Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

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The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies states that one should avail all the means of
administrative processes provided by law before seeking the intervention of the court. This is applied in the
exercise of quasi-judicial power of administrative agency.
Effect of the Doctrine
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is held whenever there is available administrative
remedy that should be used up or exhausted before a recourse to judicial action.[1] This is in order to:
 Provide an orderly procedure prescribed by law with respect to matters peculiarly within the
competence of the administrative agency.[2]
 Give the agency an opportunity to decide on its own matters and to correct its own errors.[3][4]
 Prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court.[5]
The doctrine asserts that courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain cases
proper for determination by administrative agencies.[6]
Violation of the doctrine may dismiss a case due to lack of 'cause of action'.[7] A motion to dismiss must
be filled on this ground, otherwise it is deemed to be waived.

This doctrine is held in legal cases such as:

Exceptions to the Doctrine
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply:
 when the issue involved is a pure question of law
 when the due process is clearly violated
 when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
 when there is urgent need for judicial intervention
 when there is unreasonable delay or official inaction
 when there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy provided by law
 when there is estoppel on the part of the agency concerned
 when there is great and irreparable damage which can only be prevented by court action
 when the resort to administrative remedy will amount to the nullification of a claim
 when the law specifically provides that the issue shall be brought up to the court
 when the subject matter is private land in land case proceedings
Resources
General References:
Citations:
1. ↑ Aquino v. Mariano; G.R. No. L-30485 (1984)
2. ↑ Antonio v. Tanco; G.R. No. L-38135 (1975)
3. ↑ Zabat v. CA; G.R. No. 122089 (2000)
4. ↑ Bernardo v. Abalos, Sr.; G.R. No. 137266 (2001)
5. ↑ Lopez v. City of Manila; G.R. No. 127139 (1999)
6. ↑ Teotico v. Baer; G.R. No. 147464 (2006)
7. ↑ Paat v. CA; G.R. No. 111107 (1997)
See Also:
 Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action
 Doctrine of Primary Administrative Jurisdiction
 Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency
1. General Milling Corp. vs. Spouses Ramos, GR 193723, July 20, 2011Doctrine:

Article 1169 of the Civil Code states that: those obligated to deliver or to do something incur in delay from
the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation.
Demand is necessary for delay to exist unless the contract states that no such demand is needed.

Facts:

General Milling Corporation (GMC) entered into a Growers Contract with spouses Librado and Remedios
Ramos (Spouses Ramos). Under the contract, GMC was to supply broiler chickens for the spouses to raise
on their land. To guarantee full compliance, the Growers Contract was accompanied by a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over a piece of real property and a surety bond. Spouses Ramos eventually were unable to settle
their account with GMC. The property was extrajudicially foreclosed and GMC was the highest bidder.
Spouses Ramos questioned the validity of the foreclosure proceedings. The CA found that GMC made no
demand to spouses Ramos for the full payment of their obligation. A perusal of the letters presented and
offered as evidence by defendant-appellant GMC did not “demand” but only request spouses Ramos to go to
the office of GMC to “discuss” the settlement of their account.

Issue:

WON GMC made sufficient demand to the spouses Ramos to fulfill their obligation - NO

Held:

No. There are three requisites necessary for a finding of default. First, the obligation is demandable and
liquidated; second, the debtor delays performance; and third, the creditor judicially or extrajudicially requires
the debtor's performance. According to the CA, GMC did not make a demand on Spouses Ramos but merely
requested them to go to GMCs office to discuss the settlement of their account. In spite of the lack of demand
made on the spouses, however, GMC proceeded with the foreclosure proceedings. Neither was there any
provision in the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage allowing GMC to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage
without need of demand.Article 1169 of the Civil Code states that: those obligated to deliver or to do
something incur in delay from the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the
fulfillment of their obligation. However, the demand by the creditor shall not be necessary in order that delay
may exist, when the obligation or the law expressly so declares. The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage (contract)
in the instant case has no such provision stating that demand is not necessary for delay to exist. GMC should
have first made a demand on the spouses before proceeding to foreclose the real estate mortgage.

2. NEW SUN VALLEY HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. V. SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY,

BARANGAY SUN VALLEY, PARANAQUE CITY

G.R. No. 156686; July 27, 2011

J. Leonardo-De Castro

FACTS:

Respondent BSV Sangguniang Barangay issued Resolution No. 98-096, directing the opening of
Rosemallow and Aster Streets to vehicular and pedestrian traffic. Petitioner NSVHAI filed a Petition for a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Permanent Injunction with prayer for issuance of TRO with the RTC of
Paraaque City. Petitioner claimed therein that the implementation of BSV Resolution No. 98-096 would
cause grave injustice and irreparable injury as the affected homeowners acquired their properties for strictly
residential purposes. Executive Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort of the RTC issued a TRO.
In the Amended Petition, Petitioner argued that a Barangay Resolution cannot validly cause the opening of
the subject roads because under the law, an ordinance is required to effect such an act. The RTC dismissed
the Petition. The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the Orders of the RTC.

Petitioner alleged that the CA should not have relied on respondent’s claim of ownership, as this led to the
erroneous conclusion that there was no need to pass an ordinance. Petitioner also argued that the supposed
titles to the subject roads were never submitted to the RTC. On the other hand, Respondents alleged that the
issuance of the titles in favor of Paraaque over all the roads in Sun Valley Subdivision was an official act by
the land registration office of the City of Paranaque, and was perfectly within the judicial notice of the Courts.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the BSV Sangguniang Barangay should have passed an ordinance instead of a resolution to
open the subject roads.

RULING:

No, it is not necessary for BSV Sangguniang Barangay to pass an ordinance to open the subject roads.

The local government units power to close and open roads within its jurisdiction is clear under the Local
Government Code (LGC), Section 21 of which provides:

Section 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. (a) A local government unit
may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open any local
road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction: Provided, however, That in
case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3)
of all the members of the sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate substitute for
the public facility that is subject to closure is provided.

Section 21 of the LGC, which requires the passage of an ordinance by a local government unit to effect the
opening of a local road, does not apply to the instant case. The Rosemallow and Aster Streets have already
been donated by the Sun Valley Subdivision to, and the titles thereto already issued in the name of, the City
Government of Paraaque since 1964. Petitioner did not deny this fact. Hence, the road lots have already been
placed beyond the private rights or claims of Petitioner.

Therefore, an ordinance is not necessary to open the roads lots if their titles are already in the name of the
local government unit, which is the Barangay Sun Valley in this case.

3. URC vs Laguna Lake

Universal Robina Corp. vs. Laguna Lake Devt. Authority, G.R. No. 191427, May 30, 2011
Facts:
LLDA found that URC failed to comply with DENR Administrative Orders (DAOs) Nos. 34 and 35. Later,
after receiving a complaint, LLDA conducted another analysis of petitioners wastewater, which showed its
continued failure to conform to its effluent standard.

Despite subsequent compliance monitoring and inspections conducted by the LLDA, petitioners wastewater
failed to conform to the parameters set by the aforementioned DAOs and only in 2007 that URC’s upgraded
wastewater treatment facility was completed, which petitioners plant finally complied with government
standards.
Petitioner soon requested for a reduction of penalties to cover only a period of 560 days. However, after
conducting hearings, the LLDA issued its Order to Pay penalties for a total of 1,247 days amounting to PHP
1,247,000.00.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied by the LLDA, hence, a petition for certiorari was filed
before the Court of Appeals, attributing to LLDA grave abuse of discretion in disregarding its documentary
evidence, and maintaining that the lack of any plain, speedy or adequate remedy from the enforcement of
LLDAs order justified such recourse as an exception to the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies prior to judicial action.

The appellate court went on to chide petitioners petition for certiorari as premature since the law provides for
an appeal from decisions or orders of the LLDA to the DENR Secretary or the Office of the President, a
remedy which should have first been exhausted before invoking judicial intervention.

Petitioner cites deprivation of due process and lack of any plain, speedy or adequate remedy as grounds which
exempted it from complying with the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is exempted from complying with the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies.

Ruling:

No.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of
the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine is
obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and
convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress
has been completed.

Executive Order No. 192 was issued charging DENR with the task of promulgating rules and regulations for
the control of water, air and land pollution. It also created the Pollution Adjudication Board under the Office
of the DENR Secretary for the adjudication of pollution cases, including the latters role as arbitrator for
determining reparation, or restitution of the damages and losses resulting from pollution.

Petitioner had thus available administrative remedy of appeal to the DENR Secretary. Its contrary arguments
to show that an appeal to the DENR Secretary would be an exercise in futility as the latter merely adopts the
LLDAs findings is at best, speculative and presumptuous.

4. Republic v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253 March 2, 2007

Part 2
Republic v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253 March 2, 2007
FACTS  Case is a petition for certoriari, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed, with modifications, ruling by the RTC granting the complaint for
Specific Performance and damages filed by Lacap against RP
 Dist. Eng. Of Pampanga issued an invitation to bid dated Jan 27, 1992 where Lacap
and two other contractors were pre-qualified
 Being the lowest bidder, Lacap won the bid for concreting of a certain baranggay,
and thereafter undertook the works and purchased materials and labor in
connection with
 On Oct 29, 1992, Office of the Dist. Eng conducted final investigation of end
product and fount it 100% completed according to specs. Lacap thereafter sought
the payment of the DPWH
  DPWH withheld payment on the grounds that the CoA disapproved final release
of funds due to Lacap’s license as contractor having expired
 Dist. Eng sought the opinion of DPWH legal. Legal then responded to Dist. Eng
that the Contractors License Law (RA 4566) does not provide that a contract
entered into by a contractor after expiry of license is void and that there is no law
that expressly prohibits or declares void such a contract
 DPWH Legal Dept, through Dir III Cesar Mejia, issued First Indorsement on July
20 1994 recommending that payment be made to Lacap. Despite such
recommendation, no payment was issued
 On July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance and
Damages against petitioner before the RTC.14
 On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint
states no cause of action and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of
the action since respondent did not appeal to the COA the decision of the District
Auditor to disapprove the claim.
 Following the submission of respondent’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss,the
RTC issued an Order dated March 11, 1996 denying the Motion to Dismiss. The
OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 but it was likewise denied by the RTC
in its Order dated May 23, 1996.
 On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking the defenses of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of non-suability of the
State
 Following trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, 1997 a decision ordering
DPWH to pay Lacap for the contract of the project, 12% interest from demand
until fully paid, and the costs of the suit
 CA affirmed the decision but lowered interest to 6%
ISSUE WON a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for completed projects
RULING A contractor with an expired license is entitled payment for completed projects, but
does not exonerate him from corresponding fines thereof. Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566
explicitly provides:
“SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits
or attempts to submit a bid to construct, or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or
assumes charge in a supervisory capacity of a construction work within the purview of
this Act, without first securing a license to engage in the business of contracting in this
country; or who shall present or file the license certificate of another, give false
evidence of any kind to the Board, or any member thereof in obtaining a certificate or
license, impersonate another, or use an expired or revoked certificate or license, shall
be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a
fine of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos. The
"plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear,
plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
interpretation. The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare, expressly
or impliedly, as void contracts entered into by a contractor whose license had already
expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment of the fine prescribed
therein. Thus, respondent should be paid for the projects he completed. Such payment,
however, is without prejudice to the payment of the fine prescribed under the law.

Republic Vs. Lacap

Facts:

The District Engineer of Pampanga, issued and duly published an “invitation to bid”, where Lacap
wasawarded as the lowest bidder. Accordingly, the latter undertook the works, made advances for the
purchase of materials and payment for labor costs. On October 29, 1992 the office of the DE issued
Certification of Final Inspection and Acceptance for100% completion of project in accordance with
specifications. The respondent sought to collect payment but Department of Public Works and Highways
withheld payment after the District Auditor of Commission on Audit disapproved final release of funds on
the ground that contractor’s license had expired. Opinion of the DPWH Legal Department was sought by the
District Engineer. The former then responded that RA No. 4566 does not provide that a contract entered into
after the license has expired is void and that there is no law which expressly prohibits such a contract void.
Furthermore, Cesar D. Mejia, Director III of the Legal Department in a First Endorsement, recommended the
payment should be made to Carwin Construction. However, no payment was made. On July 3, 1995,
respondent filed the complaint through Office of the Solicitor General for Specific Performance and Damages
against petitioner before the RTC. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on September 14, 1995
on the grounds that complaint states no cause of action and RTC had no jurisdiction since respondent did not
appeal to COA. RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss.The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was
likewise denied by RTC, in its order on May 23,1996. On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking
defense of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and doctrine of non-suability of the State.Following
the trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, 1997 its decision ordering the DPWH to pay thecontract price
plus interest at 12% from demand until fully paid and the costs of the suit.

Issue:

Whether or not a contractor with an expired license at the time of execution of its contract isentitled to be
paid for completed projects?

Held:

Yes. The petitioner must be required to pay the contract price since it has accepted the completed projectand
enjoyed the benefits thereof. To allow petitioner to acquire the finished project at no cost wouldundoubtedly
constitute unjust enrichment for the petitioner to the prejudice of respondent. Such unjustenrichment is not
allowed by law.

5.

6. MARK JEROME S. MAGLALANG vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING

CORPORATION (PAGCOR). G.R. No. 190566, December 11, 2013

Facts:
Petitioner was a teller at the Casino Filipino, Angeles City Branch, Angeles City, which was operated by
respondent PAGCOR, a government-owned or controlled corporation existing by virtue of PD No. 1869. On
December 13, 2008, Petitioner was approached by Cecilia Nakasato and handed to him an undetermined
amount of cash. There were 45 P1,000.00 and ten P500.00 bills for the total amount of P50,000.00. Following
casino procedure, petitioner laid the bills on the spreading board. However, he erroneously spread the bills
into only four clusters instead of five clusters worth P10,000.00 per cluster. He then placed markers for
P10,000.00 each cluster of cash and declared the total amount of P40,000.00 to Cecilia and dished out
40,000.00. Cecilia questioned him about it pointing to the first cluster of bills and requesting petitioner to
check the first cluster which she observed to be thicker than the others. Petitioner performed a recount and
found that the said cluster contained 20 pieces of P1,000.00 bills. Petitioner apologized to Cecilia and
rectified the error by declaring the full and correct amount. Petitioner, however, averred that Cecilia accused
him of trying to shortchange her and that petitioner tried to deliberately fool her. Petitioner tried to explain,
but Cecilia allegedly continued to berate and curse him. To ease the tension, petitioner was asked to take a
break. After ten minutes, petitioner returned to his booth and Cecilia allegedly showed up and continued to
berate him. They were then invited to the Internal Security Office in order to air their respective sides and
petitioner was required to file an Incident Report which he submitted on the same day.

On January 8, 2009, petitioner received a Memorandum issued by the casino’s Branch Manager, Alexander
Ozaeta, informing him that he was being charged with Discourtesy towards a casino customer and directing
him to explain within 72 hours upon receipt why he should not be sanctioned or dismissed. In compliance,
petitioner submitted a letter-explanation dated January 10, 2009.

On March 31, 2009, petitioner received another Memorandum dated March 19, 2009, stating that the Board
of Directors of PAGCOR found him guilty of Discourtesy towards a casino customer and imposed on him a
30-day suspension for this first offense. On April 2, 2009, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration seeking a reversal of the board’s decision and further prayed in the alternative that if he is
indeed found guilty as charged, the penalty be a reprimand as it is the appropriate penalty. On April 20, 2009,
petitioner also filed a Motion for Production dated April 20, 2009, praying that he be furnished with copies
of documents relative to the case but said motion was denied in a letter-reply dated June 2, 2009 (received
by petitioner on June 17, 2009) by one Atty. Carlos R. Bautista, Jr.

Subsequently, on June 18, 2009, PAGCOR issued a Memorandum and received by Petitioner of the same
date practically reiterating the contents of its March 19, 2009 Memorandum with an attached
Memorandum dated June 8, 2009 issued by PAGCOR’s Assistant Vice President for Human Resource and
Development, Atty. Lizette F. Mortel, informing petitioner that the Board of Directors resolved to deny his
appeal for reconsideration for lack of merit.

On August 17, 2009, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, before the CA, averring that there is no evidence, much less factual and legal basis
to support the finding of guilt against him. Moreover, petitioner ascribed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the acts of PAGCOR in adjudging him guilty of the charge, in failing to
observe the proper procedure in the rendition of its decision and in imposing the harsh penalty of a 30-day
suspension. Justifying his recourse to the CA, petitioner explained that he did not appeal to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) because the penalty imposed on him was only a 30-day suspension which is not within
the CSC’s appellate jurisdiction.

On September 30, 2009, the CA outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari for being premature as
petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking recourse from the CA, invoking Section
2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, in holding that the CSC has jurisdiction over issues involving
the employer-employee relationship in all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters such as
PAGCOR. Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in the assailed
Resolution dated November 26, 2009.

Issue:
WON the CA was correct in outrightly dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it on the ground of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies?

Ruling:
We resolve the question in the negative. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before
a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all
the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity
to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first
before the court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is
fatal to one’s cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and
legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier
disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will
shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with,
so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the
case.
However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits of the following
exceptions:
(1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3) when
the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is
estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when
the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and
assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private
land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay
would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) where no administrative review is provided by law; (13)
where the rule of qualified political agency applies and (14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies has been rendered moot.
The case before us falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no administrative
review for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by Civil Service law, rules
and regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more than 30 days.

Correlatively, we are not unaware of the Concurring Opinion of then Chief Justice Puno in CSC v.
Dacoycoy, where he opined, to wit:

In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is not categorically sanctioned by the Civil Service Law. For what the
law declares as “final” are decisions of heads of agencies involving suspension for not more than thirty (30)
days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days salary. But there is a clear policy reason for declaring
these decisions final. These decisions involve minor offenses. They are numerous for they are the usual
offenses committed by government officials and employees. To allow their multiple level appeal will
doubtless overburden the quasi-judicial machinery of our administrative system and defeat the expectation
of fast and efficient action from these administrative agencies. Nepotism, however, is not a petty offense. Its
deleterious effect on government cannot be over-emphasized. And it is a stubborn evil. The objective should
be to eliminate nepotic acts, hence, erroneous decisions allowing nepotism cannot be given immunity from
review, especially judicial review. It is thus non sequitur to contend that since some decisions exonerating
public officials from minor offenses can not be appealed, ergo, even a decision acquitting a government
official from a major offense like nepotism cannot also be appealed.
Decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final and unappealable by law are still subject to
judicial review. Decisions of administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are declared by law
final and unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof
of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. When such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies
grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate
to reverse the factual findings. Thus, the decision of the Ombudsman may be reviewed, modified or
reversed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on a finding that it had no
jurisdiction over the complaint, or of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction.

It bears stressing that the judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this case before the CA is a special civil
action for certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of PAGCOR, not an appeal. Suffice it to state that an appeal and a special civil action such as certiorari
under Rule 65 are entirely distinct and separate from each other. One cannot file petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules where appeal is available, even if the ground availed of is grave abuse of discretion. A
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to
appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, as the same should not be a substitute for the lost
remedy of appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
successive. In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law in view of petitioner’s allegation that PAGCOR has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the CA’s outright dismissal of the
petition for certiorari on the basis of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing
and should therefore be set aside. Finally, as a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid only when
the question involved is an error of jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions. Hence, courts
exercising certiorari jurisdiction should refrain from reviewing factual assessments of the respondent court
or agency. Occasionally, however, they are constrained to wade into factual matters when the evidence on
record does not support those factual findings; or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the
bare or incomplete facts appearing on record. Considering the circumstances and since this Court is not a
trier of facts, remand of this case to the CA for its judicious resolution is in order.