HEIRS OF POE v MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC.

APPEAL FROM RTC TO CA | G.R. No. 156302 | Chico-Nazario, J.

DOCTRINE: According to R41.3, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. The Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal
in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be
counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or
any final order or resolution

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Nature Petition for Review under R45

Parties The Heirs of George Y. Poe, petitioners

Malayan Insurance Company, Inc., respondents
 Jan. 26, 1996: George Y. Poe, while waiting for a ride to work, was run over by a ten-wheeler truck owned by
Rhoda Santos, and then being driven by Willie Labrador
 Said truck was insured with Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (MICI)
RTC  The Heirs of Poe filed with the RTC a Complaint for Damages against Rhoda and MICI
Antipolo,  Alleged that under the insurance policy over the ten-wheeler truck, MICI bound itself to be liable
Br. 73 for damages, as well as bodily injury to third persons, which may be caused by the operation of the
vehicle
 Prayed that judgment issue in their favor, ordering MICI and Rhoda jointly and solidarily to pay
them actual damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of the suit
 In their Joint Answer, Rhoda and MICI:
 Admitted that the cargo truck is insured with MICI
 Denied liability for Poe’s death
 Averred the ff. defenses:
a) The accident was caused by the negligent act of the victim George, who surreptitiously and
unexpectedly crossed the road, catching the driver Willie by surprise, and despite the latter's
effort to swerve the truck to the right, the said vehicle still came into contact with the victim;
b) The liability of respondent MICI, if any, would attach only upon a judicial pronouncement that
the insured Rhoda and her driver Willie are liable;
c) The liability of MICI should be based on the extent of the insurance coverage as embodied in
Rhoda's policy; and
d) Rhoda had always exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of her driver Willie.
 During trial, the Heirs of Poe introduced and offered evidence in support of their claims against MICI,
and then rested their case
 Thereafter, the hearings for the reception of the evidence of Rhoda and MICI were scheduled, but they
failed to adduce their evidence despite several postponements granted by the trial court
 June 9, 1995: Upon motion of petitioners’ counsel, RTC issued an Order declaring that Rhoda and
MICI waived their right to present evidence
 Ordered the parties to submit their respective Memorandum within 15 days, after which, the case
would be submitted for decision
 Rhoda and MICI filed a MR of the June 9 Order of the RTC
 Aug. 11, 1995: RTC denied the MR

CA  Rhoda and MICI filed a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, Prohibition and Injunction with Prayer for
TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the CA
 Assailed the June 9 and Aug. 11 Orders of the RTC, which foreclosed their right to adduce
evidence in support of their defense
 April 29, 1996: CA denied due course to Rhoda and MICI’s Petition

SC  Rhoda and MICI elevated the matter to the SC via a Petition for Certiorari
 Sept. 30, 1996: SC dismissed their Petition
 Nov. 8, 1996: Entry of Judgment was made

RTC of  Feb. 28, 2000: RTC rendered a Decision, ordering MICI and Rhoda to pay jointly and solidarily to
Antipolo, petitioners moral damages, actual damages, funeral expenses, exemplary damages, and attorney’s
Br. 73 fees
  March 14, 2000: Rhoda and MICI received their copy of the RTC Decision
 March 22, 2000: Rhoda and MICI filed a MR of said Decision
 Averred that the RTC erred in (1) ruling that the obligation of Rhoda and MICI to petitioners was
solidary, (2) computing Poe’s loss of earning capacity not in accord with established jurisprudence,
and (3) awarding moral damages not buttressed by evidence
 Jan. 24, 2001: RTC issued an Order modifying and amending its Feb. 28 Decision and dismissing the
case against MICI
 Held that the contention of MICI, as far as the solidary liability of the insurance company with the
other defendant, Rhoda, is meritorious.
 Decision can be modified or amended to correct the same honest inadvertence without necessarily
reversing it and set aside to conform with the evidence on hand.
 Jan. 24, 2001: Heirs of Poe filed a MR
 June 15, 2001: RTC issued an Order reinstating its Feb. 28 Decision
 Found that the arguments raised by the Heir of Poe in their MR of the Order of this Court dated
January 24, 2001 to be more meritorious than MICI’s arguments
 June 27, 2001: MICI received a copy of the June 15 RTC Order
 July 9, 2001: MICI filed a Notice of appeal of the Feb. 28, 2000 Decision, which was reinstated by the
June 15, 2001 Resolution
 Rhoda did not join respondent MICI in its Notice of Appeal
 The Heirs of Poe filed their Opposition to the Notice of Appeal of MICI with a Motion for the
Issuance of Writ of Execution
 They contend that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time while
 Sept. 6, 2001: RTC denied the Notice of Appeal of MICI and granted petitioners’ Motion for the
Issuance of Writ of Execution
 The records disclosed that on February 28, 2000 this Court rendered a Decision in favor of the
[herein petitioners] and against [Rhoda and herein respondent MICI].
 The Decision was said to have been received by MICI on March 14, 2000.
 Eight days after or on March 22, 2000, MICI mailed its Motion for Reconsideration to this Court
and granted the same in the Order dated January 24, 2001. From this Order, [petitioners] filed a
Motion for Reconsideration on February 21, 2001 to which MICI led a vigorous opposition.
 On June 15, 2001 this Court granted [petitioners'] motion reinstating the Decision dated February
28, 2000. According to MICI, the June 15, 2001 order was received by it on June 27, 2001.
 MICI filed a Notice of Appeal on July 9, 2001 or twelve (12) days from receipt of said Order
 However, the RTC holds that the fifteen (15) day period within which to file a notice of appeal
should be reckoned from the date it received the Decision on March 14, 2000.
 So that when MICI mailed its Motion for Reconsideration on March 22, 2000, eight (8) days
had already lapsed, MICI has remaining seven (7) days to le a notice of appeal.
 However, when it received the last Order of this Court it took [respondent] MICI twelve (12)
days to file the same. Needless to say, MICI's Notice of Appeal was filed out of time.

CA  MICI filed a Petition for Certiorari under R65 before the CA

 June 26, 2000: CA reversed the RTC and granted MICI’s petition
 Held that the 15 day period to appeal must be reckoned from the time Malayan received the order
dated 15 June 2001 reversing in toto the order of 24 January 2000 and reinstating in full the
Decision dated 28 February 2000
 Thus, Malayan had until 12 July 2001 within which to le its notice of appeal.
 Therefore, when Malayan filed its notice of appeal on 09 July 2001, it was well within the
reglementary period and should have been given due course by the public respondent court
 Nov. 29, 2002: CA denied petitioners' MR

SC  Petitioners come before this Court in this Petition for Review

ISSUES with HOLDING:
1) W/N the Notice of Appeal filed by MICI before the RTC was filed out of time – NO
 GENERAL RULE: According to R41.3, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or
final order appealed from.
o A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do
with respect to it.
 It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares
categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; OR
 It may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action
o Neypes v CA: To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
 Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal
Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial
Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals
and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.
o The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion
for reconsideration.
 In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to
review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment.
 With the advent of the fresh period rule, parties who availed themselves of the remedy of motion
for reconsideration are now allowed to file a notice of appeal within fifteen days from the denial of
that motion.
o The Court has accentuated that the fresh period rule is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3
 R41.3 states that the appeal shall be taken "within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order
appealed from."
 The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from
another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies.
 Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed
within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final order in the
case.
 APPLICATION: Applying the fresh period rule, the Court agrees with the CA and holds that respondent MICI
seasonably filed its Notice of Appeal with the RTC on 9 July 2001, just 12 days from 27 June 2001, when it
received the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration of the 15 June 2001 Resolution reinstating the 28 February
2000 Decision of the RTC.
o The fresh period rule may be applied to the case of respondent MICI, although the events which
transpired concerning its Notice of Appeal took place in June and July 2001, inasmuch as rules of
procedure may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage.
 The Court notes that Neypes was promulgated on 14 September 2005, while the instant Petition
was still pending before this Court.
 Republic v CA: Rules of procedure "may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may
feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure."
 CONCLUSION: Since the SC affirms the ruling of the CA that respondent MICI filed its Notice of Appeal with the
RTC within the reglementary period, the appropriate action, under ordinary circumstances, would be for the Court
to remand the case to the RTC so that the RTC could approve the Notice of Appeal of respondent MICI and
respondent MICI could already file its appeal with the Court of Appeals.
o However, considering that the case at bar has been pending for almost sixteen years, 48 and the records
of the same are already before this Court, remand is no longer necessary
o Petitioners have already suffered from the tragic loss of a loved one, and must not be made to endure
more pain and uncertainty brought about by the continued pendency of their claims against those liable.
 The case has been dragging on for almost 16 years now without the petitioners having been fully
compensated for their loss.
 The Court cannot countenance such a glaring indifference to petitioners' cry for justice.
2) W/N MICI is jointly and solidarily liable with Rhoda for the death of Poe – YES, the Heirs may recover the
awarded damages in full from either of them

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. While the Court AFFIRMS the
Decision, dated 26 June 2002, and Resolution, dated 29 November 2002, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
67297, granting the Petition for Certiorari of respondent Malayan Insurance Company, Inc., the Court, nonetheless,
RESOLVES, in consideration of the speedy administration of justice, and the peculiar circumstances of the case, to
give DUE COURSE to the present Petition and decide the same on its merits.
Rhoda Santos and respondent Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the
petitioners Heirs of George Y. Poe the following:
(1) Funeral expenses P36,000.00;
 (2) Actual damages for loss of earning capacity P611,386.92;
 (3) Moral
damages amounting to P100,000.00;
 (4) Death indemnity P50,000.00; and
 (5) Attorney's fees P50,000.00 plus
P1,500.00 per court appearance.