Salazar v.

People

Facts:

Petitioner Jorge Salazar being the Vice President and Treasurer of Aurora/Uni-Group, Inc., received
from Olivier Philippines and Skiva International, Inc. as represented by Teresita M. Tujan the amount
of $41,300.00 for the sole purpose of meeting the cost of textile and labor in the manufacture of seven
hundred dozen stretch twill jeans which he (accused) is duty bound to deliver to said complainant, and
the accused once in possession of the same, far from complying from his obligation, with
unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence and to defraud said complainant, did, then and there willfully
and unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the same for his own personal
use and benefit despite repeated demands to return the said amount, failed and refused and still fails
and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of said complainant, in the aforementioned amount of
$41,300.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency.
Petitioner was charged with estafa under Article 315 paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Petiotioner was convicted of Estafa by the
trial court.
Petitioner on appeal maintained that Skiva has no authority to institute the present action as estafa was
not committed against Skiva but against Aurora/Uni-Group on the basis of the finding that the
transaction between Skiva and Aurora/Uni-Group was one of sale. Thus, petitioner argues that pursuant
to Section 3, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the complaint should not have been
instituted by Skiva as it is not the offended party contemplated by the Rules and petitioner had no
obligation to account to Skiva the proceeds of the amount withdrawn from the joint account.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is correct.

Ruling:
The complaint referred to in Rule 110 contemplates one that is filed in court to commence a criminal
action in those cases where a complaint of the offended party is required by law, instead of an
information which is generally filed by a fiscal. It is not necessary that the proper offended party file a
complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal. The rule is that unless the offense
subject of the complaint is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, any competent person may file a
complaint for preliminary investigation.
Thus, as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by a complaint or information, both of which
are filed in court. If a complaint is filed directly in court, the same must be filed by the offended party
and in case of an information, the same must be filed by the fiscal. However, a complaint filed with the
fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed by any person. Thus, in the case at bar, the complaint was
validly filed by Skiva despite the finding of the lower court that petitioner had no obligation to account
to Skiva.
Leviste v. Alameda

Facts:
On January 16, 2007, an Information was filed against Jose Antonio Leviste charging him with
homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the RTC of Makati. The private
complainants-heirs of de las Alas filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for the deferment of the
proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a
reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. The RTC thereafter issued the Order granting the
motion by the complainants, thus, allowing the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation. Later, the trial
court issued the other order that admitted the Amended Information for murder and directed the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioner questioned these two orders before the appellate court.

Upon arraignment, the petitioner refused to plead. The trial court entered the plea of "not guilty" for
him. Prior to this, the petitioner filed an Urgent Application for Admission to Bail Ex Abundanti
Cautela, which the trial court granted on the ground that the evidence of guilt of the crime of murder is
not strong. The trial court went on to try the petitioner under the Amended Information. Then, the trial
court found the petitioner guilty of homicide. From the trial court's decision, the petitioner filed an
appeal to the CA. The appellate court confirmed the decision of the trial court. The petitioner's motion
for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition to the SC.

Issue:

Whether or not the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is considered a substantial
amendment, which would make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to ask for a preliminary
investigation.

Ruling:
Yes. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The test as to
whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it
originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant
might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other.

An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does
not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet
the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance. here is no substantial
distinction between a preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are conducted in the
same manner and for the same objective of determining whether there exists sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial.

What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of murder
after the claimed circumstances were made known to him as early as the first motion. Petitioner did
not, however, make much of the opportunity to present countervailing evidence on the proposed
amended charge. Despite notice of hearing, petitioner opted to merely observe the proceedings and
declined to actively participate, even with extreme caution, in the reinvestigation.
People v. Grey

Facts:

Joseph Grey, former Mayor of San Jorge, Samar, his son, Francis Grey, and two others were charge of
the crime of murder for the death of Rolando Diocton. Judge Bandal denied the motion for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest. She directed the prosecution to present, within five days, additional evidence but
later, she inhibited. Judge Navidad continued the proceedings of the case.
After finding that probable cause was supported by the evidence on record, he issued warrants of arrest
against respondents.

The CA held that Judge Navidad failed to abide by the constitutional mandate for him to personally
determine the existence of probable cause. According to the CA, nowhere in the assailed Order did
Judge Navidad state his personal assessment of the evidence before him and the personal justification
for his finding of probable cause. It found that the judge extensively quoted from the Joint Resolution
of the Provincial Prosecutor and the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, and then adopted these to
conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding of probable cause. The CA held that
the Constitution commands the judge to personally determine the existence of probable cause before
issuing warrants of arrest.

Issue:

Did Judge Navidad fail to personally determine the existence of probable cause?

Ruling:

No. The duty of the judge to determine probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest is mandated by
Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution. In Soliven v. Makasiar, the Court explained that
this constitutional provision does not mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the
complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the report and supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutors report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses.

What the law requires as personal determination on the part of a judge is that he should not rely solely
on the report of the investigating prosecutor. This means that the judge should consider not only the
report of the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit and the documentary evidence of the parties,
the counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes
taken during the preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor
upon the filing of the Information.

The Court has also ruled that the personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses is not
mandatory and indispensable in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. The necessity arises only when there is an utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of
probable cause. Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the investigating prosecutor, provided
that he likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in support thereof.

Contrary to respondents claim, Judge Navidad did not gravely abuse his discretion in issuing the same.
Judge Navidads Order reads:
 In this separate, independent constitutionally-mandated Inquiry conducted for the purpose
of determining the sufficiency of the evidence constituting probable cause to justify the
issuance of a Warrant of Arrest, the Court perforce, made a very careful and meticulous
and (sic) review not only of the records but also the evidence adduced by the prosecution,
particularly the sworn statements/affidavits of Mario Abella, Uriendo Moloboco and Edgar
Pellina.

It was only through a review of the proceedings before the prosecutor that could have led Judge
Navidad to determine that the accused were given the widest latitude and ample opportunity to
challenge the charge of Murder which resulted, among others, (in) a filing of a counter-charge of
Perjury. Likewise, his personal determination revealed no improper motive on the part of the
prosecution and no circumstance which would overwhelm the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions. Thus, he concluded that the previous Order, denying the motion for
the issuance of warrants of arrest, was not correct. These statements sufficiently establish the fact that
Judge Navidad complied with the constitutional mandate for personal determination of probable cause
before issuing the warrants of arrest.
Flordeliz v. People

Facts:

Petitioner was charged with the crimes of Acts of Lasciviousness, committed against AAA, and nine
(9) counts of Qualified Rape through Sexual Assault, committed against BBB, before the RTC.

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded Not guilty to all the charges. During trial, he interposed the
defense of denial and insisted that the charges against him were fabricated by his wife to cover up the
infidelity she committed while working abroad. Petitioner also relied on the testimonies of Florabel
Flordeliz, Levy Hope Flordeliz and Roderick Flordeliz, whose testimonies consisted mainly of the
alleged infidelity of ABC; and petitioner, being a good father, was often visited by his daughters at his
residence, where the rooms they occupied were only separated by see-through curtains.

The RTC rendered a Judgment finding petitioner guilty as charged. The CA affirmed petitioners
conviction.

Issue:

Whether or not the Honorable Court A Quo gravely erred in affirming the judgments of conviction of
the Honorable Regional Trial Court in the other alleged counts of rape through sexual assault despite
the fact that the guilt of the petitioner has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt with moral
certainty.

Ruling:

We have repeatedly held that when the offended parties are young and immature girls, as in this case,
courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their
relative vulnerability, but also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the
matter about which they testified were not true.
It is not uncommon in incestuous rape for the accused to claim that the case is a mere fabrication, and
that the victim was moved by familial discord and influence, hostility, or revenge. There is nothing
novel about such defense, and this Court had the occasion to address it in the past.

In People v. Ortoa, we held that:

Verily, no child would knowingly expose herself and the rest of her family to the humiliation and strain
that a public trial surely entails unless she is so moved by her desire to see to it that the person who
forcibly robbed her of her cherished innocence is penalized for his dastardly act. The imputation of ill
motives to the victim of an incestuous rape [or lascivious conduct] becomes even more unconvincing
as the victim and the accused are not strangers to each other. By electing to proceed with the filing of
the complaint, the victim risks not only losing a parent, one whom, before his moral descent, she
previously adored and looked up to, but also the likelihood of losing the affection of her relatives who
may not believe her claim. Indeed, it is not uncommon for families to be torn apart by an accusation of
incestuous rape. Given the serious nature of the crime and its adverse consequences not only to her, it is
highly improbable for a daughter to manufacture a rape charge for the sole purpose of getting even with
her father. Thus, the alleged ill motives have never swayed the Court against giving credence to the
testimonies of victims who remained firm and steadfast in their account of how they were ravished by
their sex offenders.
Neither can we sustain petitioners claim that the charges against him were products of ABCs
fabrication to cover up the infidelity she committed while working abroad. No matter how enraged a
mother may be, it would take nothing less than psychological depravity for her to concoct a story too
damaging to the welfare and well-being of her own daughter. Courts are seldom, if at all, convinced
that a mother would stoop so low as to expose her own daughter to physical, mental and emotional
hardship concomitant to a rape prosecution.
Crespo v. Mogul

Facts:

An information for estafa was filed against Mario Crespo. When the case was set for arraignment, the accused
filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the
Secretary of Justice for the filing of the information. The presiding judge, Leodegario Mogul denied the motion
but the arraignment was deferred to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court. Crespo
then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a writ of injunction in the CA to restrain respondent judge
from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused. The Solicitor General recommended that the petition be
given due course and the CA granted the same.

Meanwhile, Undersecretary of Justice Catalino Macaraig reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against Crespo. A motion to
dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal with the RTC, but the respondent judge
denied the same and set the date and time for the arraignment. Crespo then filed in the CA a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with TRO to restrain Mogul from enforcing his judgment, which was again issued by
the CA. Later on, the CA rendered a decision and dismissed the petition of Crespo and lifted the TRO. Hence
this present petition.

Issues:

1. W/N a fiscal has the authority to file a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence after
the information has been submitted to the court?

2.W/N Mogul acted with grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the arraignment of the accused?

Ruling:

No, the court acquires jurisdiction of the accused upon the filing of the information by the fiscal.

It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the fiscal determines the existence of a prima facie
case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal’s discretion and
control of the criminal prosecution. Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of
evidence has authority to do so and Courts that grant the same commit no error. The fiscal may re-investigate a
case and subsequently move for the dismissal should the re-investigation show either that the defendant is
innocent or that his guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt. However, such authority is not
without any limitation. The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal and it may be elevated
for review to the Secretary of Justice. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss
the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court. The filing of a complaint or
information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the
authority to hear and determine the case. The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of
determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the
filing of the information in the proper court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the
case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. In order to avoid such a situation whereby the
opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the
Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review from the action of
the fiscal, when the information has already been filed in Court.