Article

Mixed Messages: Iran versus Contemporary Review

of the Middle East
Saudi Arabia and GCC 5(4) 365–386
2018 Sage Publications India
Private Limited
SAGE Publications
sagepub.in/home.nav
DOI: 10.1177/2347798918795937
http://journals.sagepub.com/home/cme

Debbie Abuelghanam1
Naser Tahboub1

Abstract
Much has been written about the relationship between Iran and the Gulf states.
This relationship, while extremely complex, historic as well as deep rooted,
needs to be revisited, especially in the light of the growing discords. This article
investigates the contest over the balance of power in the Middle East which is
impacted by state interests, foreign policy, ideology, sectarianism, and geography.
There are three questions that need to be asked: (a) What role does Iran play in
the Gulf region? (b) What is its relationship with the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC)? and (c) Is there room for the two regional powers (Iran and Saudi Arabia)
in the Gulf region? Iran’s role in the Middle East has expanded exponentially
by both diplomatic means as well as by proxy and direct interventions. It has
become apparent that while once Saudi Arabia controlled the GCC, due to
recent events, the regional group has become trivialized. As Saudi Arabia and
Iran vie for power, the Gulf is tension-filled and fraught with the possibility of
misperceptions and miscalculations.

Keywords
Iran, Saudi Arabia, GCC, Gulf region, Persian Gulf

Introduction
In March 2017, Saudi Arabia granted access to Iranian pilgrims to perform the
Hajj, one of the five pillars of Islam. While the rhetoric between the two major
political powers in the Middle East remained high, this might be considered a

1
Assistant Professor, Prince Al Hussein bin Abdullah II School of International Studies, University of
Jordan, Amman, Jordan.
Corresponding author:
Debbie Abuelghanam, Assistant Professor, Prince Al Hussein bin Abdullah II School of International
Studies, University of Jordan, Amman 11942, Jordan.
E-mail: da.abuelghanam@yahoo.com
366 Contemporary Review of the Middle East 5(4)

major breakthrough in their bilateral relations (The New Arab, 2017). However,
a subsequent development could have an impact on this breakthrough.
A problem within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which is composed of
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates
(UAE), occurred between Qatar, on the one side, and Saudi Arabia, UAE,
Bahrain (also joined by Egypt), on the other. The accusation was that Qatar has
supported terrorism and in general, been destabilizing the region. This problem,
mostly between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, has been festering for at least two
decades. And one of the major sources of problems has come from Qatar trying
to improve relations with Iran (Robbins, 2017).
These two events seem to be at variance. However, they raise the issue of the
relationship that Iran has with the Gulf region, and the GCC in particular, keeping
in mind that Saudi Arabia considers the GCC and the Gulf region to be its sphere
of influence. In addition, Iran wants to be a regional player and to spread its
sphere of influence, and will this further complicate and change the balance of
power in the region?
The Gulf region itself is of great importance in terms of location. However,
there are many factors that can increase its significance. There is the economic
importance that is represented by the richness of the Gulf in terms of oil resources
and minerals, in addition to it being an avenue for trade and military ships.
Furthermore, the ideological factor has increased the degree of conflict in the
Gulf. Iran has sought to extend its influence in the Gulf by the occupation of the
three Emirate islands, interfering with the internal affairs of the GCC states, and
both the Yemeni and Syrian crises. These have led to the escalation of differences
and fear of the Iranian policies, which has intensified the tension in the region.
Iran’s ultimate goal is to become a regional power, especially after its success in
reaching an agreement over its nuclear program with the international community.
The end result is that the Gulf countries have a bigger challenge to preserve their
security, stability, and maintenance of a balance of power in the region.
This article analyzes these trends from a Gulf–Arab perspective and is just one
piece of the intricate, multifaceted puzzle concerning the very complicated
relationship between Iran and its GCC neighbors.

Factors Influencing Iranian Foreign Policy

The security determinant became clear after the Islamic Revolution of 1979,
whereby Iran sought to export its revolution to neighboring Arab countries. This
caused a lack of mutual trust in the region based on the legacy of conflicts and
wars. Additionally, the multiplicity of ethnicities seeking autonomy increased
tension between Iran and its neighbors, which exasperated the need for security.
These ethnic groups include Kurds, Turkmen, Azerbaijanis, and the Arabs. This is
further complicated by sectarian groups including the Sunni, the Shi’a, and the
Christians. The economic issue was seen as the foundation for the Islamic
Revolution, which sought to get rid of the foreign dependency restrictions and
Abuelghanam and Tahboub 367

achieve influence within the global economic level by relying on benefiting from
the oil resources. Following the revolution, Iran pursued a market economy and
growth in exports as it moved toward a capitalistic system (Deshiri & Majidi,
2008–2009).
Iran is trying to activate its role to become a key player in the regional equation.
It has done this by showing its dominance in the region and developing its military
and war techniques at the expense of developing its political institutions. This can
be seen by the development of the nuclear ability and the nuclear program.
On the basis of the former determinants which crystalized after the Iranian–
Islamic Revolution and by trying to understand the political behavior of Iran, one
has to discuss the Iranian foreign political goals. Iran does not get involved with
international policies which are not compatible with its political independence.
It goes along to get along, which means Iran respects the policies of the larger
powers in the region as long as they are sensitive to Iran’s political and economic
interests in the region. It has focused on its bilateral as well as multilateral
relations, cooperating with “Muslim-majority countries and nonaligned states;
to reduce tensions and manage disagreements with other states to foster peace and
security at both the regional and the international levels through positive
engagement” (Zarif, 2014, p. 1).
Since the late 1990s, Iran has favored regionalism. Due to its problems with
the GCC, which emerged as a response to Iran, Tehran has favored a new regional
organization for the Persian Gulf area, “one that would include Iran and perhaps
even Iraq but which would exclude the US and other extra-regional powers”
(Herzig, 2004, p. 506). As far as participating in other regional organizations is
concerned, Iran has been isolated for its anti-American rhetoric. The pursuit
toward “exporting” the revolution to neighboring countries by supporting Islamic
political movements, Iran kicks off its support to these movements from its faith
in the idea of a dogmatic ideology (Abdel Rakhman, 2004).
Iran is trying to be a regional power to pursue maintaining and strengthening
its interests. For example, it plays an important role territorially in the Syrian
crisis, but this role cannot be compared to its political involvement. Russia, the
United States, and Turkey lead the political scene. However, Iran’s attempts at
exporting their revolution is considered one of the main factors for its dispute with
neighboring countries due to its interference with these countries and supporting
the opposition movements within them.
Iran is aware of the importance of the region and always wants to project its
power in a rational way, in which it does not enter into a conflict with any powerful
country, while keeping its influence within the region.

Stages of Development and Regression

It is clear that there is an Iranian project in the region that poses a threat to the Gulf
countries, due to its insistence to export their revolution. The degree of dissemina-
tion is softened and increased depending on the clash between the reformists and
368 Contemporary Review of the Middle East 5(4)

the conservatives. The cyclical nature of these political groups affects the pro-
gress or regression in the relationship between the two groups.
At the beginning of the Islamic Republic, Iran announced it would return to the
incorporation of the Islamic speech rule (Rawabat Center for Strategic Studies,
2015). Furthermore, Ayatollah Khomeini specifically stated his intention to export
the revolution to the neighboring countries and the region. This knowledge
became embedded in the Gulf countries’ psyche as to the inevitability of the
Iranian danger. Iraq was, by virtue of its large Shi’a population as well as a neigh-
bor, a perfect candidate for exportation. The Iraqi–Iranian War commenced one
year after the creation of the Islamic Republic and continued until 1989.
At the same time, the Iranian–Saudi Arabian relationship regressed as well,
especially when Iran consistently attacked and criticized the USA and their allies
in the region. Iran considered itself the only defender of Islam. In the face of these
trends, Saudi developed a policy when King Fahad released a decree in 1986 that
stated not to use the words “his majesty” and instead use “custodian of the two
holy mosques.” In 1987, the crisis reached its peak between Iran and Saudi Arabia
and “Hajj, Khomeini believed, was a political as well as religious duty, while
Saudi Arabia insisted it was a purely religious function” (Ramazani, 2004,
p. 555). Iran was making the pilgrimage season an occasion to denounce the USA
and Saudi Arabia asked for help. In 1986–1987, the Reagan Administration sold
Saudi Arabia five airborne warning and control systems (Bents, 1995) to assist the
Saudi defense against any possible Iranian attack. The bilateral relations between
the Iranians and Saudis got to the point of breaking off all diplomatic ties in 1988.
However, there was an improvement after the Second Gulf War in 1990, where
the Iranian and Saudi positions were in harmony as both rejected the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait.
In 1989, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a reformer, became president. While in
power, he adopted a policy of neutrality and noninterference in other countries’
affairs. Furthermore, he stated that there was no reason for a conflict with the
countries of the Gulf. Iran stopped its boycott of the hajj pilgrimage and
participated in the Islamic Conference Summit, which was held in Jeddah in 1989.
Through his invitation to King Fahad to visit Iran, Rafsanjani attempted to
improve relations. Rafsanjani’s goal was economic in nature and to get organization
of petroleum exporting countries to raise their oil production quotas. However,
this invitation caused wide protests from the conservatives in Iran and they started
attacking Saudi Arabia through their newspapers, which caused a setback in the
relationship between the two sides (Herzig, 2004).
In 1994, the relationship was further strained when Iran rejected an international
arbitration and Rafsanjani announced that Iran would not give up the three islands
(Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb) to the UAE which prevented the
improvement and full normalization of the relationships. It should be noted that
the UAE claims were not internationally recognized. This event indicates that the
improvement of the Iranian–Arabian Gulf relations was not dependent on the
Iranians sacrificing their national interests to solve the dispute (Okruhlik &
Conge, 1999).
Abuelghanam and Tahboub 369

The situation continued to improve during the term of President Sayyad

Mohammad Khatami, who helped to move Iran from a foreign policy of
confrontation to one of conciliation. Iran backed away from the idea of exporting
the revolution and lessened its interference in the internal affairs of the Gulf–Arab
countries. He brought Iran further out of isolation by normalizing relations with
countries like Jordan, Morocco and even began negotiations with Egypt, and
terrorist activities also ceased under Khatami (Mozaffari, 1999).
An example of the Iranian and Saudi Arabian convergence, which also reflects
a part of the Iranian–Gulf convergence, was the signing of a security agreement
between Saudi Arabia and Iran that aimed to fight money laundering, crime, and
smuggling on 17 April 2001. This agreement was significant to their relationship
because it played a role in strengthening the trust between the Gulf countries and
Iran. It should be noted that Iran and Saudi Arabia are the central figures in the
consolidation of the political policies in the Gulf region. Although the agreement
has nonpolitical goals, it also carries political implications that indicated the
convergence between the two sides (Mirak-Weissback, 2001).

Right from the start, Prince Naif [Interior Minister at the time] made it clear that the
Kingdom was keen on establishing good relations with all the countries and especially
those in the region. Prince Naif’s message was clear and unambiguous. Iran’s security
was akin to Saudi Arabia’s security and vice versa, he said …The Iranians’ intentions
toward the Gulf Cooperation Council are good. They are willing to settle all disputes in
an amicable manner. (Al-Maeena, 2001)

The improvement of the Iranian–Gulf relations was reflected economically where

the Iranian–Saudi trade reached US$150 million and the number of common
investment projects reached 12. Trade relations continued to rise and reached
US$250 million in 2005 (Mubaydeen, 2008). It is mentioned that the economic
convergence of Iran and the Gulf did not only include Saudi Arabia but also
included the Iranian–Emeriti and Iranian–Bahraini relations.
Culturally, the Iranian–Saudi Arabian relationship has evolved, which was first
seen in 2005 when the Iranian President Sayyed Mohammad Khatami opened up the
Iranian Cultural Week in the King Fahd culture center in Riyadh. It was sponsored by
the Iranian Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance and Iran’s Islamic Culture and
Relations Organization. It was to strengthen the relations between Iran and Saudi
Arabia and confirmed the primacy of the relationship and the factor of Islamic
civilization which brings the two sides together (Samarid, 2004).
When the reformists were in power in Iran, there had been advancements espe-
cially in the area of foreign policy. In 1989, there were constitutional changes in the
way that foreign policy was conducted. The president consolidated the powers
related to foreign policy within the presidential office. “Under the reformed consti-
tution, the foreign minister reports directly to the president, who heads the council
of ministers. Thus, implementation of foreign-policy initiatives through the foreign
ministry is also monitored through the president’s office” (Ehteshami, 2002, p. 292).
Although there are other actors involved in foreign policy, the president takes the
central role.
370 Contemporary Review of the Middle East 5(4)

In 2005, the conservatives took control of the parliament and the presidency
was under the leadership of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Iran once again began
exporting their revolution in the region. Consequently, tensions were evident in
the statements between the Iranians and the Arabian–Gulf countries. However, the
Iranian foreign policy was multifaceted and the president maintained a confronta-
tional approach toward the West, especially with regard to the issue of nuclear
power/weapons. Yet within the Middle Eastern region, the Persian Gulf area in
particular, he worked to develop closer ties. More specifically:

Iran sought to firstly develop relations with the regional states, secondly undermine the
emerging concerns regarding its nuclear activities, thirdly take stance against allega-
tions based on Iranian hegemonism in the region, particularly those of Iran’s attempt at
forming a Shiite Crescent and finally reach an asymmetrical balance against the U.S.
through interaction with the regional states. (Haji-Yousefi, 2010, p. 10)

Hassan Rouhani, a reformer, was elected president in 2013. His election

provided a new chance to reduce the tension. In a letter, hand delivered to Iran
by Kuwait on behalf of the GCC, revealed the latter’s desire to take advantage
of this opportunity.

The message and its content focused on laying the foundations for a joint dialogue
based on the abstention from interfering in Gulf affairs and respecting the sovereignty
of the GCC states and all the U.N. [Security] Council articles. It will be a breakthrough
in the bilateral relations between the Gulf and Iran. (Al-Monitor, 2017)

The Kuwaiti Foreign Minister transmitted the letter and met with the Iranian
Foreign Minister to try to open up the doors to improve the relationships, especially
the Iranian–Saudi Arabia and the Iranian–Bahrain bilateral ties.
The Gulf letter had general information and did not go into the details of the
bilateral relations, which means that any positive development unfortunately
depends on Iran. This seriousness is important to crystalize in Iran’s policies of
non-interference in the Persian Gulf. So the Iranian–Arabian Gulf relationship
will be a factor in the development within a narrow margin that is governed by
strategic interests, and ideological dimensions, in addition to the principles of the
Islamic revolution and how much the cohesion of the ruling system will have an
effect on the development or regression of this relationship.

Obstacles Preventing the Development of the Gulf–

Iranian Relations
The strategic location as well as the geopolitical importance of the Gulf and its
Arab countries impacted many political events which later became obstacles
that prevented the healing of the Iranian–Arabian Gulf rift. These obstacles are
as follows:
Abuelghanam and Tahboub 371

The Eight Year War between Iran and Iraq

The ramifications of the Iran–Iraq War have affected as well as complicated the
Iranian–Arab Gulf rift. It had been “a contest of ideologies and a competition for
power” (Takeyh, 2010, p. 367). The legacy of the war is the use of sectarianism and
the war opened the door to these tactics. The use of the division of Sunni versus
Shi’a contest is taken directly from this conflict. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran

are primarily motivated by politics and competition for influence and power, culmi-
nating into the wide scale proxy conflict that has destabilized several countries of
the region. As such, sectarian conflict will continue to shape the region into the foresee-
able future. Proxy battles being fought between Iran and Saudi Arabia throughout the
region in Iraq, Syria and Yemen are causing these nations to be torn apart by deepen-
ing fault lines of Shia versus Sunni and Persian versus Arab forged during the Iran–
Iraq War. (Hamrah, 2016)

This negatively impacted the region but also the war itself has had major
consequences for the GCC countries.
The Iran–Iraq War and the Iranian exporting of revolution posed direct threat
to the Gulf–Arab region and were major impetuses in the creation of the GCC in
1981. The GCC either allied with Iraq or remained neutral, depending on the
country. They still tried to achieve better ties with Iran when the opportunity
presented itself (Nonneman, 2004). Iranian influence is currently omnipresent in
the state of Iraq. This influence has caused numerous problems including fueling
sectarianism. This situation was created by the American occupation followed by
Iranian influence.

The Impact of the three Emirati Islands

The border dispute that exists between the UAE and Iran is one of the numerous
disputes that have existed since the early twentieth century. They are the vestiges
of “colonialism and foreign intervention.” The borders were forced by actors
outside the region, after the demise of the Ottoman Empire in the hopes of
creating spheres of influence. Many borders were left ambiguous which was not
seen as a problem until the discovery of vast oil reserves in the region (Okruhlik
& Conge, 1999).
One example of these ambiguous borders concerns the ownership of the Emirati
Islands of Abu Musa, the larger Tunb Island, and the smaller Tunb Island. These
three islands would not be a bone of contention between Iran and the UAE, except
for their location. These islands are strategically located in close proximity of
many Gulf countries and can control the flow of oil by closing the Straits of
Hurmuz. Therefore, they can influence the countries that rely on the straits for their
economic survival. Iran, by occupying these islands, wants to control the navigation
lanes and whatever riches theses three islands can produce (Al-Kaabi, 1994).
372 Contemporary Review of the Middle East 5(4)

There have been three major flashpoints in the resolving of this dispute, in 1971,
1992, and 2008. The first was the year that the British were to withdraw from the
region and it was also in that same year that the UAE was formed. An agreement
was made that neither Iran nor Sharjah (one of the seven islands of the UAE and
has made a historic claim to the three islands) would give up their rights to the
islands, nor would they acknowledge the other side’s claims. Both would maintain
a presence on the islands. This agreement was made under the threat of Iranian
force, if not accepted, and Britain wanted to avoid a conflict. This agreement was
not challenged by Sharjah but was maintained (Al-Kaabi, 1994).
The second flashpoint was 1992, during a period where the relations between
Iran and the GCC were at odds under Rafsanjani. He wanted to increase the
presence of Iran on the islands, with the construction of an airport on Abu Musa
and a power station on the Greater Tunb Island (Cronin & Masalha, 2011).
Furthermore, the Iranians increased their troops on Abu Musa as well as deported
the expatriates (Okruhlik & Conge, 1999).
The third flashpoint was in 2008. At a Non-Aligned Movement meeting, held
in Tehran in 2008, the UAE called for the resolution of the conflict over the three
islands. It called for the removal of Iranian installations. The UAE has always
called for a diplomatic solution because it is not able to compete militarily with
Iran. However, it has not been able to gather the necessary international support
to get Iran to the negotiating table (Cronin & Masalha, 2011).
The UAE also does not want to disrupt the economic cooperation between the
two countries since it is considered Iran’s greatest business associate.

According to the Iranian Business Council, Dubai is home to 8,000 Iranian businesses
and 1,200 trading companies. Capital flows from Iran to Dubai in search of profit,
and Iranian investment in Dubai now reaches US$14 billion each year, the IBC vice-
president estimating the accumulated assets of Iranians in the UAE to be about US$300
billion. (Cronin & Masalha, 2011, p. 30; also see, Habibi, 2010)

It is apparent from the aforementioned economic information that economic

issues trump politics and diplomacy.

The Iranian Influence in Iraq

When discussing the Iranian influence in Iraq, it must be remembered that the
Iranian’s desire to obtain influence in Iraq has a long history. With the American
occupation of Iraq in 2003, the opportunity became available for Iran to extend its
influence when a power vacuum was created. Many strategies were employed that
created fertile ground for imposing its influence. One such strategy was the
attempt to unify the Shi’a parties in pursuit of achieving political influence and
participation. Iran also encouraged other individuals and groups to become
involved politically, for example, the Sadrists. Iran worked on training and arming
many Iraqi militias like the “Lead of the Righteous” and the Mahdi army.
Moreover, the Iraqi religious men, who were educated in Iran, played a political
Abuelghanam and Tahboub 373

role by promoting the idea of the Iranian state of Fiqih (Felter & Fishman, 2008;
Katzman, 2006).
Economically, Iran strengthened its trade and economic ties with Iraq with the
goals of financial gains and the ability to influence Iraq. According to reports,
the trade between the two countries has reached US$12 billion in 2013, although
the trade balance is largely in Tehran’s favor (Al-Hayat, 2014). Through inundat-
ing Iraq with products and consumer goods that are cheap and subsidized, the
Islamic Republic undermined the Iraqi agriculture and manufacturing sectors,
which caused an Iraqi resentment. Iran’s construction of dams and diversion of
the rivers that feed the Shatt Al-Arab waterway, undermined the Iraqi agriculture
in the south and hampered the efforts of restoring the marshlands in Iraq
(The wall of water between Iran and Iraq, n.d.).
It is clear that in the Iraqi arena Iran achieved a major political influence by
supporting the political parties that are characterized with sectarian, cultural, and
social with religious connotations. Economically, Iraq has become a major market
for the Iranian exports, albeit unbalanced. Additionally, the “War on Terror” and
extremist organizations in Iraq have impacted the expansion of the Iranian sphere
of influence. The war against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) gave Iran
the chance to operate on the Iraqi soil, whether by fighting or training the militias.
And at the end of the day, the sectarianism which was created by the American
occupation has been bolstered by the different Iraqi governments with a major
impact on Iranian domination in the Iraqi arena.

Iranian Interference in GCC Countries

GCC
The GCC was formed in 1981 following several major events: the withdraw of
the British; the forming of nation states—UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait
(Saudi Arabia was the only GCC country in existence prior to the British
withdraw); and the Iranian Revolution and the Iran–Iraq War. It is not a cohesive
internal organization unless there is a perceived threat from the outside. There is
a lack of trust among the members as well as a concern about the Saudi hegemony
(Al-Hamad, 1997). The two major focuses of the organization are security and
economics. For the purpose of this article, the authors stress the security focus.
There are both internal and external security concerns.
The first issue is population and the reliance on expatriate populations. Most of
the Gulf–Arab countries have limited numbers of citizens, except Saudi Arabia.
They rely mainly on expatriates that can number in the millions. They not only
rely on them for manpower, but for the military as well, and “GCC militaries have
had to rely on maintaining a qualitative edge in armament to make up for lack of
manpower” (Kahwaji, 2003, p. 517).
The second issue is one of economics, and the supplies of oil and gas, which
are not distributed evenly. Bahrain, Yemen, and Oman have limited oil reserves
left. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE will have vast resources
374 Contemporary Review of the Middle East 5(4)

into the future. While all six countries are in the process of diversifying, any major
changes in economics have the potential for affecting the security and stability of
each of them (Ulrichsen, 2009).
The third issue is the lack of internal cohesiveness, within the GCC itself.
There is a lack of trust among the leadership of the GCC. Each questions the
intention of the other members and perceives them as a potential threat. This
suspicion is based on sensitivities, national interests, and issues originating from
the tribes and dynasties. Many agreements are achieved at the bilateral level and
not through the GCC. There is a worry among smaller states of Saudi hegemony,
especially in relation to Saudi involvement in several regional disputes, for
example, Yemen. Decisions in the GCC are taken unanimously, which is hard to
achieve. The GCC cannot even agree on the threats that the member-states face or
on the decisions that need to be taken to address such threats (Al-Hamad, 1997;
Ulrichsen, 2009).
When it comes to its interference in other countries’ internal affairs, Iran has
gone after the control over the oil fields which are co-owned by both Iran and the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom of Bahrain revealed the links between
Tehran and the executioners of the bombing in the town of Karana in August
2015. It was alleged that the bomb was similar to one confiscated from Iran.
Additionally, in July 2015, an attempt was foiled to smuggle in weapons from Iran
(Al Arabiya English, 2015).
There are examples of intervention that are pointed out by reports that explicitly
demonstrate the work of Iranian intelligence inside the Gulf countries. Iran has
distributed its spy cells throughout the GCC countries as well as in the wider
Middle East (Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon) with the goal of amassing information
about the economic and military actions for later use. Perhaps one of the best
cases is illustrated by Kuwait. In 2010, a surveillance cell was discovered
belonging to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRG). There were calls for the
expulsion of the Iranian Ambassador but the existence of the spy cell was
vehemently denied by Iran. “The claim about identification and discovery of a spy
web in Kuwait is in line with the [enemy] project to spread IRGC-phobia in the
region.” This statement came from the Revolutionary Guard’s public relations
head, Gen. Ramezan Sharif (Los Angeles Times, 2010).
In 2015, there was the Abdali case. A Shiite terror cell with 26 members was
uncovered with links to the IRG and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Twenty of those
arrested received sentences ranging from 5 to 15 years but an appeals court freed
most of those convicted. A Supreme Court ruling in June 2017 went further by
rescinding the acquittals and awarding lesser sentences. Fourteen of the 20
reportedly have fled back to Iran. This case sparked a diplomatic controversy,
where 14 Iranian diplomats as well as the Iranian ambassador were ejected from
the country on 20 July 2017 as well as the closure of all military and cultural
operations. Once again the Iranians denied any connections. The controversy
came amidst Kuwait’s efforts to ease tensions between the GCC and the Iranians
(Cafiero, 2017).
Abuelghanam and Tahboub 375

The Iranian Nuclear File

The Iranian nuclear program with its different phases also poses a security threat
to the Gulf countries. It will affect the regions power balance and will prevent the
existence of a common security formula in the Gulf. Iran has had a goal for its
nuclear program which was to enhance its international political status by
increasing its regional influence. Domestically, Iran wants to use the nuclear
power to be able to produce power.
As for the Gulf view of the Iranian nuclear program, it differs from one country
to another because no one is sure of Iran’s intention to use its nuclear power for
military purposes. With Saudi Arabia rejecting the program and demanding to shut
it down, there are other countries like Kuwait that have confirmed Iran’s right to
own nuclear power for peaceful purposes. Additionally, the Kingdom of Bahrain
supported it by confirming the importance of the regional emptiness of nuclear
arms and that it is a right of any country to own nuclear power for peaceful
purposes. However, the government has voiced opposition to Iran wanting nuclear
weapons for offensive purposes. This would contradict the Bahraini perspective
for the use of diplomacy rather than a military option (Fulton, n.d.).
One of the numerous effects that have been caused by the Iranian nuclear
agreement is the change of the power balance in favor of Iran. The nuclear
agreement took into account the interests of the ones signing it (Iran and the West)
without looking into the Iranian obsessions, as the nuclear agreement caused an
escalation of tension in the Gulf region. The Iran deal is “actually rewarding it
with sanctions relief, will embolden hard-liners in Tehran to pursue more
aggressive policies” (Alcaro, 2015, p. 1). However, the GCC outspends Iran for
weapons procurement and in

the period from 2004–2011, Iran placed US$2.4 billion worth of arms orders, the GCC
states over US$106 billion. It is not only a matter of quantity, but quality too. While Iran
has struggled to find access to advanced technologies, the GCC states have benefitted
from transfers of advanced weapon systems from the West. (Alcaro, 2015, pp. 8–9)

One of the most important and urgent effects and fallouts is the fear of giving Iran
a bigger regional role, especially when it comes to regionally sensitive crises
which threaten the security of the Gulf countries. Consequently, the Gulf countries
may find themselves forced to come to an understanding with Iran and to accept
a compromise solution.
After announcing the signing of the Iranian nuclear agreement, the Gulf
reaction was characterized generally by dissatisfaction with the agreement, where
questions were asked about the reason of the American delinquency toward Iran
despite its policy in the region. The agreement affects the Gulf countries because
of the continuous Iranian interventions in their affairs. The region, in general, has
started to think about forming new alliances which would guarantee more security
for the Gulf countries. Therefore, the Islamic Military Alliance (formally called
376 Contemporary Review of the Middle East 5(4)

the Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism), which is led by the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, was created on 15 December 2015. It consists of 41 Sunni
Muslim member states and in January 2017 Pakistani Retired General Raheel
Sharif was hired as the first commander-in-chief. The lofty goal is to become the
Muslim NATO. In reality, it is based on Sunni vs. Shi’a logic, and little interest
has been shown by the members and to date, this organization only exists on
paper (Bokhari, 2017).
In the face of the nuclear agreement, there have to be interventionist Gulf
policies that prevent Iran’s ability to utilize the agreement to serve its own
interests. The Gulf countries must pressure Iran to stick to the letter as well as the
intent of the agreement and to keep the nuclear program within a peaceful
framework and under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). Additionally, there needs to be a focus on executing a peaceful nuclear
program from the Gulf countries perspective. In this regard, the GCC met with the
IAEA three times in 2007 and talked about a collective nuclear plan. The GCC
asked the IAEA to conduct an assessment as to whether nuclear power would be
economically feasible. The GCC, at that time did not have the infrastructure or the
manpower to undertake such a major plan. It was estimated it would take anywhere
from 12 to 15 years to develop and one of the main impetuses for these meetings
was Iran’s nuclear ambitions (Perkovich, 2007–2008).
Furthermore, the GCC must work on rebuilding the regional system in general
and must unify the political, economic, cultural as well as security levels. This all
has to be done under the shadow of the developments that have been seen in the
region, that is, the contentious environment between Iran and Saudi Arabia;
religious sectarianism as well as ethnic tensions. The Gulf countries must think
about developing new mechanisms that contribute in the reshaping of the regional
system. The current reality gives Iran a fertile environment where they have
become a pivotal player in the numerous regional crises and a part of the Syrian–
Russian alliance. This alliance, formally called the Russia–Syria–Iran–Iraq
Coalition, can at times include Hezbollah in Lebanon, and was formed in 2015.
The main purpose of the coalition is to share intelligence concerning ISIS or
Daesh. It was President Vladimir Putin’s mechanism to form a rival to the US-led
coalition (Gordon, 2015).
In conclusion, establishing an Iranian–Gulf relationship is connected to the
developments that are seen at the international level as the most important regional
issues. For example, during the period that followed the 11 September terror
attacks, the Iranian–Saudi relationship saw commonalities of perspective when it
came to the American position. Saudi Arabia and Iran were in agreement when it
came to rejecting the American accusations against Islamic countries for the
terrorist attacks. However, the American military presence in the Gulf region
greatly affects the Iranian–Gulf countries relations and Iran rejects this presence
totally. So the international players in the region, especially the USA, play a role
in the forming of the Iranian–Gulf relationship.
Abuelghanam and Tahboub 377

Iran and Its Pursuit to Become a Regional Power

It is clear that there are four fundamental axes for the Iranian foreign policies and
they are geographical perspective, ideological and cultural–religious orientation,
political emphasis, and the national security interest.
Iran is trying to harmonize these, which reveals its desire to become more
powerful and influential axis in the region. Geographically, Iran wants to preserve
what it has gained from its strategic location and what they have garnered through
the occupation of the three Emirati islands. This is in addition to holding on to the
principles of its revolution, which is clear that it still has the intentions to export.
Furthermore, Iran is attempting (and in some cases have succeeded) to entrench
sectarianism by supporting the Shi’a sects in the Gulf countries and even in
Lebanon and Syria. Politically, it is intervention in the crises that the region is
facing and the signing of the nuclear agreement which is considered a political
victory for Iran because it avoided facing off with the West. It has remained part
of the political equation in the resolution of the crises in Syria or Iraq. Additionally,
there is the Iranian role in support of the Houthis who are trying to control Yemen
and pursue insecurity on the Yemeni–Saudi border.
Today, Iran continues its interventions and its policies in the region. It has
achieved success by ending the economic sanctions which were imposed on it
and looks to improve its economic outlook. The Iranian influence has spread
tremendously. In Lebanon, Iran teamed up with Hezbollah and in Syria, Iran is
supporting Assad’s regime. When examining the situation with Syria and
Lebanon, Iran was able to exploit the unified position it has in common with
Syria when it comes to the American intervention in the region as well as the
position of the Palestinian cause.
In 2005, the Iranians and the Syrians formed the Unified Front, an agreement
that was reciprocal in nature. Any attack on Syria is an attack on Iran and vice
versa. Iran’s commitment to supporting Syria in the case of attack is in addition to
confirming the military support. In this regard, the former Iranian Defense
Minister, Ali Shamkhani, confirmed that: “Syria has strategic depth for Iran, and
is a part of the Iranian republics national security in the region” (Al-Abadi, 2008).
Moreover, Syria is considered to be a road to reach Lebanon, where Iran has great
influence due to its support of the Shi’a party of Hezbollah and the ideological
factor is a critical feature in the development of these relationships.
In addition to the aforementioned points, what pushed Iran to continue to refine
its regional power is a state of anxiety and division in the position and the absence
of clarity in adopting a united point of view from the Iranian side.

The Omani–Iranian Relationship

When talking about the Gulf–Iranian relations, each Gulf country has its own
positions and visions. These visions are similar in all the Gulf countries except for
378 Contemporary Review of the Middle East 5(4)

Oman who seems to be individually dealing with Iran apart from the GCC. There
are many examples that clarify the Omani political behavior. During the Iranian–
Iraqi War, Oman maintained balanced relations with both sides of the conflict.
In the Second Gulf War, Oman participated in the military forces to free Kuwait
but at the same time kept in contact with the Iraqi government. Additionally, in
January 2007, Oman withdrew from the GCC Monetary Union because it did not
want to surrender its sovereignty over such a complicated and contentious issue.
It further stated that because of its substantial outside debt it could not be tied to
the union (Al-Hinai, 2007).
It should be noted that Oman was not the only GCC country to withdraw from
the GCC Monetary Union. In May 2009, the UAE also withdrew from the union
over a dispute to locate the central bank of the union in Riyadh. This dispute was
between the two largest economies in the GCC and the possible future of GCC
financial integration has been further weakened (Wigglesworth, 2009). With the
withdrawal of both Oman and the UAE, the rest of the GCC created the precursor
of a central bank as well as a mutual financial council in March 2010. However,
due to a lack of political will, the project has been put on the back burner
(Reuters, 2016). The whole issue of the GCC Monetary Union once again shows
that Saudi Arabia has tried to lead but others in the GCC are pulling away.
The Omani–Iranian relations were characterized by progress during the years
of the Arab Spring. This is partially due to the Omani foreign policy perspective
which is one of neutrality and non-intervention in foreign affairs as well as
pragmatism and the use of diplomacy for seeking peaceful solutions. Additionally,
the Arab Spring hit Oman causing it to make many changes at numerous levels
including politically, culturally, socially, financially as well as constitutionally.
Therefore, Oman distanced itself from interfering in the Middle Eastern crises and
avoided clashing with the conflicting sides (Al-Bolushi, 2016; Uysa, 2016).
The history of the Oman–Iran relationship goes back to Oman’s inception as a
nation-state. Iran was the third country to recognize the political system belonging
to the Sultan Qaboos, after the USA and the UK in 1970. Iran stood by Oman to
stop the Dhofar Rebellion, which began as a tribal civil war but later, due to the
Cold War, was fought against Communist influences of both Russia and China
(DeVore, 2011). The Shah of Iran entered the conflict during 1972–1975 and
assisting Oman was part of his plan to become a major regional player. The Shah
raised the possibility of a mutual defense pact in the Gulf but even then there were
tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia as the latter was concerned about the
spread of Iranian influence. However, even after the Islamic Revolution, the
relations between Iran and Oman were not affected, partly due to the role that Iran
played in the Dhofar Rebellion (Goode, 2014).
The convergence of Oman and Iran does not mean that Oman rejects the idea
of the unity of the Gulf. Oman has signed the GCC Political Agreement which
stated that the final goal of the group was the unity. In 1991, Oman presented a
proposal to create a unified Gulf military, which was rejected by many countries.
Thus, Oman wants to have its independent foreign policies and is trying to pre-
serve the peace and security of the Gulf away from any conflicts. It has been in
constant contact with the USA and Iran to reach a settlement for the nuclear
Abuelghanam and Tahboub 379

program through negotiations. Furthermore, Oman hosted part of secret negotia-

tion concerning the Iranian nuclear program and this implies that the positive
Omani–Iranian relations do not come at the expense of its relations with other
Gulf countries.

Events Affecting the Balance of Power in Gulf

The Qatar Crisis

On 5 June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt severed diplomatic
ties with Qatar. On 22 June they sent 13 demands or ultimatums to Qatar for the
resumption of relations. These ultimatums included cutting of diplomatic ties as
well as closure of embassies in Iran (this point includes expelling all IRG mem-
bers and no joint military cooperation); cutting ties with “terrorist organizations”
including the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, Daesh, and Al Qaeda; closing of
Al Jazeera; handing over all “terrorists”; no contacts with political opposition in
the four countries; and payment of reparations to all those negatively affected by
the Qatari actions (Gulf News, 2017).
There are two major issues that have incensed the members of the GCC, and
Saudi Arabia in particular, over the last decade and they are Qatar’s support for
Islamic groups and its ever-closer relationship with Iran. These issues reached a
boiling point in June 2017 and precipitated the current crisis (BBC News, 2017).
It is important to keep in mind that Qatar’s relationship with other GCC members
has been rocky earlier and this is due to the foreign policy agenda of Qatar and in
part due to Al Jazeera. In general, Al Jazeera for the first time provided media
coverage in the Middle East that could no longer be controlled by the state-run
regional stations. A case in point was the diplomatic tension created in September
2002 where Saudi Arabia recalled its ambassador to Qatar for negative coverage
about the Saudi peace initiative “which offered Israel the normalization of ties in
exchange for peace with the Palestinians” (Al Qassemi, 2017).
The Qatari Foreign Policy agenda tends to veer away from other members of the
GCC, especially from Saudi Arabia. Both father and the son have tended to go their
separate ways from the Saudi Arabia and the GCC. Sheik Hamid bin Khalifah
Al-Thani, the father, emphasized Qatar’s role on the international stage as well as at
the regional level, sometimes to the consternation of his neighbors. He fostered his
own religious image, separate from the Saudis, with influence from the Muslim
Brotherhood, who is known for regional activism. He abdicated in June 2013 in favor
of his son, Sheik Tamim bin Hamid Al-Thani, whose foreign policy focuses more on
the regional level with more collaboration with his neighbors (Dazi-Heni, 2014).
Sheik Tamim’s first major crisis came in March 2014. This crisis involved
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE withdrawing their ambassadors as they
contended that Qatar was not supporting a 2013 GCC security agreement. This
pact stated “anyone threatening the security and stability of the GCC whether as
groups or individuals—via direct security work or through political influence, and
not to support hostile media” (BBC News, 2014). Though not specifically stated,
380 Contemporary Review of the Middle East 5(4)

it was implied that support for the Muslim Brotherhood and their activism was
threatening the GCC states as well as Qatari’s relationship with Iran. At the same
time, any critical statements made by Al Jazeera were considered as a hazard.
Qatar has so far survived the present crisis. “Kuwait’s mediation, Turkey’s
military backing, Iran’s offers of support, and Qatar’s steadfastness combined to
balance against the blockading countries” (Brookings, 2017). The crisis has
allowed Qatar to strengthen its ties with Turkey and Iran as well as to develop
other routes of transportation.
On the other hand, the crisis has illuminated the weaknesses within the GCC.
More than three decades after being formed as a counterbalance to Iran, the crisis
caused among its members has only strengthened the role of Iran within the Arab
World. Instead of dealing with the problems internally, they aired their accusations
in public. Instead of solving the crisis, which would have functionally strengthened
the GCC, it has sidelined the organization, making it far more symbolic than a
force to be reckoned with.

The more troubling pattern that emerges these days is that Saudi Arabia wishes to lay
down the law for all the Gulf states, who must submit to its leadership or suffer the same
fate as Qatar: harsh economic sanctions and restrictions, along with veiled military
threats and draconian but amateurish propaganda campaigns, designed to achieve either
collapse and regime change internally, or swift acquiescence to Saudi Arabian rule in
the region. (Khouri, 2017)

Reforms or Instability in Saudi Arabia

“Saudi Arabia’s greatest concern in the region is the rise and expansion of Iranian
influence. Everything that the Kingdom is doing outside its borders—and some of
what it’s doing inside its borders—is a response to this threat” (Wittes, 2017).
This statement might help to shed light on the recent internal and external events
occurring in Saudi Arabia.
There have been some changes and reforms both in the areas of domestic and
foreign policy. These can be attributed to the ascension of Mohammed bin Salman
as Crown Prince in June 2017. Since that time he has been heavily involved in
numerous endeavors which include giving women the right to drive (something
long sought by the women in the kingdom); economic reforms; the Saudi
involvement in the war in Yemen; and more recently, the “purge of hundreds of
prominent Saudis in a wave of arrests early last month is now widely believed to
have been an attempt on the crown prince’s part to preempt a challenge from
within the royal family” (Crowcroft, 2017). While this move will help to
consolidate his position, Mohammed bin Salman hopes to widen the political base
of the kingdom promising younger generations “better services, greater social
freedom and wider economic opportunities” (Wittes, 2017).
Furthermore, he is taking on the religious establishment. The Saudi investment
in Wahhabism goes back to the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. This attempt at
Abuelghanam and Tahboub 381

reform may be steeped in rhetoric because the attachment to Wahhabism cannot

be weakened overnight. It appears to be more about confining radical urges rather
than sweeping changes. “The approach thus far seems to be about restraining the
more radical impulses, rather than getting into the root of where that comes from”
(Chulov, 2017). This may be due to the fact that

Islamic scholars do wield a considerable amount of power in the political system and
hold key positions as judges, ministers, and officials in the religious police … others
outside the formal state apparatus overlap with government controlled institutions in
many arenas, for example in mosques, charities and mass media. (Matthiesen, 2015)

From a foreign policy perspective, the Iraq War and the Arab Uprisings, which
created instability in the region, forced Saudi Arabia to become more autonomous
and its foreign policy became more interventionist oriented. This occurred even
prior to King Salman. Saudi Arabia has always involved itself within the region
using its political and economic power. However, “it is that the degree to which
that was true, including taking initiative and using enormous resources, reflected
a sense of strategic urgency” (Telhami, 2018).
Two areas where the Saudis have asserted their influence is in Yemen and
Lebanon. The war in Yemen is taking its toll on Mohammed bin Salman’s
reputation. The war fought against the Iranian-backed Houthis has reached a point
of stalemate. In the court of public opinion, it has become progressively
unacceptable to support the war due to both the economic costs as well as the lives
lost. According to an expert, “Yemen is not our Vietnam. Vietnam was far from
you. Yemen is our neighbor. We do not have the option of leaving without victory”
(House, 2017).
In Lebanon, Iranian influence through Hezbollah drives Saudi interest. This situ-
ation, while less invasive, is troubling. On 4 November 2017, Sa’ad Hariri resigned
as Prime Minister of Lebanon while present in Saudi Arabia. This unexpected move
was announced in Riyadh not Lebanon. “It means that Saudi Arabia, which politi-
cally supported and bankrolled the Hariris throughout most of Lebanon’s post-civil
war history, is readjusting its policy in Lebanon to more effectively weaken
Hezbollah” (Saab, 2017). When Hariri took office it was seen as an understanding
had been reached between Hezbollah (Iranian proxy in Lebanon) and the other
major political factions within the country. It validated Hezbollah as part of the
Lebanese government as well as the role they play in Syria (AlFoneh, 2017).
The root cause for the crisis in Lebanon has been the Saudi rising level of
concern about the influence of Iran and its proxy Hezbollah. Although the Hariri
resignation was rescinded on 5 December, it shows the Saudi influence in
Lebanon (Reuters, 2017). It has also raised concerns in Iran, where the events in
Lebanon have been seen as part of a broader policy by the USA along with Saudi
Arabia and Israel in trying to limit the Iranian influence in the region (Majidyar,
2017). Whichever way one looks at it, the event has ratcheted up the tensions in
the region, shown the vulnerability of the Lebanese government, and added
another level of complication for the balance of power between the Saudis and
the Iranians.
382 Contemporary Review of the Middle East 5(4)

Above all, protests against the Iranian government began on 28 December

2017. These protests, domestic in nature, were against the government for “rising
prices, unemployment and economic inequality” (Al Jazeera, 2018). The question
will be to see if this has any effect on Iranian foreign policy and its relationship
with Saudi Arabia.
This article has basically been about the relationship between Iran and the
GCC (aka Saudi Arabia). It has looked at the development of proxy wars, their
results, and consequences. But, what if these two regional powers moved past
proxy wars to all-out war? This is the original premise Bilal Y. Saab (2018), whose
primary conclusion is that while war is not probable today or tomorrow, it is more
likely than any time in the recent past.

Requirements of the Next Phases

It is clear that Iran has become a regional power with a role that is growing quickly
in the shadow of the continuance of the state of tension and conflict in the region
resulting in the GCC’s need to evaluate its relevance. Here is where its failures need
to be revised, such as first, the American invasion of Kuwait and then Iraq, which
threatened the Gulf security; second, the continuance of the presence of the Iranian
threat without the Gulf countries taking any counter measures except buying
American weapons which flow into the recycling process of “the oil returns” and
the Dual Containment Policy which entered the region with increasing political and
economic dangers; and third, relying on foreign powers with regards to the Gulf
security, especially the USA and building bases for them in the region, which gives
them a guarantee of their presence in the region for a long period of time.
Another alternative is convergence with Iran, which remains on the table and
there are many steps which can be made in this regard that are represented by the
following: first, Iran and Saudi Arabia mitigate the extent of the conflict and
discord especially with respect to their position toward the crises that the region is
witnessing. Second, promote the mutual interests between Iran and the Gulf
countries especially when it comes to trading relations to guarantee the protection
of the waterways to preserve the interests of all parties. Third, engaging China as
an alternative great power in protecting the flow of fuel in the Gulf countries is
critical. This may contribute in redefining the Gulf security, that is, where Iran
cannot close the Straits of Hormuz because it will have an effect on its ally China.
And then, there can be a negotiation between Saudi Arabia and Iran to achieve
convergence by attracting new partners to the region as a part of a multi-party
formula that includes all the Gulf countries to see how to achieve joint cooperation
between regional countries.

Conclusion
It seems that the contentious relations between Iran and the Arabian Gulf coun-
tries, is a long-term relationship if not eternal, for the differences are more than
Abuelghanam and Tahboub 383

the commonalities. Indeed, the only common factor is the geography and that
itself is a conflict factor. However, the differences outweigh common interests.
To reiterate, the differences include state interests, foreign policy, ideology, and
sectarianism. If either side only serves their own interest it will impinge on all
other interests and ultimately affect the balance of power in the region. Since the
Iranians have diligently sought to achieve their interest at the expense of the Gulf
countries, the latter has to take steps that will preserve their own strategic inter-
ests. This does not stop at confronting the Iranian interventions in their internal
affairs but also addressing other conflicting issues like the three islands which
need to be settled and additionally, by playing a major role within the Iraqi arena,
especially in the fields of fighting terrorism and terrorist organizations.
The positive developments have occurred between the Iranians and the Gulf
state relations during the past several decades and they are not the result of change
in the ruling class. They are a temporary change that does not touch the essence of
the Iranian political behavior and therefore it is difficult to count on to the creation
of a safe environment for the Gulf-Arab countries. Hence, the return of the
activism and effectiveness of the international community is critical in settling the
conflicts and tension between Iran and its Arab neighbors.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, author-
ship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication
of this article.

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