Contents

Substantive Due Process ............................................................................................................................... 1

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila ........................... 2
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots................................................................................................................ 3
Procedural Due Process ................................................................................................................................ 5
Alonte vs. Savellano .................................................................................................................................. 5
Ynot vs. IAC ............................................................................................................................................... 7
Administrative Due Process ........................................................................................................................ 10
Ang Tibay vs. CIR ..................................................................................................................................... 10
Guzman vs. National University .............................................................................................................. 11

Substantive Due Process

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
Facts:
The City of Manila issued Ordinance No. 4670 which regulates Hotel and Motel Operations. The petitioners
allege that the Ordinance is null and void for being violative of the due process clause. Among the provisions
questioned by the petitioners are the following:

 Beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of Manila

 Imposition of fee per annum on first class motels and second class motels.
 Refrain from accepting customers not filling up the prescribed form in the lobby.
 The premises will be open to the inspection by the City Mayor, the police, or any authorized person.
 Requiring the maintenance of minimum facilities such as telephone, laundry, dining room, etc.
 Prohibiting persons less than 18 years old from being accepted unless accompanied by parents.
 Prohibiting the leasing of a room more than twice in 24 hours.
 Automatic cancellation of license upon conviction.

The lower court declared the Ordinance null and void. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
WON Ordinance No. 4750 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause.

Ruling: No.

Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption
of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance.

It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut
it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. The principle has
been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance
Co.,3 where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter
thus: The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked
to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence
deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the
absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation
being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation
of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.

Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant
to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty
does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to
safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and
unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of
police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers,4 extending as it does "to all the great public needs."

On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the exercise of the police
power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process,
equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties however, the exercise of such police power
insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such
exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of
due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.

We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is raised to the question
of due process.16 There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard
to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and
a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from the
imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,
obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy
the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and
result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness.
Correctly it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair
play.17 It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in
the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political
thought."18 It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances,"19 decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental
principles of our society."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery
to form or phrases.21

Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the challenged ordinance for
hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter, first-class motels being required to pay a
P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled law however, as far back as
1922 that municipal license fees could be classified into those imposed for regulating occupations or regular
enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes
only. As was explained more in detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations
are also incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license
and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider
discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that
municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule,
declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of persons
who might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the
determination of the amount of this kind of license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege
taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in of licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the
latter cases the fees have rarely been declared unreasonable.23

Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for
the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern,
common inn or the like, to lease or rent room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso
that in all cases full payment shall be charged, call for a different conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be
viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely
it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be,
and, according to the explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when
there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative
attempt at correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every regulation of conduct amounts to
curtailment of liberty which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute.

Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots

Facts:
Pursuant to its power of control, regulation, and supervision of pilots and the pilotage profession,1 the PPA
promulgated PPA-AO-03-852 on March 21, 1985, which embodied the "Rules and Regulations Governing
Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports." These rules mandate, inter alia,
that aspiring pilots must be holders of pilot licenses3 and must train as probationary pilots in outports for three
months and in the Port of Manila for four months. It is only after they have achieved satisfactory
performance4 that they are given permanent and regular appointments by the PPA itself5to exercise harbor pilotage until
they reach the age of 70, unless sooner removed by reason of mental or physical unfitness by the PPA General
Manager.

On December 23, 1992, the OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the implementation of
PPA-AO No. 04-92. In its answer, the PPA countered that said administrative order was issued in the exercise
of its administrative control and supervision over harbor pilots under Section 6-a (viii), Article IV of P.D. No.
857, as amended, and it, along with its implementing guidelines, was intended to restore order in the ports and
to improve the quality of port services.
Consequently, respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and damages, before Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which
was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-65673. On September 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a judgment declaring
PPA AO No. 04-92 is null and void.

The court a quo pointed out that the Bureau of Customs, the precursor of the PPA, recognized pilotage as a
profession and, therefore, a property right under Callanta v. Carnation Philippines, Inc.13 Thus, abbreviating the
term within which that privilege may be exercised would be an interference with the property rights of the
harbor pilots. Consequently, any "withdrawal or alteration" of such property right must be strictly made in
accordance with the constitutional mandate of due process of law. This was apparently not followed by the
PPA when it did not conduct public hearings prior to the issuance of PPA-AO No. 04-92; respondents allegedly
learned about it only after its publication in the newspapers.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue: WON PPA AO No. 04-92 is violative of due process.

Ruling: Yes.

Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the "due process clause" of the Constitution, viz.:

Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, . . .

In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is a deprivation
and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. When one speaks of due process
of law, however, a distinction must be made between matters of procedure and matters of substance. In essence,
procedural due process "refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced," while substantive due
process "requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair,
reasonable, and just."14 PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be examined in light of this distinction.

Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPA-AO No. 04-92 allegedly because
no hearing was conducted whereby "relevant government agencies" and the pilots themselves could ventilate
their views. They are obviously referring to the procedural aspect of the enactment. Fortunately, the Court has
maintained a clear position in this regard, a stance it has stressed in the recent case of Lumiqued
v. Hon. Exevea,15 where it declared that "(a)s long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in
due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the
very essence of due process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of."
In the case at bar, respondents questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 no less than four times16 before the matter was
finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this score, however, fail to persuade.

Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the validity of the
administrative order. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due
process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function.

Upon the other hand, it is also contended that the sole and exclusive right to the exercise of harbor pilotage by
pilots is a settled issue. Respondents aver that said right has become vested and can only be "withdrawn or
shortened" by observing the constitutional mandate of due process of law. Their argument has thus shifted
from the procedural to one of substance. It is here where PPA-AO No. 04-92 fails to meet the condition set
by the organic law.

Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals. Licensure is "the
granting of license especially to practice a profession." It is also "the system of granting licenses (as for
professional practice) in accordance with establishment standards."21 A license is a right or permission granted
by some competent authority to carry on a business or do an act which, without such license, would be illegal.

Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire
at the age 70 years. This is a vested right.

It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession
before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that after passing
five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a license which they could use
until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. Under the new
issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary or permanent
depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly
confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period. Renewal of their license is now
dependent on a "rigid evaluation of performance" which is conducted only after the license has already been
cancelled. Hence, the use of the term "renewal." It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily makes
PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property
without due process of law.

Procedural Due Process

Alonte vs. Savellano

Facts:
Pending before this Court are two separate petitions, one filed by petitioner Bayani M. Alonte, docketed G.R.
No. 131652, and the other by petitioner Buenaventura Concepcion, docketed G.R. No. 131728, that assail the
decision of respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 53, of
Manila finding both petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

On 13 December 1996, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through her counsel Attorney Remedios C. Balbin, and
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor ("ACSP") Leonardo Guiyab, Jr., filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator a Petition for a Change of Venue (docketed Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC) to have
the case transferred and tried by any of the Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila.

During the pendency of the petition for change of venue, or on 25 June 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, assisted
by her parents and counsel, executed an affidavit of desistance.
On 02 September 1997, this Court issued a Resolution (Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC), granting the
petition for change of venue.

On 17 September 1997, the case, now re-docketed Criminal Case No. 97-159955 by the Clerk of Court of
Manila, was assigned by raffle to Branch 53, RTC Manila, with respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr.,
presiding.

In an Order, dated 09 October 1997, Judge Savellano found probable cause for the issuance of warrants for
the arrest of petitioners Alonte and Concepcion "without prejudice to, and independent of, this Court's separate
determination as the trier of facts, of the voluntariness and validity of the [private complainant's] desistance in
the light of the opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab."

On 07 November 1997, petitioners were arraigned and both pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. The parties
manifested that they were waiving pre-trial. The proceedings forthwith went on.
It would appear that immediately following the arraignment, the prosecution presented private complainant
Juvielyn Punongbayan followed by her parents.

Assistant State Prosecutor Marilyn Campomanes then presented, in sequence: (i) Punongbayan's parents, who
affirmed their signatures on the affidavit of desistance and their consent to their daughter's decision to desist
from the case, and (ii) Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alberto Nofuente, who attested that the affidavit of
desistance was signed by Punongbayan and her parents in his presence and that he was satisfied that the same
was executed freely and voluntarily.

Thereupon, respondent judge said that "the case was submitted for decision."

On 10 November 1997, petitioner Alonte filed an "Urgent Motion to Admit to Bail." Respondent judge did
not act on the application for bail nor on the subsequent Urgent Pleas to Resolve Motion to Admit to Bail.

On 18 December 1997, after the case was called, Atty. Sigrid Fortun and Atty. Jose Flaminiano manifested that
Alonte could not attend the promulgation of the decision because he was suffering from mild hypertension and
was confined at the NBI clinic and that, upon the other hand, petitioner Concepcion and his counsel would
appear not to have been notified of the proceedings. The promulgation, nevertheless, of the decision
proceeded in absentia. The two accused were convicted.

Issue: WON there was a violation of right to due process of law.

Ruling: Yes.

Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution provides the fundamentals.

(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he
has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

Jurisprudence11 acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that the court
or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it;
(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an
opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.

While Judge Savellano has claimed in his Comment that —

Petitioners-accused were each represented during the hearing on 07 November 1997 with their respective
counsel of choice. None of their counsel interposed an intention to cross-examine rape victim Juvielyn
Punongbayan, even after she attested, in answer to respondent judge's clarificatory questions, the voluntariness
and truth of her two affidavits — one detailing the rape and the other detailing the attempts to buy her
desistance; the opportunity was missed/not used, hence waived. The rule of case law is that the right to confront and cross-examine
a witness "is a personal one and may be waived." (emphasis supplied) —

it should be pointed out, however, that the existence of the waiver must be positively demonstrated. The
standard of waiver requires that it "not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences."16 Mere silence of the holder of the
right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption
against waiver.

The Solicitor General has aptly discerned a few of the deviations from what otherwise should have been the
regular course of trial: (1) Petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to prove their defenses nor
have dates therefor been scheduled for the purpose;18 (2) the parties have not been given the opportunity to
present rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by respondent Judge for the purpose;19 and (3) petitioners
have not admitted the act charged in the Information so as to justify any modification in the order of
trial.20 There can be no short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused
his full day in court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights,
is an enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be denied even to the most undeserving.

This case, in fine, must be remanded for further proceedings. And, since the case would have to be sent back
to the court a quo, this ponencia has carefully avoided making any statement or reference that might be
misconstrued as prejudgment or as pre-empting the trial court in the proper disposition of the case. The Court
likewise deems it appropriate that all related proceedings therein, including the petition for bail, should be
subject to the proper disposition of the trial court.

Nevertheless, it is needful to stress a few observations on the affidavit of desistance executed by the
complainant.

Firstly, the affidavit of desistance of Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan, hereinbefore quoted, does not contain any
statement that disavows the veracity of her complaint against petitioners but merely seeks to "be allowed to
withdraw" her complaint and to discontinue with the case for varied other reasons.

Secondly, an affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as a pardon in the so-called "private crimes,"
is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal case once the action has been instituted. The affidavit,
nevertheless, may, as so earlier intimated, possibly constitute evidence whose weight or probative value, like
any other piece of evidence, would be up to the court for proper evaluation.

Relative to the prayer for the disqualification of Judge Savellano from further hearing the case, the Court is
convinced that Judge Savellano should, given the circumstances, the best excused from the case. Possible
animosity between the personalities here involved may not all be that unlikely.

Ynot vs. IAC

Facts:
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A which states that no carabao regardless
of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another.
The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to
confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef,
and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of
carabaos.

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when
they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above
measure.

The petitioner sued for recovery. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation
of the carabaos.

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court.

Issue: WON EO No. 626-A is unconstitutional.

Ruling: Yes.

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may not be
dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness.

This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of
admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long
as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved
and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are instances when the need for expeditions action will
justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the
loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the
people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be
summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing,
to compel his return to the country he has fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest
of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial
hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the
urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and
is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate
liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the
great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the
three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain.

It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the
basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions.
The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that "present conditions
demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them
for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy
crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the government would
have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect and preserve them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the registration,
branding and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without due process of law.

The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and declared in part as
follows:

To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. ...

But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order,
we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful
method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban
not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex,
physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The
object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose
sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing

We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate
slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another.
Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving
them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to
apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal.
Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot
be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead
meat.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon
with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation
of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police
only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment,
to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly,
no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and
declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.

In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to
the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which
was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive
order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was
carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance
to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.

In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory
treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There
certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first
in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution.
Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation
thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have
had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as
prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed
to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of
Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely
generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and
abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better
still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their
options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what
criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose
the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission,"
a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a
clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the
method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse,
is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right
to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative
authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial
functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation
of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution
of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A
unconstitutional.

Administrative Due Process

Ang Tibay vs. CIR
Facts:
National Labor Union, Inc. prays for the vacation of the judgment rendered by the majority of this Court and
the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial.

The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent
Court of Industrial Relations and to the motion for new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.

Issue: WON the granting of the new trial is proper.

Ruling: Yes.

In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13,
1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by
technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits
of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal
evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20,
Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the
parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or
determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of
preventing f urther industrial or agricultural disputes. (Section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy,
appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry
into effect the avowed legislativepurpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said
to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases
coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in
trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character:

1. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

2. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending
to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

3. "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision.

4. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin,
G. R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI 0. G. 1335), but the evidence must be
"substantial."

5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.

6. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate
in arriving at a decision.

7. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for
the decisions rendered.

In the light of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged
agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Workers' Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren
and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual ,basis upon which to predicate, in a rational way, a conclusion of
law.

By and large, after considerable discussion, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would
be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his
motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved.

Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted.

Guzman vs. National University

Facts:
Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent National
University, have come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their school’s “continued and
persistent refusal to allow them to enrol.”

In their petition “for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction” dated August 7, 1984, they allege that the respondent National University refuses to let them enrol
in their courses of study because of their participation in peaceful mass actions within the premises of the
University and this is in utter contempt of their constitutional right and in violation of the principle of due
process of law.
In the comment filed on September 24, 1986 for respondent University and its President pursuant to this
Court’s requirement therefor1, respondents make the claim that one of the petitioners failed to enrol during
the enrolment period, and that one of them has a poor academic showing, and that they engage in activities
within the University but without authorization from the University.

Ruling:

Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents’ comment and memorandum is the fact that they had
never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed led or
participated “in activities within the university premises, conducted without prior permit from school
authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein”3 or perpetrated acts of “vandalism, coercion and
intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of University authority.”

Under the Education Act of 1982,5 the petitioners, as students, have the right among others “to freely choose
their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation, except in
case of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.”6 Petitioners were being denied this right,
or being disciplined, without due process, in violation of the admonition in the Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools7 that “(n)o penalty shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in * * (the)
Manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have
been conducted.”8 This Court is therefore constrained, as in Beriña v. Philippine Maritime Institute,9 to declare
illegal this act of respondents of imposing sanctions on students without due investigation.

Educational institutions of course have the power to “adopt and enforce such rules as may be deemed expedient
for * * (its) government, * * * (this being)” incident to the very object of incorporation, and indispensable to
the successful management of the college.”

But, to repeat, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. And it
bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings
similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline
cases may be summary; and cross-examination is not, contrary topetitioners’ view, an essential part thereof.
There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and
these are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired;
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their
own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated
by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. vs. Secretary of Education

Facts:
On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education created by the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (hereinafter referred to as the DECS) submitted a report entitled "Report and
Recommendations on a Policy for Tuition and Other School Fees." The report favorably recommended to the
DECS the following courses of action with respect to the Government's policy on increases in school fees for
the schoolyear 1987 to 1988 —

(1) Private schools may be allowed to increase its total school fees by not more than 15 per cent to 20 per
cent without the need for the prior approval of the DECS. Schools that wish to increase school fees beyond
the ceiling would be subject to the discretion of the DECS;
(2) Any private school may increase its total school fees in excess of the ceiling, provided that the total
schools fees will not exceed P1,000.00 for the schoolyear in the elementary and secondary levels, and P50.00
per academic unit on a semestral basis for the collegiate level.

The DECS took note of the report of the Task Force and on the basis of the same, the DECS, through the
respondent Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports (hereinafter referred to as the respondent Secretary),
issued an Order authorizing, inter alia, the 15% to 20% increase in school fees as recommended by the Task
Force. The petitioner sought a reconsideration of the said Order, apparently on the ground that the increases
were too high. 2 Thereafter, the DECS issued Department Order No. 37 dated April 10, 1987 modifying its
previous Order and reducing the increases to a lower ceiling of 10% to 15%, accordingly. 3 Despite this
reduction, the petitioner still opposed the increases.

Thus, on May 20, 1987, the petitioner, allegedly on the basis of the public interest, went to this Court and filed
the instant Petition for prohibition, seeking that judgment be rendered declaring the questioned Department
Order unconstitutional. The thrust of the Petition is that the said Department Order was issued without any
legal basis. The petitioner also maintains that the questioned Department Order was issued in violation of the
due process clause of the Constitution in asmuch as the petitioner was not given due notice and hearing before
the said Department Order was issued.
Regarding the second argument, the petitioner maintains that students and parents are interested parties that
should be afforded an opportunity for a hearing before school fees are increased. In sum, the petitioner stresses
that the questioned Order constitutes a denial of substantive and procedural due process of law.

Issue:
WON the issuance of the Department Order without due notice and hearing violates due process.

Ruling: No.

We find the remaining argument of the petitioner untenable. The petitioner invokes the due process clause of
the Constitution against the alleged arbitrariness of the assailed Department Order. The petitioner maintains
that the due process clause requires that prior notice and hearing are indispensable for the Department Order
to be validly issued.

We disagree.

The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative
function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a
requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates
laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the
country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to
a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character.

Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its legislative function? We believe so. The
assailed Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by all private schools in
the country for schoolyear 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity
of its issuance.

This observation notwithstanding, there is a failure on the part of the petitioner to show clear and convincing
evidence of such arbitrariness. As the record of the case discloses, the DECS is not without any justification
for the issuance of the questioned Department Order. It would be reasonable to assume that the report of the
Task Force created by the DECS, on which it based its decision to allow an increase in school fees, was made
judiciously. Moreover, upon the instance of the petitioner, as it so admits in its Petition, the DECS had actually
reduced the original rates of 15% to 20% down to 10% to 15%, accordingly. Under the circumstances peculiar
to this case, We cannot consider the assailed Department Order arbitrary.

Due Process of Law in Dismissal of Employees

MGG Marine Services vs. NLRC

Facts:
Private respondent was initially employed by the MGG Marine Services, Inc. (MGG) on July 1, 1988.

On March 25, 1990, the president of MGG, petitioner Doroteo C. Garlan, went to the United States for brief
sojourn. On March 1, 1990, before his departure, he appointed private respondent as comptroller and the over-
all supervisor, concurrently with her then position as financial officer.

Petitioner Garlan instructed private respondent to pay the company's obligations as they fell due. Ma. Lourdes
G. Unson, vice-president of MGG who also traveled to the United States, left with private respondent 79
prepared and pre-signed checks.

Private respondent was specifically told to pay only the creditors mentioned in the cash vouchers and to place
on each of the 16 black checks the amount stated in the corresponding check voucher.

When the corporate officers returned from their trip in June 1990, they were dismayed to learn that the
company's deposits in the bank was reduced to only P5,720.00. It turned out that private respondent disobeyed
the instructions given her not to pay more than what was specified in the check vouchers. Likewise, she paid
some creditors who were not specified in the cash vouchers.

MGG filed estafa charges against private respondent which were however dismissed.

On November 12, 1990, MGG terminated private respondent's employment for loss of trust and confidence.
She then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against MGG and its officers.

In a decision dated December 21, 1992, the Labor Arbiter held that: the dismissal was illegal.

MGG appealed the Labor Arbiter's decision to NLRC. The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter.

Issue/s:

1. Was there valid cause for dismissal? Yes.

MGG asserts that it was legally justified in dismissing private respondent on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence.

We find that there is basis for MGG's loss of trust and confidence in private respondent, who does not deny
that she entered on the blank checks amounts in excess of what had been provided for in the cash vouchers,
and made payments to creditors other than those specified in said vouchers.

The Labor Arbiter labored under the wrong impression that private respondent was dismissed merely because
she embezzled company funds saying that ". . . except for their bare self-serving allegation that the complainant
(private respondent herein) had allegedly misappropriated corporate funds, no proof whatsoever was adduced
by respondents (petitioner herein) and not even a scintilla of evidence was presented to show that the
complainant had in fact defrauded the company to the tune of more than a million pesos" (supra).

The NLRC and the Labor Arbiter did not realize that the rights of private respondent complained of had placed
the company in great jeopardy and disturbed its financial stability, thereby causing it real and actual damage.

Indeed, private respondent's disobedience and precipitated actions caused great damage to the company's cash
flow.

An employer cannot be compelled to retain an employee who is guilty of acts inimical to the interests of the
employer.9 A company has the right to dismiss its employees if only as a measure of self-protection.10 This is
all the more true in the case of supervisors or personnel occupying positions of responsibility.

That the complaint for estafa filed by MGG against private respondent was dismissed is also of no moment.
The rule is that an employee's acquittal in a criminal case does not preclude a finding that he has been guilty of
acts inimical to the employer's interest.

Corollarily, proof beyond reasonable doubt of an employee's misconduct is not required in dismissing an
employee on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. The quantum of proof required is only substantial
evidence.13 In the case before us, there was an admitted, actual and real breach of duty committed by private
respondent, which was the basis of MGG's loss of trust and confidence in her.

2. WON procedural due process was given by the employer. No.

To constitute a completely valid and faultless dismissal, it is well-settled that the employer must show not only
sufficient ground therefor but it must also prove that it observed procedural due process by giving the employee
two notices: one, of the intention to dismiss, indicating therein his acts or omissions complained against, and
two, notice of the decision to dismiss; and an opportunity to answer and rebut the charges against him, in
between such notices.

In the case before us, the petitioners found out about the excess withdrawals when an audit was conducted.
The record is devoid of any showing that private respondent was given notice of the charges against her. Neither
was she given a hearing or opportunity to present her defense. The only allegation of petitioners was that she
was asked questions about her withdrawals during the audit. But these are too scant and too bare to amount to
due process. There was no indication of the nature and the type of questions asked, the process of the supposed
inquiry, the time and opportunity given for her defense, and the degree of explanation allowed her.

Plainly, this is not sufficient compliance with due process. An audit cannot take the place of the twin
requirements of notices and hearing. At the very least, petitioners failed to show they followed there
requirements.

This failure to show due process taints the dismissal. This does not mean that the private respondent would be
entitled to backwages or reinstatement or even separation pay.17 Under prevailing jurisprudence, she is entitled
only to indemnity or damages, the amount of which depends on the peculiar circumstances of each case.18

3. WON procedural due process was given at the Labor Arbiter. Yes.

Petitioners maintained that they were denied due process when the Labor Arbiter considered the case submitted
for resolution notwithstanding the fact that petitioners had manifested their intention to present additional
evidence.

We do not agree.
Petitioners first asked to be allowed to present additional evidence at the hearing on June 9, 1992 but they
manifested that the documents they intended to present were not then available. The Labor Arbiter allowed
petitioners to present the documents at the next hearing, July 7, 1994. As the next hearing day was declared a
special non-working holiday, the case was reset to August 4, 1992. Inasmuch as the counsel for petitioners had
to attend to another urgent matter on August 4, 1992, he failed to appear at the hearing, although he filed a
motion for postponement. The Labor Arbiter denied the motion and issued an order considering the case as
submitted for resolution. On motion for reconsideration of petitioners, the Labor Arbiter reset the case for the
reception of additional evidence on October 30, 1992. Petitioners again failed to appear on said date, prompting
the Labor Arbiter to consider the case submitted for resolution.

Under the foregoing circumstances we cannot say that the Labor Arbiter abused his discretion in considering
the case submitted for resolution on October 30, 1992. There is no denial of due process where the party was
given an opportunity to present his case, which he did not take advantage of.

Samillano vs. NLRC

Facts:
Petitioner-spouses Conrado and Myrna Samillano were hired by private respondents on 1 October 1981 and 1
August 1983 respectively. On 2 October 1990, Conrado Samillano was transferred to the Technical Department
as an SSB Operator from his previous position as Traffic Supervisor of private respondent corporation. On
the same day, his wife Myrna V. Samillano was transferred to the AM Production Department from her position
as cashier of respondent corporation.

As a result of the transfers, the petitioner-spouses filed the complaint for illegal demotion contending that the
transfer resulted in loss of commissions and violated their security of tenure.

As a result of the transfers, the petitioner-spouses filed the complaint for illegal demotion contending that the
transfer resulted in loss of commissions and violated their security of tenure.

Petitioners contended that their demotion and subsequent dismissal were retaliatory acts of private respondents
for their having reported violations by private respondents of labor laws particularly
underpayment/nonpayment of salaries and other benefits.

The labor arbiter found that the alleged misappropriations of funds committed by petitioners were not
adequately substantiated. Hence, the dismissal of petitioners was declared illegal.

On the merits of the appeal, the NLRC ruled that private respondents have substantiated their claim of having
lost trust and confidence in petitioners due to serious irregularities in the performance of their duties.

Based on the above findings, the NLRC set aside the assailed decision and ruled that petitioners were validly
dismissed.

The NLRC agreed with the petitioners that there was no formal investigation wherein the latter were given the
chance to defend themselves against the charges levelled against them.

Issue:
WON the petitioner’s right to due process was violated.

Ruling: No.
The legality of petitioners' dismissal would be determined based on whether or not private respondents have
proved the basis for loss of trust and confidence upon which the dismissals are based.

The NLRC based its decision upholding petitioners' dismissal on the conclusion that the irregularities involving
petitioners were more than sufficient to make out a case of loss of trust and confidence.9

Said irregularities allegedly involving petitioners were enumerated in An Updated Report dated 17 August 1990
submitted by the Finance Department Business Head Janice Procianos and various letter-memos to petitioners
as well as the audit report dated 17 September 1990 submitted by Domeciano Adaya.

But petitioners correctly argue that the above-mentioned documents do not provide enough basis for
termination of their employment based on loss of trust and confidence.

It is, however, clear from the above-quoted portion of the audit report that the findings contained therein do
not categorically find herein petitioners guilty of committing irregularities. The clear import of the said audit
report is that further investigation and verification would be necessary to pinpoint the source of the
irregularities.

While the law and this Court recognize the right of an employer to dismiss an employee based on loss of trust
and confidence, the former's evidence must clearly and convincingly establish the facts upon which the loss of
trust and confidence in the employee is based.11

In the present case, the unsubstantiated suspicions and baseless conclusions of private respondents do not
provide legal justification for dismissing herein petitioners. The doubt in this case should be resolved in favor
of labor pursuant to the social justice policy of labor laws and the Constitution.
Finally, on petitioners' right to due process, we uphold the NLRC findings that no formal investigation was
conducted prior to dismissal of petitioners. Private respondents thus failed to adequately comply with the
requirement that an employee should be given the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself before he is
dismissed.

In the present case, the notices/memoranda to petitioners requiring explanations/answers to the charges
against them were plainly meant to provide a semblance of compliance with the due process requirement which
the NLRC correctly ruled to be inadequate.

Preliminary Investigation and Due Process

Tatad vs. The Sandiganbayan

Facts:
The petition alleges, among other things, that sometime in October 1974, Antonio de los Reyes, former Head
Executive Assistant of the then Department of Public Information (DPI) and Assistant Officer-in-Charge of
the Bureau of Broadcasts, filed a formal report with the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command (PSC),
charging petitioner, who was then Secretary and Head of the Department of Public Information, with alleged
violations of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Apparently,
no action was taken on said report.

On April 1, 1980, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint of Antonio de los Reyes to the Criminal Investigation
Service (CIS) for fact-finding investigation. On June 16, 1980, Roberto P. Dizon, CIS Investigator of the
Investigation and Legal Panel, PSC, submitted his Investigation Report, with the following conclusion, ". . .
evidence gathered indicates that former Min. TATAD have violated Sec. 3 (e) and Sec. 7 of RA 3019,
respectively.
On October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were with the Tanodbayan for final disposition.

On July 5, 1985, the Tanodbayan approved a resolution, dated April 1, 1985, prepared by Special Prosecutor
Marina Buzon, recommending that informations be filed against petitioner before the Sandiganbayan.
Accordingly, criminal informations were filed against Tatad.

On July 22, 1985, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a consolidated motion to quash the informations on
among other ground, that prosecution deprived accused-movant of due process of law and of the right to a
speedy disposition of the cases filed against him, amounting to loss of jurisdiction to file the informations.

On August 9, 1985, the Sandiganbayan rendered its challenged resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash.

On August 30, 1985, petitioners filed a consolidated motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
Sandiganbayan September 17, 1985. Hence, petitioner filed this petition on October 16, 1985 assailing the
denial of his motion to quash.

Issue: WON the prosecution's long delay in the filing of these cases with the Sandiganbayan had deprived
petitioner of his constitutional light to due process and the right to a speedy disposition of the cases against
him.

Ruling: Yes.

We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case
to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the
requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance
with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the
procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella
of the due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied
in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative
of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or
justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of
the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may be
due to a painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high ranking government official." In the first place,
such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three
out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets
and liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual
issues necessitating such "painstaking and gruelling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in
terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving
of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not
warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.

It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not be deemed
fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the
information. True-but the absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such
investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for until
now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back time.

After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are constrained to hold that the inordinate
delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the information in the instant case is violative of
the constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases
against him. Accordingly, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503
should be dismissed. In view of the foregoing, we find it unnecessary to rule on the other issues raised by
petitioner.

Equal Protection Clause

People vs. Cayat

Prosecuted for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3), the accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet,
Mountain Province, was sentenced by the justice of the peace court of Baguio to pay a fine of five pesos (P5)
or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On appeal in the Court of First Instance, it was allegeed
that:

Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and illegally receive,
acquire, and have in his possession and under his control or custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating
liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been
accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639.

The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of fifty pesos (P50) or
supper subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Hence, this appeal.

The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds:

(1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;

(2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution: and.

(3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of the state.

Issue:
WON the law violates the equal protection clause.

Ruling: No.

It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not
equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the
classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes
of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the
same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely imaginary
or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel to the appellant
asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious
belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low
grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." (Rubi vs. Provincial
Board of Mindoro, supra.) This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the
peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of certain members thereof who
at present have reached a position of cultural equality with their Christian brothers, cannot affect the
reasonableness of the classification thus established.

That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his
possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-
called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make
prior to the passage of this Act.," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-
Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that
the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and
crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.

The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to
apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. The Act was not predicated, as counsel for appellant asserts,
upon the assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing influence." On the contrary,
the Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must
go measures of protection and security.

Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may
be unfair in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an
argument against the equality of its application.

Appellants contends that that provision of the law empowering any police officer or other duly authorized
agent of the government to seize and forthwith destroy any prohibited liquors found unlawfully in the
possession of any member of the non-Christian tribes is violative of the due process of law provided in the
Constitution. But this provision is not involved in the case at bar. Besides, to constitute due process of law,
notice and hearing are not always necessary. This rule is especially true where much must be left to the discretion
of the administrative officials in applying a law to particular cases. (McGehee, Due Process of Law p. 371, cited
with approval in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) Due process of law means simply: (1) that there
shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the government;
(2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation; (3) that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and (4) that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of the class.

Philippine Association of Service Exporters vs. Drilon

Facts:

The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally
in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," 1 challenges the
Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and
Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF
DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for
certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" 2
that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" 3
and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power,
police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.

Issue:
WON D.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

Ruling: No.

It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure. The only question is
whether or not it is valid under the Constitution.

The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority
to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare."
5 As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the
common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to
underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.

It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights.

Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its awesome
consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the
purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further
private interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power. 12

In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed.

The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no
question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," 14 but it does not thereby
make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the
Constitution 15 does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of
classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members
of the same class. 16

The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers — rests on substantial
distinctions.

As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor
force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases,
physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape
and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent
Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect
victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts.

The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no evidence that, except
perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an Identical predicament. The petitioner
has proffered no argument that the Government should act similarly with respect to male workers. The Court,
of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men are superior to women. What the Court is
saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in
massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It
is evidence capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence this Court accepts. The Court
cannot, however, say the same thing as far as men are concerned. There is simply no evidence to justify such
an inference. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is content that
distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified.

There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure.
Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino
female overseas workers" 17 this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina
workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare.

The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply indefinitely so long as
those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review of the administrative and legal
measures, in the Philippines and in the host countries . . ."18), meaning to say that should the authorities arrive
at a means impressed with a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap measure, it is
possessed of a necessary malleability, depending on the circumstances of each case.
The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas workers. That
it does not apply to "all Filipina workers" 20 is not an argument for unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given
universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them
are similarly circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of
persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage
to another person or group of persons. To apply the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed by A, but not to
those recruited by B, would obviously clash with the equal protection clause of the Charter. It would be a classic
case of what Chase refers to as a law that "takes property from A and gives it to B." 21 It would be an unlawful
invasion of property rights and freedom of contract and needless to state, an invalid act. 22 (Fernando says:
"Where the classification is based on such distinctions that make a real difference as infancy, sex, and stage of
civilization of minority groups, the better rule, it would seem, is to recognize its validity only if the young, the
women, and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment. There would be an element of
unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that calls for the law ministering to their needs is made the basis
of discriminatory legislation against them. If such be the case, it would be difficult to refute the assertion of
denial of equal protection." 23 In the case at bar, the assailed Order clearly accords protection to certain women
workers, and not the contrary.)