INTRODUCTION xxiii ——————— INTRODUCTION THE RESTORATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER AND THE RETURN TO TOCQUEVILLIAN AMERICA ‘The 1994 election, the first time Americans have selected national oficholders with terms ‘extending into the 2Ist Century, has also marked a return to old traivons—in goverament a restoration of constitutional order, in society retur toa Tocquevilan America. Marke, it ‘should be emphasized, not cause: fortis single lection did not entirely transform either the Political opinion or evil society; it oly provided an occasion and setting in which opinions which bad long been held could be expressed and a society that had been for some time ‘reshaping itself could reveal its new form. Pus, it will seem implausible to many that a single lection, and anoffear election at that, isthe harbinger of a new era. Certainly itis possible that the new Republican majorities wil fil miserably to keep their promises or, having kept them, have nothing more to afer thatthe voting poblic wants, But the 1994 election does goa long way toward setting an argument that hasbeen raging for at east dozen years about where we standin our histor. The more familar theory of oar imes is implicitin the narratives ofthe great New Deal historians and set forth a a celica theory by the bestinown of them, Arthar Schlesinger Jr. According to this theory, American politics ‘urs primarily on economic issues, and is a continuing struggle between the haves and have- nots, Every generation «new leader comes forward supported by a generation of young idealists, ‘roposing public action to solve national problems; that leader and his program are embraced for atime by the people, who then sink Back to support conservatives who try to maintain the status quo In this view, bistory always moves tothe left, lurching leftward when prodded by liberal leaders, then pausing, then lurching leftward agai: Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln the {wo Roosevets, Kennedy and, said Schlesinger hopfully after the 1992 election, Bill Cinon ‘Another theory holds that polities divides Americans lst often on economic than along ‘cultural ines—aceordng to race eligon, region, ethnic group and cultural values. It believes that Americans are looking 10 government not so uch for economic redistribution-—indeed, until the mid-20th century government didnot seem capable of massive economic redistibu- tion—but for the maintenance of base ordet—not some authoritarian order, it must be added, ‘but toanonderly framework in which people can make thei ivings ase thei families and work {together in their eommunities. This theory holds that most Americans donot cast thei ots just sa referendum on the performance of the macroeconomy, though some marginal number of votes, frequently enough to change the outcomes of otherwite close elections, often do 80 Rather, thee voting allegiance is determined by the accumulated effects of experiences over time that cut 0 the quick of their lives. Thus millions of Americans switched from the Republican tothe Democratic Party in response tothe economic disorder ofthe early 19305 and zillions of Americans switched from the Democratic tothe Republican Party in response othe cultural disorder ofthe ate 19605. There is no inevitable eycle here, occuring ata certain placexxiv INTRODUCTION on the calendar. Rather, people respond to real events, and carry the experience of those events ‘ith them the rest of thei ives, or until some other extended series of events cuts as deeply, ‘he presidential results ofthe lst quarter century gave powerful support to the second ‘theory. Republicans won five of the six presidential elections from 1968 o 1988 and lot the ther, 1976, by only a SO%—48% margin. Republicans had an average margin of $3%-43%, a larger advantage than aay party has won over any other six elections in American history. But DDemoerats won control of the Senate during most ofthis period and held the House for al fi ‘countervailing evidence. And in 1992, when Bil Clinton was elected, Schlesinger was only one of ‘many who argued that hs victory proved the eyclcal theory was ght: the new Hiberalleader had arrived, surrounded by a coterie of idealistic aides, and America was ready inthis generation once again fora lurch tothe lft The 1994 election goes about as far as any election could toward seting the argument Franklin Roosevelt, after his frst victory in 1932, saw his party gain seats inthe House and Senate in 1934—the only such offyear gun for the part in power in American history, John ‘Kennedy, ate his victory in 1960, saw his party gain fur seats in the Senate and lose four in the House in 1962—a trade any president woul accep, and the second best showing of any party in history: In contrast, Bill Clinton, after his victory in 1992, saw his arty lse control of both {he Senate and the House in 1994, the most disastrous frat term los for a president since Herbert Hoover, inthe Great Depression, n 1930. Since World War I, the average los forthe party in power during the fist term after the election of & president has been zero seat in the Senate and 13 in the House. Bill Clinton's party lost eight seats inthe Senate and 82 in the House. Moreover, these losses came ata time when the macroeconomy was growing and the United States was at peace. A clearer repudiation of the party in power cannot be imagined. ‘Wherever history is headed itt no longer headed left. “These resus were no accident. They flowed logically from the lection of 1992 and its aftermath, from the Democrats’ past congressional victories and their performance as the ‘majority in Congress and from voters’ basic attitudes. Bll Clinton was elected in 1992 because hhe campaigned as a New Democrat, one who would use a combination of market and {government mechanisms to reform public sector institution that weren't working, and his party ‘was repudiated in 1994 because he governed as an old Democrat, one who seks an eve larger and more assertive public secor to slve problems. The most astonishing thing about Clinton's presidency is how this articulate, politically shrewd man utterly misread the leson of his own lection. Ii sai in his behalf that his campaign emphasized government “investinents” and ‘that his programs included some New Democratic initiatives, But the “investments” were only ‘ert ofa marketgovernment mix; when the Clinton general election campaign was in rouble, ‘the ad that it put up on TV was tbe one tht pledged 1 “end welfare as we know i” In ofc, it is true that Clinton adopted New Democrat itative Vice President Al Gores reinventing ‘government and the national service plan. But the (wo isues which the resident himself made umber one were the budget and tax package of 1993, with is tax increases and fasterthan- ‘economic-growth increases in government spending, and Hillary Rodham Clinton's healthcare finance reform package of 1994, which politcal sienist Martha Derthick called the bosiest ‘Rovernment program she had ever read ‘The embrace of the Clinton front-row-center Old Democrat programs by the Democratic Congress enabled the Republicans to nationalize the congresionl elections more than at any time since the Republicans lst control of the House i 1954. Democrats had denatinalized House elections, starting around 1970, by building up institutional advantages —superior candidate skills, redistricting, artful employment of the perquisites of ofce and pork barrel projects and the camouflage of allowing members to eas showy moderate and conservative ‘oes while a whip-racking leadership insisted on loyalty on key procedural and rues votes. BY {he early 1990s the quality of al these institutional advantages was degrading, The Democral’ ge in. superior candidate skis, greatest when slfstaring young liberals energized. by ‘opposition tothe Vietnam war and Richard Nixon were capturing and holding onto marginal INTRODUCTION XV, ee aes seb cr eae sree ent rl Na se ets sie ae er nr ee are Obi esta Dea antec ta ans Rate jae eth enh aed ee a ae Caen oer Pek ee oc eae eile et oe ree Na Sel en ace el eee te ar ee a el scons Seen te ace he ones ste eg eae ea polaron ey ee eae ert re ree ere Se ie ies De ce naereanre le Ce ee ang ap wa ee a nari annie ap rr a le oe ra card eset ee at eg ie Oy cman ao oe cote em a en icra nt nee carat ern Se rem etree ee ne me ae a ree epee cet ie ee eee oe eerie nn ae tare once ame et a ere ea ace foc eet te emer cy et ee ee ne eo ie ere = rant et cre bt He Ta a eet a sy eee, een et ah acon as Soot sab secs apie Sat a eager ee is mesa re ti ve ae eae set! ie Neh ot ia tra te Set ea ee rian eee wn es a ar le nen er i re ee oe i Soper sey ce ae oe ar eer oe en enrages cue Be ip oe seb wegen tea ae i eigenen eeennetomey reer eee ages Se encore iets epic epee coe et ea ced em ceca Po Deora far advantages, as already noted, were vanishing. The economic package, crime bill and healthcare plan they had counted on as assets turned out to be liabilities. The President whose support they ete edie arene re a eee Se ae nn ee tale ae oe ee ee caeXxxvi INTRODUCTION governorand other stat offices. The eight largest states, with 49% of the nation's population ll Jha seriously contested elections for governor. Republicans won seven ofthese eight races, and the Democrat who won the other, Lawton Chiles of Florida, caried only voters age 65 and over snd lost among voters under 65- Republicans won contra of both houses of the legislature in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan and Ilinois they won lower statewide fies in New York, Ohio, ‘Michigan, Minos, Florida Texas and California. In all these contest there were personal and local factors and different personalities, but in ll the basic contrast between the paris coeely resembled the contrast between the partes nationally, ‘The Republican victory in 1994 arose from fundamental, not incidental eauces, It was the result of voten' rational responses to the parte’ diflerences on major issues, not o some sccidenal events of irrational paroxysm of anger. The long course of election resus over the last ‘quarter cetury proves, ab much as these things an evr be proved, that 1992 was the exception sand 1994 the role, We are moving away from, not toward, an everJarger government; We are atthe least uneasy about our renunciation of traditional cultural moces and possibly ready 10 ‘embrace them again; we cherish an inchoste, mostly unariculated American nationalism that ‘ides our unfocused, seeming contradictory impulses on foreign and defense and-rade policy. ‘WHERE ARE WE HEADED? Jn important respects, we seem to be returning to 2 Tocquevillian America, to something resembling the country thatthe French aristocrat Alexis de Tocqueville visited in 1831 and Sescrbed in his Demoeracyrin America. Tocqueville's America was egalitarian, individualistic, ‘decentralized, religious, propertydving ightly governed. Egalitarian, notin economic terms but in the sene that Americans are comfortable withthe presumption ofthe moral equality of every citizen: we are nota servile people in awe of any elite, though we are quick to recognize and honor talent. Individualistc, not rejecting common enterprise but insisting on the right to ‘make personal decisions without imerferece from others. Decentralized, as the big units that ‘dominated America in World War It and for decades afterward big goverament, bg business, ‘ig abor—hve lost their hold onthe economy and.on people's imaginations. Religious, because ‘the United States emsins the one economically advanced country in-vhich most people are teligions. Propery-oving since ordinary people inthe course of lifetime expect to and do ‘scoumulate significant wealth, primarily i residential rel estate but alo in investments and ‘Pension, Lightly governed, because government leaves tovoluntary associations of many kinds tocial functions which elsewhere and at other times have been performed by the state. (Centtalization and hierarchy, which historian Robert Wiebe in Self-Rule- Cultural ‘istry of American Democracy ideatfes as the dominant characteristics of American ie for ‘mostof the 0th Century, seem tobe yielding to decentralization and equality as Wiebe shows ‘they were, even more suddenly, inthe early 19th Century. Then, when they were released fom ‘the threat of the Napoleonic wars, Americans liberated religion and medicine from central ‘authorities, stopped working for big employers and surged west in-great numbers to become independent farmers and merchants. That America developed a national two-party polities but 15 Wiebe puts it, “Politic dfsed government power and united» sprawling nation.” Inthe 1990s, Americans once again have ben released suddenly fom the theat of word wat. They are rejecting the authority of hierarchies in religion (compare the declining mainline denomin- ‘ions withthe surging fundamentalist faiths or the New Age mentality) and medicine (ook the popularity of alternative healing and fads even in a time of great scientiie progres). ‘Geographically, ordinary Americans have been spreading out to edge cities and beyond, in ‘computerequipped houses in low-priced subdivisions, living comfortably on credit extended in {ree ifseemingly disorderly markets, Economically, they increasingly work for small businesses or op fromone job to another with destrity and optimism and without generating politcal ‘demands for economic redistribution or government guarantees. Americans are not a people yearning for security, although the Gl. generation who grew up in the Depression served in INTRODUCTION ‘World War TI and helped build prosperous postwar Ameria do have a more than economic attachment to Social Security; when politicians bave staked their all on claims to provide ‘security, when Richard Nion resisted Watergate investigations in the name of national security ‘or when Bill Clinton offered votes what he claimed was health security, they have conspicu- ‘ously failed 10 command voter" allegiance. Ttlloctaly, Americans take dretion not from a cultural and educational elit that seeks to smake the county obey abstract rules learned in prestigious univerities—en elite that in many ‘ways esembles the New England Federaists who were swept ese in the years following the Ball of New Orleans—but from self-help advisers, television evangelists and radio talk show. Jost. The Ivy League lite that Christopher Lasch described in his posthumous The Revolt of ‘the Eltes andthe Betrayal of Democracy no longer captures American imaginations: compare the fascination with the Kennedys in the early 1960s with the vitro dislike fo Bill and Hilary Rodham Clinton expressed by avery large minority of voters and the indiference of the res. “his 2ist Century Tooqueilian America is not necessarily Republican, any more than ‘Tocqueville's 1830s Americ inevitably voted fr the Jacksonian Democrats. The Whigs, when they escaped the thrall of their New England elites, won elections too, and in the 1990s Democrats can certainly win again, and not just because of Republican blunders. They can win, ‘it they develop a New Democratic politics that san aoveptabe variant ofthe Republican faith, ‘act of policies with a more communitarian thrust but not one that attempts to impose ‘centralized, hierarchical solutions ona country that resists centralization and hierarchy. Such a polis what Bill Clinton seemed to be promising in 1992 bu, inthe opinion of most voters Failed to deliver in 1993 and 1994. ‘But inthis new-old America the politcal rues are different from those most readers have srown up with and become accurtomed to. Underlying much of today’s political analysis and flrategis isthe assumption that the fst things voters sek from government are economio—a ‘smooth upward busines cycle and after distribution of income and wealth. But that is clearly ‘wrong. The first thing voters seek of government is order—not some arbitrary, authoritarian ‘order, but a rational, predictable order in which ordinary people can raise their families, make their living, participate in thir communities and go about their daly lives without fear of, ‘physical violence or economic disaster. Americans have-had a happy history during most of ‘which they took this basic order for granted. But they have reacted strongly when order i ‘threatened. The economic diorder of the 1930s deprived the Republicans of their natural iy and gave Democrats the chance fo become the majority part. The cultural disorder of 1960s deprived the Democrats of their natural majority and gave Republicans the chance to become the majority party. "The fallacy that the fist things voters seck from government are economic is an idea th srew out of New Deal politics and Keynesian esonomics-—specii responses to an episode of fevere economic disorder. Yet even in the 1980s and the generation that followed that idea was ‘ever tre except at the margins Indifferent election 5% and sometimes even 10% ofthe voters ‘would change their votes based on the performance of the macroeconomy or in response to policies of economic redistribution, And in an electorate closely divided between adherents of ‘the two major partis, those 5% and 10% could easily make the difference in outcomes between ‘one party or the other: But even atthe height of what seemed tobe clas warfare polties—from 1935 to 1963, approximately—the very much larger blocs ofthe electorate adhered to party preferences that reulted from cultural iasues, Southern whites were Democrats because Democrats opposed the fue ofthe Civil War. Afrcan-Americas, for three generations solidly Republican became solidly Democratic, because Franklin Roosevelt seemed to back cv right inthe 1930s and 194038 Abraham Lincoln and the radial Republicans had inthe 18603 a 1870s, (Interestingly the New Dealers who were most favorable to eivl rights were former Republicans—Eleanor Roosevelt, Harold Ickes, Henry Wallace) Voters of New England ‘Yankee stock were heavily Republican, as they had been since they founded the Republican Party in the 1850e; voter of immigrant stock were heavily Democratic, as they had been since XxVii