xxii POSTWAR POLITICS POSTWAR POLITICS 1.THE POSTWAR CONTEXT ‘The 1990s have been years of peculiar instability in American electra politics. Any acount of these years mus explain the wie osiltions in pubic opinion how George Bash went from 91% approval in March 1991 to 25% in uly 1992 bow Rone Pert went fom nowhere fois in the presidental race rom March to uly 1992 how Bill Clinton ced from 23% in June 1992 to $7% in July 1992, then fll to 43% ofthe vote, or how he squandered the usual indulgence “Americans give to tet incoming presidents and fell to «negative jo approval ating by May 1995. The best explanation i thatthe US as been ina ped of poster poles poo- Cold Wor, post Gul wa For instability of opinion and party preference is characteristic of postwar periods. In June 1945, the British clectrste famouly rejected Winston Church ter bi five yeas of magnificent war leadership, using is Conservative Paty and giving the Labour Party its largest parliamentary majority ever Similry in November 1946, the fist general lection alter the American victory in World Wat I, the Democrat, for he Bat ine in 16 years, were Sept out of contol of both houses of Congress, losing 54 seats inthe House and 12 in the Senate. Just two years att, In 1948, the Democrats won back control of both houses of Congress by large margins, picking p 75 seats inthe House and nine in the Senate, and ‘Producing more House resimen (118) than in any year since, including 1992, and won an upset tictory for President Harry Truman, Something similar happened inthe United States after World War 1. Woodrow Wilts Democrats a November 118, us days after the Armistice, ‘ost control ofboth houses of Congress, losing 26 sets nthe Hout and soren inthe Senate; hen in November 1920, after the defen ofthe Versailles Treaty and Woodrow Wilson's inapacita: tin, they lest further seats inthe House ad 10 inthe Senate. Two Years latt they snapped ‘ick, hough not to majorities, with pin of 94 Howe eats and Ave the Senate ‘Why these vast shifts in postwar period? I ia if people ome up ou ofthe reaches, efter yearsef bombardment and danger and misery, and suddenly sex what Wision Chueh called the rg sn uplands wh 2a ane ete thom texan, bot isorenting people wan a roadmap, a sense of where they are going and how much pegrss they have made, of what pathways to chaos and where cach one wll eed. Winston Church ‘Conservatives lest because the Labour Party ad such « map. te Beveridge Report and ater specie pan forthe welfare stat thatthe Labour goverment in fact established the Yeas js aftr the war. Robert Tats Republican during those same years had «lear donstc Program, which infact they accompliahed: mantle domestic price control cut ta ates, iit the power of labor unions But when voters didnot want to take tat road any further, hey rewarded the Democrats for their programs that encouraged, atte, sbeiized and honored. Upwardly mobile behavior the G1 Bil of Rights, the FHA home morgage guarantes nd the childrens allowance created by the combination of generous dependent eduction anda stecply ‘graduated income tax i was nots immediately apparent thatthe United States inthe 1990s was in a postwar fetid. The Cold War ended abrupt, bt not with the ofl suddenness ofthe Armistice of ‘November 1918 or the unconditional surrender of May and September 1945. The Bein Wal «ame down in October 198, and Eastern Europe mas son eof the Soviet yoke; batt mas ot unt the failure of te Soviet coup in August 1991 andthe abolton ofthe Soviet Union in December 1991 that te treat tothe United States andthe fre word from Soviet militar power clearly had disipated, Inthe Gulf war, in contrast, the United States tcieved a clea ‘ctory in March 1991, but Saddam Hussein remained in power and the war ise though i | | } POSTWAR POLITICS xxiii ‘momentarily held the nation breathless, was not of the ength or magnitude to make Americans feel they had spent long months under siege. Evens, it was plain as these conflicts ended that ‘Americans were living in, and inevitably had special responsibilities in, a new world. Climbing ‘out more slowly, and les surely, we stil found that we had emerged from the trenches. We needed a rad map. And George Bush, a competent leader inthe Cold War and the Gulf war, proved exactly the wrong kind of leader forthe postwar period: with his disdain for what he ‘called “the vision thing," his distaste fr general principles and abstract concepts, his unwiling- ess to enunciate and’ pethape even envision a long-range strategy, he did not provide his constituents with the one thing they wanted—a road map, 1, THE 1991-92 CAMPAIGN CYCLE George Bush could have seized the national imagination in is speech to Congress after the Gull ‘War in March 1991. Instead, he asked fr passage of his transportation bill and a routine crime Dil, He could have used the occasion of the weakening economy in late 1991 to articulate @ sion of America growing with crestive private entrepreneurship and empowered personal choice, Instead, he announced that he would delay any economic program until the new year. His plans proved tepid, and lacked the framework the road map-voters craved. Meanwhile, ‘he was on the defensive politically, not so much from the Democrats as from Pat Buchanan, who abandoned his work asa columnist and television debater to run a feisty campaign in New Hampehire the state where Bush won his decisive victory over Bob Dole in February 1988 and his second highest percentage in November 1988. But New Hampshire had been intensely aflicted by the unexpected economie downturn, not so much an income recession (Tor by historic measures this was a shallow recession) but a wealth recession, which atacked not jst ‘one year's earings but seemed io threaten the ifelong accumulation of wealth, in the form of residential real estate and modest investments, the common American experience by the 190s “More than fourfths of Americans had accumulated more than $100,000 of wealth i their ‘fetes, mos ofthat in ther homes; but residential eal estate values fell nationally in 1990 and 1991, plummeting sharply in New England and expecially New Hampehire, which was hurt by the woes of local high-tech firms, Bush suddenly was forced to defend himself on the most unfriendly of terrain, and in February 1992 Bush won the primary by only $3%-37%. That turned out to be the highwater mark of Buchanan's candidacy, which signalled less the popularity of his ecentrie mix of policies (opposition to free trade, immigration, the Gulf war: the old Republicanism of Robert Taft, out of hibernation after 40 years) than Bush's tenuous hold on the poblic imagination. ‘AL this stage, the best thing going for Bush seemed tobe the weakness of the Democrats. Their five candidates were lite known or unknown nationally, none had signfcant foreign policy experience and each seemed o have disqualifying weaknesses. Tom Harkin, senator from Towa, ‘was a ery exponent of Democratic ald-ime religion, « denouncer of trickledown economies 4nd of George Herbert Waker Bush; but his impressive victory in his home sate caucuses was ‘iscounted as no one competed against him there. Bob Kerrey, senator from Nebraska, was ‘expected to dazzle voters with inspirational rhetoric and hie Congresional Medel of Honor from ‘Vietnam, but, despite his ability to discus in detail is proposal for national health insurance, he failed to convince voters who saw him up close. Two other candidates found constituencies in [New Hampshire and later primaries. Jerry Brown, elected governor of the natin’ largest state at 36 and defeated for election tothe Senate at 44, abandoned a California Senate race and ‘campaigned as the tribune of outsiders, accepting no contribution higher than $100, giving out his 800 number in television interviews and running agains lobbyists and politcal insiders of both partes His voters tended tobe young and unconnected to existing civic organization. As ‘od in different ways, was the candidacy of Pal Tsongas, lawyer from Lowell, Massachusets, twolteem congressman and onederm senator who retired in 1988 when he found out he had cancer, he underwent bone marrow replacement therapy and, he said, had no recurrence, Although after his candidacy was over it was reported that he had indeed had one. Tsongasxxiv. POSTWAR POLITICS brandished an 83-page booklet which stated his opinions on many issues, developed over his years in public ofce and as a Boston lawyer and board member of corporations like Lowell ‘based Wang. Tsongas focused on the federal budget deficit and called for higher taxes and cuts in spending, including Social Security his constituency was clustered heavily among the highly ‘educated and afluent, who made up afar larger percentage of Democratic primary voters in 1992 than as recently as 1984 and gave ima the New Hampshire primary victor. Bat the clear leader in the Democratic fed, atleast after a December 1991 speech tothe Democratic state chairmen, was Bill Clinlon, governor of Arkansas, The themes Clinton ‘embraced as head of the moderate Democratic Leadership Council including welfare reform, rational service anda “New Covenant,” were attractive, and his abilities and interpersonal skills Clearly superior to thos of his opponents. This, plus the support of hie wife Hilary Clinton (as he then referred ther) on 60 Minutes, enabled Clinion to survive the charges by Gennifer Flowers in January 199201 a 12-year affair with ber. He was lso dogged by storie that he had avoided the military draft, including the release of letter he wrote tothe director of the University of ‘Ackansas ROTC thanking him for "saving me from the drat” and preserving hit “polities ‘Viability he promised wo enrol nthe ROTC, though he was not astudent thereat the time—an extraordinary circumstance —at atime when he might have been drafted and didnot abandon ‘the possibilty of joining the ROTC until receiving & high lotery number. As became apparent late, Clinton ied many times about his draft status and concealed the fact that e had received 1 draft notice. But his genuine strengths as a candidate, his attractive platform, his ability to rally in a isis andthe weakness of his opponents enabled him to finish a slid second in New Hampshire and to win primaries fst in Georgia on March 3 and the Super Tuesday South “March 10, and then to essentially clinch the Democratic nomination by winning Ilinois and Michigan March 17, But even as Clinton was going through the motions ofthe Democratic primary the spotlight was stolen by Texas billionaire Ross Prot, who on Larry King Live in Februar said he would ‘un for president if enough people wanted him to. Pers rsp certainty and gift for sound bites (CT won't sound bite this") made bim popular, hs sharp attacks on budget deficits and calls for shared sacrifice struck chord; hi military Background and success in business on ane hand and his support of abortion rights and even gays in the military onthe other made him 8 bridge between ‘culturally hostile groups in a culturally divided country. ero’s campaign “depantssnized the eritique of Bush” as Democratic strategist Paul Tully put it, pushing Bush lower and lower inthe polls ia the sping asa then wounded and dstrsted Bil Clinton could not Ihave done. By June 1992, Perot was running even or ahead ina three-way race in national pols Clinton was running poor third and Bush a incumbent president was losing the votes of two of ‘three Americans. The young vote, solidly Republican fora decade, shifted to Perot, and then, «specially aftr his appearance on MTV in June and his selection of Al Gore as vce presidential ‘candidate in July, Clinton, ‘Then, on the Thursday of the Democratic convention, Perot withdrew from the race and saluted “revitalization” of the Democratic Paty, and Clintons share af the vote, recently 25%, shot upto 57%. Not great deal of difference was made by the est ofthe eampaign. The Bush forces succeeded in the Republican National Convention to recsablish the party's hold on the cultural right, perhaps 20% ofthe electorate; but the media was outraged by the convention, and sowere perhaps 20% onthe cultural left Although Ross Perot rentered the race October 1, he ‘won lest suppor than he had before July 16; yet he was competitive in pols in many states and ‘ended up finishing second in two (Maine and Utah). Support for Bill Clinton eeilted during the fall debates, After the October 13 debate, in which Dan Quayle beat Al Gore by hammering home his contentions that Clinton would rat taxes and that he bad “trouble tling the truth,” the Bush-Quayle ticket cut the Cinto-Gore margin in pols toils narrowest unt the Binal week. Inthe October 15 Oprah Winfrey/Phil Donahue syle debate, George Bush seemed bewildered ‘while Bill Clinton shone, andthe Clinton Gore margin widened agai. Tn the final week, Ross Perot made bizarre charges, aired on 60 Minutes, saying that he bad withdrawn from the race POSTWAR POLITICS XXV ‘because George Bush was threatening to sabotage his daughter's wedding: this, lke his other bizare ores f being shadowed in the srets of Tehran or having commandos attack his house {in Dallas, invariably showed him as subjected to the rigors of combat which he, unlike Bush and ‘many other politicians, has never experienced. Perot ost litle support, but most of his voters Femained frozen in their commitments. Bush appeared tobe closing the Exp tbe lst weekend, but his momentum was slowed by muich-ballyhooed but in fact already-tld stories about Iran ‘contra more likly erica! quantum ofvters decided that if Bush really hada chance to win, ‘hey should vote for Clinton. IL. THE ELECTORAL VERDICT The dynamic ofthe election from July on was notin doubt. George Bush was in trouble not 30 ‘much because ofthe poor performance of the economy —by historic standards the recesion of, 1990-91 was not deep and by 1992 it statistically was over— but because of an awareness that he ras disengaged from domestic isues. Bush simply would not give voters the domestic policy road map they wanted, The clearest map eame from Perot, but he disqualified himself fr most ‘votesby his fakiness. Clinton provided a road map of sors, with lines going off inal directions; ‘but at least he was inieresed and empathetic. The result was a Democratic victory, with Clinton, a diferent kind of Democrat,” winning 43% ofthe vote, 19.37% for Bush and 19% fr Perot ‘Yet fr al the wid oscillations inthis year of postwar polities, opinion on sues stayed largely the same. Pals showed continued doubts about the eficacy of government as a mechanism (0 salve domestic problems. There was a call 0 reform the domesti publi sector, just as other Sectors had been reformed—the military, heavy industry, the private sector. Those reforms had ‘ot boen painless: as big units which did not serve consumers, customers or citizens well ere broken up, many individuals were hur, and if small units, capable of supple and rapid adaptation, replaced them, not everyone did well. But the end result was a military capable of the small unit flexibility and high-ech competence seen in the Gulf War, steel and auto industries capable finally of competing with foreign producers, and burgeoning high-tech and Service businesses which, without government planning or much assistance, contine lead the ‘word, On cultural issues, polls showed an American people wiling to tolerate behaviors that a {generation ego were considered ilgitimate; “choi had become a euphemism for abortion Fights, but also forthe feeling that people shouldbe left to their own decisions on moral ses, ‘Yer pl also showed a sense that we were neglecting our children, economically by spending less pubic and private money on them than we ought to, culturally by failing to give them ‘enough time and attention and by neglecting to set mora standards and boundaries. In the ‘campaign, both parties attempted to address these feclings. George Bush, in his speeches tothe Detroit Economic Club in September and Denver Ace Hardware owners in Octobe, showed the ‘outlines ofa coherent policy, «road map; but voters obviously were skeptical that he would follow it after November 3, and indeed within six weeks his attentions were directed to Somalia, Bill Clinton in his New Covenant speeches in fall 1991 hs convention acceptance speech in July and on the stump, sketched out a new Democratic paradigm with room for reform initiatives and a middle cass tax cut. ‘twas widely assered by journalists and Democrats that Americans had undergone fundamental shift in attitude on economic isues and the place of government, that the esesion ofthe early 1990s caused them to reject the policies ofthe 1980s and to embrace governmental Solutions. This was wishful thinking; polls showed no wich thing. Pll dd show, as they din the late 1980, that votes were prepared o consider mixed government and market proposals {er reform, But fundamental atudes about the place of government are set by sustained and ‘emotionally moving experiences. Most Americans concluded from the Depression of the 1930s ‘that economic markets were not reliable, and from the New Deal and, even more the vetoy in ‘World War Il and postwar prosperity, that goverament worked prety wel: ence the political ‘movement away from markets and toward government that prevailed from about 1935 to aboutXXVi POSTWAR POLITICS 1965. Most Americans conchided from the stagfation and rising taxes of the 1970s that ‘government did't work very well and from the vibrant economic growth and creativity of the 1980s—seven years of lowinflation economic growth and 18 millon new jobs—that markets worked pretty well Or put moce briefly the breadlines ofthe 1930s convinced Americans that ‘markets dida't work, and the as lines ofthe 1970s convinced Americans that goverament din’ work The recession af the early 1990s, thought painful to many, was simply nt enough tosift ‘many Americans’ underlying attitudes. It may have dented faith in markets, ba it didnot come lose to inspiring faith in government. Only on foreign policy was a new consensus emerging, primarily because of the sudéen eatnetion of the doves. For a quarter century, from the time a Democratic administration embroiled the nation in a Vietnam war it could not win, until the debate over the Gulf War resolution in January 1991, doves had been among the hardest and most vocal species in the ‘American political 200. Their central bei was that the extension of American military power broad was dangerous and evi—-dangerous tous and evil o others. The foreign policy doves, ‘advancing Vietnam a paradigm forall foreign policy experience, sought 10 hold down ‘American military expenditures and wo prevent American defense technology advances (Fearing ‘destabilization of our relations with the Soviet Union). They not only opposed but vliled every ‘American foreign military intervention, s0 that the rele! of Grenada from « bungling Aictatorship was portrayed in terms more aplly describing Hitler's takeover of Czechoslovakia. ‘The doves spoke most eloquently inthe thiceday congressional debate over the Gull War resolution, predicting a military wae that would be disastrous tous and consequences that would bbe evil wo others. The spoke sincerely, yet their words described not so much the Persian Gulf situation as the diemma the United States faced in the Gulf of Tonkin when President Johnson ‘ssked for a similar resolution in August 1964, ab if this were the chance to vote against the ‘solution they wished more than two members ofthe Senate had voted agaist 26 years before ‘Seldom have so many sincere politician been so wrong. The ist few days ofthe Gul War made itapparent that this cnfict was neither unduly dangerous tous nor evil to oters, and the doves sisappeared overnight. The end ofthe Cold War, many analysts told us, meant the obsolescence ‘of foreign policy hawks, because there was no Soviet Union to defend against any more. Its ‘more apt to say that the bepinning ofthe Gulf Wer meant the obsolescence of foreign policy doves, because it became apparent that there were circumstances in which the extension of ‘American military power was safe and good. In the yeas sine, former doves have hailed the ispatch of American military forces to Somalia and have called for the involvement of ‘American military forces in Bosnia, disregarding what thore on both sides ofthe Gulf War understood was the tragic potential inherent in ay military ation and what the denouement of "he Gulf War reminded us was the unhappy incompleteness of any military veto. ‘The 1992 election results showed a country split ino fragments But despite the Clinton headquarters sign tha sad, “I's the economy, stupid," this was not an electorate split primarily along economic lines. Rather, as is usually the cae in American polities soters were split along cultural ines—by region, race and ethnic group, age, gender and femily status, education and religion. The Voter Research Survey (VRS) ex oll figures enable ue fo chart thede divisions, ‘Age. The baby boomer ticket of Bil Clinton and Al Gore won its largest margins among people old enough tobe their parents, those 60 and over (SO%-38%). They also turned around {he young vote, more favorable than average to George Bush up through May 1992, but in ‘November for Clinton (43534%) with a big vote for Perot (22%) Baby boomers thone 30 to ‘4, voted narrowly for Clinton (41%-38%) Race and ethic group Blacks voted overwhelmingly for Clinton (835-10%). Hispanics were ‘much less uniform (1‘%- 25), about midway between blacks and whites (40%-39% for Bush). ‘Asians were for Bush (SS%-314), and one of the few groups that seemed to get more Republican between 1988 and 1992; 40% of Asian-American ive in California, and perhaps ‘hey were reacting tothe Los Angels rots and the lack of concern, especially by liberal forthe Korean and other Asian shopkeepers who had, i Bill Clinton's phrase, worked hard and played POSTWAR POLITICS Xxxvi by the rules. rsh and Htalian Americans, in states ike New York where ethnic consciousness ‘remains high, voted less Democratic than average: the Democratic coalition there was blacks, gle women and gays-—not the ethnic Catholics, Irish and Halians who delivered the state to John Kennedy in 1960, ‘Gender. The gender gap aller a dozen years Seems a permanent part of our polis, with women more strongly for Clinton (45%-37%) than men (41%38%). But marred women and ‘specially married women who had ever had children, voted very much lke men, while single fand divorced women formed almost leftoving proletariat. Careless writers and feminist boosters ten wrote “women” during the 1991-92 eyele when they meant something more Ike “those women sympathetic to a broad range of ideas associated with feminism.” The later overwhelmingly believed Anita Hill oer Clarence Thomas and supported the much-ballyhooed “year of the woman’ Democratic Senate candidates (a similar number of Republican women ‘Senate candidates in 1990 inspired no such ballyboo), But most American women were only a bit more likly than average to support women Senate candidates ‘Edueation. Some of the most striking diferences are along education lines, and not in Iistorically predictable ways. Clinton had his biggest percentage margin among those who never ‘graduated from high schoo! (54%-28%), but they amounted to only 6% of the electorate. In ‘absolute numberof votes, he actually go larger margin from those witha graduate school ‘education (50% 368), who make up 16% of the electorate. These leachers social workers, lawyers, nore and even doctors tend to be young, culturally liberal, and public sector cemployeet—all characteristics that correlate highly with voting Democratic. In contrast, college ‘graduates were, though narrowly, for Bush (41% 39%), and both high school graduates and ‘those with Some cllege voted at aboot the national average Religion, Here isthe great divide. In 1960, 78% of Catholics voted for Catholic John Kennedy, 635% of white Protestant for white Protestant Richard Niton, in a campaign year with tundercurents of religious hostility, In 1992, also a campaign year with undercurrents of religious hostliy, white born again Christians voted very heavily for George Bush (62%-23%) while Jews were even more heavily for Bill Clinton (80%-11%), with noo-believers not far behind (62% 185), White Protestants wee for Bush (37%-334), while Catholics were only ‘narrowly for Clinton ($4%-35%), with white Cathlis nearly 40 points lower for Clinton than. for his hero John Kennedy), But differences today are not just between denominations but aso between intensity of religious fooling. The highly observant and traditionally devout voted heavily for Bush Lese observant Catholics and Protests and those whose religious belies {oleate society’sibeal ways were moe likely to vot for Clinton. Pert, incidentally, dd poorly With thase of any strong beies—born-again Protestants or Jews, traditional Catholics of Lntelivers. Instead, he di beter with those without deep rots: the young, those living beyond ‘metro area beltways or in new Western or northern New England communities, the middle ‘income and middling edvcated. "Region. When the country i divided into nine regions, with boundaries determined 10 reflect similar respontes othe Perot candidacy, the bigest margins for Bill Clinton come in the regions ‘containing the nation's two largest metropolitan areas, the Mid-Atlantic (4% 36%) and Paci (458-33); wel as the smallest region, New England (44% 32%), In electoral votes, the big ‘atin here for Democrats from the las three decades was in the Pacific states, where Clinton ‘eaily caved all 76 electoral votes; yet the bass for this was established in Michael Dukakis rearsin in the Pace in 1988, These three regions showed similar collapse in Bush's ‘tandings—partly due tothe spectacular collapse of residential ral estate values in all three freak Clinton carried three regions with about his national average the Great Lakes (43% 537%), the Great Plans (40%-36%) and, bolstered by wins in his bome state and Al Gore's, iarely carried the Mississippi Valley South (438-43). George Bush, however, carried the South overall (43% 41% in poplar vote 116 to 82 in electoral votes), ad earied thre of cur fegions here as wel: the Southwest (41%-37%), the Mountains (38%-35%) and the South ‘Atlantic (438-41). Rous Pero’ best regions wer the Mountains (25%), Great Pais (23%),