G.R. No.

159357 April 28, 2004

Brother MARIANO "MIKE" Z. VELARDE, petitioner,

vs.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A decision that does not conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution
and the law is void and deemed legally inexistent. To be valid, decisions should comply
with the form, the procedure and the substantive requirements laid out in the
Constitution, the Rules of Court and relevant circulars/orders of the Supreme Court. For
the guidance of the bench and the bar, the Court hereby discusses these forms, procedures
and requirements.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
June 12, 2003 Decision2 and July 29, 2003 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila (Branch 49).4

The challenged Decision was the offshoot of a Petition for Declaratory Relief5 filed
before the RTC-Manila by herein Respondent Social Justice Society (SJS) against herein
Petitioner Mariano "Mike" Z. Velarde, together with His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin,
Executive Minister Eraño Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F.
Soriano as co-respondents. The Petition prayed for the resolution of the question
"whether or not the act of a religious leader like any of herein respondents, in endorsing
the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in urging or requiring the members of
his flock to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the letter or spirit of the
constitutional provisions x x x."6

Alleging that the questioned Decision did not contain a statement of facts and a
dispositive portion, herein petitioner filed a Clarificatory Motion and Motion for
Reconsideration before the trial court. Soriano, his co-respondent, similarly filed a
separate Motion for Reconsideration. In response, the trial court issued the assailed
Order, which held as follows:

"x x x [T]his Court cannot reconsider, because what it was asked to do, was only
to clarify a Constitutional provision and to declare whether acts are violative
thereof. The Decision did not make a dispositive portion because a dispositive
portion is required only in coercive reliefs, where a redress from wrong suffered
and the benefit that the prevailing party wronged should get. The step that these
movants have to take, is direct appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, for a
conclusive interpretation of the Constitutional provision to the Supreme Court."7

The Antecedent Proceedings

On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief ("SJS Petition") before
the RTC-Manila against Velarde and his aforesaid co-respondents. SJS, a registered
political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions,8 specifically
on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality
of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or
requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.
The subsequent proceedings were recounted in the challenged Decision in these words:

"x x x. Bro. Eddie Villanueva submitted, within the original period [to file an
Answer], a Motion to Dismiss. Subsequently, Executive Minister Eraño Manalo
and Bro. Mike Velarde, filed their Motions to Dismiss. While His Eminence
Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, filed a Comment and Bro. Eli Soriano, filed an Answer
within the extended period and similarly prayed for the dismissal of the Petition.
All sought the dismissal of the Petition on the common grounds that it does not
state a cause of action and that there is no justiciable controversy. They were
ordered to submit a pleading by way of advisement, which was closely followed
by another Order denying all the Motions to Dismiss. Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro.
Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Eraño Manalo moved to reconsider the
denial. His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, asked for extension to file
memorandum. Only Bro. Eli Soriano complied with the first Order by submitting
his Memorandum. x x x.

"x x x the Court denied the Motions to Dismiss, and the Motions for
Reconsideration filed by Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and
Executive Minister Eraño Manalo, which raised no new arguments other than
those already considered in the motions to dismiss x x x."9

After narrating the above incidents, the trial court said that it had jurisdiction over the
Petition, because "in praying for a determination as to whether the actions imputed to the
respondents are violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, [the Petition]
has raised only a question of law."10 It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue
raised in the Petition – the separation of church and state – even tracing, to some extent,
the historical background of the principle. Through its discourse, the court a quo opined
at some point that the "[e]ndorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public
office is a clear violation of the separation clause."11

After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a dispositive
portion in its assailed Decision. Thus, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration which, as mentioned earlier, were denied by the lower court.

Hence, this Petition for Review.12

This Court, in a Resolution13 dated September 2, 2003, required SJS and the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) to submit their respective comments. In the same Resolution, the
Court gave the other parties -- impleaded as respondents in the original case below --the
opportunity to comment, if they so desired.

On April 13, 2004, the Court en banc conducted an Oral Argument.14

The Issues

In his Petition, Brother Mike Velarde submits the following issues for this Court’s
resolution:

"1. Whether or not the Decision dated 12 June 2003 rendered by the court a quo
was proper and valid;

"2. Whether or not there exists justiceable controversy in herein respondent’s

Petition for declaratory relief;

"3. Whether or not herein respondent has legal interest in filing the Petition for
declaratory relief;
 "4. Whether or not the constitutional question sought to be resolved by herein
respondent is ripe for judicial determination;

"5. Whether or not there is adequate remedy other than the declaratory relief; and,

"6. Whether or not the court a quo has jurisdiction over the Petition for
declaratory relief of herein respondent."15

During the Oral Argument, the issues were narrowed down and classified as follows:

"A. Procedural Issues

"Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy? Did it
state a cause of action? Did respondent have any legal standing to file the Petition
for Declaratory Relief?

"B. Substantive Issues

"1. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance required by
the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court?

"2. May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be
prohibited from endorsing candidates for public office? Corollarily, may
they be banned from campaigning against said candidates?"

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition of Brother Mike Velarde is meritorious.

Procedural Issues:

Requisites of Petitions for Declaratory Relief

Section 1 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which deals with petitions for declaratory
relief, provides in part:

"Section 1. Who may file petition.- Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising,
and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder."

Based on the foregoing, an action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person
interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights
are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The purpose of
the remedy is to interpret or to determine the validity of the written instrument and to
seek a judicial declaration of the parties’ rights or duties thereunder.16 The essential
requisites of the action are as follows: (1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking the
relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for judicial
determination.17

Justiciable Controversy
Brother Mike Velarde contends that the SJS Petition failed to allege, much less establish
before the trial court, that there existed a justiciable controversy or an adverse legal
interest between them; and that SJS had a legal right that was being violated or threatened
to be violated by petitioner. On the contrary, Velarde alleges that SJS premised its action
on mere speculations, contingent events, and hypothetical issues that had not yet ripened
into an actual controversy. Thus, its Petition for Declaratory Relief must fail.

A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or

ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.18 The
SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief fell short of this test. It miserably failed to allege an
existing controversy or dispute between the petitioner and the named respondents therein.
Further, the Petition did not sufficiently state what specific legal right of the petitioner
was violated by the respondents therein; and what particular act or acts of the latter were
in breach of its rights, the law or the Constitution.

As pointed out by Brother Eliseo F. Soriano in his Comment,19 what exactly has he done
that merited the attention of SJS? He confesses that he does not know the answer,
because the SJS Petition (as well as the assailed Decision of the RTC) "yields nothing in
this respect." His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, adds that, at the time SJS filed its
Petition on January 28, 2003, the election season had not even started yet; and that, in any
event, he has not been actively involved in partisan politics.

An initiatory complaint or petition filed with the trial court should contain "a plain,
concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for
his claim x x x."20 Yet, the SJS Petition stated no ultimate facts.

Indeed, SJS merely speculated or anticipated without factual moorings that, as religious
leaders, the petitioner and his co-respondents below had endorsed or threatened to
endorse a candidate or candidates for elective offices; and that such actual or threatened
endorsement "will enable [them] to elect men to public office who [would] in turn be
forever beholden to their leaders, enabling them to control the government"[;]21 and
"pos[ing] a clear and present danger of serious erosion of the people’s faith in the
electoral process[;] and reinforc[ing] their belief that religious leaders determine the
ultimate result of elections,"22 which would then be violative of the separation clause.

Such premise is highly speculative and merely theoretical, to say the least. Clearly, it
does not suffice to constitute a justiciable controversy. The Petition does not even allege
any indication or manifest intent on the part of any of the respondents below to champion
an electoral candidate, or to urge their so-called flock to vote for, or not to vote for, a
particular candidate. It is a time-honored rule that sheer speculation does not give rise to
an actionable right.

Obviously, there is no factual allegation that SJS’ rights are being subjected to any
threatened, imminent and inevitable violation that should be prevented by the declaratory
relief sought. The judicial power and duty of the courts to settle actual controversies
involving rights that are legally demandable and enforceable23 cannot be exercised when
there is no actual or threatened violation of a legal right.

All that the 5-page SJS Petition prayed for was "that the question raised in paragraph 9
hereof be resolved."24 In other words, it merely sought an opinion of the trial court on
whether the speculated acts of religious leaders endorsing elective candidates for political
offices violated the constitutional principle on the separation of church and state. SJS did
not ask for a declaration of its rights and duties; neither did it pray for the stoppage of any
threatened violation of its declared rights. Courts, however, are proscribed from rendering
an advisory opinion.25
 Cause of Action

Respondent SJS asserts that in order to maintain a petition for declaratory relief, a cause
of action need not be alleged or proven. Supposedly, for such petition to prosper, there
need not be any violation of a right, breach of duty or actual wrong committed by one
party against the other.

Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that the subject matter of an action for declaratory
relief should be a deed, a will, a contract (or other written instrument), a statute, an
executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. But the subject matter of the SJS Petition is
"the constitutionality of an act of a religious leader to endorse the candidacy of a
candidate for elective office or to urge or require the members of the flock to vote for a
specified candidate."26 According to petitioner, this subject matter is "beyond the realm
of an action for declaratory relief."27 Petitioner avers that in the absence of a valid subject
matter, the Petition fails to state a cause of action and, hence, should have been dismissed
outright by the court a quo.

A cause of action is an act or an omission of one party in violation of the legal right or
rights of another, causing injury to the latter.28 Its essential elements are the following:
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) such defendant’s act or omission that is
violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the
former to the latter.29

The failure of a complaint to state a cause of action is a ground for its outright
dismissal.30 However, in special civil actions for declaratory relief, the concept of a cause
of action under ordinary civil actions does not strictly apply. The reason for this
exception is that an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual
breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder.31 Nevertheless, a
breach or violation should be impending, imminent or at least threatened.

A perusal of the Petition filed by SJS before the RTC discloses no explicit allegation that
the former had any legal right in its favor that it sought to protect. We can only infer the
interest, supposedly in its favor, from its bare allegation that it "has thousands of
members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters and who are keenly interested in a
judicial clarification of the constitutionality of the partisan participation of religious
leaders in Philippine politics and in the process to insure adherence to the Constitution by
everyone x x x."32

Such general averment does not, however, suffice to constitute a legal right or interest.
Not only is the presumed interest not personal in character; it is likewise too vague,
highly speculative and uncertain.33 The Rules require that the interest must be material to
the issue and affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from simple
curiosity or incidental interest in the question raised.34

To bolster its stance, SJS cites the Corpus Juris Secundum and submits that the
"[p]laintiff in a declaratory judgment action does not seek to enforce a claim against [the]
defendant, but seeks a judicial declaration of [the] rights of the parties for the purpose of
guiding [their] future conduct, and the essential distinction between a ‘declaratory
judgment action’ and the usual ‘action’ is that no actual wrong need have been committed
or loss have occurred in order to sustain the declaratory judgment action, although there
must be no uncertainty that the loss will occur or that the asserted rights will be
invaded."35

SJS has, however, ignored the crucial point of its own reference – that there must be no
uncertainty that the loss will occur or that the asserted rights will be invaded. Precisely,
as discussed earlier, it merely conjectures that herein petitioner (and his co-respondents
below) might actively participate in partisan politics, use "the awesome voting strength of
its faithful flock [to] enable it to elect men to public office x x x, enabling [it] to control
the government."36

During the Oral Argument, though, Petitioner Velarde and his co-respondents below all
strongly asserted that they had not in any way engaged or intended to participate in
partisan politics. They all firmly assured this Court that they had not done anything to
trigger the issue raised and to entitle SJS to the relief sought.

Indeed, the Court finds in the Petition for Declaratory Relief no single allegation of fact
upon which SJS could base a right of relief from the named respondents. In any event,
even granting that it sufficiently asserted a legal right it sought to protect, there was
nevertheless no certainty that such right would be invaded by the said respondents. Not
even the alleged proximity of the elections to the time the Petition was filed below
(January 28, 2003) would have provided the certainty that it had a legal right that would
be jeopardized or violated by any of those respondents.

Legal Standing

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in
the case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
challenged act.37 Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the
questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the
question involved.38

Petitioner alleges that "[i]n seeking declaratory relief as to the constitutionality of an act
of a religious leader to endorse, or require the members of the religious flock to vote for a
specific candidate, herein Respondent SJS has no legal interest in the controversy";39 it
has failed to establish how the resolution of the proffered question would benefit or injure
it.

Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an act or a statute must
show "not only that the law [or act] is invalid, but also that [they have] sustained or [are]
in immediate or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that [they] suffer thereby in some indefinite way."40 They
must demonstrate that they have been, or are about to be, denied some right or privilege
to which they are lawfully entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to some burdens
or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.41

First, parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that they have sufficient interest
in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation.42 A taxpayer’s action
may be properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power.43 In the present case, there is no allegation, whether express or implied,
that taxpayers’ money is being illegally disbursed.

Second, there was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political
party or its members as registered voters would be adversely affected by the alleged acts
of the respondents below, if the question at issue was not resolved. There was no
allegation that SJS had suffered or would be deprived of votes due to the acts imputed to
the said respondents. Neither did it allege that any of its members would be denied the
right of suffrage or the privilege to be voted for a public office they are seeking.

Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its "thousands of members who are citizens-
taxpayers-registered voters" is too general44 and beyond the contemplation of the
standards set by our jurisprudence. Not only is the presumed interest impersonal in
character; it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the
requirement of standing.45

Transcendental Importance

In any event, SJS urges the Court to take cognizance of the Petition, even sans legal
standing, considering that "the issues raised are of paramount public interest."

In not a few cases, the Court has liberalized the locus standi requirement when a petition
raises an issue of transcendental significance or paramount importance to the people.46
Recently, after holding that the IBP had no locus standi to bring the suit, the Court in IBP
v. Zamora47 nevertheless entertained the Petition therein. It noted that "the IBP has
advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents."48

Similarly in the instant case, the Court deemed the constitutional issue raised in the SJS
Petition to be of paramount interest to the Filipino people. The issue did not simply
concern a delineation of the separation between church and state, but ran smack into the
governance of our country. The issue was both transcendental in importance and novel in
nature, since it had never been decided before.

The Court, thus, called for Oral Argument to determine with certainty whether it could
resolve the constitutional issue despite the barren allegations in the SJS Petition as well as
the abbreviated proceedings in the court below. Much to its chagrin, however, counsels
for the parties -- particularly for Respondent SJS -- made no satisfactory allegations or
clarifications that would supply the deficiencies hereinabove discussed. Hence, even if
the Court would exempt this case from the stringent locus standi requirement, such heroic
effort would be futile because the transcendental issue cannot be resolved anyway.

Proper Proceedings Before the Trial Court

To prevent a repetition of this waste of precious judicial time and effort, and for the
guidance of the bench and the bar, the Court reiterates the elementary procedure49 that
must be followed by trial courts in the conduct of civil cases.50

Prefatorily, the trial court may -- motu proprio or upon motion of the defendant -- dismiss
a complaint51 (or petition, in a special civil action) that does not allege the plaintiff’s (or
petitioner’s) cause or causes of action.52 A complaint or petition should contain "a plain,
concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for
his claim or defense."53 It should likewise clearly specify the relief sought.54

Upon the filing of the complaint/petition and the payment of the requisite legal fees, the
clerk of court shall forthwith issue the corresponding summons to the defendants or the
respondents, with a directive that the defendant answer55 within 15 days, unless a
different period is fixed by the court.56 The summons shall also contain a notice that if
such answer is not filed, the plaintiffs/petitioners shall take a judgment by default and
may be granted the relief applied for.57 The court, however, may -- upon such terms as
may be just -- allow an answer to be filed after the time fixed by the Rules.58

If the answer sets forth a counterclaim or cross-claim, it must be answered within ten (10)
days from service.59 A reply may be filed within ten (10) days from service of the
pleading responded to.60

When an answer fails to tender an issue or admits the material allegations of the adverse
party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such
pleading (except in actions for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal
separation).61 Meanwhile, a party seeking to recover upon a claim, a counterclaim or
crossclaim -- or to obtain a declaratory relief -- may, at any time after the answer thereto
has been served, move for a summary judgment in its favor.62 Similarly, a party against
whom a claim, a counterclaim or crossclaim is asserted -- or a declaratory relief sought --
may, at any time, move for a summary judgment in its favor.63 After the motion is heard,
the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if there is a showing that, except as to
the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.64

Within the time for -- but before -- filing the answer to the complaint or petition, the
defendant may file a motion to dismiss based on any of the grounds stated in Section 1 of
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. During the hearing of the motion, the parties shall submit
their arguments on the questions of law, and their evidence on the questions of fact.65
After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion, or order the
amendment of the pleadings. It shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason
that the ground relied upon is not indubitable. In every case, the resolution shall state
clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor.66

If the motion is denied, the movant may file an answer within the balance of the period
originally prescribed to file an answer, but not less than five (5) days in any event,
computed from the receipt of the notice of the denial. If the pleading is ordered to be
amended, the defendant shall file an answer within fifteen (15) days, counted from the
service of the amended pleading, unless the court provides a longer period.67

After the last pleading has been served and filed, the case shall be set for pretrial,68 which
is a mandatory proceeding.69 A plaintiff’s/ petitioner’s (or its duly authorized
representative’s) non-appearance at the pretrial, if without valid cause, shall result in the
dismissal of the action with prejudice, unless the court orders otherwise. A similar failure
on the part of the defendant shall be a cause for allowing the plaintiff/petitioner to present
evidence ex parte, and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.70

The parties are required to file their pretrial briefs; failure to do so shall have the same
effect as failure to appear at the pretrial.71 Upon the termination thereof, the court shall
issue an order reciting in detail the matters taken up at the conference; the action taken on
them, the amendments allowed to the pleadings; and the agreements or admissions, if
any, made by the parties regarding any of the matters considered.72 The parties may
further avail themselves of any of the modes of discovery,73 if they so wish.

Thereafter, the case shall be set for trial,74 in which the parties shall adduce their
respective evidence in support of their claims and/or defenses. By their written consent or
upon the application of either party, or on its own motion, the court may also order any or
all of the issues to be referred to a commissioner, who is to be appointed by it or to be
agreed upon by the parties.75 The trial or hearing before the commissioner shall proceed
in all respects as it would if held before the court.76

Upon the completion of such proceedings, the commissioner shall file with the court a
written report on the matters referred by the parties.77 The report shall be set for hearing,
after which the court shall issue an order adopting, modifying or rejecting it in whole or
in part; or recommitting it with instructions; or requiring the parties to present further
evidence before the commissioner or the court.78

Finally, a judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be rendered.
The decision shall be in writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by the issuing
magistrate, and filed with the clerk of court.79
Based on these elementary guidelines, let us examine the proceedings before the trial
court in the instant case.

First, with respect to the initiatory pleading of the SJS. Even a cursory perusal of the
Petition immediately reveals its gross inadequacy. It contained no statement of ultimate
facts upon which the petitioner relied for its claim. Furthermore, it did not specify the
relief it sought from the court, but merely asked it to answer a hypothetical question.

Relief, as contemplated in a legal action, refers to a specific coercive measure prayed for
as a result of a violation of the rights of a plaintiff or a petitioner.80 As already discussed
earlier, the Petition before the trial court had no allegations of fact81 or of any specific
violation of the petitioner’s rights, which the respondents had a duty to respect. Such
deficiency amounted to a failure to state a cause of action; hence, no coercive relief could
be sought and adjudicated. The Petition evidently lacked substantive requirements and,
we repeat, should have been dismissed at the outset.

Second, with respect to the trial court proceedings. Within the period set to file their
respective answers to the SJS Petition, Velarde, Villanueva and Manalo filed Motions to
Dismiss; Cardinal Sin, a Comment; and Soriano, within a priorly granted extended
period, an Answer in which he likewise prayed for the dismissal of the Petition.82 SJS
filed a Rejoinder to the Motion of Velarde, who subsequently filed a Sur-Rejoinder.
Supposedly, there were "several scheduled settings, in which the "[c]ourt was apprised of
the respective positions of the parties."83 The nature of such settings -- whether pretrial or
trial hearings -- was not disclosed in the records. Before ruling on the Motions to
Dismiss, the trial court issued an Order84 dated May 8, 2003, directing the parties to
submit their memoranda. Issued shortly thereafter was another Order85 dated May 14,
2003, denying all the Motions to Dismiss.

In the latter Order, the trial court perfunctorily ruled:

"The Court now resolves to deny the Motions to Dismiss, and after all the
memoranda are submitted, then, the case shall be deemed as submitted for
resolution."86

Apparently, contrary to the requirement of Section 2 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, the
Motions were not heard. Worse, the Order purportedly resolving the Motions to Dismiss
did not state any reason at all for their denial, in contravention of Section 3 of the said
Rule 16. There was not even any statement of the grounds relied upon by the Motions;
much less, of the legal findings and conclusions of the trial court.

Thus, Velarde, Villanueva and Manalo moved for reconsideration. Pending the resolution
of these Motions for Reconsideration, Villanueva filed a Motion to suspend the filing of
the parties’ memoranda. But instead of separately resolving the pending Motions fairly
and squarely, the trial court again transgressed the Rules of Court when it immediately
proceeded to issue its Decision, even before tackling the issues raised in those Motions.

Furthermore, the RTC issued its "Decision" without allowing the parties to file their
answers. For this reason, there was no joinder of the issues. If only it had allowed the
filing of those answers, the trial court would have known, as the Oral Argument revealed,
that the petitioner and his co-respondents below had not committed or threatened to
commit the act attributed to them (endorsing candidates) -- the act that was supposedly
the factual basis of the suit.

Parenthetically, the court a quo further failed to give a notice of the Petition to the OSG,
which was entitled to be heard upon questions involving the constitutionality or validity
of statutes and other measures.87
Moreover, as will be discussed in more detail, the questioned Decision of the trial court
was utterly wanting in the requirements prescribed by the Constitution and the Rules of
Court.

All in all, during the loosely abbreviated proceedings of the case, the trial court indeed
acted with inexplicable haste, with total ignorance of the law -- or, worse, in cavalier
disregard of the rules of procedure -- and with grave abuse of discretion.

Contrary to the contentions of the trial judge and of SJS, proceedings for declaratory
relief must still follow the process described above -- the petition must state a cause of
action; the proceedings must undergo the procedure outlined in the Rules of Court; and
the decision must adhere to constitutional and legal requirements.

First Substantive Issue:

Fundamental Requirements of a Decision

The Constitution commands that "[n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No
petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be
refused due course or denied without stating the basis therefor."88

Consistent with this constitutional mandate, Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure similarly provides:

"Sec. 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. – A judgment or final order

determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly
prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which
it is based, signed by him and filed with the clerk of court."

In the same vein, Section 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure
reads as follows:

"Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgments. -- The judgment must be written in the
official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him
and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted
by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.

"x x x xxx x x x."

Pursuant to the Constitution, this Court also issued on January 28, 1988, Administrative
Circular No. 1, prompting all judges "to make complete findings of facts in their
decisions, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence
presented. They should avoid the tendency to generalize and form conclusions without
detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced."

In many cases,89 this Court has time and time again reminded "magistrates to heed the
demand of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution." The Court, through Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr. in Yao v. Court of Appeals,90 discussed at length the implications of
this provision and strongly exhorted thus:

"Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is
indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. It is likewise
demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution. The parties to a litigation should
be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons
that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is
rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification
whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may
appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be
reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on
which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely
prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court
for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the
parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal
reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him
from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution
but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life,
liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power of
reason for sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision."

In People v. Bugarin,91 the Court also explained:

"The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they
must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based
serves many functions. It is intended, among other things, to inform the parties of
the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point
out to the appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings on points of law with
which he disagrees. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties
that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal
reasoning. x x x."

Indeed, elementary due process demands that the parties to a litigation be given
information on how the case was decided, as well as an explanation of the factual and
legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court.92

In Madrid v. Court of Appeals,93 this Court had instructed magistrates to exert effort to
ensure that their decisions would present a comprehensive analysis or account of the
factual and legal findings that would substantially address the issues raised by the parties.

In the present case, it is starkly obvious that the assailed Decision contains no statement
of facts -- much less an assessment or analysis thereof -- or of the court’s findings as to
the probable facts. The assailed Decision begins with a statement of the nature of the
action and the question or issue presented. Then follows a brief explanation of the
constitutional provisions involved, and what the Petition sought to achieve. Thereafter,
the ensuing procedural incidents before the trial court are tracked. The Decision proceeds
to a full-length opinion on the nature and the extent of the separation of church and state.
Without expressly stating the final conclusion she has reached or specifying the relief
granted or denied, the trial judge ends her "Decision" with the clause "SO ORDERED."

What were the antecedents that necessitated the filing of the Petition? What exactly were
the distinct facts that gave rise to the question sought to be resolved by SJS? More
important, what were the factual findings and analysis on which the trial court based its
legal findings and conclusions? None were stated or implied. Indeed, the RTC’s Decision
cannot be upheld for its failure to express clearly and distinctly the facts on which it was
based. Thus, the trial court clearly transgressed the constitutional directive.

The significance of factual findings lies in the value of the decision as a precedent. How
can it be so if one cannot apply the ruling to similar circumstances, simply because such
circumstances are unknown? Otherwise stated, how will the ruling be applied in the
future, if there is no point of factual comparison?
Moreover, the court a quo did not include a resolutory or dispositive portion in its so-
called Decision. The importance of such portion was explained in the early case
Manalang v. Tuason de Rickards,94 from which we quote:

"The resolution of the Court on a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part
of the decision or order is the investitive or controlling factor that determines and
settles the rights of the parties and the questions presented therein,
notwithstanding the existence of statements or declaration in the body of said
order that may be confusing."

The assailed Decision in the present case leaves us in the dark as to its final resolution of
the Petition. To recall, the original Petition was for declaratory relief. So, what relief did
the trial court grant or deny? What rights of the parties did it conclusively declare? Its
final statement says, "SO ORDERED." But what exactly did the court order? It had the
temerity to label its issuance a "Decision," when nothing was in fact decided.

Respondent SJS insists that the dispositive portion can be found in the body of the
assailed Decision. It claims that the issue is disposed of and the Petition finally resolved
by the statement of the trial court found on page 10 of its 14-page Decision, which reads:
"Endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation
of the separation clause."95

We cannot agree.

In Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag,96 the obligation of the party imposed by the Court
was allegedly contained in the text of the original Decision. The Court, however, held:

"x x x The quoted finding of the lower court cannot supply deficiencies in the
dispositive portion. It is a mere opinion of the court and the rule is settled that
where there is a conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion, the former
must prevail over the latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is the final
order while the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing." (Italics in the
original)

Thus, the dispositive portion cannot be deemed to be the statement quoted by SJS and
embedded in the last paragraph of page 10 of the assailed 14-page Decision. If at all, that
statement is merely an answer to a hypothetical legal question and just a part of the
opinion of the trial court. It does not conclusively declare the rights (or obligations) of the
parties to the Petition. Neither does it grant any -- much less, the proper -- relief under the
circumstances, as required of a dispositive portion.

Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Decisions or orders issued in careless
disregard of the constitutional mandate are a patent nullity and must be struck down as
void.97

Parts of a Decision

In general, the essential parts of a good decision consist of the following: (1) statement of
the case; (2) statement of facts; (3) issues or assignment of errors; (4) court ruling, in
which each issue is, as a rule, separately considered and resolved; and, finally, (5)
dispositive portion. The ponente may also opt to include an introduction or a prologue as
well as an epilogue, especially in cases in which controversial or novel issues are
involved.98
An introduction may consist of a concise but comprehensive statement of the principal
factual or legal issue/s of the case. In some cases -- particularly those concerning public
interest; or involving complicated commercial, scientific, technical or otherwise rare
subject matters -- a longer introduction or prologue may serve to acquaint readers with
the specific nature of the controversy and the issues involved. An epilogue may be a
summation of the important principles applied to the resolution of the issues of
paramount public interest or significance. It may also lay down an enduring philosophy
of law or guiding principle.

Let us now, again for the guidance of the bench and the bar, discuss the essential parts of
a good decision.

1. Statement of the Case

The Statement of the Case consists of a legal definition of the nature of the action. At the
first instance, this part states whether the action is a civil case for collection, ejectment,
quieting of title, foreclosure of mortgage, and so on; or, if it is a criminal case, this part
describes the specific charge -- quoted usually from the accusatory portion of the
information -- and the plea of the accused. Also mentioned here are whether the case is
being decided on appeal or on a petition for certiorari, the court of origin, the case
number in the trial court, and the dispositive portion of the assailed decision.

In a criminal case, the verbatim reproduction of the criminal information serves as a

guide in determining the nature and the gravity of the offense for which the accused may
be found culpable. As a rule, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime different from or
graver than that charged.

Also, quoting verbatim the text of the information is especially important when there is a
question on the sufficiency of the charge, or on whether qualifying and modifying
circumstances have been adequately alleged therein.

To ensure that due process is accorded, it is important to give a short description of the
proceedings regarding the plea of the accused. Absence of an arraignment, or a serious
irregularity therein, may render the judgment void, and further consideration by the
appellate court would be futile. In some instances, especially in appealed cases, it would
also be useful to mention the fact of the appellants’ detention, in order to dispose of the
preliminary query -- whether or not they have abandoned their appeal by absconding or
jumping bail.

Mentioning the court of origin and the case number originally assigned helps in
facilitating the consolidation of the records of the case in both the trial and the appellate
courts, after entry of final judgment.

Finally, the reproduction of the decretal portion of the assailed decision informs the
reader of how the appealed case was decided by the court a quo.

2. Statement of Facts

There are different ways of relating the facts of the case. First, under the objective or
reportorial method, the judge summarizes -- without comment -- the testimony of each
witness and the contents of each exhibit. Second, under the synthesis method, the factual
theory of the plaintiff or prosecution and then that of the defendant or defense is
summarized according to the judge’s best light. Third, in the subjective method, the
version of the facts accepted by the judge is simply narrated without explaining what the
parties’ versions are. Finally, through a combination of objective and subjective means,
the testimony of each witness is reported and the judge then formulates his or her own
version of the facts.

In criminal cases, it is better to present both the version of the prosecution and that of the
defense, in the interest of fairness and due process. A detailed evaluation of the
contentions of the parties must follow. The resolution of most criminal cases, unlike civil
and other cases, depends to a large extent on the factual issues and the appreciation of the
evidence. The plausibility or the implausibility of each version can sometimes be initially
drawn from a reading of the facts. Thereafter, the bases of the court in arriving at its
findings and conclusions should be explained.

On appeal, the fact that the assailed decision of the lower court fully, intelligently and
correctly resolved all factual and legal issues involved may partly explain why the
reviewing court finds no reason to reverse the findings and conclusions of the former.
Conversely, the lower court’s patent misappreciation of the facts or misapplication of the
law would aid in a better understanding of why its ruling is reversed or modified.

In appealed civil cases, the opposing sets of facts no longer need to be presented. Issues
for resolution usually involve questions of law, grave abuse of discretion, or want of
jurisdiction; hence, the facts of the case are often undisputed by the parties. With few
exceptions, factual issues are not entertained in non-criminal cases. Consequently, the
narration of facts by the lower court, if exhaustive and clear, may be reproduced;
otherwise, the material factual antecedents should be restated in the words of the
reviewing magistrate.

In addition, the reasoning of the lower court or body whose decision is under review
should be laid out, in order that the parties may clearly understand why the lower court
ruled in a certain way, and why the reviewing court either finds no reason to reverse it or
concludes otherwise.

3. Issues or Assignment of Errors

Both factual and legal issues should be stated. On appeal, the assignment of errors, as
mentioned in the appellant’s brief, may be reproduced in toto and tackled seriatim, so as
to avoid motions for reconsideration of the final decision on the ground that the court
failed to consider all assigned errors that could affect the outcome of the case. But when
the appellant presents repetitive issues or when the assigned errors do not strike at the
main issue, these may be restated in clearer and more coherent terms.

Though not specifically questioned by the parties, additional issues may also be included,
if deemed important for substantial justice to be rendered. Note that appealed criminal
cases are given de novo review, in contrast to noncriminal cases in which the reviewing
court is generally limited to issues specifically raised in the appeal. The few exceptions
are errors of jurisdiction; questions not raised but necessary in arriving at a just decision
on the case; or unassigned errors that are closely related to those properly assigned, or
upon which depends the determination of the question properly raised.

4. The Court’s Ruling

This part contains a full discussion of the specific errors or issues raised in the complaint,
petition or appeal, as the case may be; as well as of other issues the court deems essential
to a just disposition of the case. Where there are several issues, each one of them should
be separately addressed, as much as practicable. The respective contentions of the parties
should also be mentioned here. When procedural questions are raised in addition to
substantive ones, it is better to resolve the former preliminarily.
5. The Disposition or Dispositive Portion

In a criminal case, the disposition should include a finding of innocence or guilt, the
specific crime committed, the penalty imposed, the participation of the accused, the
modifying circumstances if any, and the civil liability and costs. In case an acquittal is
decreed, the court must order the immediate release of the accused, if detained, (unless
they are being held for another cause) and order the director of the Bureau of Corrections
(or wherever the accused is detained) to report, within a maximum of ten (10) days from
notice, the exact date when the accused were set free.

In a civil case as well as in a special civil action, the disposition should state whether the
complaint or petition is granted or denied, the specific relief granted, and the costs. The
following test of completeness may be applied. First, the parties should know their rights
and obligations. Second, they should know how to execute the decision under alternative
contingencies. Third, there should be no need for further proceedings to dispose of the
issues. Fourth, the case should be terminated by according the proper relief. The "proper
relief" usually depends upon what the parties seek in their pleadings. It may declare their
rights and duties, command the performance of positive prestations, or order them to
abstain from specific acts. The disposition must also adjudicate costs.

The foregoing parts need not always be discussed in sequence. But they should all be
present and plainly identifiable in the decision. Depending on the writer’s character,
genre and style, the language should be fresh and free-flowing, not necessarily
stereotyped or in a fixed form; much less highfalutin, hackneyed and pretentious. At all
times, however, the decision must be clear, concise, complete and correct.

Second Substantive Issue:

Religious Leaders’ Endorsement

of Candidates for Public Office

The basic question posed in the SJS Petition -- WHETHER ENDORSEMENTS OF

CANDIDACIES BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL --
undoubtedly deserves serious consideration. As stated earlier, the Court deems this
constitutional issue to be of paramount interest to the Filipino citizenry, for it concerns
the governance of our country and its people. Thus, despite the obvious procedural
transgressions by both SJS and the trial court, this Court still called for Oral Argument,
so as not to leave any doubt that there might be room to entertain and dispose of the SJS
Petition on the merits.

Counsel for SJS has utterly failed, however, to convince the Court that there are enough
factual and legal bases to resolve the paramount issue. On the other hand, the Office of
the Solicitor General has sided with petitioner insofar as there are no facts supporting the
SJS Petition and the assailed Decision.

We reiterate that the said Petition failed to state directly the ultimate facts that it relied
upon for its claim. During the Oral Argument, counsel for SJS candidly admitted that
there were no factual allegations in its Petition for Declaratory Relief. Neither were there
factual findings in the assailed Decision. At best, SJS merely asked the trial court to
answer a hypothetical question. In effect, it merely sought an advisory opinion, the
rendition of which was beyond the court’s constitutional mandate and jurisdiction.99

Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because
it made no findings of facts and final disposition. Hence, it is void and deemed legally
inexistent. Consequently, there is nothing for this Court to review, affirm, reverse or even
just modify.

Regrettably, it is not legally possible for the Court to take up, on the merits, the
paramount question involving a constitutional principle. It is a time-honored rule that "the
constitutionality of a statute [or act] will be passed upon only if, and to the extent that, it
is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the
protection of the rights of the parties concerned."100

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review of Brother Mike Velarde is GRANTED. The
assailed June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila (Branch 49) are hereby DECLARED NULL AND VOID and thus SET ASIDE.
The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief is DISMISSED for failure to state a cause of
action.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator to evaluate
and recommend whether the trial judge may, after observing due process, be held
administratively liable for rendering a decision violative of the Constitution, the Rules of
Court and relevant circulars of this Court. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160465 April 28, 2004

ROMEO M. ESTRELLA, petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. COMMISSIONER RALPH C. LANTION
and ROLANDO F. SALVADOR, respondents.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 seeking to set aside and nullify
the November 5, 2003 Status Quo Ante Order1 issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Banc in EAC No. A-10-2002, "Romeo F. Estrella v. Rolando F.
Salvador."

Romeo M. Estrella (petitioner) and Rolando F. Salvador (respondent) were mayoralty

candidates in Baliuag, Bulacan during the May 14, 2001 Elections.

The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed respondent as winner. Petitioner

thereafter filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan an election protest,
docketed as EPC No. 10-M-2001, which was raffled to Branch 10 thereof.2

By Decision of April 10, 2002, the RTC annulled respondent’s proclamation and declared
petitioner as the duly elected mayor of Baliuag.3

Respondent appealed the RTC decision to the COMELEC where it was docketed as EAC
No. A-10-2002, and raffled to the second Division thereof, while petitioner filed before
the RTC a motion for execution of the decision pending appeal.4

The RTC, by Order of April 16, 2002, granted petitioner’s motion for execution pending
appeal and accordingly issued a writ of execution.5

Respondent thus assailed the April 16, 2002 Order of the RTC via petition for certiorari
filed on April 24, 2002 before the COMELEC where it was docketed as SPR No. 21-
2002, and raffled also to the Second Division thereof.6

Petitioner later moved for the inhibition7 of Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion, a member
of the COMELEC Second Division.

On May 30, 2002, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Status Quo Ante Order,8

By Order of July 9, 2002, the motion for inhibition of Commissioner Lantion was denied
by the COMELEC Second Division.

On July 11, 2002, petitioner filed before this Court a petition for certiorari questioning
the COMELEC Second Division May 20, 2002 Status Quo Ante Order, which petition
was supplemented on July 30, 2002. The petition was docketed by this Court as G.R. No.
154041.

As no temporary restraining order was issued by this Court, the May 30, 2002 Status Quo
Ante Order of the COMELEC Second Division was implemented on or about July 17,
2003, resulting in the ouster of petitioner from the mayoral post.
In the meantime, during the July 23, 2002 hearing of SPR No. 21-2002, COMELEC
Commissioner Lantion inhibited himself.9 Commissioner Ressureccion Z. Borra was, by
Order of August 25, 2002,10 thus designated in place of Commissioner Lantion.

During the pendency of G.R. No. 154041 before this Court, the COMELEC Second
Division, by Order of January 16, 2003, nullified in SPR No. 21-2002 the writ of
execution11 issued by the RTC. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said
Order which motion was duly certified to the COMELEC En Banc.

On September 16, 2003, this Court, by Resolution on even date, dismissed G.R. No.
154041 on the grounds that 1) the case had become moot and academic because of the
COMELEC Second Division’s resolution on the merits of SPR No. 21-2002, and (2) this
Court has no jurisdiction over Division orders or rulings of the COMELEC.

On October 15, 2003, the COMELEC Second Division, issued in EAC No. A-10-2002
an Order12 adopting the order of substitution in SPR No. 21-2002 dated August 25, 2002
designating Commissioner Borra as substitute member thereof.

On October 20, 2003, the COMELEC Second Division issued in EAC No. A-10-2002 a
Resolution13 affirming with modifications the RTC decision and declaring petitioner as
the duly elected mayor. On even date, respondent moved to reconsider14 the said October
20, 2003 Order.

Petitioner, in the meantime, filed on October 22, 2003 a motion for immediate
execution15 of the COMELEC Second Division October 20, 2003 Resolution, which was
set for hearing on October 28, 2003 but reset to November 4, 2003.

On October 29, 2003, respondent filed before the COMELEC Second Division a "very
urgent motion to consider the instant case certified to the Commission en banc."16

Respondent later filed on November 3, 2003 a "very urgent manifestation and motion to
suspend proceedings."17

Hearing of the incidents in EAC No. A-10-2002 was conducted on November 4, 2003.
The following day or on November 5, 2003, the COMELEC Second Division issued an
Order18 denying respondent’s plea for suspension of proceedings and granting
petitioner’s motion for execution pending appeal and accordingly directing the issuance
of a writ of execution. On even date, the COMELEC En Banc issued the questioned
November 5, 2003 Status Quo Ante Order. Five (5) members including Commissioner
Lantion participated in this November 5, 2003 Order wherein Commissioner Lantion
stated that "his previous voluntary inhibition is only in the SPR cases and not in the
EAC" and "as further agreed in the Second Division, [he] will not participate in the
Division deliberations but will vote when the case is elevated [to the] en banc." Of the
five Commissioners, Commissioner Borra dissented.

Hence, the present petition, alleging as follows:

I. THE NOV. 5 STATUS QUO ANTE ORDER IS NULL AND VOID FOR WANT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY OF THE COMELEC TO
ISSUE SUCH AND ORDER.

II. THE COMELEC EN BANC PALPABLY ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION

AND IN FLAGRANT BREACH OF INTER-COLLEGIAL COMITY WHEN IT
ISSUED THE NOV. 5 ORDER CONSIDERING THAT EAC NO. A-10-2002 IS STILL
UNDER THE PRIMARY AND CONTINUING JURISDICTION OF THE SPECIAL
SECOND DIVISION WHICH HAS YET TO FULLY DISPOSE OF ESTRELLA’S
TIMELY FILED MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE EXECUTION.

III. DUE TO HIS PREVIOUS VOLUNTARY INHIBITION IN A RELATED CASE,

SPR NO. 21-2002 AND AT THE DIVISION LEVEL IN THE SAME CASE, EAC NO.
A-10-2002, COMMISSIONER LANTION’S VOTE IN THE ASSAILED ORDER
SHOULD BE DISREGARDED AND CANCELLED. THE EN BANC’S NOV. 5
ORDER IS THUS INVALID FOR FURTHER REASON THAT IT IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE REQUIRED MAJORITY VOTE.

IV. THE COMELEC EN BANC ALSO ACTED ARBITRARILY AND IN MANIFEST

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT PREVENTED THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE
DIVISION’S ORDER OF EXECUTION THE ISSUANCE OF WHICH IS LEGALLY
JUSTIFIED UNDER THE APPLICABLE CASE PRECEDENTS AND WARRANTED
UNDER THE SPECIFIC FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE.

V. THE COMELEC EN BANC GROSSLY VIOLATED ESTRELLA’S RIGHT TO

EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS AND EQUAL OR FAIR TREATMENT
WHEN IT IGNORED ITS OWN CASE PRECEDENTS AND PRACTICE. IN STARK
CONTRAST TO WHAT IT DID IN THIS CASE, THE EN BANC HAD PREVIOUSLY
ALLOWED THE FIRST DIVISION, IN AT LEAST TWO RECENT CASES (EPC NO.
2001-19 AND EAC NO. A-4-20030 TO RESOLVE TIMELY FILED MOTION FOR
EXECUTION PENDING RECONSIDERATION AND GAVE SAID DIVISION A
FREE HAND AT FULLY DISPOSING OF SAID INCIDENTS.

Petitioner argues that Commissioner Lantion’s vote in the assailed order should be
disregarded because of his previous inhibition in a similar case and in the same case in
the Division level, thus making said assailed order null and void as it was not concurred
by the required majority.

Petitioner’s argument is meritorious.

Commissioner Lantion’s voluntary piecemeal inhibition cannot be countenanced.

Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit
with reservation. To allow him to participate in the En Banc proceedings when he
previously inhibited himself in the Division is, absent any satisfactory justification, not
only judicially unethical but legally improper and absurd.

Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in the issuance of the
questioned order, thus leaving three (3) members concurring therewith, the necessary
votes of four (4) or majority of the members of the COMELEC was not attained. The
order thus failed to comply with the number of votes necessary for the pronouncement of
a decision or order, as required under Rule 3, Section 5(a) of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure which provides:

Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. – (a) When sitting en banc, four (4)
Members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of
transacting business. The concurrence of a majority of the Members of the
Commission shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision,
resolution, order or ruling.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Status Quo Ante Order dated
November 5, 2003 issued by the COMELEC En Banc is hereby NULLIFIED. This
Resolution is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161418 April 28, 2004

NOEL Y. REPOL, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VIOLETO CERACAS, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Petitioner Noel Y. Repol ("Repol") filed this Petition for Certiorari1 on 21 January 2004
alleging that the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") First Division2 committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Order dated 12 January 2004 ("Order") in SPR
Case No. 1-2004. The Order directed "the parties to maintain the STATUS QUO ANTE,
which is the condition prevailing before the issuance and implementation of the
questioned Order of the court a quo dated January 5, 2004 in Election Case No. T-001
entitled, ‘Noel Y. Repol versus Violeto Ceracas.’"

The Facts

Repol and private respondent Violeto Ceracas ("Ceracas") were candidates for Municipal
Mayor of Pagsanghan, Samar in the 14 May 2001 elections. On 16 May 2001, Ceracas
was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor with 66 votes more than Repol.

On 23 May 2001, Repol filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of
Tarangnan, Samar, Branch 40 ("trial court"), docketed as Election Case No. T-001.
Claiming that fraud and other irregularities marred the elections in Precincts 3A, 5A and
71, Repol prayed for revision of the ballots in these precincts. Judge Francisco Mazo
dismissed the election protest on 28 August 2001. On certiorari, the COMELEC First
Division reversed the dismissal order of Judge Mazo in a Resolution dated 22 May 2002
"for being issued with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction." The
COMELEC First Division directed the trial court "to reinstate the subject election protest,
conduct the revision of ballots from the protested precincts and render its Decision with
immediate dispatch." On 18 September 2003, the COMELEC en banc denied Ceracas’s
motion to reconsider the Resolution dated 22 May 2002. The COMELEC en banc
affirmed in toto the reinstatement of Repol’s election protest. This time around, trial and
revision of the ballots ensued with Judge Roberto A. Navidad presiding.

On 30 December 2003, the trial court declared Ceracas’s proclamation void and
proclaimed Repol the duly elected mayor of Pagsanghan, Samar. The trial court
explained thus:

After a very careful study and meticulous and painstaking appraisal of the
contested ballots, the Court finds and so holds that the cheating and commission
of various frauds and irregularities in these three contested precincts was massive,
used many people to fill up the ballots – including the voters, connivance with
those perpetrating the fraud and the members of the Board of Election Inspectors,
the perpetrators of the fraud enjoyed the luxury of time to perpetrate the fraud and
filling the ballots, that filling up of some of the ballots was done outside of the
voting booth and it is not difficult to finally find the answers to the questions of
the Protestant as to wherever and whatever happened to the 24 excess ballots it
noted in precinct 3A (Barangay Canlapwas) and 21 excess ballots in precinct 5A
(Brgy. Sto. Ninio).
From the foregoing peculiar facts and circumstances it is clearly evident that the
electoral fraud was perpetrated by the use of some ballots as shuttles [lanzadera],
by which device, the ballots of the voters who are not skilled in the act of writing
or whose fidelity to party is in doubt is illegally written out for them by others.

It is likewise not hard to find the answers why the sisters in law of the Protestee
were illegally at the table of the BEI Chairman controlling the voting process and
even angrily and at the top of their voices demanding that some voters be allowed
to vote as illiterates even though there were no proper identifications and
indications that indeed they were illiterates. Or why the Minutes of Voting in
precinct 5A is not the printed one. It only means that there was something to hide.

After a very careful study, meticulous and painstaking appraisal of the ballots the
Court finds that the handwriting of one person in some of the ballots in one
precinct are also found in the other two precincts.

Thus, the handwriting in the ballots in Exhibits 1, 12, 24, 27, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41,
42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 51, 53 all in Precinct 3A (Canlapwas) is the same
handwriting as in the ballots in Exhs. 3, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33,
38, 39, 40, 56, 57, 58, 59 all in Precinct 5A (Sto. Ninio) and is also the same
handwriting in the ballots in Exhs. 3, 12, 13, 14, 25, 30, 36, 38, 41, 44, 49, 51, 52
all in Precinct 7A (Buenos Aires).

The handwriting in the ballots in Exhs. 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 13, 16, 19, 21, 22, 23, 26 all
of Precinct 3A (Canlapwas) is the same handwriting in the ballots in Exhs. 12, 34,
35, 37, 43, 44, 45, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 60, 61, 64, 65, 68, 69, 70, 71 all
precinct 5A (Sto. Ninio) is the same handwriting in the ballots in Exhs. 10, 26, 27,
28, 29, 36, 61, 62, 65, 66, 67 all of precinct 7A (Buenos Aires).

Likewise, the other handwriting in the ballots in Exhs. 4, 48, 60, 61, 64 and 65 all
in precinct 3A (Canlapwas) is the same handwriting in the ballots in Exhs. 14, 15,
16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 all in precinct 5A (Sto. Ninio) is the same handwriting
in the ballots in Exhs. 40, and 47 all in precinct 7A (Buenos Aires).

Likewise, the handwriting in the ballots in Exhs. 11, 8, 20, 30 all of Precinct 3A
(Canlapwas) is the same handwriting in the ballots in Exhs. 46, 47, 48, 63 all in
precinct 5A (Sto. Ninio).

In like manner, the handwriting in the ballots in Exhs. 2, 7, 14, 35, 36 all in
precinct 3A (Canlapwas) is the same handwriting in the ballots in Exhs. 6, 7, 36,
all in precinct 5A (Sto. Ninio).

All these ballots should not be counted in favor of the Protestee.

Further, the following ballots are marked for their being written with or
unnecessary decorations serving to easily identify his vote. Accordingly, they
should not be counted in favor of the protestee. These ballots are:

1. Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 all of Precinct 5A (Sto.

Ninio) and

2. Exhs. 1, 2 and 3 all of precinct 7A (Buenos Aires).

Clearly, the will of the electorate was fraudulently substituted by the will of the
perpetrators of the fraud.
 All in all a total of 142 votes had been illegally counted in favor of the Protestee.
Deducting 66 from 142 we get a total of 76. In other words, the Protestant
garnered a majority of 76 votes over that of the protestee.3

In light of these findings, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered

DECLARING as null and void the proclamation of the Protestee and instead
hereby PROCLAIM AND DECLARE, NOEL Y. REPOL, the duly elected Mayor
of Pagsanghan, Samar in the May 2001 elections with a majority of 77 votes.4

Repol filed before the trial court a motion for execution pending appeal. On 5 January
2004, the trial court granted Repol’s motion and issued a writ of execution. Meanwhile,
Ceracas appealed the trial court’s judgment to the COMELEC.

On 6 January 2004, Repol took his oath of office as the duly elected mayor of
Pagsanghan, Samar. On the same date, Ceracas filed before the trial court an omnibus
motion to reconsider, set aside and quash the writ of execution.

During the pendency of Ceracas’s appeal with the COMELEC and without waiting for
the trial court to resolve his omnibus motion, Ceracas filed with the COMELEC a
Petition for Certiorari (with prayer for temporary restraining order, writ of preliminary
injunction and/or status quo ante) assailing the writ of execution, docketed as SPR No. 1-
2004.5 On 12 January 2004, the COMELEC First Division issued the assailed Order
directing the parties to maintain the status quo ante. The Order reads in part:

Acting on the Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order, Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order
filed by Petitioner Violeto Ceracas through counsel on January 8, 2004, the
Commission (First Division) hereby directs respondents to file their Answer
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.

The application for the Writ of Preliminary Injunction shall be heard on January
29, 2004 at ten o’clock in the morning at the Comelec Session Hall, Intramuros,
Manila.

In the interest of justice and so as not to render the issues moot and academic, the
Comelec (First Division) hereby directs the parties to maintain the STATUS QUO
ANTE, which is the condition prevailing before the issuance and implementation
of the questioned Order of the court a quo dated January 5, 2004 in Election Case
No. T-001, entitled, "Noel Y. Repol versus Violeto Ceracas".

Accordingly, effective immediately, private respondent Noel Repol, is hereby

ordered to cease and desist from assuming the duties and functions of
Municipal Mayor of Pagsanghan, Western Samar until further orders from
this Commission. In the meantime, petitioner Violeto Ceracas shall assume
the post of Municipal Mayor of Pagsanghan, Western Samar.

The Provincial Election Supervisor of Samar and the Provincial Director of the
Philippine National Police (PNP), Catbalogan, Samar, are hereby directed to
immediately implement this Order and make a return of service within five (5)
days from the implementation thereof.

The Clerk of Commission is hereby directed to serve a copy of this Order together
with a copy of the Petition to each of the respondents.6 (Emphasis supplied)
At the scheduled hearing on 29 January 2004, the COMELEC First Division issued an
order which reads in full:

In today’s hearing of the application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction prayed

for in the above entitled petition, Atty. Sixto S. Brillantes appeared for the
petitioner, while Attys. Baltazar Y. Repol and Farah D. Repol appeared for the
private respondent.

Both parties argued on their respective legal positions.

In view of the pendency of the petition for certiorari filed by private respondent
with the Supreme Court questioning the status quo ante issued on January 12,
2004, both parties are hereby given five (5) days from today or until February 3,
2004 to file their respective memoranda on the issue of whether this Commission
can resolve on the Application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction despite the
pendency of the said petition. Parties may likewise include in their memoranda
authorities and arguments on the life span of a status quo ante Order issued by the
Commission. Thereafter, with or without the said memoranda, the said issue shall
be deemed submitted for resolution.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues

Repol raises the sole issue of –

WHETHER THE COMELEC IS EMPOWERED UNDER ANY STATUTE,

RULE, OR JURISPRUDENCE TO ISSUE A STATUS QUO ANTE IN EFFECT
OVERTURNING THE EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE WRIT OF
EXECUTION ISSUED BY THE TRIAL COURT AND SUSPENDING
INDEFINITELY, WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE AND HEARING, THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH WRIT.7

Repol argues that the COMELEC First Division acted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the status quo ante Order which indefinitely suspended and effectively nullified
the trial court’s writ of execution. Repol contends that the COMELEC First Division has
no authority to issue the Order after the trial court found the election in the protested
precincts marred by fraud and after the trial court considered meritorious the grounds
cited by Repol in his motion for execution pending appeal. According to Repol, the law,
rule and jurisprudence limit the COMELEC’s power to issue temporary restraining orders
to a non-extendible period of 20 days from the date of issuance.

Ceracas agrees with Repol that the rules do not expressly grant to the COMELEC the
power to issue status quo ante orders. However, Ceracas argues that the COMELEC’s
power to issue temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions necessarily
includes the power to issue status quo ante orders.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appearing on behalf of the
COMELEC, prays that the Court dismiss the instant petition. The OSG asserts that Repol
cannot challenge before this Court by way of a petition for certiorari an interlocutory
order issued by a COMELEC Division without first filing a motion for reconsideration
with the COMELEC en banc.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Remedy to Assail Interlocutory Orders of the COMELEC in Division

Where the COMELEC in division allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion or acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing an interlocutory order, the applicable rule is
Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which states-

Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. –

(a) x x x.

(b) x x x.

(c) Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a

Division shall be resolved by the Commission en banc except motions on
interlocutory orders of the division, which shall be resolved by the
division which issued the order. (Emphasis supplied)

The 12 January 2004 Order did not dispose of the case completely as there is something
more to be done. Interlocutory orders merely rule on an incidental issue and do not
terminate or finally dispose of the case as they leave something to be done before it is
finally decided on the merits.8 Since the COMELEC First Division issued the
interlocutory Order of 12 January 2004, the same COMELEC First Division should
resolve Repol’s motion for reconsideration of the Order. The remedy of the aggrieved
party is neither to file a motion for reconsideration for certification to the COMELEC en
banc nor to elevate the issue to this Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Section 5, Rule 19 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure governs motions for
reconsideration of decisions of a COMELEC Division, as follows:

SEC. 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed of. - Upon the filing of a
motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the
Clerk of Court concerned shall, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing
thereof, notify the presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days
thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc.

In Gementiza v. Commission on Elections,9 the Court explained the import of this rule in
this wise:

Under the above-quoted rule, the acts of a Division that are subject of a motion
for reconsideration must have a character of finality before the same can be
elevated to the COMELEC en banc. The elementary rule is that an order is final
in nature if it completely disposes of the entire case. But if there is something
more to be done in the case after its issuance, that order is interlocutory.

Only final orders of the COMELEC in Division may be raised before the COMELEC en
banc. Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution mandates that only motions for
reconsideration of final decisions shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc, thus:

SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and
shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in Division, provided that motions for reconsideration of
decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. (Emphasis supplied)
Under this constitutional provision, the COMELEC en banc shall decide motions for
reconsideration only of "decisions" of a Division, meaning those acts having a final
character.10 Clearly, the assailed status quo ante Order, being interlocutory, should first
be resolved by the COMELEC First Division via a motion for reconsideration.

Furthermore, the present controversy does not fall under any of the instances over which
the COMELEC en banc can take cognizance of the case. Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:

SEC. 2. The Commission En Banc. – The Commission shall sit en banc in cases
hereinafter specifically provided, or in pre-proclamation cases upon a vote of a
majority of the members of the Commission, or in all other cases where a division
is not authorized to act, or where, upon a unanimous vote of all the Members of a
Division, an interlocutory matter or issue relative to an action or proceeding
before it is decided to be referred to the Commission en banc.

The present case is not one of the cases specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure in which the COMELEC may sit en banc. Neither is this case one where a
division is not authorized to act nor a case where the members of the First Division
unanimously voted to refer the issue to the COMELEC en banc. Thus, the COMELEC en
banc is not even the proper forum where Repol may bring the assailed interlocutory
Order for resolution.

We held in Ambil, Jr. v. Commission on Elections11 that -

Under the existing Constitutional scheme, a party to an election case within the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC in division can not dispense with the filing of a
motion for reconsideration of a decision, resolution or final order of the Division
of the Commission on Elections because the case would not reach the Comelec en
banc without such motion for reconsideration having been filed x x x.

Repol went directly to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory order of the COMELEC
First Division. Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution prescribes the power of the
Supreme Court to review decisions of the COMELEC, as follows:

Section 7. Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members
any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of
each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

We have interpreted this constitutional provision to mean final orders, rulings and
decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers.12 The decision must be a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en
banc.13 The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari14 an interlocutory order
or even a final resolution of a Division of the COMELEC. Failure to abide by this
procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.15

However, this rule is not ironclad. In ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v.

COMELEC,16 we stated –

This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement [of
filing a motion for reconsideration] may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage
 of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection
of labor, when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity, or
when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate
and speedy remedy available.

The Court further pointed out in ABS-CBN that an exception was warranted under the
peculiar circumstances of the case since there was hardly enough opportunity to move for
a reconsideration and to obtain a swift resolution in time for the 11 May 1998 elections.
The same can be said in Repol’s case. We rule that direct resort to this Court through a
special civil action for certiorari is justified under the circumstances obtaining in the
present case.

Validity of the Status Quo Ante Order

The main issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the COMELEC First Division
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the status quo ante Order which effectively overturned the trial court’s grant of execution
pending appeal in Repol’s favor. This issue is not mooted even if the next elections are
just a few weeks away. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our
democratic government.17 To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone
a task that could well crop up again in future elections.18

We rule in the affirmative.

First. Rule 30 of the 1993 COMELEC Rule of Procedure provides the metes and bounds
on the COMELEC’s power to issue injunctive relief as follows:

SECTION 1. Preliminary Injunction. - The Commission or any of its Divisions

may grant preliminary injunction in any ordinary action, special action, special
case, or special relief pending before it.

SECTION 2. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary

injunction may be granted at any time after the commencement of an action or
proceeding and before judgment when it is established that:

(a) The petitioner or protestant is entitled to the relief demanded and the
whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the acts complained of, or in the performance of an act or
acts, either for a limited period or perpetually.

(b) The commission or continuance of some act complained of during the

pendency of the action or the non-performance thereof would work
injustice to the petitioner or protestant.

(c) The respondent or protestee is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is

procuring to be done, some act in violation of petitioner’s/protestant’s
rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.

SECTION 3. Grant of injunction discretionary. - The grant of the preliminary

injunction is entirely left to the sound discretion of the Commission or its
Divisions.

SECTION 4. Bond for preliminary injunction. - No writ of preliminary injunction

shall be issued unless the applicant shall file a bond, in an amount to be fixed by
the Commission or the Division concerned, to the effect that the
 petitioner/protestant will pay to such party all damages which the latter may
sustain by reason of the injunction if the Commission or the Division concerned
shall finally decide that the petitioner/protestant was not entitled thereto.

SECTION 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; issuance of

restraining order. - No preliminary injunction shall be granted without notice to
the adverse party. If it shall appear from the facts shown by affidavits or the
verified petition that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant
before the matter can be heard on notice, the Commission or any Division to
which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a
restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty days from date of
its issuance. Within the said twenty-day period, the Commission or the Division,
as the case may be, must cause an order to be served on the respondent requiring
him to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be
granted, and determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary
injunction shall be granted and shall accordingly issue the corresponding order. In
the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied, the restraining
order is deemed automatically vacated. (Emphasis supplied)

A cursory reading of the Order dated 12 January 2004 or the so-called status quo ante
Order reveals that it was actually a temporary restraining order. It ordered Repol to cease
and desist from assuming the position of municipal mayor of Pagsanghan, Samar and
directed Ceracas to assume the post in the meantime. The status quo ante Order had a life
span of more than 20 days since the directive was qualified by the phrase "until further
orders from this Commission." This violates the rule that a temporary retraining order has
an effective period of only 20 days and automatically expires upon the COMELEC’s
denial of the preliminary injunction. Thus, the status quo ante Order automatically ceased
to have any effect after 1 February 2004 since the COMELEC First Division did not issue
a writ of preliminary injunction.

While the hearing on Ceracas’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction was held
on 29 January 2004, the COMELEC First Division failed to resolve the application.
Instead, it issued an Order directing the parties to file their memoranda until 3 February
2004 on their respective positions "on the life span of status quo ante orders and whether
a writ of preliminary injunction should be granted in the case." Clearly, the COMELEC
First Division’s indecision on the matter not only worked injustice to Repol but also
failed to dispel the uncertainty beclouding the real choice of the electorate for municipal
mayor.

Second. The decision of the trial court in Election Case No. T-001 was rendered on 30
December 2003, or after almost one year of trial and revision of the questioned ballots. It
found Repol as the candidate with the plurality of votes. The grant of execution pending
appeal was well within the discretionary powers of the trial court.19 In the recent case of
Edgar Y. Santos v. Commission on Elections (First Division) and Pedro Q. Panulaya,20
we ruled:

Between the determination by the trial court of who of the candidates won the
elections and the finding of the Board of Canvassers as to whom to proclaim, it is
the court’s decision that should prevail. This was sufficiently explained in the
case of Ramas v. COMELEC in this wise:

All that was required for a valid exercise of the discretion to allow
execution pending appeal was that the immediate execution should be
based "upon good reasons to be stated in a special order." The rationale
why such execution is allowed in election cases is, as stated in Gahol v.
Riodique, "to give as much recognition to the worth of a trial judge’s
 decision as that which is initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation
by the board of canvassers." Thus:

Why should the proclamation by the board of canvassers suffice as

basis of the right to assume office, subject to future contingencies
attendant to a protest, and not the decision of a court of justice?
Indeed, when it is considered that the board of canvassers is
composed of persons who are less technically prepared to make an
accurate appreciation of the ballots, apart from their being more
apt to yield to extraneous considerations, and that the board must
act summarily, practically racing against time, while, on the other
hand, the judge has the benefit of all the evidence the parties can
offer and of admittedly better technical preparation and
background, apart from his being allowed ample time for
conscientious study and mature deliberation before rendering
judgment, one cannot but perceive the wisdom of allowing the
immediate execution of decisions in election cases adverse to the
protestees, notwithstanding the perfection and pendency of appeals
therefrom, as long as there are, in the sound discretion of the court,
good reasons therefor.

To deprive trial courts of their discretion to grant execution pending appeal

would, in the words of Tobon Uy v. COMELEC, bring back the ghost of the
"grab-the-proclamation-prolong the protest" techniques so often resorted to by
devious politicians in the past in their efforts to perpetuate their hold to an elective
office. This would, as a consequence, lay to waste the will of the electorate.

Applying Santos to this petition, we hold that the COMELEC First Division
committed grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the trial court’s order
granting execution pending appeal.

Ceracas was Guilty of Forum Shopping

We must point out that Ceracas is guilty of forum-shopping. At the time he instituted
SPR Case No. 1-2004 with the COMELEC, he had a pending omnibus motion to
reconsider, set aside and quash the writ of execution with the trial court. In addition,
Ceracas’s appeal of the trial court’s adverse decision was also pending before the
COMELEC.21 Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or
order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion
in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari.22 It may also
be the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on
the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.23

Due to a clear showing that Ceracas was forum-shopping, the COMELEC First Division,
following our ruling in Santos,24 should have dismissed outright instead of giving due
course to Ceracas’s petition in SPR No. 1-2004.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Order dated 12 January 2004 of
the COMELEC First Division in SPR Case No. 1-2004 is ANNULLED and said case is
ordered DISMISSED on the ground of forum-shopping. The Order dated 5 January 2004
of the Regional Trial Court of Tarangnan, Samar, Branch 40, granting the execution
pending appeal of its decision in Election Case No. T-001, and the Writ of Execution
issued pursuant thereto, are REINSTATED. The full enforcement of the said Writ must
forthwith be made.

This Decision shall be immediately executory.