Concept of Marriage
Case No. 1 - BALOGBOG VS CA
FACTS:
Ramonito and GenerosoBalogbog filed an action
for partition and accounting against their Aunt
Leoncia and Uncle Gaudioso for partition and
accounting of their grandparents’ estate at the
Court of First Instance of Cebu City which was
granted by the latter. Leoncia and Gaudioso
appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter
affirmed the lower court’s decision.
BasilioBalogbog and GenovevaArnibal died
intestate in 1951 and 1961 respectively. They
have three children, Leoncia, Gaudioso and
Gavino, their older brother who died in 1935.
Ramoncito and Generoso was claiming that they
were the legitimate children of Gavino by
Catalina Ubas and that, as such they were
entitled to the one-third share in the estate of
their grandparents. However, Leoncia and
Gaudioso claimed they are not aware that their
brother has 2 sons and that he was married.
They started to question the validity of the
marriage between their brother Gavino and
Catalina despite how Gaudioso himself admitted
during a police investigation proceeding that
indeed Ramonito is his nephew as the latter is
the son of his elder brother Gavino.
In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to
prove the validity of their parent’s marriage, they
presented PrisciloTrazo, 81 years old then
mayor of Asturias from 1928 to 1934 and Matias
Pogoy who both testified that he knew Gavino
and Catalina to be husband and wife and that
they have three children. Catalina herself
testified that she was handed a “receipt”
presumably the marriage certificate by Fr.
Jomao-as but it was burned during the war.
On the other hand,Leoncia claimed that her
brother Gavino died single at the family
residence in Asturias. She obtained a certificate
from the local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the
effect that the office did not have a record of the
names of Gavino and Catalina which was
prepared by Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan
Maranga who testified in the hearing as well.
Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the
marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have
been proven in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54
of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the
law in force at the time of the alleged marriage
was celebrated.
Art. 53 provides that “marriages celebrated
under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven
only by a certified copy of the memorandum in
the Civil Registry, unless the books thereof have
not been kept or have been lost, or unless they
are questioned in the courts, in which case any
other proof, such as that of the continuous
possession by parents of the status of husband
and wife, may be considered, provided that the
registration of the birth of their children as their
legitimate children is also submitted in
evidence”.
ISSUE:
Whether Gavino and Catalina’s wedding is valid
RULING:
Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial
court and Court of Appeals in rendering Gavino
and Catalina’s marriage as valid and thus entitle
Ramonito and Generoso one third of their
grandparents’ estate.
The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 of
the Civil Code of 889 of Spain did not take
effect, having been suspended by the Governor
General of the Philippines shortly after the
extension of that code of this country.
Therefore, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into
force. Since this case was brought in the lower
court in 1968, the existence of the marriage
must be determined in accordance with the
present Civil Code, which repealed the
provisions of the former Civil Code, except as
they related to vested rights, and the rules of
evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the
presumption is that a man and a woman
conducting themselves as husband and wife are
legally married.
Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary
evidence of marriage, failure to present it would
not mean that marriage did not take place.
Other evidence may be presented where in this
case evidence consisting of the testimonies of
witnesses was held competent to prove the
marriage of Gavino and Catalina in 1929, that
they have three children, one of whom,
Petronilo, died at the age of six and that they are
recognized by Gavino’s family and by the public
as the legitimate children of Gavino.

Case No. 2 - ZULUETA VS CA
FACTS:
This is a petition to review the decision of the
Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which
ordered petitioner to return documents and
papers taken by her from private respondent's
clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private
respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a
doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her
mother, a driver and private respondent's
secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and
cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157
documents consisting of private correspondence
between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours,
greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr.
Martin's passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in
evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine
which petitioner had filed against her husband.
ISSUE:
Whether the documents and papers in question
are inadmissible in evidence
HELD:
No. Indeed the documents and papers in
question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be]
inviolable" is no less applicable simply because
it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her
husband's infidelity) who is the party against
whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in
the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from
a] court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation
of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do
not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of
marital infidelity. A person, by contracting
marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his
right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him
or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of
communication between the spouses by making
it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may
testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined
without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one
from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom
of communication; quite another is a compulsion
for each one to share what one knows with the
other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of
fidelity that each owes to the other.
The review for petition is DENIED for lack of
merit.
Essential Requirements
Case No. 3 - CHI MING TSOI VS CA
FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in
1988. After the celebration of their wedding,
they proceed to the house of defendant’s
mother. There was no sexual intercourse
between them during their first night and same
thing happened until their fourth night. In an
effort to have their honeymoon in a private
place, they went to Baguio but Gina’s relatives
went with them. Again, there was no sexual
intercourse since the defendant avoided by
taking a long walk during siesta or sleeping on a
rocking chair at the living room. Since May 1988
until March 1989 they slept together in the same
bed but no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them. Because of this, they submitted
themselves for medical examination to a
urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989.
The result of the physical examination of Gina
was disclosed, while that of the husband was
kept confidential even the medicine prescribed.
There were allegations that the reason why Chi
Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his
residency status here in the country. Gina does
not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and
want their marriage declared void on the ground
of psychological incapacity. On the other hand,
the latter does not want to have their marriage
annulled because he loves her very much, he
has no defect on his part and is physically and
psychologically capable and since their
relationship is still young, they can still overcome
their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted
himself to another physical examination and the
result was there is not evidence of impotency
and he is capable of erection.
ISSUE:
Whether Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual
intercourse with his wife constitutes
psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to
consummate his marriage is strongly indicative
of a serious personality disorder which to the
mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance tot the marriage within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.
If a spouse, although physically capable but
simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marital obligations and the refusal is senseless
and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of
the essential marital obligations under the
Family Code is to procreate children thus
constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the
marriage.
Case No. 4 - WEIGEL VS SEMPIO-DIY
FACTS:
The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to
consummate his marriage is strongly indicative
of a serious personality disorder which to the
mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance tot the marriage within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.
If a spouse, although physically capable but
simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marital obligations and the refusal is senseless
and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of
the essential marital obligations under the
Family Code is to procreate children thus
constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the
marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s prior marriage
was merely voidable assuming the presence of
force exerted against both parties.
HELD:
The Supreme Court upheld that there is no need
for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was
initiated by force committed against both parties
because assuming that this is so, the marriage
will not be void but merely voidable (Article 85,
Civil Code) and therefore valid until annulled.
Since no annulment has yet been made, it is
clear that when she married private respondent,
she was still validly married to her first husband,
consequently, her marriage to respondent is
void. Hence, petitioner’s prior marriage is merely
voidable but valid until annulled.
Case No. 5 - REPUBLIC VS. ALBIOS
FACTS:
Fringer and Liberty Albios got married on
October 22, 2004, before the sala of Judge Calo
in Mandaluyong City. 2 years after their
marriage (December 6, 2006), Albios filed with
the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Fringer. According to her, the
marriage was a marriage in jest because she
only wed the American to acquire US citizenship
and even arranged to pay him $2,000 in
exchange for his consent. Adding that
immediately after their marriage, they separated
and never lived as husband and wife because
they never really had any intention of entering
into a married state and complying with their
marital obligations. The court even sent
summons to the husband but he failed to file an
answer.
Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of Albios
declaring that the marriage was void ab initio for
lack of consent because the parties failed to
freely give their consent to the marriage as they
had no intention to be legally bound by it and
used it only as a means to acquire American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00..
However, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) elevated the case to the SC. According to
the OSG, the case do not fall within the concept
of a marriage in jest as the parties intentionally
consented to enter into a real and valid
marriage. That the parties here intentionally
consented to enter into a real and valid
marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of
Albios to acquire American citizenship would be
rendered futile.
ISSUE:
Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of
acquiring American citizenship in consideration
of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack
of consent?
HELD:
NO. Both Fringer and Albios consented to the
marriage. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any vice of consent.
Their consent was also conscious and intelligent
as they understood the nature and the beneficial
and inconvenient consequences of their
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do
so.
That their consent was freely given is best
evidenced by their conscious purpose of
acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they
willingly and deliberately contracted the
marriage. There was a clear intention to enter
into a real and valid marriage so as to fully
comply with the requirements of an application
for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be
created between them, since it was that precise
legal tie which was necessary to accomplish
their goal.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent
to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2)
made in the presence of a solemnizing officer.
A "freely given" consent requires that the
contracting parties willingly and deliberately
enter into the marriage.
Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the
vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the
Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation,
and undue influence. None of these are present
in the case.
Therefore, their marriage remains valid.
Case No. 6 - SILVERIO VS REPUBLIC
FACTS:
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel
Jacinto DantesSilverio filed a petition for the
change of his first name and sex in his birth
certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 8. He then sought to have his name in
his birth certificate changed from “Rommel
Jacinto” to “Mely,” and his sex from “male” to
“female.” The trial court ruled in his favor.
The Republic filed a petition for certiorari in the
CA alledging that there is no law allowing the
change of entries in the birth certificate by
reason of sex alteration. The CA rendered a
decision in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the
that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis.
There is no law allowing the change of either
name or sex in the certificate of birth on the
ground of sex reassignment through surgery.
Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the
Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the
trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case
No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is allowed to change of
name and sex in the birth certificate under Art.
407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108
of the Rules of Court, and RA 9048 on grounds
of sex reassignment.
HELD:
No. The petition lacks merit. Before a person
can legally change his given name, he must
present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change. In
addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced
by the use of his true and official name. In this
case, he failed to show, or even allege, any
prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using
his true and official name.
Jurisdiction over applications for change of first
name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. RA 9048
now governs the change of first name. It vests
the power and authority to entertain petitions for
change of first name to the city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general concerned. Under the
law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for
change of first name is now primarily lodged with
the aforementioned administrative officers. The
intent and effect of the law is to exclude the
change of first name from the coverage of Rules
103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court, until and unless an
administrative petition for change of name is first
filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays
down the corresponding venue, form, and
procedure. In sum, the remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are
primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
It was also filed in the wrong venue as the
proper venue was in the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is
kept. In sum, the petition in the trial court in so
far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first
name was not within that court’s primary
jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed
with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming
it could be legally done. It was an improper
remedy because the proper remedy was
administrative, that is, that provided under RA
9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the
proper venue was in the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is
kept.
Words employed in a statute are presumed to
have been used in that sense unless the context
says otherwise. When words are not defined in a
statute they are to be given their common and
ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary
legislative intent. The words “sex,” “male” and
“female” as used in the Civil Register Law and
laws concerning the civil registry (and even all
other laws) should therefore be understood in
their common and ordinary usage, there being
no legislative intent to the contrary. In this
connection, sex is defined as “the sum of
peculiarities of structure and function that
distinguish a male from a female” or “the
distinction between male and female.” Female is
“the sex that produces ova or bears young” and
male is “the sex that has organs to produce
spermatozoa for fertilizing ova.” Thus, the words
“male” and “female” in everyday understanding
do not include persons who have undergone sex
reassignment. Furthermore, “words that are
employed in a statute which had at the time a
well-known meaning are presumed to have been
used in that sense unless the context compels to
the contrary.” Since the statutory language of
the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early
1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be
argued that the term “sex” as used then is
something alterable through surgery or
something that allows a post-operative male-to-
female transsexual to be included in the
category “female.”
The changes sought by petitioner will have
serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself
found that the petition was but petitioner’s first
step towards his eventual marriage to his male
fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most
sacred social institutions, is a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman.
One of its essential requisites is the legal
capacity of the contracting parties who must be
a male and a female. To grant the changes
sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure
and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family
relations. It will allow the union of a man with
another man who has undergone sex
reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative
transsexual). Second, there are
various laws which apply particularly to women
such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women, certain felonies under
the Revised Penal Code 40 and the presumption
of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule
131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These
laws underscore the public policy in relation to
women which could be substantially affected if
petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the
law, not to make or amend it. It is true that
Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that “[n]o
judge or court shall decline to render judgment
by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the law.” However, it is not a
license for courts to engage in judicial
legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or
interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
Statutes define who may file petitions for change
of first name and for correction or change of
entries in the civil registry, where they may be
filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof
must be presented and what procedures shall
be observed. In our system of government, it is
for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to
determine what guidelines should govern the
recognition of the effects of sex reassignment.
The need for legislative guidelines becomes
particularly important in this case where the
claims asserted are statute-based. It might be
theoretically possible for this Court to write a
protocol on when a person may be recognized
as having successfully changed his sex.
However, this Court has no authority to fashion
a law on that matter, or on anything else. The
Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It
can only apply or interpret the written word of its
co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Case No. 7 - REPUBLIC VS CAGANDAHAN
FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional
Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate of her name from Jennifer B.
Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her
gender from female to male. It appearing that
Jennifer Cagandahan is sufferingfrom
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare
medical condition where afflicted persons
possess both male and female characteristics.
Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary
male characteristics. To further her petition,
Cagandahan presented in court the medical
certificate evidencing that she is suffering from
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate
is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
Department of Psychiatry, University of the
Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in
addition, explained that “Cagandahan
genetically is female but because her body
secretes male hormones, her female organs did
not develop normally, thus has organs of both
male and female.” The lower court decided in
her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General
appealed before the Supreme Court invoking
that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and
108 of the Rules of Court because the said
petition did not implead the local civil registrar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing
in her birth certificate be changed.
HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
lower court. It held that, in deciding the case, the
Supreme Court considered “the compassionate
calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be
subject to outright denial.” The Supreme Court
made use of the availale evidence presented in
court including the fact that private respondent
thinks of himself as a male and as to the
statement made by the doctor that
Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of
male hormones (androgen), which is
preponderant biological support for considering
him as being male.”
The Supreme Court further held that they give
respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how
an individual deals with what nature has handed
out. That is, the Supreme Court respects the
respondent’s congenital condition and his
mature decision to be a male. Life is already
difficult for the ordinary person. The Court added
that a change of name is not a matter of right but
of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light
of the reasons and the consequences that will
follow.
Formal Requirements – Authority of the
Solemnizing Officer
Case No. 8 - NAVARRO VS DOMAGTOY
FACTS:
Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigaodel Norte,
Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on two
specific acts committed by respondent Municipal
Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy
on the grounds of gross misconduct, inefficiency
in office and ignorance of the law.
The first allegation of Navarro to Domagtoy is
that the latter solemnized marriage of Gaspar
Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on September 27,
1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has
a subsisting marriage was merely separated. It
was told that the wife of Gaspar left their
conjugal home and has not returned and been
heard for almost seven years.
The second allegation of the plaintiff was that
the said Judge likewise solemnized marriage of
FlorianoDadoySumaylo and Gemma G. del
Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction on
October 27, 1994. The judge holds his office and
has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigaodel Norte
but he solemnized the said wedding at his
residence in the municipality of Dapa located 40
to 50 km away.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage solemnized by the
defendant Judge Domagtoy were void;
HELD:
The court held that the marriage between
Tagadan and Borja was void and bigamous
there being a subsisting marriage between
Tagadan and his wife, notwithstanding, the latter
was gone for seven years and the spouse had a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
dead, Tagadan did not institute a summary
proceeding as provided in the Civil Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del
Rosario, the said marriage was solidified as
valid, Albeit, Judge Domagtoy was not
authorized to solemnize the marriage of
Sumaylo and Del Rosario as against Article 3 (1)
of the Family Code with regard to irregularity of
formal requisites of marriage. In addition, article
4 par 3 of the Family Code of the Philippines
states that formal requisites shall not affect the
validity of marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.
Hence, Domagtoy was held administratively
liable because of the latter’s failure to apply the
legal principles applicable in these cases, the
Court find Domagtoy have acted in gross
ignorance of the law and because of this he was
suspended for a period of six months.
Case No. 9 - EUGENIO SR. VS VELEZ
FACTS:
Vitaliana Vargas’ brothers and sisters unaware
of the former’s death on August 28, 1988 filed a
petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27,
1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental
alleging that she was forcible taken from her
residence sometime in 1987 and was confined
by the herein petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his
palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.
The court then issued a writ of habeas corpus
but petitioner refused to surrender the Vitaliana’s
body to the sheriff on the ground that a corpse
cannot be subjected to habeas corpus
proceedings. Vitaliana, 25 year old single, died
of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in
Eugenio’s residence. The court ordered that the
body should be delivered to a funeral parlor for
autopsy but Eugenio assailed the lack of
jurisdiction of the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody
of the deceased.
HELD:
The court held that the custody of the dead body
of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the
surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to
Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative
Code which provides:
“Persons charged with duty of burial- if the
deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a
child and left any kin; the duty of the burial shall
devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased.
Albeit, petitioner claims he is the spouse as
contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code,
Philippine law does not recognize common law
marriages where “a man and a woman not
legally married who cohabit for many years as
husband and wife, who represent themselves to
the public as husband and wife, and who are
reputed to be husband and wife in the
community where they live may be considered
legally mauled in common law jurisdictions”. In
addition, it requires that the man and woman
living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage. Whereas,
the petitioner has a subsisting marriage with
another woman, legal impediment that
disqualified him from even legally marrying
Vitaliana.
AUTHORITY OF SOLEMNIZING OFFICER
Case No. 10 - COSCA V. PALAYPAYON, 237
SCRA 249
Facts: In an administrative complaint filed with
the Office of the Court Administrator, herein
respondents were charged with the following:
Illegal solemnization of marriage
Complainants allege that respondent Judge
Palaypayon, Jr. solemnized marriages even
without the requisite marriage license. Thus,
couples were able to get married by the simple
expedient of paying the marriage fees.
Respondent judge did not sign their marriage
contracts and did not indicate the date of
solemnization, the reason being that he
allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to
be submitted by the parties which was usually
several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the
marriage contracts were not filed with the local
civil registrar.
Held:
Judge Palaypayon subjected to
administrative sanction
1. The evidence presented by the complainants
sufficiently show that respondent Judge
Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized marriages
without a marriage license, and that it having
been shown that he did not comply with his duty
in closely supervising his clerk of court in the
preparation of the monthly report of cases being
submitted to the Supreme Court, particularly for
the months of July and September, 1992 where
it has been proven that the reports for said two
(2) months were falsified with respect to the
number of documents notarized.
2. The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign
the marriage contracts or certificates of those
marriages he solemnized without a marriage
license, there were no dates placed in the
marriage contracts to show when they were
solemnized, the contracting parties were not
furnished their marriage contracts and the Local
Civil Registrar was not being sent any copy of
the marriage contract, will not absolve him from
liability. By solemnizing alone a marriage without
a marriage license he as the solemnizing officer
is the one responsible for the irregularity in not
complying (with) the formal requisites of
marriage and under Article 4(3) of the Family
Code of the Philippines, he shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.
3. The civil aspect is addressed to the
contracting parties and those affected by the
illegal marriages, and what we are providing for
herein pertains to the administrative liability of
respondents, all without prejudice to their
criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code
provides that "(p)riests or ministers of any
religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities
who shall perform or authorize any illegal
marriage ceremony shall be punished in
accordance with the provisions of the Marriage
Law." This is of course, within the province of
the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
MARRIAGE LICENSE
Case No. 11 - MORENO V. BERNABE, 246
SCRA 120
Facts:Complainant alleges that on October 4,
1993, she and Marcelo Moreno were married
before respondent Judge Bernabe. She avers
that respondent Judge assured her that the
marriage contract will be released ten (10) days
after October 4, 1993. Complainant then visited
the office of the Respondent Judge on October
15, 1993 only to find out that she could not get
the marriage contract because the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar failed to issue a marriage
license. She claims that respondent Judge
connived with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to
deceive her.
Respondent denied that he conspired with the
relatives of Marcelo Moreno to solemnize the
marriage for the purpose of deceiving the
complainant.
Respondent contends:
1. That the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig has
actually prepared the marriage license but it was
not
released due to the subsequent objection of the
father of Marcelo Moreno;
2. That he did not violate the law nor did he have
the slightest intention to violate the law when he,
in good faith, solemnized the marriage, as he
was moved only by a desire to help a begging
and pleading complainant who wanted some
kind of assurance or security due to her
pregnant condition;
3. That in order to pacify complainant, Marcelo
Moreno requested him to perform the marriage
ceremony, with the express assurance that "the
marriage license was definitely forthcoming
since the necessary documents were complete;"
4. That the contracting parties were not known
to him; and
5. That both parties, particularly the
complainant, were fully apprised of the effects of
a marriage
performed without the required marriage license.
Held: In its Memorandum dated January 17,
1995, the Office of the Court Administrator
stated:
Careful study of the records reveal that
indeed respondent Judge displayed his
ignorance of the law when he solemnized
the marriage without a marriage license.
As a judge, he is presumed to be aware of
the existence of Article 3(2) of the Family
Code of the Philippines (E.O. 209, as
amended by E.O. 227), which provides of
a marriage is a valid marriage license.
Absence of said requisite will make the
marriage void from the beginning (Article
35 [3], the Family Code of the
 Philippines). Judges are enjoined to show
more than just a cursory acquaintance of
the law and other established rules. It
recommended that Respondent be held
liable for misconduct for solemnizing a
marriage without a marriage license and
that the appropriate administrative
sanctions be imposed against him.
We concur with the findings and
recommendation of the office of the Court
Administrator.
Respondent, by his own admission 8 that he
solemnized the marriage between complainant
and Marcelo Moreno without the required
marriage license, has dismally failed to live up to
his commitment to be the "embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence" 9 and
to his promise to be "faithful to the law."
Respondent cannot hide behind his claim of
good faith and Christian motives which, at most,
would serve only to mitigate his liability could
never justify violation of the law.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the
Family Code pertinently provides that the formal
requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid
marriage license except in the cases provided
for therein.
Complementarily, it declares that the absence of
any of the essential or formal requisites shall
generally render the marriage void ab initio and
that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites
shall not effect the validity of the marriage, the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity
shall be civilly, criminally and administratively
liable.
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting
parties and those affected by the illegal
marriages, and what we are providing for herein
pertains to the administrative liability of
respondents, all without prejudice to their
criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code
provides that "[p]riests or ministers of any
religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities
who shall perform or authorize any illegal
marriage ceremony shall be punished in
accordance with the provisions of the Marriage
Law." This is of course, within the province of
the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
Formal Requirements – Marriage Ceremony
Case No. 12 - GO V. CA
No less than the Constitution commands us to
protect marriage as an inviolable social
institution and the foundation of the family. In
our society, the importance of a wedding
ceremony cannot be underestimated as it is the
matrix of the family and, therefore, an occasion
worth reliving in the succeeding years.
NOTE: Yung issue dito is
nadeletenungnagvideoyung record ng wedding
ceremony ng Spouses Ong. Taposnagfilesila ng
Specific Performance with Damages against
sanagrecord. Walang Family Code related
eklavu?
Non-essential Requirements - Marriage
Certificate
Case No. 13 - VILLANUEVA V. CA, 198 SCRA
472
Facts: Private respondent Catalina Sanchez,
claiming to be the widow of Roberto Sanchez,
averred that her husband was the owner of a
275 sq. meter parcel of land located at Rosario,
Cavite, which was registered without her
knowledge in the name of the herein petitioners
on the strength of an alleged deed of sale
executed in their favor by her late husband.
Involving the report of a handwriting expert from
the Philippine Constabulary Criminal
Investigation Service, who found that the
signature on the document was written by
another person, she prayed that the deed of sale
be annulled, that the registration of the lot in the
name of the petitioners be canceled, and that
the lot be reconveyed to her.
Petitioners questioned the personality of
the private respondent to file the complaint,
contending that the late Roberto Sanchez was
never married.
In the decision of the trial judge, he
stated that the contract of a marriage submitted
by the private respondent should be rejected
because although the document was dated
September 21, 1964, the Torrens certificate
issued to Roberto Sanchez over the subject land
on August 25, 1966, described his civil status as
"single." It was also doubtful if she could bring
the action for reconveyance alone, even
assuming she was the surviving spouse of
Roberto Sanchez, considering that he left
illegitimate children and collateral relatives who
were also entitled to share in his estate. The
decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals,
which held that the trial court did err, as
contended by the appellant, that Catalina
Sanchez was not the widow of Roberto Sanchez
and that she had no capacity to institute the
complaint.
Held: The Court notes at the outset that
Catalina Sanchez has proved her status as the
widow of Roberto Sanchez with her submission
of the marriage contract denominated as Exhibit
"A." That evidence rendered unnecessary the
presumption that "a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage" and may also
explain why Roberto Sanchez could not marry
the woman by whom he supposedly had two
illegitimate children, assuming these persons did
exist. It is strange that the trial court should
reject Exhibit "A" in favor of the Transfer
Certificate of Title describing Roberto
Sanchez as "single," disregarding the
elementary principle that the best
documentary evidence of a marriage is the
marriage contract itself. A Torrens certificate is
the best evidence of ownership of registered
land, not of the civil status of the owner.
Case No. 14 - GARCIA V. RECIO
Facts: RederickRecio, a Filipino, was married to
Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived
together as husband and wife in Australia.
On May 18, 1989,a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued
by an Australian family court.
In 1992, RederickRecio (respondent)
also became an Australian citizen. In 1994,
RederickReciomarried Grace Garcia (petitioner),
a Filipina, in Cabanatuan City. In their
application for a marriage license, Rederick was
declared as "single" and "Filipino. Not long
afterm however, the couple was living separately
in Australia without prior judicial dissolution of
their marriage.
In 1998, Grace filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
Rederick on the ground of bigamy for he
allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the
time he married her in 1994. She claimed that
she learned of his marriage to Editha Samson
only in November, 1997.
Rederick contended that his first
marriage to Editha Samson had been validly
dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in
Australia in 1989, thus, he was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. While
the suit for the declaration of nullity was
pending, Rederick was able to secure a divorce
decree in Australia because the "marriage had
irretrievably broken down.” Consequently, he
prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be
dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause
of action.
Held:
Nationality Principle
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.
2. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot
be dissolved even by a divorce obtained
abroad,
because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.
3. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and
a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code
allows the former to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry."
4. RederickRecio was no longer bound by
Philippine personal laws after he acquired
Australian
citizenship in 1992. By becoming an Australian,
he severed his allegiance to the Philippines and
the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine
personal laws.
Recognition of Divorce Obtained Abroad
5. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who
are both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
respective national laws
6. Before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it
must prove thedivorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
7. Before a foreign judgment is given
presumptive evidentiary value, the document
must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree
itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is
the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a
written act or record of an act of an official body
or tribunal of a foreign country.
Proof of Foreign Divorce
8. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, a writing or document may be
proven asa public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If
the record is not kept in the Philippines, such
copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
9. In this case however, when the divorce
decree of 1989 was submitted in evidence,
counsel for
petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but
only to the fact that it had not been registered in
the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.
Petitioner's failure to object properly rendered
the divorce decree admissible as a written act of
the Family Court of Sydney, Australia
Burden of Proving Foreign Laws
10. The burden of proof lies with "the party who
alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an
action."
11. Since the divorce was a defense raised by
respondent RederickRecio, the burden of
proving the pertinent Australian law validating it
falls squarely upon him.
12. Philippine courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts,
they must be alleged and proved. Australian
marital laws are not among those matters that
judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function.
Types of Divorce
13. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the
legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause
arising after marriage.
14. Divorces are of different types. The two
basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a
vinculo
matrimoniiand (2) limited divorce or a mensa
et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage,
while the second suspends it and leaves the
bond in full force.
Legal Capacity to Remarry
15. Recio presented a decree nisi or an
interlocutory decree -- a conditional or
provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the
same as a separation from bed and board,
although an absolute divorce may follow after
the lapse of the prescribed period during which
no reconciliation is effected.
16. The Australian divorce decree contained a
restriction that reads: “A party to a marriage who
marries again before this decree becomes
absolute (unless the other party has died)
commits the offence of bigamy”
17. The divorce obtained by respondent appears
to be restricted. It did not absolutely establish his
legal capacity to remarry according to his
national law. Hence, the trial court erroneously
assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto
restored respondent's capacity to remarry. In
other words, in the absence of sufficient proof, it
cannot be concluded that respondent Recio was
legally capacitated to marry Grace Garcia on
January 12, 1994.
18. The legal capacity to contract marriage is
determined by the national law of the party
concerned.
19. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of
the Family Code would have been sufficient to
establish the legal capacity of respondent, had
he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima
facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the
part of the alien applicant for a marriage license
Bigamy
20. The court cannot grant Garcia's prayer to
declare her marriage to Recio null and void on
the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out
that under Australian law, he was really
capacitated to marry her as a direct result of the
divorce decree.
21. The most judicious course is to remand the
case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any,
which show Recio's legal capacity to marry
Garcia. Failing in that, then the court a quo may
declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the
ground of bigamy, there being already in
evidence two existing marriage certificates,
which were both obtained in the Philippines, one
in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987
and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January
12, 1994
Marriage outside the Philippines – Foreign
Divorce
Case No. 15 - VAN DORN V. ROMILLO
Facts: Alice Reyes, a Filipino citizen, and
Richard Upton, an American citizen, were
married in Hongkong in 1972. After the
marriage, they resided in the Philippines and
begot two children.
Subsequently, the were divorced in Nevada,
United States, in 1982. Alice re-married in
Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Richard Upton filed suit against Alice
Van Dorn stating that her business in Ermita,
Manila (the Galleon Shop) is conjugal property
of the parties, and asking that she be ordered to
render an accounting of that business, and that
he be declared with right to manage the conjugal
property.
Alice van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that the cause of action is barred by
previous judgment in the divorce proceedings
before the Nevada Court wherein Upton had
acknowledged that they had "no community
property" as of 1982. The lower court denied the
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
property involved is located in the Philippines so
that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the
case. The denial is now the subject of this
Certiorari proceeding. Upton contends that Alice
cannot rely on the divorce decree obtained in
Nevada as the divorce is not valid and binding in
this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.
Held:
1. Owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationalsare covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may berecognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case,
the divorce in Nevada released Richard Upton
from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage.
2. Pursuant to his national law, Richard Upton is
no longer the husband of Alice van Dorn. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below
as Alice's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said
Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property. He should not continue to be
one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served.
Case No. 16 - PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERA, 174
SCRA 653
Facts: Imelda ManalaysayPilapil, a Filipino
citizen and Erich EkkehardGeiling, a German
national, were married in Germany. The couple
lived for a while in Manila and had a daughter
together
After about 3 and ½ years of marriage, the
husband initiated divorce proceedings in
Germany. The German court granted a divorce
decree.
Five months after the issuance of the
divorce decree, the Geiling filed two complaints
for adultery against Pilapil before the City Fiscal
of Manila alleging that, while still married to him,
Pilapil had an affair with 2 men (William Chia
and James Chua). Information was filed against
Pilapil and the two men.
Pilapil moved unsuccessfully to have the
criminal case dismissed. The present petition is
anchored on the main ground that the court is
without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge
of adultery, which is a private offense that
cannot be prosecuted de officio, since the
purported complainant, a foreigner, does not
qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a
final divorce decree under his national law prior
to his filing the criminal complaint."
Held:
Prosecution for Adultery
The law specifically provides that in
prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the
person who can legally file the complaint should
be the offended spouse, and nobody else.
Status as offended spouse
1. Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus
presupposes that the marital relationship is
still
subsisting at the time of the institution of the
criminal action for adultery. This is a logical
consequence since the raison d'etre of said
provision of law would be absent where the
supposed
offended party had ceased to be the spouse of
the alleged offender at the time of the filing of
the criminal case
2. Such status or capacity (as an offended
spouse) must exist as of the time he initiates the
action. Thus, the person who initiates the
adultery case must be an offended spouse,
and by this is meant thathe is still married to
the accused spouse, at the time of the filing
of the complaint.
3. Hence, Geiling, being no longer the husband
of Pilapil, had no legal standing to commence
the
adultery case under the imposture that he was
the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
4. The allegation that he could not have brought
this case before the decree of divorce for lack of
knowledge, even if true, is of no legal
significance or consequence in this case. There
would no longer be a family nor marriage vows
to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is
decreed. Neither would there be a danger of
introducing spurious heirs into the family, which
is said to be one of the reasons for the particular
formulation of our law on adultery, since there
would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to
speak of. The severance of the marital bond had
the effect of dissociating the former spouses
from each other, hence the actuations of one
would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
Case No. 17 - REPUBLIC V. MANALO, G.R.
No. 221029, April 24, 2018
Facts: On January 10, 2012, Marelyn Tanedo
Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation
of entry of marriage pursuant to Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court by virtue of a judgment
of divorce rendered by a Japanese court.
The RTC of Dagupan City set the case for initial
hearing. Manalo moved to amend the petition as
one for recognition and enforcement of a foreign
judgment.
The RTC denied the petition. In ruling that the
divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not
be
recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of
the New Civil Code, the Philippine law “does not
afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce,
whether they are in the country or living abroad,
if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or
if they celebrated their marriage in the
Philippines or in another country” and that
unless Filipinos “are naturalized as citizens of
another country, Philippine laws shall have
control over issues related to Filipinos' family
rights and duties.”
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA)
overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article
26 of the Family Code is applicable even if it
was Manalo who filed for divorce against her
Japanese husband. Cited as similar to this case
was Van Dorn vs. Judge Romillo, Jr.8 where the
marriage between a foreigner and a Filipino was
dissolved through a divorce filed abroad by the
latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration,but it
was denied. Hence, this petition.
Held:
Divorce in the Philippine jurisdiction
1. Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union
for a cause arising after marriage, are of two
types: (1) absolute divorce or a vincula
matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and
(2) limited divorce or amensa et tharo, which
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.
2. In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
(a) Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.
(b) Consistent with Articles 15 and 17 of the
New Civil Code, the marital bond between two
Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an
absolute divorce obtained abroad.
(c) An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a
couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized
in
the Philippines, provided it is consistent with
their respective national laws.
(d) In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the absolute
divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
Article 26, Family Code
3. As modified, Article 26 now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force
in
the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country,except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
4. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 authorizes our
courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce
decree
precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on
the merits because it is tantamount to trying a
divorce case. Under the principles of comity, our
jurisdictionrecognizes a valid divorce obtained
by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal
effects thereof, e. g., on custody, care and
support of the children or property relations of
the Spouses, must still be determined by our
courts.
5. In Republic v. Orbecido III (2005), this Court
concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies
to a case where, at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, the parties were both Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them acquired
foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a
divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable
decree. The court stated therein that “the
reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce isobtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
Article 26 applies even if it is the Filipino
spouse who filed for divorce from the alien
spouse
6. Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether,
under Article 26, a Filipino citizen has the
capacity to remarry under Philippine law after
initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and
obtaining a favorable judgment against his or
her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry.
We rule in the affirmative.
7. The fact that a validly obtained foreign divorce
initiated by the Filipino spouse can be
recognized and given legal effects in the
Philippines is implied from Our previous rulings.
In Van Dorn vs. Romillowas decided before the
Family Code took into effect. There, the court
held that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound
by a divorce decree obtained abroad, and
dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for
accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal
property and rejected his submission that the
foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse)
is not valid in this jurisdiction. In Fujiki vs.
Marinay, the Filipino wife, with the help of her
first husband, who is a Japanese national, was
able to obtain a judgment from Japan's family
court, which declared the marriage between her
and her second husband, who is a Japanese
national, void on the ground of bigamy. The
court held that a husband or wife of a prior
marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy. (see
also Dacasin vs. Dacasin andMedina vs. Koike)
8. There is no compelling reason to deviate from
the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court
recognized a foreign divorce decree that was
initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and
extended its legal effects on the issues of child
custody and property relation, it should not stop
short in likewise acknowledging that one of the
usual and necessary consequences of absolute
divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is
no longer a mutual obligation to live together
and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is
severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and
the domestic relation of the former spouses
change as both of them are freed from the
marital bond.
Interpretation of Article 26 should give effect
to the intent behind the provision
9. The dissent is of the view that, under the
nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is
subject to Philippine law, which prohibits
absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree
which she obtained under Japanese law cannot
be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a
national not of Japan, but of the Philippines.
10. We beg to differ. Paragraph 2 of Article 26
speaks of “a divorce x xx validly obtained abroad
by thealien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry. ”Based on a clear and plain reading of
the provision, itonly requires that there be a
divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the
law does not demand that the alien spouse
should be the one who initiated the proceeding
wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does
not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the
petitioner or the respondent in the foreign
divorce proceeding. Verbalegis non
estrecedendum, or from the words of a statute
there should be no departure.
11. Assuming that the word “obtained” should be
interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding
must be actually initiated by the alien spouse,
still, the Court will not follow the letter of the
statute when to do so would depart from the true
intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield
conclusions inconsistent with the general
purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve,
and statutes should be so construed as not to
defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes.
12. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a corrective
measure to address an anomaly where the
Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of
his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse
initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a
favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond
and capacitating his or her alien spouse to
remarry will have the same result: the Filipino
spouse will effectively be without a husband or
wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding is in the same place and in ‘like
circumstance as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.
Therefore, the subject provision should not
make a distinction. In both instance, it is
extended as a means to recognize the residual
effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos
whose marital ties to their alien spouses are
severed by operation of the latter's national law.
Nationality rule cannot be invoked if it will
lead to unequal application of the law
13. Conveniently invoking the nationality
principle is erroneous. Such principle, found
under Article 15 of the Civil Code, is not an
absolute and unbending rule. ln fact, the mere
existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a
testament that the State may provide for an
exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to
the nationality principle must be disallowed if it
would cause unjust discrimination and
oppression to certain classes of individuals
whose rights are equally protected by law. The
courts have the duty to enforce the laws of
divorce as written by the Legislature only if they
are constitutional.
14. While the Congress is allowed a wide
leeway in providing for a valid classification, the
deference stops where the classification violates
a fundamental right, or prejudices persons
accorded special protection by the Constitution.
If a legislative classification impermissibly
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of
a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is
required since it is presumed unconstitutional,
and the burden is upon the government to prove
that the classification is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest and that it is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest.
15. “Fundamental rights” whose infringement
leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection
clause are those basic liberties explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution. It
includes the right to marry. On the other hand,
what constitutes compelling state interest is
measured by the scale of rights and powers
arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by
history. It essentially involves a public right or
interest that, because of its primacy, overrides
individual rights, and allows the former to take
precedence over the latter.
16. The differentiation in Paragraph 2 of Article
26 is arbitrary. There is no real and substantial
difference between a Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino who
obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of
his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the
Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered
as Filipinos who have the same rights and
obligations in an alien land. The circumstances
surrounding them are alike. Were it not for
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married
to their foreigner spouses who are no longer
their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a
distinction between them based merely on the
superficial difference of whether they initiated
the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair.
Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one
and unjustly discriminate against the other.
Divorce is not prohibited under the 1987
Constitution; Divorce Law history in the
Philippines
17. The 1987 Constitution expresses that
marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State. Nevertheless, it was not
meant to be a general prohibition on divorce
because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C.
Gascon, in response to a question by Father
Joaquin G Bernas during the deliberations of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, was
categorical about this point.
18. Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not
new in our country. Effective March 11, 1917,
Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce
on the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife
or concubinageon the part of the husband by
virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine
Legislature. On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the
authority conferred upon him by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese
Forces in the Philippines and with the approval
of the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine
Executive Commission promulgated an EC. No.
141 (“New Divorce Law "), which repealed Act
No. 2710 and provided eleven grounds for
absolute divorce, such as intentional or
unjustified desertion continuously for at least
one year prior to the filing of the action, slander
by deed or gross insult by one spouse against
the other to such an extent as to make further
living together impracticable, and a spouse's
incurable insanity. When the Philippines was
liberated and the Commonwealth Government
was restored, it ceased to have force and effect
and Act No. 2710 again prevailed. From August
30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act
No. 386 or the New Civil Code, an absolute
divorce obtained by Filipino citizens, whether
here or abroad, is no longer recognized.
19. Through the years, there has been constant
clamor from various sectors of the Philippine
society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a
matter of fact, in the current 17th Congress, H.B.
No. 7303 entitled “AnAct Instituting Absolute
Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the
Philippines " or the Absolute DivorceAct of 2018
was submitted by the House Committee on
Population and Family Relations on February
28, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on
Third Reading.
20. The declared State policy that marriage, as
an inviolable social institution, is the foundation
of the family and shall be protected by the State,
should not be read in total isolation but must be
harmonized with other constitutional provisions.
Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the
Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to
actively promote its total development. It is also
obligated to defend, among others, the right of
children to special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development. To
Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce
these obligations if We limit the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to those foreign
divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not
amiss to point that the women and children are
almost always thehelpless victims of all forms of
domestic abuse and violence.
Japanese law on divorce must be proved
21. If the opposing party fails to properly object,
as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered
admissible as a written act of the foreign court.
As it appears, the existence of the divorce
decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was
the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached
nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on
the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so.
22. Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce
must still be proved. It is well-settled in our
jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. The burden of proof lies
with the “party who alleges the existence of a
fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action. In civil cases, plaintiffs
have the burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint when those are
denied by the answer; and defendants have the
burden of proving the material allegations in
their answer when they introduce new matters.
23. Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the
burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law
validating it, as well as her former husband's
capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her.
Japanese laws on persons and family relations
are not among those matters that Filipino judges
are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.
Grounds for Void Marriages – Lack of
Formal/Essential Requirements
Case No. 18 - REPUBLIC V. CA AND
ANGELINA CASTRO, 236 SCRA 257
Facts: Angelina Castro and Edwin Cardenas
were married in a civil ceremony performed by
Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of
Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated
without the knowledge of Castro's parents.
Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the
processing of the documents required for the
celebration of the marriage, including the
procurement of the marriage license.
It was only when Castro discovered she
was pregnant, that the couple decided to live
together. However, their cohabitation lasted only
for four months. Thereafter, the couple parted
ways. The baby was adopted by the brother of
Angelina, with the consent of Edwin.
The baby was now in the United States.
Desiring to follow her daughter, Angelina wanted
to put in order her marital status before leaving
for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer
regarding the possible annulment of her
marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they
discovered that there was no marriage license
issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of
their marriage. As proof, Angelina Castro offered
in evidence a certification from the Civil Register
of Pasig.
The trial court denied the petition. It held
that the above certification was inadequate to
establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage
license prior to the celebration of the marriage
between the parties.
The appellate court reversed the
decision of the trial court. It declared the
marriage between the
contracting parties null and void and directed the
Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the subject
marriage contract.
Held:
Absence of a Valid Marriage License
(Essential Requisite) makes Marriage Void
Ab Initio
1. The law provides that no marriage shall be
solemnized without a marriage license first
issuedby a local civil registrar. Being one of
the essential requisites of a valid marriage,
absence of alicense would render the
marriage void ab initio.
2. The SC held that, under the circumstances
of the case, the documentary and testimonial
evidence presented by private respondent
Castro sufficiently established the absence
of the
subject marriage license.Certification of
Local Civil Registrar Adequate to Prove Non-
issuance of License
3. A written statement signed by an officer
having custody of an official record or by his
deputy,that after diligent search, no record
or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist
in the records ofhis office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible
as evidence that therecords of his contain no
such record or entry. (Section 29, Rule 132 of
Rules of Court)
4. As custodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officers charged with
the duty,inter alia, of maintaining a register
book where they are required to enter all
applications formarriage licenses.
5. The certification of "due search and
inability to find" issued by the civil registrar
of Pasig
enjoys probative value, he being the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all
datarelative to the issuance of a marriage
license.
Grounds for Void Marriages –
Bigamous/Polygamous Marriages
Case No. 19 – PEOPLE v. NOLASCO
FACTS:
Nolasco, a seaman, first met Janet Monica
Parker in a bar in England. After that, she lived
with him on his ship for 6 months. After his
seaman's contract has expired, he brought her
to his hometown in San Jose, Antique. They got
married in January 1982.
After the marriage celebration, he got another
employment contract and left the province. In
January 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his
mother that 15 days after Janet gave birth to
their son, she left. He cut short his contract to
find Janet. He returned home in November
1983.
He did so by securing another contract which
England is one of its port calls. He wrote several
letters to the bar where he and Janet first met,
but all were returned to him. He claimed that he
inquired from his friends but they too had no
news about Janet. In 1988, Nolasco filed before
the RTC of Antique a petition for the declaration
of presumptive death of his wife Janet.
RTC granted the petition. The Republic through
the Solicitor-General, appealed to the CA,
contending that the trial court erred in declaring
Janet presumptively dead because Nolasco had
failed to show that there existed a well-founded
belief for such declaration. CA affirmed the trial
court's decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded
belief that his wife is already dead.
RULING:
No. Nolasco failed to prove that he had complied
with the third requirement under the Article 41 of
the Family Code, the existence of a "well-
founded belief" that Janet is already dead.
Under Article 41, the time required for the
presumption to arise has been shortened to 4
years; however, there is a need for judicial
declaration of presumptive death to enable the
spouse present to marry. However, Article 41
imposes a stricter standard before declaring
presumptive death of one spouse. It requires a
"well-founded belief" that the absentee is
already dead before a petition for declaration of
presumptive death can be granted.
In the case at bar, the Court found Nolasco's
alleged attempt to ascertain about Janet's
whereabouts too sketchy to form the basis of a
reasonable or well-founded belief that she was
already dead.
Nolasco, after returning from his employment,
instead of seeking help of local authorities or of
the British Embassy, secured another contract to
London. Janet's alleged refusal to give any
information about her was too convenient an
excuse to justify his failure to locate her. He did
not explain why he took him 9 months to finally
reached San Jose after he asked leave from his
captain. He refused to identify his friends whom
he inquired from. When the Court asked
Nolasco about the returned letters, he said he
had lost them. Moreover, while he was in
London, he did not even dare to solicit help of
authorities to find his wife.
The circumstances of Janet's departure and
Nolasco's subsequent behavior make it very
difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet
was dead a well-founded one.
Grounds for Void Marriages – Pyschological
Incapacity
Case No. 20 – Santos v. CA
FACTS:
Leouel Santos, a member of the Army, met Julia
Rosario Bedia in Iloilo City. In September 1986,
they got married. The couple latter lived with
Julia’s parents. Julia gave birth to their son in
1987. Their marriage, however, was marred by
the frequent interference of Julia’s parents, as
averred by Leouel. The couple also occasionally
quarreled about as to, among other things, when
should they start living independently from
Julia’s parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to
work as a nurse despite Leouel’s opposition. 7
months later, she and Leouel got to talk and she
promised to return home in 1989. She never
went home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the
chance to be in the US due to a military training.
During his stay, he desperately tried to locate his
wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at
least have his wife come home, filed a petition to
nullify their marriage due to Julia’s alleged
psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted that
due to Julia’s failure to return home or at least
communicate with him even with all his effort
constitutes psychological incapacity. Julia filed
an opposition; she said that it is Leouel who is
incompetent. The prosecutor ascertained that
there is no collusion between the two. Leouel’s
petition is however denied by the lower and
appellate court.
ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity
is attendant to the case at bar.
HELD: No. Before deciding on the case, the SC
noted that the Family Code did not define the
term “psychological incapacity”, which is
adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But
basing it on the deliberations of the Family Code
Revision Committee, the provision in PI,
adopted with less specificity than expected, has
been designed to allow some resiliency in its
application. The FCRC did not give any
examples of PI for fear that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis.
Rather, the FCRC would like the judge to
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be
given persuasive effect since the provision was
taken from Canon Law. The term “psychological
incapacity” defies any precise definition since
psychological causes can be of an infinite
variety.
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken
and construed independently of but must stand
in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law
on marriage. PI should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which (Art. 68), include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. The
intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of PI to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The SC also notes that PI must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that
the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be
rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
In the case at bar, although Leouel stands
aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed
because the alleged PI of his wife is not clearly
shown by the factual settings presented. The
factual settings do not come close to to the
standard required to decree a nullity of marriage.
Case No. 21 – Republic v. Molina
FACTS:
The case at bar challenges the decision of CA
affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel
Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of
psychological incapacity. The couple got
married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo
manifested signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility both as husband and a father
preferring to spend more time with friends whom
he squandered his money, depends on his
parents for aid and assistance and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances.
In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and
as a result their relationship was estranged.
Roridel quit her work and went to live with her
parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks
later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since
then he abandoned them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on
the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo
subsists and remains valid. What constitutes
psychological incapacity is not mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and confliction
personalities. It is indispensable that the parties
must exhibit inclinations which would not meet
the essential marital responsibilites and duties
due to some psychological illness. Reynaldo’s
action at the time of the marriage did not
manifest such characteristics that would
comprise grounds for psychological incapacity.
The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed
that she and her husband cannot get along with
each other and had not shown gravity of the
problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by
Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric
disorder but only incompatibility which is not
considered as psychological incapacity.
The following are the guidelines as to the
grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth
in this case:
 burden of proof to show nullity belongs
to the plaintiff
 root causes of the incapacity must be
medically and clinically inclined
 such incapacity should be in existence
at the time of the marriage
 such incapacity must be grave so as to
disable the person in complying with the
essentials of marital obligations of marriage
 such incapacity must be embraced in
Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the
Family Code
 decision of the National Matrimonial
Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be
respected
 court shall order the prosecuting
attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on
behalf of the state.
Case No. 22 – Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA

Facts:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao married sometime
on May 22, 1988. However, since their marriage
and cohabitation for 10 months, the wife stated
that there was no sexual interaction between
them. This claim was also affirmed by the
husband. Frustrated, Gina filed an annulment
case against her husband on the ground of
psychological incapacity for being unable to fulfill
the basic marital obligations. RTC granted the
annulment and was also affirmed by the CA.
Hence, the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the inability of the husband to
have sexual intercourse with his wife for more
than 10 months constitute a ground for
annulment by reason of psychological
incapacity.
Ruling:
One of the basic marital obligations under the
Family Code is “To procreate children based on
the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of this
obligation will finally destroy the integrity and
wholeness of the marriage. Sexual intimacy is a
gift and a participation in the mystery of creation.
The prolonged and senseless refusal of the
husband to fulfill such marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Hereby, SC affirmed CA’s ruling.
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
Case No. 23 – Domingo v. CA
FACTS:
Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto
Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage and separation
of property. She did not know that Domingo had
been previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz
in 1969. She came to know the previous
marriage when the latter filed a suit of bigamy
against her. Furthermore, when she came
home from Saudi during her one-month leave
from work, she discovered that Roberto
cohabited with another woman and had been
disposing some of her properties which is
administered by Roberto. The latter claims that
because their marriage was void ab initio, the
declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and
superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists
the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for
the purpose of remarriage, but in order to
provide a basis for the separation and
distribution of properties acquired during the
marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial
declaration should only be filed for purposes of
remarriage.
HELD:
The declaration of the nullity of marriage is
indeed required for purposed of remarriage.
However, it is also necessary for the protection
of the subsequent spouse who believed in good
faith that his or her partner was not lawfully
married marries the same. With this, the said
person is freed from being charged with bigamy.
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law
states that final judgment shall provide for the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and
support of the common children and the delivery
of their presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in previous
judicial proceedings. Soledad’s prayer for
separation of property will simply be the
necessary consequence of the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage.
Hence, the petitioner’s suggestion that for their
properties be separated, an ordinary civil action
has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless.
The Family Code has clearly provided the
effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage,
one of which is the separation of property
according to the regime of property relations
governing them.
Legal Separation - Concept
Case No. 24 – Lapuz v. Eufemio
Facts:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal
separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August
1953. They were married civilly on September
21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They
had lived together as husband and wife
continuously without any children until 1943
when her husband abandoned her. They
acquired properties during their marriage.
Petitioner then discovered that her husband
cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go
Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the
issuance of a decree of legal separation, which
among others, would order that the defendant
Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the
conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the
ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with
Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties
adduced their respective evidence. However,
before the trial could be completed, respondent
already scheduled to present surrebuttal
evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident
on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the
court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss
the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on
the grounds that the said petition was filed
beyond the one-year period provided in Article
102 of the Civil Code and that the death of
Carmen abated the action for legal separation.
Petitioner’s counsel moved to substitute the
deceased Carmen by her father, Macario
Lapuz.
ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before
final decree in an action for legal separation,
abate the action and will it also apply if the
action involved property rights.
HELD:
An action for legal separation is abated by the
death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are
involved. These rights are mere effects of
decree of separation, their source being the
decree itself; without the decree such rights do
not come into existence, so that before the
finality of a decree, these claims are merely
rights in expectation. If death supervenes during
the pendency of the action, no decree can be
forthcoming, death producing a more radical and
definitive separation; and the expected
consequential rights and claims would
necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity
is moot and academic and there could be no
further interest in continuing the same after her
demise, that automatically dissolved the
questioned union. Any property rights acquired
by either party as a result of Article 144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved
and determined in a proper action for partition by
either the appellee or by the heirs of the
appellant.
Grounds for Legal Separation -
Abandonment
Case No. 25- De La Cruz v. De La Cruz
FACTS:
Estrella, the plaintiff, and Severino, the
defendant were married in Bacolod and
begotten 6 children. During their coverture, they
acquired several parcels of land and were
engage in various businesses. The plaintiff filed
an action against her husband for the separation
of their properties. She further alleged that her
husband aside from abandoning her, also
mismanaged their conjugal properties. On the
other hand, Severino contended that he had
always visited the conjugal home and had
provided support for the family despite his
frequent absences when he was in Manila to
supervise the expansion of their business.
Since 1955, he had not slept in the conjugal
dwelling instead stayed in his office at Texboard
Factory although he paid short visits in the
conjugal home, which was affirmed by Estrella.
The latter suspected that her husband had a
mistress named Nenita Hernandez, hence, the
urgency of the separation of property for the fear
that her husband might squander and dispose
the conjugal assets in favor of the concubine.
ISSUE: WON there has been abandonment on
the part of the husband and WON there has
been an abused of his authority as administrator
of the conjugal partnership.
HELD:
The husband has never desisted in the
fulfillment of his marital obligations and support
of the family. To be legally declared as to have
abandoned the conjugal home, one must have
willfully and with intention of not coming back
and perpetual separation. There must be real
abandonment and not mere separation. In fact,
the husband never failed to give monthly
financial support as admitted by the wife. This
negates the intention of coming home to the
conjugal abode. The plaintiff even testified that
the husband “paid short visits” implying more
than one visit. Likewise, as testified by the
manager of one of their businesses, the wife has
been drawing a monthly allowance of P1,000-
1,500 that was given personally by the
defendant or the witness himself.
SC held that lower court erred in holding that
mere refusal or failure of the husband as
administrator of the conjugal partnership to
inform the wife of the progress of the business
constitutes abuse of administration. In order for
abuse to exist, there must be a willful and utter
disregard of the interest of the partnership
evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts or
omissions prejudicial to the latter.
Grounds for the denial of the Petition for
Legal Separation - Condonation
Case No. 26 – Ocampo v. Florenciano
FACTS:
Estrella, the plaintiff, and Severino, the
defendant were married in Bacolod and
begotten 6 children. During their coverture, they
acquired several parcels of land and were
engage in various businesses. The plaintiff filed
an action against her husband for the separation
of their properties. She further alleged that her
husband aside from abandoning her, also
mismanaged their conjugal properties. On the
other hand, Severino contended that he had
always visited the conjugal home and had
provided support for the family despite his
frequent absences when he was in Manila to
supervise the expansion of their business.
Since 1955, he had not slept in the conjugal
dwelling instead stayed in his office at Texboard
Factory although he paid short visits in the
conjugal home, which was affirmed by Estrella.
The latter suspected that her husband had a
mistress named Nenita Hernandez, hence, the
urgency of the separation of property for the fear
that her husband might squander and dispose
the conjugal assets in favor of the concubine.
ISSUE: WON there has been abandonment on
the part of the husband and WON there has
been an abused of his authority as administrator
of the conjugal partnership.
HELD:
The husband has never desisted in the
fulfillment of his marital obligations and support
of the family. To be legally declared as to have
abandoned the conjugal home, one must have
willfully and with intention of not coming back
and perpetual separation. There must be real
abandonment and not mere separation. In fact,
the husband never failed to give monthly
financial support as admitted by the wife. This
negates the intention of coming home to the
conjugal abode. The plaintiff even testified that
the husband “paid short visits” implying more
than one visit. Likewise, as testified by the
manager of one of their businesses, the wife has
been drawing a monthly allowance of P1,000-
1,500 that was given personally by the
defendant or the witness himself.
SC held that lower court erred in holding that
mere refusal or failure of the husband as
administrator of the conjugal partnership to
inform the wife of the progress of the business
constitutes abuse of administration. In order for
abuse to exist, there must be a willful and utter
disregard of the interest of the partnership
evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts or
omissions prejudicial to the latter.
Grounds for the denial of the Petition for
Legal Separation - Consent
Case No. 27 – People v. Sensano
FACTS:
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married and
had a child whom the latter allegedlyabandoned when
he went and stayed in Cagayan for three years without
letters or financial supportto the former who worked hard
for herself and her son until she met the accused
Marcelo Ramoswho later took care of them.Ventura
charged Sensano and Ramos for adultery, found by the
court guilty of the crime chargedand served their
sentence.Sensano after serving her sentenced and
leaving her paramour made steps to reconcile with and
goback to her husband but to no avail - She and her
child were abandoned for the second time. Thus,they
went back to her co-accused Ramos.Despite the
knowledge that she resumed living with her
codefendant, her husband did nothing toassert his right
as her spouse. Instead, he went abroad for seven years
and presumably hadcompletely abandoned
them..When Ventura returned home, he charged
Sensano of adultery for the second time in order to
obtaindivorce under Act No. 2710.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ramos can file adultery against his
spouse for the second time being the offendedparty.
HELD:
No. The Court concluded that the evidence in this case
as well as the conduct of Ramos showedthat he
consented to the adulterous relations existing between
the accused and former co-defendant. He is therefore
under the law not authorized to institute the criminal
proceeding. Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code, paragraphs 1 and 2, are as follows:
Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage,
seduction, abduction, rape and acts oflasciviousness
. the properties in question as conjugal properties
— of Alanis and Pacete which were ordered
The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be
prosecuted exceptupon a complaint filed by the offended
spouse.The offended party cannot institute criminal
prosecution without including both the guiltyparties, if
they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have
consented or pardoned theoffenders.The court, in
reversing the decision of the court aquo found the
argument of the Solicitor Generalthat his seven years of
acquiescence in the adultery of his wife is due to his
absence in the countrywhich made him impossible to
take any action against the accused, to be unmeritorious.
Legal Separation -Procedure
Case No. 28 - PACETE vs. CARIAGA
FACTS:
The issue in this petition for certiorari is whether
or not the CFI of Cotabato, Branch I, gravely
abused its discretion in denying petitioners’
motion for extension of time to file their answer
and in declaring petitioners in default and in
rendering its decision of which, among other
things, decreed the legal separation of petitioner
Enrico L. Pacete and private respondent
Concepcion Alanis and held to be null and void
ab initio the marriage of Enrico L. Pacete to
Clarita de la Concepcion.
Concepcion Alanis filed for the declaration of
nullity of the marriage between her erstwhile
husband Enrico L. Pacete and one Clarita de la
Concepcion, as well as for legal separation and
accounting and separation of property. She
averred that she was married to Pacete on 30
April 1938 and they had a child named
Consuelo. She learned that Pacete
subsequently contracted a second marriage with
Clarita de la Concepcion. She and Pacete
acquired vast property that he fraudulently
placed the several pieces of property either in
his name and Clarita or in the names of his
children with Clarita and other “dummies;”
After having been summoned, the defendants
repeatedly asked the court for extension of filing
for an answer which eventually resulted to being
declared in default. Five months after the
petition was filed the court granted the issuance
of a Decree of Legal Separation and declared
forfeited in favor of Alanis. The court also
nullified his marriage to Clarita.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its
discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for
extension of time to file their answer, in
declaring petitioners in default and in rendering
its decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed
the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and
held to be null and void the marriage of Pacete
to Clarita.
RULING:
The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal
separation shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgment. In case of non-appearance of the
defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to inquire whether or not collusion
between parties exists. If there is no collusion,
the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the
State in order to take care that the evidence for
the plaintiff is not fabricated.”
The above stated provision calling for the
intervention of the state attorneys in case of
uncontested proceedings for legal separation
(and of annulment of marriages, under Article
88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a
mere contract.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of
the Family Code, further mandates that an
action for legal separation must “in no case be
tried before six months shall have elapsed since
the filing of the petition,” obviously in order to
provide the parties a “cooling-off” period. In this
interim, the court should take steps toward
getting the parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive
provisions of the law is further or underscored by
the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the
Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in
actions for annulments of marriage or for legal
separation. Therefore, “if the defendant in an
action for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation fails to answer, the court shall order
the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether
or not a collusion between the parties exists,
and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the
State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated.”
Duties and Obligation of the Spouses
Case No. 29 - LACSON VS. LACSON
FACTS:
Alfonso Lacson (hereinafter referred to as the
petitioner spouse) and Carmen San Jose-
Lacson (hereinafter referred to as the
respondent spouse) were married on February
14, 1953. To them were born four children, all
alive.
On January 9, 1963 the respondent spouse left
the conjugal home in Santa Clara Subdivision,
Bacolod City, and commenced to reside in
Manila. She filed on March 12, 1963 a complaint
in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila (hereinafter referred to as the JDRC) for
custody of all their children as well as support for
them and herself.
However, the spouses, thru the assistance of
their respective attorneys, succeeded in
reaching an amicable settlement respecting
custody of the children, support, and separation
of property.
Finding the foregoing joint petition to be
"conformable to law," the CFI (Judge Jose F.
Fernandez, presiding) issued an order on April
27, 1963, rendering judgment approving and
incorporating in toto their compromise
agreement. In compliance of their mutual
agreement, the petitioner spouse delivered all
the four children to the respondent spouse and
remitted money for their support.
ISSUE: Whether the compromise agreement
entered into by the parties and the judgment of
the CFI grounded on the said agreement, are
valid.
RULING: We hold that the compromise
agreement and the judgment of the CFI
grounded on the said agreement are valid with
respect to the separation of property of the
spouses and the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership.
The law allows separation of property of the
spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership provided judicial sanction is secured
beforehand.
It is likewise undisputed that the couple have
been separated in fact for at least five years -
the wife's residence being in Manila, and the
husband's in the conjugal home in Bacolod City.
Therefore, inasmuch as a lengthy separation
has supervened between them, the propriety of
severing their financial and proprietary interests
is manifest.
Besides, this Court cannot constrain the
spouses to live together, as
[I]t is not within the province of the courts of this
country to attempt to compel one of the spouses
to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the
other. .. At best such an order can be effective
for no other purpose than to compel the spouse
to live under the same roof; and the experience
of those countries where the courts of justice
have assumed to compel the cohabitation of
married couple shows that the policy of the
practice is extremely questionable. (Arroyo v.
Vasquez de Arroyo, 42 Phil. 54, 60).
However, in so approving the regime of
separation of property of the spouses and the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership, this
Court does not thereby accord recognition to nor
legalize the de facto separation of the spouses,
which again in the language of Arroyo v.
Vasquez de Arroyo, supra — is a "state which is
abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all
concerned." We would like to douse the
momentary seething emotions of couples who,
at the slightest ruffling of domestic tranquility —
brought about by "mere austerity of temper,
petulance of manners, rudeness of language, a
want of civil attention and accommodation, even
occasional sallies of passion" without more —
would be minded toseparate from each other. In
this jurisdiction, the husband and the wife are
obliged to live together, observe mutual respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support
(art. 109, new Civil Code). There is, therefore,
virtue in making it as difficult as possible for
married couples — impelled by no better cause
than their whims and caprices — to abandon
each other's company.
'... For though in particular cases the
repugnance of the law to dissolve the obligations
of matrimonial cohabitation may operate with
great severity upon individuals, yet it must be
carefully remembered that the general
happiness of the married life is secured by its
indissolubility. When people understand that
they must live together, except for a very few
reasons known to the law, they learn to soften
by mutual accommodation that yoke which they
know they cannot shake off; they become good
husbands and good wives from the necessity of
remaining husbands and wives; for necessity is
a powerful master in teaching the duties which it
imposes ..." (Evans vs. Evans, 1 Hag. Con., 35;
161 Eng. Reprint, 466, 467.) (Arroyo vs.
Vasquez de Arroyo, Id., pp. 58-59).
We agree with the Court of Appeals, however,
that the CFI erred in depriving the mother, the
respondent spouse, of the custody of the two
older children (both then below the age of 7).
The Civil Code specifically commands in the
second sentence of its article 363 that "No
mother shall be separated from her child under
seven years of age, unless the court finds
compelling reasons for such measure."
... When husband and wife are divorced or living
separately and apart from each other, and the
question as to the care, custody, and control of a
child or children of their marriage is brought
before a Court of First Instance by petition or as
an incident to any other proceeding, the court,
upon hearing testimony as may be pertinent,
shall award the care, custody and control of
each such child as will be for its best
interest permitting the child to choose which
parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years
of age, unless the parent so chosen be unfit to
take charge of the child by reason of moral
depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or
poverty... .
One last point regarding the matter of support
for the children — assuming that the custody of
any or more of the children will be finally
awarded to the mother. Although the spouses
have agreed upon the monthly support of P150
to be given by the petitioner spouse for each
child, still this Court must speak out its mind on
the insufficiency of this amount. We, take judicial
notice of the devaluation of the peso in 1962 and
the steady skyrocketing of prices of all
commodities, goods, and services, not to
mention the fact that all the children are already
of school age. We believe, therefore, that the
CFI may increase this amount of P150
according to the needs of each child.
Exercise of Legitimate Profession of the
Spouse
Case No. 30 - GO VS CA
FACTS:
Private respondents spouses Hermogenes and
Jane Ong were married in Dumaguete City. The
video coverage of the wedding was provided by
petitioners at a contract price of P1,650.00.
Three times thereafter, the newlyweds tried to
claim the video tape of their wedding, which they
planned to show to their relatives in the United
States where they were to spend their
honeymoon, and thrice they failed because the
tape was apparently not yet processed. The
parties then agreed that the tape would be ready
upon private respondents return.
When private respondents came home from
their honeymoon, however, they found out that
the tape had been erased by petitioners and
therefore, could no longer be delivered.
Furious at the loss of the tape which was
supposed to be the only record of their wedding,
private respondents filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages against petitioners
before the Regional Trial Court. After a
protracted trial, the court a quo rendered a
decision, to wit:
1. Ordering the rescission of the agreement
entered into between plaintiff Hermogenes Ong
and defendant Nancy Go;
2. Declaring defendants Alex Go and Nancy Go
jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs
Hermogenes Ong and Jane C. Ong for the
following sums:
a) P450.00, the down payment made at contract
time;
b) P75,000.00, as moral damages;
c) P20,000.00, as exemplary damages;
d) P5,000.00, as attorneys fees; and
e) P2,000.00, as litigation expenses;
ISSUE: Whether Alex Go may be held jointly
and severally liable with his wife Nancy
regarding the pecuniary liabilities imposed upon
contractsentered into with private respondent
who was acting alone for her sole interest.
RULING:Under Article 117 of the Civil Code
(now Article 73 of the Family Code), the wife
may exercise any profession, occupation or
engage in business without the consent of the
husband. In the instant case, we are convinced
that it was only petitioner Nancy Go who entered
into the contract with private respondent.
Consequently, we rule that she is solely liable to
private respondents for the damages awarded
below, pursuant to the principle that contracts
produce effect only as between the parties who
execute them.
System of Absolute Community – Separate
Properties
Case No. 31 - VILLANUEVA vs. IAC
FACTS:
Modesto Aranas, husband of Victoria, inherited
a land from his father. Dorothea and Teodoro,
Modesto’s illegitimate children, borrowed money
from private respondent Jesus Bernas,
mortgaging as collateral their father’s property.
In the loan agreement, Aranas described
themselves as the absolute co-owners.
Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay the loan
resulting to extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage
in 1977 and thereafter Bernas acquired the land
as the highest bidder. Aftewards, the Aranases
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition in
1978, in which they adjudicated the same land
unto themselves in equal share pro-indiviso.
Bernas then consolidated his ownership over the
lot when the mortgagors failed to redeem it withn
the reglementary period, and had the title in the
name of Modesto cancelled and another TCT
issued in his name.
In 1978, petitioner Consolacion Villanueva and
Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint against
respondents spouses Jesus and Remedios
Bernas, for the cancellation of the TCT under
the name of the Bernases, and they be declared
co-owners of the land. Petitioner alleged that
spouses Modesto and Victoria in 1987 and 1958
executed 2 separate wills: first bequeathing to
Consolacion and Raymundo and to Dorothea
and Teodoro, in equal shares pro diviso, all of
said Victoria’s shares from the conjugal
partnership property; and second Modesto’s
interests in his conjugal partnership with Victoria
as well as his separate properties bequeathed to
Dorothea and Teodoro. Trial court dismissed
the complaint, declaring herein respondents as
the legal owners of the disputed property. IAC
likewise affirmed the lower court’s decision.
ISSUE: WON Villanueva had a right over the
land and the improvements thereon made by
Victoria who rendered the lot as conjugal
property.
RULING:
The land was not a conjugal partnership
property of Victoria and Modesto. It was
Modesto’s exclusive property since he inherited
it from his parents. Moreover, since Victoria
died ahead of Modesto, Victoria did not inherit
said lot from him and therefore had nothing of
the land to bequeath by will of otherwise to
Consolacion.
Article 158 of the Civil Code says that
improvements, whether for utility or adornment
made on the separate property of the spouses
through advancements from the partnership or
through the industry of either spouse belong to
the conjugal partnership, and buildings
constructed at the expense of the partnership
during the marriage on land belonging to one of
the spouses also pertain to the partnership, but
the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the
spouse who owns the same.
There was no proof presented by Villanueva.
Such proof is needed at the time of the making
or construction of the improvements and the
source of the funds used thereof in order to
determine the character of the improvements as
belonging to the conjugal partnership or to one
spouse separately. What is certain is that the
land on which the improvements stand was the
exclusive property of Modesto and that where
the property is registered in the name of one
spouse only and there is no showing of when
precisely the property was acquired, the
presumption is that is belongs exclusively to said
spouse. It is not therefore possible to declare
the improvements to be conjugal in character.
Furthermore, Bernas’ mode of acquisition of
ownership over the property appears in all
respect to be regular, untainted by any defect
whatsoever. Bernas must therefore be deemed
to have acquired indefeasible and clear title to
the lot which cannot be defeated or negated by
claims subsequently arising and of which he had
no knowledge or means of knowing prior to their
assertion and ventilation
Liabilities of the Absolute Community
Case No. 32 - BA FINANCE CORP vs. CA
FACTS:
Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner
in the amount of P591,003.59 as evidenced by a
promissory note he signed in his own behalf and
as a representative of A&L Industries. Augusto
presented an alleged special power of attorney
executed by his wife, Lily Yulo, who managed
the business and under whose name the said
business was registered, purportedly authorized
the husband to procure the loan and sign the
promissory note. 2months prior the
procurement of the loan, Augusto left Lily and
their children which in turn abandoned their
conjugal home. When the obligation became
due and demandable, Augusto failed to pay the
same.
The petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ
of attachment alleging that said spouses were
guilty of fraud consisting of the execution of
Deed of Assignment assigning the rights, titles
and interests over a construction contract
executed by and between the spouses and A.
Soriano Corporation. The writ hereby prayed for
was issued by the trial court and not contented
with the order, petitioner filed a motion for the
examination of attachment debtor alleging that
the properties attached by the sheriff were not
sufficient to secure the satisfaction of any
judgment which was likewise granted by the
court.
ISSUE: WON A&L Industries can be held liable
for the obligations contracted by the husband.
RULING:
A&L Industries is a single proprietorship, whose
registered owner is Lily Yulo. The said
proprietorship was established during the
marriage and assets were also acquired during
the same. Hence, it is presumed that the
property forms part of the conjugal partnership
of the spouses and be held liable for the
obligations contracted by the husband.
However, for the property to be liable, the
obligation contracted by the husband must have
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. The obligation was contracted by
Augusto for his own benefit because at the time
he incurred such obligation, he had already
abandoned his family and left their conjugal
home. He likewise made it appear that he was
duly authorized by his wife in behalf of the
company to procure such loan from the
petitioner. Clearly, there must be the requisite
showing that some advantage accrued to the
welfare of the spouses.
Thus, the Court ruled that petitioner cannot
enforce the obligation contracted by Augusto
against his conjugal properties with Lily.
Furthermore, the writ of attachment cannot be
issued against the said properties and that the
petitioner is ordered to pay Lily actual damages
amounting to P660,000.00.
Case No. 33 - AYALA INVESTMENTS VS. CA
FACTS: Article 73; Philippine Blooming Mills
loan from petitioner Ayala Investment. As an
added security for the credit line extended to
PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching – Exec. VP,
executed security agreements and making
himself jointly and severally answerable with
PBM’s indebtedness to Ayala Investments.
PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, Ayala
Investments filed a case for sum of money
against PBM and Alfredo Ching. The lower court
issued a writ of execution of pending appeal.
Thereafter, deputy sheriff Magsajo caused
issuance and service upon respondents-
spouses of a notice of sheriff sale on three of
their conjugal properties.
Private respondents, spouses Ching, filed a
case of injunction against petitioners alleging
that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment
against conjugal partnership levied on the
ground that the subject loan did not redound to
the benefit of the said conjugal partnership.
Upon application of private respondents, the
lower court issued a temporary restraining order
to prevent Magsajo from proceeding with the
enforcement of the writ of execution and with the
sale of the said properties at public auction.
ISSUE: Whether or not loan acquired by PBM
from Ayala Investments as guaranteed by
Alfredo Ching be redounded to the conjugal
partnership of the spouses.
RULING: The husband and the wife can engage
in any lawful enterprise or profession. While it is
but natural for the husband and the wife to
consult each other, the law does not make it a
requirement that a spouse has to get the prior
consent of the other before entering into any
legitimate profession, occupation, business or
activity. The exercise by a spouse of a legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity is
always considered to redound to the benefit of
the family. But an isolated transaction of a
spouse such as being guarantor for a third
person’s debt is not per se considered as
redounding to the benefit of the family.
Therefore, to hold the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership property liable for any loss
resulting from such isolated activity, proofs
showing a direct benefit to the family must be
presented.
Case No. 34 - ERLINDA REYNOSO
REYESvs.ALEJANDRO
FACTS:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of
First Instance of Cavite dismissing the petition
filed by petitioner-appellant Erlinda Reynoso
Reyes to have her husband Roberto Reyes
declared an absentee.
In a petition Erlinda Reynoso prayed for the
declaration of the absence of her husband
Roberto L. Reyes alleging that her husband had
been absent from their conjugal dwelling since
April 1962 and since then had not been heard
from and his whereabouts unknown. The petition
further alleged that her husband left no will nor
any property in his name nor any debts.
After hearing the Court a quo dismissed the
petition on the ground that since Roberto L.
Reyes left no properties there was no necessity
to declare him judicially an absentee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a need for the
declaration of absence of Roberto Reyes
RULING:
No. The need to have a person judicially
declared an absentee is because of his
properties which have to be administered by a
representative appointed by the Court (Article
384, Civil Code); the spouse of the absentee is
asking for separation of property (Article 191,
Civil Code) or his wife is asking the Court that
the administration of an classes of property in
the marriage be transferred to her (Article 196,
Civil Code). The petition to declare the husband
an absentee and the petition to place the
management of the conjugal properties in the
hands of the wife may be combined and
adjudicated in the same proceedings, Peyer vs.
Martinez, 88 Phil. 72, 80).
Case No. 35 - PNB vs. CA et al
FACTS: The spouses Chua were the owners of
a parcel of land covered by a TCT and
registered in their names. Upon the husband’s
death, the probate court appointed his son,
private respondent Allan as special administrator
of the deceased’s intestate estate. The court
also authorized Allan to obtain a loan
accommodation from PNB to be secured by a
real estate mortgage over the above-mentioned
parcel of land, which Allan did for P450,000.00
with interest.
For failure to pay the loan in full, the
bank extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate
mortgage. During the auction, PNB was the
highest bidder. However, the loan having a
payable balance, to claim this deficiency, PNB
instituted an action with the RTC, Balayan,
Batangas, against both Mrs. Chua and Allan.
The RTC rendered its decision, ordering the
dismissal of PNB’s complaint. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the RTC decision by dismissing
PNB’s appeal for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: The WON it was error for the CA to rule
that petitioner may no longer pursue by civil
action the recovery of the balance of
indebtedness after having foreclosed the
property securing the same.
RULING:
No
Petitioner relies on Prudential Bank v.
Martinez, 189 SCRA 612, 615 (1990),holding
that in extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage,
when the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to
pay the debt, the mortgagee has the right to
recover the deficiency from the mortgagor.
However, it must be pointed out that petitioner’s
cited cases involve ordinary debts secured by a
mortgage. The case at bar, we must stress,
involves a foreclosure of mortgage arising out of
a settlement of estate, wherein the administrator
mortgaged a property belonging to the estate of
the decedent, pursuant to an authority given by
the probate court. As the CA correctly stated,
the Rules of Court on Special Proceedings
comes into play decisively. The applicable rule is
Section 7 of Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of
Court ( which PNB contends is not.)
In the present case it is undisputed that the
conditions under the aforecited rule have been
complied with [see notes]. It follows that we
must consider Sec. 7 of Rule 86, appropriately
applicable to the controversy at hand, which in
summary [and case law as well] grants to the
mortgagee three distinct, independent and
mutually exclusive remedies that can
be alternatively pursued by the mortgage
creditor for the satisfaction of his credit in case
the mortgagor dies, among them:
(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire
debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an
ordinary claim;
(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and
prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and
(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively,
foreclosing the same at any time before it is
barred by prescription without right to file a
claim for any deficiency.
Clearly petitioner herein has chosen the
mortgage-creditor’s option
of extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgaged
property of the Chuas. This choice now bars any
subsequent deficiency claim against the estate
of the deceased. Petitioner may no longer avail
of the complaint for the recovery of the balance
of indebtedness against said estate, after
petitioner foreclosed the property securing the
mortgage in its favor. It follows that in this case
no further liability remains on the part of
respondents and the deceased’s estate.
Case No. 36 - DEL MUNDO VS CA
FACTS: Private respondent Alejandra Nava was
a former client of petitioner Gerardo A.
delMundo. The spouses Carlos and Alejandra
Nava owned a house and lot located in Project
6, Quezon City covered by TCT No. 256140
which was mortgaged to the Philippine Veterans
Bank. In 1981, before the spouses Nava
migrated to the United States, this residential
property was leased by petitioner. In a lease
contract denominated as Agreement of Lease
with Option to Purchase, private respondent
spouses agreed to lease the property to
petitioner for one year, with a monthly rental of
P2,500.00. The delMundo family moved into the
house upon execution of the lease
contract. Petitioner was given until October 16,
1982 to exercise his option to buy the property.
Petitioner was unable to exercise his option
to purchase because he had no money. While
respondent spouses were in the United States,
petitioner sent them a Deed of Sale with
Assignment of Mortgage.He asked the spouses
Nava to sign the said Deed ostensibly to enable
him to borrow part of the purchase price in the
sum of P470,000.00 from the bank.Petitioner
also sent them an Addendum to the Deed of
Sale which states that he will also assume her
obligations to Mrs. Ligaya Gonzales and to
Pablo Nava. After several letters, petitioner
succeeded in persuading the spouses Nava to
trust him and to sign the Deed of Sale with
Assignment of Mortgage and the Addendum
even without receiving consideration for the
property.
Private respondent Alejandra Nava lost
faith in petitioner because he did not comply with
his promise to pay the P174,000.00 obligation to
the Philippine Veterans Bank, the P166,000.00
indebtedness to Mrs. Ligaya Gonzales and her
P40,000.00 obligation to Pablo Nava. On March
16, 1983, private respondent spouses Nava
executed a Revocation of Deed of Sale with
Assignment of Mortgage which was duly
notarized by a County Clerk of the Superior
Court of California and certified by Vice Consul
DaniloBacalzo of the Philippine Consulate
General in California, U.S.A. The Deed of Sale
with Assignment of Mortgage in favor of
petitioner and his wife was revoked and
canceled by private respondent spouses
because the former had not yet paid the private
respondent spouses and Mrs. Ligaya Gonzales.
On August 11, 1983, private respondent
spouses through their attorney-in-fact BayaniSy,
filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer (Civil
Case No. 44181) against petitioner before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
43. Petitioner was ordered to vacate the
premises, pay rent and attorneys fees in a
decision dated March 26, 1992. Petitioner
appealed to the Regional Trial Court and the
unlawful detainer suit was docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-92-12438.Upon motion by
private respondent spouses, Judge Teodoro P.
Regino ordered the issuance of a writ of
execution pending appeal on January 14, 1993
It is petitioners contention that the notarized
Deed of Sale with Assignment of Mortgage
signed by the spouses Nava conclusively shows
that there was consideration for the contract of
sale.
ISSUE: Whether the Deed of Sale with
assignment of mortgage by the spouses is valid.
RULING:No, the Deed of Sale with assignment
of mortgage by the spouses is null and void. The
errors raised by petitioner are clearly factual in
nature. There is no justification to depart from
the well-settled principle laid down in a long line
of cases that the findings of fact of the lower
courts, the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
are, as a general rule, binding and conclusive
upon this Court.[23] There is likewise no basis to
review the factual conclusions of the Regional
Trial Court, particularly since respondent Court
of Appeals adopted them as its own and found
them to be in order.
Moreover, we agree with respondent
appellate court in sustaining the trial courts
findings:
a) Appellants allegation that he paid the amount
of P476,000.00 to Mrs. Nava in his law office
was not corroborated by any of the office
personnel allegedly present at that time;
b) There was no receipt of payment signed by
the Navas presented in evidence;
c) Appellants allegation that he paid the
consideration in his office is in conflict with his
statement in his affidavit-complaint (Exh. 32-a-1)
that he paid the said amount at the City Hall of
Manila.
d) His payment of the rentals on the premises in
question for the months of December 1981 and
January 1982; and his failure to declare the
property in question in his name and his non-
payment of the realty taxes due thereon, are
clear indications that at the time of the alleged
sale, he still recognized the Navas as the
owners of the premises in question.
e) The series of letters he sent to the Navas who
were in the United States (Exhs. 16 to 24) from
March to June 1982 would show that he has not
paid the consideration as he was then
requesting the Navas to sign the prepared
documents and return them to him, so that he
may use them in applying for a bank loan the
proceeds of which will be used in paying the
loans of the Navas and the consideration for the
sale of the property. the instant petition for
review is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Case No. 37 - WONG v IAC
FACTS:Romarico Henson married Katrina
Pineda on January 6, 1964 they had been most
of the time livingseparately. During the marriage
or on January 6, 1971, Romarico bought a 1,787
square-meter parcel of land,in June 1972,
Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita
Chan who consigned to Katrina pieces of
jewelryfor sale valued at 199,895 Hongkong
dollars or P321,830.95. Katrina failed to return
the pieces of jewelrywithin the 20-day period
agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of
their value.Anita Chan and her husband Ricky
Wong filed against Katrina and her husband
Romarico Henson, anaction forcollection of a
sum of money. Trial court promulgated a
decisionsin favor of the Wongs. A writ of
executionwas thereafter issued. Levied upon
were four lots in Angeles City all in the name
of Romarico Henson ...married to Katrina
Henson. Lots were sold September 9,
1977.August 8, 1 978, Romarico filed an action
for the annulment of the decision because he
was "not givenhis day in court”, the court, finding
that there was no basis for holding the conjugal
partnership liable for thepersonal indebtedness
of Katrina, ruled in favor of reconveyance.
ISSUE:Whether or not the execution of a
decision in an action for collection of a sum of
money may benullified on the ground that the
real properties levied upon and sold at public
auction are the alleged exclusiveproperties of a
husband who did not participate in his wife's
business transaction from which said
actionstemmed
HELD:Romarico and Katrina had in fact been
separated when Katrina entered into a business
deal with AnitaWong. Thus, the business
transaction involved the personal dealings of his
estranged wife. Writ of executioncannot be
issued against Romarico since he was not
represented in court.On the matter of ownership
of the properties involved, having been acquired
during the marriage, they arestill presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnershipeven though
Romarico and Katrina had been livingseparately
but the conjugal nature of the properties
notwithstanding, Katrina's indebtedness may not
be paidfor with them her obligation not having
been shown by the petitioners to be one of
the charges against theconjugal
partnership.Katrina's indebtedness may not be
paid for with them her obligation not having
been shown by thepetitioners to be one of
the charges against the conjugal partnership. In
addition to the fact that her rightsover the
properties are merely inchoate prior to the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the
consent of herhusband and her authority to incur
such indebtedness had not been alleged in the
complaint and proven atthe trial.Under the Civil
Code, a wife may bind the conjugal partnership
only when she purchases things necessaryfor
the support of the family or when she borrows
money for the purpose of purchasing things
necessary forthe support of the family if the
husband fails to deliver the proper sum;
when the administration of theconjugal
partnership is transferred to the wife by the
courtsor by the husband and when the wife
givesmoderate donations for charity. Having
failed to establish that any of these
circumstances occurred, theWongs may not
bind the conjugal assets to answer for Katrina's
personal obligation to them
Case No. 38 - COBB-PEREZ vs LANTIN
FACTS: Damaso Perez owe Ricardo Hermoso
P17,309.44 representing unpaid purchases of
leather materials used in Damaso’s shoe
business. Damaso was unable to pay hence
Hermoso sued him. Hermoso won hence a writ
of execution was issued. Pursuant to said writ of
execution, the sheriff issued a notice of sale of
Damaso’s 210 shares of stocks in a certain
property. Damaso opposed said public sale.
Later, his wife, Mercedes Cobb-Perez, filed a
motion to quash the writ issued by Judge Lantin
on the ground that the shares of stock subject to
public sale is conjugal property while her
husband’s debt was Damaso’s own personal
debt which never redounded to the conjugal
property. She initially filed in another court but
the same was dismissed because the judge in
said court said that it has no power to enjoin a
co-equal court. She then filed the motion to
quash before Judge Lantin who denied the
same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the motion to quash
should be granted.
HELD: No. A judge may only quash the wwit of
execution he issued when:
(a) it has been improvidently issued, or
(b) it is defective in substance, or
(c) it has been issued against the wrong party,
or
(d) the judgment debt has been paid, or
(e) the writ has been issued without authority, or
(f) there has been a change in the situation of
the parties which makes such execution
inequitable, or
(g) the controversy has never been submitted to
the judgment of the court, and therefore no
judgment at all has ever been rendered thereon.
None of the above instances were alleged by
Cobb-Perez. Her allegation was not even proved
as in fact, Damaso, in the Court of Appealas,
asserted that said 210 stocks are his own
property and they are even under his name
alone.
The Supreme Court also observed that there
were numerous pleadings filed in order to thwart
the execution of the writ which caused this case
to be protracted. Said pleadings can be
observed to be dilatory hence it ordered the
counsels of Damaso and Mercedes to shoulder
the costs.
Case No. 39 - PARTOSA-GO vs CA
FACTS: The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the
legal wife of Jose Jo, herein private respondent.
The latter admitted to have cohabited with 3
women and fathered 15 children. Prima filed a
complaint against the husband for judicial
separation of conjugal property in addition to an
earlier action for support which was
consolidated. RTC decision was a definite
disposition of the complaint for support but none
of that for the judicial separation of conjugal
property. Jose elevated the decision to CA
which affirmed rulings of the trial court. The
complaint on the separation of property was
dismissed for lack of cause of action on the
ground that separation by agreement was not
covered in Art. 178 of the Civil Code. Prima
contested that the agreement between her and
Jose was for her to temporarily live with her
parents during the initial period of her pregnancy
and for him to visit and support her. They never
agreed to be separated permanently. She even
returned to him but the latter refused to accept
her.
ISSUE: WON there is abandonment on the part
of Jose Jo to warrant judicial separation of
conjugal property.
HELD:The Court of Appeals dismissed the
complaint on the ground that the separation of
the parties was due to their agreement and not
because of abandonment. The respondent court
relied mainly on the testimony of the petitioner,
who declared under oath that she left
Dumaguete City, where she and Jo were living
together “because that was our agreement.” It
held that a agreement to live separately without
just cause was void under Article 221 of the Civil
Code and could not sustain any claim of
abandonment by the aggrieved spouse.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint
on the ground that the separation of the parties
was due to their agreement and not because of
abandonment. The respondent court relied
mainly on the testimony of the petitioner, who
declared under oath that she left Dumaguete
City, where she and Jo were living together
“because that was our agreement.” It held that a
agreement to live separately without just cause
was void under Article 221 of the Civil Code and
could not sustain any claim of abandonment by
the aggrieved spouse.
Under the Art. 128 of Family Code, the
aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial
separation on either of these grounds:
1. Abandonment by a spouse of the other
without just cause; and
2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or
her obligations to the family without just cause,
even if she said spouse does not leave the other
spouse.
Abandonment implies a departure by one
spouse with the avowed intent never to return,
followed by prolonged absence without just
cause, and without in the meantime providing in
the least for one’s family although able to do so.
5 There must be absolute cessation of marital
relations, duties and rights, with the intention of
perpetual separation.
The private respondent had already rejected the
petitioner, whom he denied admission to their
conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she
returned from Zamboanguita. The fact that she
was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too
clearly that he had no intention of resuming their
conjugal relationship. the private respondent
refused to give financial support to the petitioner.
The physical separation of the parties, coupled
with the refusal by the private respondent to give
support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute
abandonment as a ground for the judicial
separation of their conjugal property.
Their separation thus falls also squarely under
Article 135 of the Family Code, providing as
follows:
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be
considered sufficient cause for judicial
separation of property:
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouse
have been separated in fact for at least one year
and reconciliation is highly improbable.
Case No. 40 - VALDEZ VS RTC
FACTS:Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez
were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children.
Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration
of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36
of the Family Code, which was granted hence,
marriage is null and void on the ground of their
mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and
Joaquin are placed under the custody of their
mother while the other 3 siblings are free to
choose which they prefer.
*Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage , shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.(
As amended by E.O. No.227, dated July 17,
1987)
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in
the decision regarding the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in “unions
without marriage”. During the hearing on the
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit
expressing desire to stay with their father.
HELD:The Supreme Court ruled that in a void
marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties are governed by
the rules on co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts. A party who did not participate in
the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly
if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family.
Case No. 41 - AGAPAY VS PALANG
FACTS:
Miguel Palang married CalinaVellesterol with
whom he had 1 child. He then contracted his
second marriage with ErlindaAgapay, with whom
he had a son. The couple purchased a parcel of
agricultural land and the transfer certificate was
issued in their names. She also purchased a
house and lot in Binalonan, where the property
was later issued in her name. Miguel and
Carlina executed a Deed of Donation, wherein
they agreed to donate their conjugal property
consisting of 6 parcels of land to their only child,
Herminia. Carlina filed a complaint against
Miguel and Erlinda for bigamy.
Miguel died, and Carlina and Herminia instituted
an action for recovery of ownership and
possession with damages against Erlinda. They
sought to get back the riceland and house and
lot allegedly bought by Miguel during his
cohabitation with Erlinda. RTC dismissed the
complaint and ordered the respondents to
provide for the intestate shares of the parties,
particularly of Erlinda's son. CA reversed the trial
court's decision.
ISSUE:Whether or not the properties from
Miguel's second marriage be granted to Erlinda.
RULING:No. SC held that the agricultural land
and house and land cannot be granted to
Erlinda.
The sale of the riceland was made in favor of
Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law
applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code
providing for cases of cohabitation when a man
and a woman who are not capacitated to marry
each other live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
or under a void marriage. The marriage of
Miguel and Erlinda was null and void because
the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was
still subsisting and unaffected by the latter's de
facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. It
must be stressed that actual contribution is
required by this provision, in contrast to Article
147 which states that efforts in the care and
maintenance of the family and household, are
regarded as contributions to the acquisition of
common property by one who has no salary or
income or work or industry. If the actual
contribution of the party is not proved, there will
be no co-ownership and no presumption of
equal shares.
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by
her testimony that she is engaged in the
business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari
store but failed to persuade SC that she actually
contributed money to buy the subject riceland.
Worth noting is the fact that on the date of
conveyance, when she was only around 20 of
age and Miguel Palang was already 64 and a
pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering
her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that
she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the
purchase price of subject property, there being
no proof of the same.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda
allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 when
she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the
notary public who prepared the deed of
conveyance for the property testified that Miguel
Palang provided the money for the purchase
price and directed that Erlinda’s name alone be
placed as the vendee.
Since Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed
money to the purchase price of the riceland, we
find no basis to justify her co-ownership with
Miguel over the same. Consequently, the
riceland should, as correctly held by the CA,
revert to the conjugal partnership property of the
deceased Miguel and CarlinaPalang.
The transaction was properly a donation made
by Miguel to Erlinda was void. Article 87 of the
Family Code expressly provides that the
prohibition against donations between spouses
now applies to donations between persons living
together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those
who incurred guilt would turn out to be better
than those in legal union.
As regards to the donation of their conjugal
property executed by Miguel and Carlina in favor
of their daughter, was also void. Separation of
property between spouses during the marriage
shall not take place except by judicial order or
without judicial conferment when there is an
express stipulation in the marriage settlements.
The judgment which resulted from the parties’
compromise was not specifically and expressly
for separation of property and should not be so
inferred.
Case No. 42 - O’LACO vs CO CHO CHIT
FACTS:
It appears that on 31 May 1943, the Philippine
Sugar Estate Development Company, Ltd., sold
a parcel of land, Lot No. 5, Block No. 10, Plan
Psu-10038, situated at Oroquieta St., Sta. Cruz,
Manila, with the Deed of Absolute Sale naming
Emilia O'Laco as vendee; thereafter, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 66456 was issued in her
name.
On 17 May 1960, private respondent-spouses
Valentin Co Cho Chit and O Lay Wa learned
from the newspapers that Emilia O'Laco sold the
same property to the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila for P230,000.00, with
assumption of the real estate mortgage
constituted thereon. 4
On 22 June 1960, respondent-spouses Valentin
Co Cho Chit and O Lay Kia sued petitioner-
spouses Emilia O'Laco and Hugo Luna to
recover the purchase price of the land before the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal, respondent-
spouses asserting that petitioner Emilia O'Laco
knew that they were the real vendees of the
Oroquieta property sold in 1943 by Philippine
Sugar Estate Development Company, Ltd., and
that the legal title thereto was merely placed in
her name. They contend that Emilia O'Laco
breached the trust when she sold the land to the
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila.
Meanwhile, they asked the trial court to garnish
all the amounts still due and payable to
petitioner-spouses arising from the sale, which
was granted on 30 June 1960.
Petitioner-spouses deny the existence of any
form of trust relation. They aver that Emilia
O'Laco actually bought the property with her
own money; that she left the Deed of Absolute
Sale and the corresponding title with
respondent-spouses merely for safekeeping;
that when she asked for the return of the
documents evidencing her ownership,
respondent-spouses told her that these were
misplaced or lost; and, that in view of the loss,
she filed a petition for issuance of a new title,
and on 18 August 1944 the then Court of First
Instance of Manila granted her petition.
On 20 September 1976, finding no trust relation
between the parties, the trial court dismissed the
complaint together with the counterclaim.
Petitioners and respondents appealed.
ISSUE: Whether there is trust relationship
between the parties.
RULING: Yes, There is. By definition, trust
relations between parties may either be express
or implied. Express trusts are those which are
created by the direct and positive acts of the
parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by
words evincing an intention to create a trust.
Implied trusts are those which, without being
express, are deducible from the nature of the
transaction as matters of intent, or which are
superinduced on the transaction by operation of
law as matters of equity, independently of the
particular intention of the parties. Implied trusts
may either be resulting or constructive trusts,
both coming into being by operation of law.
First. As stipulated by the parties, the document
of sale, the owner's duplicate copy of the
certificate of title, insurance policies, receipt of
initial premium of insurance coverage and real
estate tax receipts ware all in the possession of
respondent spouses which they offered in
evidence. As emphatically asserted by
respondent O Lay Kia, the reason why these
documents of ownership remained with her is
that the land in question belonged to her.
Indeed, there can be no persuasive
rationalization for the possession of these
documents of ownership by respondent-spouses
for seventeen (17) years after the Oroquieta
property was purchased in 1943 than that of
precluding its possible sale, alienation or
conveyance by Emilia O'Laco, absent any
machination or fraud. This continued possession
of the documents, together with other
corroborating evidence spread on record,
strongly suggests that Emilia O'Laco merely held
the Oroquieta property in trust for respondent-
spouses.
Second. It may be worth to mention that before
buying the Oroquieta property, respondent-
spouses purchased another property situated in
Kusang-Loob, Sta. Cruz, Manila, where the
certificate of title was placed in the name of
AmbrosioO'Laco, older brother of Emilia, under
similar or identical circumstances. The testimony
of former counsel for respondent-spouses, then
Associate Justice Antonio G. Lucero of the Court
of Appeals,
Third. The circumstances by which Emilia
O'Laco obtained a new title by reason of the
alleged loss of the old title then in the
possession of respondent-spouses cast serious
doubt on the veracity of her ownership. The
petitions respectively filed by Emilia O'Laco and
AmbrosioO'Laco for the Oroquieta and the
Kusang-Loob properties were both granted on
the same day, 18 August 1944, by the then
Court of First Instance of Manila. These orders
were recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the
Register of Deeds of Manila at the same time,
2:35 o'clock in the afternoon of 1 September
1944, in consecutive entries, Entries Nos.
246117-18. This coincidence lends credence to
the position of respondent-spouses that there
was in fact a conspiracy between the siblings
Ambrosio and Emilia to defraud and deprive
respondents of their title to the Oroquieta and
Kusang-Loob properties.
Fourth. Until the sale of the Oroquieta property
to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,
petitioner Emilia O'Laco actually recognized the
trust. Specifically, when respondent spouses
learned that Emilia was getting married to Hugo,
O Lay Kia asked her to have the title to the
property already transferred to her and her
husband Valentin, and Emilia assured her that
"would be arranged (maaayosna)" after her
wedding. Her answer was an express
recognition of the trust, otherwise, she would
have refused the request outright. Petitioners
never objected to this evidence; nor did they
attempt to controvert it.
Fifth. The trial court itself determined that
"Valentin Co Cho Chit and O Lay Kia had some
money with which they could buy the property."
In fact, Valentin was the Chief Mechanic of the
Paniqui Sugar Mills, was engaged in the buy
and sell business, operated a gasoline station,
and owned an auto supply store as well as a
ten-door apartment in Caloocan City. In
contrast, Emilia O'Laco failed to convince the
Court that she was financially capable of
purchasing the Oroquieta property. In fact, she
opened a bank account only in 1946 and
likewise began filing income tax returns that
same year, while the property in question was
bought in 1943. Respondent-spouses even
helped Emilia and her brothers in their expenses
and livelihood. Emilia could only give a vague
account on how she raised the money for the
purchase of the property. Her narration of the
transaction of sale abounds with "I don't know"
and "I don't remember."
Case No. 43 - MANACOP VS CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Florante F. Manacop and his wife
Eulaceli purchased residential lot with a
bungalow. Private Respondent E & L
Merchantile, Inc. filed a complaint against
petitioner and F.F. Manacop Construction Co.,
Inc. before the RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila to
collect indebtedness. Instead of filing an answer,
petitioner and his company entered into a
compromise agreement with private
respondent.
The trial court rendered judgment approving the
aforementioned compromise agreement. It
enjoined the parties to comply with the
agreement in good faith. Private respondent filed
a motion for execution which the lower court
granted. However, execution of the judgment
was delayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on
several vehicles and other personal properties of
petitioner. These chattels were sold at public
auction for which certificates of sale were
correspondingly issued by the sheriff.
Petitioner and his company filed a motion to
quash the alias writs of execution and to stop
the sheriff from continuing to enforce them on
the ground that the judgment was not yet
executory. Private respondent opposed the
motion. The lower court denied the motion to
quash the writ of execution and the prayers in
the subsequent pleadings filed by petitioner and
his company. Finding that petitioner and his
company had not paid their indebtedness even
though they collected receivables, the lower
court held that the case had become final and
executory. It also ruled that petitioner's
residence was not exempt from execution as it
was not duly constituted as a family home,
pursuant to the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of execution of a
final and executory judgment issued before the
effectivity of the Family Code be executed on a
house and lot constituted as a family home
under the provision of Family Code.
RULING: The petition is denied for utter lack of
merit. It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153
FC have a retroactive effect such that all existing
family residences are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the FC and
are exempt from execution for the payment of
obligations incurred before the effectivity of the
FC. Art. 162 simply means that all existing family
residences at the time of the effectivity of the
FC, are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to
a family home under the FC.
Case N0. 44 - MODEQUILLO vs BREVA
FACTS:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land
located at PoblacionMalalag, Davao del Sur on
July 1988, registered in the name of Jose
Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land
located at DalagbongBulacan, Malalag, Davao
de Sur also registered in the latter’s name. A
motion to quash was filed by the petitioner
alleging that the residential land is where the
family home is built since 1969 prior the
commencement of this case and as such is
exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for
liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and
that the judgment sought to be enforced against
the family home is not one of those enumerated.
With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged
that it is still part of the public land and the
transfer in his favor by the original possessor
and applicant who was a member of a cultural
minority. The residential house in the present
case became a family home by operation of law
under Article 153.
ISSUE:
WON the subject property is deemed to be a
family home in as much as it does not fall under
the exemption from execution.
RULING:
No. The subject property is deemed to be a
family home but it does not fall under the
exemption from execution of the money
judgmemtaforecited.
Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is
provided that “the provisions of this Chapter
shall also govern existing family residences
insofar as said provisions are applicable.” It
does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said
Code have a retroactive effect such that all
existing family residences are deemed to have
been constituted as family homes at the time of
their occupation prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code and are exempt from execution for
the payment of obligations incurred before the
effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply
means that all existing family residences at the
time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are
considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family
home under the Family Code. Article 162 does
not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V
have a retroactive effect.
The debt or liability which was the basis of the
judgment arose or was incurred at the time of
the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and
the money judgment arising therefrom was
rendered by the appellate court on January 29,
1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988. Therefore, this case
does not fall under the exemptions from
execution provided in the Family Code.
As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly
ruled that the levy to be made shall be on
whatever rights the petitioner may have on the
land.
44. FLORANTE F. MANACOP v. COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 97898, August 11, 1997
FACTS: In 1972 petitioner Florante Manacop
and his wife purchased a house and lot in
Quezon City. In 1986 private respondent E & L
Mercantile, Inc filed a complaint against
petitioner and F.F. Manacop Construction Co.
Inc., before the RTC of Pasig to collect an
indebtedness. They subsequently entered into a
compromise agreement, upon which the RTC
rendered judgment approving the same.
Private respondent filed a motion for writ of
execution which was granted. The sheriff levied
on several vehicles and other personal
properties of petitioner, and the same were sold
at a public auction.
In 1989 petitioner and his company filed a
motion to quash the alias writs of execution on
the ground that the judgment was not yet
executory, alleging that the compromise
agreement had not yet matured. In its opposition
to the motion to quash, the private respondent
alleged that the house and lot of petitioner could
not be considered a family home on the ground
that petitioner was already living abroad and that
the property, having been acquired in 1972,
should have been judicially constituted as a
family home to exempt it from execution,
pursuant to the Civil Code.
The RTC denied the motion to quash. Petitioner
filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, which
was dismissed. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether a writ of execution of a final
and executory judgment issued before the
effectivity of the Family Code can be executed
on a house and lot constituted as a family home.
RULING: Yes. Under the Family Code which
took effect on August 3, 1988 the subject
property became his family home under the
simplified process embodied in Article 153 of the
said Code. However, the Court in Modequillo
explicitly ruled that said provision of the Family
Code does not have retroactive effect. In other
words, prior to August 3, 1988 the procedure
mandated by the Civil Code had to be followed
for a family home to be constituted as such.
There being absolutely no proof that the subject
property was judicially or extrajudicially
constituted as a family home, it follows that the
law’s protective mantle cannot be availed of by
petitioner. Since the debt involved herein was
incurred and the assailed orders of the trial court
issued prior to August 3, 1988, the petitioner
cannot be shielded by the benevolent provisions
of the Family Code.
45. JOSE MODEQUILLO v. HON. AUGUSTO
V. BREVA
G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990
FACTS: In January 1988 a judgment was
rendered by the Court of Appeals rendering
petitioner liable to pay for damages. The
judgment having become final and executory, a
writ of execution was issued by the RTC of
Davao City. In July 1988 the sheriff levied on a
parcel of residential land registered in the name
of petitioner.
A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of
execution was filed by petitioner alleging that the
residential land is where the family home is built
since 1969 prior to the commencement of the
case and as such is exempt from execution,
forced sale, or attachment under the Family
Code. The trial court denied the motion, as well
as the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether a final judgment of the Court of
Appeals in an action for damages may be
satisfied by way of execution of a family home
constituted under the Family Code.
RULING: Under the Family Code, a family home
is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence.
There is no need to constitute the same
judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil
Code. If the family actually resides in the
premises, it is, therefore, a family home as
contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should
take the necessary precautions to protect their
interest before extending credit to the spouses
or head of the family who owns the home.
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as
follows:
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment
except:
(1) For non-payment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the
constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the
premises before or after such constitution;
and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics,
architects, builders, material men and others
who have rendered service or furnished
material for the construction of the building.
The exemption provided as aforestated is
effective from the time of the constitution of the
family home as such, and lasts so long as any of
its beneficiaries actually resides therein.
In the present case, the residential house and lot
of petitioner was not constituted as a family
home whether judicially or extrajudicially under
the Civil Code. It became a family home by
operation of law only under Article 153 of the
Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a
family home upon the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year
after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on
August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).
The contention of petitioner that it should be
considered a family home from the time it was
occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is
not well- taken. Under Article 162 of the Family
Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this
Chapter shall also govern existing family
residences insofar as said provisions are
applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152
and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect
such that all existing family residences are
deemed to have been constituted as family
homes at the time of their occupation prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt
from execution for the payment of obligations
incurred before the effectivity of the Family
Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing
family residences at the time of the effectivity of
the Family Code, are considered family homes
and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family
Code. Article 162 does not state that the
provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a
retroactive effect.
Is the family home of petitioner exempt from
execution of the money judgment aforecited No.
The debt or liability which was the basis of the
judgment arose or was incurred at the time of
the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and
the money judgment arising therefrom was
rendered by the appellate court on January 29,
1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall
under the exemptions from execution provided
in the Family Code.
46. MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA v. COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 105625, January 24, 1994
FACTS: Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian died intestate in 1989 and 1982,
respectively, leaving several properties in
Laguna. Proceedings for administration of
properties were filed with the trial court by
Vicente’s sister, Victoria B. Lirio, in favor of the
nephew, herein private respondent. Petitioner
Marissa Benitez-Badua opposed the petition,
alleging that she is the sole heir of the estate.
The trial court decided in favor of petitioner. On
appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed
the RTC decision, stating that petitioner was not
the biological child of the deceased spouses.
Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is the legitimate child
and the sole heir of the deceased spouses.
RULING: No. The mere registration of a child in
his or her birth certificate as the child of the
supposed parents is not a valid adoption. It does
not confer upon the child the status of an
adopted child and her legal rights. Such act
amounts to simulation of the child’s birth or
falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is
a public document.
It is worthy to note that Vicente and brother of
the deceased wife executed a Deed of Extra-
Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the latter. In
the notarized document, they stated that they
were the sole heirs of the deceased because
“she died without descendants and ascendants”.
In executing such deed, Vicente effectively
repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of the
petitioner where it appeared that he was the
petitioner’s father.
A careful reading of the above articles 164, 166,
170, and 171 of the Family Code will show that
they do not contemplate a situation, like in the
instant case, where a child is alleged not to be
the child of nature or biological child of a certain
couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation
where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his
own a child of his wife.
Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who
can impugn the legitimacy of said child by
proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him
to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within
the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2)
that for biological or other scientific reasons, the
child could not have been his child; (3) that in
case of children conceived through artificial
insemination, the written authorization or
ratification by either parent was obtained
through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or
undue influence.
Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as
they speak of the prescriptive period within
which the husband or any of his heirs should file
the action impugning the legitimacy of said child.
Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err
when it refused to apply these articles to the
case at bench. For the case at bench is not one
where the heirs of the late Vicente are
contending that petitioner is not his child by
Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that
petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel.
47. ANTONIO MACADANGDANG v. COURT
OF APPEALS and ELIZABETH MEJIAS
G.R. No. L-49542, September 12, 1980
FACTS:Elizabeth Mejias, married to Crispin
Anahaw, allegedly had intercourse with
petitioner Antonio Macadangdang sometime in
March 1967. She also alleged that due to the
affair, she and her husband separated in
October 30, 1967, or 7 months or 210 dats
following the illicit encounter, she gave birth to a
baby boy who she named Rolando
Macadangdang in baptismal rites.
Records also disclose that in 1972 respondent
filed a complaint for recognition and support
against petitioner. The complaint was dismissed.
On appeal, the CA reversed the CFI decision,
declaring minor Rolando to be an illegitimate
son of Rolando Macadangdang. The motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES: (1) Whether the child Rolando is
conclusively presumed the legitimate issue of
the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin
Anahaw; (2) Whether the wife may institute an
action that would bastardize her child without
giving her husband, the legally presumed father,
an opportunity to be heard.
RULING:
(1) Yes. Article 255, 256, and 257 of the Civil
Code and the Rules of Court should be borne in
mind:
Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and
eighty days following the celebration of the
marriage, and before three hundred days
following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption, no evidence shall be
admitted other than that of the physical
impossibility of the husband's having access to
his wife within the first one hundred and twenty
days of the three hundred which preceded the
birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were
separately, in such a way that access was not
possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate,
although the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as
an adulteress.
Art. 257. Should the wife commit adultery at or
about the time of the conception of the child, but
there was no physical impossibility of access
between her and her husband as set forth in
article 255, the child is prima facie presumed to
be illegitimate if it appears highly improbable, for
ethnic reasons, that the child is that of the
husband. For the purposes of this article, the
wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal
case.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Quasi-conclusive presumptions of
legitimacy-
(a) Children born after one hundred eighty days
following the celebration of the marriage, and
before three hundred days following its
dissolution or the separation of the spouses
shall be presumed legitimate.
Against presumption no evidence be admitted
other than that of the physical impossibility of the
husband's having access to his wife within the
first one hundred and twenty days of the three
hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
[1] By the impotence of the husband
[2] By the fact that the husband and the wife
were living separately, in such a way that access
was not possible;
[3] By the serious illness of the husband;
(b) The child shall be presumed legitimate
although the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as
an adulteress.
(c) Should the wife commit adultery at or about
the time of the conception of the child, but there
was no physical impossibility of access between
her and her husband as set forth above, the
child is presumed legitimate, unless it appears
highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the
child is that of the husband. For the purpose of
the rule, the wife's adultery need not be proved
in a criminal case. ... (Rule 131, Rules of Court).
---
Whether or not respondent and her husband
were separated would be immaterial to the
resolution of the status of the child Rolando.
What should really matter is the fact that during
the initial one hundred twenty days of the three
hundred which preceded the birth of the
renamed child, no concrete or even substantial
proof was presented to establish physical
impossibility of access between respondent and
her spouse. From her very revealing testimony,
respondent declared that she was bringing two
sacks of rice to Samal for her children; that her
four children by her husband in her mother's
house in the said town; that her alleged
estranged husband also lived in her mother's
place. It should also be noted that even during
her affair with petitioner and right after her
delivery, respondent went to her mother's house
in Samal for treatment.
The baby boy subject of this controversy was
born on October 30, 1967, only seven (7)
months after March, 1967 when the "incident" or
first illicit intercourse between respondent and
petitioner took place, and also, seven months
from their separation (if there really was a
separation). It must be noted that as of March,
1967, respondent and Crispin Anahaw had
already four children; hence, they had been
married years before such date. The birth of
Rolando came more than one hundred eighty
180 days following the celebration of the said
marriage and before 300 days following the
alleged separation between aforenamed
spouses.
Under the aforequoted Article 255 of the Civil
Code, the child Rolando is conclusively
presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent
and her husband.
The fact that the child was born a mere seven
(7) months after the initial sexual contact
between petitioner and respondent is another
proof that the said child was not of petitioner
since, from indications, he came out as a normal
full-term baby.
(2) No. It must be stressed that Article 256 of the
Civil Code which provides that the child is
presumed legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress has been
adopted for two solid reasons. First, in a fit of
anger, or to arouse jealousy in the husband, the
wife may have made this declaration. Second,
the article is established as a guaranty in favor
of the children whose condition should not be
under the mercy of the passions of their parents.
The husband whose honor if offended, that is,
being aware of his wife's adultery, may obtain
from the guilty spouse by means of coercion, a
confession against the legitimacy of the child
which may really be only a confession of her
guilt. Or the wife, out of vengeance and spite,
may declare the as not her husband's although
the statement be false. But there is another
reason which is more powerful, demanding the
exclusion of proof of confession or adultery, and
it is, that at the moment of conception, it cannot
be determined when a woman cohabits during
the same period with two men, by whom the
child was begotten, it being possible that it be
the husband himself.
Hence, in general, good morals and public policy
require that a mother should not be permitted to
assert the illegitimacy of a child born in wedlock
in order to obtain some benefit for herself.
The law is not willing that the child be declared
illegitimate to suit the whims and purposes of
either parent, nor Merely upon evidence that no
actual act of sexual intercourse occurred
between husband and wife at or about the time
the wife became pregnant. Thus, where the
husband denies having any intercourse with his
wife, the child was still presumed legitimate.
48. CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE
R. DEZOLLER v. COURT OF APPEALS and
TEODORA DOMINGO
G.R. No. 121027, July 31, 1997
FACTS: Spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero owned a parcel of land with a
house and apartment in Quezon City. Upon the
death of Teodora in 1983, her surviving spouse,
Martin, adjudicated unto himself the subject
property, via an affidavit of extrajudicial
settlement, as sole heir thereof. In 1988 Martin
sold the lot to private respondents Teodora
Domingo. Later that year, Martin died.
Thus, an action for reconveyance was filed by
petitioners, as niece and nephew of Teodora
Guerrero, against private respondent before the
RTC over the subject property, claiming that
they were entitled to inherit one-half of the
property in question by right of representation,
presenting documentary evidence to prove filial
relation. The private respondent filed a demurrer
to evidence on the ground that petitioners failed
to prove legitimate filiation with the deceased
Teodora Guerrero in accordance with 172 of the
Family Code.
The RTC granted the demurrer and dismissed
the complaint for reconveyance. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC judgment.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners failed to meet
the quantum of proof required by Article 172 of
the Family Code to establish legitimacy and
filiation.
RULING: No. It seems that both the RTC and
CA have regrettably overlooked the universally
recognized presumption on legitimacy. There is
no presumption of the la more firmly established
and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that
children born in wedlock are legitimate. And
settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy
cannot be attacked collaterally.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested
by way of defense or as a collateral issue in
another action for a different purpose. The
necessity of an independent action directly
impugning the legitimacy is more clearly
expressed in the Mexican Code (Article 335)
which provides: The contest of the legitimacy of
a child by the husband or his heirs must be
made by proper complaint before the competent
court; any contest made in any other way is
void. This principle applies under our Family
Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm
this view, because they refer to the action to
impugn the legitimacy. This action can be
brought only by the husband or his heirs and
within the periods fixed in the present articles.
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in
Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy
of a child can no longer be brought. The status
conferred by the presumption, therefore,
becomes fixed, and can no longer be
questioned. The obvious intention of the law is
to prevent the status of a child born in wedlock
from being in a state of uncertainty for a long
time. It also aims to force early action to settle
any doubt as to the paternity of such child, so
that the evidence material to the matter, which
must necessarily be facts occurring during the
period of the conception of the child, may still be
easily available.
The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners
are the legitimate children of Hermogenes
Dezoller cannot be properly controverted in the
present action for reconveyance. This is aside,
of course, from the further consideration that
private respondent is not the proper party to
impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. The
presumption consequently continues to operate
in favor of petitioners unless and until it is
rebutted.
Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be
resolved in this case, the burden of proof rests
not on herein petitioners who have the benefit of
the presumption in their favor, but on private
respondent who is disputing the same. This fact
alone should have been sufficient cause for the
trial court to exercise appropriate caution before
acting, as it did, on the demurrer to evidence. It
would have delimited the issues for resolution,
as well as the time and effort necessitated
thereby.
49. MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUIO, et
al. v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-57062, January 24, 1992
FACTS: Lupo Mariategui contracted 3 marriages
during his lifetime. Lupo and Felipa, the third
wife, got married in 1930 and begot 3 children.
Felipa died in 1941. At the time of his death in
1953, Lupo left certain properties which he
acquired when he was still unmarried, described
as Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346, and 156 of the
Muntinlipa Estate.
In 1962 Lupo’s descendants by his first and
second marriages executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated
unto themselves Lot No. 163 of the Muntinlupa
Estate. Thus, the subdivision of the said lot into
Lots Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for which separate
transfer certificates of title were issued to the
respective parties.
In 1973 Lupo’s children by his third marriage
filed with the lower court an amended complaint
claiming that Lot No. 163 together with Lots Nos.
669, 1346, and 154 were owned by their
common father, and that they were deprived of
their respective shares in the lots.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds of lack of cause of action and
prescription, specifically contending that the
complaint was one for recognition of natural
children. The motion was denied. Subsequently,
the complaint was dismissed by the trial court.
On appeal, the CA rendered a decision
declaring all the children and descendants of
Lupo as entitled to equal shares in the estate of
Lupo Mariategui. The motion for reconsideration
was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES: (1) Whether prescription barred private
respondents’ right to demand the partition of the
estate; (2) Whether the private respondents who
belatedly filed the action of recognition, were
able to prove successional rights over said
estate.
RULING:
(1)A perusal of the entire allegations of the
complaint, however, shows that the action is
principally one of partition. The allegation with
respect to the status of the private respondents
was raised only collaterally to assert their rights
in the estate of the deceased. Hence, the Court
of Appeals correctly adopted the settled rule that
the nature of an action filed in court is
determined by the facts alleged in the complaint
constituting the cause of action.
With respect to the legal basis of private
respondents’ demand for partition, the CA
correctly held that the private respondents are
legitimate children of the deceased.
A marriage may be presumed to have taken
place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws
presume that a man and a woman, deporting
themselves as husband and wife, have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child
born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce,
absolute or from bed and board is legitimate;
and that things have happened according to the
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits
of life.
Article 172 of the said Code provides that the
filiation of legitimate children may be established
by the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment or by the open and
continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child.
Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation
of the private respondents. Jacinto's birth
certificate is a record of birth referred to in the
said article. Again, no evidence which tends to
disprove facts contained therein was adduced
before the lower court. In the case of the two
other private respondents, Julian and Paulina,
they may not have presented in evidence any of
the documents required by Article 172 but they
continuously enjoyed the status of children of
Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as their
brother Jacinto.
(2)In view of the foregoing, there can be no
other conclusion than that private respondents
are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo
Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation
prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for
recognition is inapplicable to this case.
Corollarily, prescription does not run against
private respondents with respect to the filing of
the action for partition so long as the heirs for
whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not
expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-
ownership. In other words, prescription of an
action for partition does not lie except when the
co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-
owner.
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by
prescription the share of the other co-owners
absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly
communicated to the other co-owners.
Furthermore, an action to demand partition is
imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches.
On the other hand, an action for partition may be
seen to be at once an action for declaration of
co-ownership and for segregation and
conveyance of a determinate portion of the
property involved.
Petitioners' registration of the properties in their
names in 1971 did not operate as a valid
repudiation of the co-ownership. Inasmuch as
petitioners registered the properties in their
names in fraud of their co-heirs prescription can
only be deemed to have commenced from the
time private respondents discovered the
petitioners' act of defraudation. Hence,
prescription definitely may not be invoked by
petitioners because private respondents
commenced the instant action barely two
months after learning that petitioners had
registered in their names the lots involved.
MIGUELA CAMPOS ONG, v. COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 95386, May 29, 1997
FACTS: Petitioner Miguela Campos Ong is the
surviving spouse of Manuel Ong, who died in
1990 while the case was pending in the CA.
Private respondents Alfredo, Jr. and Robert,
both surnamed Ong, are children of Saturnina
Caballes allegedly by Manuel Ong. They
brought this case to compel Manuel Ong to
recognize them as his illegitimate children and to
give them support.
After trial, private respondents were found to be
the illegitimate children of Manuel Ong in
accordance with Article 283, paragraphs 2 and 4
of the Civil Code. On appeal, the decision was
affirmed by the CA. The motion for reconsidered
was likewise denied.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the
trial court ruling declaring the private
respondents as illegitimate children of Manuel
Ong.
RULING: No. To begin with, factual questions as
determined by the trial court, especially rulings
on the credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by
the appellate court, are binding on this Court
and are accorded utmost respect. In this case,
no sufficient reason has been shown for this
Court not to adhere to the general rule.
Inconsistencies there are in the testimony of
Saturnina Caballes, but they are not of such a
nature as to put in doubt the testimony of
Saturnina that Manuel Ong was the father of
private respondents Alfredo Ong, Jr. and Robert
Caballes. The discrepancies concern minor
details and, if at all, only show that Saturnina
Caballes was an uncoached witness. Saturnina
testified that shortly after getting acquainted with
each other, she and Manuel Ong had relation
and in fact lived together at A. Lopez Street in
Cebu City for four months, and that Manuel Ong
gave her support consisting of money and the
necessities of life, like rice.
Saturninas testimony was corroborated by
Constancia Lim Monteclaros. Constancia was
the person who introduced Saturnina to Manuel
Ong. Constancia and Vicente Sy, Manuel Ongs
close friend, lived together in a room in the
house of Ong. She knew Manuel very well. No
reason has been given why she should testify
falsely against Manuel Ong.
Two circumstances are mentioned which
allegedly make it improbable that Manuel Ong
was the father of private respondents. The first
is that Saturnina Caballes admitted having
cohabited with another man before meeting
Manuel Ong. The records show, however, that
the man, who was a paralytic, was taken by his
mother in 1953, before Saturnina started having
an affair with Manuel Ong in 1954. Private
respondent Alfredo Ong, Jr. was born on June
28, 1955, more than a year after the paralytic
had left Saturnina. The other private respondent,
Robert Caballes, was born on August 17, 1956.
Hence, private respondents could not have been
conceived during the period of cohabitation of
their mother with the unidentified paralytic.
The other circumstance mentioned is that
Manuel Ong was allegedly sterile. Ong claimed
that, in addition to petitioner Miguela Campos
Ong, he lived with a commonlaw wife, Dolores
Dy, and with another woman named Anatolia
Veloria but he had no child with anyone of them.
He said that during World War II he got sick and
was treated by a certain Dr. Deiparine who
allegedly told him that as a result of his illness
he would not be able to beget any child. Ong
further claimed that he cohabited with Dolores
Dy before and during his marriage with petitioner
Miguela Campos Ong. His inability to procreate
is said to be the reason why petitioner and
Manuel Ong raised six children not related to
them by blood.
We think both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals correctly dismissed claims that Manuel
Ong was sterile and therefore could not have
been the father of private respondents. No
competent medical testimony was presented to
prove this claim. His testimony that he had been
told by a certain Dr. Deiparine that because of
an illness he contracted during the war he would
no longer be able to procreate is plain hearsay.
On the other hand, the claim that although he
lived with three women (including petitioner) no
one bore him a child is belied by the fact that he
acknowledged a certain Lourdes Balili as his
natural child.
We agree that this case does not fall under pars.
2 and 3 of Art. 283 of the Civil Code. As
petitioner well states, the four times during which
Manuel Ong met Alfredo and gave the latter
money cannot be considered proof of
continuous possession of the status of a child.
The fathers conduct toward his son must be
spontaneous and uninterrupted for this ground
to exist. Here there are no acts shown of Manuel
Ong treating Alfredo Ong, Jr. as his son except
on the four occasions during which they met. In
the case of Robert Caballes, there is no proof at
all that Manuel Ong treated him as his son.
Nor can it be said that there was proof of
cohabitation in this case. While Saturnina
Caballes testified that she and Manuel Ong lived
together for four months as husband and wife in
order to justify a finding of cohabitation, the
relationship was not open and public so as to
constitute cohabitation.[16] While the parties are
not required to hold themselves out as husband
and wife, neither must they act clandestinely or
secretly, otherwise they will be considered to
have merely engaged in illicit sexual
intercourse.[17]
Nonetheless, we hold that the evidence in this
case sufficiently makes this case fall under the
last paragraph of Art. 283, i.e., any other
evidence showing that Manuel Ong was the
father of private respondents. In Ilano vs. Court
of Appeals,[18] this Court held that the phrase
any evidence or proof in the last paragraph of
Art. 283 operates as a blanket provision
covering all cases in the preceding ones, so that
evidence, even though insufficient to constitute
proof under the other paragraphs, may
nonetheless be enough to qualify the case under
par. 4. In this case, the testimony of Saturnina
Caballes that she had illicit sexual relation with
Manuel Ong over a long period (1954-1957)
which, had it been openly done, would have
constituted cohabitation under par. 3 is proof
that private respondents were conceived and
born during such relationship and constitutes
evidence of Ongs paternity. This relationship
was further established through the testimony of
Constancia Lim. The evidence for private
respondents is not negated by the admission of
Saturnina Caballes that she had relation with
another man before, because the relationship
terminated at least a year before the birth of
Alfredo Ong, Jr. and two years before the birth
of the second child Robert Caballes.
CASIMIRO MENDOZA v. COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 86302, September 24, 1991
FACTS: A complaint for compulsory recognition
was filed in the RTC of Cebu by private
respondent Teopista Toring Tufiacao, alleging
that she was born in 1930 to Brigida Toring, then
single, and petitioner Casimiro Mendoza,
married at that time to Emiliana Barrientos. She
averred that Mendoza recognized her as an
illegitimate child by treating her as such and
according her the rights and privileges of a
recognized illegitimate child.
Petitioner specifically denied the allegations. He
himself did not testify because of his advanced
age (then 91 years old), but Vicente Toring,
Teopista’s brother, took the stand to resist
Teopista’s claim. Vicente, who professed to be
Casimiro’s only illegitimate child by Brigida,
declared that Teopista’s father was not
Casimiro.
The RTC rejected Teopista’s claim that she was
in continuous possession of the status of a child
of the alleged father. On appeal, the CA
disagreed and found that Teopista has
sufficiently proven her continuous possession of
such status. The motion for reconsideration was
denied.
The counsel, now acting for Vicente Toring,
asked the Court to substitute the latter for the
deceased Casimiro Mendoza in the present
petition. The Court allowed the substitution, it
appearing that Vicente Toring was Casimiro’s
illegitimate son.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ruling that
Teopista was Casimiro’s illegitimate daughter.
RULING: To establish "the open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child,"
it is necessary to comply with certain
jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does
not mean that the concession of status shall
continue forever but only that it shall not be of an
intermittent character while it continues. The
possession of such status means that the father
has treated the child as his own, directly and not
through others, spontaneously and without
concealment though without publicity (since the
relation is illegitimate). There must be a showing
of the permanent intention of the supposed
father to consider the child as his own, by
continuous and clear manifestation of paternal
affection and care.
With these guidelines in mind, we agree with the
trial court that Teopista has not been in
continuous possession of the status of a
recognized illegitimate child of Casimiro
Mendoza, under both Article 283 of the Civil
Code and Article 172 of the Family Code.
The plaintiff lived with her mother and not with
the defendant although they were both residents
of Omapad, Mandaue City. It is true, as the
respondent court observed, that this could have
been because defendant had a legitimate wife.
However, it is not unusual for a father to take his
illegitimate child into his house to live with him
and his legitimate wife, especially if the couple is
childless, as in this case. In fact, Vicente Toring,
who also claimed to be an illegitimate child of
Casimiro, lived with the latter and his wife,
apparently without objection from the latter. We
also note that Teopista did not use the surname
of Casimiro although this is, of course, not
decisive of one's status. No less significantly, the
regularity of defendant's act of giving money to
the plaintiff through Gaudencio Mendoza and
Isaac Mendoza has not been sufficiently
established. The trial court correctly concluded
that such instances were "off-and-on," not
continuous and intermittent. Indeed, the plaintiff
s testimony on this point is tenuous as in one
breath she said that her mother solely spent for
her education and in another that Casimiro
helped in supporting her.
But although Teopista has failed to show that
she was in open and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, we
find that she has nevertheless established that
status by another method.
What both the trial court and the respondent
court did not take into account is that an
illegitimate child is allowed to establish his
claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws," according
to the Civil Code, or "by evidence or proof in his
favor that the defendant is her father," according
to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist
of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission,
a family Bible in which his name has been
entered, common reputation respecting his
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies
of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
The trial court conceded that "the defendant's
parents, as well as the plaintiff himself, told
Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, that
Teopista was the daughter of the defendant." It
should have probed this matter further in light of
Rule 130, Section 39, of the Rules of Court,
providing as follows:
Sec. 39. — Act or declarations about pedigree.
— The act or declaration of a person deceased,
or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of
another person related to him by birth or
marriage, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the
relationship between the two persons is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration.
The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates
when and the places where these facts
occurred, and the names of the relatives. It
embraces also facts of family history intimately
connected with pedigree.
The statement of the trial court regarding
Teopista's parentage is not entirely accurate. To
set the record straight, we will stress that it was
only Isaac Mendoza who testified on this
question of pedigree, and he did not cite
Casimiro's father. His testimony was that he was
informed by his father Hipolito, who was
Casimiro's brother, and Brigida Mendoza,
Casimiro's own mother, that Teopista was
Casimiro's illegitimate daughter.
Such acts or declarations may be received in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule
because "it is the best the nature of the case
admits and because greater evils are
apprehended from the rejection of such proof
than from its admission. Nevertheless, precisely
because of its nature as hearsay evidence, there
are certain safeguards against its abuse.
Commenting on this provision, Francisco
enumerates the following requisites that have to
be complied with before the act or declaration
regarding pedigree may be admitted in
evidence:
1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.
2. The pedigree must be in issue.
3. The declarant must be a relative of the person
whose pedigree is in issue.
4. The declaration must be made before the
controversy arose.
5. The relationship between the declarant and
the person whose pedigree is in question must
be shown by evidence other than such
declaration.
All the above requisites are present in the case
at bar. The persons who made the declarations
about the pedigree of Teopista, namely, the
mother of Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza, and his
brother, Hipolito, were both dead at the time of
Isaac's testimony. The declarations referred to
the filiation of Teopista and the paternity of
Casimiro, which were the very issues involved in
the complaint for compulsory recognition. The
declarations were made before the complaint
was filed by Teopista or before the controversy
arose between her and Casimiro. Finally, the
relationship between the declarants and
Casimiro has been established by evidence
other than such declaration, consisting of the
extrajudicial partition of the estate of Florencio
Mendoza, in which Casimiro was mentioned as
one of his heirs.
The said declarations have not been refuted.
Casimiro could have done this by deposition if
he was too old and weak to testify at the trial of
the case.
The Court held that by virtue of the above-
discussed declarations, and in view of the other
circumstances of this case, 'reopista Toring
Tufiacao has proved that she is the illegitimate
daughter of Casimiro Mendoza and is entitled to
be recognized as such. In so holding, we give
effect to the policy of the Civil Code and the
Family Code to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of "the paternity of illegitimate
children, without prejudice to the right of the
alleged parent to resist the claimed status with
his own defenses, including evidence now
obtainable through the facilities of modern
medicine and technology.
G.R. No. 86302 September 24, 1991
CASIMIRO MENDOZA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TEOPISTA
TORING TUÑACAO, respondents.
FACTS
Respondent Teopista is claiming to be
recognized as the illegitimate child of herein
pettioner.
The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981, in
the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City. Teopista
Toring Tufiacao, the herein private respondent,
alleged that she was born on August 20, 1930,
to Brigida Toring, who was then single, and
defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married at that
time to Emiliana Barrientos. She averred that
Mendoza recognized her as an illegitimate child
by treating her as such and according her the
rights and privileges of a recognized illegitimate
child.
Casimiro Mendoza, then already 91 years old,
specifically denied the plaintiffs allegations and
set up a counterclaim for damages and
attorney's fees.
Amplifying on her complaint, Teopista testified
that it was her mother who told her that her
father was Casimiro. She called him Papa Miroy.
She lived with her mother because Casimiro
was married but she used to visit him at his
house. When she married Valentin Tufiacao,
Casimiro bought a passenger truck and
engaged him to drive it so he could have a
livelihood. Casimiro later sold the truck but gave
the proceeds of the sale to her and her husband.
In 1977, Casimiro allowed her son, Lolito
Tufiacao, to build a house on his lot and later he
gave her money to buy her own lot from her
brother, Vicente Toring. On February 14, 1977,
Casimiro opened a joint savings account with
her as a co-depositor at the Mandaue City
branch of the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank. Two years later, Margarita Bate,
Casimiro's adopted daughter, took the passbook
from her, but Casimiro ordered it returned to her
after admonishing Margarita.1
ISSUE
Whether respondent Teopesita satisfied the
burden of proof to prove filiation
HELD
Yes. Failed to satisfy open and continuous
possession, but satisfied ay other means.
To establish "the open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child,"
it is necessary to comply with certain
jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does
not mean that the concession of status shall
continue forever but only that it shall not be of an
intermittent character while it continues.10 The
possession of such status means that the father
has treated the child as his own, directly and not
through others, spontaneously and without
concealment though without publicity (since the
relation is illegitimate).11 There must be a
showing of the permanent intention of the
supposed father to consider the child as his
own, by continuous and clear manifestation of
paternal affection and care.12
With these guidelines in mind, we agree with the
trial court that Teopista has not been in
continuous possession of the status of a
recognized illegitimate child of Casimiro
Mendoza, under both Article 283 of the Civil
Code and Article 172 of the Family Code.
The plaintiff lived with her mother and not with
the defendant although they were both residents
of Omapad, Mandaue City. It is true, as the
respondent court observed, that this could have
been because defendant had a legitimate wife.
However, it is not unusual for a father to take his
illegitimate child into his house to live with him
and his legitimate wife, especially if the couple is
childless, as in this case. In fact, Vicente Toring,
who also claimed to be an illegitimate child of
Casimiro, lived with the latter and his wife,
apparently without objection from the latter. We
also note that Teopista did not use the surname
of Casimiro although this is, of course, not
decisive of one's status. No less significantly, the
regularity of defendant's act of giving money to
the plaintiff through Gaudencio Mendoza and
Isaac Mendoza has not been sufficiently
established. The trial court correctly concluded
that such instances were "off-and-on," not
continuous and intermittent. Indeed, the plaintiff
s testimony on this point is tenuous as in one
breath she said that her mother solely spent for
her education and in another that Casimiro
helped in supporting her.13
But although Teopista has failed to show that
she was in open and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, we
find that she has nevertheless established that
status by another method.
What both the trial court and the respondent
court did not take into account is that an
illegitimate child is allowed to establish his
claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws," according
to the Civil Code, or "by evidence or proof in his
favor that the defendant is her father," according
to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist
of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission,
a family Bible in which his name has been
entered, common reputation respecting his
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies
of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.14
The trial court conceded that "the defendant's
parents, as well as the plaintiff himself, told
Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, that
Teopista was the daughter of the defendant." It
should have probed this matter further in light of
Rule 130, Section 39, of the Rules of Court,
providing as follows:
Sec. 39. — Act or declarations about
pedigree. — The act or declaration of a
person deceased, or unable to testify, in
respect to the pedigree of another
person related to him by birth or
marriage, may be received in evidence
where it occurred before the
controversy, and the relationship
between the two persons is shown by
evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word "pedigree"
includes relationship, family genealogy,
birth, marriage, death, the dates when
and the places where these facts
occurred, and the names of the
relatives. It embraces also facts of
family history intimately connected with
pedigree.
The statement of the trial court regarding
Teopista's parentage is not entirely accurate. To
set the record straight, we will stress that it was
only Isaac Mendoza who testified on this
question of pedigree, and he did not cite
Casimiro's father. His testimony was that he was
informed by his father Hipolito, who was
Casimiro's brother, and Brigida Mendoza,
Casimiro's own mother, that Teopista was
Casimiro's illegitimate daughter.15
Such acts or declarations may be received in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule
because "it is the best the nature of the case
admits and because greater evils are
apprehended from the rejection of such proof
than from its admission.16 Nevertheless,
precisely because of its nature as hearsay
evidence, there are certain safeguards against
its abuse. Commenting on this provision,
Francisco enumerates the following requisites
that have to be complied with before the act or
declaration regarding pedigree may be admitted
in evidence:
1. The declarant is dead or unable to
testify.
2. The pedigree must be in issue.
3. The declarant must be a relative of
the person whose pedigree is in issue.
4. The declaration must be made before
the controversy arose.
5. The relationship between the
declarant and the person whose
pedigree is in question must be shown
by evidence other than such
declaration.17
All the above requisites are present in the case
at bar. The persons who made the declarations
about the pedigree of Teopista, namely, the
mother of Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza, and his
brother, Hipolito, were both dead at the time of
Isaac's testimony. The declarations referred to
the filiation of Teopista and the paternity of
Casimiro, which were the very issues involved in
the complaint for compulsory recognition. The
declarations were made before the complaint
was filed by Teopista or before the controversy
arose between her and Casimiro. Finally, the
relationship between the declarants and
Casimiro has been established by evidence
other than such declaration, consisting of the
extrajudicial partition of the estate of Florencio
Mendoza, in which Casimiro was mentioned as
one of his heirs.18
The said declarations have not been refuted.
Casimiro could have done this by deposition if
he was too old and weak to testify at the trial of
the case.
If we consider the other circumstances narrated
under oath by the private respondent and her
witnesses, such as the financial doles made by
Casimiro to Brigida Toring, the hiring of
Teopista's husband to drive the passenger truck
of Casimiro, who later sold the vehicle and gave
the proceeds of the sale to Teopista and her
husband, the permission he gave Lolito Tufiacao
to build a house on his land after he found that
the latter was living on a rented lot, and, no less
remarkably, the joint savings account Casimiro
opened with Teopista, we can reasonably
conclude that Teopista was the illegitimate
daughter of Casimiro Mendoza.
We hold that by virtue of the above-discussed
declarations, and in view of the other
circumstances of this case, 'reopista Toring
Tufiacao has proved that she is the illegitimate
daughter of Casimiro Mendoza and is entitled to
be recognized as such. In so holding, we give
effect to the policy of the Civil Code and the
Family Code to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of "the paternity of illegitimate
children, without prejudice to the right of the
alleged parent to resist the claimed status with
his own defenses, including evidence now
obtainable through the facilities of modern
medicine and technology.
REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS and
ZENAIDA C. BOBILES
FACTS
Republic appeals for the reversal of the
judgment confirming adoption in favor of
Bobiles.
The petition for adoption was filed by private
respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2,
1988, when the law applicable was Presidential
Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare
Code. Under said code, a petition for adoption
may be filed by either of the spouses or by both
of them. However, after the trial court rendered
its decision and while the case was pending on
appeal in the Court of Appeals, Executive Order
No. 209, the Family Code, took effect on August
3, 1988. Under the said new law, joint adoption
by husband and wife is mandatory.
Republic argues that the adoption should have
been dismissed, by applying the family code
retroactively, since Bobiles did not file jointly
together with her husband.
ISSUE
Wheher the family code should be applied
retroactively
Whether Bobiles’s husband should likewise be
considered as adopter
HELD
NO.
Article 246 of the Family Code provides for
retroactive effect of appropriate relevant
provisions thereof, subject to the qualification
that such retrospective application
will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws.
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity
and extent does not depend upon events foreign
to the will of the holder. 9 The term expresses
the concept of present fixed interest which in
right reason and natural justice should be
protected against arbitrary State action, or an
innately just and imperative right which
enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent
and irrefragable individual rights, cannot
deny. 10 Vested rights include not only legal or
equitable title to the enforcement of a demand,
but also an exemption from new obligations
created after the right has vested. 11
Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
private respondent had the right to file a petition
for adoption by herself, without joining her
husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her
petition, she was exercising her explicit and
unconditional right under said law. Upon her
filing thereof, her right to file such petition alone
and to have the same proceed to final
adjudication, in accordance with the law in force
at the time, was already vested and cannot be
prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a
new law.
When private respondent filed her petition in
Special Proceeding No. 1386, the trial court
acquired jurisdiction thereover in accordance
with the governing law. Jurisdiction being a
matter of substantive law, the established rule is
that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by
the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action.12 We do not find
in the present case such facts as would
constitute it as an exception to the rule.
When private respondent filed her petition in
Special Proceeding No. 1386, the trial court
acquired jurisdiction thereover in accordance
with the governing law. Jurisdiction being a
matter of substantive law, the established rule is
that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by
the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action.12 We do not find
in the present case such facts as would
constitute it as an exception to the rule.
The first error assigned by petitioner warrants a
review of applicable local and foreign
jurisprudence. For that purpose, we start with
the premise that Article 185 of the Family Code
is remedial in nature. Procedural statutes are
ordinarily accorded a retrospective construction
in the sense that they may be applied to pending
actions and proceedings, as well as to future
actions. However, they will not be so applied as
to defeat procedural steps completed before
their enactment. 13
Procedural matters are governed by the law in
force when they arise, and procedural statutes
are generally retroactive in that they apply to
pending proceedings and are not confined to
those begun after their enactment although, with
respect to such pending proceedings, they affect
only procedural steps taken after their
enactment. 14
The rule that a statutory change in matters of
procedure will affect pending actions and
proceedings, unless the language of the act
excludes them from its operation, is not so
extensive that it may be used to validate or
invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into
effect, since procedure must be governed by the
law regulating it at the time the question of
procedure arises.15
The jurisdictional, as distinguished from the
purely procedural, aspect of a case is
substantive in nature and is subject to a more
stringent rule. A petition cannot be dismissed by
reason of failure to comply with a law which was
not yet in force and effect at the time. As long as
the petition for adoption was sufficient in form
and substance in accordance with the law in
governance at the time it was filed, the court
acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully
disposes of the case. 16 To repeat, the
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction
of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases,
once it attaches cannot be ousted by
subsequent happenings or events, although of a
character which would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. 17
On the second issue, petitioner argues that,
even assuming that the Family Code should not
apply retroactively, the Court of Appeals should
have modified the trial court's decision by
granting the adoption in favor of private
respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles only, her
husband not being a petitioner. We do not
consider this as a tenable position and,
accordingly, reject the same.
Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as
one of the petitioners in the petition for adoption
filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent,
attached to the petition as Annex "B" and
expressly made an integral part thereof, shows
that he himself actually joined his wife in
adopting the child. The pertinent parts of his
written consent read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. That my wife, ZENAIDA O.
CORTEZA BOBILES and I
mutually desire to adopt as our
child, a boy named JASON
CONDAT, still a minor being six
(6) years old, likewise residing
at 18 C. Imperial Street, Legaspi
City, Albay, also in the
Philippines;
3. That we are filing the
corresponding Petition for
Adoption of said minor child,
JASON CONDAT, before the
Juvenile and Domestic
Relations court, now the
Regional Trial Court in Legaspi
City, Albay in the Philippines;
4. That I, Dioscoro C. Bobiles as
the husband and father, am
giving my lawful consent to this
adoption of said minor child,
JASON CONDAT;
5. That further, my wife
ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA
BOBILES, and I have
continuously reared and cared
for this minor child, JASON
CONDAT since birth;
6. That as a result thereof, my
wife and I have developed a
kind of maternal and paternal
love for the boy as our very
own, exercising therein the care,
concern and diligence of a good
father toward him;
7. That I am executing this
document, an AFFIDAVIT OF
CONSENT for whatever it is
worth in the premises as to the
matter of adoption of this minor
child, JASON CONDAT, by my
 wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA
BOBILES and by me,
DIOSCORO C. BOBILES, in
any court of justice; (Emphasis
supplied.) 18
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing declarations, and his subsequent
confirmatory testimony in open court, are
sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Under the
circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of
his foreign residence, he must have yielded to
the legal advice that an affidavit of consent on
his part sufficed to make him a party to the
petition. This is evident from the text of his
affidavit. Punctiliousness in language and
pedantry in the formal requirements should yield
to and be eschewed in the higher considerations
of substantial justice. The future of an innocent
child must not be compromised by arbitrary
insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules
on the form of pleadings.
We see no reason why the following doctrines in
American law should not apply to this case and,
for that matter, in our jurisdiction. It is a settled
rule therein that adoption statutes, as well as
matters of procedure leading up to adoption,
should be liberally construed to carry out the
beneficent purposes of the adoption institution
and to protect the adopted child in the rights and
privileges coming to it as a result of the
adoption. 19 The modern tendency of the courts
is to hold that there need not be more than a
substantial compliance with statutory
requirements to sustain the validity of the
proceeding; to refuse would be to indulge in
such a narrow and technical construction of the
statute as to defeat its intention and beneficial
results or to invalidate proceedings where every
material requirement of the statute was complied
with.
Santos vs Aranzanso
Facts:
A petition for adoption of Paulina Santos and
Aurora Santos was filed by Simplicio Santos and
Juliana Reyes in the Court of First Instance of
Manila on June 4, 1949.. The petition, which
was under oath, alleged inter alia, that the
whereabouts of the minors' nearest of kin,
particularly their parents, were unknown; that
since the outbreak of the war said minors have
been abandoned by their respective parents;
and that for years, since their infancy, said
children have continuously been in petitioners'
care and custody. A guardian ad litem Crisanto
de Mesa, was thereafter appointed for the
minors. Said guardian ad litem forthwith gave his
written consent to the adoption. Paulina Santos,
being over fourteen years of age, likewise gave
her written consent thereto.
After due publication and hearing, the adoption
court (CFI) rendered on August 25, 1949 a
decision granting the decree of adoption.
No appeal was taken from the aforesaid
decision.
Subsequently — eight years later — on October
21, 1957, Juliana Reyes died, in Manila, without
testament. On November 25, 1957 Simplicio
Santos filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of Juliana Reyes.3 In said
petition he stated among other things that the
surviving heirs of the deceased are: he, as
surviving spouse, Paulina Santos and Aurora
Santos, 27 and 17 years of age, respectively. In
the same petition, he asked that he be
appointed administrator of the estate.
Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging that she is first
cousin to the deceased, filed on January 2, 1958
an opposition to the petition for appointment of
administrator. For her grounds she asserted that
Simplicio Santos" marriage to the late Juliana
Reyes was bigamous and thus void: and that the
adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos
was likewise void ab initio for want of the written
consent of their parents, who were then living
and had not abandoned them. An answer to the
opposition was filed by Simplicio Santos on
March 7, 1958 and oppositor Aranzanso filed a
reply thereto on March 17, 1958.
Demetria Ventura, alleging likewise that she is
the first cousin of the deceased Juliana Reyes
and adding that she is the mother of the child
Paulina Santos, filed on March 19, 1959 an
opposition to the petition of Simplicio Santos to
be named administrator, and, moreover,
thereunder adopted, as her own, the pleadings
filed by Gregoria Aranzanso.
By order of April 6, 1959, the Court of First
Instance decided the point in dispute, ruling that
the validity of the adoption in question could not
be assailed collaterally in the intestate
proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 34354). From the
order Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria
Ventura appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In its decision, promulgated on September 14,
1964, the Court of Appeals reversed the
appealed order, finding instead that the adoption
was null and void ab initio due to the absence of
consent thereto by the natural parents of the
minor children, which it deemed a jurisdictional
defect still open to collateral attack.

ISSUE
Can the adoption decree be collaterally
attacked, since it is void ab initio for lack of the
consent of natural parents?
HELD
No. The CA committed a reversible error.
In this regard it should be stated that the Court
of Appeals completely relied on American
jurisprudence and authorities to the effect that
parental consent to the adoption is a
jurisdictional requisite (E.g., 2 C.J.S., Adoption
of Children, Section 45[a] p. 435; Whetmore vs.
Fratello, 282 P2d 667, 670). The point to
remember, however, is that under our law on the
matter, consent by the parents to the adoption
is not an absolute requisite:
SEC. 3. Consent to adoption.—There
shall be filed with the petition a written
consent to the adoption signed by the
child if over fourteen years of age and
not incompetent, and by each of its
known living parents who is not insane
or hopelessly intemperate or has not
abandoned such child, or if there are no
such parents by the general guardian or
guardian ad litem of the child, or if the
child is in the custody of an orphan
asylum, children's home, or benevolent
society or person, by the proper officer
or officers of such asylum, home, or
society, or by such person; but if the
child is illegitimate and has not been
recognized, the consent of its father to
the adoption shall not be required. (Rule
100, Old Rules of Court.)4
Stated otherwise, if the natural parents have
abandoned their children, consent to the
adoption by the guardian ad litem suffices. This
brings as to the question whether in the
proceedings at bar the Court of Appeals can still
review the evidence in the adoption case and
conclude that it was not sufficiently established
therein that the parents of Paulina and Aurora
Santos had abandoned them.
First of all, it is not quite accurate to say that the
adoption court made no determination of the fact
of abandonment. As quoted earlier, it is stated in
the decision of the adoption court, that:
From the evidence presented at the
hearing it appears that the petitioners
have been married for the past twenty-
seven years and have no children of
their own. They desire to adopt the
minors Paulina Santos [y] Reyes and
Aurora Santos [y] Reyes, both of whom
are and for years have been living under
their care and custody; that the former,
since she was barely three months old
has already been taken care of by
them up to the present time, and the
latter has been cared for since she was
only fifteen days old. Paulina Santos [y]
Reyes is now seventeen years old. . .
. Both parents of the minors have long
been unheard from and in spite of
diligent efforts of the petitioners to locate
them, they could not be found. The
consent to the adoption has been given
by the guardian ad litem appointed by
the Court. . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Abandonment — under persuasive American
rulings — imports "any conduct on the part of
the parent which evinces a settled purpose to
forgo all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims to the child". It means "neglect
or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which parents
owe to their children." (2 Am. Jur. 2d, Adoption,
Sec. 32, pp. 886-887.) It can thus readily be
seen that altho the CFI judgment approving the
adoption does not use the word "abandoned", its
findings sufficiently contain a set of facts and
circumstances which truly constitutes a finding
of abandonment.
Coming now to the power of the Court of
Appeals to review in this case the finding of
abandonment made by the adoption court, we
find that even under American jurisprudence —
relied upon, as stated, by said Court — the
settled rule is that even when the jurisdiction of
an inferior or special tribunal depends upon the
existence of a fact to be established before it,
the determination of that fact by the tribunal
cannot be questioned in a collateral attack upon
its order (In re McKaeg's Estate, 141 Cal. 403,
74 Pac. 1039, 1040; In re Camp's Estate, 131
Cal. 469, 63 Pac. 736).
Anent this point the rulings are summed up in 2
American Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption,
Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:
An adoption order implies the finding of
the necessary facts and the burden of
proof is on the party attacking it; it
cannot be considered void merely
because the fact needed to show
statutory compliance is obscure. While a
judicial determination of some particular
fact, such as the abandonment of his
next of kin to the adoption, may be
essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to
 enter the order of adoption, this does
not make it essential to the jurisdictional
validity of the decree that the fact be
determined upon proper evidence, or
necessarily in accordance with the truth;
a mere error cannot affect the
jurisdiction, and the determination must
stand until reversed on appeal, and
hence cannot be collaterally attacked. If
this were not the rule, the status of
adopted children would always be
uncertain, since the evidence might not
be the same at all investigations, and
might be regarded with different effect
by different tribunals, and the adoption
might be held by one court to have been
valid, while another court would hold it
to have been of no avail.
Freeman on Judgments says the same thing:
In general, therefore, where the right of
the court to assume jurisdiction of a
cause and proceed to judgment
depends upon the ascertainment of
facts in pais and the court retains
jurisdiction it thereby impliedly adjudges
that the requisite jurisdictional facts exist
and having found such facts in favor of
jurisdiction, its decision in this respect,
whether erroneous or not, cannot be
questioned in a collateral proceedings,
for a presumption arises in such cases,
when the validity of the judgment is
attacked, that the necessary
jurisdictional facts were proven. . . . .
(Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720.)
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, construing a
statute akin to our law in this regard, said
in Parsons vs. Parsons, 101 Wis. 76, 77 N.W.
147, 148:
The statute to be considered is section
4022, Rev. St. 1878, which reads as
follows: "No such adoption shall be
made without the written consent of the
living parents of such child unless the
court shall find that one of the parents
has abandoned the child or gone to
parts unknown." Thus it will be seen that
upon the fact being established that the
living parent has abandoned his child,
he is deemed by the statute to have
thereby relinquished all parental right to
be consulted in respect to the child's
welfare, and his consent to the adoption
is therefore dispensed with. The term
"abandon" obviously means no more
than neglect or refusal to perform the
natural and legal obligations of care and
support which parents owe to their
children. The fact of abandonment,
judicially determined, was essential to
the jurisdiction; not essential that it
should be determined on proper
evidence, necessarily, or in accordance
with the truth, because mere error in
that regard does not affect jurisdicition.
If jurisdiction be obtained to determine a
fact, its determination wrong or on
insufficient or improper evidence is
immaterial oh the question of legal right
to proceed judicially to the next step.
That is deemed to be elementary... A
judicial determination may be contrary to
conclusive evidence, or legal evidence,
or without any evidence, yet cannot be
impeached for want of jurisdiction. Van
Fleet, Coll. Attack, Secs. 663, 665. That
rule applies to all judicial proceedings. . .
..
It follows, therefore, that the Court of Appeals
erred in reviewing, under a collateral attack, the
determination of the adoption court that the
parents of Paulina and Aurora Santos had
abandoned them. This is so even if such fact of
abandonment is deemed jurisdictional, a point
which we need not — and do not — rule upon in
this case.
DSWD vs Belen
FACTS
In this administrative complaint initiated by
Corazon M. Layug, Social Welfare Officer IV of
the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), respondent Judge
Antonio M. Belen, is charged with rendering an
erroneous decree of adoption in violation of
Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603,
otherwise known as The Child and Youth
Welfare Code, and the corresponding Supreme
Court circular thereon, namely, Circular No. 12
dated October 2, 1986.
As appears from the records, the spouses
Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-
Soriano, both of whom are naturalized American
citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of
their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea,
which was docketed as Special Proceeding No.
5830 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, and assigned to Branch 38
thereof. In due time, respondent Judge Belen
granted the petition in a decision dated June 25,
1992, after finding that petitioner spouses were
highly qualified to adopt the child as their own.
 Among other evidence adduced before him,
respondent judge based his decree primarily on
the findings and recommendation of the DSWD
that the adopting parents on the one hand and
the adoptee on the other hand have already
developed love and emotional attachment and
parenting rules have been demonstrated to the
minor. On these considerations, respondent
judge decided and proceeded to dispense with
trial custody. Said DSWD findings and
recommendations, as respondent judge
asserted in his judgment, are contained in the
Adoptive Home Study Report and Child Study
Report prepared by the local office of the DSWD
through respondent Elma P. Vedaa.[1]
However, when the minor Zhedell Bernardo
Ibea sought to obtain the requisite travel
clearance from the DSWD in order to join her
adoptive parents in the United States, the
department uncovered what it considered as an
anomalous adoption decree regarding said
minor. It turned out that the DSWD did not have
any record in its files regarding the adoption and
that there was never any order from respondent
judge for the DSWD to conduct a Home and
Child Study Report in the case. Furthermore,
there was no directive from respondent judge for
the social welfare officer of the lower court to
coordinate with the DSWD on the matter of the
required reports for said minors adoption.
As the adoption never passed through the
DSWD, it filed the present administrative
complaint against respondent judge charging
him with violating Article 33 of Presidential
Decree No. 603 which requires, inter alia, that
petitions for adoption shall be granted only after
the DSWD has conducted and submitted a case
study of the adoptee, the natural parents and the
adoptive parents. It was also alleged by the
DSWD that respondent Elma P. Vedaa had
asked for an undisclosed amount of money from
the adopting parents in order to expedite the
adoption case with the DSWD.
ISSUE: whether the judge can be held
admininstratively liable
HELD:
Yes. Article 33 of the Child and Youth Welfare
Code provides in no uncertain terms that:
No petition for adoption shall be granted unless
the Department of Social Welfare, or the Social
Work and Counselling Division, in case of
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, has
made a case study of the child to be adopted,
his natural parents as well as the prospective
adopting parents, and has submitted its report
and recommendations on the matter to the court
hearing such petition. The Department of Social
Welfare shall intervene on behalf of the child if it
finds, after such case study, that the petition
should be denied.
Circular No. 12, as a complementary
measure, was issued by this Court precisely to
obviate the mishandling of adoption cases by
judges, particularly in respect to the
aforementioned case study to be conducted in
accordance with Article 33 of Presidential
Decree No. 603 by the DSWD itself and
involving the child to be adopted, its natural
parents, and the adopting parents. It definitively
directs Regional Trial Courts hearing adoption
cases:
"0(1) to NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services
and Development, thru its local agency, of the
filing of adoption cases or the pendency thereof
with respect to those cases already filed;
(2) to strictly COMPLY with the requirement in
Article 33 of the aforesaid decree x x x
xxx
The Staff Assistant V (Social Worker) of the
Regional Trial Courts, if any, shall coordinate
with the Ministry of Social Services and
Development representatives in the preparation
and submittal of such case study. x x x
The error on the part of both respondent
judge and social worker is thus all too
evident. Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper
course that respondent judge should have taken
was to notify the DSWD at the outset about the
commencement of Special Proceeding No. 5830
so that the corresponding case study could have
been accordingly conducted by said department
which undoubtedly has the necessary
competence, more than that possessed by the
court social welfare officer, to make the proper
recommendation. Moreover, respondent judge
should never have merely presumed that it was
routinary for the social welfare officer to
coordinate with the DSWD regarding the
adoption proceedings. It was his duty to exercise
caution and to see to it that such coordination
was observed in the adoption proceedings,
together with all the other requirements of the
law.
By respondents failure to do so, he may
well have wittingly or unwittingly placed in
jeopardy the welfare and future of the child
whose adoption was under
consideration. Adoption, after all, is in a large
measure a legal device by which a better future
may be accorded an unfortunate child like
Zhedell Bernardo Ibea in this case. Treading on
equally sensitive legal terrain, the social welfare
officer concerned, respondent Elma P. Vedaa,
arrogated unto herself a matter that pertained
exclusively to the DSWD, her task being to
coordinate with the DSWD in the preparation
and submission of the relevant case study
reports, and not to make the same and
recommend by herself the facts on which the
court was to act.
We are, however, persuaded that
respondent judge acted in good faith when he
stated in his decision that the DSWD submitted
the required reports to his court through
respondent Vedaa, presumably in the belief that
it was standard procedure for the Social Welfare
Officer II of a Regional Trial Court to do so in
coordination with the DSWD. We also agree with
the findings of the OCA that there is no evidence
whatsoever that respondent Vedaa sought to
obtain any amount from the adopting parents. In
fact, this is belied by the affidavit of the childs
natural mother, Loreta Ibea. We are, therefore,
inclined to adopt a liberal view on the charges
against respondents.
The judge was just censured.
Lerma vs CA
Petitioner Lerma and respondent Diaz are
husband and wife. They married on May 19,
1951. On August 22, 1969 the petitioner filed a
complaint for adultery against the respondent
and a certain Teodoro Ramirez (Crim. Case No.
0519 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal). On
November 18, 1969 the respondent filed with the
lower court, presided by Judge Leonor Ines
Luciano, a complaint1 against the petitioner for
legal separation and/or separation of properties,
custody of their children2 and support, with an
urgent petition for support pendente lite for her
and their youngest son, Gregory, who was then
and until now is in her custody. The
respondent's complaint for legal separation is
based on two grounds: concubinage and
attempt against her life.
Respondent court reversed tsuch order, saying
that adultery is a valid defense.
ISSUE whether adultery is a good defense
against respondents claim for support
HELD
The legal issue posed by the foregoing facts is
whether adultery is a good defense against the
respondent's claim for support pendente lite.
In Quintana v. Lerma, 24 Phil. 285, which was
an action by the wife against the husband for
support, based upon a written contract, this
Court held that adultery is a good defense. This
ruling was reiterated in the subsequent cases
of Sanchez v. Zulueta, 68 Phil. 110,
and Mangoma v. Macadaeg, et al., 90 Phil. 508.
See also Olayvar v. Olayvar, 98 Phil. 52.
The respondent Court of Appeals, in upholding
the questioned orders of the lower court, relied
on Article 292 of the Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 292. During the
proceedings for legal
separation, or for annulment of
marriage, the spouses and
children shall be supported from
the conjugal partnership
property. After the final
judgment of legal separation, or
of annulment of marriage, the
obligation of mutual support
between the spouses ceases.
However, in case of legal
separation, the court may order
that the guilty spouse shall give
support to the innocent one, the
judgment specifying the terms of
such order.
It is suggested that while adultery may be a
defense in an action for personal support,
that is, support of the wife by the husband
from his own funds, it is not a defense when
the support is to be taken from the conjugal
partnership property.
We do not see that the distinction is material in
this case. In the first place Article 292 is not in
itself the source of the legal right to receive
support. It merely states that the support, not
only of the spouses but also of the children, shall
be taken from the conjugal property during the
pendency of the legal separation proceeding. It
does not preclude the loss of such right in
certain cases. In the second place, the said
article contemplates the pendency of a court
action and, inferentially at least, a prima
facie showing that the action will prosper. For if
the action is shown to be groundless the mere
filing thereof will not necessarily set Article 292
in operation. This is also the sense of Section 5
of Rule 61, supra, which requires, among other
things, when support pendente lite is applied for,
that the court determine provisionally "the
probable outcome of the case."
Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that "the
legal separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage ... (and) where both spouses are
offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed
by either of them ..."
In a provisional sense at least, within the
meaning of Rule 61 (Section 5), the probable
failure of the respondent's suit for legal
separation can be foreseen since she is not an
innocent spouse, having been convicted of
adultery by the Court of First Instance. It is true
that the judgment of conviction is on appeal in
the Court of Appeals, but the same undoubtedly
satisfies the standard of provisional showing set
by the aforesaid Rule. If legal separation cannot
be claimed by the guilty spouse in the first place,
the fact that an action for that purpose is filed
anyway should not be permitted to be used as a
means to obtain support pendente lite, which,
without such action, would be denied on the
strength of the decisions of this Court
recognizing adultery as a good defense.
Otherwise, as pointed out by the petitioner, all
that an erring spouse has to do to circumvent
such defense would be to file a suit for legal
separation no matter how groundless.
The right to separate support or maintenance,
even from the conjugal partnership property,
presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause
for the spouse claiming such right to live
separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of the
Civil Code, which states that after the filing of
the petition for legal separation the spouses
shall be entitled to live separately from each
other. A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by
one who is himself or herself guilty of an act
which constitutes a ground for legal separation
at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be
considered as within the intendment of the law
granting separate support. In fact under Article
303 of the same Code the obligation to give
support shall cease "when the recipient, be he a
forced heir or not, has committed some act
which gives rise to disinheritance;" and under
Article 921 one of the causes for disinheriting a
spouse is "when the spouse has given cause for
legal separation." The loss of the substantive
right to support in such a situation is
incompatible with any claim for
support pendente lite.
What has been said above, of course, is not
meant to be a prejudgment of either the legal
separation proceeding pending in the lower
court or the criminal case for adultery pending in
the Court of Appeals. It is to be understood only
in the light of Rule 61, Section 5, of the Rules of
Court, which specifically governs the subject of
support pendente lite.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of respondent
Court of Appeals of January 20, 1971 and the
orders of respondent Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court herein complained of, dated
December 24, 1969 and February 15, 1970, all
are set aside and their enforcement enjoined,
without prejudice to such judgment as may be
rendered in the pending action for legal
separation between the parties. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Santero vs CA
Facts:
This is a Petition for certiorari which questions
the order of the respondent court granting the
Motion for Allowance filed by private
respondents. Said order reads as follows:
Acting on the Motion For
Allowance dated June 30, 1982
filed by Victor, Rodrigo,
Anselmina and Miguel, all
surnamed Santero, thru their
guardian, Anselma Diaz, the
Opposition thereto dated July 8,
1982 filed by the oppositors, the
Reply to Opposition dated July
12, 1982 filed by movant
Anselma Diaz and the Rejoinder
dated July 26, 1982 filed by the
oppositors, the Court was
constrained to examine the
Motion For Allowance filed by
the herein movant last year clothing and
wherein the ground cited was medical
for support which included attendance,
educational expenses, clothing according to the
and medical necessities, which social position
was granted and said minors of the family.
were given an allowance prayed Support also
for in their motion. includes
In the Motion For Allowance in the education of
question guardian-movant the person
Anselma Diaz only followed the entitled to be
precedent of the Court which supported until
granted a similar motion last he completes
year to be spent for the school his education or
expenses of her wards. In their training for
opposition the oppositors some trade or
contend that the wards for vocation, even
whom allowance is sought are beyond the age
no longer schooling and have of majority.'
attained majority age so that citing also Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Rules of
they are no longer under Court which provides:
guardianship. They likewise Allowance to
allege that the administrator widow and
does not have sufficient funds to family. The
cover the said allowance widow and
because whatever funds are in minor or
the hands of the administrator, incapacitated
they constitute funds held in children of a
trust for the benefit of whoever deceased
will be adjudged as owners of person, during
the Kawit property from which the settlement
said administrator derives the of the estate,
only income of the intestate shall receive
estate of Pablo Santero, et al. therefrom,
In the Reply filed by the under the
guardian-movant, she admitted direction of the
some of her children are of age Court, such
and not enrolled for the first allowance as
semester due to lack of funds provided by
but will be enrolled as soon as law.'
they are given the requested From the foregoing discussion
allowances. She cited Article alone, the Court cannot deviate
290 of the Civil Code providing from its duty to give the
that: allowance sought by the wards,
Support is the fact that they need further
everything that education which should have
is indispensable been provided to them if their
for substance, deceased father were alive.
dwelling,
 On the allegation that the funds
from which the allowance would
be derived are trust funds, the
Court, time and again had
emphasized that the estate of
the Santeros is quite big and the
amount to be released for
allowances is indeed
insignificant and which can
easily be replaced from its
general fund if the so-called
trust fund is adjudicated to the
oppositors.
WHEREFORE, Victor, Rodrigo,
Anselmina and Miguel, all
surnamed Santero are hereby
granted an allowance of two
thousand (P2,000.00) pesos
each for tuition fees, clothing
materials and subsistence out of
any available funds in the hands
of the administrator who is
ordered to reimburse to them
the said amount after this order
shall have become final to
enable the oppositors to file
their appeal by certiorari if they
so desire within the
reglementary period.
SO ORDERED.
Santos vs CA
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army
lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by
profession, were married in Iloilo City in 1986.
Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos,
Jr. who was born July 18, 1987.
From the time the boy was released from the
hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been
in the care and custody of his maternal
grandparents, private respondents herein,
Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel
Jr. in the temporary custody of the latter's
parents, the respondent spouses Bedia. The
latter alleged that they paid for all the hospital
bills, as well as the subsequent support of the
boy because petitioner could not afford to do so.
The boy's mother, Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the
United States in May 1988 to work. Petitioner
alleged that he is not aware of her whereabouts
and his efforts to locate her in the United States
proved futile. Private respondents claim that
although abroad, their daughter Julia had been
sending financial support to them for her son.
On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his
two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where
three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private
respondents contend that through deceit and
false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy
and clandestinely spirited him away to his
hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for
Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward
Leouel Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as
respondent.2
After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990,
the trial court issued an order on the same day
awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr.
to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.3
Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of
Appeals.4 In its decision dated April 30, 1992,
respondent appellate court affirmed the trial
court's
order. 5 His motion for reconsideration having
been denied,6 petitioner now brings the instant
petition for review for a reversal of the appellate
court's decision.
The Court of Appeals erred, according to
petitioner, in awarding custody of the boy to his
grandparents and not to himself. He contends
that since private respondents have failed to
show that petitioner is an unfit and unsuitable
father, substitute parental authority granted to
the boy's grandparents under Art. 214 of the
Family Code is inappropriate.
Petitioner adds that the reasons relied upon by
the private respondents in having custody over
the boy, are flimsy and insufficient to deprive
him of his natural and legal right to have
custody.
On the other hand, private respondents aver that
they can provide an air-conditioned room for the
boy and that petitioner would not be in a position
to take care of his son since he has to be
assigned to different places. They also allege
that the petitioner did not give a single centavo
for the boy's support and maintenance. When
the boy was about to be released from the
hospital, they were the ones who paid the fees
because their daughter and petitioner had no
money. Besides, Julia Bedia Santos, their
daughter, had entrusted the boy to them before
she left for the United States. Furthermore,
petitioner's use of trickery and deceit in
abducting the child in 1990, after being
hospitably treated by private respondents, does
not speak well of his fitness and suitability as a
parent.
The Bedias argue that although the law
recognizes the right of a parent to his child's
custody, ultimately the primary consideration is
what is best for the happiness and welfare of the
latter. As maternal grandparents who have
amply demonstrated their love and affection for
the boy since his infancy, they claim to be in the
best position to promote the child's welfare.
ISSUE
To whome shall the custody of the child be
awarded
HELD
To the father.
The law vests on the father and mother joint
parental authority over the persons of their
common children. 16 In case of absence or
death of either parent, the parent present shall
continue exercising parental authority. 17 Only in
case of the parents' death, absence or
unsuitability may substitute parental authority be
exercised by the surviving grandparent. 18 The
situation obtaining in the case at bench is one
where the mother of the minor Santos, Jr., is
working in the United States while the father,
petitioner Santos, Sr., is present. Not only are
they physically apart but are also emotionally
separated. There has been no decree of legal
separation and petitioner's attempt to obtain an
annulment of the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity of his wife has failed. 19
We find the aforementioned considerations
insufficient to defeat petitioner's parental
authority and the concomitant right to have
custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.,
particularly since he has not been shown to be
an unsuitable and unfit parent. Private
respondents' demonstrated love and affection
for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father
is still preferred over the grandparents. 22 The
latter's wealth is not a deciding factor,
particularly because there is no proof that at the
present time, petitioner is in no position to
support the boy. The fact that he was unable to
provide financial support for his minor son from
birth up to over three years when he took the
boy from his in-laws without permission, should
not be sufficient reason to strip him of his
permanent right to the child's custody. While
petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable
and merits only the severest criticism, it cannot
be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the
unfavorable decision against him and his efforts
to keep his only child in his custody may be
regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past
misdeeds. To award him custody would help
enhance the bond between parent and son. It
would also give the father a chance to prove his
love for his son and for the son to experience
the warmth and support which a father can give.
His being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing
him custody over the boy. So many men in
uniform who are assigned to different parts of
the country in the service of the nation, are still
the natural guardians of their children. It is not
just to deprive our soldiers of authority, care and
custody over their children merely because of
the normal consequences of their duties and
assignments, such as temporary separation
from their families.
Petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting
away his boy from his in-laws, though
unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest
custody from him.
Private respondents' attachment to the young
boy whom they have reared for the past three
years is understandable. Still and all, the law
considers the natural love of a parent to
outweigh that of the grandparents, such that
only when the parent present is shown to be
unfit or unsuitable may the grandparents
exercise substitute parental authority, a fact
which has not been proven here.
The strong bonds of love and affection
possessed by private respondents as
grandparents should not be seen as trades but an academic institution of learning. It
incompatible with petitioner' right to custody over also held that the students were not in the
the child as a father. Moreover, who is to say custody of the school at the time of the incident
whether the petitioner's financial standing may as the semester had already ended, that there
improve in the future? was no clear identification of the fatal gun and
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED that in any event the defendant, had exercised
the necessary diligence in preventing the
Amadora vs CA injury. 5
FACTS
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo
ISSUE
Amadora went to the San Jose-Recoletos on
What is the liability of SSC, if any?
April 13, 1972, and while in its auditorium was
HELD
shot to death by Pablito Daffon, a classmate. On
Resolution of the case will depend on the
the implications and consequences of these
interpretation of Article 2180 which, as it
facts, the parties sharply disagree.
happens, is invoked by both parties in support of
The petitioners contend that their son was in the
their conflicting positions. The pertinent part of
school to show his physics experiment as a
this article reads as follows:
prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was
Lastly, teachers or heads of
then under the custody of the private
establishments of arts and
respondents. The private respondents submit
trades shall be liable for
that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school
damages caused by their pupils
only for the purpose of submitting his physics
and students or apprentices so
report and that he was no longer in their custody
long as they remain in their
because the semester had already ended.
custody
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless
Three cases have so far been decided by the
imprudence . 2 Additionally, the herein
Court in connection with the above-quoted
petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil
provision, to wit: Exconde v. Capuno 7 Mercado
action for damages under Article 2180 of the
v. Court of Appeals, 8 and Palisoc v.
Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-
Brillantes. 9 These will be briefly reviewed in this
Recoletos, its rector the high school principal,
opinion for a better resolution of the case at bar.
the dean of boys, and the physics teacher,
In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student
together with Daffon and two other students,
of the Balintawak Elementary School and a Boy
through their respective parents. The complaint
Scout, attended a Rizal Day parade on
against the students was later dropped. After
instructions of the city school supervisor. After
trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held the
the parade, the boy boarded a jeep, took over its
remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs in
wheel and drove it so recklessly that it turned
the sum of P294,984.00, representing death
turtle, resulting in the death of two of its
compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of
passengers. Dante was found guilty of double
litigation, funeral expenses, moral damages,
homicide with reckless imprudence. In the
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees .3 On
separate civil action flied against them, his father
appeal to the respondent court, however, the
was held solidarily liable with him in damages
decision was reversed and all the defendants
under Article 1903 (now Article 2180) of the Civil
were completely absolved
Code for the tort committed by the 15-year old
boy.
In its decision, which is now the subject of this
This decision, which was penned by Justice
petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
Bautista Angelo on June 29,1957, exculpated
of Court, the respondent court found that Article
the school in an obiter dictum (as it was not a
2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San
party to the case) on the ground that it was riot a
Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and
school of arts and trades. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
with whom Justices Sabino Padilla and Alex
Reyes concurred, dissented, arguing that it was
the school authorities who should be held liable
Liability under this rule, he said, was imposed on
(1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of schools
of arts and trades in particular. The modifying
clause "of establishments of arts and trades"
should apply only to "heads" and not "teachers."
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case,
and with an elaboration. A student cut a
classmate with a razor blade during recess time
at the Lourdes Catholic School in Quezon City,
and the parents of the victim sued the culprits
parents for damages. Through Justice Labrador,
the Court declared in another obiter (as the
school itself had also not been sued that the
school was not liable because it was not an
establishment of arts and trades. Moreover, the
custody requirement had not been proved as
this "contemplates a situation where the student
lives and boards with the teacher, such that the
control, direction and influences on the pupil
supersede those of the parents." Justice J.B.L.
Reyes did not take part but the other members
of the court concurred in this decision
promulgated on May 30, 1960.
In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, decided on October 4,
1971, a 16-year old student was killed by a
classmate with fist blows in the laboratory of the
Manila Technical Institute. Although the
wrongdoer — who was already of age — was
not boarding in the school, the head thereof and
the teacher in charge were held solidarily liable
with him. The Court declared through Justice
Teehankee:
The phrase used in the cited
article — "so long as (the
students) remain in their
custody" — means the
protective and supervisory
custody that the school and its
heads and teachers exercise
over the pupils and students for
as long as they are at
attendance in the school,
including recess time. There is
nothing in the law that requires
that for such liability to attach,
the pupil or student who
commits the tortious act must
live and board in the school, as
erroneously held by the lower
court, and the dicta in Mercado
(as well as in Exconde) on
which it relied, must now be
deemed to have been set aside
by the present decision.
This decision was concurred in by five other
members, 10 including Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who
stressed, in answer to the dissenting opinion,
that even students already of age were covered
by the provision since they were equally in the
custody of the school and subject to its
discipline. Dissenting with three others,11 Justice
Makalintal was for retaining the custody
interpretation in Mercado and submitted that the
rule should apply only to torts committed by
students not yet of age as the school would be
acting only in loco parentis.
In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed
with Justice Reyes' dissent in the Exconde Case
but added that "since the school involved at bar
is a non-academic school, the question as to the
applicability of the cited codal provision to
academic institutions will have to await another
case wherein it may properly be raised."
This is the case.
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de
San Jose-Recoletos has been directly
impleaded and is sought to be held liable under
Article 2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is not a
school of arts and trades but an academic
institution of learning. The parties herein have
also directly raised the question of whether or
not Article 2180 covers even establishments
which are technically not schools of arts and
trades, and, if so, when the offending student is
supposed to be "in its custody."
Academic, teacher vs non academic, head of
the school
After an exhaustive examination of the problem,
the Court has come to the conclusion that the
provision in question should apply to all schools,
academic as well as non-academic. Where the
school is academic rather than technical or
vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort
committed by the student will attach to the
teacher in charge of such student, following the
first part of the provision. This is the general
rule. In the case of establishments of arts and
trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who
shall be held liable as an exception to the
general rule. In other words, teachers in general
shall be liable for the acts of their students
except where the school is technical in nature, in
which case it is the head thereof who shall be
answerable. Following the canon of reddendo
singula singulis"teachers" should apply to the
words "pupils and students" and "heads of
establishments of arts and trades" to the word
"apprentices."
The Court cannot see why different degrees of
vigilance should be exercised by the school
authorities on the basis only of the nature of
their respective schools. There does not seem to
be any plausible reason for relaxing that
vigilance simply because the school is academic
in nature and for increasing such vigilance
where the school is non-academic. Notably, the
injury subject of liability is caused by the student
and not by the school itself nor is it a result of
the operations of the school or its equipment.
The injury contemplated may be caused by any
student regardless of the school where he is
registered. The teacher certainly should not be
able to excuse himself by simply showing that
he is teaching in an academic school where, on
the other hand, the head would be held liable if
the school were non-academic.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the
teacher of the academic school is to be held
answerable for the torts committed by his
students, why is it the head of the school only
who is held liable where the injury is caused in a
school of arts and trades? And in the case of the
academic or non- technical school, why not
apply the rule also to the head thereof instead of
imposing the liability only on the teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the
fact that historically the head of the school of
arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over
his pupils than the head of the academic school.
The old schools of arts and trades were
engaged in the training of
artisans apprenticed to their master who
personally and directly instructed them on the
technique and secrets of their craft. The head of
the school of arts and trades was such a master
and so was personally involved in the task of
teaching his students, who usually even boarded
with him and so came under his constant
control, supervision and influence. By contrast,
the head of the academic school was not as
involved with his students and exercised only
administrative duties over the teachers who
were the persons directly dealing with the
students. The head of the academic school had
then (as now) only a vicarious relationship with
the students. Consequently, while he could not
be directly faulted for the acts of the students,
the head of the school of arts and trades,
because of his closer ties with them, could be so
blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer
obtains at present in view of the expansion of
the schools of arts and trades, the consequent
increase in their enrollment, and the
corresponding diminution of the direct and
personal contract of their heads with the
students. Article 2180, however, remains
unchanged. In its present state, the provision
must be interpreted by the Court according to its
clear and original mandate until the legislature,
taking into account the charges in the situation
subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the
necessary amendment.
When considerd under custody
As long as it can be shown that the student is in
the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate
student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate
student right, and even in the enjoyment of a
legitimate student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the
responsibility of the school authorities over the
student continues. Indeed, even if the student
should be doing nothing more than relaxing in
the campus in the company of his classmates
and friends and enjoying the ambience and
atmosphere of the school, he is still within the
custody and subject to the discipline of the
school authorities under the provisions of Article
2180.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the
teacher-in-charge who must answer for his
students' torts, in practically the same way that
the parents are responsible for the child when
he is in their custody. The teacher-in-charge is
the one designated by the dean, principal, or
other administrative superior to exercise
supervision over the pupils in the specific
classes or sections to which they are assigned.
It is not necessary that at the time of the injury,
the teacher be physically present and in a
position to prevent it. Custody does not connote
immediate and actual physical control but refers
more to the influence exerted on the child and
the discipline instilled in him as a result of such
influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the
student, the teacher and not the parent shag be
held responsible if the tort was committed within
the premises of the school at any time when its
authority could be validly exercised over him.
In any event, it should be noted that the liability
imposed by this article is supposed to fall
directly on the teacher or the head of the school
of arts and trades and not on the school itself. If
at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be
held to answer for the acts of its teachers or
even of the head thereof under the general
principle of respondeat superior, but then it may
exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had
exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.
Such defense is, of course, also available to the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and
trades directly held to answer for the tort
committed by the student. As long as the
defendant can show that he had taken the
necessary precautions to prevent the injury
complained of, he can exonerate himself from
the liability imposed by Article 2180, which also
states that:
The responsibility treated of in
this article shall cease when the
Persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damages.
In this connection, it should be observed that the
teacher will be held liable not only when he is
acting in loco parentis for the law does not
require that the offending student be of minority
age. Unlike the parent, who wig be liable only if
his child is still a minor, the teacher is held
answerable by the law for the act of the student
under him regardless of the student's age. Thus,
in the Palisoc Case, liability attached to the
teacher and the head of the technical school
although the wrongdoer was already of age. In
this sense, Article 2180 treats the parent more
favorably than the teacher.
Application
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court
has arrived at the following conclusions:
1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot,
he was still in the custody of the authorities of
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding
that the fourth year classes had formally ended.
It was immaterial if he was in the school
auditorium to finish his physics experiment or
merely to submit his physics report for what is
important is that he was there for a legitimate
purpose. As previously observed, even the mere
savoring of the company of his friends in the
premises of the school is a legitimate purpose
that would have also brought him in the custody
of the school authorities.
2. The rector, the high school principal and the
dean of boys cannot be held liable because
none of them was the teacher-in-charge as
previously defined. Each of them was exercising
only a general authority over the student body
and not the direct control and influence exerted
by the teacher placed in charge of particular
classes or sections and thus immediately
involved in its discipline. The evidence of the
parties does not disclose who the teacher-in-
charge of the offending student was. The mere
fact that Alfredo Amadora had gone to school
that day in connection with his physics report did
not necessarily make the physics teacher,
respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-
charge of Alfredo's killer.
3. At any rate, assuming that he was the
teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that
Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon
Daffon or that he had waived observance of the
rules and regulations of the school or condoned
their non-observance. His absence when the
tragedy happened cannot be considered against
him because he was not supposed or required
to report to school on that day. And while it is
true that the offending student was still in the
custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the
latter was physically absent when the tort was
committed, it has not been established that it
was caused by his laxness in enforcing
discipline upon the student. On the contrary, the
private respondents have proved that they had
exercised due diligence, through the
enforcement of the school regulations, in
maintaining that discipline.
4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is
probably the dean of boys who should be held
liable especially in view of the unrefuted
evidence that he had earlier confiscated an
unlicensed gun from one of the students and
returned the same later to him without taking
disciplinary action or reporting the matter to
higher authorities. While this was clearly
negligence on his part, for which he deserves
sanctions from the school, it does not
necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador
as it has not been shown that he confiscated
and returned pistol was the gun that killed the
petitioners' son.
5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly
liable under the article because only the teacher
or the head of the school of arts and trades is
made responsible for the damage caused by the
student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to
answer for the tort committed by any of the other
private respondents for none of them has been
found to have been charged with the custody of
the offending student or has been remiss in the
discharge of his duties in connection with such
custody.
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as
disclosed by the record and in the light of the
principles herein announced that none of the
respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by
Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted
in the latter's death at the auditorium of the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13,
1972. While we deeply sympathize with the
petitioners over the loss of their son under the
tragic circumstances here related, we
nevertheless are unable to extend them the
material relief they seek, as a balm to their grief,
under the law they have invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without
any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Perez vs. CA, GR No. 118870, March 29, 1996
Facts: Respondent father, a doctor of medicine
and petitioner mother, a registered nurse
working in the US are married couples who are
separated in fact with only one child.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus
asking respondent to surrender the custody of
their son. The RTC issued an Order awarding
custody of the one-year old child to his mother,
citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the
Family Code.
Upon appeal by the father, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court’s order and awarded
custody of the boy to him ruling that there were
enough reasons to deny petitioner custody over
the child even under seven years old. It held that
granting custody to the boy’s father would be for
the child’s best interest and welfare.
Article 213, par 2, provides in case of separation
of parents that no child under 7 years of age
shall be separated from the mother, unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.
Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court
also states that “No child under seven years of
age shall be separated from the mother, unless
the court finds there are compelling reasons
therefore.
Issue: WON custody of the child is to be given
to the father.
Held: No. The provisions of the law clearly
mandate that a child under seven years of age
shall not be separated from his mother unless
the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise. The use of the word “shall” in Article
213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Sec 6 of
the Revised Rules of Court connotes a
mandatory character.
Couples who are separated in fact are covered
within the term separation.
The Family Code in reverting to the provision of
the Civil Code that a child below seven years old
shall not be separated from the mother (Article
363), has expressly repealed the earlier Article
17, par 3 of the Child and youth Welfare Code
which reduced the child’s age to 5 years.
PINEDA vs CAG.R. No. 105562 September 27,
1993
Facts: The sailors perished while the ship sank
in Morocco. The families of the victims then
wanted to claim the benefits of the insurance.
The checks were given to PMSI. Nuval, the
PMSI president, pocketed the amounts in his
bank account. When the families went to insular
to get the benefits, their request was denied
because Insular claimed that the checks were
already given to PMSI. Hence, The families filed
a petition with the Insurance Commission. They
won and Insular was ordered to pay them 500 a
day until the amount was furnished to them.
Issue:Whether or not the families of the victim
have the right to claim benefits of the insurance
of the deceased
Held:Yes. Under Article 225 The father and the
mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship
over the property of their unemancipated
common child without the necessity of a court
appointment. In case of disagreement, the
father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is
judicial order to the contrary. Hence, the families
left has the right to receive just compensation
from the insurance company.
Tamargo vs CAGR No. 85044, June 3, 1992
FACTS:In October 1982, AdelbertoBundoc,
minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle causing injuries that resulted in
her death. The petitioners, natural parents of
Tamargo, filed a complaint for damages against
the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he
was living the time of the tragic incident.
In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a
petition to adopt AdelbertoBundoc. Such
petition was granted on November 1982 after
the tragic incident.
ISSUE: WON parental authority concerned may
be given retroactive effect so as to make
adopting parents the indispensable parties in a
damage case filed against the adopted child
where actual custody was lodged with the
biological parents.
HELD:Parental liability is a natural or logical
consequence of duties and responsibilities of
parents, their parental authority which includes
instructing, controlling and disciplining the child.
In the case at bar, during the shooting incident,
parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged
with the natural parents. It follows that they are
the indispensable parties to the suit for
damages. “Parents and guardians are
responsible for the damage caused by the child
under their parental authority in accordance with
the civil code”.
SC did not consider that retroactive effect may
be given to the decree of adoption so as to
impose a liability upon the adopting parents
accruing at the time when they had no actual or
physical custody over the adopted child.
Retroactivity may be essential if it permits
accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of
the adopted child. Under Article 35 of the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is
provisionally vested in the adopting parents
during the period of trial custody however in this
case, trial custody period either had not yet
begin nor had been completed at the time of the
shooting incident. Hence, actual custody was
then with the natural parents of Adelberto.
Petition for review was hereby granted.
Eugenio vs Velez, G.R. No. 85140, May 17,
1990
Facts:Vitaliana Vargas’ brothers and sisters
unaware of the former’s death on August 28,
1988 filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on
September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis
Oriental alleging that she was forcible taken
from her residence sometime in 1987 and was
confined by the herein petitioner, Tomas
Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan,
Misamis Oriental.
The respondent court in an order dated 28
September 1988 issued the writ of habeas
corpus, but the writ was returned unsatisfied.
Petitioner refused to surrender the body of
Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to
the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse
cannot be the subject of habeas corpus
proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he
had already obtained a burial permit. Petitioner
claims that as her common law husband, he has
legal custody of her body.
Issue:Whether or not the petitioner can claim
custody of the deceased.
Held: The custody of the dead body of Vitaliana
was correctly awarded to the surviving brothers
and sisters. Section 1103 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides:
“Persons charged with duty of burial - if the
deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a
child and left any kin; the duty of the burial shall
devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased.
Philippine Law does not recognize common law
marriages. A man and woman not legally
married who cohabit for many years as husband
and wife, who represent themselves to the
public as husband and wife, and who are
reputed to be husband and wife in the
community where they live may be considered
legally married in common law jurisdictions but
not in the Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush
aside the fact that such relationships are present
in our society, and that they produce a
community of properties and interests which is
governed by law, authority exists in case law to
the effect that such form of co-ownership
requires that the man and woman living together
must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a
subsisting marriage with another woman, alegal
impediment which disqualified him from even
legally marrying Vitaliana.(Eugenio vs Velez,
G.R. No. 85140, May 17, 1990).
Tolentino v CA (1988)
FACTS:
Private respondent Consuelo David married
Arturo Tolentino in 1931. The marriage was
dissolved and terminated in 1943 pursuant to
the law during the Japanese occupation by a
decree of absolute divorce on the grounds of
desertion and abandonment by the wife for at
least 3 continuous years.
Arturo Tolentino then married Pilar Adorable but
she died soon after the marriage. After that,
Constancia married Arturo Tolentino on April 21,
1945 and they had 3 children. Constancia
Tolentino is the present legal wife of Arturo
Tolentino.
Consuelo David continued using the surname
Tolentino after the divorce and up to the time
that the complaint was filed. Her usage of the
surname Tolentino was authorized by the family
of Arturo Tolentino (brothers and sisters).
In RTC, Consuelo David should discontinue her
usage of the surname of Tolentino. The CA
decision reversed that of the RTC’s.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioner’s cause of action has
already prescribed
2. WON the petitioner can exclude by injunction
Consuelo David from using the surname of her
former husband from whom she was divorced.
HELD:
1. Yes
In Art 1150 CC The time for prescription of all
kinds of actions, when there in no special
provision which ordains otherwise, shall be
counted from the day they may be brought.
Art 1149 CC Period of prescription is 5 years
from the right of action accrues.
The action has long prescribed because she
married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945; Civil
Code took effect on August 30, 1950; She
acquired knowledge that Consuelo David was
still using the surname Tolentino in 1951.
She should have filed the case after she
obtained knowledge that Consuelo David was
still using the surname Tolentino. The case was
filed on November 23, 1971 or 20 years after
she obtained knowledge.
2. No
Philippine law is silent whether or not a divorced
woman may continue to use the surname of her
husband because there are no provisions for
divorce under Philippine law.
On the Commentary of Tolentino as regards Art
370 of the CC. The wife cannot claim an
exclusive right to use the husband’s surname.
She cannot be prevented from using it, but
neither can she restrain others from using it.
Art 371 is not applicable because it
contemplates annulment while the present case
refers to absolute divorce where there is
severance of valid marriage ties. Effect of
divorce was more akin to death of the spouse
where the deceased woman is continued to be
referred to as “Mrs. of the husband” even if he
has remarried.
If the appeal would be granted the respondent
would encounter problems because she was
able to prove that she entered into contracts with
third persons, acquired properties and entered
into other legal relations using the surname
Tolentino. Petitioner failed to show the she
would suffer any legal injury or deprivation of
right.
There was no usurpation of the petitioner’s
name and surname. Usurpation implies injury to
the interests of the owner of the name. It
consists with the possibility of confusion of
identity. The elements of usurpation were 1.
Actual use of another’s name, 2. Use is
unauthorized, 3. Use of another’s name is to
designate personality or identity of a person.
None of these elements were present in the
case because public knowledge referred to
Constancia as the legal wife of Arturo, and
Consuelo did represent herself after the divorce
as Mrs. Arturo Tolentino.
Silva v Peralta was cited by the petitioner but the
case is not applicable. In Silva, it was not mere
use of the surname that was enjoined but the
defendant’s representation that she was the wife
of Saturnino Silva, there was usurpation of the
status of the wife.
Mossesgeld vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
111455. December 23, 1998
Case Doctrines:
● Illegitimate children shall use the surname of
the mother , and this is rule regardless of
whether or not the father admits paternity.
● Mandamus does not lie to compel the
performance of an act prohibited by law
Facts: In 1989, Marissa Mossesgeld (single),
gave birth to a baby boy. The father, one
Eleazar Calasan (married), signed the birth
certificate of the child as the informant,
indicating therein the child’s name as Jonathan
MossesgeldCalasan. Both Eleazar and Marissa
accomplished the dorsal side of the certificate of
live birth stating that the information contained
therein were true and correct. In addition,
Eleazar executed an affidavit admitting paternity
of the child.
The person in charge at the hospital refused to
place Calasan as the child’s surname in the
certificate of live birth; hence, Eleazar himself
submitted the certificate to the office of the local
civil registrar of Mandaluyong, for registration.
The local civil registrar denied the registration on
the basis of Circular No. 4, dated October 11,
1988, of the Civil Registrar General, providing
that under Article 176 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, illegitimate children born on or after
August 3, 1988, shall use the surname of their
mother.
Eleazar filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig a petition for mandamus to compel the
Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong to register
the certificate of live birth of his alleged
illegitimate son using his surname. The RTC
denied the petition. Eleazar filed a motion for
reconsideration. Later, he filed a motion for
leave to amend petition and to admit amended
petition, substituting the child’s mother Marissa
A. Mossesgeld as the petitioner. The MR was
denied. The CA affirmed the decision.
Issue: Does mandamus lie to compel the Local
Civil Registrar to register a certificate of live birth
of an illegitimate child using the alleged father’s
surname where the latter admitted paternity?
Held:
No. Article 176 of the Family Code of the
Philippines provides that “illegitimate children
shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code.”
This is the rule regardless of whether or not the
father admits paternity. Consequently, the Local
Civil Registrar correctly refused to register the
certificate of live birth of petitioner’s illegitimate
child using the surname of the alleged father,
even with the latter’s consent. Of course, the
putative father, though a much married man,
may legally adopt his own illegitimate child. In
case of adoption, the child shall be considered a
legitimate child of the adopter, entitled to use his
surname.
Mandamus will not lie to compel the local civil
registrar to register the certificate of live birth of
an illegitimate child using the father’s surname,
even with the consent of the latter. Mandamus
does not lie to compel the performance of an act
prohibited by law.
Republic v. Valencia G.R. No. L-32181,5
March 1986
FACTS:
Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the
cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth
of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil
Registry of the City of Cebu. The case was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3043-R.
The Solicitor General filed an opposition to the
petition alleging that the petition for correction of
entry in the Civil Registry, contemplates a
summary proceeding and correction of mere
clerical errors, those harmless and innocuous
changes such as the correction of a name that is
merely mispelled, occupation of parents, etc.,
and not changes or corrections involving civil
status, nationality, or citizenship which are
substantial and controversial.
Respondent Leonor Valencia, filed her reply to
the opposition wherein she admitted that the
present petition seeks substantial changes
involving the civil status and nationality or
citizenship of respondents, but alleged that
substantial changes in the civil registry records
involving the civil status of parents, their
nationality or citizenship may be allowed if- (1)
the proper suit is filed, and (2) evidence is
submitted, either to support the allegations of
the petition or to disprove the same; that
respondents have complied with these
requirements by filing the present special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry pursuant to Rule 108
of the Revised Rules of Court and that they have
caused reasonable notice to be given to the
persons named in the petition and have also
caused the order for the hearings of their petition
to be published for three (3) consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.
Subsequently, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu
City filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
since the petition seeks to change the nationality
or citizenship of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go
from “Chinese” to “Filipino” and their status from
“Legitimate” to Illegitimate”, and changing also
the status of the mother from “married” to
“single” the corrections sought are not merely
clerical but substantial, involving as they do the
citizenship and status of the petitioning minors
and the status of their mother.
ISSUE:
May a change in the record of birth in a civil
registry, involving the nationality or citizenship of
a person, be granted in a summary procedure?
RULING:
The Supreme Court likewise held that
corrections involving the nationality or
citizenship of a person were substantial and
could not be effected except in adversarial
proceedings.
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of
a petition is not for the correction of clerical
errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but
one involving the nationality or citizenship, which
is undisputably substantial as well as
controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted
in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it
is also true that a right in law may be enforced
and a wrong may be remedied as long as the
appropriate remedy is used. The SC adheres to
the principle that even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by
the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceedings.

Rule 108 of the Revise Rules of Court now

provides for such a procedure which should be
limited solely to the implementation of Article
412, the substantive law on the matter of
correcting entries in the civil register. Rule 108,
lay all the other provisions of the Rules of Court,
was promulgated by the Supreme Court
pursuant to its rule- making authority under Sec.
13 of Art. VIII of the Constitution, which directs
that such rules of court ‘shall not diminish or
increase or modify substantive rights.’ If Rule
108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or
harmless changes or corrections of errors which
are visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding, so as to comprehend substantial
and controversial alterations concerning
citizenship, legitimacy or paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108 would
thereby become unconstitutional for it would be
increasing or modifying substantive rights, which
changes are not authorized under Article 412 of
the New Civil Code.

Thus, Valencia requires that a petition for

substantial correction or change of entries in the
civil registry should have as respondents the
civil registrar, as well as all other persons who
have or claim any interest that would be affected
thereby. It further mandates that a full hearing,
not merely a summary proceeding, be
conducted.