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Religion, Meaning and Purpose, and Mental Health

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DOI: 10.1037/a0037887

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2015, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1–12 1941-1022/15/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0037887

Religion, Meaning and Purpose, and Mental Health

Kathleen Galek Kevin J. Flannelly

The Spears Research Institute, Healthcare Chaplaincy, New Center for Psychosocial Research, Massapequa, New York
York, New York

Christopher G. Ellison Nava R. Silton

The University of Texas at San Antonio Marymount Manhattan College

Katherine R. B. Jankowski
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Center for Psychosocial Research, Massapequa, New York

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

The present study was specifically designed to examine the associations among religious commitment,
belief in meaning and purpose in life, and psychiatric symptoms among the general public using data
from the 2010 Baylor Religion Survey (BRS). The BRS obtained data from a nationwide sample of 1,714
U.S. adults, 1,450 of which are included in the current analyses. The central hypothesis of the study,
based on identity theory, was that religious commitment would interact with belief in meaning and
purpose in their net associations on psychiatric symptoms: general anxiety, social anxiety, paranoia,
obsession, and compulsion. Specifically, it was hypothesized that believing life lacks meaning and
purpose will have a more pernicious association among highly religious individuals, than it will among
individuals who are less religious. Other hypotheses derived from previous research were also tested. The
results confirm the central hypothesis of the study for 4 of the 5 classes of psychiatric symptoms. The
results are discussed with respect to identity theory, evolutionary threat assessment systems (ETAS)
theory, and the hostile world scenario.

Keywords: beliefs, ETAS theory, identity theory, religion, meaning in life, psychiatric symptoms

Victor Frankl proclaimed, “Man’s search for meaning is the
primary force in his life . . .” (Frankl, 1946/1992, p. 105). In so
doing, he introduced a novel perspective on human motivation,
which challenged the prevailing wisdom of American schools of
psychology at the time: behaviorism and psychoanalysis (McAd-
ams, 2012). Frankl’s ideas also helped to lay the foundation for
positive psychology (Wong, 2011), although researchers in posi-
This article was published Online First November 3, 2014.
Kathleen Galek, The Spears Research Institute, Healthcare Chaplaincy,
New York, New York; Kevin J. Flannelly, Center for Psychosocial Re-
search, Massapequa, New York; Christopher G. Ellison, Department of
Sociology, The University of Texas at San Antonio; Nava R. Silton,
Department of Psychology, Marymount Manhattan College; Katherine
R. B. Jankowski, Center for Psychosocial Research, Massapequa, New
York.
The conduct of this research and the preparation of this article for
publication were made possible through the generous support of a grant
from the John Templeton Foundation to HealthCare Chaplaincy, NY,
NY: ID# 21296, “Spiritual Beliefs as Predictors of Mental Health: A
Test of ETAS Theory” (Kevin J. Flannelly, PhD, and Kathleen Galek,
PhD, Co-PIs). The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton
Foundation.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Kevin J.
Flannelly, Center for Psychosocial Research, 33 Maple Street, Mass-
apequa, NY 11758. E-mail: kjflannelly@gmail.com
1
tive psychology do not accord meaning the same status that Frankl
did (Peterson & Park, 2012; Wong, 2012b).
Frankl claimed the meaning of life was to be found, not in
oneself, but in one’s interaction with the surrounding world. Frankl
believed that meaning in life could be discovered through three
pathways: “(1) by creating a work or doing a deed; (2) by expe-
riencing something or encountering someone; and (3) by the
attitude we take toward unavoidable suffering” (Frankl, 1946/
1992, p. 115). Wong and his colleagues have explicated 12 sources
of meaning associated with these three pathways (McDonald,
Wong, & Gingras, 2012; Reker & Wong, 1988; Wong, 1998).
Other research has distinguished between the search for meaning
and the presence of meaning, and has explored the associations
between these two concepts and psychological well-being (Steger,
Frazier, Oishi, & Kaler, 2006; Steger, Kashdan, Sullivan, &
Lorentz, 2008).
According to Frankl (1946/1992), the meaning of one’s life may
change, but the need for meaning is always present. Baumeister
(1991) believes the search for meaning encompasses four basic
needs. The first is the need to have a sense of purpose in life, to
believe that one’s life has purpose. The second is the need for a
sense of efficacy, to believe that one is able to meet challenges and
to achieve goals. The third is self-worth, to believe that one is a
worthy person with desirable characteristics. The fourth is the need
for value, to believe that one’s actions are good and justified.
Reker and Wong’s (1988) definition of personal meaning taps into
the first three of Baumeister’s four needs. To them, personal
 2 GALEK, FLANNELLY, ELLISON, SILTON, AND JANKOWSKI
meaning is: “coherence and purpose in one’s existence, the pursuit
and attainment of worthwhile goals, and an accompanying sense of
fulfillment” (Reker & Wong, 1988, p. 221).
Although Frankl thought we lost our ancient instincts over the
course of human evolution, some psychologists contend that the
need to believe one’s life has meaning is so universal that it may
be an evolutionary adaptation (King & Hicks, 2012; Klinger, 2012;
Sommer, Baumeister, & Stillman, 2012). For example, Klinger
(2012) suggests that the need for meaning originates from the
mammalian brain system involved in goal seeking (i.e., seeking
food and other necessary resources), which has been extensively
studied by Panksepp (1998, 2005). In a similar vein, a theoretical
paper by Silton, Flannelly, Flannelly, and Galek (2011) proposed
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
that this same goal-seeking system in the brain underlies the
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
human needs for meaning and self-actualization (Maslow, 1943,
1958).
According to Klinger, “Because success at these pursuits is
central to animal survival . . . persistent goal striving . . . consti-
tutes an imperative of purpose” (Klinger, 2012, p. 27). Given this
imperative, he states that a lack of purpose causes distress. Re-
search on the relationship between psychological distress and lack
of meaning and purpose in life is discussed below.
Religion and Meaning
Many theorists believe that one of the fundamental functions of
religion is to help individuals fulfill their yearning for meaning and
purpose in life. Clark, for instance, believed that “religion more
than any other human function satisfies the need for meaning”
(Clark, 1958, p. 419). Pargament stated it more simply: “In es-
sence, religion offers meaning in life” (Pargament, 1997, p. 49).
Empirical evidence confirms that there is a positive association
between religion and the belief there is in meaning and purpose in
life. Francis and his colleagues, who have studied this relationship
for years in Britain, have found that various measures of religion
are directly related to meaning and purpose. For example, several
studies by Francis and his associates have reported that frequency
of church attendance among convenience samples of children and
adolescents (Francis, 2000; Francis & Burton, 1994; Francis &
Evans, 1996), as well as college students (Robbins & Francis,
2000) are positively related to believing that one has a purpose in
life. The same studies also found that the frequency of prayer and
Bible reading (Francis & Burton, 1994; Francis & Evans, 1996)
and belief in God (Francis, 2000) are positively related to believing
one’s life has a purpose. Finally, Francis, Jewell, and Robbins
(2010) have reported that intrinsic religiosity has a strong positive
correlation with having a sense of purpose in life.
Two related studies have found that beliefs about God are
related to meaning and purpose in life. The first, which was a study
of Methodist church members in Britain, found that congregants
who firmly believed God is involved in their lives more strongly
believed there was meaning and purpose in life than congregants
who were less certain of God’s involvement (Jewell, 2010). The
second, which was a U.S. study of Baptist congregants, found very
similar results, in that those who believed God was involved in the
world in general, were more likely to believe there was meaning
and purpose in life (Jackson & Coursey, 1988).
Other research in the United States has reported a positive
relationship between meaning and purpose in life and various
measures of religion among college students, such as intrinsic
religiosity (Crandall & Rasmussen, 1975; Soderstrom & Wright,
1977), religious commitment (Soderstrom & Wright, 1977), fre-
quency of personal religious practices, and self-ratings of religi-
osity (Steger & Frazier, 2005). Meaning in life was more closely
linked to religion than to other factors (e.g., positive mood) among
those U.S. college students who report higher levels of religious
commitment (Hicks & King, 2008). Meaning in life also has been
found to be associated with strength of religiousness in a large,
nonprobability sample of adults from the United States and other
English-speaking countries (Peterson & Park, 2012).
A number of authors have suggested that the relationship be-
tween religion and meaning in life is attributable to the fact that
religious commitment fosters a coherent set of goals that provide
meaning and purpose (Pargament, 1997; Park, 2005; Wong, 1998),
and there is some evidence that this may be so, at least among
college students (Klinger, 2012). One such explicitly religious goal
concerns life after death. Christianity and other religions put life
experiences in the context of future spiritual salvation, which
provides a sense of purpose in life (Sommer et al., 2012), and
limited research indicates that personal meaning is associated with
belief in salvation (Crandall & Rasmussen, 1975).
Although there are many ways through which individuals find
meaning and purpose in life (Wong, 1998, 2012a), religion is
unique in providing meaning to the existential problems that all
individuals encounter (Pargament, 1997; Park, 2005; Wong,
1998). In addition to explaining problems that are explicitly reli-
gious (e.g., death and suffering), religion provides perspectives
about other aspects of the world, such as global beliefs about
fairness and equity and one’s vulnerability to the vagaries of life
(Pargament, 1997; Park, 2005; Flannelly, Ellison, Galek, & Silton,
2012).
According to Wong (2010, 2012a), existential meaning encom-
passes at least seven personal questions: “Who am I? What should
I do with my life to make it worthwhile? What can I do to find
happiness and life satisfaction? How can I make the right choices
in an age of moral ambiguity and conflicting values? Where do I
belong and where can I call home? What is the point of living in
the face of suffering and death? What happens after death?”
(Wong, 2012a, p. xxx). Depending on your point of view, religion
provides answers to all or most of these questions.
Religion has been said to represent the quest for the ultimate
meaning of human existence, and the meaning system provided by
religion is especially helpful for addressing the most severe chal-
lenges of life, such as death, illness, suffering, and other tragedies
(Wong, 1998). Moreover, as alluded to above, religion provides
ultimate goals through which to find meaning and purpose in life
(Park, 2005; Wong, 1998).
Since people of many different religious faiths rely on their
religious beliefs to make sense of the world and to find meaning in
their lives (Pargament, 1997; Park, 2005; Spilka, Hood,
Hunsberger, & Gorsuch, 2003), one might wonder whether some
religious faiths are better able to promote meaning than others. The
only research, of which we are aware, that has broached this topic
was a study of U.S. college students belonging to three Christian
denominations: Catholics, Evangelical Protestants, and non-
Evangelical Protestants (Steger & Frazier, 2005). The study found
no significant differences in perceived meaning in life among the
three groups of students.
 RELIGION, MEANING AND PURPOSE, AND MENTAL HEALTH
Meaning and Mental Health
The belief that there is meaning and purpose in life has been
associated with various aspects of mental health. For instance,
studies of U.S. college students have reported that meaning and
purpose in life is directly related to positive affect (Hicks, Cicero,
Trent, Burton, & King, 2010; Hicks, Trent, Davis, & King, 2011)
and hope (Mascaro & Rosen, 2005). The positive association
between meaning in life and hope has also been demonstrated in a
nationally representative sample of American adults (Ryff &
Keyes, 1995). Convenience samples of older adults in Canada and
New Zealand have likewise found that belief in meaning and
purpose in life is positively associated, respectively, with life
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
satisfaction (Zika & Chamberlain, 1992), and psychological well-
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
being (Fry, 2000). Steger (2012) reviewed research from the
United States and elsewhere on the association between meaning
in life and various measures of well-being, all of which confirm the
salutary association between psychological well-being and the
belief that there is meaning and purpose in life.
Some of the studies mentioned in the preceding paragraph have
reported an inverse relationship between meaning and purpose in
life and negative affect (Zika & Chamberlain, 1992), including
depression (Mascaro & Rosen, 2005). Indeed, Steger (2012) cites
more than a dozen U.S. studies that have reported an inverse
relationship between depression and meaning and purpose in life.
Though most of these studies used convenience samples of college
students, this salubrious association has also been observed in a
representative sample of U.S. adults (Krause, 2007a).
Moreover, meaning in life has been found to have an inverse
relationship with anxiety in undergraduates, patients, and commu-
nity samples (see review by Steger, 2012). A study of Australian
adults indicates that belief in meaning and purpose in life has a
salutary association with symptoms of obsessive– compulsive dis-
order, as well (Scannell, Allen, & Burton, 2002).
Since the belief that there is meaning in life is inversely related
to psychological distress, it follows that the belief that life lacks
meaning should be directly related to psychological distress. In-
deed, a recent study reported that even daily fluctuations in mean-
ing are associated with poor psychological well-being (Steger &
Kashdan, 2013). And though pure cases of “existential neurosis”
(i.e., the failure to find meaning in life) are relatively uncommon
among healthy American adults, meaninglessness is fairly com-
mon among persons with clinical disorders, such as alcoholism,
posttraumatic stress disorder, obsessive– compulsive disorder, and
depression, especially among depressed persons who are suicidal
(Bergner, 1998). It appears, however, that only three studies have
specifically examined the relationship between meaninglessness
and mental health (Harlow, Newcomb, & Bentler, 1986; Kinnier,
Metha, Keim, Okey, 1994; Newcomb & Harlow, 1986). All three
studies reported that the lack of meaning in life was associated
with suicidal ideation and substance abuse in convenience samples
of American adolescents.
The influence of meaning on psychological health may be more
complicated than one might conclude from the research findings
reviewed so far, which indicate that meaning in life has a salubri-
ous association with mental health and lack of meaning has a
pernicious association with mental health. The results of two series
of studies of American college students suggest that psychological
well-being is differentially related to the degree to which one has
3
a sense of meaning in life or one is searching for meaning in life
(Steger et al., 2006, 2008).
These articles report that having a sense of meaning in life,
which the authors call the “presence” of meaning, was generally
associated with good psychological well-being, whereas searching
for meaning was generally associated with poor psychological
well-being (Steger et al., 2006, 2008). For example, presence of
meaning had a salubrious association with self-esteem, self-
efficacy, self-consciousness, depression, neuroticism, and anxiety,
whereas searching for meaning had a pernicious associations with
the same six measures of psychological well-being.
Religion, Meaning, and Mental Health
A study by Krause (2003) directly connected these two lines of
research in demonstrating that meaning in life that was explicitly
tied to religious faith was positively related to life satisfaction,
self-esteem, and optimism among a representative sample of older
American adults. The few studies that have examined the interplay
between religion and meaning, with respect to their connection to
mental health, have yielded conflicting results.
An early study, which employed a convenience sample of
women, found significant correlations between affect and meaning
and purpose, but not religiousness (Chamberlain & Zika, 1988).
Meaning and purpose had salutary associations with both positive
and negative affect. However, a salutary correlation was found
between religiousness and positive and negative affect only after
controlling for meaning and purpose. On the other hand, a recent
study of U.S. college students reported that religiousness and
meaning and purpose were both significantly correlated with psy-
chological well-being (Steger & Frazier, 2005). Moreover, that
study found the salubrious association between religion and psy-
chological well-being was mediated by meaning in life. It is
interesting that some research suggests that meaning and purpose
also mediate the effects of role-identity salience on psychological
well-being (Thoits, 2012).
A recent study of American college students reported ethnic
differences in the associations of religiousness and meaning and
purpose with a global measure of psychiatric symptomology (Hol-
mes & Hardin, 2009). When both independent variables were
included in the same regression model, religiousness (but not
meaning and purpose) had a significant salutary association with
psychiatric symptoms among African American students, and
meaning and purpose (but not religiousness) had a significant
salutary association with psychiatric symptoms among Caucasian
students.
Identity Theory and Religious Commitment
According to identity theory, individuals construct personal
identities based largely on the roles they occupy in life (Burke,
1991; Thoits, 1991). These roles exist in hierarchies, with social
roles in which a person has made a greater temporal, financial, or
psychological investment being more central to one’s identity than
other roles.
Religions are inherently social systems through which world-
views, or beliefs systems, are socially constructed and maintained
(Berger, 1967). Since religious commitment requires significant
temporal and psychological investment (Silton, Flannelly, Ellison,
 4 GALEK, FLANNELLY, ELLISON, SILTON, AND JANKOWSKI
et al., 2011), the role of being a religious person may be a central
social role for some individuals. As Park and Edmondson (2012, p.
150) put it: “Religion is the core of many individuals’ identities,
affecting how they understand themselves as religious or spiritual
beings . . . as well as determining their social identification with a
particular religious group.”
Identity theory further states that circumstances that threaten
central social roles will be more distressing for an individual than
circumstances that threaten less important roles. There is already
evidence that this occurs with respect to threats to one’s central
religious role. For example, Krause reported that doubts about
religious faith have a pernicious association with psychological
well-being, and that they are more troubling for individuals who
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
are more committed to their religious faith than to those who are
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
less committed (Krause, 1994, 1998). A later report by Krause and
Wulff (2004) yielded similar results with respect to the association
between religious doubt and mental health; religious doubt was
most troubling for persons who were most committed to their
religious faith. Finally, a recent study by Ellison, Fang, Flannelly,
and Steckler (2013) found that doubts about religion, especially
doubts about God, had more profound pernicious associations with
psychiatric symptoms among individuals who expressed strong
religious commitment, compared to individuals who expressed
moderate or no religious commitment. All three sets of findings are
consistent with the view that individuals who are highly invested
in their roles as religious individuals may be particularly wounded
by threats to this aspect of their identity. Since meaning and
purpose in life are so closely tied to religion, we would expect that
believing life lacks meaning would be more troubling or threaten-
ing to highly religious persons than to less religious persons,
because it undermines their central social role.
Present Study
A growing body of literature indicates that believing life has
meaning and purpose is associated with both religious commit-
ment and psychological well-being. However, these relationships
may be more complex for religious individuals who may have
doubts about their religious faith (Krause, Ingersoll-Dayton, Elli-
son, & Wulff, 1999; Krause & Wulff, 2004). With this in mind, the
current paper explores the relationships among religious commit-
ment, the belief there is meaning and purpose in life, and mental
health.
Theoretical Perspective
People have various beliefs that guide their daily lives: “that the
world is reasonably fair, that they are good people, that bad things
don’t happen to good people, and that God is good and is looking
after them and protecting them” (Park, 2005, p. 298). These kinds
of general, or global beliefs, are considered to be an essential
element of meaning-making (Steger & Park, 2012). Evolutionary
Threat Assessment Systems (ETAS) theory provides a biologically
plausible, causal mechanism by which such beliefs can directly
affect mental health.
ETAS theory proposes that beliefs about the world can directly
influence psychological well-being, specifically psychiatric symp-
toms (Flannelly, Koenig, Galek, & Ellison, 2007). The theory is
based, in part, on evolutionary or Darwinian psychiatry, and cog-
nitive psychotherapy. MacLean (1972, 1985) was an early propo-
nent of the idea that psychiatric symptoms were rooted in evolu-
tionarily primitive brain functions related to threats. Marks and
Nesse (Marks & Nesse, 1994; Nesse, 1998) advanced this perspec-
tive by illustrating how specific psychiatric symptoms reflect
different kinds of threats of physical harm or threats to social
relationships. The proposition that psychiatric symptoms are the
product of a brain system that detects and assesses threats is
steadily gaining acceptance (Eilam, Izhar, & Mort, 2011; Flannelly
et al., 2007; Hinds et al., 2010; Woody & Szechtman, 2011). In
addition to the term ETAS, such neural threat-assessment systems
have been called security motivation systems (Woody & Szecht-
man), human alarm systems (Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams,
2003) and, simply, threat detection systems (Eilam et al., 2011).
Beck (Beck, 1987; Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985) and
Gilbert (1984) introduced the idea that psychiatric symptoms result
from distorted beliefs about the dangerousness of the world. These
beliefs often are quite general, such as, “Any strange situation
should be regarded as dangerous” (Beck et al., 1985, p. 63), or “It
is always best to assume the worst” (Beck et al., 1985, p. 63). Beck
and his colleagues continue to accumulate evidence that dysfunc-
tional beliefs are at the root of psychiatric symptomology (Beck &
Rector, 2002), including depression (Beck, 2008), panic attacks
(Wenzel, Sharp, Brown, Greenberg, & Beck, 2006), and person-
ality disorders (Beck et al., 2001). Cognitive psychotherapy at-
tempts to alleviate psychiatric symptoms by altering the dysfunc-
tional beliefs and underlie them.
ETAS theory incorporates these two theoretical perspectives in
proposing: (a) that certain classes of psychiatric symptoms are the
products of neural assessments about potential threats to individ-
uals and their social relationships; (b) that these threat assessments
are moderated by beliefs about the world (Flannelly et al., 2007);
and therefore, (c) that beliefs about the world moderate psychiatric
symptoms. Threats to individuals involve threats of physical and
psychological harm and threats to social relationships, including
threats to social status (Price, Gardner, & Erickson, 2004; Price et
al., 2007). Threats to social status entail threats to self-concept and
self-esteem.
ETAS theory proposes that beliefs about the world influence
psychiatric symptoms by modulating the sensitivity of threat as-
sessment systems or the threshold of what constitutes a threat. In
either case, beliefs can inhibit or facilitate threat assessments. In so
doing, religious and secular beliefs about the world can enhance or
ameliorate psychiatric symptoms.
A basic aspect of ETAS theory and related theories of human
alarm (Eisenberger et al., 2003), security (Woody & Szechtman,
2011), and threat (Eilam et al., 2011) systems has been incorpo-
rated into research on meaning and purpose in the form of the
“hostile world scenario” (Shmotkin & Shrira, 2012; Shrira, Palgi,
Ben-Ezra, & Shmotkin, 2011). The hostile world scenario is said
“to function as a system of appraisal that scans for any potential
negative condition” (Shmotkin & Shrira, 2012, p. 146). According
to Shmotkin and Shrira (2012), the system is adaptive in keeping
individuals vigilant about potential danger, but it can also generate
“a continuous sense of survivorship in a disastrous world” (Shmot-
kin & Shrira, 2012, p. 146). Shmotkin and Shrira (2012) believe
the positive bias of meaning systems counteract the negative
perspective of the hostile world scenario by offering favorable, and
 RELIGION, MEANING AND PURPOSE, AND MENTAL HEALTH
sometimes unreasonably positive, interpretations of adverse life
events.
Hypotheses
The present study was designed, therefore, to test the degree to
which the belief that life lacks meaning and purpose moderates the
association of religious commitment on psychiatric symptoms,
using data from the 2010 Baylor Religion Survey. The Baylor data
also afford the opportunity to test other hypotheses based on the
foregoing review of the literature, using a large nationwide sample
of U.S. adults. The following hypotheses were tested. First, reli-
gious commitment has a significant salutary association with psy-
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
chological well-being—specifically, psychiatric symptoms in the
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
present study. Second, the belief that life lacks meaning and
purpose has a significant pernicious association with psychiatric
symptoms. Third, religious commitment has a significant salutary
association with psychiatric symptoms, controlling for beliefs
about meaning and purpose. Fourth, the belief that life lacks
meaning and purpose mediates the association of religious com-
mitment with psychiatric symptoms. Fifth, religious commitment
interacts with the belief that life lacks meaning and purpose in their
net associations on psychiatric symptoms— our central hypothesis.
Specifically, we hypothesize that believing life lacks meaning and
purpose will have a more pernicious effect on highly religious
individuals than it will on individuals who are less religious. Sixth,
both religious commitment and the belief that life lacks meaning
and purpose interact with race on their respective associations with
psychiatric symptoms. In particular, it is hypothesized that the
salutary association of religious commitment will be significant for
African Americans (but not for Caucasians), and that the perni-
cious association of believing life lacks meaning and purpose will
be significant for Caucasians (but not for African Americans).
Method
Participants
A national survey was conducted for the Baylor Religion Survey
in November 2010 by the Gallup Organization. Random digit
dialing was used to contact a sample of 7,000 U.S. adults who were
asked to participate in a survey. Approximately 2,500 of those who
were contacted were subsequently mailed the survey question-
naire, of which 1,714 returned the survey. A number of survey
respondents were eliminated from the final analyses due to missing
data. Sixty-five of the surveys were excluded due to missing data
on the demographic variables. Seventy-seven surveys were ex-
cluded because they were missing data on various independent
variables, and 119 surveys were excluded due to missing data on
the dependent variables. The final analyses included responses
from 1,453 participants.
Measures
Dependent variables. Five classes of psychiatric symptoms:
(general anxiety, social anxiety, paranoia, obsession, and compul-
sion), were measured by three items each. The items were adapted
from existing scales in the public domain: general anxiety
(Kroenke, Spitzer, Williams, & Lowe, 2009); social anxiety
5
(Moore & Gee, 2003); paranoia (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992);
obsession (Kaplan, 1994); and compulsion (Kaplan, 1994).
The root question was: “Over the past month, how often have
you . . .” The response options were: Never ⫽ 0; Rarely ⫽ 1;
Sometimes ⫽ 2; Often ⫽ 3; and Very Often ⫽ 4. The three items
for each symptom class were: Generalized Anxiety (␣ ⫽ .84)—
Felt nervous, anxious or on edge, Unable to stop or control
worrying, Worried too much about different things; Social Anxiety
(␣ ⫽ .82)—Feared that you might do something to embarrass
yourself in a social situation, Became anxious doing things be-
cause people were watching, Endured intense anxiety in social or
performance situations; Paranoia (␣ ⫽ .77)—Felt like you were
being watched or talked about by others, Felt that it is not safe to
trust anyone, Felt that people were taking advantage of you;
Obsession (␣ ⫽ .76)—Been plagued by thoughts or images that
you cannot get out of your mind, Thought too much about things
that would not bother other people, Thought too much about
pointless matters; Compulsion (␣ ⫽ .77)—Felt compelled to per-
form certain actions for no justifiable reason, Repeated simple
actions that realistically did not need to be repeated, Been afraid
something terrible would happen if you did not perform certain
rituals.
The variable for each class of symptoms consisted of the aver-
age of the three items comprising that class. The five measures
were developed by the authors of the current study specifically for
the 2010 Baylor Religion Survey.
Independent variables. The 2010 Baylor Religion Survey
(BRS) contained three questions about meaning and purpose in
life: (a) I do not believe there is any ultimate meaning in life, (b)
It is useless to try to discover the purpose of my life, and (c) I
seldom think about the meaning of life. The first two questions
were selected for use in the present study to measure the belief that
life lacks existential meaning (r ⫽ .43; p ⬍ .001, ␣ ⫽ .60);
specifically, that participants did not believe that meaning was
present in their lives (Steger et al., 2006). The four response
categories were: Strongly disagree ⫽ 1; Disagree ⫽ 2; Agree ⫽ 3;
Strongly agree ⫽ 4. The third question was not used because its
interpretation was considered to be ambiguous. For instance, one
might not think about meaning in life because: (a) one has found
meaning, already; (b) one does not consider meaning to be impor-
tant; or (c) one does not believe meaning exists.
Two of the BRS questions were used to measure religious
commitment (␣ ⫽ .82). The first question, “How religious do you
consider yourself to be?” had four response categories: Not at all
religious ⫽ 1; Not too religious ⫽ 2; Somewhat religious ⫽ 3;
Very religious ⫽ 4. The second question, “How often do you
attend religious services?” had eight category responses ranging
from Never ⫽ 0 to Several times per week ⫽ 8. Responses to each
question were converted to standardized scores and combined,
with the average of the two scores forming the variable religious
commitment.
Covariates. The control variables were age, gender, race,
education, and marital status. Gender was recoded as Female (1 vs.
0), race was coded as Caucasian (1 vs. 0) and African American (1
vs. 0), and marital status was recoded as Married (1 vs. 0).
Education was measured on a 7-point scale from 8th grade or
less ⫽ 1 to Postgraduate work/Degree ⫽ 7.
 6 GALEK, FLANNELLY, ELLISON, SILTON, AND JANKOWSKI
Analysis Plan
Bivariate and univariate analyses were performed on all of the
variables. A series of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression
analyses were conducted to test the hypotheses. A preliminary
regression analysis was conducted to predict the belief that life
lacks meaning from religious commitment for use in the mediation
analyses to test Hypothesis 4 (see below).
Model 1 regressed each of the five dependent variables (general
anxiety, social anxiety, paranoia, obsession, and compulsion) on
the demographic control variables (age, female, Caucasian, Afri-
can American, education, and married) in five separate analyses.
Model 2 regressed each psychiatric symptom on religious com-
mitment and the control variables to test Hypothesis 1. Model 3
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regressed each psychiatric symptom on belief in meaning and
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purpose in life and the control variables to test Hypothesis 2.
Model 4 regressed each psychiatric symptom on religious com-
mitment, belief in meaning and purpose in life and the covariates
to test Hypothesis 3. Mediation was analyzed using the Sobel-
Goodman test to test Hypothesis 4 (Sobel, 1982).
Model 5 tested Hypothesis 5 that religious commitment will
interact with the belief that life lacks meaning to produce their net
effects on the dependent variables. Model 5 was identical to Model
4, except it included the interaction of religious commitment and
meaning and purpose.
Prior to calculating statistical interactions, the raw scores for
belief in meaning and purpose were zero-centered to minimize the
collinearity of the product terms, as recommended by Aiken and
West (1991). The scores for religious commitment were already
zero-centered because they were standardized scores. The interac-
tion term was created by multiplying the zero-centered scores for
religious commitment and belief in meaning and purpose in life.
Interaction terms were also created for the interaction of Cau-
casian with religious commitment, Caucasian with meaning and
purpose, African American with religious commitment, and Afri-
can American with meaning and purpose in life. Models 6 –9
separately tested the association of these interactions with each of
the dependent variables. Models 6 –9 were identical to Model 4
except for the inclusion of the interaction terms.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
The levels of the five classes of psychiatric symptomology were
quite low among the survey participants. General anxiety had the
highest average score, with a mean of 1.16 (SD ⫽ 0.90), which lies
between rarely and sometimes on the 0 – 4 scale. The average
scores of the other four classes of psychiatric symptoms fell
between never and rarely: Social Anxiety (M ⫽ 0.67, SD ⫽ 0.75);
Paranoia (M ⫽ 0.75, SD ⫽ 0.67); Obsession (M ⫽ 0.95, SD ⫽
0.77); Compulsion (M ⫽ 0.35, SD ⫽ 0.59).
The average age of participants was nearly 56 years, slightly
more than half of the respondents were women (53%), and nearly
two thirds (64%) were married. Most of the sample was Caucasian
(86%) or African American (8%). The median level of education
was “some college” and approximately 39% had earned a college
or advanced degree. Close to 80% of the sample was Christian, 2%
were Jewish, and just over 11% said they had no religious affili-
ation.
Bivariate Correlations
The intercorrelations among the demographic variables were
generally low, but there were a number of notable correlations
between the demographic and independent variables. Age was
positively related to religious commitment, r ⫽ .19, p ⬍ .001 as
well the belief that life lacks meaning and purpose, r ⫽ .11, p ⬍
.001. Females, r ⫽ ⫺.12, p ⬍ .001 and better educated partici-
pants, r ⫽ ⫺.11, p ⬍ .001 were less likely to hold that belief.
Religious commitment was inversely related to the belief that
life lacks meaning and purpose, r ⫽ ⫺.35, p ⬍ .001. Religious
commitment also had small, but significant, negative correlations
with all five dependent variables: general anxiety, r ⫽ ⫺.10, p ⬍
.001, social anxiety, r ⫽ ⫺.05, p ⬍ .05, paranoia, r ⫽ ⫺10, p ⬍
.001, obsession, r ⫽ ⫺.08, p ⬍ .01, and compulsion, r ⫽ ⫺.06,
p ⬍ .05. In contrast, believing that life lacks meaning and purpose
had small, but significant, positive correlations with four of the
five dependent variables: social anxiety, r ⫽ .07, p ⬍ .05, para-
noia, r ⫽ .08, p ⬍ .05, obsession, r ⫽ .07, p ⬍ .05, and compul-
sion, r ⫽ .13, p ⬍ .001.
OLS Regression Analyses
The regression analysis predicting psychiatric symptoms from
the six demographic variables (Model 1) found that three of them
had significant negative associations with all five classes of symp-
toms: age (␤s ⫽ ⫺.070 to ⫺.116), education (␤s ⫽ ⫺.131
to ⫺.241) and being married (␤s ⫽ ⫺.102 to ⫺.216). Being
female had a significant positive relationship with general anxiety
(␤ ⫽ .199) and a significant negative relationship with compulsion
(␤ ⫽ ⫺.066). Being Caucasian also had a significant negative
relationship with compulsion (␤ ⫽ ⫺.119). No other demographic
variables were significantly related to the psychiatric symptoms.
Table 1 presents the results of the four models testing the six
hypotheses (i.e., Models 2–5). Although religious commitment had
a significant negative association with all of the dependent vari-
ables in the bivariate analyses, it only had a significant negative
association with general anxiety (␤ ⫽ ⫺.053) when entered into
Model 2 along with the six demographic variables. These results
provide support for Hypothesis 1 only with respect to general
anxiety. They do not support the overall proposition of Hypothesis
1, that religious commitment has a salutary association with psy-
chiatric symptomology, after controlling for the demographic vari-
ables.
The belief that life lacks meaning and purpose, which had a
significant positive association with four of the five dependent
variables in the bivariate analyses, exhibited the same patterns of
associations in the multivariate regression analyses performed in
Model 3. These results provide support for Hypothesis 2, that
believing life lacks meaning has a pernicious association with
psychiatric symptoms (excluding general anxiety).
As found in Model 2, the only significant association that
religious commitment had with any of the dependent variables in
Model 4 was its negative association with general anxiety. There-
fore, the results of Model 4 undermine Hypothesis 3, that religious
commitment will have a salutary association with psychiatric
symptoms, controlling for beliefs about meaning in life. Sobel-
Goodman mediation tests were conducted for all five dependent
variables despite the fact that the results essentially made them
unnecessary. The tests provided no support for Hypothesis 4, that
 RELIGION, MEANING AND PURPOSE, AND MENTAL HEALTH 7

Table 1
Estimated Net Effects of Religion Commitment, the Belief That Life Lacks Meaning, and Their Interaction on Psychiatric Symptoms
(Models 2– 4)

General anxiety Social anxiety Paranoia Obsession Compulsion

Model 2
Religious commitment ⫺.053ⴱ (⫺.055) ⫺.014 (⫺.018) ⫺.041 (⫺.049) ⫺.029 (⫺.034) ⫺.019 (⫺.030)
Intercept .722 .711 1.036 .836 .649
Adjusted R2 .047 .038 .089 .041 .044
Model 3
Belief that life lacks meaning and purpose .049 (.037) .072ⴱ (.064) .070ⴱ (.060) .076ⴱ (.066) .100ⴱⴱⴱ (.113)
Intercept .766 .683 .977 .790 .610
Adjusted R2 .046 .042 .094 .044 .055
Model 4
Religious commitment ⫺.046ⴱ (⫺.048) .007 (.009) ⫺.025 (⫺.030) ⫺.009 (⫺.010) .010 (.016)
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Belief that life lacks meaning and purpose .025 (.019) .076ⴱ (.067) .056 (.049) .071ⴱ (.062) .106ⴱⴱⴱ (.120)
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Intercept .766 .527 .900 .663 .393

Adjusted R2 .047 .041 .950 .043 .055
Model 5
Religious commitment ⫺.057ⴱ (⫺.058) .000 (.000) ⫺.032 (⫺.039) ⫺.015 (⫺.018) .008 (.013)
Belief that life lacks meaning and purpose .039 (.029) .086ⴱⴱ (.076) .066ⴱ (.057) .080ⴱ (.069) .109ⴱⴱⴱ (.123)
Religious commitment ⫻ Belief life lacks
meaning .143ⴱⴱⴱ (.104) .098ⴱⴱⴱ (.084) .097ⴱⴱⴱ (.082) .084ⴱⴱ (.071) .033 (.037)
Intercept .809 .550 .922 .683 .401
Adjusted R2 .057 .047 .096 .047 .055
Note. Values are unstandardized parameter estimates and (standardized estimates, ␤s). All the regression models control for age, gender, education,
marital status, Caucasian and African American.
ⴱ
p ⬍ .05. ⴱⴱ p ⬍ .01. ⴱⴱⴱ p ⬍ .001.

lack of meaning mediates the association between religious com-
mitment and general anxiety or any of the other dependent vari-
ables.
The belief that life lacks meaning and purpose exhibited the
same patterns of associations with psychiatric symptoms in the
interaction model (Model 5) that it did in the main effects models.
Model 5 also found significant interactions of religious commit-
ment with the belief that life lacks meaning and purpose for
general anxiety, social anxiety, paranoia, and obsession.
The predicted interaction effects (Hypothesis 5), were evident
for general anxiety, social anxiety, paranoia, and obsession. The
interaction effect is best illustrated for social anxiety, obsession
and paranoia, as seen in Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3. Social
anxiety showed the most profound effect (see Figure 1). Individ-
uals who were low in religious commitment exhibited comparable
levels of social anxiety. regardless of their belief in meaning and
purpose in life. As hypothesized, individuals who were high in
religious commitment but low in their belief that there is meaning
and purpose in life had higher levels of social anxiety. Moreover,
this group had appreciably higher levels of social anxiety than
religiously committed individuals who had a strong belief in
meaning and purpose in life. The pattern of the interaction effects
was nearly identical for obsession (see Figure 2), but differed
somewhat for paranoia (see Figure 3). General anxiety and com-
pulsion exhibited broadly similar patterns, but in the case of
compulsion, the interaction effect was not statistically significant.
Models 6 –9 (not shown) provided no support for Hypothesis 6
that race would interact with religious commitment, belief in
meaning and purpose in life, and with their respective associations

0.70 Lack of
Meaning 0.80
Lack of
Social Anxiety

Meaning
0.60 0.75
High +1 SD
Obsession

Mean 0.70 High +1 SD

Low -1 SD Mean
0.50 0.65 Low -1 SD

0.60

0.40 0.55
-1 SD Mean +1 SD -1 SD Mean +1 SD
Religious Commitment Religious Commitment

Figure 1. Interaction effect of religious commitment and the belief that Figure 2. Interaction effect of religious commitment and the belief that
life lacks meaning and purpose on social anxiety. life lacks meaning and purpose on obsession.
 8 GALEK, FLANNELLY, ELLISON, SILTON, AND JANKOWSKI
1.05
Lack of
Meaning
0.95
High +1 SD
Paranoia
Mean
Low -1 SD
0.85
0.75
-1 SD Mean +1 SD
Religious Commitment
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Figure 3. Interaction effect of religious commitment and the belief that
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
life lacks meaning and purpose on paranoia.
with the dependent variables. No significant interaction effect was
found for either Caucasians or African Americans.
Discussion
The present study contributes to our understanding of the rela-
tionship between religion and meaning and purpose in regard to
mental health in several ways. The use of a large, nationwide
sample of adults allowed us to test the generality of findings from
previous studies that employed convenience samples. The results
confirm Hypothesis 1 and previous research findings that religious
commitment has a salutary association with psychological well-
being, in that religious commitment had a significant inverse
association with all five classes of psychiatric symptoms examined
in the current study. In addition, the results are consistent with
prior research that meaning and purpose in life have a salutary
association with psychological well-being, since lack of meaning
and purpose was found to be directly related to psychiatric symp-
tomology in the current study. Specifically, the results provide
strong support for Hypothesis 2, that lack of meaning and purpose
has a pernicious association with mental health, in that it had a
significant positive association with four of the five classes of
psychiatric symptoms.
The results do not the support Hypothesis 3 or Hypothesis 4.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that the salutary association of religious
commitment with psychiatric symptoms would be statistically
significant after controlling for beliefs about meaning and purpose,
but this was true for only one of the five classes of symptoms.
Hypothesis 4 stated that the association of religious commitment
with psychiatric symptoms is mediated by beliefs about meaning
and purpose in life, but this is not the case in our sample. There-
fore, the present results do not support research on college students
that found the salubrious association between religion and psycho-
logical well-being was mediated by meaning in life (Steger &
Frazier, 2005). The results also undermine research findings on
college students that religiousness (but not meaning and purpose)
has a salutary association with psychiatric symptomology among
African Americans, whereas meaning and purpose (but not reli-
giousness) has a salutary association with psychiatric symptomol-
ogy among Caucasians (Holmes & Hardin, 2009).
The results provide strong support for the central hypotheses of
the current study (Hypothesis 5). Hypothesis 5 stated that belief in
meaning and purpose in life interacts with religious commitment
on their net associations with psychiatric symptoms. As hypothe-
sized, highly religious individuals who believed their lives lacked
meaning and purpose experienced more frequent symptoms of
social anxiety, paranoia, and obsession than individuals who were
less religious or highly religious individuals who believed their
lives have meaning and purpose. To our knowledge, the present
study is one of only a few studies specifically designed to analyze
the relationship between lack of meaning in life and mental health
outcomes. We will return to these findings shortly to place them in
a theoretical perspective.
Several theoretical propositions bear on our interpretation of the
current results. First, religious beliefs form the heart of all religions
(Stark & Glock, 1968). Second, religious belief systems are main-
tained through religious commitment, which is expressed, in part,
by engaging in religious practices, such as attending religious
services. Collectively, religious convictions and practices foster
the belief there is meaning and purpose in life.
The “hostile world scenario” (Shmotkin & Shrira, 2012; Shrira
et al., 2011) is similar to ETAS theory in that it proposes a
vigilance system that scans for potential threats of harm in the
physical and social environment. While this vigilance system is
adaptive, its focus on adversity in the world can have negative
effects on psychological well-being, according to Shmotkin and
Shrira (2012). Shmotkin and Shrira propose that the negative bias
of the vigilance system can be off-set by the positive bias of
meaning systems, which provide favorable interpretations of ad-
verse life events.
Whereas the hostile world scenario asserts that the focus of the
vigilance system on adversity can have negative consequences for
psychological well-being, ETAS theory specifically proposes that
psychiatric symptoms, such as those studied here, are the direct
result of threat assessments by neural circuits in the brain. More-
over, ETAS theory provides a plausible biological mechanism
through which global beliefs about the world, which are central to
meaning making, can directly affect psychiatric symptoms.
To the degree that meaning in life counters the negative conse-
quences of recognizing the threats posed by the world, lack of
meaning should exacerbate these negative consequences. Thus, as
Hypothesis 2 states, the belief that life lacks meaning and purpose
should have significant pernicious associations with psychiatric
symptoms. Hence, ETAS theory and the hostile world scenario
may account for our findings that lack of meaning is associated
with higher levels of psychiatric symptoms.
Religions are inherently social systems (Berger, 1967), and
religion provides many people with their core identity or role (Park
& Edmondson, 2012). Therefore, based on Identity theory, we
hypothesized that religiously committed people who believe life
lacks meaning and purpose would have higher psychiatric symp-
toms because it undermines their religious beliefs and, therefore,
threatens their social role within the religious community. Such a
threat should increase certain psychiatric symptoms, according to
ETAS theory. As predicted by Hypothesis 5, individuals who
reported the highest levels of religious commitment were the most
troubled, scoring higher on four of the five classes of psychiatric
symptoms.
The belief that life lacks meaning is akin to other forms of
religious doubt, or spiritual struggles, which have been found to
have a pernicious association with mental health, especially among
 RELIGION, MEANING AND PURPOSE, AND MENTAL HEALTH
individuals with strong religious commitment (Ellison et al., 2013;
Krause, 1994, 1998; Krause & Wulff, 2004). However, since
individuals who have other forms of religious doubt can still derive
meaning and purpose from other sources, the belief that life lacks
meaning and purpose may have a more profound effect on mental
health than do other forms of struggles and doubt (Krause &
Ellison, 2009).
From the perspective of ETAS theory, the belief that life lacks
meaning and purpose should facilitate threat assessments that
cause psychiatric symptoms for a number of reasons. As men-
tioned already, belief in meaning and purpose is proposed to
counter the negative consequences of threat assessments that the
world is a dangerous place to live. This may be because belief in
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meaning and purpose in life encompasses other positive, global
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
beliefs about oneself, others, and the world at large. In any case,
since the consequences of threat assessments are, in many cases,
psychiatric symptoms, the lack of belief in meaning and purpose
contributes to an increase in psychiatric symptoms. According to
ETAS theory, lack of meaning would reduce the threshold of what
constitutes a threat, thereby increasing psychiatric symptomology.
Religious identity provides a source of self-esteem (Park &
Edmondson, 2012), which is one of Baumeister’s (1991) four basic
needs for meaning. The belief that life lacks meaning probably
undermines one’s identity as a religious person and threatens
self-esteem. This perceived threat to social status and self-esteem
is reflected in higher levels of both social anxiety and paranoia,
which according to ETAS theory are increased by neural assess-
ments that elements of the social world pose a threat of harm.
How does ETAS theory explain the other interaction effects?
Since obsession-compulsion is also thought to be triggered by
social threats (Baxter, 2003; Gilbert, 2001), a perceived threat to
social status and/or self-esteem could account for the observed
interaction effects for obsession, as well. Although compulsion
exhibited an interaction effect that was generally similar to that of
obsession, its pattern was not sufficiently pronounced to be statis-
tically significant. The nonsignificant finding for compulsion was
probably due, at least in part, to its very low rate of occurrence
among survey participants.
Gilbert (2001) contends that most psychiatric symptoms, includ-
ing general anxiety, are produced by social threats. Price and other
theorists also think general anxiety can be produced by social
threats (Price et al., 2004). To the degree this is true, this could
explains why general anxiety is also associated with threats to
social status and self-esteem in the current study. From the per-
spective of ETAS theory, the belief that life lacks meaning and
purpose may facilitate threat assessments about the dangerousness
of the future and the world at large, which could increase general
anxiety. Given that feelings of efficacy reflect another dimension
of meaning (Baumeister, 1991), doubts about one’s efficacy to
deal with challenges to one’s faith may further heighten general
anxiety. This could help explain why the interaction effect was
strongest for general anxiety.
This study has a number of limitations. For example, Krause and
Wulff (2004) suggest that religious doubts are likely to result from
particularly severe events (e.g., serious illness or injury, loss of a
loved one), which undermine one’s belief that life is meaningful.
Unfortunately, the survey did not collect information about these
types of events.
9
As with any cross-sectional study, it is impossible to ascribe
causal influences about the directionality of the observed associ-
ations. Hence, it is not possible to say whether religious commit-
ment and believing in meaning and purpose in life lead to psycho-
logical well-being, or whether psychological well-being leads to
religious commitment and the belief that there is meaning and
purpose in life. Moreover, though this study is based on a large
nationwide sample of U.S. adults, since the survey had a relatively
low response rate it may not be entirely representative of the U.S.
population.
Finally, there are two conceptual issues that should be men-
tioned. First, the operational definition of meaning and purpose
used in the study employed only two questions, whereas Krause
(2007a, 2007b) has operationalized meaning in life into four di-
mensions measured by an array of items. Second, although we
discuss the interpretation of the results from the perspective of
ETAS theory, the study does not directly test ETAS theory and the
results to do not directly support ETAS theory.
Despite these limitations, we believe the results of this study
make a major contribution to our understanding of the relation-
ships among religion, belief in meaning and purpose in life, and
mental health outcomes. In particular, the results point to the
importance of examining the extent to which the association be-
tween religion and mental health is dependent upon additional
variables. The results further contribute to our understanding of
how religious beliefs may enhance or ameliorate psychiatric symp-
toms.
Overall, the results of the current study add to a growing body
of research that provide either direct or indirect support for ETAS
theory, including studies of the association between psychiatric
symptoms and specific beliefs about God (Ellison et al., 2013;
Flannelly, Galek, Ellison, & Koenig, 2010; Silton, Flannelly,
Galek, & Ellison, 2013), life after death (Flannelly, Ellison, Galek,
& Koenig, 2008), and doubts about one’s religious faith (Ellison et
al., 2013).
Future research should continue to test the salutary and perni-
cious associations between psychological well-being and religious,
spiritual, and secular beliefs. It would be particularly valuable for
future research on beliefs about existential meaning to examine the
factors that foster or deter such beliefs.
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Received January 31, 2012
Revision received April 4, 2014
Accepted May 12, 2014 䡲