[G.R. No. L-24444-45. July 29, 1968.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. ROMEO DORIQUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

DOCTRINE: The right against double jeopardy

FACTS:

Appellant Romeo Doriquez was charged with the offense of grave oral defamation before the CFI of Iloilo.
Six days later, he was indicted before the same court for discharge of firearm. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not
guilty to the two indictments. He moved to dismiss both information. One of his contentions is that the
institution of criminal action for discharge of firearm places him in double jeopardy for he had already been
in jeopardy once in the municipal court of Batad, Iloilo which dismissed, without his consent, the information
charging him with the offense of alarm and scandal based on the same facts. The court denied the motion to dismiss.
MR was also denied. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Doriquez was placed in double jeopardy when he was charged of the offense of discharge
of firearm.

HELD:

This plea of Doriquez is obviously untenable. Doriquez was not placed in double jeopardy.

For double jeopardy to attach in his favor, the accused must prove, among other things,
that there is "identity of offenses," so that, in the language of Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Court, his "conviction or acquittal . . . or the dismissal of the case (without his express
consent) shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense charged or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information." It is altogether
evident, however, that the offense of discharge of firearm is not the crime of alarm and scandal,
nor is it an attempt or a frustration of the latter felony. Neither may it be asserted that every crime
of discharge of firearm produces the offense of alarm and scandal. Nor could the reverse situation
be true, for the less grave felony of discharge of firearm does not include or subsume the offense
of alarm and scandal which is a light felony.

Although the indictment for alarm and scandal filed under Article 155(1) of the Revised
Penal Code and the information for discharge of firearm instituted under Article 258 of the same
Code are closely related in fact (as the two apparently arose from the same factual setting, the
firing of a revolver by the accused being a common element), they are definitely diverse in law.
Firstly, the two indictments do not describe the same felony — alarm and scandal is an offense
against public order while discharge of firearm is a crime against persons. Secondly, the
indispensable element of the former crime is the discharge of a firearm calculated to cause alarm
or danger to the public, while the gravamen of the latter is the discharge of a firearm against or at
a certain person without intent to kill.
 The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded merit, as the two indictments are
perfectly distinct in point of law howsoever closely they may appear to be connected in fact. 10

It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for
the same offense 11 or identical offense. 12 A single act may offend against two (or more) entirely
distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact
or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information
under one does not bar prosecution under the other. 13 Phrased elsewise, where two different laws
(or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to
a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves
some important act which is not an essential element of the other. 14

In the case at bar, granting that the two indictments arose from the same act — a contention
traversed by the State — they describe and constitute, nevertheless, essentially different felonies
having fundamentally diverse indispensable elements. Hence, there can be no such "identity of
offenses" as would support the suggestion that double jeopardy has ensued. The trial judge,
therefore, did not commit abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the information for discharge
of firearm.

In sum, we hold that the instant appeal is premature, and that — even if it were treated as a
petition for certiorari — the contentions and arguments of the appellant cannot be accorded credit.

ACCORDINGLY, the present appeal is dismissed. This case is hereby ordered remanded to
the court of origin for immediate trial on the merits.