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without deforming themselves. Thus they lose the confidence and the
authority lent by science. The very distinction between sciences and
humanities is a rear-guard action of the humanists attempting to pro-
tect themselves from the destructive onslaughts of science by setting
a limit to scientific reasoning. This Maginot Line succeeds only in
cutting the humanities off from their only source of salvation-a
support in nature.
The study of the sciences, formerly the surest road to the rational
discussion of the most comprehensive principles, hardly leads in that
direction any longer, and a doctor in physics as such hardly qualifies
as a wise man. The humanities still try to make such claims, but they
are hardly justifiable without a rational foundation in nature; any
humanistic interpretation of man is always threatened by a counter-
explanation emanating from a psychology which has its roots in mod-
em theoretical science; the human has no separate status. There is a
cleft in our understanding of the world, and this is necessarily expressed
in the university and its members. The two worlds go on indepen-
dently. The situation is not remedied by the suggestions that scientists
should read poetry and humanists learn the second law of thermo-
dynamics. The two sides do not appear to need each other for the
pursuit of their disciplines as they are currently conceived; a man will
not be any less a scientist for want of a humanistic training, nor will
a humanist be any less a humanist for want of scientific training. This
is particularly true of the sciences, which in their splendid isolation
continue progressing according to their own standards. The two kinds
of learning and men live together in the university, but they have no
vital connection, and their relationship is a rather tense administrative
one.
The split in the world of learning is the most decisive intellectual
phenomenon of our time, and there is no easy healing of the breach.
It is the real source of the crisis of liberal education, and the serious
study of that crisis would be a liberal education in itself. Here, I can
only discuss its effect on the university as it is faced by the under-
graduate. In general his professors do not feel that the university's lack
of unity is a problem because they have made their life decisions and
are convinced of the importance of their fields. They wish to get ahead
with them, and the nature of their studies-particularly in the sci-
ences, but also in some aspects of the humanities that slavishly and
unnecessarily imitate the natural sciences-leads them to smaller and
smaller topics of research, ever further from the orientation and ques-
tions of the students. The student is really asked to perform an act of
faith in his choice of field and learn its tools in the promise of future
fulfillments which he knows from the outset can only be partial. And
THE CRISIS OF LIBERAL EDUCATION 355
a large proportion of his teachers are primarily researchers for whom
teaching is secondary and whose researches, built on the researches
of still others, are such that they have never, or not for a long time,
raised the first questions.
But still, against the tide, some educators and citizens insist that
there is an education of a human being as a human being and that a
person cannot be minted into a small coin and still remain human.
They are aware that the only living knowledge is that united in the
head of a single individual, and thirty individuals, each with a part
of the knowledge of Newton or Rousseau, do not equal a Newton or
a Rousseau. Such educators have been given encouragement by the
student unrests; attention has again been turned to the problems of
the undergraduate which seemed to have been forgotten in the period
of the apparently triumphant professionalism.
Money and the time of university administrators are now being
devoted to the improvement of the undergraduate education. This is
in itself promising, for, willy-nilly, the attention paid to the problem
of the undergraduate requires some consideration of the total formation
of a human being and a standpoint beyond the specialties. Of course,
much of the proposed reform evades the issue and merely gives way
to unreasonable and inappropriate student demands, such as removal
of all university control over student conduct, or admission of students
into the decision of questions which are properly the responsibility of
the faculty. In some cases one suspects that there is a tacit complicity
of faculty and administration in irresponsible political and moral be-
havior of the students just so long as it does not affect the campus life
too seriously; this provides the supplement to the students' lives which
is necessary due to the spiritual impoverishment of their education.
This aspect of a young person's training is thus no longer a duty of
the university. There are, also, the usual efforts to provide for more
classrooms, smaller classes, and more faculty-student contact, all of
which are desirable but also peripheral.
But when it comes to actual discussion of what a liberal curriculum
should be, there is an extraordinary poverty of ideas. It seems that
the substance of general studies has been exhausted, parceled out
among the specialties. There is a great deal of talk about the vanished
universal man, and it is argued that we must at least try to simulate
his comprehensiveness, but what such a man was is widely misun-
derstood. It is assumed he was a polymath, a man who had the curiosity
to learn each of the fields at a time when none was so vast that it
required the entire life of an exceptionally able man. Now the fields
have become much more complex and filled with detail so we are faced
with the choice between a careful knowledge of one or a superfi-
356 GIANTS AND DWARFS
cial acquaintance with many. If this were the case, what must be done
would be clear, and liberal education would be a thing of the past.
But the so,called universal man was not an idle browser in the
plurality of sciences. Men like Aristotle, Descartes, and Leibniz began
and ended with unique interests in certain fundamental questions that
do not belong to any single domain and are presupposed by each,
questions like what is knowledge, what is good, etc. They did not have
to be practitioners of all the arts any more than an architect has to
be a carpenter and a bricklayer in order to build a house. The architect
must know what each of the subordinate arts can accomplish and how
they fit into the whole plan, but the special arts are rather more
dependent on the architect's knowledge of the whole plan than the
architect is dependent on their skills. The architect, without being a
specialist, contributes vitally to the specialties.
Similarly, the interesting cases of the universal man were occu,
pied with the special sciences insofar as they shed light on the universal
problems, and their contributions to those special sciences were a
consequence of their larger view. This possibility exists today as much
as it ever did, and its actualization is even more necessary inasmuch
as many new fields of endeavor are developing aimlessly. That ac,
tualization is admittedly more difficult today, but it can be attained
by a careful study of one or two fields with respect to the general
questions and a constant canvass of the others, ruthlessly cutting away
the irrelevant, with a view to the effect their conclusions have on our
understanding of the whole and the legitimacy of those conclusions
in the light of the whole.
What I argue is that the questions which relate to the first prin'
ciples of all things and the nature of the good life are as real as they
ever were and that they constitute a study which is not contained in
the special disciplines although those disciplines presuppose such re,
flection. The universal man is adept at this architectonic science, and
his contributions to the various fields are a result of his larger knowl,
edge. He is the only one who is open to the whole by the very nature
of his studies, and he is a model of the proper intellectual concerns
of a man who wishes to be complete. However difficult our particular
problems may have made his quest, the issues remain, and we become
self,conscious only by getting a glimpse of them.
This is what our rebellious students sense when they try to get a
grasp of the whole by the easy route of mere feeling. And this is what
is lost when professionalism dominates; each profession prefers to get
ahead with the business at hand and avoid the sticky questions at the
beginning. They like to give the appearance of self,sufficiency and to
treat the philosophic interest as dilettantism. The world is divided up
THE CRISIS OF LIBERAL EDUCATION 357
among the disciplines, and there is nothing left. What is forgotten is
that the division is itself a question, and that each discipline must
have something more than the right of the first occupier to justify the
possession of its terrain. If we have lost touch with the way in which
one approaches such a question, there are models of it in the literature
of the tradition, and our first step would be to study that literature to
see whether the earlier attempts were adequate and, if not, to deter,
mine why not. If this is not done, one remains a prisoner of the
tradition which established our division of the disciplines represented
in the university. There is indeed a subject matter for liberal education;
it is only obscured by our particular situation.
It is usually agreed today that time should be left in the curriculum
for general studies, but when it comes to filling that time not much
is said. The disappearance of the general under the cloud of the
particular has left the impression that beyond the specialties there is
a vacuum. There are suggestions for the inclusion of exotic specialties
which are nevertheless still specialties. The most characteristic solu,
tion is to give up and, under the guise of freedom, let the students
do anything they please, construct any kind of program they like. In
the last two or three years the most prominent reforms in the Ivy
League institutions have all had to do with providing more freedom.
Distribution requirements are being relaxed or abandoned altogether;
one school lets some of its best students spend their last year doing
whatever interests them, another suggests they go away for a year,
and still another is going to permit good students to graduate as quickly
as they want.
All of these plans are declarations of bankruptcy on the part of
the universities, a renunciation of their function of teaching the stu,
dents, and an avoidance of the difficulties involved in making the
decisions as to what a student ought to know. Of course, none of the
specialties have any such problems, and so that fixed pole remains and
dominates the student's course of studies. The argument that this
freedom makes the student more autonomous remains to be proven,
and there are other ways to make him responsible.
No one can be against freedom, but one wonders whether this
truly provides it. Students can take whatever they want, but if there
exist only the alternatives which naturally proliferate in our day, then
they are cut off from the rarer alternatives. How can the student be
expected to know of important fields of study which he hardly sees
represented around him? Only if the university encourages and makes
respectable what is important and neglected can it be preserved and
the students made to pay attention to it. The university is responsible
for the atmosphere which forms the student, and to make no decision
358 GIANTS AND DWARFS
lIn Higher Education and Modern Democracy, ed. Robert A. Goldwin (Chicago: Rand
McNally, 1967), pp. 121-39.
THE CRISIS OF LIBERAL EDUCATION 359
Far more important are such questions as whether the presup~
positions and conclusions of psychology are compatible with those of
physics or the law and what to do about it if they are not. And surely
the question of what a state is, what an individual's duties to it are,
and what constitutes a good one have primacy over the way social
scientists are studying developing states. And such questions cannot
be handled quickly, but require time, concern, and continuing study.
They are the questions answers to which are always presupposed but
rarely thought out.
It would be easy to demonstrate that the questions are the same
today as they were for Socrates. It is these questions which are per~
manent and the consideration of which forms a serious man. It is the
role of the university to keep these questions before its students. Its
curriculum should not be grounded on implied answers to them which
exclude other possible alternatives. It may be true that "method" or
"conceptual innovation" is at the core of the learned disciplines, or
that "values infuse all inquiry," but a curriculum should not assume
the truth of these assertions, as does Mr. Bell's. They are products of
a particular view, which should be considered along with other views.
For in these various perspectives, the fields of knowledge look very
different. Plato may reflect and express the "values" of ancient Greece;
but it is also possible that he saw permanent truths and that our interest
in "method" and our notion of "value judgments" are only a reflection
of certain transient needs of our time.
There is no reason why one should work within Mr. Bell's frame~
work any more than that of someone else. That framework gives an
appearance of openness but is actually grounded on very narrow and
dogmatic premises. The only real openness is to see the world as it
was seen in the most thoughtful perspectives, attempting to understand
them as they were understood by their authors, not fitting them into
a preexisting framework, not forcing them to respond to our perhaps
misguided concerns. The proper curriculum must begin behind such
assumptions as Mr. Bell's. There is nothing spectacular or new in what
must be done. The old questions must be learned and their relevance
to our particular situation seen. This can be accomplished most ad~
equately by making the center of the curriculum consist in the best
things that have been said about them and in the studies that prepare
the character, imagination, and intellect of the student to receive
those teachings.
For this reason those universities which used some version of
what are called the great books-institutions like the Experimental
College at Wisconsin, St. John's College, and the College of the
360 GIANTS AND DWARFS
OF THE UNIVERSITY
II
6(:onstance Garnett trans" The Possessed (New York: Modem Library, 1936), p,
427,
382 GIANTS AND DWARFS
outside, bravely facing all risks. It is the strong-willed versus the weak-
willed instead of the good versus the bad. We praise men now, not
for the rightness of their cause, but because they care; the primary
thing is not truth but concern. This, of course, puts a premium on
fanaticism, not to speak of fakery.
At all events, man as the value-needing and value-producing
animal leads directly to the view that the good society is one which
allows selves to commit themselves to authentic values and to grow
in terms of them. This is exactly the prescription of the New Left. It
is, of course, in the absence of elaboration, empty. One has no idea
what such a society would be like; it is utterly unprogrammatic. But
it is just such a vision which allows for the most complete rejection
and destruction of the present regime and the greatest self-indulgence
without guilt; and to be committed to this vision gratifies moralistic
vanity at the same time. It is the best of many possible worlds.
Nietzsche, who was the first to present a profound teaching of
the self, understood it to be an aristocratic teaching, for true selves
are rare. The kind of man who can create a horizon for a whole people
and make his values theirs and thus ennoble their lives is extremely
rare. This is a natural distinction among men, and democratic society,
according to him, effaces this distinction. But, as is easy to see, this
teaching, or a corruption of it, easily becomes grist for the mill of
radical egalitarianism. Objective standards encourage distinctions of
rank among men; each self is a standard unto itself, and there is no
rational basis for comparison of one self with another. The self justifies
the most extreme freedom, for there is nothing in nature to which
the self is subservient; the self is the creator, the biblical God possessed
uniquely by everyone.
In politics, teachings tend to be transformed by what is most
powerful in the regime and in tum transform the regime in the di-
rection of its most dangerous tendencies. The corruption of a teaching
which was intended to be noble is peculiarly revolting. Not content
with understanding democratic citizens as self-regarding but decent
men who try to live by laws they themselves set down for the good
of the community, we have had to make them into gods to whom
nothing can be compared. Every man must be understood to be cre-
ative, no matter how much the standards of art and taste have to be
debauched in order to do so. Political restraint and moderation must
give way to ugly fanaticism in order to give everyone the chance to
be committed. The grossest indecencies are permitted in the name of
sincerity. And the wisdom of the ages must be forgotten in order to
avoid alienating a growing self.
All of this tends to intensify the conformism-the increasingly
THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE UNIVERSITY 387
monolithic quality of life-which it is supposed to overcome; for in
the absence of real goals to strive for, human beings are most likely
to fall back into their animal sameness, into the common instincts in
the satisfaction of which all men and women are alike. Real diversity
is never the result of the concentration on diversity. And at the same
time as we are likely to produce greater conformity, we do not stop
to consider whether the laissez aller we encourage is consonant with
civility or political justice. No one asks whether we have any right to
be so hopeful that every healthy self will posit nice civil values for
itself which are consonant with everyone else's self-realization. Is there
any built~in assurance that the unrestrained growth of each individual
will not encroach on the vital space of other individuals? Yet this is
all that seems to be talked about; the situation is parallel to that in
which Rousseau's rhetoric of compassion was used by every dry, self~
serving French bureaucrat in the nineteenth century. One thing at
least is certain: in all of this there is no concern for justifying or
preserving those restraints which have been necessary to the life of
every community ever known to man. If neither reason nor tradition
can bring about consensus, then the force of the first man resourceful
and committed enough must needs do so.
It cannot be doubted that the status of values is a most perplexed
and difficult question. Great men have contributed to the present view
of things. They must be studied carefully, and the alternatives to them
must be equally considered. Reason can only be abandoned reasonably;
without this serious examination the modem view becomes empty and
dangerous nonsense. It is precisely in this context that the value of
liberal democracy becomes manifest: it is the only regime which per~
mits and encourages such a quest. It should be the university's vocation
to carry out this quest. In order for it to restore itself today, its faculties
would have to make common cause in defense of free inquiry and at
the same time protect and encourage those students who wish to learn.
It is highly questionable whether it would any longer be capable of
such an effort, for it lacks the awareness, the desire, and the personnel.
Instead, radical egalitarianism is a dogma within it. Given the in~
creasing and menacing pressures for conformity growing up within the
university, it seems reasonable to ask whether it will not be necessary
for thinking men and women to return to the isolation of private life
in order to be able to think freely. This is not a happy thought for
our universities. However, there is also a larger question: is liberal
democracy conceivable in the absence of the liberal university? The
liberal university appears to be both the highest expression of liberal
democracy and a condition of its perpetuation.