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DEVELOPMENT
Variegated development among newly independent countries in Asia has prompted both
economy to a highly industrialized one becomes relevant. Key to this transition is the
spatial linkage between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors that enables the transfer
emerging economies lack this productive linkage (Elvinia, 2011). Accordingly, effective
land reform can rectify this lacking link between agricultural development and
transformation that permits coalitions more conducive to high road development policy
(Putzel 2000). Thus, academics and development practitioners ask how have the
flawed, if not a cumulative failure (Almeda-Martin, 1999; Cornista, 1990; Elvinia, 2011;
Fabella, 2014; Putzel, 1992). In this sense, the Philippines can be regarded as an
enclave economy whereby a skewed income distribution directly related to unequal land
urban centers without any substantial link to local agricultural production (Cardoso &
Filetto in Conning & Robinson, 2009). By contrast, South Korea, with comparable
as one of few countries with successful redistributive land reforms regarded as a key
pre-condition for its stellar economic take-off, catch-up, and eventual development
leapfrogging (Barraclough, 1999; Dorner and Thiesenhusen, 1990; Gon & Gyon 2013;
Harkin, 1976; Kim, 2012; Ledesma, 1976; Lee, 2013; Putzel 2000; You, 2014).
of land reform success demonstrates the diametric disparity between these two country
cases.
success of land reform in South Korea centers on the impressive feat in land ownership
transfer (Barraclough, 1999; Dorner and Thiesenhusen, 1990; Gon & Gyuk 2013;
Harkin, 1976; Ledesma, 1976; Putzel, 1992; You, 2014). ). While the American Military
Government (AMG) started redistributing 10% of all cultivated land just before the 1948
2
elections and the Korean War, the bulk of land transfer happened was virtually
completed within two years after the enactment of the 1950 Agricultural Land Reform
Amendment Act (Jeon & Kim 2000; Putzel 1992; You 2014). By contrast, the rate of
redistributing lands covered under land reform in the Philippines was dismal, with
acquire private lands, and hence resorting to less contention land acquisitions modes
(APPC, 2007; Borras, 2001; DARa, n.d.; DAR, 2000; Vanzi, 1997). As of December
2006, overall accomplishment in land distribution was at 3.8 million hectares or 86% of
the department’s target of 4.4 million hectares in a span of in a span of 30 years or so,
20 years in excess of the original ten-year timeline proposed by the latest land reform
Further literature review also suggests two structural transformations that indicate the
success of any land reform: the collapse of the colonial landlord system and the
land reform as “the non-market transfer of land from the traditional landed elite to the
landless poor farmers” (Gon & Gyuk 2013:7), a positive appraisal of the gains and
losses of all three parties involved in the South Korean land reform (the landed elite who
are deprived of their land holdings, the poor farmers who receive the land, and the
years after Japanese rule, the richest 2.7% of rural households owned two thirds of all
cultivated lands, while 58% owned no land at all (You, 2014). Within only a year of
accomplished a ratio of owner-cultivated land to total arable land of about 96% (Jeon &
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Kim 2000). Hence, by 1956, the top 6% owned only 18% of cultivated lands while
tenancy dropped from 49% to 7% of all farming households, and the area of cultivated
land under tenancy fell from 65% to 18% (You 2014). So, by 1960s, land reform was
categorically finished while 97.3% of compensation to landlords was achieved (Jeon &
Kim 2000). In this context, land redistribution has benefitted the landless poor
unequivocally. On the other hand, 36.7%) of 446,600 families who acquired lands under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), the latest land reform program of
the Philippine Government, were still living below the poverty line (bottom 30%). These
numbers are especially significant when contrasted with the national profile of poverty in
the country. In 2012, 80% of the poor inhabit the countryside as small farmers and
agricultural laborers (NSO, 2012a). While close to 70% of unpaid family workers thrive in
agriculture (NSO, 2012b), the largest portion of the underemployed (44%) are working in
the agricultural sector (NSO, 2012c). By contrast, only 3.6%, the smallest occupation
for credit selling (up to 30% in one study) or mortgaging (80% in one survey) their lands
Arlanza et. Al 2006). This could be explained by the fact that as beneficiaries become
environment of the agricultural credit market is unable to mitigate these farm costs
improvement. Five years after the ALRAA was implemented, rice production, labor
inputs, and arable land increased while capital requirements decreased significantly,
4
suggesting greater efficiency in the sector (Jeon & Kim 2000). In the decade following
percent. In the rice sector alone, yields per acre nearly doubled, while exports climbed
an average of 40 percent per year in the 1960s and 25 percent per year in the 1970s
(Jeon & Kim 2000). Land reform’s role as pre-condition for industrialization was also
shown by more than tenfold increase in manufacturing and mining output in over two
decades (Gon & Gyok 2013). While a systematic study on the income-augmenting effect
of South Korean land reform has yet to be conducted, literature shows that land reform
tenants, government, and the general public by regulating land prices below market
prices due to considerations of the median voter if tenants paid in cash and land
securities, thereby incurring income savings among tenants and generating savings in
government compensation to landlords (Jeon & Kim 2000; Gon & Gyuk 2013).
In contrast, land reform programs in the Philippines have allegedly exacerbated, instead
effect of land reform. A meso-level assessment reporting a substantial crop yield decline
from 31 to 33% from 2000 to 2006 and a macro assessment revealing decades of
implementation ahve failed to increase total factor productivity of only 0.13% per annum
from 1980 to 1998 (APPC, 2007; Gordoncillo et. al, 2007). One government think tank
(almost 10% lesser poverty incidence and 28% higher incomes) while other studies
disputing this categorical claim (Fabella, 2014; Gordoncilla et. al, 2007; Tecson, 2009).
These positive outcomes of land reform were reinforced by later constructive agricultural
development programs such as the the Saemaul Undong (SU) movement, a rural
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development acceleration program generally considered a crucial catalyst for the
shortly after instating the undemocratic Yusin Constitution, the program achieved its
primary objective of eradicating endemic rural poverty through (1) rehabilitating and
telecommunication line installment, etc.); (2) increasing household incomes through the
use of modern agricultural technology for hybrid production and alternative livelihoods;
and ultimately (3) overcoming the shortage of domestic supply of food (Kim 2012).
Scholars of the movement argue that the successful completion of land redistribution
Overall, land reform and its offshoot rural development programs served as the
development (Gon & Gyuk 2013). On the other hand, Philippine land reform remains
unfinished and plagued with implementation problems including but not limited to lack of
reliable access to credit, unfettered informal and illegal land sales or mortgages, and
inadequate and improper mechanisms for government support services (APPC, 2007;
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Given this, this paper aims to demonstrate that different colonial legacies in the
Philippines and South Korea were instrumental in shaping state capacity that in turn
determines the success and failure of their respective land reforms. This argument will
be articulated mainly through (1) comparing pre-, colonial, and post-colonial empirical
conditions and (2) analyzing these comparative details based on state formation theories
on the Weak State (Abinales & Amoroso; Putzel 1992), Weberian concept of the
Bureaucratic State (in Runciman 1978), and High Modernism (Scott 1998).
South Korea, its failure in the Philippines and the adoption of dual principles in the latter.
Literature suggests that the most potent in explaining the divergence are the (1)
contingencies of colonial history and the effects of (2) colonial rule on (a) state formation
and (b) configuration of socioeconomic and political power especially of landed elites,
Colonial Contingencies. Some scholars posit that certain circumstances during the
respective colonial periods of each country provided certain impetus that shaped the
substantially populated and ruled by dynasties with a unitary state and centuries of
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Confucian tradition in statecraft and polity governance (Cumings, 1984; Palais, 1996).
Saliently, land ownership was communal for subsistence purposes only for a non-
capitalistic/monetized economy in the former (Bauzon, 1975; Hick, 1987; Putzel, 1992),
private property was already instituted in the latter, but was dominated by landlords
resisting the centralizing power of the King and was hence heavily regulated by central
government to thwart peripheral resistance (Kim in Lee et. Al, 2013; Palais, 1996).
influence of such on the evolution of crafting and clarifying their respective colonial
policies.
strategy of colonization highly effective and cost efficient, requiring only a small garrison
to subdue opposition and mild conciliation with indigenous leaders and gradual, subtle
substitution of their governance functions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Putzel, 1992).
of ancient Japan (Cumings, 1984; Palais, 1996). This harsh campaign to supplant a way
of life of over 2000 years in the making primarily through education propaganda and
institutional innovations partly explains the tremendous resistance and hate Korean
subjects have had against their Japanese colonizers (Cumings, 1984). Temporally,
Spanish colonialism transpired during the age of “New World” exploration and a global
scramble with its rivaling power Portugal over resources regarded as scarce in European
metropoles. By contrast, Japan came late in the game of conquest, distinguishing its
8
Western conquests, limiting the geopolitical space to maneuver, and forcing it to
colonize contiguous territories both for geographic convenience and industrial supply
chain efficiency as the entire globe was virtually settled in (Cumings, 1984). This time
element somehow shaped the objectives of conquest and the evolution of colonial
treatment of their conquered territories. While both conquests were geared towards
some form of resource extraction, Spanish and Japanese colonial officials underwent
introspection and shifting intentions in crafting a clear policy on treating their colonial
discoveries. Spain’s accidental discovery of the Philippines en route to the much coveted
spice island Moluccas meant the Spanish Crown had little interest initially in developing
Spain capitalized on its strategic location (1) as a naval base with the aim of controlling
the Portuguese-dominated spice trade in the Pacific and a stopover in the Mexico-China
galleon trade route. It was not until 1780, when an unambiguous policy of export crops
production did agriculture develop and transform rural landscape and colonial economy
Japan’s imperial ambitions were also characterized more as an evolution than a clear
intention (Cumings, 1984; Kublin 1959). Although undoubtedly its conquest was couched
in a language of extraction, its drive for overseas expansion was sparked by national
defense insecurities, arising from the threat of Western conquest after centuries of
isolation (Kublin 1959). Its establishment of strongholds over southern Okinawa and
northern Hokkaido and its military victories over China and Russia in conquering Korea
and Manchuria galvanized its definite transition into a full-blown colonizer that by the
time of besieging Korea, Japanese colonial officials already honed a deliberate colonial
based on its view of colonies as an investment with immediate returns (Kublin 1959).
9
Thus, locating industry in the colony itself in proximity with the motherland, bringing
technology and capital to labor and raw materials, instead of vice-versa, achieved this
communication supplement this approach and concretely demonstrated to the world its
national pride in its superior colonizing abilities (Kublin 1959). So, unlike the Philippines
that was ignored by the Spanish Crown itself and left under the auspices of autonomous
religious orders (Putzel 1992), Korea did not suffer from neglect but rather excessive
This nuanced difference in colonization implied that Spanish and Japanese colonization
would have different treatments of their colonies and hence produce different colonial
impacts.
While in both case, decades of colonization had created oppressive land tenure
while three hundred years of Spanish colonial rule had benefitted a landed oligarchy
abusive land tenure patterns and acquisition modes ranging from captive loans to
outright land grabbing (Bauzon, 1975; Hick, 1987; Putzel, 1992). Alongside increasing
taxation, intensified forced labor, and installation of a native police force deployment,
these practices established an unjust regime that exploited the natives’ ignorance of
with some serious enough to endanger the survival of the Spanish colonial government
10
(Putzel 1992). This Friar abuse of power and their majority ownership of productive
agricultural lands by the end of Spanish rule eventually agitated landed enlightened
elites (ilustrados) previously brokering between the colonial government and pre-colonial
society to join forces with revolutionary peasants, establish a clandestine fraternity, and
launch the 1896 Philippine Revolution that demanded friar expulsion, redistribution of
their landholdings, and ultimately national independence two years later (Bauzon 1976;
In Korea, 36 years of brutal Japanese rule also engendered an oppressive albeit highly
productive land tenure system that bifurcated a more or less unitary pre-colonial agrarian
society. As pre-colonial attempts at land reform to standardize land plots and nationalize
land ownership failed (Palais, 1996), the Japanese Government-General required new
land registration to (1) clarify property rights through simpler land taxes for the coffers of
the colony and (2) introduce a capitalist market economy that would maximize profits
from agricultural investments. Unlike pre-colonial land surveys, this new process
excluded multiple customary rights of peasants, depriving them of the ability for
subsistence, plunging them to dire poverty, and disrupting their complementary, mutually
beneficial relationship with landlords (Kim in Lee et. Al 2013). Facing this new market
economy mechanism, landlords controlled tenants through increasing rent for profit
maximization, substituting defaulting tenants, and demanding the use of new agricultural
technology to increase land productivity. These measures surpassed the tolerance limits
of peasants, who naturally resisted and coalesced with socialists to acquire better
organizational capacity to mobilize huge uprisings (Kim in Lee et. Al 2013; Palais, 1996).
To combat this, the landlords collaborated with the colonial government to establish
associations but their inability to deal with violent protests compelled the former to
change tenant laws to control peasants (Kim in Lee et. Al 2013). Besides supporting
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associations, the colonial government incentivized landlords to enhance agricultural
providing subsidies to those faithfully following government agricultural policies, and (3)
capital to reinvest in land enhancements and industries later on (Kim in Lee et. Al 2013).
Along with the de-personalization of individuals in the new market system, this colonial
intervention fomented class division by widening the economic distance and political
cleavage between landlords and peasants. Hence, unlike precolonial times when
peasants and landowners united in protests against excessive state taxation, protests
under the Japanese were geared towards antagonizing landowners and their alliance
with the colonial government (Kim in Lee et. Al 2013). So, despite being pushed out of
political power upon the destruction of the Yi Monarchy upon the arrival of Japanese
colonizers, the Yangban class who used to own 80% of the land collaborated with the
colonial government to survive (Putzel 1992). Given this, the brutal history of Japanese
eliminating sympathy for their Japanese colonizers and hence lessening resistance in
1992).
reform policy in the two countries. While the inspiration for both land reform programs
was derived from the same redistributive social justice framework earlier applied by the
US in Japan to contain the spread of Communism in the region (Putzel 1992), their
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for redistributive land reform. While in both countries land reform was deployed as a
In South Korea, the probability of a Communist North takeover provided strong external
pressure for redistributive land reform while in the Philippines the lack of such an
external threat and the domestic, sporadic nature of peasant uprisings tempered the
perception of US colonial administrators and national politicians for the need of a truly
redistributive approach to land reform. Indeed, the peaceful execution of land reform in
North Korea incited rural unrest in South Korea and opposition to the American Military
Government (AMG) and the consequent failure of right-wing policies on rural pacification
Communist indoctrination (Putzel 1992). The process, however, entailed tedious political
on blocking liberal land reform measures and subsequently installing the transitory
National Land Administration to commence redistributing 10% of all cultivated land just
before the 1948 elections (Putzel 1992; You 2014). Moreover, the episodic Communist
occupation of the South by the North seemed to have persuaded landowners of the
practical value of land redistribution that by the time the Korean War erupted in 1950,
landlords had directly sold about 500,000 hectares to their tenants (Putzel 1992; You
2014). This expedited the land transfer process that by 1952, the government had
completed the program (Putzel 1992; You, 2014). This successful redistribution plus
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private sales changed the land tenure structure in the country that by the end of the
reform the tenancy rate had fallen from 65% in to only 18% in 1965 (Putzel 1992:82).
To be fair, no internal security threat of a similar magnitude confronted the state in the
Philippines (Putzel 1992; Vu 2010). This may in fact shape the perception of the US
colonial government that the threat mounted by peasant movements did not warrant the
kind of challenge to property rights and rural power structure, which required the liberal,
more radical approach (Putzel 1992). Instead, a series of peasant uprisings have often
preceded any concrete land reform legislation or program in the Philippines. The
compelled the American colonial government to redistribute the controversial friar lands
Escalante 2002; Putzel 1992). The Land Reform Act (LRA) of 1955 redistributed lands
whose deliberate exclusion from mainstream politics by the US revived their militancy
and spurred the rise of their postwar party organization (Espiritu & Yoingco 1995; Putzel
1992). Presidential Decree (PD) 27 abolished tenancy in rice and corn lands to
anticipate and contain the rise of a newly armed Communist group the New People’s
Army (Putzel 1992). The 1988 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) was
restored democratic government to the ‘Mendiola Bridge Massacre,’ a bloody protest six
months before the first Committee hearing for CARL, which left 19 unarmed peasants
killed after the police and a contingent of marines opened fire to 15,000 members of
Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (Putzel 1992). Yet all these agrarian movements had
not developed military capacity to a point of threatening to overturn the basic structures
14
of the state (Putzel 1992). A strengthened military and expanded traditional rural
believed, would be sufficient to check the growth of such radical movement (Putzel
1992).
This rendered the laws quite ambivalent as all granted land entitlements to landless
farmers, while safeguarding property interests of the elites to whom the US relied on for
internal colonial affairs. Hence, their provisions imposed high land retention thresholds
through simple parceling of lands or phased implementation, heightened due process for
process for beneficiaries, and guaranteed just compensation for landowners based on
complex land valuation methods (Almeda-Martin, 1999; Connolly, 1992; Elvinia 2011;
Hick, 1987; Putzel, 1992). In addition, qualified landless farmers in land claims disputes
Hick, 1987; Putzel, 1992). These dual principles of granting property rights to peasants
while heightening due process for landowners were practically irreconcilable tasks that
balancing the skewed class structure seriously threatening political stability (Almeda-
Martin 1999).
Further analysis of the debates behind these laws show that this policy ambivalence is
proponents of liberal redistributive land reform and its conservative opponents, whose
15
dominant landowner interests triumph to incorporate provisions securing land properties
(Cornista 1990; Putzel 1992). For instance, the proposal drafted by U.S. land reform
specialist Robert Hardie, credited for the success of redistributive land reform in Japan,
was vehemently attacked by leading Filipino Congressmen, unsupported by the U.S. aid
mission, was branded unfounded and even leftist or radical by an outspoken Liberal
Congressman (and later Philippine president) Diosdado Macapagal, who was backed up
by landed interests in his district, and finally called a “national insult” by then President
Similarly, this rhetoric of land reform as a strategy to garner votes from the rural masses
was evident in the South Korean case. The AMG’s decision to dissolve their previously
tenants’ expectations and forced politicians to include land reform in their electoral
1992). The dictator Syngman Rhee himself was forced to settle this electoral impetus
proposal by his Cabinet and overrode his veto to force him to sign a radical Land Reform
Act in 1949. Party politics cleavage due to Rhee’s earlier withdrawal from the ruling
party, the intent to curb his increasing executive power, and the expediency of improving
public image among peasants motivated this irony (Putzel 1992). Still, Rhee requested
the Assembly for amendments and delayed implementation until a week before the
Korean War erupted (Putzel 1992; You 2014). Nevertheless, once redistribution
resumed after the war, it only took two years to finish the land transfer and the “principle
of land to tillers” to be realized, a feat nonexistent in the Philippine case (Putzel 1992;
You, 2014).
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Colonial State Formation. Indeed, these colonial experiences have profound effects on
structural foundations of their postcolonial state formation and capacity (Vu 2010).
bureaucracy (Cumings, 1984; Vu 2010). The Japanese are credited with removing the
decayed agrarian bureaucracy, the Japanese built a modern centralized state with vast
As Cumings would put it, Korea’s march to modernity coincided with aggression and
education, military, polity, and economy (Cumings, 1984). Indeed, this sparks even up
today a debate between on one side a nationalist approach, emphasizing that Japanese
rule stymied the development of modern economic and political structures on the
peninsula, and on the other, a “colonial modernity” school of thought, which argues that
colonial rule laid the foundation for South Korea’s massive economic growth in the
Japanese colonial land survey obliterated but simplified complex multiple ancient forms
of land ownership by assigning one owner for a particular plot, thereby facilitating an
unambiguous transfer of land ownership to the landless poor. This uniformalized land
plots substantially and destroyed the old feudal power structure of formerly proud small
and medium sized landed elites (Gon & Gyuk 2013; Kim in Lee et. Al 2013). The
17
intervention of the Japanese colonial government, however oppressive, to codify
exclusive property rights through land titles had the positive consequence of enabling
and assuring investment predictability (Kim in Lee et. al 2013). Japanese collaboration
with landlord associations also enabled access to technological innovations that boosted
agricultural productivity (Kim in Lee et. Al 2013). Jointly, such had an unprecedented
farmer system, and ultimately, creating an egalitarian economic structure that served as
pre-condition for Korea’s rapid economic takeoff (Gon & Gyuk 2013).
Later indication of the beneficial part of South Korea’s colonial experience was how
American Occupation required Koreans to have previous experience with colonial state
apparatuses before employment or recruitment to civil service and retained the police
force (Cumings, 1984; Putzel 1992; Vu 2010). First free elections in Korea were
South Korea’s colonial state formation story can also be analyzed in terms of the
Weberian concept of the bureaucratic state (Weber in Runciman 1978). The imminent
military threat from the North and the perceived necessity of ruling parties to grow the
national pie in order to legitimize their rule and make side payments to their coalition
supporters heeds Weber’s idea that stronger bureaucracy was needed to regulate or
achieve growth of a money economy. On the first function, Weber (as cited in Runciman
1978:8) theorizes that the formation or maintenance of a standing military provides the
compels leaders within a territorially bound state to consolidate internal unity of the
18
needs which come into existence as a result of the creation, for reasons of power-
politics, of a standing army and the development of finance associated with it” (Weber in
Runciiman 1978:7-8). On the second function, Weber remarks, “To that extent, then,
Runciman 1978:348-9).
On the other hand, the lineage of the colonial state is less disputed, if not more
pronounced, in the Philippines than in South Korea, perhaps because state theorists
argue that colonial rulers allowed indigenous elites to form governments under their
tutelage in the postwar era (Vu 2010). It is thus easier to argue that the postcolonial
decentralized one in the Philippines resulted directly from the policies of their colonial
government functions. Some Philippine scholars identify this lack of delineation between
clerics and secular state functionaries as the categorical origins of the weakness and
underdevelopment of the Philippine state (Abinales & Amoroso 2005; Putzel 1992). A
enlistment of criminals in Spanish America in the islands, and a legal ban on non-clerical
Spaniards in the colony created a scarcity of qualified civil service that presented
19
consolidated friar power able to resist the theoretical authority of colonial governor-
generals. The American occupational government merely reinforced this state weakness
preserved the concentration of elite economic power and political clout that became the
[the] official generally not handing over the revenue from the objects allocated to
him but disposes such for his own purely private purposes while, on the other
added](Weber in Runciman:344)
Colonial Rule and Landed Elites. This colonial state context informs the extent to
which the adoption of the liberal approach in South Korea and its rejection in the
Philippines is influenced by the direct effects of colonial rule and its ensuing postcolonial
In Korea, the Japanese colonizers substantially weakened the power of the old Yangban
landowning class who wielded authority during the Yi Dynasty (Putzel 1992:103).
Subsequently, landowners who made peace with Japanese colonizers were tainted by
collaboration and became the target of public ire, especially from the rural population,
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and hence the object of land reform during postcolonial independence (Putzel 1992).
Moreover, the bitter experience of Northern occupation most likely persuaded many
landowners to submit to reform during the two years following the war (Putzel 1992).
profitability of the colonial land ownership system have also incentivized landed elites to
diversify and develop a new economic escape route (Gon & Gyok 2013). Due to these
reasons, South Korea’s land reforms were implemented without significant resistance
and the independent farmer system and egalitarian land ownership structure that
emerged contributed greatly to South Korea’s development of capitalism (Gon & Gyun
2013:2-3).
landowning hacienderos, whose economic and political power increased during the US
occupation (Putzel 1992). While landowners had collaborated with the Japanese in the
Philippines as well, the period of occupation was so short that the effect was not nearly
The Role of Individual Agency: High Modernists in Land Reforms. In addition to the
development between our two country cases. That is, it can be argued that decisive
breaks in policy decisions by individual agents in power influenced the fate of land
21
Scott (1998) defines high modernists as “revolutionary elites” who are “typically
progressives who have come to power with a comprehensive critique of existing society
and a popular mandate (at least initially) to transform it” with the primary aim of
1998:89). “To give their growing ambitions full rein, they required a far greater hubris, a
state machinery that was equal to the task, and a society they could master” (Scott
Both displayed such utopian, high modernist aspirations, with Marcos making grand
(New Society) and Park launching his comprehensive rural development program called
the Saemaul Undong (New Village Remodelling) Movement (Kim 2012; Putzel 1992).
However, the former did not follow through with deep commitment to effect concrete
institutional changes, let alone redound to visible and drastic societal transformation,
while the latter opportunistically capitalized on the movement to achieve his newfound
Park Chung Hee launched his social engineering brainchild or SU Movement anchored
on diffusing a new social ideology of the Saemaul “can-do” spirit that aimed to transform
“a former national mentality of chronic defeatism into new hope, a long-term shared
vision of a better life for all, and an infectious enthusiasm sustained by volunteerism at
the community level” (Kim 2012:vii). In this sense, high modernism implies a truly radical
break with history and tradition (Scott 1998:93-4). Park’s grand pronouncement radically
unequivocally qualifies him as a high modernist with three distinct aspirations: (1) the
administrative ordering of nature and society, i.e. high modernism, that is shared by a
22
wide spectrum of political ideology from the left to right wing governments, (2) the
unrestrained use of power of the modern state as an instrument for achieving designs,
and (3) weakened civil society that lacks the capacity to resist these ambitious plans
(Scott 1998:88-89). As a matter of historical fact, to accomplish the last two aspirations
at least, Park had to create a new political system capable of effectively mobilizing
defense against the communist North (Kim 2012). On October 17, 1972, President Park
suspended the Constitution by declaring martial law and dismissing the National
The new constitution enlarged presidential power by (i) giving the president authority to
issue emergency decrees, to disband the National Assembly at will, and to appoint one
third of all lawmakers; and (ii) by creating a 6-year presidential mandate without term
limitation (Kim 2012). Under this system, the president was to be indirectly elected by
2,359 nonpartisan delegates from small constituencies that could be easily controlled by
the government (Kim 2012). In December 1972, these delegates re-elected Park Chung
which a resistant society could make its influence felt is one of and by far the most
dramatic steps, Park evidently believed that he could justify both the military coup he led
in 1961 and the authoritarian political system he created with the Yusin Constitution if he
movement at its core (Graham 2003; Kim 2012). Because one means of vindicating the
economic development, improved quality of life in rural communities became the initial
23
goal of the SU movement (Graham 2003; Kim 2012).
Herein, James Scott’s treatise on High Modernism diverges from the empirical reality of
South Korea’s development story through his assertion that “High-modernist ideology
thus tends to devalue or banish politics. Political interests can only frustrate the social
solutions devised by specialists with scientific tools adequate to their analysis” (Scott
1998:94). To be fair, he did acknowledge that, “as individuals, high modernists might
well hold democratic views about popular sovereignty or classical liberal views about the
inviolability of a private sphere that restrained them” (Scott 1998:94). But his idea that
“such convictions are external to, and often at war with, their high-modernist convictions”
ambitions (Scott 1998:94). The SU movement has often been interpreted as being
the Republic of Korea in order to attain a certain level of affluence “to abolish the chronic
poverty that had traditionally plagued its rural villages” (Kim 2012:6). This tendency
been reinforced by the fact that implementing a grand scheme such as the SU
movement would require a political system. Scott (1998:95) the past is an impediment, a
history that must be transcended; the present is the platform for launching plans for a
better future. A key characteristic of discourses in high modernism and of the public
images of heroic progress toward a totally transformed future. In this sense, the Yusin
Constitution represented a radical departure from the status quo or the ways of doing
things in postwar, postcolonial South Korea while Park Chung Hee sees himself as the
24
The reason for the attractiveness of high modernism is clear: tremendous development
Scott (1998: 91), a more pragmatic link underlines this shift, for “A state that improved its
population's skills, vigor, civic morals, and work habits would increase its tax base and
field better armies”. Indeed, scholars on the South Korean development miracle explain
once war-ravaged and poverty-stricken country to leapfrog into prosperity in the global
economic order (Graham 2003; Kim 2012; Lee, 2013). This is where the Philippines
breaks away from South Korea. That is, while the declaration of martial law provided
the Constitution like Park did and implement a sweeping land reform that would have
potentially and profoundly transformed the countryside, it also gave him the assurance
or a security blanket given the absence of an intense external security threat and internal
challenges by landlords who support him and who are against redistributive reform.
incentives), his decision to sustain the status quo perhaps amounted to a historical
turning point that herded the Philippines into a sustained path of unreformed agricultural
CONCLUSIONS
and the Philippines. These two countries were selected for both their similarities in
25
Given this, this paper offers a three-pronged argument explaining their divergence.
The difference in degree and kind of colonial circumstances, particularly security threats,
The immanent threat of a Communist takeover in South Korea compelled the AMG to
authorities that conventional military response and continued landed elite co-optation
coupled with haphazard land reform legislation were sufficient counterinsurgency tactics.
The urgency of this threat also expedited the land reform by convincing both the
peasantry and landed elites of the importance of participating in the reform process.
Yet, more importantly, the extensive colonization of these two countries produced
profound effects on state formation in these two countries, as acutely manifested in their
of the South Korean peninsula laid the foundations of a highly centralized bureaucratic
state capable of implementing transformative and socially disruptive liberal land reform.
Lastly, of noteworthy relevance as well are powerful agents in the form of visionary,
sweeping land reforms and rural development programs in light of their utopian goals
spelled a major difference in the development path of their countries. On this note, Park
Chung Hee embodies the quintessential high-modernist leader who capitalizes on the
26
gains of past land reforms to launch an ambitious social engineering new village
movement that facilitated the successful transition of his war-ravaged, rural poverty-
stricken nation into a highly developed economy, while Ferdinand Marcos failed to
realize his grand vision of a ‘new society’ and steer the Philippines into a path of virtuous
development in his failure to utilize his systemic opportunity to use land reform as a
With this, it is hoped that this paper ably illuminates on the combined power of history
and human agency in effecting meaningful and desirable change in light of the
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