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On Aristotle's Definition of Tragedy

Nathan Spiegel

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Spiegel Nathan. On Aristotle's Definition of Tragedy. In: Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire, tome 49, fasc. 1, 1971. pp. 14-
30;

doi : https://doi.org/10.3406/rbph.1971.2856

https://www.persee.fr/doc/rbph_0035-0818_1971_num_49_1_2856

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 ON AEISTOTLE'S DEFINITION OF TRAGEDY (*)

A RECONSIDERATION

The subject of this paper is the problem of Aristotle's definition

of tragedy. Although Aristotle's view of tragedy has been discussed
many times in the scientific literature scholars have not arrived at
any unity of opinion. The main reason for this lies in the fact that
the Poetics, as preserved, is incomplete : once, apparently it consisted
of two books, of which the second has been lost.
The differences of opinion relate to several topics : the
reconstruction of Aristotle's views of tragedy in general, and of
"catharsis" in particular ; the correctness of his assertions ; the connection
between Aristotle's theory of tragedy and Plato's views of tragedy ;
and others.
Since the year 1548, when Robortelli published his commentary
on Aristotle's Poetics (x), there have been published in connection
with the Poetics hundreds of studies — papers and books — of
significantly differing qualities. Among these works, that of J. Bernays,
written more than a hundred years ago, is outstanding (2).
However, even Bernays, though he surpassed other commentators on the
Poetics, did not succeed in resolving all the controversial points.
His work, written with great ability, provoked a lively discussion
among scholars.
Is it then worth while to deal yet again with a problem about
which hundreds of books have been written ?

(♦) I should like to express my sincere thanks to Mrs. A. Tcherikover for her kind help
in the preparation of this paper for the press.
(1) F. Robortelli, In librum Aristotelis de arte poëtica explicatione». Florence, 1548.
(2) « Grundzüge der verlorenen Abhandlung des Aristoteles über die Wirkung der
Tragödie», 1857.
 on Aristotle's definition of tragedy 15

It is difficult to present a definitive interpretation of Aristotle's

opinions on matters about which scholars have arrived at such
different and even contradictory conclusions, for it is difficult to
delineate Aristotle's views with absolute certainty. Nevertheless,
it seems worth while to attempt to clarify this matter in the spirit
of Aristotle's method, which may assist us in reaching at least a
partial conclusion. As Aristotle himself observed, man, in his thirst
for knowledge, is happy with even a partial solution of matters about
which there are great doubts (1).
Let us start with the definition of tragedy as given in the Poetics.
"Tragedy is a description of an action that is serious, complete in
itself and of a certain magnitude ; it is presented in language
embellished with pleasing accessories, which are found in the various
parts of the work ; it is related in a dramatic rather than a narrative
form and through pity and fear, it effects the proper release of
painful emotions such as these".
This definition is of classical character and provides the definitio
per genus proximum et dijferentiam spedficam, a classification through
delineation of the closest related category and the depiction of the
identifying, unique factor (2). Two of Aristotle's ideas are significant
for us : I) definition depends on homogeneity ; II) "Of the various
parts of the definition, it is the genus which expresses most distinctively
the essence ofthat which is defined" (3). With regard to this point,
Thomas Aquinas (in his Commentary on the Metaphysics (4) writes :

« ... cum differentia additur generi, non additur quasi aliqua diversa
essentia a genere sed quasi in genere implicite contenta.»

In the definition of tragedy the "genus proximum" is μίμησις

while the "differentia specifica" contains the rest of the definition.
If, according to Aristotle, the definition is a unity (homogeneity),
one must examine the entire definition and not only a certain part
or detail of it ; and if, according to Aristotle, it is the genus which

(1) De caelo, II : 12, 30.

(2) Poet. 49b, 24 sqq.
(3) Topica, 139 a, 29-31.
(4) No. 1549.
16 Ν. SPIEGEL

primarily expresses the essence of things, it is clear that the

clarification of Aristotle's views depends first and foremost upon a correct
interpretation of Mimesis.

I. Mimesis

The meaning of the term μίμησις is quite complicated. Wilamo-

witz called it "ein verhängnisvolles Wort", and the absence of a
clear understanding of this complex term led to serious errors, as if,
for instance, art were "an imitation" in the literal sense of the word.
In our discussion we shall try to understand what Aristotle meant
by this term : 1) what is the essence of Mimesis ; 2) what is
characteristic of the subject of Mimesis, its means and modes ; 3) what is the
value and influence of mimesis.
1 ) Aristotle distinguishes three kinds of human spiritual activity (x) .
Each such activity is either practical, creative, or theoretical :
Πασά διάνοια ή πρακτική ή ποιητική ή θεωρητική. What is the
essence of the creative activity i.e. of διάνοια ποιητική or of τέχνη
μιμητική. Let us recall Aristotle's words : μιμείται ή τέχνη την
φύσιν (2). In order to understand this statement fully, one must
pay attention not only to the term μιμείται but, in the first place,
to the word φύσις. What is most characteristic of nature, of φύσις ?
Nature creates — φύσις φύει. The expression μιμείται ή τέχνη
την φύσιν means : as does creative nature, art too creates ; it is an
attempt of the human spirit to compete with creative nature. The
artist creates according to the same principle by which a plant grows
from of seed and an animal from semen (3). Aristotle says (4) that
art partly completes what nature cannot bring to completion and
partly imitates nature.
Thus nature and art are the two basic creative forces in the world.
In addition, nature has its own laws of development, while, because
of art, things are created whose form is found in the soul (5) .

(1) Metaphysica, 1025b.

(2) Meteorobgica, 381 b6.
(3) Met., 1032a.
(4) Physica, 199al5.
(5) Met., 1032b.
 on Aristotle's definition of tragedy 17

Apparently, the meaning of mimesis is creation. On the other hand,

Aristotle emphasizes that nature exists independently and according
to its own laws ; nature is primary while art is secondary, since it is
not nature which imitates art but rather art which imitates nature.
Thus mimesis is also imitation, yet it is not imitation in the sense of
"copying" ; it is the imitation of nature as a creative force. Mimesis,
as a creative activity, is in a sense an illusion, since it is rooted in
the soul and moves — consciously — away from reality. Yet art,
as Aristotle asserts, is essentially of a philosophical nature since it
depicts the "general", the "typical" (το καθόλου) (ν). Phidias'
wisdom, writes Aristotle, is similar to that of a philosopher engaged
in the recognition of the fundamental principles of existence.
In summary, it may be said that mimesis, according to Aristotle,
has two faces : on the one hand it is an illusion, and on the other it
contains philosophical elements. Thus, it seems that the term
mimesis should be translated (according to context) as creation,
representation, expression, "imitation".
2) Let us now turn to analysis of the subject of mimesis, its means
and modes. Like Plato, Aristotle distinguishes between the real
thing which it to be represented, explained or "imitated", and the
subject in the process of its formation and artistic elaboration.
Yet Aristotle does not agree with Plato's opinion that the
represented thing is only an imitation to be found three steps away from
truth, as only "a shadow of a shadow ", a game, and not a product
of deep thinking (2). In opposition to Plato, Aristotle thinks that
the subject of a work of art is of a special nature, having two faces ;
on the one hand, it is an unreal thing and found somewhere in the
sphere of imagination, while on the other hand things in their artistic
formulation represent real things and do it in such a way that we
are inclined to forget — at least to a certain extent — that they are
only "representations". The represented things take the place, as
it were, of the things themselves, they arouse an illusion of reality,
they pretend to be the things themselves, they imitate the actual.
Just as the precious stone, the jacinth, flashes different colors at

(1) Poet., 50bl2, 51b7,8, 55bl.

(2) The Republic, 602.
18 Ν. SPIEGEL

various times, creation shows its varied sides, once appearing as

imaginary, once as actual.
Aristotle understands this well, and he probably has this in mind
when he speaks of the magic of art, which makes even ugly things
beautiful.
The means of mimesis, Aristotle explains, are words, melodies,
gestures, and so forth. As for the modes of the art of poetry (and it
is precisely this art which is of interest to us), Aristotle notes that the
art of poetry, depicts the plot either by way of a narrative — as in
an epic, or in a dramatic form — as in tragedy or comedy.
3) Let us turn to the problem of the value and influence of
mimesis. Aristotle distinguishes, as noted above, among three kinds of
human spiritual activity : practical, artistic and theoretical. He
attaches particular importance to theoretical activity, yet he
emphasizes also the great value of practical and artistic activities. Art,
in his opinion, serves an important biological function. There are
rooted in man's nature from his birth, needs and desires which
gradually develop from base to elevated ones, from practical to spiritual
needs and — among these — from aesthetic to intellectual ones.
The satisfaction of aesthetic needs brings pleasure and makes life
easier and more beautiful.

II. The Objective Elements of Tragedy

1) ΙΤραξις σπουδαία
Mimesis serves, as noted above, as the genus proximum in the
definition of tragedy. The definition is completed through the
"differentia specifica" with its two major parts : a) the objective elements
of tragedy and b) the influence tragedy exerts upon the spectator.
Tragedy, says Aristotle in the sixth chapter of the "Poetics", is
a representation of a serious plot (μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας) ζ1).
What is a "serious plot" ? Quite characteristic are the following
words in the thirteenth chapter of the Poetics (2) : "the most beautiful

(1) Poet., 49b24.

(2) Poet., 53b 10 sq.
 on Aristotle's definition of tragedy 19

tragedies are written... about men whose fate it was to suffer or to

cause suffering".
Aristotle uses the term πραξις in the following senses : a) activity —
έργον ; b) events — πράγμα ; c) sensations — πάθος and d) the
behaviour of the hero in a time of misfortune. What, then, is a
serious plot ? According to Aristotle, it is evil, which bears destruction
and suffering ; this evil is named by Aristotle πάθος (Poetics, 52, b 11).
Sufferings (πάθος) occupy a central place in tragedy. Tragedy is
but a representation of man's life (μίμησις βίου) (χ), and sufferings
are an unseparable part of this life. Euripides, we are told, said that
tragedy is but a perception (apprehension) of misfortunes. The Latin
grammarian Diomedes said : "nihil aliud esse tragoediam quam
miseriarum comprehensionem". Πάθος, the evil which brings
destruction or sufferings, results from the change from success to failure,
misfortune, and troubles.
Yet, with this the subject of the tragic incident is still not exhausted.
On the basis of Aristotle's observations in the Poetics and in his other
works, one may distinguish the following features of the tragic
incident. The first characteristic of a tragic plot pertains to the
connection between the tragic incident and moral values. Aristotle
notes in the sixth chapter of the Poetics that "Tragedy is not a
representation of persons nor, primarily, of ethics, but rather of life" (2)
and, further on, adds that a tragedy is impossible without a plot,
but there may be one without ethical standards (3). Second, with
the change from success to failure, a man should appear to be neither
morally perfect nor wholly evil. And it is better that he should be
good than evil ; man is not insured against the vicissitudes of fate
(misfortune) because of his being better rather than worse. Third,
the tragic incident ends with failure, with disaster, with suffering.
"It is necessary that a good plot encompass a change, not from
failure to success, but rather the opposite — from success to failure" (4).

(1) Poet., 50a 16 sq.

(2) Poet., 50a 16-17.
(3) Poet., 23-25.
(4) Poet., 52b 35 sqq.
20 Ν. SPIEGEL

Furthermore, the tragic incident ends with disaster for those who
are evil as well as for those who are good.
Plato criticizes the poets, and says that their attitude towards the
most important things is evil (x) ; they write that many wicKed
men prosper while the righteous live in poverty and hardship.
Plato demands that in poetical works the good hero should be happy
while misery should be the fate of the evil one. Aristotle thinks
otherwise. He knows well enough that the spectator wishes a "happy
end" with all ending favourably for the good and in misery for
;
the evil. Yet he emphasizes that the tragedian does not seek the
solution of the conflict in the moral sphere. The tragedian depicts
the tragic event : he does not appear as a judge who confers prizes
upon the good and inflicts penalties upon the evil. The tragic
incident ends in disaster irrespective of whether the hero is good or
evil. It is quite clear, thus, that in Aristotle's opinion, the cause of
tragic incidents is not rooted in moral values.
What is then the root, the source, of the tragic incident ? The
tragic incident, the change from a state of success to one of misfortune,
a sudden change of human fate, derives from the very essence of
existence, from the essence of human nature. On the one hand,
external factors act (men, events, fate, and so forth) ; on the other
hand, human nature itself, with its permanently rooted
contradictory forces, acts. One and the same trait allows man to carry out
contradictory actions. It enables the hero to accomplish some
wonderful act, yet this very act causes his downfall. This twofold human
force, the source of man's most wonderful actions and also of his
perdition, derives from man's appetites and desires. Desires are
a necessary condition of life.
Aristotle speaks about this in his book On the Soul (2) : "There is
but one instigator : desire. The mind never operates unless moved
by desires".
In Ethica Nicomachea (3) Aristotle says that man's appetites are
imprinted upon him and inseparably linked to his nature. Yet

(1) Republic, 392.

(2) De anima, 433a 21.
(3) Eth. N.G., 1135b 21.
 on Aristotle's definition of tragedy 21

appetites, without which life is impossible, also encompass dangerous

tendencies. Tragedy presents precisely these excessive appetites
which lead to perdition, desires which dominate the whole of man's
life, silencing the voice of reason and breaking man into fragments.
Medea wishes to kill her own children in order to take revenge
on Jason. She struggles with her inner feelings, but jealousy prevails
over reason (1). "Jealousy overcomes all my thoughts ; jealousy
which brings disaster to all flesh and blood". Phaedra expresses a
similar thought (2) : "We understand what is correct, but we do not
do it".
The external factors, which influence man and his nature, create
a complex knot ; this compels man to act in a certain way, and the
consequences of his activity may be quite different from those he
intended. "And he hoped for grapes, and it produced sour grapes. "
(Isaiah, V : 2). Aristotle indicates this in saying, "the messenger
who comes to gladden Oedipus and to remove his fears concerning
relations with his mother, reveals the secret of his birth and causes
the opposite result" (3).
External happenings, fate, man's desires, human logical
weakness, disorientation in a certain situation — these are the causes
which necessarily lead to an error which engenders misfortune. And
this is why — as Aristotle emphasizes in the Ethica Nicomachea —
we speak of error when the action of the hero and its consequences
are evil while the hero himself is not. From what has been said above,
it may be inferred that the roots of tragic incidents do not lie in
moral values but in the very nature of existence and in the nature
of man himself and it is out of these that the great, the tragic, error
necessarily grows.

2. Μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας

We perceive the πραξις σπουδαία, the sudden change in man's
life from happiness to misfortune, not in its bare concrete image,
but in a poetic illusion presented in a perfect artistic form — thanks

(1) Medea, 1078 sq.

(2) Hippol., 380 sq.
(3) Poet., 52a 24 sqq.
22 Ν. SPIEGEL

to tragedy. Aristotle offers us not only an excellent characterization

of πραξις σπουδαία but also a wonderful analysis of μίμησις πράξεως
σπουδαίας. One may say that he offers us the anatomy and the
physiology of tragedy.
Aristotle first approaches tragedy through a horizontal cross-
section, and distinguishes the following qualitative components
(τα ποία) : a) plot ; b) character ; c) thoughts of the active figures
(μΰθος, ήθη, διάνοια). These three components belong to the
subject of mimesis.
Apart from the subject of mimesis, Aristotle distinguishes, as noted,
the means of mimesis and also its mode. The means of mimesis in
tragedy are diction (λέξις) and melody (μελοποιία). The mode
in tragedy, Aristotle explains, in contrast to the epic, is not the
narrative but the action {δράμα) which is the mode of expression. And
he adds that "The spectacle (δψις) must form a part of tragedy" (x).
Thus, Aristotle distinguishes six parts in every tragedy which are :
plot, character, thought, diction, melody and spectacle ; and he
emphasizes : "there is nothing else besides these" (2).
These six parts (or components) fulfil important functions, each
depending upon and connected with the others. Yet the most
important component is the plot ; it is the backbone of the work. "The
plot", writes Aristotle in the sixth chapter of the Poetics, "is tragedy's
chief purpose" ; and then adds : "the plot is the beginning and, as it
were, the soul of tragedy" (3).
Aristotle calls the six above mentioned components of tragedy
qualitative. Aristotle does not content himself with a qualitative
analysis of tragedy, with the definition of the six components ; he
believes that they do not fully express the essence of the literary work.
There also exists the element of structure — a certain order of the
components. Therefore, apart from the qualitative analysis (το ποίον),
that is the horizontal analysis, Aristotle makes a quantitative or
vertical analysis (ποσόν).
On the basis of Aristotle's observations in the Poetics, one may

(1) Poet., 49b 32 sq.

(2) Poet., 50a 12.
(3) Poet., 50a 38 sq.
 on Aristotle's definition of tragedy 23

add the following features concerning the quantitative side of

tragedy. In the first place he attributes great importance to the
structure of tragedy, to the composition of the plot, to the unity of
structure, and to the absence of superfluous material. He emphasizes
many times that the plot of a tragedy is to be constructed in such a
way that incidents develop from previous events, either through
necessity or by way of probability, since there is a great difference
between a thing happening propter hoc or post hoc (r) .
With regard to the vertical analysis, Aristotle adds the following
features : 1) a certain magnitude neither too big nor too small ;
2) a certain order of events with one following the other, 3) a good
development and resolution of the tragic conflict ; 4) organic
integrity.
Aristotle emphasizes frequently that a literary work, though
composed of different parts both vertically and horizontally, is not an
unstable incidentally — structured combination of such parts but
rather an organic unity.
Moreover, the fact that the tragic incident is presented to us as
an aesthetic illusion is the very reason we perceive the πραξις σπουδαία
with pleasure. The decisive point is that πραξις σπουδαία appears
in tragedy as a represented reality, and therefore we may view it
aesthetically.
Finally, thanks to tragedy as well as to philosophy, there appears
before us a more profound meaning of life and of existence in
general. Tragedy provides us with a world-outlook which is, in the main,
pessimistic.

III. The Influence of Tragedy upon the Spectator

1) The perception of tragedy.

specifica"
It has already
in Aristotle's
been said
definition
that the
of tragedy
second part
is itsofinfluence
the "differentia
exerted

upon the spectator. This definition states that "mimesis" (the

description) effects, through pity and fear, the proper release of painful
emotions such as these". This definition gave rise to many detailed

(1) Poet., 52a 21 sq.

24 Ν. SPIEGEL

discussions among scholars on two basic problems : I) would it be

correct to introduce into the definition of tragedy such a factor as
the influence of tragedy ? II) in what manner is the influence of
tragedy conceived by Aristotle and perceived by the audience ?
As to the first problem, Aristotle thinks that without considering
the influence of an artistic work it would be impossible to grasp its
essence. There are two reasons for Aristotle's view : first, it derives
from his teleological approach. When speaking about an artistic
work, Aristotle always asks : what is its aim ? In the Ethica Nicoma-
chea we read : "everyone who creates does so for a specific goal" (x).
Second, Aristotle, as is well known, discusses phenomena not only
from the teleological point of view but also from that of possibility
and reality, of potentiality and realization. Tragedy, as an artistic
literary creation in its objective form, exists in potential. All its
values exist potentially, and they emerge and are realized only through
reading it or seeing it performed. Consequently Aristotle considers
that the influence of tragedy on its percipient is one of its essential
components.
The next problem is : in what way is tragedy perceived ? Aristotle
distinguishes three elements which determine the perception of an
artistic work. They are : a) what acts ? b) upon whom does it act ?
c) by what means does it act ? As to through what tragedy exerts
its influence, Aristotle thinks that it is first and foremost, the plot
(μνθος) : "The first essential, the life and the soul, so to speak, of
tragedy is the plot" (2). Yet all the other components of tragedy
also exert their influence, the qualitative components (character,
thought, diction, melody, spectacle), and the quantitative
components (homogeneity of structure, a certain magnitude, organic unity).
Tragedy exerts its influence as a whole i.e. through its shattering
plot and through the charm of its form.
Let us quickly review the role of the percipient of tragedy.
Aristotle's On the Soul (3) indicates that "Movement, activity and
sensation are the lot of the influenced... The causes, the active and

(1) Eth. Nie, 1139b 1 sqq.

(2) Poet., 50a 38.
(3) De An., 426a 1 sqq.
 on Aristotle's definition of tragedy 25

moving forces, are transformed into energy with regard to that which
absorbs these activities'". The influence of tragedy depends not only
upon its objective elements but also upon its spectators with their
specific characteristics.
The differences among various readers and spectators are
considerable. They derive from factors such as cultural level, character,
age, innate emotional inclinations, economic condition, social status
and success or failure.
In the second book of Rhetoric (x) Aristotle brings an excellent,
profound, and valid description of men according to the factors
mentioned above.
From these observations it may be concluded that spectators in
the Athenian theatre came from various strata of the population,
and that they differed from each other (like the spectators in the
theatre of our time) in their characteristics. One may distinguish
two groups of spectators : the cultured and educated, and the
common people (2). We have spoken of the differences among the
spectators. They had in common, however, the fact that in greater or
lesser degree, they all participate in a general human fate. Sufferings,
sorrow, anxiety, alarms, fears, unsatisfied desires, are every man's
lot (3).
In short : sufferings are rooted in the spectator of tragedy,
irrespective of his being a powerful king or a miserable beggar.
After these observations about the factors which activate the
influence of tragedy on the spectator, we may turn to our main
problem : in what way is tragedy perceived ?
Each literary work — including tragedy — is composed, as we
have already seen, of various parts. The diversity of tragedy is the
reason for its being perceived in a special way. Tragedy is absorbed
through various interconnected perceptive processes and experiences :
1) hearing the musical part of the work (άκρόασις) ; 2)
contemplation (αΐσθησις) ; 3) activities of the imagination (φαντάσματα) ; 4)
perception of the heroes' thoughts and intellectual penetration into

(1) Rhetorica, II, 12-17.

(2) Politua, 1342a 19.
(3) Rhet., 1379a 16.
26 Ν. SPIEGEL

the work (διάνοια) ; 5) perception of what is happening in the soul

of the hero, in particular of awareness of the forces struggling within
it.
Aristotle says in On the Soul (x) : "When we see something fearsome
or shocking we immediately participate in the experience, react
emotionally, and identify with it through our emotions". A similar idea
appears in the Politics (2) : "When men hear artistic creations, their
feelings move in sympathy with them".
One should not take literally the statement that we experience the
misfortunes and the feelings of the heroes. We are able to imagine
quite vividly their state of mind, for instance that of Medea before
she kills her children, or that of Glytemnestra before her murder,
but we are unable to actually "live" these sensations. We may in
some way "sense" or "understand" the sufferings of the acting
personages. One may sense the "taste", the "quality" of the feelings
of another, yet they cannot be imparted in their full reality. Even
at the moment of out profound identification with the misfortunes and
the states of mind of the heroes, these remain imaginary experiences,
and the spectator realizes the distance between the represented and
the real world.
No doubt, we sense and experience the misfortunes and the feeling
of others. Yet it is neither mere knowledge of another's situation nor
the sensation of real disaster or actual feelings of others. It is an
experience imparted in an aesthetic form.
In Ethica Nicomachea (3) Aristotle observes that thought may
include a grain of aspiration (ορεκτικός νους), and aspiration — a
grain of thought (δρεξις διανοητική). Would it be possible to say,
by way of analogy, that there is in thinking or understanding a
shade of feeling ?
Aristotle distinguishes carefully between a true experience and an
imaginary one. In On the Soul (4) : he notes : "Imagination is
different from both perception and thought", and further on: "As for

(1) De An., 427b 21.

(2) Pol., 1340a 12-13.
(3) Eth. Nie, 1139b.
(4) De An., 427b 14.15.
 on Aristotle's definition of tragedy 27

Imagination it is as if we were looking at a painting of some dreadful

or encouraging scene...".

2. The Reactions of the Percipient of Tragedy

The impact of tragedy upon man is not only in his perception of
the things tragedy contains. In addition the spectator reacts to the
stimuli of tragedy. We may distinguish two kinds of reaction : first,
the feelings connected with the plot of the tragedy and deriving from
the participation of the spectator in the fate of the heroes ; let us
call them "feelings of empathy". The second type of reaction is
those feelings of the spectator engendered within him as the result
of his contact with tragedy, yet bearing upon his own soul ; let us
call them "private or individual feelings".
The following feelings pertain to "empathy" : participation in the
sorrow of the hero, anxiety for his fate, sympathy for him, anger
towards his enemies, and also trembling in the face of shocking events.
Among these feelings, Aristotle ranks pity and fear (trembling)
first. Pity and fear are basic tragic feelings with which the spectator
reacts to the tragic events before him. This fact has been recognized
by the great dramatists of all generations.
Yet thanks to what are we able to experience "feelings of
participation in the tragic plot" ? How can tragedy exert its influence
upon the spectator and make him yield to it, i.e., apprehend it and
react to it with various feelings, especially pity and fear ?
That one thing acts and another one senses the consequences of
this activity is possible only if there exists between the two something
in common : "Only to the extent that two things have something
in common does it appear that the one acts and the other experiences
the action" (x).
If this be so, then what do the spectator and the plot have in
common ? That which is represented in tragedy — the activities and
fate of the heroes — is of general character, typical (το καβάλου)
of human fate, and therefore concerns everyone. The spectator
senses that the things represented concern him, he is under the
impression that it is his own affairs which are represented.

(1) De An., 429b 24-26.

28 Ν. SPIEGEL

In Sophocles' Ajax, Odysseus says "I pity him, unfortunate man,

though he is my enemy, for he is linked to a miserable fate. I look
not at him but at myself, for I see that as long as we live we are but
shades and vain shadows " (x) . Any spectator of tragedy might say
these words about himself. Nietzsche tells us that the tragedian
addresses the audience through his characters in this way : "Watch
now, watch carefully ! This is your life" (2).
The plot of a tragedy can be apprehended and comprehended
not only because of its universality, but also because of the
spectator's thesaurus of experiences, acquired through his misfortunes and
torments. In Oedipus Coloneus, the hero says : "Only he who has
himself suffered can participate in the emotions of others " (3) . In the
same tragedy Theseus assures Oedipus in a moving speech that he
(Theseus) is capable of understanding the suffering of a blind
wanderer, having been trained himself in a school of woe (4) . Dido
expresses herself in similar terms : "Non ignara mali miseris succurrere
disco" (5).
The tragic emotions of pity and fear which are experienced in the
theatre are qualitatively different from the correspondent emotions
in real life. Müller noted the difference between έλεος and φόβος
as "tragic emotions " and the emotions of the same names in real
life (6). Wilamowitz correctly observes : "For him who can
appreciate the value of the Greek word, one thing is certain : fear and pity
do not express Aristotle's meaning. Pity is passable, though
insufficient ; we should rather call the feeling 'commotion'. But fear is
simply the wrong word". In fact, Aristotle himself tells us in one
place (1453 b) that we experience 'tremor'. This is the affect, then,
which tragedy excites in the spectator (7). In tragedy, the emotions

(1) Ajax, 121 sqq.

(2) F. Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragoedie (Leipzig, 1907), p. 167.
(3) Oed. Col, 1135.
(4) Ibid., 563 sq.
(5) Vergil, Aeneid, I, 630.
(6) A. Müller, Geschichte der Theorie der Kunst bei den Alten, Breslau, 1834-1837, vol. II,
pp. 60-70.
(7) U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Griechische Tragoedien, vol. XIV : Die
Griechische Tragœdie und ihre drei Dichter (Berlin, 1932), 61.
 on Aristotle's definition of tragedy 29

"pity" and "fear" lack certain essential components. Thus, for

example, fear does not, in the theatre, provoke flight (the spectator
does not flee because of fear) . Aesthetic emotions are partial ones,
incomplete in the sense that they do not bring about a dynamic
reaction. Nonetheless, these emotions may be powerful ones and
express themselves in the same physiological manifestations which
express actual emotions. Plato's Ion says : "Whenever I say a sad
thing, my eyes fill with tears ; whenever I say a horrible thing, my
hair stands on end and my heart beats strongly" (x). The reactions
of spectators (or readers) to tragedy, which arouses pity or fear, are
similar.
Feelings of participation and, in particular, the aesthetic feelings
of pity and fear enable us to perceive tragedy more profoundly, to
"live" it. Because of these feelings, we "live" the experiences of
the heroes as if they were our own. Yet their role is not limited to
this. They enable us to see and recognize things we could not have
met in our everyday life : to sense, to grasp the profound meaning
and the sssence of things we named above πραξις σπουδαία. The
represented things have no real existence : there is a certain distance
between the "represented thing" and the actual thing. The πραξις
σπουδαία as a representation, is not wholly realized.
It is precisely this fact which enables its comprehension. It is
perceived and apprehended because it does not possess the power
of full realization. In real life tragic incident leads to madness, to
disaster, and to suffering ; whereas when we perceive the πραξις
σπουδαία in the theatre, though we are drawn by it and shaken by it,
the fact of its being unreal permits us to perceive it without actual
pain, and even with a certain pleasure. Though we apprehend it
as if in miniature, as if in a distant reflection, it is nevertheless, a
profound experience, a shock, a trauma (εκπληξις) . It is, however,
not that kind of shock which breaks and rends, but rather one which
even brings a certain healing.
The spectator experiences not only the feelings and thoughts which
concern the plot, and which arise while he concentrates upon an
external subject ; he also concentrates upon his inner self, upon what

(1) Ion, 535.

30 Ν. SPIEGEL

is going on within his own soul. It is clear, however, that the

external and the inner concentrations are intertwined. It also may occur
that one type of concentration prevails over the other. When the
inner concentration prevails, the spectator is divided against
himself; he is, in a way, "beside his soul", simultaneously grasping the
subject in its general outline. Thereafter, following the stage of
"intensive inner concentration", there comes the stage of an
"intensive external concentration" which appears alongside a weakened
"inner concentration", and so forth.
Now, let us discuss the phenomena which, though evoked by
tragedy, bear upon ourselves, our soul, our life.
Gorgias says that the readers of poetry are seized with a shudder
of fear, an abundance of tears of excitement, and sad longings, and
alongside the happiness and sorrow of another... the soul undergoes
certain experiences of its own (x) .
What is this private thing which the spectator of tragedy
experiences ? The tragic incident while penetrating, due to the feelings of
participation, deep down into the soul of the spectator, draws
from the depths his hidden sufferings and reveals his worries. De-
mocritus says (Diels, fr. 149) : "If you will examine your inner self,
you will discover a storehouse packed with sorrows and suffering".
Let us sum up our discussion about empathie and individual
feelings. We should note as the first fact the misfortunes and
sufferings of the hero. This fact entails the second : the participation of
the spectator in the sorrows and sufferings of the hero, anxiety for his
fate, and the fear in the face of the terrible events which take place
before him. All these feelings in their turn lead to the third state :
the hero's tragedy arouses the spectator's sadness and suffering,
while the fear resulting from the dreadful events draws forth from
the depths of the spectator's soul his worries and alarms.
The autopathic emotions are intimately related to the katharsis,
but this is quite a problem for itself (2).

The Hebrew University, Jerusalem Nathan Spiegel.

(1) Helen, 9.
(2) See my article, The Nature oJKatiuxrsis according to Aristotle, RBPhH,LlV, 1965, N° 1.