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Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 26 (2013) 895e903

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Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries


journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jlp

Application of a multi-plant QRA: A case study investigating the risk


impact of the construction of a new plant on an existing chemical
plant’s risk levels
Shahabaldin Baesi a, Bahman Abdolhamidzadeh a, *, Che Rosmani Che Hassan a,
Mahar Diana Hamid a, Genserik Reniers b, c
a
Department of Chemical Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, University of Malaya, 50603 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
b
Antwerp Research Group on Safety and Security (ARGoSS), University of Antwerp, Prinsstraat 13, 2000 Antwerpen, Belgium
c
Hogeschool-UniversiteitBrussel/KULeuven, Belgium

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: The construction of chemical clusters whereby a variety of chemical plants are located next to each other
Received 10 April 2012 provides great economic benefits. However, in such clusters, due to the mere scale on which hazardous
Received in revised form materials are processed, stored and handled, the potential of various accidents is much higher than in
25 October 2012
single companies. Furthermore, the close proximity of process installations and storage tanks in such
Accepted 6 November 2012
areas gives rise to the risk of domino effects. Therefore, land use planning and layout design has always
been a challenge within such clusters.
Keywords:
In this paper, a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) is carried out and used as a decision making tool to
Quantitative Risk assessment
Individual risk
evaluate the acceptability of constructing a new chemical plant adjacent to an existing one. For this
Societal risk purpose, standard parameters such as individual risk and societal risk were quantified, before and after
Domino accidents the new plant would come into operation. Given the experience of past accidents in the process
Chemical cluster industries, the likelihood of domino accidents in the two neighboring plants has also been analyzed.
Process industries Ó 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction 2003), and Atherton and Gil (2008) for many other examples of
major accidents in the chemical industries. Such catastrophic
Due to the flammable and toxic nature of substances which are events also happen in developing countries and especially in the
being handled in the oil-, gas- and petrochemical industries, Middle East (Khan & Abbasi, 1999a). This may be related to the ever
installations within chemical plants have a high potential to cause growing number of chemical clusters in this particular region due
substantial damages in terms of fatalities, serious injuries, property to the existence of massive sources of energy in the Persian Gulf. In
damages and environmental degradation. In addition, large chemical clusters, upstream activities such as production and
inventories of hydrocarbons, intense temperature and pressure separation are increasingly carried out in chemical plants being
conditions and inherent congestion in process installations physically located nearby chemical companies with downstream
whereby process equipment is often situated in close proximity to activities, such as refineries.
one another, increases the probability of catastrophic accidents and One of the important issues in the construction of chemical
amplifies their potential consequences (Abdolhamidzadeh, Abbasi, clusters is so-called land use planning. Land use planning is influ-
Rashtchian, & Abbasi, 2010; Khan & Abbasi, 1999a, 1999b; Reniers, enced by economic, operational and safety aspects. The high
2010). For example, in Toulouse, France, 30 people were killed and number of hazardous activities and substances in chemical clusters,
2242 injured in 2001 due to an ammonium nitrate explosion, and in in combination with high levels of congestion, demand an adequate
Texas city, USA, 15 persons lost their lives and 170 others were and solid decision making process for situating new plants in the
injured in 2005 due to a refinery disaster (Dechy, Bourdeaux, area, whereby individual and group risks are taken into account.
Ayrault, Kordek, & Le Coze, 2004; Kalantarnia, Khan, & Hawboldt, Usually, so-called Quantitative Risk Assessment, or abbreviated
2010). We refer e.g. to Lees (1996), Wells (1997), Kletz (1999a, QRA, is used for this purpose. Previous studies indicate that QRA is
a useful tool for land use planning, layout design and modification in
* Corresponding author.
the process industries. Khan and Abbasi (1999b) have estimated the
E-mail address: abdolhamidzadeh@um.edu.my (B. Abdolhamidzadeh). overall individual risk posed by a chemical cluster to adjacent

0950-4230/$ e see front matter Ó 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2012.11.005
896 S. Baesi et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 26 (2013) 895e903

residential areas in order to compare the result with safety onwards (Abbasi, Krishnakumari, & Khan, 1998; Khan & Abbasi,
criteria and eventually recommendations were given to make 1998). QRA is a method that provides quantified estimation for
modifications in the plants since the criteria were not met. Jo and the risk posed by a group of hazards (Kletz, 1999). Hence, this
Crowl (2008) specified the minimum safety distances between technique enables risk mitigation methods to be evaluated in order
a high pressure gas pipeline and residential areas. Risk and conse- to bring the risk to tolerable levels without resorting to too costly
quence analyses of toxic chemicals in certain warehouses to the protective systems (Pula, Khan, Veitch, & Amyotte, 2006). Although
nearby villages were analyzed by Rigas and Sklavounos (2002) to QRA has its weaknesses and drawbacks, it is often the only approach
investigate the extent of compliance to exposure threshold limits. to get grip on possible risks and to tame complexity, as indicated by
The study by Papazoglou, Nivolianitou, Aneziris, Christou, and Pasman, Jung, Prem, Rogers, and Yang (2009). QRA involves the
Bonanos (1999) demonstrated that a high level of risk is exposed following main steps: scenario selection, frequency estimation,
to passengers crossing the highway adjacent to a specific refinery consequence assessment, and risk quantification (CCPS, 2000;
and therefore a new trajectory with the safety distance calculated by Khan, Sadiq, & Husain, 2002). We will discuss these steps hereafter.
QRA should be constructed. These are a limited number of examples
showing that land use planning is vital for locating process facilities 2.1. Scenario selection
near to public areas and a QRA could be an effective technique for
this purpose. In this method, in addition to identifying the hazards, Possible scenarios in the process industries may be different
also their associated consequences and the frequencies of occur- modes of fire, explosion and toxic dispersion (Arunraj & Maiti,
rences are quantitatively estimated (Kletz, 1999b). Furthermore, 2009; Markowski, 2007). Neglecting any possible scenario can
parameters such as ‘individual risk’ and ‘group risk’ (the latter also lead to a risk underestimation and eventually affect the overall risk
being called ‘societal risk’) are parameters which support the deci- values (Van Sciver, 1990). Scenario selection is usually based on
sion making process for land use planning. Several other relevant expert’s opinion, history of past accidents and safety reviews. For
studies can be found elsewhere (Bubbico, Maschio, Mazzarotta, our study, after selecting the credible scenarios based on a combi-
Milazzo, & Parisi, 2006; Gharabagh et al., 2009; Milazzo et al., nation of mentioned methods, Event Tree Analysis (ETA) was
2002; Yet-Pole, Chi-Min, & Ching-Hong, 2009). applied for scenario development. The quantitative feature of ETA
The proliferation of chain accidents suggests that the probability was then used for incident frequency calculation.
of domino effects should also be considered as an important
parameter in land use planning for chemical clusters. A recent study 2.2. Frequency estimation
on past domino events indicated that the number of cascading
accidents in the process industries has increased globally in recent Once the final outcomes and their sequences are predicted for
decades (Abdolhamidzadeh, Abbasi, Rashtchian, & Abbasi, 2011). In each scenario, the scenario frequency should be determined. For
the same study there are some accidents mentioned in which an this purpose, the failure frequency of each initiating event and the
initiating event in a single plant has led to a catastrophe within probability of every intermediate event such as immediate ignition,
a cluster of chemical plants. A recent example could be Shazand, Iran delayed ignition, vapor cloud fire, etc., are used. The frequency
in which 30 people were killed and 38 others were seriously injured values which can be found in literature, are mostly based on
in 2008 due to an initial explosion that led to other major explosions historical data of previous incidents (Beerens, Post, & Uijt de Haag,
and fires in the neighboring plants. The dominant accident 2006). The frequency of a scenario specifies the number of occur-
that caused the majority of fatalities was the major explosions that rences of that scenario in a specified timeframe (which is usually
were triggered by the initial blast (Abdolhamidzadeh et al., 2011). one year). The probability of an intermediate event is a dimension-
As already mentioned, in land use planning, possible scenarios less value between0 and 1 which indicates the possibility of
are reviewed from different points of view, one being the safety occurrence of that event in a specific period of time. For this paper,
perspective. In many cases, different chemical plants in a chemical the failure frequencies for the initiating events and the intermediate
industrial area do not come into operation at the same point in values were obtained from the Purple Book (CPR, 1999). Application
time. For example, it is common practice to build plants to consume of failure frequencies in the Purple Book and the BEVI Manual during
the product(s) of an existing plant. It is obvious that the construc- the past years was industry standard. Also software such as ARIPAR-
tion of new plant(s) adjacent to existing one(s) will affect the GIS (Spadoni, Egidi, & Contini, 2000) or DomPrevPlanning (Reniers
overall risk of the industrial area, regardless of the fact whether risk & Dullaert, 2007) use these values. The following equation shows
assessments have been performed for individual plants. how the initiating event frequency, intermediate probabilities and
In the remainder of this article, QRA has been applied to eval- final outcome frequency are related to each other (CCPS, 2000):
uate the risk-based effects of constructing a new chemical plant
(which is called BSPC in this article) adjacent to an existing one fi ¼ FI Po;i Poc;i (1)
(called AKPC in this paper). These two plants forming our case-
study, are located in one of the largest energy zones in the world where, fi is the frequency of the final outcome of scenario i arising
in southern Iran (called ‘PETZONE’). Parameters such as the indi- from incident I (1/yr),FI is the frequency of incident I which causes
vidual risk and the societal risk have been assessed, before and after different outcomes (1/yr),Po;i is probability of occurrence for an
the new plant came into operation. Furthermore, the possibility intermediate outcome of incident I which causes a number of i final
and the likelihood of domino events in the two neighboring plants outcomes, and Poc;i is the probability of occurrence for a final
were investigated. We mainly focus on safety aspects in our article, outcome which is a subset of outcomes arising from incident I.
as the feasibility of the planning from both an economic and an
operational perspective has been carried out in an earlier stage of 2.3. Consequences assessment
the land-use planning decision process.
During the consequence assessment, the effects and magnitude
2. Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) of the final outcome of each scenario should be estimated. The
consequences of potential scenarios could be classified as follows
QRA along with other techniques have been used in one way or (Lees, 1996): fire: thermal radiation; explosion: overpressure and
another in the process industries for loss prevention from 1970 fragment projection; and toxic dispersion and exposure.
S. Baesi et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 26 (2013) 895e903 897

Besides serious physical human harm and eventually casualties, risks are summed to estimate the overall risk at that specific point.
property damage and environmental effects are other conse- To calculate the individual risk at location (x,y) arising from
quences among the overall potential loss (Pintaric, 2007). scenario i the following equation is applied (CCPS, 2000):
The measure of damage in QRA is fatality, since other types of loss
IRx;y;i ¼ fi Pf ;i (3)
are more complex to assess in comparison to human casualties
(Pula et al., 2006).
where fi is the frequency of the final outcome of scenario i arising
A chain of rigorous calculations is needed to estimate the
from an incident (1/yr), andPf,iis the fatality probability of the final
intensity of the physical harm posed by the mentioned scenario
outcome of scenario i at the geographical location (x,y). Individual
outcomes in a chemical cluster. Software packages for the proce-
risk contours represent the final results of this step. The individual
dure of consequence assessment are used to estimate the numer-
risk value in every position, when compared to universally or
ical value of thermal heat load, explosion overpressure and toxic
regionally accepted values, is one of the criteria in risk-based
concentration at various spots around the release point. For this
decision making for land use planning.
study, the well-known PHAST (Process Hazard Analysis Safety Tool)
Societal risk provides a risk evaluation for a group of people
software was used for consequence assessment. Once the appro-
located in the vicinity of the accident location. In other words, the
priate failure frequencies are given, this particular software con-
number of people affected by all final outcomes is estimated
taining fine discharge, dispersion, evaporation, and rainout models,
(Renjith & Madhu, 2010). Similar to the individual risk, the societal
is a powerful tool for the prediction of effect zones (Pintaric, 2007).
risk is a function of frequency of occurrence and rate of fatality.
In addition to the results of consequence modeling, fatality probit
Another important and determinant factor for calculating the
equations were used to quantify the expected percentage of
societal risk is the population density around the incident location.
lethality for the exposed population.
The societal risk is presented in form of FeN (FrequencyeNumber
of fatalities) curves where the cumulative frequency of final
2.4. Risk quantification outcomes is plotted against the number of fatalities arising from an
outcome in a logarithmic scale. To calculate the number of fatalities
The frequency and severity (rate of fatality) of every specific of each final outcome the following equation is used (CCPS, 2000):
scenario are combined, to obtain a measure of the corresponding X
risk. Risk quantification results are presented in two conventional Ni ¼ Px;y pf ;i (4)
x;y
categories which are known as ‘individual risk’ and ‘group risk’
(also called ‘societal risk’).
whereNirepresents the number of fatalities of the final outcome of
The frequency at which a particular individual being fatally
scenario i, Px,yis the number of individuals at the geographical
harmed when standing at a certain distance from a potential
location (x,y), and pf,i is the probability that the final outcome of
hazard, is known as “individual risk” (Gooijer, Cornil, & Lenoble,
scenario i causes death at the geographical location (x,y).
2012). The overall individual risk at any location (x,y) inside or
The results obtained above, are used in Equation (5) to calculate
outside the industrial plant is the summation of all individual risks
the ultimate data required for plotting the FeN curve. This equation
at that specific point. The individual risk at any location (x,y) is
which is known as the cumulative frequency equation is expressed
calculated by the following equation (CCPS, 2000):
as below (CCPS, 2000):
X
n X
IRx;y ¼ IRx;y;i (2) FN ¼ Fi for all final outcome case I which Ni > N (5)
i¼1 i

In other words, the risk of any identified scenario will be indi- where FN is the cumulative frequency for all final outcomes which
vidually calculated at a specific location (x,y), and subsequently all result in fatalities of more than N persons,Fi is the frequency of the

Fig. 1. Layout of the study area (case-study) showing the two neighboring plants; AKPC and BSPC.
898 S. Baesi et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 26 (2013) 895e903

Table 1 Table 2
List of AKPC storages in this study. List of BSPC storages in this study.

TK-item Compound Type Temperature Pressure Volume Inventory TK-item Compound Type Temperature Pressure Volume Inventory
( C) (barg) (m3) (tonne) ( C) (barg) (m3) (tonne)
TK-101 Propylene Spherical 40 25 2200 1044 TK-201 Naphtha Cylindrical 30 0.01 33,118.8 24,839
TK-102 Propylene Spherical 40 25 2200 1044 TK-202 Naphtha Cylindrical 30 0.01 33,118.8 24,839
TK-103 Propylene Spherical 40 25 2200 1044 TK-203 Naphtha Cylindrical 30 0.01 33,118.8 24,839
TK-104 Propylene Spherical 40 25 2200 1044 TK-204 Naphtha Cylindrical 30 0.01 16,272 12,204
TK-105 Ethylene Cylindrical 104 Atm. 14,000 7968 TK-205 Naphtha Cylindrical 30 Atm. 16,272 12,204
TK-206 P-Xylene Cylindrical 30 Atm. 17,085.6 14,693
TK-207 P-Xylene Cylindrical 30 Atm. 17,085.6 14,693
TK-208 P-Xylene Cylindrical 40 0.003 1500 1267
final outcome of scenario i, and Ni is the number of fatalities for the TK-209 Acetic acid Cylindrical 45 0.014 1500 1554
final outcome of scenario i. Finally, having the quantities of FN and TK-210 Acetic acid Cylindrical 45 0.014 1500 1554
N, the cumulative frequency of final outcomes is plotted against the
number of fatalities. The obtained FeN curved will be compared
against the intended criteria to evaluate the acceptability of the Based on a safety review and on a safety screening carried out
potential societal risk. as a preliminary step, the major hazard sources of the study area
(as displayed in Fig. 1), appear to be the storage tanks of these two
3. Case study plants. Although there are obviously other sources of hazards
within this area, their contribution in the overall risk could be
“AKPC” and “BSPC” are two neighboring complexes located in regarded negligible (compared with the present storage tanks).
the so-called PETZONE. In this industrial region, 15 petrochemical AKPC houses 5 major operational storage tanks containing
plants are situated in 5 distinct sites within an area of approxi- ethylene and propylene, while BSPC contains 10 major atmo-
mately 20 km2 and therefore, it is known to be one of the biggest spheric storage tanks containing naphtha, p-xylene and acetic
energy zones in the world. The PETZONE lies in the northern coast acid. Tables 1 and 2 provide a list of the chemical substance
of the Persian Gulf and expands to the southwestern city of Mah- inventories in AKPC and BSPC. Although there were some other
shahr, in southern Iran. storage tanks or process equipment, no one passed the screening
Before and during the construction of many plants in the PET- step for scenario selection due to their low inventory of hazardous
ZONE, until present only economic and operational factors have materials and due to the lesser inherent hazardousness of the
been taken into account, leaving safety aspects to be largely materials.
neglected in the layout design of those plants. This was also the The atmospheric data used in this study, were established by the
case for our case study of the two plants AKPC and BSPC. The olefin Iranian Meteorological Organization (IMO) for the Mahshahr port
unit of AKPC produces ethylene and propylene and these from 1988 to 2006 (IRIMO, 2006). The result of the meteorological
substances are later used in the polymerization unit to produce data analysis indicates that two prevailing weather conditions (hot
high density polyethylene, low density polyethylene and poly- season and cold season) can be intended for the QRA study during
propylene. Regarding BSPC, its main products are naphtha, p- daytime and nighttime to cover almost all of the probable condi-
xylene and acetic acid. tions. Table 3 summarizes the average meteorological data which
These two plants present an interesting case study due to their are used for the consequence analysis.
high number of storage tanks and huge inventory of chemicals. As
one of these plants provides a portion of the other one’s feed,
3.1. Accident scenarios
constructing them close together seemed a wise choice from an
economic and operational point of view. However, the compliance
As stated previously, the storage tanks have been identified to
of risk criteria had not been an item of consideration. After occur-
lead to the most hazardous scenarios in the case under study.
rence of some minor process accidents with limited consequences
in these plants, the risk of accident escalation from one plant to
another was highlighted more than ever. Therefore, the idea of Table 4
constructing AKPC and BSPC in proximity of each other, which Accident scenarios and the relevant failure frequencies.
seemed a defendable choice once, has been challenged. In the Scenario TK-item no. Containment Scenario type Frequency
present study, the two adjacent chemical complexes AKPC and no. (1/yr)
BSPC are both subjected to one QRA (treating both plants as one 1e4 TK-101,102,103,104 Propylene Leakage 1  105
plant), allowing us to analyze the effects of the construction of a 5e8 TK-101,102,103,104 Propylene Rupture 5  107
petrochemical plant, adjacent to an existing one, on the overall risk. 9 TK-105 Ethylene Leakage 1  105
10e14 TK-201,202,203, Naphtha Leakage 1  105
The purpose was to verify whether it was indeed a wise choice to
204,205
construct these two plants this close to each other (for production 15e17 TK-206,207,208 P-Xylene Leakage 1  105
purposes), or not (for safety reasons). Fig. 1 represents the layout of 18e19 TK-209, 210 Acetic acid Leakage 1  105
the two petrochemical plants.

Table 3
Prevailing weather conditions.

Category Atmospheric stability Average wind Average ambient Average relative


speed (m/s) temp. ( C) humidity (%)
Hot season (daytime) Neutral (D class) 5 40 50
Hot season (nighttime) Stable (F class) 1.5 25 60
Cold season (daytime) Neutral (D class) 5 20 80
Cold season (nighttime) Stable (F class) 1.5 10 90
S. Baesi et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 26 (2013) 895e903 899

Fig. 2. Bowtie diagram for propylene tank leakage.

Fig. 3. Bowtie diagram for propylene tank rupture.

Table 4 shows the possible scenarios and their frequencies for the both in the structure and probability values have been done in
selected storage tanks for this study. The failure frequencies were order to customize the case for the existing conditions of the case
mainly obtained from the Purple Book (CPR, 1999). under study. The possible events leading to the initiating events are
The data provided in Table 4 indicates that 19 specific scenarios shown in the fault tree side conceptually.
have been identified for the consequence analysis. Furthermore, Since safety principles e both in design and in operation- are
only the storage tanks containing propylene have the potential of highly adhered in the tank yard, the probability of immediate
instantaneous release (tank rupture) as well as continuous release. ignition for a liquid leakage scenario is very low. Contrary, tank
This is due to the high pressure under which the propylene is rupture usually occurs when a storage tank is engulfed in flames
stored. Other storage vessels are operating under atmospheric and hence, the probability of immediate ignition is considerably
pressure and therefore leakage is the only accidental release visu- higher for the rupture case. The latter explains the difference
alized for those tanks. between the values used for the immediate ignition probability in

3.2. Release categories and the final outcomes


Table 5
Consequence modeling results for the selected scenarios.
As already mentioned, Event Tree Analysis was applied for
predicting all possible scenarios arising from an initial incident. For Discharge Discharge Liquid Max. pool Time to
instance, bowtie diagrams are constructed in Figs. 2 and 3 to show rate (kg/s) velocity (m/s) fraction radius (m) reach LEL (s)
the scenario development for a propylene tank leakage and rupture Propylene tank 247.6 282 0.6 15.23 18.7
scenario based on the recommended structure available in the leakage
Propylene tank e 262 0.59 e 18.7
literature (CPR, 1999; Vílchez, Espejo, & Casal, 2011). Although the rupture
structure remained almost constant, some minor modifications
Fig. 4. A, B individual risk contours before (for AKPC) and after (for cluster composed of AKPC and BSPC) constructing the new plant.
S. Baesi et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 26 (2013) 895e903 901

the leakage case and in the rupture case. Moreover, based on the 4. Result and discussion
plant layout review and due to the low level of equipment
congestion in this particular area under study, the probability of In order to evaluate the risk-based effects of constructing BSPC
a flash fire is higher than that of a Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE), adjacent to AKPC, calculations were made for both individual risk
since higher congestion is known to increase the probability of and societal risk before and after the new plant came under oper-
a VCE rather than that of a flash fire. ation adjacent to the existing one. The quantified risk can then be

Fig. 5. A, B societal risk (FeN curve) before (A) and after (B) constructing the new plant.
902 S. Baesi et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 26 (2013) 895e903

compared against the criteria to assess the acceptability of the risk Table 6
levels. The likelihood of domino effects needs to be assessed as Target equipment affected by domino accident (due to overpressure).

well. Magnitude of overpressure caused by different AKPC scenarios at


target equipment (bar)

TK-201

TK-202

TK-203

TK-204

TK-205

TK-207

TK-208

TK-209
TK-206

TK-210
4.1. Calculation of individual risk

Using the results of frequency estimation and a detailed scenario


consequence assessment for all the possible scenarios, the indi- 1-4 1 1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.08 0.08 0.17 0.15 0.15
vidual risk contours were obtained and are shown on a satellite
view of the study area. Key outputs of the consequence modeling 5-8 1 1 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.14 0.14 0.25 0.23 0.22
are presented in Table 5 to give more insight in the two selected
scenarios. Fig. 4A and B demonstrate the individual risk levels 9 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05

before (A) and after (B) the second plant came operational. The
numerical value of each risk contour represents the frequency at Affected by Domino Not Affected by Domino
which a particular individual is fatally harmed when standing accident accident
within the contour boundary.
The results of individual risk calculations reveal that inside the
chemical cluster composed of both plants (AKPC and BSPC), as well
as within the single plant AKPC, the individual risk values do not
exceed the tolerable magnitude of 105/yr before and after the new (1e9), at the location of BSPC’s storage tanks. These values are
plant came under operation. Fig. 3A and B also demonstrate that for based on performing a detailed consequence modeling.
public areas (such as the main roads around AKPC and BSPC) the As it can be seen in Table 6, the closest storage tanks to AKPC
risk level does not exceed the magnitude of 106/yr, except for (TK-201 and TK-202) are possibly damaged due to overpressure
a short interval of 100 m at the southern main road of AKPC. caused by a propylene explosion after a leakage or tank rupture,
Nevertheless, this issue was already present even before the eventually triggering secondary accidents. In other words, the
construction of BSPC. In general, we can state that in terms of accidental release of propylene in AKPC, either continuous
individual risk, constructing the new plant adjacent to the existing (scenarios 1e4) or instantaneous (scenarios 5e8), has the capa-
one, did not affect the acceptability of risk levels. bility of causing cascading accidents in BSPC. This suggests that if
decision-makers insist on not changing the new plant’s layout (e.g.
4.2. Calculation of societal risk due to large economic and operational benefits), countermeasures
should be taken into consideration in order to minimize the
Although the previous section indicates that individual risk heightened risk of domino accidents.
levels do not exceed the tolerable levels, the impact of any potential Both choices for the Purple Book and the UK risk tolerance
accident on operators and public should also be investigated. criteria are individual choices for this study, and they should be
Fig. 4A and B provide the societal risk calculation results before and seen and respected as such. We are aware that failure frequencies
after the new plant came into operation respectively. As it can be are subject to constant optimization, and that the Purple Book has
seen in Fig. 5A, the societal risk posed by AKPC individually, falls in its limitations (Pasman, 2011). Nonetheless, for this study of two
the ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) region, as defined by plants situated in Iran, using the frequencies reported in this well-
HSE (UK).Fig. 5Bshows that after constructing the new plant, the known and much-used work, was a justifiable choice.
societal risk curve gets closer to the maximum risk criteria, but still
remains in the ALARP region. Therefore, constructing the new plant 5. Conclusions
BSPC adjacent to the existing one AKPC, seems to have only limited
impact upon the change of tolerability of the societal risk in our The risk-based effects of constructing a new chemical plant
case study. adjacent to an existing one, forming a chemical cluster, is analyzed
and discussed in this paper. For this purpose, a QRA was carried out
4.3. Domino effects assessment to assess different parameters of risk. Individual and societal risks
were evaluated before and after the new plant came under oper-
The distance from the storage tanks located in AKPC to the ation. The results indicate that the new plant did not have a major
closest operational storage tank in BSPC is about 800 m. Based on impact on the risk levels, since the risk levels stay within the
the values reported by Cozzani, Gubinelli, and Salzano (2006) this tolerability limits. Although no major impact was observed, there
distance suggests that potential cascading accidents between the was a significant increase in the societal risk. Moreover, a domino
neighboring plants caused by thermal radiation are highly effect analysis indicates that some storage tanks in the new plant
improbable. Therefore, the only factor that can trigger a secondary entail a high potential of being affected by events originating in the
accident in the other neighboring plant, is the overpressure caused existing plant.
by an unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion. Considering the volatility This research and this case study illustrate that in order to make
of the materials involved, the operational conditions of storage, the an objective plant lay out decision for a chemical cluster with
average ambient temperature and the prevailing wind direction regard to operational risks, not only conventional risk assessments
(west), we may conclude that only materials stored in AKPC’s should be carried out, but a domino effects analysis should be
storages are capable of forming an effective vapor cloud. performed as well, since otherwise some risks may be under-
There are different values reported for damage threshold due to estimated and overlooked.
overpressure in literature, but the overpressure of 1bar would It is undoubtedly true that the more accurate information is used
surely destroy any target equipment (Salzano & Cozzani, 2005). (e.g. concerning probabilities), the more accurate risk calculations
This threshold has been chosen to evaluate the possibility of can be made. However, one should always remember that, basically,
domino accidents on the storage tanks in BSPC. Table 6 provides calculated risks are relative risks, and that absolute values are prone
the magnitude of overpressure, caused by different AKPC scenarios to variability and uncertainty. As referenced by Pasman et al. (2009),
S. Baesi et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 26 (2013) 895e903 903

EU-studies have shown that a factor of 10e100 both ways in risk Khan, F. I., & Abbasi, S. A. (1999b). Assessment of risks posed by chemical indus-
triesdapplication of a new computer automated tool MAXCRED-III. Journal of
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