned over to the client. The unjustified
withholding of money belonging to the client warrants the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
on the lawyer. Without doubt, Atty. Reyes failure to immediately account for and to deliver the
money upon demand was deceit, for it signified that she had converted the money to her own
use, in violation of the trust Bayonla had reposed in her. It constituted gross misconduct for
which the penalty of suspension from the practice of law became justified pursuant to Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
The proper penalty for Atty. Reyes is suspension from the practice of law for two years,
with warning that a similar offense by her will be dealt with more severely. Atty. Reyes is
further obliged to pay to Bayonla the amount of P44,582.67, which the IBP Board of Governors
found to be still unpaid, by way of restitution. In addition, Atty. Reyes is liable for interest of
12% per annum reckoned from June 22, 1997, the date when she was formally charged with
disbarment.
The Christian Spiritists in the Philippines, Inc., vs. Mangallay, AC No. 10483, March 16,
2016 (ROCHELLE)
FACTS:
Atty. Daniel Mangallay filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Maria Omiles and
all persons staying with and/or acting in her behalf, including all Officers and/or patrons of the
Church of the Christian Spiritists in the Philippines, represented by Pastor Maliked. Atty.
Mangallay claimed ownership of the land where the church of CSP-PLC had been erected. MTC
later on decided the case by declaring Atty. Mangallay to have the better right of possession.
MTC further declared that the CSP-PLC was a builder in good faith, without prejudice to the
respondent exercising his option to appropriate the building n accordance with Article 448 of
the Civil Code.
After receiving the decision of the MTC, the parties entered into a compromise agreement
by virtue of which the CSP-PLC withdrew its appeal and promised to voluntarily vacate and
surrender the disputed premises in consideration of P300,000.00 to be paid by Atty.Mangallay.
Despite his having paid the same, the CSP-PLC did not vacate the premises even within the
grace period given to them. Atty. Mangallay sought and obtained the writ of execution from the
MTC. The CSP-PLC did not comply with the writ of execution to remove or demolish its
structures on the premises. Atty. Mangallay consequently sought from the MTC the writ of
demolition and the MTC issued the writ of demolition.
The demolition impelled the CSP-PLC, represented by its local Minister, Edwin A. Pante,
to bring the disbarment complaint against the respondent based on his allegedly gross
misconduct and deceit in causing the demolition of the structure without the demolition order
from the court, violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, and disobedience to a lawful order of the court,
positing that he thereby abused his legal knowledge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not referral of the complaint to the IBP for the conduct of the formal
investigation is compulsory.
RULING:
No. Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of an attorney may be taken by

the Court, motu proprio, or by the IBP itself upon the verified complaint of any person. (Section
1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court)
Should the disciplinary complaint against the attorney be filed directly with the Court,
the complaint is referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. The
reference to the IBP is resorted to whenever the factual basis for the charge may be contested or
disputed, or may require the reception of the evidence of the complainant and the respondent
attorney. After the referral and hearings, the IBP renders its findings and recommendations on
the complaint, subject to the review by the Court. Yet, the Court may dispense with the referral
to the IBP and resolve the charge without delay. This happens particularly when the charge is
patently frivolous, or insincere, or unwarranted, or intended only to harass and spite the
respondent attorney.
The Court has not enunciated any rule that prohibits the direct filing with it of
administrative complaints against attorneys in order to emphasize its role as the guardian of
the legal profession with the ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. The disciplinary power
of the Court is both a right and a duty. Quite recently, the Court has revised Rule 139-B to
eliminate any ambiguity about the authority of the Court to directly receive administrative
complaints against attorneys.
Under the revisions of Rule 139-B, the administrative complaints against attorneys are
generally not dismissed outright but are instead referred for investigation, report and
recommendation either to the IBP, or the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), or any office of the
Court or even a judge of a lower court. Such referral ensures that the parties’ right to due
process is respected as to matters that require further inquiry and which cannot be resolved by
the mere valuation of the documents attached to the pleadings. Consequently, whenever the
referral is made by the Court, the IBP, the OBC or the authorized office or individual must
conduct the formal investigation of the administrative complaint, and this investigation is a
mandatory requirement that cannot be dispensed with except for valid and compelling reasons
because it serves the purpose of threshing out all the factual issues that no cursory evaluation
of the pleadings can determine.
However, the referral to the IBP is not compulsory when the administrative case can be
decided on the basis of the pleadings filed with the Court, or when the referral to the IBP for
the conduct of formal investigation would be redundant or unnecessary, such as when the
protraction of the investigation equates to undue delay. Dismissal of the case may even be
directed at the outset should the Court find the complaint to be clearly wanting in merit.
Indeed, the Rules of Court should not be read as preventing the giving of speedy relief whenever
such speedy relief is warranted.
It is upon this that we dispense with the need to refer the complaint against the
respondent to the IBP for the conduct of the formal investigation. The documents he submitted
to substantiate his denial of professional wrongdoing are part of the records of the trial court,
and, as such, are sufficient to establish the unworthiness of the complaint as well as his lawful
entitlement to the demolition of the structures of the defendants in Civil Case.
Atty. Maturan vs. Judge Gutierrez-Torres, AM OCA IPI No. 04-1606-MTJ, September 19,
2012 (JOY)
FACTS:
Atty. Maturan, the counsel for the private complainant, filed a complaint against Judge
Torres, the former Presiding Judge of MeTC in Mandaluyong City charging her with
unjustifiably delaying the rendition of the decision in his client’s criminal case. Atty.
Matruan averred that the criminal case had remained pending and unresolved despite its
having been submitted for decision since June 2002 yet. Atty. Maturan stated that Judge
Torres’ failure to render the judgment within the 90-day period from submission of the
case for decision violated Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the
Constitution, and constituted gross inefficiency. The Office of the Court Administrator
directed her to submit her comment. Notwithstanding the liberality of the Court in
granting several extensions, she still did not submit a comment. The OCA recommended
that Judge Torres be administratively sanctioned.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Torres violated Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct?
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court adopt the findings and the recommendations of the OCA. The
Court said that a judge like Judge Torres should be imbued with a high sense of duty and
responsibility in the discharge of the obligation to promptly administer justice. She must
cultivate a capacity for promptly rendering her decisions. Should she anticipate that she
would need a period longer that what the Constitution and the issuances of the Court
prescribe within which to render her decision or resolution, she should request a proper
extension of the period from the Court, through OCA, and lay out in the request the
justification for her inability. She was clearly guilty of gross inefficiency, especially
because her inability to decide the case within the required period became absolutely
devoid of excuse after she did not bother to proffer any explanation of her inability. The
Court finds Judge Torres guilty of gross inefficiency and imposes on her a fine of P20,
000.00.
Robert Victor G. Seares, Jr. Vs. Atty. Saniata Liwliwa V. Gonzales-Alzate, ADM. Case
No. 9058, November 14, 2012 (ANGELICA)
Facts:
Robert Seares, Jr. alleges that Atty Gonzales-Alzate was his legal counsel when he ran
for the position of Municipal Mayor of Dolores, Abra in the 2007 elections. She filed a
Petition of Protest Ad Cautelam in his behalf after he lost by a 50-vote margin to Albert
Guzman. Said petition was dismissed for being fatally defective. She filed another Petition
of Protest in the RTC which was also dismissed on the ground that it was already time-
barred, and for forum shopping. Seares ran again for Municipal Mayor in the 2010
elections and won; he later learned that his political opponents retained her as their
counsel. Barely two months in office, he was charged with abuse of authority, oppression
and grave misconduct in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Atty. Gonzales-Alzate
represented Turqueza, the complainant, as counsel. Seares Jr. further alleges that Atty.
Gonzales-Alzate intentionally made false and hurtful statements in the memorandum she
prepared in that administrative case in order in order to attack him.
Seares, Jr. asserts that Atty. Gonzales-Alzate thereby violated Canon 15, Canon 17 and
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for negligently handling his election
protest, for prosecuting him, her former client, and for uttering false and hurtful
allegations against him. Atty. Gonzales-Alzate denies the charges against her.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Gonzales-Alzate is guilty of professional negligence and

incompetence in her handling .of Seares, Jr.’s electoral protest.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that for administrative liability to attach, the negligent act
of the attorney should be gross and inexcusable as to lead to a result that was highly
prejudicial to the client’s interest. The court has found the attendance of inexcusable
negligence when and attorney resorts to a wrong remedy, or belatedly files an appeal, or
inordinately delays the filing of a complaint. Gross misconduct on the part of an attorney
is determined from the circumstances of the case, the nature of the act done and the
motive that induced the attorney to commit the act. Thus in this case, the court sees no
trace of professional negligence or incompetence on the part of Atty. Gonzales-Alzate in
her handling of Seares, Jr.’s protest. Had Seares, Jr. been prejudiced by her negligent and
incompetent handling of his election protest, he should have denounced her not after
nearly five years have passed.
Mayor Balindong, et.al. vs. CA, et.al., GR No. 177600, LImbona vs. Hon. Judge Balut of
RTC Branch 76, GR No. 178684, October 19, 2015(EDCARL)
FACTS:
This is a consolidated case of the review of Balindong, et al’s criminal cases as decided by
the CA on one hand and the “Petition to Show Cause Why Respondent Should Not be Held in
Contempt of Court” brought by Limbona, the private complainant in the criminal cases
instituted against Balindong, et al, charging the Presiding Judge Balut of RTC Branch 76 with
Contempt of Court for issuing the order dated July 16, 2007, suspending the proceedings in the
criminal cases against Balindong, et al out of judicial courtesy, on the other.
ISSUE:
Did Judge Balut disobey the decisions of the court by suspending the proceedings our of
judicial courtesy, thus subjecting him to being charged with Contempt of Court?
HELD:
NO. It is clear that Judge Balut did not thereby disobey the decisions of the Court in G.R.
No. 159962 and G.R. No. 173290. To start with, there was no indication in his Order that bad
faith had moved him to suspend the implementation of the warrants of arrest against Balindong,
et al., or that he had thereby acted with a willful and deliberate intent to disobey or to ignore the
Court's bidding, or to cause injustice to any of the parties. In the absence of the clear showing of
bad faith on his part, his being prudent could only be an error of judgment, for which he could
not be held to account.
Verily, the power of the courts to punish for contempt is to be exercised cautiously,
sparingly, and judiciously.[36] Self-restraint in wielding contempt powers should be the rule
unless the act complained of is clearly contumacious. An act, to be contumacious, must manifest
willfulness, bad faith, or deliberate intent to cause injustice.
Johnny M. Pesto vs. Marcelito M. Millo, AC No. 612, March 13, 2013 (RANZEL)
Facts: Johnny Pesto (Johnny), a Canadian national, charged Atty. Marcelito M. Millo with
conduct unbecoming an officer of the Court, misleading his client, bungling the transfer of title,
and incompetence and negligence in the performance of his duty as a lawyer.
In May 1990, his wife Abella Pesto (Abella) retained the services of Atty. Millo to handle
the transfer of title over a parcel of land to her name, and the adoption of her niece, Arvi Jane
Dizon. Johnny and Abella gave to Atty. Millo the amounts of P14,000.00 for the transfer of title
and P10,000.00 for the adoption case. Atty. Millo thereafter repeatedly gave them false
information and numerous excuses to explain his inability to complete the transfer of title and
made them believe that the capital gains tax for the property had been paid way back in 1991,
but they found out upon their return to the country in February 1995 that he had not yet paid
the tax. When they confronted him, Atty. Millo insisted that he had already paid the same, but
he could not produce any receipt for the supposed payment. Atty. Millo then further promised in
writing to assume the liability for the accrued penalties.
Exasperated by Atty. Millo’s neglect and ineptitude, Johnny brought this administrative
complaint in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). On October 11, 2001, the IBP-CBD,
through Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez-De los Reyes, deemed the case submitted for
resolution. On October 4, 2010, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez, to whom the
case had been meanwhile transferred, submitted a report and recommendation, whereby he
found Atty. Millo liable for violating Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for six months.
Ruling: Every attorney owes fidelity to the causes and concerns of his clients. He must be
ever mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the clients. His duty to safeguard the
clients’ interests commences from his engagement as such, and lasts until his effective release by
the clients. In that time, he is expected to take every reasonable step and exercise ordinary care
as his clients’ interests may require.
Without doubt, Atty. Millo had the obligation to serve his clients with competence and
diligence. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, expressly so
demanded of him, to wit:
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Atty. Millo claimed that his belated response to the charge was due to the assurances of
Abella that she would be withdrawing the complaint. The Court disbelieves him, however, and
treats his claim as nothing but a belated attempt to save the day for himself. He ought to
remember that the withdrawal of an administrative charge for suspension or disbarment based
on an attorney’s professional misconduct or negligence will not furnish a ground to dismiss the
charge. Suspension or disbarment proceedings that are warranted will still proceed regardless of
the lack or loss of interest on the part of the complainant. The Court may even entirely ignore
the withdrawal of the complaint, and continue to investigate in order to finally determine
whether the charge of professional negligence or misconduct was borne out by the record. This
approach bespeaks the Court’s consistent view that the Legal Profession is not only a lofty and
noble calling, but also a rare privilege reserved only for the deserving.
Atty. Millo made his situation even worse by consistently absenting himself from the
scheduled hearings the IBP had set for his benefit. His disregard of the IBP’s orders requiring
his attendance in the hearings was not only irresponsible, but also constituted utter disrespect
for the Judiciary and his fellow lawyers. Such conduct was absolutely unbecoming of a lawyer,
because lawyers are particularly called upon to obey Court orders and processes and are
expected to stand foremost in complying with orders from the duly constituted authorities
The recommended penalty is not well taken. We modify the penalty, because Atty. Millo
displayed no remorse as to his misconduct, and could not be given a soft treatment. His
professional misconduct warranted a longer suspension from the practice of law because he had
caused material prejudice to the clients’ interest. He should somehow be taught to be more
ethical and professional in dealing with trusting clients like Johnny and Abella, who were
innocently too willing to repose their utmost trust in his abilities as a lawyer and in his
trustworthiness as a legal professional. He should remember that misconduct has no place in the
heart and mind of a lawyer who has taken the solemn oath to delay no man for money or malice,
and to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion. Under
the circumstances, suspension from the practice of law for six months is the condign and
commensurate penalty for him.
Re: Complaint Dated January 28, 2014 of Wenefredo Parreno, et.al. Against Hon. Librea-
Leagogo, Hon. Ybañez, and Hon. Lazaro-Javier, Associate Justices of CA, Relative to CA GR SP
No. 108807, OCA IPI No. 14-220-CA-J, March 15, 2015(ANNA)
National Tobacco Administration vs. Castillo, GR No. 154124, August 4, 2010 (AMZIE)
The National Tobacco Administration prays before the Court to review the decision in
their previously decided case and the resolution which denied the motion for reconsideration
filed by the NTA.
The NTA was the losing party in a case decided by the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
which mandated the former to reinstate the cashier who they dismissed due to the abolition of
his position in the Isabela branch. The NTA filed a motion for reconsideration which the CSC
denied for lack of merit. Subsequently they filed a second motion for reconsideration which the
CSC automatically denied since their rules of procedure only prescribes a filing of a motion for
reconsideration once.
The NTA persisted and filed a “petition for admission of the second motion for
reconsideration and of herein supplemental manifestation” citing excusable negligence and the
lack of manpower and resources and the massive workload the counsel has to hurdle in
defending cases, to which the CSC denied immediately. Undaunted still, the NTA filed a petition
for relief before the CSC to which the latter vehemently denied since a petition for relief is not
contemplated within its rules, and is within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals (CA).
The Court of Appeals denied the petition of the NTA and likewise noted that the defense of
excusable negligence and others is not to be merited.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defense of the National Tobacco Administration of excusable

negligence is tenable.
RULING:
NO. Notwithstanding the herculean task that surrounds the counsel of the NTA, the fact
alone that he resorted to the erroneous application of remedies is unjustifiable. The counsel
ought to have known what legal recourse should the Administration take in pursuing its claim.
Moreover, the defense of excusable negligence is not merited as the NTA caused its own
counsel to be overburdened with work and mere volume of cases is not a valid excuse the court
recognizes in complying with the period to appeal.
Campugan, et.al. vs. Atty. Tolentino, AC No. 8261, March 11, 2015; Jessie T. Campugan,
et.al. vs. Atty. Caluya, et.al., AC No. 8725,March 11, 2015 (TINA)
FACTS
Atty. Victorio, Jr. is the counsel of the complainants in a civil action they brought to seek
the annulment of TCT No. N-290546 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City (Civil Case No. Q-
07-59598). They impleaded as defendants Ramon and Josefina Ricafort, etc. and caused to be
annotated on said title their affidavit of adverse claim, as well as notice of lis pendens.
It appears that the parties entered into an amicable settlement during the pendency of
Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 in order to end their dispute. Pursuant to the terms of the amicable
settlement, Atty. Victorio, Jr. filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint, which the RTC granted in
its order upon noting the defendants’ lack of objection thereto and the defendants’ willingness to
similarly withdraw their counterclaim.
Complainants, however, assail an unlawful cancellation of their notice of adverse claim

and their notice of lis pendens, thus, they filed an appeal en consulta with the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) docketed as Consulta No. 4707.
Unable to receive any response or assistance from Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite their having
paid him for his professional services, the complainants felt that said counsel had abandoned
their case.
ISSUE
Whether or not Atty Victorio is liable for abandonment of his client.
RULING
No.
With Atty. Victorio, Jr. assistance as their counsel in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598, the
complainants obtained a fair settlement. The complainants did not competently and persuasively
show any unfaithfulness on the part of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as far as their interest in the litigation
was concerned. Hence, Atty. Victorio, Jr. was not liable for abandonment.
The Law Profession did not burden its members with the responsibility of indefinite
service to the clients; hence, the rendition of professional services depends on the agreement
between the attorney and the client. Atty. Victorio, Jr.’s alleged failure to respond to the
complainants’ calls or visits, or to provide them with his whereabouts to enable them to have
access to him despite the termination of his engagement in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 did not
equate to abandonment without the credible showing that he continued to come under the
professional obligation towards them after the termination of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598.
Spouses Emilio and Alicia Jacinto vs. Atty. Emelie P. Bangot, Jr., AC No. 8494, October 5,
2016
Jacinto v. Bangot, Jr.
804 SCRA 509, A.C. No. 8494
October 5, 2016
Facts:
Spouses Emilio and Alicia Jacinto filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Emelie
Bangot, Jr. for his unjust and dishonest treatment to them as clients. The complainants averred
that they had consulted with the respondent with regard their case in their land. Respondent
had told them that he would be instituting a case for certiorari in their behalf but insinuated
that one of their lots would be his attorney’s fees. On October 7, 2008, respondent requested
them to proceed to his law office which led to the signing of a MOA. Feeling aggrieved, the
complainants decided to bring their complaint against respondent. On the respondent’s part,
denied the allegation of the spouses and that the complaint was a harassment tactic designed to
intimidate him from seeking judicial remedies to settle their dispute on the validity of the MOA
which for him was valid. The IBP Commissioner suspended the respondent from the practice of
law for one ear for his unfair and injudicious treatment of the complainants as clients.
Issue:
Did the respondent violate his ethical duties as a member of the Bar in his dealings with
the complainants?
Ruling:
Yes.
Rationale:
The Court finds and holds that the respondent grossly violated his Lawyer’s Oath and his
ethical duties as an attorney because he did not observe candor and fairness in his dealings with
his clients. To determine the reasonableness of attorney’s fees, the factors as enumerated in Rule
20.1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility may serve as a guide. Surely, the totality of the
respondent’s actuations inevitably eroded public trust in the Legal Profession. On the basis of his
acts and actuations, the attorney’s fees in the form of the lot he charged from them were
unconscionable and unreasonable, and should be struck down for failing to pass muster under
the guidelines.
Czarina T. Malvar vs. Kraft Food Phils., Inc. and/or Bienvenido Bautista, Kraft Foods
International, GR No. 183952, September 9, 2013(JOY)
FACTS:
Malvar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against KFPI and
Bautista in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The Labor Arbiter found and
declared her suspension and dismissal illegal, and ordered her reinstatement, and the payment
of her full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits, plus attorney’s fees. NLRC and
CA affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. After the judgment in her favor became final and
executory Malvar moved for the issuance of a writ of execution but the execution failed due to
questionable computation of the award. Malvar requested for the 2nd issuance of the writ of
execution and was partially complied with but with protest on the part of Kraft by filing a TRO
for further execution since the computation is incorrect. CA ruled in favor of Kraft. Thus, Malvar
appealed.
While her appeal was pending in this Court, Malvar and Kraft entered into a compromise
agreement. Thereafter, Malvar filed an undated Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw Case, praying that
the appeal be immediately dismissed/withdrawn in view of the compromise agreement, and that
the case be considered closed and terminated. Before the Court could act on Malvar’s Motion to
Dismiss/Withdraw Case, the Court received a so called Motion for Intervention to Protect
Attorney’s Rights from Malvar’s counsel. The counsel indicated that Malvar’s precipitate action
had baffled, shocked and even embarrassed the Intervenor/counsel, because it had done
everything legally possible to serve and protect Malvar’s interest.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Malvars motion to dismiss the petition on the ground of the execution if
the compromise agreement was proper.
2. Whether or not the motion for intervention to protect attorneys right can prosper.
RULING:
1. Yes. The Court approves the compromise agreement. The court defined compromise
agreement as contract, whereby the parties undertake reciprocal obligations to avoid litigation,
or put an end to one already commenced. The client may enter into a compromise agreement
with the adverse party to terminate the litigation before a judgment is rendered therein.
However, it is important for the client to show that the compromise agreement does not
adversely affect third persons who are not parties to the agreement.
Further, a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship at
any time with or without cause but such right is not unlimited because good faith is required in
terminating the relationship. The limitation is based on Article 19 of the Civil Code. Such right is
also subject to the right of the attorney to be compensated. This is clear from Section 26, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court.
An attorney may, in the discretion of the court, intervene in the case to protect his rights.
For the payment of his compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the
payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in the case
wherein his services had been retained by the client. Thus, an attorney is entitled to have and to
receive a just and reasonable compensation for services performed at the special instance and
request of his client. The attorney who has acted in good faith and honesty in representing and
serving the interests of the client should be reasonably compensated for his service.
2. Yes. On considerations of equity and fairness, the Court disapproves of the tendencies of
clients compromising their cases behind the backs of their attorneys for the purpose of
unreasonably reducing or completely setting to naught the stipulated contingent fees. Thus, the
Court grants the Intervenor’s Motion for Intervention to Protect Attorney’s Rights as a measure
of protecting the Intervenor’s right to its stipulated professional fees that would be denied under
the compromise agreement. The Court does so in the interest of protecting the rights of the
practicing Bar rendering professional services on contingent fee basis.
The claim for attorney’s fees does not void or nullify the compromise agreement between
Malvar and the respondents. It is duty of the Court not only to ensure that the attorney acts in a
proper and lawful manner, but also to see to it that the attorney is paid his just fees. Even if the
compensation of the attorney is dependent only on winning the litigation, the subsequent
withdrawal of the case upon the client’s initiative would not deprive the attorney of the
legitimate compensation for professional services rendered.
Lily Flores-Salado, Minda Flores Lura, and Fe V. Flores vs. Atty. Roman A. Villanueva,
RR. AC No. 11099, September 27, 2016(ANGELICA)
Facts:
Lily Flores-Salado, Mida Flores-Lura, Anacorito Flores, Angel Flores, Jr. and Fe Flores
presented their adverse claim on the parcel of land situated in Nasipit, Agusan del Norte and
registered under a Transfer Certificate of Title in the names of Spouses Roman Villanueva, Jr.
and Rosario Alipao. The adverse caim was annotated and the Transfer Certificate of Title of the
spouses was canceled. In 2009, complainants Lily Flores-Salado, Minda Flores-Lura, and Fe
Flores lodged their complaint with the IBP charging the respondent with gross dishonestly on
the basis of their assertion that they had not signed the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal. They
further averred that he was disqualified for the position because he had already been 70 years
old at the time of his appointment. The respondent denied the charges, and imputed ill-motives
to the complainants in filing the disbarment complaint against him. Complainants further
prayed for respondent’s disbarment.
The respondent was found liable for gross misconduct in relation to the forged affidavit of
waiver/withdrawal, and was recommended his two-year suspension from the practice of law. The
charge of dishonesty in relation to respondent’s age was dismissed because his birth certificate
prevailed over the documents submitted by the complainants.
Issue:
Whether or not the IBP was in the right when it decided on the complaint against
respondent Atty. Roman Villanueva, Jr.
Ruling:
No. Although it may entertain a disbarment or suspension complaint brought against a

lawyer employed in the government service whether or not the complaint pertained to an act or
conduct unrelated to the discharge of his official functions, the investigation should be carried
out by the agency or office having administrative supervision over him or her when the
allegations of the complaint relate to the qualifications of the respondent to be appointed to the
public office. The complaint for disbarment is sui generis, and the proceeding thereon should
focus only on the qualification and fitness of the respondent lawyer to continue membership in
the Bar.
Interadent Zahntechnik, Phil., Inc., vs. Atty. Rebecca S. Francisco-Simbillo, AC No. 9464,
August 24, 2016 (EDCARL)
FACTS:
Respondent, prior being a full-fledged lawyer, was charged with criminal complaints of
estafa and qualified theft by the complainant, who then sought for her disbarment, the crimes
charged being those involving moral turpitude. However, the said charges were dismissed by
both the City Prosecutor and the DOJ, upon appeal.
ISSUE:
May the disbarment complaint against the respondent prosper?
HELD:
NO. A complaint for disbarment based on the respondent attorney's alleged moral
turpitude cannot prosper after the criminal cases charging him with offenses involving moral
turpitude were dismissed by the competent trial courts. The rule regarding this ground for
disbarment requires the respondent attorney's conviction of the offense involving moral
turpitude by final judgment.
GSIS vs. Cancino-Erum, AM No. RTJ-09-2182, September 25, 2012(RANZEL)
Facts: This administrative complaint emanated from the filing on July 18, 2008 by one
Belinda Martizano (Martizano) of a suit to restrain the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), Land Transportation Office (LTO), Stradcom Corporation
(STRADCOM), Insurance Commission, and Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
from implementing DOTC Department Order No. 2007-28 (DO 2007-28), an issuance that
constituted the LTO the sole insurance provider of compulsory third party liability (CTPL)
that was required for the registration of motor vehicles. The suit, docketed as Civil Case
No. MC08-3660 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Mandaluyong City, claimed that the
implementation of DO 2007-28 would deprive Martizano of her livelihood as an insurance
agent.3 She applied for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO). On July 21,
2008, Civil Case No. MC08-3660 was raffled and assigned to Branch 213 of the RTC,
presided by respondent Judge Carlos A. Valenzuela. On October 2, 2008, GSIS charged
respondent RTC Judge Maria A. CancinoErum, the then Executive Judge of the RTC in
Mandaluyong City, with grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, and violation of the
Rules of Court. On the same date, GSIS also charged Judge Valenzuela with grave
misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, violation of the Rules of Court, and knowingly
rendering an unjust order.6 The charges against the respondents were both based on the
non-raffling of Civil Case No.MC08-3660. Allegedly, Judge Erum violated Section 2, Rule
20 of the Rules of Court by assigning Civil Case No. MC08-3660 to Branch 213 without the
benefit of a raffle.
Issues: Whether or not the filing of an administrative complaint is the proper remedy
against erring judges.
Whether or not respondent Judge violated the rule on raffling of cases.
Held: No. Administrative case is improper for Judges – We have always regarded as a
fundamental precept that an administrative complaint against a judge is inappropriate as
a remedy for the correction of an act or omission complained of where the remedy of appeal
or certiorari is a recourse available to an aggrieved party. Two reasons underlie this
fundamental precept, namely: (a) to hold otherwise is to render judicial office untenable,
for no one called upon to try the facts or to interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment; and (b) to follow a different rule
can mean a deluge of complaints, legitimate or otherwise, and our judges will then be
immersed in and be ceaselessly occupied with answering charges brought against them
instead of performing their judicial functions.
No. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has expressly made the raffle the exclusive method
of assigning cases among several branches of a court in a judicial station by providing in
Section 2 of Rule 20, as follows:
Section 2. Assignment of Cases. – The assignment of cases to the different branches of a

court shall be done exclusively by raffle. The assignment shall be done in open session of
which adequate notice shall be given so as to afford interested parties the opportunity to
be present.
The avowed purpose of instituting raffle as the exclusive method of assigning cases among
several branches of a court in the same station is two-fold: one, to equalize the distribution
of the cases among the several branches, and thereby foster the Court’s policy of
promoting speedy and efficient disposition of cases; and, two, to ensure the impartial
adjudication of cases and thereby obviate any suspicion regarding assignment of cases to
predetermined judges.
Circular No. 7, supra, stated that only the maximum number of cases, according to their
dates of filing, as could be equally distributed to all the branches in the particular station
or grouping should be included in the raffle; and that cases in excess of the number
sufficient for equal distribution should be included in the next scheduled raffle.
Despite not strictly following the procedure under Circular No. 7 in assigning Civil Case
No. MC08-3660 to Branch 213, the respondents as members of the Raffle Committee could
not be held to have violated the rule on the exclusivity of raffle because there were
obviously less TRO or injunction cases available at anytime for raffling than the number of
Branches of the RTC. Given the urgent nature of TRO or injunction cases, each of them
had to be immediately attended to. This peculiarity must have led to the adoption of the
practice of raffling such cases despite their number being less than the number of the
Branches in Mandaluyong City. The practice did not absolutely contravene Circular No. 7
in view of the circular itself expressly excepting under its fourth paragraph, supra, any
incidental or interlocutory matter of such urgent nature (like a TRO application) that
might not wait for the regular raffle.
The urgent nature of an injunction or TRO case demands prompt action and immediate
attention, thereby compelling the filing of the case in the proper court without delay.
Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, et. al., AM OCA IPI No. 11-184-CA-J,
January 31, 2012 (ANNA)
FACTS:
FH-GYMN requested the amendment of Kautusang Bayan Blg.37-02-97 of the City of San
Jose del Monte, Bulacanin order to include the authorization of FH-GYMN’s Chairman to
issue motorized tricycle operators permit to its members. It was alleged that during the
public hearings, employees of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, have uttered statements
exhibiting their bias against FH-GYMN, and believed that the Committee members were
favoring the existing franchisees. The Sanggunian, acting upon the recommendation of the
Committee, denied the request of FH-GYMN.FH-GYMN brought a complaint in the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for violations of Article 124(2)(d) of the Cooperative Code,
Section 3(e) and (f) of the Republic Act No. 3019 also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, and Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713 also known as the Code of
Conduct for Public Officials and Employees.The complaint of FH-GYMN was dismissed
and its subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. FH-GYMN timely filed a
petition for review in the CA and was denied. FH-GYMN moved for the reconsideration
with prayer for inhibition, but the CA’s Sixth Division denied the motion. Thereafter,
Ongjoco initiated this administrative case against the CA’s Sixth Division.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the administrative complaint against the respondent Justices of the Court
of Appeals is meritorious
RULING:
No. In administrative cases involving judicial officers, the complainants always carried on
their shoulders the burden of proof to substantiate their allegations through substantial
evidence. That standard of substantial evidence is satisfied only when there is reasonable
ground to believe that the respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of
although such evidence may not be overwhelming or even preponderant. The Court seizes
this occasion, therefore, to stress once again that disciplinary proceedings and criminal
actions brought against any judge in relation to the performance of his official functions
are neither complementary to nor suppletory of appropriate judicial remedies, nor a
substitute for such remedies. Any party who may feel aggrieved should resort to these
remedies, and exhaust them, instead of resorting to disciplinary proceedings and criminal
action.
A judge’s failure to correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence
presented does not necessarily incur administrative liability. Administrative sanction and
criminal liability should be visited on him only when the error is so gross, deliberate and
malicious, or is committed with evident bad faith, or only in clear cases of violations by
him of the standards and norms of propriety and good behavior prescribed by law and the
rules of procedure, or fixed and defined by pertinent jurisprudence.
Bides-Ulaso vs. Atty. Noe-Lacsamana, AC No. 7297, September 30, 2009 (AMZIE)
Facts:
Through the respondent as her counsel, Bides opposed the motion to dismiss on August 6,
2003, claiming an inadvertent mistake committed in relation to the signature appearing
above the printed name of the affiant, but offering the excuse that the defective amended
verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping had actually been only a sample-draft
intended to instruct Irene Mallari, the respondents new secretary, on where Bides, as
affiant, should sign. Bides also claimed that the respondents signature above the printed
name of the affiant had not been intended to replace the signature of Bides as the affiant;
that the correct amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping to be appended
to the amended complaint had been executed only on June 23, 2003 due to her (Bides)
delayed arrival from her home province of Abra; and that Mallari had failed to replace
the defective document with the correct amended verification and affidavit of non-forum
shopping.
Issue:
Whether or not the notarization of the jurat of the amended verification and affidavit of
non-forum shopping attached to the initiatory pleading even before the plaintiff-client
has affixed her own signature amounts to censurable conduct on the part of the notary-
counsel
Ruling: Yes.
The lack of bad faith notwithstanding, we nonetheless concur with the findings of
Investigating Commissioner Velez that the respondents notarizing the amended
verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping in the absence of Bides as the affiant
constituted a clear breach of the notarial protocol and was highly censurable.
Being a lawyer commissioned as a notary, the respondent was mandated to discharge

with fidelity the sacred duties appertaining to her notarial office. Such duties being
dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest, she could not disregard the
requirements and solemnities of the Notarial Law. It was emphatically her primary duty
as a lawyer-notary to obey the laws of the land and to promote respect for the law and
legal processes. She was expected to be in the forefront in the observance and
maintenance of the rule of law. She ought to have remembered that a graver
responsibility was placed upon her shoulders by virtue of her being a lawyer.[
Re: Failure of Former Judge Antonio A. Carbonell to Decide Cases Submitted for
Decision and to Resolve Pending Motions in the RTC, Branch 27, July 9, 2013 (TINA)
FACTS
This administrative case originates from the judicial audit conducted by the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA). According to the Audit Team’s Report, Branch 27 had a total
caseload of 231 cases, consisting of 147 criminal cases and 84 civil cases, and Judge
Carbonell failed to decide 41 criminal cases (one inherited) and 22 civil cases (four inherited).
Judge Carbonell was also reported to have failed to resolve pending motions or incidents in
four criminal cases and 12 civil cases.
The OCA recommend to impose a fine of ₱50,000.00 on Judge Carbonell, noting that he
had failed to render any valid reason for his delay in deciding the cases submitted for
decision and in resolving the pending motions or incidents in other cases. It stressed that
heavy caseload would not justify the failure to promptly decide and resolve cases because he
could have simply asked the Court for an extension of time.
ISSUE
Whether or not Judge Carbonell be administratively liable for failure to decide cases
within the reglementary period.
RULING
Yes.
As a frontline official of the Judiciary, a trial judge should at all times act with efficiency
and probity. He is duty-bound not only to be faithful to the law, but also to maintain
professional competence. The pursuit of excellence ought always to be his guiding principle.
Such dedication is the least that he can do to sustain the trust and confidence that the public
have reposed in him and the institution he represents.
Judge Carbonell failed to decide a total of 63 cases and to resolve 16 pending motions or
incidents within the 90-day reglementary period. He intimated that his poor health affected
his pace in deciding the cases. Had such been the case, then he should have explained his
predicament to the Court and asked for an extension of time to decide the cases.
Unfortunately, he failed to do so.
Judge Juanita Guerrero vs. Teresita Ong, AM No. P-09-2676, December 16,
2009(ROCHELLE)
In turn, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that the
administrative matter against Ong be referred for investigation to a consultant of the OCA in
order to ascertain every act of impropriety imputed against her. Accordingly, the Court referred
the administrative matter against Ong to retired Justice Narciso T. Atienza for investigation.
During the investigation, Ong explained that her attendance at the hearings and ocular
inspection had been made only upon the request of Garcia, whose plea for moral support she
could not refuse; that she had not filed applications for leave because her superior had permitted
her to attend the hearings and the ocular inspection; and that her sole purpose for talking with
Judge Guerrero had been only to inform the latter about the case pending in her sala.
Justice Atienza regarded Ong's defense as incredible, and observed that Ong's real
intention in talking with Judge Guerrero in her chambers while in office uniform had been to
influence Judge Guerrero to resolve the pending incident in Garcia’s favor. He concluded that
Ong had attended several hearings and the ocular inspection in Civil Case No. 03-045 in her
office uniform and during office hours; and that on those occasions, she had not filed applications
for leave and had not reflected her undertime in her daily time records
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ong is guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty.
RULING:
YES. Ong was guilty of grave misconduct, for using her official position as a court
employee to secure benefits for Garcia; and of dishonesty, for committing serious irregularities in
the keeping of her DTRs.
A court employee is not prohibited from helping individuals in the course of performing
her official duties, but her actions cannot be left unchecked when the help extended puts under
suspicion the integrity of the Judiciary. Indeed, she is strictly instructed not to use her official
position to secure unwarranted benefits, privileges, or exemptions for herself or for others. The
evident purpose of the instruction is precisely to free the court employees from suspicion of
misconduct.
Ong did not comply with the instruction. Instead, she used her official position as an
employee of the Judiciary to attempt to influence Judge Guerrero to rule in favor of litigant
Garcia, her landlord. She was thereby guilty of misconduct, defined as a transgression of some
established or definite rule of action; or, more particularly, an unlawful behavior on the part of a
public officer or employee. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule
must be manifest. Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official
or employee who unlawfully or wrongfully uses her station or character to procure some benefit
for herself or for another, contrary to the rights of others. It is established herein that Ong
knowingly and corruptly tried to influence Judge Guerrero to favor Garcia in the latter’s pending
civil action.
In addition, Justice Atienza found that Ong had made false entries in her DTRs by
indicating therein that she had been at work although she had been elsewhere. We sustain the
finding of Justice Atienza and pronounce Ong administratively liable for committing
irregularities in the keeping of her DTRs. Her false entries in the DTRs constituted dishonesty,
an act that Section 52, Rule IV, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
classifies as a grave offense for which the penalty of dismissal from the service even for the first
commission is imposable.
Olaguer vs. Judge Ampuan, AM No. MTJ-10-1769, October 6, 2010(JOY)
FACTS:
The complainant charged respondent Judge with delay in rendering a decision, gross
inefficiency, and conduct unbecoming of a judge relative to his handling of Civil Case No. 27653.
The said civil case had been already pending for eight years. The complainant claimed that
respondent had failed to render a decision despite the lapse of six months and had likewise failed
to act on the last two motions he had filed. The complainant averred that the Branch Clerk of
Court had informed him that the cause of delay had been the reconstruction of the various
transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs), which should not be true considering that the original
TSNs had earlier been provided to the parties.
On August 5, 2008, the complainant filed an ex parte manifestation in Civil Case No.
27653, however, respondent Judge rendered no decision despite the lapse of three months.
Thereafter, complainant filed motions to resolve on December 12, 2008 and on February 18,
2009. Still, respondent Judge did not decide Civil Case No. 27653 until only on June 2, 2009,
which was way beyond the three-month reglementary period.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge is guilty of gross negligence.
RULING:
YES. Respondent Judge really failed in his duty to promptly and expeditiously dispose of
Civil Case No. 27653. For such reason, he ran afoul of Supreme Court Administrative Circular
No. 28 which specifically provides ‘The ninety (90) day period for deciding the case shall
commence to run from submission of the case for decision without memoranda; in case the court
requires or allows its filing, the case shall be considered submitted for decision upon the filing of
the last memorandum or upon the expiration of the period to do so, whichever is earlier. Lack of
transcript of stenographic notes shall not be a valid reason to interrupt or suspend the period for
deciding the case unless the case was previously heard by another judge not the deciding judge
in which case the latter shall have the full period of ninety (90) days for the completion of the
transcripts within which to decide the same.’’
Moreover, designations imposed upon respondent Judge did not make him less liable for
the delay. A judge cannot by himself choose to prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that
authorized by law. Had his additional court assignments or designations unduly prevented him
from deciding Civil Case No. 27653, respondent Judge could have easily sought additional time
by requesting an extension from the Court, through the OCAd, but he did not avail himself of
this remedy. Without an order of extension granted by the Court, his failure to decide within the
required period constituted gross inefficiency that merited administrative sanction.
Ferrer and Arandez vs. Judge Rabaca, AM No. MTJ-05-1580, October 6,
2010(ANGELICA)
Facts:
An ejectment suit entitled Young Women’s Christian Association Inc v. Conrado Cano was
decided by respondent Judge Romeo Rabaca, the complainants being the President and the
Executive Director of the plaintiff. Judge Rabaca thereafter denied a motion for Immediate
Execution filed by the plaintiff’s counsel. The complainants averred that respondent Judge’s
denial of their motions had rendered their victory inutile, and had unfairly deprived the plaintiff
of the possession of the premises, and that his refusal to perform an act mandated by the Rules
of Court had given undue advantage to the defendant to the plaintiff’s damage and prejudice.
Respondent Judge denied the charges, claiming the Court was already divested of its jurisdiction
over the case when he ordered the elevation of the records to the appellate court at the time the
complainants filed their motion for Immediate Execution.
Issue:
Whether or not judge Romeo Rabaca had lost jurisdiction over the case by virtue of
defendant’s appeal.
Ruling:
No. The Court, upholding the memorandum of the Court Administrator, ruled that the
perfection of the appeal by the defendant did not forbid the favorable action on the plaintiff’s
motion for immediate execution. Only the filing of the sufficient supersedeas bond and the
deposit with the appellate court of the amount of rent due from time to time, coupled with the
perfection of the appeal, could stay the execution of the decision. Secondly, he could not claim
good faith or honest belief, as it justifies a non-compliance only when there is an as-yet unsettled
doubt on the meaning or applicability of a rule or legal provision. Thirdly, given that his court
had been assigned many such cases, he was not a trial judge bereft of the pertinent prior
experience to act on the issue of immediate execution.
This case is thus an opportune occasion to remind judges of the first level courts to adhere
always to the mandate under Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court to issue writs of execution
upon motion of the plaintiffs action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer when the defendant
has appealed but has not filed a sufficient supersedeas bond. The purpose is to prevent the
plaintiffs from being further deprived of their rightful possession, should always be borne in
mind. Judge Rabaca is therefore imposed a fine of 5,000 pesos with warning that a repetition of
the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
Re: Judge Herrera, AM. No. RTJ-05-1924, October 13, 2010(EDCARL)
FACTS:
Court Administrator Velasco initiated the administrative matter for agenda to report
cases submitted for decision before the newly-retired Judge Herrera, citing the ff:
1. 55 cases decided beyond the reglementary period;
2. increase of dockets from 26-55 cases in one month’s time;
3. failure to request the extension of his time to decide the cases; and
4. Branch 24 did not submit the monthly report of cases within the period required by law.
Judge Herrera contended that he had requested extensions of time to decide cases; that he
had exerted earnest efforts to decide the cases; that his heavy workload and hectic court
schedules had prevented him from deciding his cases within the prescribed period; that that his
delay in the submission of monthly reports and the inaccuracy of the data reflected thereon were
caused by his branch’s heavy workload and by the fact that his Acting Branch Clerk of Court had
also functioned as Legal Researcher.
ISSUE:
Is Judge Herrera guilty of undue delay in the disposition of the cases pending him in his
court?
HELD:
YES. Judge Herreras failure to decide his cases with dispatch constituted gross
inefficiency and warranted the imposition of administrative sanctions upon him.
Judge Herreras plea of heavy workload, lack of sufficient time, poor health, and physical
impossibility could not excuse him. Such circumstances were not justifications for the delay or
non-performance, given that he could have easily requested the Court for the extension of his
time to resolve the cases. Our awareness of the heavy caseload of the trial courts has often
moved us to allow reasonable extensions of the time for trial judges to decide their cases. But we
have to remind Judge Herrera and other trial judges that no judge can choose to prolong, on his
own, the period for deciding cases beyond the period authorized by the law. Without an order of
extension granted by the Court, a failure to decide even a single case within the required period
rightly constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative sanction.
Jamsani Rodriguez vs. Ong, AM No. 08-19-SB-J, August 24, 2010 (RANZEL)
Special Prosecutor Rohermia Jasmani-Rodriguez alleges before the court that the Fourth
Division of the Sandiganbayan is guilty of grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to interest of
public service, and manifest partiality.
With regard to the claim of grave misconduct, Special Prosecutor Jasmani-Rodriguez

substantiates that the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan hears its cases not as a collegial
body but instead divides it into two wherein the Chairman will hear some of the cases alone and
so will the other members of the division. They conduct hearings separately and simultaneously.
As such, she raised her objection to this procedural flaw as it can expose the determination of the
case to injustice. She claims that her repeated objections earned her the ire of the Justices.
On the matter of her claim regarding the Justice’s conduct that is prejudicial to interest of
public services, her allegations state that the Justice’s uttered, berated, and made discriminatory
words during their hearings wherein Justice Ong is said to have had stated that the case by one
of the parties during the hearing will be futile as he will have been a Supreme Court Justice by
the time it is appealed, among others.
The facts stated by the Special Prosecutor regarding manifest partiality merely stated
that the Fourth Division failed to take cognizance and contravenes her findings about one
particular case which concluded that there is no perfected contract. The Fourth Division in this
case, she claims, went to dismiss it in light of such stark fact.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Fourth Division of Sandiganbayan engaged in practice that is

lamentable and violative of the procedural laws and ethical standards imposed upon the
Judiciary.
RULING:
YES. What is contemplated in the establishment of the Sandiganbayan and its divisions is
that in determining and hearing a case they shall do so as a collegial body, with each member
having equal power and authority. Under Presidential Decree 1606, the law mandates that the
Justices must be actually present during the course of such hearing to constitute a quorum to
conduct business and trial proceedings.
With regard to their conduct during the trial proceedings and manifest partiality, the
Court merely touched upon the issue that due to the absence of substantiated fact, the Court
presumes that their conduct and subsequent dismissal of one case is within the realm of legality.
The Justices admissions however regarding statements about law school performances has been
admonished by the Court for the continuous banter and unprofessional conduct lowers the trust
of the public in the Judiciary.
Jocelyn De Leon vs. Atty. Tyrone Pedreña, AC No. 9401, October 22, 2013(ANNA)
FACTS: Jocelyn de Leon filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint
for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law against Atty. Tyrone Pedreña, a Public
Attorney. Records show, as established by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, on January
30,2006 after asking about the status of the case Atty. Pedreña told Jocelyn De Leon then to ride
with him and he would just drop Jocelyn by the jeepney station, she refused to ride with him but
Atty. Pedreña persistently told her to get in the car, and so she acceded to his request so as not to
offend him. Inside the car Atty. Pedreña rubbed the Jocelyn’s right leg with his hand tried to
insert his finger into her hand, grabbed her hand and forcibly placed it on his crotch area and
pressed his finger against her private part. Jocelyn thereafter tried at all cost to unlock the car’s
door and told him categorically that she was getting off the car. Instead he accelerated a bit more
but sensing her insistence to get off, he stopped the car, and allowed her to get off. In his answer,
Atty. Pedreña averred that De Leon’s allegations were unsubstantiated; that entertaining such a
complaint would open the gates to those who had evil desires to destroy the names of good
lawyers; that the complaint was premature and should be dismissed on the ground of forum
shopping because De Leon had already charged him with acts of lasciviousness in the Parañaque
City Prosecutor’s Office; and that he had also filed a complaint for theft against De Leon.
IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended for his disbarment, the IBP Board of
Governors however, modifed the penalty to three month suspension from practice of law. Upon
motion for reconsideration by Atty. Pedreña which the Board denied, they increased the penalty
to six months. Thereafter transmitted records and resolution to the Court for approval.
ISSUE: Whether or Not Atty. Pedreña is guilty in violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of Code of
Profession and Responsibility.
RULING: Yes, Atty. Pedreña is guilty. The Supreme Court adopted the finding and
conclusions of the IBP Investigating Commissioner. Given the circumstances in which he
committed them, his acts were not merely offensive and undesirable but repulsive, disgraceful
and grossly immoral. They constituted misconduct on the part of any lawyer. In this regard, it
bears stressing that immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal
act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency. Yet, the
Court considers the recommended penalty of suspension for six months not commensurate with
the gravity of the offensive acts committed.
Re: Verified Complaint for Disbarment of AMA Land, Inc. Against CA Associate Justices
Hon. Danton Bueser, Hon. Sesinando E. Villon and Hon. Ricardo R. Rosario, OCA IPI No. 12-
204-CA-J, March 11, 2014 (AMZIE)
Facts:
AMA Land, Inc., (AMALI) brought this administrative complaint against Associate Justice
Danton Q. Bueser, Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and Associate Justice Ricardo R.
Rosario, all members of the Court of Appeals (CA), charging them with knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment, gross misconduct, and violation of their oaths on account of their promulgation
of the decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 118994 entitled Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc. v. The
Honorable Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 264, Assigned in San Juan, and AMA
Land, Inc.
Issue:
Are the respondent Justices liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court?
Ruling:
NO. The administrative complaint is bereft of merit.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations
of the complaint by substantial evidence. Failure to do so will lead to the dismissal of the
complaint for its lack of merit. This is because an administrative charge against any official of
the Judiciary must be supported by at least substantial evidence. But when the charge equates
to a criminal offense, such that the judicial officer may suffer the heavy sanctions of dismissal
from the service, the showing of culpability on the part of the judicial officer should be nothing
short of proof beyond reasonable doubt, especially because the charge is penal in character.
We seize this occasion, therefore, to stress once again that disciplinary proceedings and
criminal actions brought against any judge in relation to the performance of his official functions
are neither complementary to nor suppletory of appropriate judicial remedies, nor a substitute
for such remedies. Any party who may feel aggrieved should resort to these remedies, and
exhaust them, instead of resorting to disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions.
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Edwin C. Larida, Jr., RTC Branch 18
Tagaytay City, AM No. RTJ-08-2151, March 11, 2014(TINA)
FACTS
A fire occurred at the records room of Branch 18 of the RTC in Tagaytay City. Atty.
Calma, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 18, immediately reported the fire as a clear case of
arson to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). The investigative team started
interviewing the personnel of Branch 18, including Atty. Calma, and their declarations aided the
review of the records of the cases decided and pending in Branch 18.
In the course of its investigation, the investigative team uncovered anomalies supposedly
committed by Presiding Judge Edwin G. Larida (Judge Larida), namely:
***NOTE: For writing purposes, you may not write the 7 enumerated anomalies.***
1. violation of Administrative Circular No. 28-2008, in authorizing the detail of locally-

funded employees to his court without obtaining permission from the Supreme Court, and in
allowing them to take custody of court records and to draft court orders and decisions for him;
2. knowingly allowing detailed employees to demand commissions from bonding companies

in exchange for the issuance of release orders;
3. extorting money from detained accused;
4. defying the directive of the Supreme Court in Administrative Order No. 132-2008, to
stop from trying and hearing cases and to instead, decide cases already submitted for decision;
5. releasing the accused on bail in Criminal Case No. TG-4382-03 despite their positive
identification as the perpetrators of the crime;
6. granting a motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No. TG-5307-06 without a
case record and without requiring a comment from the prosecutor; and
7. granting a petition for the issuance of owner's duplicate copies of various titles in LRC
case No. TG-06-1183 under questionable circumstances.
ISSUE
Is Judge Larida guilty of misconduct?
RULING
YES.
A judge is tasked with the administrative supervision over his personnel and he should
always see to it that his orders are promptly enforced and that case records are properly stored.
It is, therefore, incumbent upon the judge to see to it that the personnel of the court perform
their duties well and to call the attention of the clerk of court when they fail to do so.
The solicitations were surely irregular and improper activities undertaken by persons
visibly working for the courts. Considering that such activities were committed with his
knowledge, Judge Larida should have done more than merely confronting them in the presence
of the representative of the complaining bonding company, and then and there merely telling
them to stop the solicitations. He should have instead immediately caused or called for their
investigation and, if the evidence warranted, seen to their proper criminal prosecution. The
firmer action by him would have avoided the undesirable impression that he had perversely
acquiesced to their activities. He thus contravened the Code of Judicial Conduct, which imposed
on him the duty to take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against court personnel for
unprofessional conduct of which he would have become aware.
Judge Larida has been found guilty of a less serious charge for not complying with the
directive of Administrative Circular No. 28-2008 to send an inventory of locally-funded
employees to the Supreme Court within one month from notice of the circular, and of allowing
locally funded employees to perform more than merely clerical tasks; and of a light charge for
unbecoming conduct for not causing the investigation of the solicitations of commission from a
bonding company committed by three employees assigned to his court.
It is the sense of the Court to consolidate the imposable sanctions on Judge Larida into a
single penalty of suspension from office without pay for a period of two months.
Alleged Loss of Various Boxes of Copy Paper During their Transfer from the Property
Division, Office of Administrative Services, to the Various Rooms of the Philippine Judicial
Academy, AM No. 2008-23-SC, September 30, 2014(ROCHELLE)
City Government of Butuan and City Mayor Leonides Plaza vs. Consolidated
Broadcasting System, Inc., GR No. 157315, December 1, 2010 (JOY)
FACTS:
Mayor Plaza denied the application for Mayors permit of CBS, and eventually
closed down CBS radio station. CBS filed complaint in the RTC of Butuan City. The case
was first raffled to Judge Dabalos to which he voluntarily inhibited. On the same day,
Judge Victor Tomaneng issued an order also inhibiting himself from handling the case.
The case was forwarded to the court of Judge Calo, who refused because his wifde had
been recently appointed by Mayor Plaza. Judge Calo ordered the immediate return of the
case to the court of the Judge Tomaneng, without any other Judge to handle the case
Judge Tomaneng formally returned the case to Judge Dabalos, stating that Judge
Dabalo’s reason for inhibition did not amount to a plausible ground to inhibit. Judge
Tomaneng instructed Judge Dabalos to hear the case. Judge Dabalos caused a hearing to
serve. Mayor Plaza moved to quash the notice insisting that Judge Dabalos already lost
his authority to act on the case by virtue of his inhibition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Dabalos lawfully re-assume jurisdiction over the case after he
had already inhibited himself from the hearing.
RULING:
Yes. The court ruled that although a trial Judge who voluntarily inhibits loses
jurisdiction to hear a case, he or she may decide to reconsider the self-inhibition and re-
assume jurisdiction after re-assessment of the circumstances giving cause to the
inhibition. The discretion to reconsider acknowledges that the trial judge is in the better
position to determine the issue of inhibition, and a reviewing tribunal will not disturb the
exercise of that discretion except upon a clear and strong finding of arbitrariness or
whimsicality.
It further ruled that Judge Dabalos re-assumption of jurisdiction was legally tenable,
having come from his seizing the opportunity to re-assess the circumstances impelling his
self-inhibition upon being faced with the urgent need to hear and resolve CBSs
application for preliminary injunction. Such action was commendable on his part, given
that the series of self-inhibitions by the other RTC Judges had left no competent judge in
the station to hear and resolve the application.
Re: Complaint filed by Lucena B. Rallos Against Justices Gabriel T. Ingles, Pamela Ann
Maxino, and Carmelita S. Manahan, AM No. 12-9-08-CA, December 10, 2013(ANGELICA)
Facts:
In Civil Case NO. CEB-20388 of the RTC of Cebu City, the Heirs of Vicente Rallos, one of
whom is complainant Lucena B. Rallos, sought just compensation from the city government for
two parcels of land pertaining to the estate that Cebu City had been maintaining as public roads
without their consent. The RTC rendered its decision in 2000 holding Cebu City liable to pay just
compensation to the heirs, and in 2001 ordering the city to compensate the heirs in the amount
of 34.9M pesos plus 12% per annum interest and attorney’s fees. The RTC granted the motion of
the heirs for the execution pending appeal. In implementing the execution pending appeal, the
RTC issued 3 separate orders. Both parties sought the reconsideration of the orders, and later
the RTC issued its consolidated order in 2002. Both parties appealed to the CA, Visayas Station.
In 2012, Cebu City brought in the CA, Visayas Station a petition for the annulment of the
RTC’s decisions, alleging that Rallos and his heirs had been obliged under a compromise
agreement called Convenio. Cebu City filed for a TRO. The CA granted Cebu City’s application
for the writ of preliminary injunction, with Justice Ingles as Chairman of the 18th Division,
Justice Pamella Maxino and Justice Carmelita Manahan and the senior and junior members of
the Division. The heirs moved for reconsideration and plaintiff wrote a letter-complaint
requesting an investigation of the allegedly unlawful and unethical conduct of Justices
Abarintos, Hernando, and Paredes as previous members of the 18th Division. The court also
received an affidavit-complaint where she also charged the current justices of the 18th Division
with administrative and criminal offences. Rallos asserted that respondent Justices had
knowingly disobeyed the resolutions promulgated by their granting of Cebu City’s application for
the writ of preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Whether or not voluntarily inhibiting oneself from hearing a case is sufficient proof of bias,
negligence, or improper motives.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court cites the case of Abrajano v. Heirs of Augusto F. Salas, Jr.
wherein it held that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and
sound discretion on the part of the judge. This discretion is an acknowledgement of the fact that
judges are in a better position to determine the issue of inhibition, as they are the ones who
directly deal with the parties-litigants in their courtrooms. The rule does not give the judge the
unfettered discretion to decide whether he should desist from hearing a case.it must be for just
and valid cases. The mere imputation of bias, partiality and prejudgment will not suffice in the
absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will
undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or
favor.
Re: Employees Incurring Habitual Tardiness in the Second Semester of 2009, AM No.
2010-11-SC, March 15, 2011(EDCARL)
FACTS:
Eight (8) employees of various branches/departments/offices of the Judiciary were subject

to this administrative proceeding for allegedly being habitually tardy. An employee shall be
considered habitually tardy if he incurs tardiness, regardless of the number of minutes, 10 times
a month for at least 2 months in a semester or at least 2 consecutive months.
ISSUE:
May the 8 employees be administratively sanctioned for being habitually tardy?
HELD:
YES. Public office is a public trust. Accordingly, court officials and employees must at all
times strictly observe official hours to inspire the public’s respect for the justice system. The
exacting standards of ethics and morality imposed upon court officials and employees reflect the
premium placed on the image of the courts of justice. That image is necessarily mirrored in the
conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work in the Judiciary. Employees of
the Judiciary should observe punctuality in reporting to work. Tardiness, if habitual, prejudices
the efficiency of the service being rendered by the Judiciary to the people, and cannot be
tolerated and must that be administratively sanctioned.
In Re: Fabiana, AM No. CA-13-51-J, July 2, 2013(NINANNE)
FACTS:
The heirs of the late Marlon Fabiana claim death benefits against the manning
agent Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and its principal Air Sea Holiday.
The Labor Arbiter granted the monetary claims, plus damages and attorney’s fees.
The NLRC modified the award with regard to the damages. The adverse parties separately
brought their petitions for certiorari to the CA, wherein the heirs of Fabiana assailed the
jurisdiction of the NLRC and seeking the reinstatement of the damages as awarded by the LA;
while Magsaysay Maritime Corporation et. al. challenged the propriety of the monetary awards
granted to the heirs of Fabiana.
CA partly granted the first petition. The heirs of Fabiana filed an MR, but the MR
was denied. They filed a petition for review on certiorari to the SC, but the same was denied.
Meanwhile, the heirs of Fabiana also moved to dismiss the second petition, and the
First Division of the CA denied the motion to dismiss. The second petition was ultimately
dismissed by the Sixth Division of the CA. Complainant Merlita B. Fabiana, Marlon’s surviving
spouse, hereby accuses members of the CA’s First Division, of having openly defied the resolution
promulgated by the Court whereby the Court had allegedly "fixed with finality complainant’s
claims for death benefits and other monetary claims, including damages and attorney’s fees,
against the Maritime Company arising from the death of her husband."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals Justices are administratively liable.
RULING:
NO. The explanation, whether correct or not, was issued in the exercise of judicial
discretion. It is not for us to say now in a resolution of this administrative complaint whether the
explanation was appropriate or not, nor for the complainant to herself hold them in error. The
recourse open to the heirs of Fabiana, including the complainant, was to move for the correction
of the resolution, if they disagreed with it, and, should their motion be denied, to assail the
denial in this Court through the remedy warranted under the law.
Truly, disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions brought against any Judge or Justice
in relation to the performance of official functions are neither complementary to nor suppletory
of appropriate judicial remedies, nor a substitute for such remedies.
The Court reiterates that a judge’s failure to correctly interpret the law or to properly
appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily incur administrative liability, for to hold
him administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming he
has erred, will be nothing short of harassment and will make his position doubly unbearable.
Re: Danton Q. Bueser, OCA IPI No. 12-204-CA-J, March 11, 2014 (NINANNE)
FACTS:
AMALI is the owner and developer of a condominium project and due to the project’s
location, AMALI would have to use Fordham Street as an access road and staging area for the
construction activities. In that regard, AMALI needed the consent of the Wack Wack Residents
Association, Inc. (WWRAI). Accordingly, AMALI sent a notice to WWRAI, which ignored the
notice. Left with no option, AMALI set up a field office along Fordham Street that it enclosed
with a temporary fence. WWRAI allegedly tried to demolish the field office and set up a fence to
deny access to AMALI’s construction workers, which prompted AMALI to file a petition for the
enforcement of an easement of right of way in the Regional Trial Court in Pasig City.
WWRAI filed an urgent motion to set for hearing its prayer for a TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. The denial of the prayer for injunction by the RTC impelled WWRAI to
bring a petition for certiorari with an application for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction
in the CA to enjoin the RTC from proceeding the case. After hearing, the CA issued a TRO.
Consequently, the Special Former Tenth Division of the CA promulgated a decision

granting the petition of WWRAI.
AMALI then brought this administrative complaint, alleging that respondent Justices had
conspired with the counsels of WWRAI and stated that the decision of the CA had been rendered
in bad faith and with conscious and deliberate intent to favor WWRAI, and to cause grave
injustice to AMALI. In thereby knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, respondent Justices
were guilty of gross misconduct, and violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 1, Rules 10.01 and
10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUE:
Are the respondent Justices liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court?
RULING:
NO.
It is a general principle, abundantly sustained by authority and reason, that no civil action
can be sustained against a judicial officer for the recovery of damages by one claiming to have
been injured by the officer’s judicial action within his jurisdiction. From the very nature of the
case, the officer is called upon by law to exercise his judgment in the matter, and the law holds
his duty to the individual to be performed when he has exercised it, however erroneous or
disastrous in its consequences it may appear either to the party or to others. Besides, even if the
subject decision or portions thereof turn out to be erroneous, administrative liability will only
attach upon proof that the actions of the respondent CA Justices were motivated by bad faith,
dishonesty or hatred, or attended by fraud or corruption, which were not sufficiently shown to
exist in this case. Neither was bias as well as partiality established. Acts or conduct of the judge
clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice must be clearly shown before he can be branded
the stigma of being biased and partial. In the same vein, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred
simply because the judgment or order is adverse to a party. Here, other than AMALI’s bare and
self-serving claim that respondent CA Justices "conspired with WWRAI’s counsel in knowingly
and in bad faith rendering an unjust judgment and in committing xxx other misconduct," no act
clearly indicative of bias and partiality was alleged except for the claim that respondent CA
Justices misapplied the law and jurisprudence.
Tan vs. Hernando, AM No. P-08-2501, August 28, 2009(NINANNE)
FACTS:
Complainant Wilson Tan charged respondent Jesus F. Hernando, Clerk IV, with
dishonesty, moral turpitude and conduct unbecoming a public officer. He alleged that Hernando,
then with the Office of the Clerk of Court, borrowed ₱3,000.00; and did not pay his obligation
despite repeated demands; and that the act of Hernando compelled him to commence a criminal
case for estafa against Hernando.
Hernando admitted that he had borrowed ₱3,000.00 from the complainant but insisted
that he had already paid the loan in full. However, the acknowledgment receipt issued by the
complainant stated that Hernando still had a balance of ₱1,500.00.
In the recommendation of the Court Administrator, this being respondent’s first offense,
the imposable penalty would have been a reprimand. However, since respondent already reached
the compulsory retirement age and is no longer reporting to work, the penalty of fine should be
imposed instead.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the imposition of fine to Hernando is appropriate.
RULING:
YES. Having incurred just debts, Hernando had the moral and legal duty to pay them
when they became due. As a court employee, he must comply with his valid contractual
obligation, act fairly and adhere to high ethical standards to preserve the Judiciary’s integrity
and reputation. Unfortunately, he failed to prove that he had adequately discharged his
obligation. Hence, his actuations warrant condign disciplinary action.
Concerned Citizen vs. Nonita V. Catena, Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 50, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, AM OCA IPI No. 02-1321-P, July 16, 2013 (NINANNE)
FACTS:
An undated anonymous letter-complaint charging respondent Nonita Catena, a Court

Stenographer III of Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan with
gross dishonesty she allegedly committed in connection with her Civil Service eligibility accusing
her of having caused another person to take the Civil Service Eligibility Examination in her
stead.
Despite several notices served, Catena failed to comply with and continued to ignore the
Court’s requirement for her to comment on the anonymous complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Catena should be dismissed for her dishonesty.
RULING:
YES. A finding of dishonesty against an employee in the Civil Service carries with it the
penalty of dismissal. Under Rule IV Section 52 (A) (1) of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service Rules (Revised Uniform Rules), dishonesty is classified
as a grave offense that is already punishable by dismissal from the service even at the first
offense.
Considering that Catena’s misrepresentation of her eligibility concerned a material fact

that enabled her to secure her appointment equated to her deliberate fabrication of the truth
concerning her eligibility, she was guilty of gross dishonesty. She should not be allowed to
remain in the service of the Judiciary, because no other office in the Government exacted a
greater demand for mortal righteousness from an official or employee than a position in the
Judiciary.
Atty. Oscar Embido vs. Atty. Salvador Pe, Jr., AC No. 6732, October 22, 2013(NINANNE)
FACTS:
Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Court of the RTC, received a written communication
from Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a Solicitor in the United Kingdom (UK). The letter
requested a copy of the decision rendered by Judge Rafael O. Penuela in Special
Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death
of Rey Laserna, whose petitioner was one Shirley Quioyo.
It was then discovered that the RTC had no record of Special Proceedings No. 084 wherein
Shirley Quioyo was the petitioner. Instead, the court files revealed that Judge Penuela
had decided Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rolando Austria, whose petitioner was one Serena Catin Austria.
Informed that the requested decision and case records did not exist, Mr. Hunt sent a letter
attaching a machine copy of the purported decision in Special Proceedings No. 084. After
comparing the two documents and it was ascertained that the document attached was a
falsified court document.
Upon being required by the Court, the respondent submitted his counter-affidavit,
whereby he denied any participation in the falsification.
The Court then referred the case to the IBP, where the IBP Board of Governors
recommended suspension of respondent from the practice of law for six years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court is correct to disbar Atty. Salvador Pe.
RULING:
YES. Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent

transactions can justify a lawyer’s disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act
that reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery
of the administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of the falsification, which
was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby became
unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar.

PALE Digests Compilation (Bersamin Cases)

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PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL

ETHICS PROBLEM AREAS IN

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Zapatos is disqualified to represent the defendants as a

The complainants averred that complainant Rey C. Decena had brought an

Issue: Whether the actuations of Judge Malanyaon complained of constituted conduct

The Complainants herein averred the following:

IBP Investigating Commissioner Manuel M. Maramba rendered his report and

1. Whether the findings of the IBP are correct

Whether or not Atty. Dealca’s contravened his duties as a lawyer.

The Investigating Commissioner found this as sufficient reason to render a

NO. The SC reversed the IBP Board of Governors’ resolution.

FACTS: An undated letter-complain addressed to the Complaints and Investigation

ISSUE 2: Did Lopez’s money-lending activities render her administratively liable?

RULING: Yes. "moonlighting" activities : Although many "moonlighting" activities were

The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBPCBD)

In this regard, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly declares

In 1979 complainant Diongzon, a businessman engaged in the fishing industry in Bacolod

Was there an attorney-client relationship established between the complainant Diongzon

A conflict of interest exists when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two

No. Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of an attorney may be taken by

Whether or not Atty. Gonzales-Alzate is guilty of professional negligence and

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

Whether or not the defense of the National Tobacco Administration of excusable

Complainants, however, assail an unlawful cancellation of their notice of adverse claim

Whether or not Atty Victorio is liable for abandonment of his client.

Jacinto v. Bangot, Jr.

804 SCRA 509, A.C. No. 8494

No. Although it may entertain a disbarment or suspension complaint brought against a

May the disbarment complaint against the respondent prosper?

Whether or not respondent Judge violated the rule on raffling of cases.

Section 2. Assignment of Cases. – The assignment of cases to the different branches of a

Being a lawyer commissioned as a notary, the respondent was mandated to discharge

Whether or not Ong is guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty.

Whether or not the respondent Judge is guilty of gross negligence.

1. 55 cases decided beyond the reglementary period;

2. increase of dockets from 26-55 cases in one month’s time;

With regard to the claim of grave misconduct, Special Prosecutor Jasmani-Rodriguez

Whether or not the Fourth Division of Sandiganbayan engaged in practice that is

NO. The administrative complaint is bereft of merit.

1. violation of Administrative Circular No. 28-2008, in authorizing the detail of locally-

2. knowingly allowing detailed employees to demand commissions from bonding companies

3. extorting money from detained accused;

Is Judge Larida guilty of misconduct?

Eight (8) employees of various branches/departments/offices of the Judiciary were subject

May the 8 employees be administratively sanctioned for being habitually tardy?

Whether or not the Court of Appeals Justices are administratively liable.

Consequently, the Special Former Tenth Division of the CA promulgated a decision

Whether or not the imposition of fine to Hernando is appropriate.

An undated anonymous letter-complaint charging respondent Nonita Catena, a Court

Whether or not Catena should be dismissed for her dishonesty.

Considering that Catena’s misrepresentation of her eligibility concerned a material fact

Whether or not the Court is correct to disbar Atty. Salvador Pe.

YES. Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent

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