Phenomenology and Hermeneutics Paul Ricoeur No&ucire;s, Vol. 9, No. 1, Symposium Papers to be Read at the Meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association in Chicago, Ilinois, April 24-26, 1975 (Mar., 1975), 85-102. Stable URL: hhup//links,jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624%28197503%299%3A 1%3C85%3APAH%3E2,0,CO%3B2-R Nogucirc:s is curtently published by Blackwell Publishing, ‘Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at hhup:/www.jstororg/about/terms.huml. JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at butp:/swww jstor.org/journals/black hm, Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission, ISTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. hupulwwwjstor.org/ ‘Tuo May 3 15:54:51 2005Phenomenology and Hermeneutics Paut Ricoeur UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO This study will not be a contribution to the history of phenomenology, to its archeology, but mainly a questioning of the destiny of phenomenology today. And if I have chosen asa touchstone the general theory of interpretation or herme- neutics, that will not mean either that I would replace a historical monograph with a comparative history of con- temporary philosophy. Whatever may be the dependence of the present meditation on Heidegger and moreover on Gadamer, what is at stake is the possibility of continuing to do philosophy with them and after them—without forgetting Husserl." I propose for discussion the following two theses: First’ Thesis: What hermeneutics has ruined is not phenomenology, but one of its interpretations, namely its idealistic interpretation by Husserl himself; this is why I will hereafter speak of Husserlian idealism, I will use as a reference and a guide the Nachwort to the Ideen? and submit its principle theses to the critique of hermeneutics. The two sections of this first part will therefore be purely and simply antithetical. Second Thesis: Beyond a mere opposition, there exists between phenomenology and hermeneutics a mutual belonging which it is important to explicate. On the one hand, herme- neutics is built on the basis of phenomenology and thus preserves that from which it nevertheless differs: phenome- nology remains the indispensible presupposition of herme- neutics. On the other hand, phenomenology is not able to establish itself without a hermeneutical presupposition. The hermeneutical condition of phenomenology is linked to the role played by the Auslegung in the fulfillment of its philosophical task. Now 9 (1975) (©1975 by Indizna University 85a6 Nowls 1. THE HERMENEUTICAL CRITIQUE OF HUSSERLIAN IDEALISM ‘The first part of this essay secks to lay bare the divergence which separates the task of a hermeneutic from any idealistic expressions of phenomenology. One will find here only the development of the antithetical position between the two philosophical projects. Yet, one ‘expects to reserve the possibility that phenomenology as such is not exhausted by one of its interpretations, even that of Husserl himself. It is Husserlian idealism which, to my mind, succumbs to the critique of hermeneutical philosophy. 1. The Schematic Theses of Husserlian Idealism In order to meet the needs of a necessarily schematic discussion, T have taken as a typical document of Husserlian idealism the Nachwort to the Ideen. It constitutes, with the Cartesian Meditations [3], the most extreme expression of this idealism. From it [ have taken the few theses which follow, and which 1 will afterwards submit to the critique of hermeneutics. (a) The ideal of scientificity which phenomenology claims is not in continuity with the sciences, with their axioms, with their fundamental enterprise: the “ultimate justification” which constitutes phenomenology is of another order (Nachwort, “Preliminary Remark” and §7). This thesis, which expresses the dlaim to radicality by phenomenology is affirmed in a polemical style; it is the thesis of a combative philosophy which always has an enemy in sight: the enemy in this case being objectivism, naturalism, philosophy of life, anthropology. It proceeds by means of a radical disconnection which cannot be couched in a demonstrative argument, because from what would one deduce it? From a self-assertive style of claim to radicality which is only attested by the denial of what could deny it, Husserlian idealism begins. It is therefore fruitless to ask about the motivation of such a radical beginning; there is no reason internal to a given field which raises the question of origin. It is in this sense that the justification is a Selbst- Begriindung. (b) The principle foundation is on the order of intuition; to found is to see. In that way, the Nachwort confirms the