VAN DORN vs. HON. ROMILLO and RICHARD UPTON G.R. No.

L-68470 October 8, 1985

FACTS: Petitioner Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the USA.
They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and begot two children. The parties were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. Alice has
then re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

In 1983, Richard filed suit against Alice in the RTC-Pasay, stating that Alice’s business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property of the
parties, and asking that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that Richard be declared with right to
manage the conjugal property.

Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings
before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had “no community property” as of June
11, 1982.
The Court below (presiding judge: Judge Romillo) denied the MTD in the mentioned case on the ground that the property
involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this
certiorari proceeding.

ISSUE: What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines?

HELD: Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint… For the resolution of this case, it is
not necessary to determine whether the property relations between Alice and Richard, after their marriage, were upon absolute
or relative community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is
the Nevada divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before
the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who authorized his attorneys in the
divorce case to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community
property nor community obligations.

As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD. to represent him in the
divorce proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do all things necessary and
proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the following:

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. That there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding
on private respondent as an American citizen. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by
the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American
law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in
the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,

G. R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboaga del Sur,
Branch 23, granting respondent’s petition for authority to remarry invoking par. 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were married in Lam-an, Ozamis City and were blessed with a
son and a daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S. bringing along their son and after a few years she was naturalized as an
American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son – who was living with his wife in the States – that his wife had
remarried after obtaining her divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to remarry with the trial court invoking
par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code.

Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur granted the petition of the respondent and
allowed him to remarry.

The Solicitor General’s motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of that, petitioner filed this petition for review on
certiorari of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the
instant case.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER THE ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Held:
Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent evidence showing his allegations that his
naturalized American wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried. Therefore, the Petition of the Republic of the
Philippines is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the RTC Br. 32 of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur is hereby SET ASIDE.

“Art. 26 (2) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
the Philippine laws.”

Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two
Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26
does not apply to the instant case.

However, the legislative intent must be taken into consideration and rule of reason must be applied. The Supreme Court ruled
that par. 2 of Art. 26 should be construed and interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of
the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of then becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be sanction absurdity and injustice. Were the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it
should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A stature may
therefore be extended to case not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirits or intent.

BAYOT V BAYOT G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008

FACTS:
On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American, were married in Muntinlupa. They had a child name Alix, born in
November 27, 1982 in California.

In February 22, 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in Dominican Republic, which was docketed as Civil Decree No.
362/96 ordering the dissolution of the marriage. The same court also issued Civil Decree No. 406/97 settling the couple's
conjugal property in Muntinlupa in March 4, 1997.

She then filed a declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity,
docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094. She sought dissolution of the conjugal partnerships of gains with application for support
pendente lite for her and Alix. She also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter
Alix in the amount of P 220,000.00.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the
prior judgment of divorce.

RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss. CA dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094 and set aside RTC's incidental orders. According the
the CA, RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss, since the marriage between the spouses is already dissolved when
the divorce decree was granted since Rebecca was an American citizen when she applied for the decree.

Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Dominican Republic is valid.

Ruling:
Yes. Civil Decrees No. 362/96 and 406/97 are valid. Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce was an American
citizen and remains to be one, being born to American parents in Guam, an American territory which follows the principle of jus
soli granting American citizenship to those who are born there. She was, and still may be, a holder of American passport.

She had consistently professed, asserted and represented herself as an American citizen, as shown in her marriage certificate, in
Alix's birth certificate, when she secured divorce in Dominican Republic.

Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a country which allows
divorce.

The Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued by the Dominican Republic court properly adjudicated the ex-couple's property relations.

The Court said, in order that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, the divorce decree must be proven as a fact and as valid
under the national law of the alien spouse.

The fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in
any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing
said decree is, as here, sufficient.

Thus the foreign decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid, and consequently, bind both Rebecca
and Vicente.

The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognised as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by the DOJ
Secretary of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, stand alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign
divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen in 1996. In determining whether or not a divorce is secured abroad would
come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the
time a valid divorce is obtained.
Categories: Judicial Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage, Persons and Family Relations

Republic v. CA and Molina

GR 108763, 13 February 1997

Facts:
Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo
showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” on the early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to spend time
with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters
involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987,
Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple is
separated-in-fact for more than three years.

On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for
Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General
Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. On 14
May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. Hence, the present recourse.

Issue: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity

Held:
The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize the application of Philippine
civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct
on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other
spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said
conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of
marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage.

The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity
must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that
the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in
the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no
wise constitutes psychological incapacity.

The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code,
removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff;
(2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently
proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration
of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6)
the essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and
Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels
for the State.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision; concluding that the marriage of Roridel
Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

Te vs. Te GR No. 161793, February 13, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their
college. Initially, he was attracted to Rowena’s close friend but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to
court Rowena, which happened in January 1996. It was Rowena who asked that they elope but Edward refused bickering that he
was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. They left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing
their travel money of P80,000 and she, purchasing the boat ticket.

They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house and Edward to his parents’ home.
Eventually they got married but without a marriage license. Edward was prohibited from getting out of the house
unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and her uncle. After a month, Edward escaped from the house, and stayed with
his parents. Edward’s parents wanted them to stay at their house but Rowena refused and demanded that they have a separate
abode. In June 1996, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives and they then parted ways.

After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latter’s
psychological incapacity.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:
The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged
marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and
respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder

There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert,
for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.

Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living
together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions
without advice from others, and allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live). As clearly shown
in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no
sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.

As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital
obligations on account for her disregard in the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse,
and her tendency to blame others. Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms
in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage that they
contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
SANTOS vs. CA AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

FACTS: Leouel Santos, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo. The two got married in 1986 before a
municipal trial court followed shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. The couple lived with Julia’s parents at the J. Bedia
Compound. Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was named as Leouel Santos Jr. Occasionally, the couple will quarrel over a
number of things aside from the interference of Julia’s parents into their family affairs.
Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouel’s pleas to dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, she called her
husband and promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989 but she never did. Leouel got a chance to
visit US where he underwent a training program under AFP, he desperately tried to locate or somehow get in touch with Julia but
all his efforts were of no avail.

Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. He argued that failure of Julia
to return home or to communicate with him for more than 5 years are circumstances that show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life.

ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

HELD:
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personal
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.

Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor
society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. Wherefore, his petition was denied.
__________
Notes:
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must
be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be
rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage;
and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

CHI MING TSOI VS. C.A.

266 SCRA 324, January 16 1997

Facts: On May 22, 1988, Gina Lao married Chi Ming Tsoi. Since their marriage until their separation on March 15, 1989, there
was no sexual contact between them. Gina filed a case of annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity with
the RTC of Quezon City. The RTC granted annulment which was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Is the failure to the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife from the time of the marriage until their separation
on March 15 1989 a ground for psychological incapacity.

Ruling: On of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to procreate children based on the universal principle
that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.”

Antonio vs. Reyes

GR No. 155800, March 10, 2006

FACTS:
Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989. Barely a year after their first meeting, they
got married at Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A child was born but died 5
months later. Reyes persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and
other events or things. She even did not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she represented to her husband as adopted
child of their family. They were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for good in
November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void anchored in
Article 36 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring their marriage null and void.

HELD:
Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as opposed to a mere inability to
comply with them. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested
that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wife’s
behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity. Respondent’s fantastic ability to invent, fabricate stories and letters of
fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of make-believe that made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her
incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes’ psychological incapacity have been
medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity
was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage without their consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to
commit the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes’ case is incurable
considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remain unchanged.

Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.