Section 5 of the Limitation Act deals with condonation of delay in case of appeal.

Since the limitation period for appeals is very short, this section is then introduced to
meet the end of justice such that the purpose of justice is not defeated merely because
there is “sufficient cause” is present due to which an appeal was not preferred. This
section extends the limitation period.

The word “sufficient cause” is an important phrase in this section. Since the section is
not a matter of right for the party who pleads the condonation, but it depends on the
discretion of the court. The court must be satisfied that the delay is caused due to a
genuine reason. It is sufficiency of the cause which counts, and not length of delay -
Expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction - As regards delay
on the part of State, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible - Expression
"sufficient cause" should be considered with pragmatism in justice oriented approach
rather than technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay -
Matter remitted to High Court to decide the criminal revision on merits - Suggestions
made to prevent delay in State litigation - Administration of justice – [State (NCT Of
Delhi) Vs Ahmed Jaan August 12, 2008]

Now the question arises what can be the “sufficient cause” which the court accepts-:

* Illness it is the sufficient cause when it is proved without the reasonable cause that
the appellant was not able to file an appeal.

* Imprisonment-The imprisonment of the appellant can be a sufficient cause.

* Ignorance of law can also be a one of the reason but it should be bonafide.

* Mistake of fact-It should be real and unintentional.

* Delay in obtaining copies of judgement can be sufficient cause also this reason is
also covered in section 12.

* Poverty, Infancy, Pardah

* Mistake of Counsel-mistake by counsel which is not negligence.

But to enjoy the benefit of section 5 There should be no negligence due to inaction of
the party is a prerequisite, also length of delay is not a matter of concern but
reasonable explanation why the delay has occurred is the subject matter of this
section.
In the end the court prefer liberal approach in favour of justice and favour only
reasonable excuses to condone any delay in filing an appeal .However the court must
be convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the delay was genuine and it must be
condoned in favour of justice. Also there should be absence of negligence in order to
make the cause reasonable.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

By-:Nitish Banka (Legal Consultant based in New Delhi)

Ph no -9891549997 / Mail-nitish@lexspeak.in

:www.lexspeak.in

CON The Supreme Court Opens the Floodgates for Condoning Delay
http://www.criticaltwenties.in/lawthejudiciary/the-supreme-court-opens-the-
floodgates-for-condoning-delay

Written by Shantanu // September 11, 2010 // Law & The Judiciary // 9

Comments
Lord Hewart, in his book titled ‘Not Without Prejudice’, very piquantly observes,
“While sympathy is a most commendable quality, it never appears in a less
attractive guise than when it is practiced at the expense of somebody else”. The
Supreme Court may have done well to keep this observation in mind when
recasting law of limitation in Improvement Trust, Ludhiana v. Ujagar Singh. In
short, in this seemingly liberal, but disturbing decision, the Court held that
“unless mala fides is writ large on the conduct of the party, generally, as a
normal rule, delay should be condoned”.
The facts which led to the proceedings before the Supreme Court were fairly
straightforward, but require a detailed reproduction. Land belonging to the
Respondents 1-4 was acquired by the Appellant, but the compensation due for
this acquisition was not deposited. The Respondents approached the Executing
Court for the recovery of this amount, but despite the service of notice, no one
appeared for the Appellant. As a matter of course, the property was put up for
auction sale on 12/8/1992, and Respondent 5 was declared the highest bidder
with a bid of 22,65,000/-. In the words of the Supreme Court itself, it was only
after this that the Appellant “woke up from its slumber”, and filed objections
under Order 21, Rule 90. The case was then fixed for the recording of evidence
on four dates in March, April and May, 1993. However, on none of these dates
did any one appear on behalf of the Appellant, leading to its objections being
dismissed on grounds of non-appearance. The case was posted for confirmation
of the sale to June 1993, on which date again no one appeared for the
Appellants. The sale was confirmed, and the amount of compensation due to
Respondents 1-4 was paid over, and the rest of the moneys are still lying in
deposit in Executing Court. It was only after this that the Appellant filed a
Miscellaneous Appeal before the District Judge, Ludhiana, challenging the
validity of the orders. This appeal was filed two months and a few days beyond
the period of limitation, and was hence dismissed by the District Judge. An
application for condoning delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed,
but was also dismissed since sufficient cause for condonation of delay was not
established. In the face of a specific bar created by section 104 of the CPC, the
Appellant filed a second appeal before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana,
which the Court was kind enough to treat as a Revision Application, which it
proceeded to dismiss. It was against this that a Special Leave Petition was filed
in the Supreme Court (again severely delayed, as appears on p. 5 of the
judgment).
The above list of dates and events provides no indication of what sufficient cause
allowed for a condonation of delay. Even the judgment is entirely silent on what
reasons justified this lackadaisical attitude by the Appellant. The only reason put
forth is that the erstwhile advocate of the Appellant before the Executing Court,
Mr. P.K. Jain, had been appearing in several matters for it, and enjoyed the
“implicit faith and confidence” of the Appellant. Since the matter had been
contested “in right earnest right from the beginning”, and since “whatever best
was possible to be done by the appellant that (sic) had been done”, even though
there was “some delay”, it should have been condoned by the District Judge. The
above quotes show that apart from blanket assertions, little was produced in the
Court by way of concrete circumstances that justified the condonation of the non-
participation of the Appellant in the execution proceedings. This was particularly
necessary given that two courts (the District Court and the High Court) had come
to the conclusion that sufficient cause was not established on facts.支架水池
On this unpersuasive account offered by the Appellant, the Court held that the
District Court should not have dismissed the appeal on such a “hypertechnical”
ground. It reiterated that an application for condonation should be decided as per
the facts and circumstances of that case. The Court opined that the Appellant
here had not been “absolutely callous and negligent” in prosecuting the matter.
Inspite of the fact that the Appellant was an Improvement Trust and not a poor,
indigent person, and inspite of the airy grounds put forth for condonation, one
may persuade oneself that the Court was justified in arriving at this factual
finding. Given bureaucratic loopholes and red-tape, as pitted against the
imperatives of development and other such policy imperatives, one may make a
case for siding with the Appellant. However, what one cannot make oneself see
eye to eye with, is the observation that “unless mala fides is writ large on the
conduct of the party, generally, as a normal rule, delay should be condoned”.
For, with due respect to the liberal stance adopted by the Court, this observation
turns section 5 of the Limitation Act on its head. The provision, in its relevant
part, reads-
Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the
provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) may be
admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the
court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the
application within such period. [emphases supplied]
Clearly, under the provision, the burden is on the applicant to establish that he
had sufficient cause for the delay. The above observation indicates that it is for
the other party to establish that the delay is on account of mala fide, or
occasioned by ‘callousness’ or ‘negligence’. Further, it is interesting to note that
even section 5 does not apply to an application under Order 21 of the CPC. The
likely rationale for this is that Order 21 deals with execution proceedings, which
should be conducted without undue delays. Admittedly, the appeal before the
District Court is not an application under section 5. However, in determining if a
sufficient cause is established, the Court would have been expected to note the
fact that the appeal was from a proceeding, which the legislature in its wisdom,
has sought to fast-track. Indeed, if a condonation application before the
Execution Court would not be permitted, it seems absurd to allow a condonation
application on appeal before the District Court, especially when the matter before
the Execution Court has been disposed off on grounds of non-appearance.
In sum, while the Court’s quest for justice must be appreciated, observations
such as “justice can only be done when a matter is fought on merits and in
accordance with law”, are both incorrect and contradictory. For dismissing the
matter on grounds of the expiry of limitation or the lack of jurisdiction is as much
‘in accordance with law’ as disposing of it on merits. It can only be hoped that
these observations are not adopted with too much vigour by lower Courts, or that
they are watered down soon by the Supreme Court itself.
DONATION OF DELAY : THE LAW
http://www.legalblog.in/2011/02/condonation-of-delay-law.html

Justice Swatanter Kumar

The Supreme Court in a recent decision, in Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh &
Ors., had the occasion to deal with the concept of 'condonation of delay' and
'sufficient cause' as contained in the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court,
while dealing with various authorities on the subject, has culled out principles,
which are reproduced hereunder;

9. In the case of Mithailal Dalsangar Singh (supra), a Bench of this Court had
occasion to deal with the provisions of Order 22 Rule 9, CPC and while
enunciating the principles controlling the application of and exercising of
discretion under these provisions, the Court reiterated the principle that the
abatement is automatic and not even a specific order is required to be passed
by the Court in that behalf. It would be useful to reproduce paragraph 8 of the
said judgment which has a bearing on the matter in controversy before us:

“8. Inasmuch as the abatement results in denial of hearing on the merits of the
case, the provision of abatement has to be construed strictly. On the other
hand, the prayer for setting aside an abatement and the dismissal consequent
upon an abatement, have to be considered liberally. A simple prayer for
bringing the legal representatives on record without specifically praying for
setting aside of an abatement may in substance be construed as a prayer for
setting aside the abatement. So also a prayer for setting aside abatement as
regards one of the plaintiffs can be construed as a prayer for setting aside the
abatement of the suit in its entirety. Abatement of suit for failure to move an
application for bringing the legal representatives on record within the
prescribed period of limitation is automatic and specific order dismissing the
suit as abated is not called for. Once the suit has abated as a matter of law,
though there may not have been passed on record a specific order dismissing
the suit as abated, yet the legal representatives proposing to be brought on
record or any other applicant proposing to bring the legal representatives of the
deceased party on record would seek the setting aside of an abatement. A
prayer for bringing the legal representatives on record, if allowed, would have
the effect of setting aside the abatement as the relief of setting aside abatement
though not asked for in so many words is in effect being actually asked for and
is necessarily implied. Too technical or pedantic an approach in such cases is
not called for.”

10. Another Bench of this Court in a recent judgment of Katari Suryanarayana

v. Koppisetti Subba Rao, (AIR 2009 SC 2907) again had an occasion to
construe the ambit, scope and application of the expression ‘sufficient cause’.
The application for setting aside the abatement and bringing the legal heirs of
the deceased on record was filed in that case after a considerable delay. The
explanation rendered regarding the delay of 2381 days in filing the application
for condonation of delay and 2601 days in bringing the legal representatives on
record was not found to be satisfactory. Declining the application for
condonation of delay, the Court, while discussing the case of Perumon
Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bhargavi Amma (2008) 8 SCC 321 in its para 9 held
as under:

“11. The words “sufficient cause for not making the application within the
period of limitation” should be understood and applied in a reasonable,
pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and
circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words ‘sufficient cause’ in
Section 5 of Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to
advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory
tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the
appellant.”

11. The Learned Counsel appearing for the applicant, while relying upon the
cases of Ram Sumiran, Mithailal Dalsangar Singh and Ganeshprasad
Badrinarayan Lahoti (supra), contended that the Court should adopt a very
liberal approach and the delay should be condoned on the mere asking by the
applicant. Firstly, none of these cases is of much help to the applicant.
Secondly, in the case of Ram Sumiran (supra), the Court has not recorded any
reasons or enunciated any principle of law for exercising the discretion. The
Court, being satisfied with the facts averred in the application and particularly
giving benefit to the applicant on account of illiteracy and ignorance, condoned
the delay of six years in filing the application. This judgment cannot be treated
as a precedent in the eyes of the law. In fact, it was a judgment on its own
facts.

12. In the case of Ganeshprasad Badrinarayan Lahoti (supra), the High Court
had rejected the application, primarily, on the ground that no separate
application had been filed for substitution and for setting aside the abatement.
The Court held that the principles of res judicata were not applicable and the
application could be filed at a subsequent stage. Thus, the delay was
condoned. We must notice here that the earlier judgments of the equi benches
and even that of larger benches (three Judge Bench) in the case of Ram
Charan (supra) were not brought to the notice of the Court. Resultantly, the
principles of law stated by this Court in its earlier judgments were not
considered by the Bench dealing with the case of Ganeshprasad Badrinarayan
Lahoti (supra).

13. As held by this Court in the case of Mithailal Dalsangar Singh (supra), the
abatement results in the denial of hearing on the merits of the case, the
provision of abatement has to be construed strictly. On the other hand, the
prayer for setting aside an abatement and the dismissal consequent upon an
abatement, have to be construed liberally. We may state that even if the term
‘sufficient cause’ has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within
the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. The
purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the
concept of ‘reasonableness’ as it is understood in its general connotation. The
law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the
right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to
and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given
case. Once a valuable right, as accrued in favour of one party as a result of the
failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and
its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere
asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of
negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both
parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has
been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be
equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to
it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. The application filed by the
applicants lack in details. Even the averments made are not correct and ex-
facie lack bona fide. The explanation has to be reasonable or plausible, so as to
persuade the Court to believe that the explanation rendered is not only true,
but is worthy of exercising judicial discretion in favour of the applicant. If it
does not specify any of the enunciated ingredients of judicial pronouncements,
then the application should be dismissed. On the other hand, if the application
is bona fide and based upon true and plausible explanations, as well as reflect
normal behaviour of a common prudent person on the part of the applicant,
the Court would normally tilt the judicial discretion in favour of such an
applicant. Liberal construction cannot be equated with doing injustice to the
other party. In the case of State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh(2000) 9
SCC 94, this Court had taken a liberal approach for condoning the delay in
cases of the Government, to do substantial justice. Facts of that case were
entirely different as that was the case of fixation of seniority of 400 officers and
the facts were required to be verified. But what we are impressing upon is that
delay should be condoned to do substantial justice without resulting in
injustice to the other party. This balance has to be kept in mind by the Court
while deciding such applications. In the case ofRamlal and Others v. Rewa
Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361 this Court took the view:

“7. In construing Section 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important

considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of
limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the
decree holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other
words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder
has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond
challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree holder by lapse
of time should not be light heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which
cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown
discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This
discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial
power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial
justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v.
Chathappan, ILR 13 Mad 269. It is however, necessary to emphasize that even
after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation
of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a
condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in
the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to
be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that
ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire
whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter
naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this
stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration;…”

14. In the case of Union of India v. Tata Yodogawa Ltd., 1988 (38) Excise Law
Times 739 (SC), this Court while granting some latitude to the Government in
relation to condonation of delay, still held that there must be some way or
attempt to explain the cause for such delay and as there was no whisper to
explain what legal problems occurred in filing the Special Leave Petition, the
application for condonation of delay was dismissed. Similarly, in the case
of Collector of Central Excise, Madras v. A.MD. Bilal & Co., 1999 (108) Excise
Law Times 331 (SC), the Supreme Court declined to condone the delay of 502
days in filing the appeal because there was no satisfactory or reasonable
explanation rendered for condonation of delay. The provisions of Order 22 Rule
9, CPC has been the subject matter of judicial scrutiny for considerable time
now. Sometimes the Courts have taken a view that delay should be condoned
with a liberal attitude, while on certain occasions the Courts have taken a
stricter view and wherever the explanation was not satisfactory, have dismissed
the application for condonation of delay. Thus, it is evident that it is difficult to
state any straight-jacket formula which can uniformly be applied to all cases
without reference to the peculiar facts and circumstances of a given case. It
must be kept in mind that whenever a law is enacted by the legislature, it is
intended to be enforced in its proper perspective. It is an equally settled
principle of law that the provisions of a statute, including every word, have to
be given full effect, keeping the legislative intent in mind, in order to ensure
that the projected object is achieved. In other words, no provisions can be
treated to have been enacted purposelessly. Furthermore, it is also a well
settled canon of interpretative jurisprudence that the Court should not give
such an interpretation to provisions which would render the provision
ineffective or odious. Once the legislature has enacted the provisions of Order
22, with particular reference to Rule 9, and the provisions of the Limitation Act
are applied to the entertainment of such an application, all these provisions
have to be given their true and correct meaning and must be applied wherever
called for. If we accept the contention of the Learned Counsel appearing for the
applicant that the Court should take a very liberal approach and interpret
these provisions (Order 22 Rule 9 of the CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation
Act) in such a manner and so liberally, irrespective of the period of delay, it
would amount to practically rendering all these provisions redundant and
inoperative. Such approach or interpretation would hardly be permissible in
law. Liberal construction of the expression ‘sufficient cause’ is intended to
advance substantial justice which itself presupposes no negligence or inaction
on the part of the applicant, to whom want of bona fide is imputable. There can
be instances where the Court should condone the delay; equally there would be
cases where the Court must exercise its discretion against the applicant for
want of any of these ingredients or where it does not reflect ‘sufficient cause’ as
understood in law. [Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Edition,
1997]

The expression ‘sufficient cause’ implies the presence of legal and adequate
reasons. The word ‘sufficient’ means adequate enough, as much as may be
necessary to answer the purpose intended. It embraces no more than that
which provides a plentitude which, when done, suffices to accomplish the
purpose intended in the light of existing circumstances and when viewed from
the reasonable standard of practical and cautious men. The sufficient cause
should be such as it would persuade the Court, in exercise of its judicial
discretion, to treat the delay as an excusable one. These provisions give the
Courts enough power and discretion to apply a law in a meaningful manner,
while assuring that the purpose of enacting such a law does not stand
frustrated. We find it unnecessary to discuss the instances which would fall
under either of these classes of cases. The party should show that besides
acting bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control
and had approached the Court without any unnecessary delay. The test is
whether or not a cause is sufficient to see whether it could have been avoided
by the party by the exercise of due care and attention. [Advanced Law Lexicon,
P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edition, 2005]

15. We feel that it would be useful to make a reference to the judgment of this
Court in Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom (supra). In this case, the Court, after
discussing a number of judgments of this Court as well as that of the High
Courts, enunciated the principles which need to be kept in mind while dealing
with applications filed under the provisions of Order 22, CPC along with an
application under Section 5, Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing
the application for bringing the legal representatives on record. In paragraph
13 of the judgment, the Court held as under:-

“13 (i) The words “sufficient cause for not making the application within
the period of limitation” should be understood and applied in a
reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon
the facts and circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words
‘sufficient cause’ in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a
liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay
is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate
inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant.”

(ii) In considering the reasons for condonation of delay, the courts are
more liberal with reference to applications for setting aside abatement,
than other cases. While the court will have to keep in view that a
valuable right accrues to the legal representatives of the deceased
respondent when the appeal abates, it will not punish an appellant with
foreclosure of the appeal, for unintended lapses. The courts tend to set
aside abatement and decided the matter on merits. The courts tend to
set aside abatement and decide the matter on merits, rather than
terminate the appeal on the ground of abatement.

(iii) The decisive factor in condonation of delay, is not the length of

delay, but sufficiency of a satisfactory explanation.

(iv) The extent or degree of leniency to be shown by a court depends on

the nature of application and facts and circumstances of the case. For
example, courts view delays in making applications in a pending appeal
more leniently than delays in the institution of an appeal. The courts
view applications relating to lawyer’s lapses more leniently than
applications relating to litigant’s lapses. The classic example is the
difference in approach of courts to applications for condonation of delay
in filing an appeal and applications for condonation of delay in re-filing
the appeal after rectification of defects.

(v) Want of “diligence” or “inaction” can be attributed to an appellant

only when something required to be done by him, is not done. When
nothing is required to be done, courts do not expect the appellant to be
diligent. Where an appeal is admitted by the High Court and is not
expected to be listed for final hearing for a few years, an appellant is
not expected to visit the court or his lawyer every few weeks to ascertain
the position nor keep checking whether the contesting respondent is
alive. He merely awaits the call or information from his counsel about
the listing of the appeal.

We may also notice here that this judgment had been followed with approval by
an equi-bench of this Court in the case of Katari Suryanarayana (supra)

16. Above are the principles which should control the exercise of judicial
discretion vested in the Court under these provisions. The explained delay
should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained
delay. Delay is just one of the ingredients which has to be considered by the
Court. In addition to this, the Court must also take into account the conduct of
the parties, bona fide reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay
could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution.
The statutory provisions mandate that applications for condonation of delay
and applications belatedly filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation for
bringing the legal representatives on record, should be rejected unless
sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay. The larger benches as well
as equi-benches of this Court have consistently followed these principles and
have either allowed or declined to condone the delay in filing such applications.
Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as
a matter of right and even in a routine manner. An applicant must essentially
satisfy the above stated ingredients; then alone the Court would be inclined to
condone the delay in the filing of such applications.

MANOHARAN VS. SIVARAJAN & ORS.

[Civil Appeal No. 10581 of 2013 arising out of SLP (C) No. 23918 of 2012]

V. Gopala Gowda J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal is filed by the appellant questioning the correctness of the

judgment and final Order dated 21.03.2012 passed by the High Court of Kerala
at Ernakulam in RFA No. 678 of 2011 urging various facts and legal
contentions in justification of his claim.

3. Necessary relevant facts are stated hereunder to appreciate the case of the
appellant and also to find out whether the appellant is entitled for the relief as
prayed in this appeal. The appellant approached the respondent no. 1 - a
money lender, for a loan of [pic]2,20,000/-. The respondent no. 1 agreed to give
him the loan in return of execution of a sale deed with respect to 3 cents of
land in re-survey No. 111/13-1 in Block No. 12 of Maranalloor village by the
appellant in his favour. It was agreed upon between the parties that the
respondent no. 1 will reconvey the property in favour of the appellant on
repayment of the loan. The appellant accordingly executed sale deed No. 575 of
2001 at sub Registrar's office at Ooruttambalam with respect to 3 cents of land
in Re-survey No.111/13-1 in Block no.12 of Maranalloor village in favour of
respondent no.1. The respondent no. 1 executed an agreement of re-
conveyance deed in favour of the appellant regarding the above mentioned
property on the same day.

4. The learned senior counsel, Mr. Basanth R. appearing on behalf of the

appellant argued that the appellant approached the respondent no.1 several
times with money for re-conveying the property in favour of the appellant as
was agreed upon between them but the respondent no. 1 evaded from doingso.

5. It is also the case of the appellant that respondent no.1, instead of issuing a
deed of re-conveyance, sold the property to Respondent nos. 2and 3 without
the knowledge of the appellant. The appellant sent a legal notice to the
respondent no.1 requesting him to appear before the sub Registrar's office for
the execution of re-conveyance deed regarding the plaint schedule property to
which the respondent no. 1 did not oblige. The appellant then filed a suit being
OS No. 141/2007 before the Court of sub Judge, Neyyattinkara for mandatory
injunction, for declaration of the sale deed executed by Respondent no.1 in
favour of Respondent nos. 2 and 3 as null and void, for execution of re-
conveyance deed in his favour and also for consequential reliefs. The suit was
valued at [pic]3,03,967/- and the court fee was valued at [pic]28,797/-. The
appellant paid 1/10th of the court fee i.e., [pic]2880/- at the time of filing the
suit. The Court of sub Judge, Neyyattinkara granted injunction in favour of the
appellant restraining the respondents from carrying out new construction
activities including the parts of the plaint schedule property until further
orders.

6. The court of sub Judge, Neyyattinkara heard the application for extension of
time sought by the appellant for paying the balance court fee. However, the
application was rejected and the file was closed by the learned sub Judge. The
appellant then filed Regular First Appeal No. 678 of2011 along with an
application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. The High Court
dismissed the application for condonation of delay on the ground that the delay
in filing the appeal was not explained by the appellant and consequently,
dismissed the Regular First Appeal filed by the appellant. The High Court's
opinion that the appellant has not given any ground for delay in filing the
Regular First Appeal is not sustainable since the appellant has categorically
claimed that he was not aware of the rejection of the suit of the appellant for
delayed payment of court fee by the learned sub Judge.

7. In the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, the following points
would arise for our consideration:

1. Whether the learned sub Judge was justified in rejecting the suit for non-
payment of court fee?

2. Was the appellant entitled to condonation of delay for non- payment of court
fee by the learned sub Judge?

3. Whether the High Court was right in rejecting the application for
condonation of delay filed by the appellant against the decision of the learned
sub judge who rejected the suit of the appellant for non- payment of court fee?

4. What Order?

Answer to Point no. 1

8. Section 149 of the Civil Procedure Code prescribes a discretionary power

which empowers the Court to allow a party to make up the deficiency of court
fee payable on plaint, appeals, applications, review of judgment etc. This
Section also empowers the Court to retrospectively validate insufficiency of
stamp duties etc. It is also a usual practice that the Court provides an
opportunity to the party to pay court fee within a stipulated time on failure of
which the Court dismisses the appeal. In the present case, the appellant filed
an application for extension of time for remitting the balance court fee which
was rejected by the learned sub Judge. It is the claim of the appellant that he
was unable to pay the requisite amount of court fee due to financial difficulties.
It is the usual practice of the court to use this discretion in favour of the
litigating parties unless there are manifest grounds of mala fide. The Court,
while extending the time for or exempting from the payment of court fee, must
ensure bona fide of such discretionary power. Concealment of material fact
while filing application for extension of date for payment of court fee can be a
ground for dismissal. However, in the present case, no opportunity was given
by the learned sub Judge for payment of court fee by the appellant which he
was unable to pay due to financial constraints. Hence, the decision of the
learned sub Judge is wrong and is liable to beset aside and accordingly set
aside.

Answer to Point no. 2

9. In the case of State of Bihar & Ors. v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh & Anr.[1], it
was held that power to condone the delay in approaching the Court has been
conferred upon the Courts to enable them to do substantial justice to parties
by disposing the cases on merit. The relevant paragraphs of the case read as
under:

"11. Power to condone the delay in approaching the Court has been conferred
upon the Courts to enable them to do substantial justice to parties by
disposing of matters on merits. This Court in Collector, Land Acquisition,
Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (1987)ILLJ 500 SC held that the expression 'sufficient
cause' employed by the legislature in the Limitation Act is adequately elastic to
enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves
the ends of justice-that being the life purpose for the existence of the
institution of Courts. It was further observed that a liberal approach is adopted
on principle as it is realised that:

1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown

out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this
when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be
decided on merits after hearing the parties.

3. 'Every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic
approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay?
The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against

each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other
side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-
deliberate delay.

5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account

of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to
benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be
grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize
injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice
and is expected to do so. XXX XXX XXX

12. After referring to the various judgments reported in New India Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra [1976] 2 SCR 266, Brij Inder Singh v. Kanshi Ram
(1918)ILR 45 P.C. 94, Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari [1969]1 SCR
1006, Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi [1979] 118 ITR
507(SC), Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [1970] 2 SCR 90, State of Kerala v.
E.K. Kuriyipe 1981 (Supp)SCC 72, Milavi Devi v. Dina Nath (1982)3 SCC 366a,
O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh AIR 1984 SC 1744, Collector, Land
Acquisition v. Katiji (1987) ILLJ 500 SC, Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra 1987
Supp(1)SCC 399, G. Ramegowda, Major v. Sp. Land Acquisition Officer [1988]
3 SCR 198, Scheduled Caste Co-op. Land Owning Society Ltd. v. Union of India
AIR 1991 SC 730, Binod Bihari Singh v. Union of India AIR 1993 SC 1245,
Shakambari & Co. v. Union of India AIR 1992 SC 2090, Ram Kishan v. U.P.
SRTC 1994 Supp(2)SCC 507 and Warlu v. Gangotribai AIR 1994 SC 466, this
Court in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani 2002(143) ELT 249(SC) held ;

".....The expression 'sufficient cause' should, therefore, be considered with

pragmatism in justice-oriented process approach rather than the technical
detention of sufficient case for explaining every day's delay. The factors which
are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of pragmatic approach
injustice oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits
unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to
determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to
prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level
should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles
are involved for decision by the Courts or whether cases require adjustment
and should authorize the officers to take a decision to give appropriate
permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file the appeal needed
prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal
and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the
State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would
always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by
way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State
is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants.'

To the same effect is the judgment of this Court in Special Tehsildar, Land
Acquisition, Kerala v. K.V. Ayisumma AIR 1996 SC 2750.

13. In Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab (1995)6 SCC 614 this Court under the
peculiar circumstances of the case condoned the delay in approaching this
Court of about 31 years. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy
2008(228)ELT 162(SC) this Court held that the purpose of Limitation Act was
not to destroy the rights. It is founded on public policy fixing a life span for the
legal remedy for the general welfare. The primary function of a Court is to
adjudicate disputes between the parties and to advance substantial justice.
The time limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not
because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good
cause. The object of providing legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by
reason of legal injury. If the explanation given does not smack mala fides or is
not shown to have been put forth as a part of a dilatory strategy, the Court
must show utmost consideration to the suitor. In this context it was observed
in 2008(228) ELT 162(SC) :
It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court.
Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be
exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter,
acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the
shortest range may be uncontainable due to a want of acceptable explanation
whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as
the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the Court accepts the explanation
as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the
superior Court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional
jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds
or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first Court refuses
to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior Court would be free to
consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior
Court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the
lower Court."

10. In the case in hand, it is clear from the evidence on record that the
appellant could not pay court fee due to financial difficulty because of which
his suit got rejected. It is also pertinent to note that the appellant had moved
the Court claiming his substantive right to his property. The appellant faced
with the situation like this, did not deserve the dismissal of the original suit by
the Court for non- payment of court fee. He rather deserved more
compassionate attention from the Court of sub Judge in the light of the
directive principle laid down in Article 39A of the Constitution of India which is
equally applicable to district judiciary. It is the duty of the courts to see that
justice is meted out to people irrespective of their socio economic and cultural
rights or gender identity.

11. Further, Section 12(h) of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987provides
that every person who has to file or defend a case shall been titled to legal
services under this Act if that person is: "in receipt of annual income less than
rupees nine thousand or such other higher amount as may be prescribed by
the State Government if the case is before a court other than the Supreme
Court, and less than rupees twelve thousand or such other higher amount as
may be prescribed by the Central Government, if the case is before the
Supreme Court "Further, Section 12 of the Kerala State Legal Services
Authorities Rules,1998 states that: "

12. Any person whose annual income from all sources does not exceed Rupees
Twelve Thousand shall be entitled to legal services under clause (h) of Section
12 of the Act". Therefore, subject to the submission of an affidavit of his
income, the court fee of the appellant could have been waivered or provided by
the District Legal Services Authority, instead of rejection of the suit.

12. Further, in the case of State of Maharashtra V. Manubhai Pragaji Vashiand

Others[2], it has been held that: "17. ..... we have to consider the combined
effect of Article 21 and Article 39A of the Constitution of India. The right to free
legal aid and speedy trial are guaranteed fundamental rights under Article 21
of the Constitution. The preamble to the Constitution of India assures 'justice,
social, economic and political'. Article 39A of the Constitution provides 'equal
justice' and 'free legal aid'. The State shall secure that the operation of the legal
system promotes justice. It means justice according to law. In a democratic
polity, governed by rule of law, it should be the main concern of the State, to
have a proper legal system. Article 39A mandates that the State shall provide
free legal aid by suitable legislation or schemes or in any other way to ensure
that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of
economic or other disabilities. The principles contained in Article 39A are
fundamental and cast a duty on the State to secure that the operation of the
legal system promotes justice, on the basis of equal opportunities and further
mandates to provide free legal aid in any way-by legislation or otherwise, so
that justice is not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other
disabilities. The crucial words are (the obligation of the State) to provide free
legal aid 'by suitable legislation or by schemes' of 'in any other way', so that
opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of
economic or other disabilities.

(Emphasis supplied)......"

13. Further, Article 39A of the Constitution of India provides for holistic
approach in imparting justice to the litigating parties. It not only includes
providing free legal aid via appointment of counsel for the litigants, but also
includes ensuring that justice is not denied to litigating parties due to financial
difficulties. Therefore, in the light of the legal principle laid down by this Court,
the appellant deserved waiver of court fee so that he could contest his claim on
merit which involved his substantive right. The Court of sub Judge erred in
rejecting the case of the appellant due to non- payment of court fee. Hence, we
set aside the findings and the decision of the Court of sub Judge and condone
the delay of the appellant in non-payment of court fee which resulted in
rejection of his suit.

Answer to Point no. 3

14. Having answered Point nos. 1 and 2 in favour of the appellant, we are
inclined to answer point no. 3 as well in his favour. In the case of Muneesh
Devi v. U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. And Ors.[3], it was held as under: "

15. In the application filed by her for condonation of delay, the Appellant made
copious references to the civil suit, the writ petition and the special leave
petition filed by her and the fact that the complaint filed by her was admitted
after considering the issue of limitation. She also pleaded that the cause for
claiming compensation was continuing. The National Commission completely
ignored the fact that the Appellant is not well educated and she had
throughout relied upon the legal advice tendered to her. She first filed civil suit
which, as mentioned above, was dismissed due to non payment of deficient
court fees. She then filed writ petition before the High Court and special leave
petition before this Court for issue of a mandamus to the Respondents to pay
the amount of compensation, but did not succeed. It can reasonably be
presumed that substantial time was consumed in availing these remedies. It
was neither the pleaded case of Respondent No. 1 nor any material was
produced before the National Commission to show that in pursuing remedies
before the judicial forums, the Appellant had not acted bona fide. Therefore, it
was an eminently fit case for exercise of power under Section 24-A(2) of the Act.
Unfortunately, the National Commission rejected the Appellant's prayer for
condonation of delay on a totally flimsy ground that she had not been able to
substantiate the assertion about her having made representation to the
Respondents for grant of compensation."

15. In the case in hand, the High Court, vide its impugned judgment
dated21.03.2012 held that the appellant has not provided sufficient grounds
for delay in filing the appeal. This decision of the High Court is unsustainable
in law. The appellant has categorically stated that he went to his advocate's
office at Neyyattinkara on 24.05.2011 to enquire about the status of the suit.
His advocate informed him that the learned sub Judge has rejected the suit on
11.8.2008 for non-payment of balance court fee. The advocate claimed that he
has informed the same to the appellant through a postal card but the appellant
claims that the same has not reached him and he was under the impression
that his application for extension of time for payment of court fee will be
allowed by the learned sub Judge. He further claimed that he had applied for
procurement of the certified copy of the decision of the learned sub Judge on
the same day.

16. The learned senior counsel Mr. K.P. Kylasantha Pillay, appearing on behalf
of the respondents alleged that the appeal of the appellant before this court is
based on wrong and frivolous grounds. The material produced by them in
support of their contention is totally based on the merit of the case. Since, we
are not deciding the merit of the case, the material produced by the
respondents in support of their contention becomes irrelevant. We have
condoned the delay in paying the court fee by the appellant while answering
point nos. 1 and 2. We see no reason in rejecting the application filed by the
appellant for condonation of delay in filing the appeal before the High Court as
well.

17. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the impugned judgment passed by the
High Court is not sustainable and is liable to be set aside as per the principle
laid down by this Court in as much the High Court erred in rejecting the
application for condonation of delay filed by the appellant. We accordingly,
condone the delay in filing the appeal in the High Court as well.
Answer to Point no. 4

18. In view of the reasons assigned while answering point nos. 1,2 and 3
infavour of the appellant, the impugned judgment passed by the High Court is
set aside and the application filed by the appellant for condonation of delay is
allowed. Therefore, we allow the appeal by setting aside the judgments and
decree of both the trial court and the High Court and remand the case back to
the trial court for payment of court fee within 8 weeks. If for any reason, it is
not possible for the appellant to pay the court fee, in such event, he is at liberty
to approach the jurisdictional district legal service authority and Taluk Legal
Services Committee seeking for grant of legal aid for sanction of court fee
amount payable on the suit before the trial court.

If such application is filed, the same shall be considered by such committee

and the same shall be facilitated to the appellant to get the right of the
appellant adjudicated by the trial court by securing equal justice as provided
under Article 39A of the Constitution of India read with the provision of Section
12(h) of the Legal Services Authorities Act read with Regulation of Kerala State.
We further direct the trial court to adjudicate on the rights of the parties on
merit and dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible.

19. The appeal is allowed in terms of the observations and directions given as
above to the trial court. There will be no order as to costs.

...................................J. [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA]

...................................J. [V. GOPALA GOWDA]

New Delhi,

November 25, 2013

[1] (2000) 9 SCC 94

[2] (1995) 5 SCC 730

[3] 2013 (9) SCALE 64

 SECTION 5 OF THE LIMITATION ACT, 1963:

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (―LA 1963‖) confers upon the court the
discretion to condone delay. However, such condonation can be granted only in
respect of ―an appeal‖ or ―an application‖. Thus, in order to invoke the
provisions of Section 5 of the LA 1963, the underlying document must
constitute an ―appeal‖ or an ―application‖. Clearly, a written statement of
defence filed under the provisions of Order VI and Order VIII of the Code does
not answer the description of ―appeal‖ or ―application‖ for the purposes of
Section 5 of the LA 1963. The provisions of the said section, therefore, cannot
be pressed into service by the defendant.11 The confusion amongst the courts
and the distress amongst lawyers culminated into a challenge to the
constitutional validity of the 2002 Amendment before the Supreme Court in
Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India12 (―Salem Advocate Bar I‖)
The petitioner however sought to withdraw the writ petition, which was
disallowed on the ground that the petition had been filed in public interest.
Interestingly, no arguments were advanced on the (un)constitutionality of the
amendment. In the first brush, the Court held that the 2002 Amendment was
not ―in any way ultra vires the Constitution‖. Detailed submissions were
however made to highlight the practical difficulties in implementing the
amendment. To ―ensure that the amendments [became] effective and result[ed]
in quicker dispensation of justice‖, the Court constituted a Committee with
directions to submit a detailed report concerning the 2002 Amendment. Upon
receipt of the Report of the Committee constituted pursuant to Salem Advocate
Bar I, the matter was considered by another Bench of three judges in Salem
Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India. 13 As regards the provisions of
Rule 1 of Order VIII, the Court reproduced the Report, in paras 20 and 21, as
follows: ―20. The use of the word ―shall‖ in Order VIII Rule 1 by itself is not
conclusive to determine whether the provision is mandatory or directory. …
The use of the word ―shall‖ is ordinarily indicative of mandatory nature of the
provision, but having regard to the context in which it is used or having regard
to the intention of the legislation, the same can be construed as directory. …
Construction of the rule or procedure which promotes justice and prevents
miscarriage has to be preferred…. 21. In construing this provision, support can
also be had from Order VIII Rule 10, … [where] despite [the] use of the word
―shall‖ [in Rule 1], the court has been given discretion to pronounce or not to
pronounce the judgment against the defendant even if the written statement is
not filed and instead pass such order as it may think fit in relation to the suit.
In construing the provisions of Order 8, Rule 1 and Rule 10, the doctrine of
harmonious construction is required to be applied. … The effect would be that
under Rule 10 [of] Order VIII, the court in its discretion would have the power
to allow the defendant 10 The Bombay High Court took a similar view in the
case of Iridium Indian Telecom Ltd. Bombay v. Motorola Inc. 2004 (1) Mh. L.J
532, where a Division Bench of the Court, referring to the applicability of
Section 148 of the Code to a belated written statement, observed that ―the
provisions of Order VIII, Rule 1 are in the nature of self-contained Code insofar
as filing of written statement is concerned. It prescribes the outer limit for filing
the written statement and hence reliance upon the general power under
Section 148 was not permissible.‖ There were, however, no observations
regarding difference between time fixed by ―the Code‖ and ―a court‖, as
highlighted in the text above. 11 See, the observations of the Allahabad High
Court in Sunder Lal Verma v. Ranvir Rana 2005 (1) ARC 174 endorsing the
aforesaid view: ―[A] written statement is not an appeal or an application or
even a suit and therefore [the] Limitation Act cannot help the Court for
condoning the delay.‖ 12 AIR 2003 SC 189, (2003) 1 SCC 49 (B.N. Kirpal, C.J.,
Y.K. Sabharwal and Arijit Pasayat, JJ.) per Kirpal, CJ. 13 (2005) 6 SCC 344 (YK
Sabharwal, DM Dharmadhikari and Tarun Chaterjee, JJ) per Sabharwal, J. 6
to file the written statement even after the expiry of the period of 90 days
provided under Order VIII Rule 1. Clearly, therefore, the provision of Order VIII
Rule 1 providing for the upper limit of 90 days to file written statement is
directory.‖14 A question of the nature of the proviso to Rule 1 of Order VIII first
arose before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kailash v. Nanhku and
Ors.15 In that case, the appellant was served with the summons, requiring his
appearance before the Court on 06.04.2004. On the request of the counsel of
the appellant on the appointed day, the Court allowed time till 13.05.2004 for
filing the written statement. On the said date, the appellant sought further time
on the ground that copies of several documents were required to be obtained.
The Court adjourned the hearing to 03.07.2004 as between 13.05.2004 to
02.07.2004, the High Court was closed for summer vacations. Towards the end
of the summer vacations, i.e. on 22.06.2004, the nephew of the appellant's
advocate expired. Although the written statement was drafted during the
summer vacations and was kept ready for filing, the same was filed only on
08.07.2004 together with an application for condonation of delay stating the
aforesaid reason. In appeal against the refusal of the High Court to accept the
written statement on the ground of expiry of the prescribed period of 90 days,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court and accepted
the written statement. Since Nankhu’s was the first decision by the Supreme
Court on the issue and since this has been cited in almost all subsequent
cases, it merits some time and space.16 The Supreme Court held as under:
―[T]hat ordinarily, the time schedule prescribed by Order VIII Rule 1 has to be
honoured. The defendant should be vigilant. No sooner the writ of summons is
served on him [than] he should take steps for drafting his defence and filing the
written statement on the appointed date of hearing without waiting for the
arrival of the date appointed in the summons for his appearance in the Court.
The extension of time sought for by the defendant from the Court whether
within 30 days or 90 days, as the case may be, should not be granted just as a
matter of routine and merely for the asking, more so, when the period of 90
days has expired. The extension can be only by way of an exception and for
reasons assigned by the defendant and also recorded in writing by the court to
its satisfaction. It must be spelled out that a departure from the time schedule
prescribed by Order 8 Rule 1 was being allowed to be made because the
circumstances were exceptional, occasioned by reasons beyond the control of
the defendant and such extension was required in the interest of justice, and
grave injustice would be occasioned 14 Emphasis supplied. For the
interchangeability of ―shall‖ and ―may‖, see also, M. V. "Vali Pero" v.
Fernandeo Lopez AIR 1989 SC 2206; State of Haryana v. Raghubir Dayal
(1995) 1 SCC 133. On the manner of interpreting a provision as mandatory or
directory, see also, Rampur v. Municipal Board, Rampur AIR 1965 SC 895;
Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari v. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta (1985) 3 SCC 53. As to
the difference between a mandatory and directory provision, see Sharif-ud-Din
v. Abdul Gani AIR 1980 SC 303 and particularly, the observations in para 17 of
Ponnammal .v Subburaman C.R.P. (P.D.) 489 of 2003‖ ―17. A mandatory
provision in a statute is one, which renders the proceedings illegal and void on
omission to comply with the same strictly, while directory provision is one
where the substantial compliance of which is sufficient to validate the
proceeding. The other test which can be employed to determine whether the
provision is mandatory or directory in character, is whether non-compliance of
the particular provision causes inconvenience or injustice and if it does then
the Court would say that that provision must be complied with and that it is
mandatory in character.‖ 15 AIR 2005 SC 2441, (2005) 4 SCC 480 16 The
question of condonation of delay where a proviso spelling out a time period is
couched in negative language had arisen earlier before the Supreme Court,
albeit in the context of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, in the
cases of Dr. J. J. Merchant v. Srinath Chaturvedi AIR 2002 SC 2931, (2002) 6
SCC 635 decided on 12.08.2002 by a Bench of three Judges and Topline Shoes
Ltd v. Corporation Bank (2002) 6 SCC 33 decided on 08.07.2002 by a Division
Bench. In the former, while a specific reference was made to the provisions of
Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code, holding that the time limit in the said rule was
required to be strictly adhered to, the issue of a possible extension of time was
not the principal issue before the Court. In Topline, the issue arose more
directly. It may be interesting to note that in Topline, no reference was made to
the case of JJ Merchant. (None of the judges or lawyers was however common).
7 if the time was not extended. … The process of justice may be speeded up
and hurried but the fairness which is a basic element of justice cannot be
permitted to be buried. It is also to be noted that though the power of the Court
under the proviso appended to Rule 1 of Order VIII is circumscribed by the
words - "shall not be later than ninety days" but the consequences flowing from
non-extension of time are not specifically provided though they may be read by
necessary implication. Merely, because a provision of law is couched in a
negative language implying mandatory character, the same is not without
exceptions. The courts, when called upon to interpret the nature of the
provision, may, keeping in view the entire context in which the provision came
to be enacted, hold the same to be directory though worded in the negative
form.”17 The Court further observed that while extending the time beyond the
stipulated period of 90 days, the courts may impose costs as a means to (a)
deter the defendant and (b) compensate the plaintiff. The Court also held that
the defendant seeking extension may be required to furnish affidavit and other
documents in support of the grounds pleaded for extension of time, depending
on the facts and circumstances of a given case. What appears to have weighed
the mind of the Court in the Nankhu case was the recording of specific findings
of fact by the lower authorities to the effect that (a) the written statement had
been drafted and kept ready for filing much before the expiry of the limitation
period; and (b) the factor that prevented the defendant’s counsel from filing the
written statement was the death of his nephew. The first points to bonafide of
the defendant and the second, that the event that prevented the written
statement from being filed was out of the control of the defendant and his
representatives. In Rani Kusum v. Kanchan Devi,18 the summons was served
upon the defendant on 10.11.2003 and the written statement was filed on
10.07.2004. The plaintiff objected to the acceptance of the written statement on
the ground that the same was filed beyond the prescribed period of 90 days
and that the court had, as result of the 2002 Amendment, no discretion in the
matter. The High Court, however, accepted the written statement. The Supreme
Court upheld the action of the High Court, based on the following four views:
(a) the amendment dealt with and targeted only the obligation of the defendant
and not the power of the courts to accept a written statement filed beyond the
stipulated time in that ―the consequences flowing from non-extension of time
are not specifically provided‖; (b) Order VIII, Rule 1 is a rule of procedure and
is, therefore, the handmaid of justice; (c) India follows the adversarial system;
and, (d) unless compelled by express and specific language of the statute, the
courts ought not be rendered helpless to meet extraordinary situations. The
Court reiterating that ―[t]he mortality of justice at the hands of law troubles a
Judge's conscience and points an angry interrogation at the law reformer‖ took
the view that a ―procedural law should not ordinarily be construed as
mandatory‖ and held that the proviso to Rule 1 of Order VIII of the Code was
directory. It appears that the reasoning which was intended to operate as a way
out of a rather stringent and a potentially harsh provision was made the
―ordinary‖ rule for interpreting procedural statutes by the Court. The
procedural laws, on the contrary, represent the guarantee of the minimum
standard of safeguards in the pursuit of a legal remedy, any conduct beneath
which is considered unacceptable, and at times, abhorrent, by the members of
the society whose legislature prescribes that law. Serious difficulties would
arise for a judge, particularly from the subordinate 17 Emphasis supplied. See
also, Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal AIR 1955 SC 425, where, considering
the provisions of the Code dealing with the trial of the suits, it was opined by
the Court that: ―the Code is a ―procedur[al] and not a penal enactment …
designed to trip people up… Too technical construction of sections that leaves
no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded
against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means
designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it.‖ (Emphasis
supplied). 18 AIR 2005 SC 3304, (2005) 6 SCC 705 (Arijit Pasayat and H.K.
Sema, JJ.) per Pasayat, J. 8 judiciary, who is confronted with a submission to
apply the aforesaid observation in reaching his decision in respect of a
provision other than the proviso to Rule 1 of Order VIII of the Code. The only
defence against the temptation of following the Supreme Court would then be
the distinction between ―obiter dictum‖ and ―ratio decidendi‖ available to a
properly informed judge or the opposing counsel.19 In Shaikh Salim Haji Abdul
Khayumsab v. Kumar,20 the appellants were summoned on 21.10.2003 and
sought time to file the written Statement, which was granted first until
17.11.2003 and for a second time until 19.02.2004. The latter date being a
holiday, the written statement was filed on 20.02.2004. The trial court refused
to accept the written statement on the ground of limitation. The Supreme Court
found that the trial court had itself granted time up to 19.02.2004, which date
fell beyond the period of 90 days. On the reasoning, that had the written
statement been filed on 19.02.2004, the trial court could not have refused to
accept the written statement as it was within the time granted by it, held that a
mere fortuitous circumstance cannot make the written statement filed,
unacceptable. While the Court reasoned its decision on the said basis, the
same result could have been reached at by relying on the provisions of the
Limitation Act, 1963 since the said Act expressly provides that where the last
date of limitation is a holiday, the limitation extends to the date on which the
concerned court reopens. The precise question, therefore, that the apex Court
was called to answer was whether it was at all within the power of the trial
court to provide a date which was beyond the period of 90 days. What appears
to weigh with the Court in Shaikh Salim Haji is the principle that no person
can be made to suffer because of an error on the part of a judicial authority.21
Reference may also be made to the case of Aditya Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Bombay
Swadeshi Stores Ltd,22 where the summons was served on the defendant on
22.03.2005. On 25.04.2005, the counsel for the defendant sought, and was
granted, time to file the written statement until 20.06.2005. The matter was
adjourned three times and the written statement was finally filed in August
2005, i.e. almost five months later. Despite serious objections from the
plaintiff, the court accepted the written statement, subject to costs of
Rs.2,000/-. The action of the court accepting the written statement was
challenged before the Supreme Court on the ground that the proviso to Order
VIII, Rule 1 mandates the recording of reasons, which, in the matter, the courts
below had failed to record. The apex Court set aside the orders of the lower
courts on the ground that no reason(s) had been indicated justifying the
acceptance of the belated written statement. In R.N. Jadi v.
Subhashchandra23, the Supreme Court was once again confronted with a
similar question. In that case also, the Court accepted the written statement
after the expiry of the prescribed period of 90 days. In this case, however, the
Court, for the first time, laid the test of ―a clear satisfaction of the justification
for granting such extension.‖ Here, the delay occasioned was a delay of merely
two days beyond the 90 days’ period. Citing Nankhu for the proposition that
Order VIII, Rule 1 is directory, the Court dismissed the writ appeal as not
maintainable. 19 See, generally, for the difference between ratio decidendi and
obiter dicta, State of Orissa v. Sudhanshu Shekhar Misra AIR 1968 SC 647;
MCD v. Gurnam Kaur AIR 1989 SC 38; Somawati v. State of Punjab AIR 1963
SC 151; T. Govidaraja Mudliar v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1973 SC 974; State
of U.P. v. Ramchandra Trivedi AIR 1976 SC 2547; Director of Settlements v.
M.R. Apparao (2002) 4 SCC 638; Ballabhadas Mathurdas Lakhani v. Municipal
Committee, Malkapur AIR 1970 SC 1002. 20 AIR 2006 SC 396, (2006) 1 SCC
46 21 The principle is embodied in the Latin maxim actus curiae neminem
gravabit. For application of that maxim generally by the Supreme Court, see
also, Krishnaswamy S.Pd. v Union of India 281 ITR 305 (SC), ―The maxim of
equity, namely, actus curiae neminem gravabit - an act of court shall prejudice
no man, is founded upon justice and good sense which serves a safe and
certain guide for the administration of law‖. 22 AIR 2007 SC 1574 (Arijit
Pasayat and Lokeshwar Singh Panta, JJ.) per Pasayat, J. 23 AIR 2007 SC
2571, (2007) 6 SCC 420 (Arijit Pasayat, D.K. Jain and P.K. Balasubramanyam,
JJ.). 9 In the R. N. Jadi case, Balasubramanyam, J. made some interesting
comments (and a possible clarification) of his reading of Nankhu, to which his
Lordship was a party. Retorting tacitly the observation that ―ordinarily
procedural laws cannot be interpreted as mandatory‖, his Lordship,
underlining the desirability of leaving a residuary power with the courts,
observed that ―there could be situations where even a procedural provision
could be construed as mandatory… Kailash v. Nankhu is no authority for
receiving written statements, after the expiry of the period permitted by law, in
a routine manner.‖ As indicators, where the courts could exercise the power to
grant an extension, the Court pointed out that the power to grant extension
should be exercised (a) with caution, (b) for adequate reasons (c) only based on
a clear satisfaction of the justification for granting such extension and (d) only
in rare and exceptional cases. In its ―order‖ passed in the case of Zolba v.
Keshao,24 the Supreme Court reaffirming the law laid down in the Salem
Advocates Bar Association case, turned its language negative and took the view
that it was ―unable to hold that the provisions under Order VIII, Rule 1 are
mandatory in nature.‖ In that case, a suit for partition was filed against the
defendant therein. In the said suit, an application for grant of temporary
injunction was moved and allowed. Against the order granting temporary
injunction, the defendant preferred an appeal, which remained pending. The
counsel of the defendant advised that the written statement could be filed after
the decision of the aforesaid appeal. On that basis, the defendant did not file
the written statement until his counsel reconsidered the matter and advised
him to file the written statement. The defendant, accordingly, filed an
application for acceptance of the written statement along with a request for
condonation of delay. The Court decided to excuse the delay for the reason that
the place of filing the suit and the place of preferring the appeal against the
order of injunction were different and ―[t]herefore, the file was not available
with the lawyer of the appellant at [the place of the suit] and therefore, the
written statement could not be filed within limitation.‖ In Sambhaji v. Gangabai
and Ors,25 the Supreme Court allowed the written statement to be entertained
after the expiry of 90 days of the service of summons on the consideration that
in a case ―where close relatives are litigants, a liberal approach is called for.‖
In Mohammed Yusuf v. Faij Mohammad,26 the summons in respect of a suit
for a decree for permanent injunction with application for temporary injunction
was served on 06.07.2002 and the adjournments were sought and granted
from time to time until 31.05.2005, when the plaintiff applied for
pronouncement of judgment in terms of Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code on the
ground of non-filing of the written statement by the defendant. On the said
date, no application for condonation of delay was however filed. The trial court
refused to entertain the written statement and, instead, fixed the matter for
recording of evidence in support of plaintiff’s case. In a writ petition, however,
the High Court allowed the petitioner to contest the suit on merits and
accepted his written statement, subject to payment of costs of Rs. 10,000/-.
The Court, referring to the Nankhu case, held that while the said case
interpreted the provisions of the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code as
directory, this Court, ―in no uncertain terms stated that defendants may be
permitted to [do so] only in exceptional situation‖ and on that reasoning, set
aside the order of the High Court in view of the clear recording of the reasons
against such acceptance by the trial court. In this case, the Court also
reiterated the limitation on the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts under
Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.27 24 AIR 2008 SC 2099, (2008) 11 SCC
769 (Tarun Chatterjee and Harjit Singh Bedi, JJ.). See also, Haripriya
Padmanathan, ―CPC Observed in its Breach‖ (2008) Practical Lawyer 27. 25
2008 (15) SCALE 322 (Arijit Pasayat and Mukundakam Sharma, JJ.) per
Pasayat, J. 26 2009 (1) SCALE 71 (S.B. Sinha and Cyriac Joseph, JJ.). 27 On
the point of limitation of jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution,
the Court observed that ―the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226
and 227 of the Constitution of India is limited. It could have set aside the
orders passed by the learned trial Court and the Revisional Court only on
limited ground, namely, illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. The
High Court did not arrive at a finding that there had been a substantial failure
of justice or the orders passed by the trial Court as also by the Revisional
Court contained error apparent on 10 SUMMARY OF THE JUDICIAL
RESPONSE The following table summarizes the manner in which the Supreme
Court responded to the aforesaid cases: Title of the Case Date of Service of
Summons Date of Filing of Written Statement Cause for the Delay Decision of
the Court and the rule/ principle evolved/ applied Kailash v. Nanhku
06.04.2004 08.07.2004 Death of the nephew of the defendant’s counsel Written
statement accepted Proviso to O. VIII, R. 1 is directory and by way of an
exception and for reasons recorded, departure is permissible Rani Kusum v.
Kanchan Devi 10.11.2003 10.07.2004 No reason cited in the judgment Written
statement accepted The 2002 Amendment dealt with only the ―obligation‖ of
the defendant and not the ―power‖ of the courts Shaikh Salim Haji Abdul
Khayumsab v. Kumar 21.10.2003 20.02.2004 The trial court had itself
adjourned the matter to a date beyond 90 days’ period. The said date was a
holiday and the defence was filed the next day Accepted the written statement
No person to suffer from an act of a court Aditya Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Bombay
Swadeshi Stores Ltd. 22.03.2005 August 2005 No reasons cited by the
defendant Acceptance refused No reason(s) had been indicated justifying the
acceptance of the belated written statement R.N. Jadi v. Subhash Chandra Not
cited in the judgment 08.06.2004 Date fixed by court was beyond the 90 days’
period Accepted the written statement No person to suffer from an act of a
court the face of the record warranting interference by a superior Court in
exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India.‖ (Emphasis supplied). 11 Zolba v. Keshao Not cited in the judgment Not
cited in the judgment Defendant was pursuing appeal against order granting
temporary injunction to the plaintiff and honestly believed that the written
statement could be filed after disposal of the aforesaid appeal. The defendant
was so advised by his counsel Accepted the written statement Since the place
of filing the suit and the place of preferring the appeal against the order of
injunction were different, the file was no available with the defendant’s counsel
and so, delay would be excused Mohammed Yusuf v. Faij Mohammad
06.07.2002 31.05.2005 No reason cited in the judgment Acceptance refused
Nankhu is no authority for indiscriminate and routine acceptance of belated
written statements CONCLUDING THOUGHTS AND (IN)CONCLUDING TREND!
After Nankhu, there remains no controversy that the proviso to Rule 1 of Order
VIII of te Code is directory and the time limit of 90 days stipulated therein can
be extended. 28 What, however, continues to be difficult is the assessment of
the gravity of circumstances in which judicial discretion warrants an exercise
in favour of the extension of time. On a survey of the aforesaid decisions
handed down by the Supreme Court, the following principles appear to emerge:
1. The proviso has an in-built mechanism for the extension of time for
sufficient reasons. Thus, any further extension of time beyond the stipulated
time limit of 90 days in the proviso is permissible only if the Courts is ―clearly
satisfied‖ that there exist cogent reasons that prevented the defendant from
filing the written statement; 2. Where the court is satisfied of the cogency of
reasons, it must record its satisfaction each time it extends the time; 3. The
time which may then be extended must be reasonable considering all the facts
and circumstances and the reasons cited by the defendant. 4. In order to deter
the defendant and with a view to compensating the plaintiff for the delay, the
court may impose costs upon the defendant, which would be payable to the
plaintiff. Whether the trial/appellate courts are indeed following these
principles is far from clear. The Nankhu case has often come to being seen as
an authority for the proposition that costs may be imposed in lieu of extension
of time. In some cases, it may be observed that the courts have begun to
 looking at costs as an effective substitute for the court’s satisfaction of the
cogency of reasons. The undercurrent leading to that attitude is perhaps a tacit
consciousness that a fortuitous circumstance pressed into service and cited as
a reason for the delay in filing of the 28 Amongst others, see the case of J.M.
Overseas v. Shri Vijay Kumar Mangla RFA No. 20/2005 (Delhi High Court)
rendered on 08.01.2007, where the arguments of the mandatory nature of the
proviso to Rule 1 of Order VIII of the Code were raised and demolished after a
detailed survey of all major decisions on the issue. 12 written statement, is,
more often than not, unconnected with the delay. And yet, should that trend be
permitted to continue?29

Recent Supreme Court guidelines on Delay condonation:

Recent Supreme Court guidelines on Delay condonation:
Brijesh Kumar & Ors. V State of Haryana
1. The courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented
approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay.
However the court while allowing such application has to draw
a distinction between delay and inordinate delay for want of
bona fides of inaction or negligence would deprive a party of
the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of
discretion by the Court for condoning the delay.
2. The Supreme Court has time and again held that when
mandatory provision is not complied with and that delay is not
properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the court
cannot condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone.
3. It is also a well settled principle of law that if some
person has taken a relief approaching the Court just or
immediately after the cause of action had arisen, other
persons cannot take benefit there of approaching the court at
a belated stage for the reason that they cannot be permitted to
take the impetus of the order passed at the behest of some
diligent person.
· In the instant case, after considering the facts and circumstances
and the reasons for inordinate delay of 10 years 2 months and 29
days, the High Court did not find sufficient grounds to condone the
delay. In view of the facts of the case and the above-cited
judgments, we do not find any fault with the impugned judgment.
The petitions lack merit and are accordingly dismissed.
Full Text of Judgement :

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NOS.6609-6613 OF 2014
Brijesh Kumar & Ors. … Petitioners
Versus
State of Haryana & Ors. …Respondents
ORDER
1. These petitions have been filed challenging the judgment and
order dated 22.11.2013, passed by the High Court of Punjab &
Haryana at Chandigarh dismissing the Civil Misc. Applications in
RFA No.5793 of 2012 for condonation of delay of more than10 years
in filing the appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’).

2. The land of the petitioners alongwith the lands of others

admeasuring 134 acres, 5 kanals and 10 marlas situate in revenue
estate of village Manakpur, Hadbast No.386, Tehsil Jagadhri,
District Yamuna Nagar stood notified under Section 4 of the Act on
8.9.1993. In respect of the same, the award was made by the Land
Acquisition Collector on 8.10.1997 assessing the market value of
the land of the petitioners @ Rs.1,75,000/- per acre.

3. Aggrieved, the petitioners and other persons interested filed

references under Section 18 of the Act for enhancement of
compensation and the Reference Court made the award on
7.9.2001 assessing the market value of the land @ Rs.1,85,000/-
per acre and they were also given other statutory benefits.
4. Aggrieved, some of the persons interested filed appeals before the
High Court, however, petitioners had chosen not to file appeal at
the initial stage but filed the same in the year 2012 after a lapse of
10 years 2 months and 29 days. The High Court refused to condone
the delay in spite of the fact that other persons who had preferred
the appeals in time had been given a higher compensation. Hence,
these petitions.
5. Shri Shish Pal Laler, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners has submitted that it was a fit case where the delay
ought to have been condoned and the High Court has committed an
error in not entertaining the appeal on merit.

6. The High Court had given cogent and valid reasons and relied
upon large number of judgments of this Court while rejecting the
application for condonation of delay including Mewa Ram (Deceased
by L.Rs) & Ors. v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 45; State of
Nagaland v. Lipok AO & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 2191;
and D.Gopinathan Pillai v. State of Kerala & Anr., AIR 2007 SC
2624.
7. The issues of limitation, delay and laches as well as condonation
of such delay are being examined and explained every day by the
Courts. The law of limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim
“Interest Reipublicae Ut Sit Finis Litium” (it is for the general welfare
that a period be put to litigation). Rules of Limitation are not meant
to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal
remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.

8. The Privy Council in General Fire and Life Assurance Corporation

Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, AIR 1941 PC 6, relied upon the
writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lectures 1932 wherein it has
been said that “a law of limitation and prescription may appear to
operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law
provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of
hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on applicable
grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its
operation,or introduce exceptions not recognised by law.”

9. In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala & Anr., AIR 1998 SC

2276, the Apex Court while considering a case of condonation of
delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation much less a reasonable
or satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay had been given,
held as under:–“Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular
party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so
prescribes and the Courts have no power to extend the period of
limitation on equitable grounds.”
10. While considering a similar issue, this court in Esha
Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors. (2013) 12
SCC 649 laid down various principles inter alia: “ v) Lack of bona
fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a
significant and relevant fact vi) The concept of liberal approach has
to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be
allowed a totally unfettered free play ix) The conduct, behavior and
attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant
factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental
principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of
balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle
cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. xvii)
The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious mater
and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a
nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal
parameters.” (See also: Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer (2013)
14 SCC 81)

11. The courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in

rejecting the application for condonation of delay. However the
court while allowing such application has to draw a distinction
between delay and inordinate delay for want of bona fides of an
inaction or negligence would deprive a party of the protection of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Sufficient cause is a condition
precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for condoning the
delay. This Court has time and again held that when mandatory
provision is not complied with and that delay is not properly,
satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the court cannot condone
the delay on sympathetic grounds alone.

12. It is also a well settled principle of law that if some person has
taken a relief approaching the Court just or immediately after the
cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take benefit there
of approaching the court at a belated stage for the reason that they
cannot be permitted to take the impetus of the order passed at the
behest of some diligent person.

13. In State of Karnataka & Ors. v. S.M. Kotrayya & Ors., (1996) 6
SCC 267, this Court rejected the contention that a petition should
be considered ignoring the delay and laches on the ground that he
filed the petition just after coming to know of the relief granted by
the Court in a similar case as the same cannot furnish a proper
explanation for delay and laches. The Court observed that such a
plea is wholly unjustified and cannot furnish any ground for
ignoring delay and laches.

14. Same view has been reiterated by this Court in Jagdish Lal
&Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 2366, observing as
under:–
“Suffice it to state that appellants kept sleeping over their rights for
long and elected to wake-up when they had the impetus from Vir
Pal Chauhan and Ajit Singh’s ratios…Therefore desperate attempts
of the appellants to re-do the seniority, held by them in various
cadre.... are not amenable to the judicial review at this belated
stage. The High Court, therefore, has rightly dismissed the writ
petition on the ground of delay as well.”

15. In M/s. Rup Diamonds & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR
1989 SC 674, this Court considered a case where petitioner wanted
to get the relief on the basis of the judgment of this Court wherein a
particular law had been declared ultra vires. The Court rejected the
petition on the ground of delay and laches observing as under:–
“There is one more ground which basically sets the present case
apart. Petitioners are re-agitating claims which they have not
pursued for several years. Petitioners were not vigilant but were
content to be dormant and chose to sit on the fence till somebody
else’s case came to be decided.”

16. In the instant case, after considering the facts and

circumstances and the reasons for inordinate delay of 10 years 2
months and 29 days, the High Court did not find sufficient grounds
to condone the delay. 17. In view of the facts of the case and the
above-cited judgments, we do not find any fault with the impugned
judgment. The petitions lack merit and are accordingly dismissed.
J.(DR. B.S. CHAUHAN)
J.(J. CHELAMESWAR)
New Delhi
March 24, 2014.
Courtesy:
http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=41333