Civil Law – Civil Personality – When does civil personality start – When does life begin

In January 2006, the wife of Rolando Hortillano had a miscarriage which caused the death of their unborn child.
Hortillano, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, then filed death benefits claim from his employer, the
Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation which denied the claim. Eventually, the issue was submitted for arbitration
and both parties agreed to have Atty. Allan Montaño act as the arbitrator. Montaño ruled that Hortillano is entitled to his
claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of Montaño.

On appeal, Continental Steel insisted that Hortillano is not entitled because under the CBA, death benefits are awarded if
an employee’s legitimate dependent has died; but that in this case, no “death” has occurred because the fetus died inside
the womb of the mother, that a fetus has no juridical personality because it was never born pursuant to Article 40 of the
Civil Code which provides a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born; that the fetus was not born hence
it is not a legitimate dependent as contemplated by the CBA nor did it suffer death as contemplated under civil laws.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the fetus is a legitimate dependent?
2. Whether or not a person has to be born before it could die?

HELD:

1. Yes. In the first place, the fact of marriage between Hortillano and his wife was never put in question, hence they are
presumed to be married. Second, children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Hence,
the unborn child (fetus) is already a legitimate dependent the moment it was conceived (meeting of the sperm and egg
cell).

2. No. Death is defined as “cessation of life”. Certainly, a child in the womb has life. There is no need to discuss whether or
not the unborn child acquired juridical personality – that is not the issue here. But nevertheless, life should not be
equated to civil personality. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished
by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die. In this case,
Hortillano’s fetus had had life inside the womb as evidenced by the fact that it clung to life for 38 weeks before the
unfortunate miscarriage. Thus, death occurred on a dependent hence Hortillano as an employee is entitled to death
benefit claims as provided for in their CBA.

Quimiguing vs Icao

FACTS:

Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan City and had close and
confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff
several times under force and intimidation and without her consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs
supplied by defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month,
damages and attorney’s fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground
lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a
baby girl but the court ruled that “no amendment was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of action”.

ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.

HELD:

Supreme Court held that “a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own
for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines”. The conceive
child may also receive donations and be accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they were already
born as prescribed in Article 742.

Lower court’s theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate
children does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates article 40 aforementioned.

Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lust
and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmen’s rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation for the damage
caused.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.

QUIMIGUING VS ICAO

Facts: Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her parents, Antonio and Jacoba Cabilin, sought an appeal from the orders of
Zamboanga CFI, which dismissed her complaint for support and damages and request for amendment of complaint.

Quimiguing averred that the then already married Felix Icao succeeded in having sexual relations with her through force
and intimidation. As a result, she became pregnant despite efforts and drugs supplied by Icao and had to stop studying.
She then claimed for monthly support, damages and attorney’s fees.

The defendant-appellee, however, moved to dismiss in light of Quimiguing’s failure to allege the fact that a child had been
born in her complaint. The lower court dismissed the case and subsequently denied further amendment to the
complaint, ruling that no amendment was allowed for failure of the original complaint to state a cause of action.

Issue:

W/N the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and damages from defendant despite failure to allege fact of birth in
complaint

Ruling:

Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support of the child she was carrying and an independent cause
of action for damages.

This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40) recognizes the provisional personality of the unborn child, which includes its
right to support from its progenitors, even it is only “en ventre de sa mere.” Article 742 of the same Code holds that, just
as a conceived child, it may receive donations through persons that legally represent it. Readings of Articles 40, 854 of
the Civil Code and Article 29 of the Spanish Code also further strengthen the case for reversal of order.

Additionally, “for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust xxx constitutes a clear violation of the
rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for damage caused” per Article 21 of the Civil Code, a
provision supported by Article 2219, which provides moral damages for victims of seduction, abduction, rape or other
lascivious acts.

Judgment reversed, set aside and remanded for proceedings conformable to the decision; with costs against Icao.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION vs. FIRMEG.R. No. L-52179 April 8, 1991

Facts: A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand
truck owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by
Alfredo Bislig. Dueto the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died asa result of the
injuries they sustained and four (4) others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries. On December 11, 1966, the
private respondents instituted a complaint for damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot,
owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney. However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party
Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner. Petitioner filed its answer and raised
affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of action and the
negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the collision. Respondent Judge
Romeo N. Firme ordered defendants Municipality of San Fernando,La Union and Alfredo Bislig to pay, jointly and
severally, the plaintiffs for funeral expenses. Private respondents stress that petitioner has not considered that every
court, including respondent court, has the inherent power to amend and control its processand orders so as to make
them conformable to law and justice.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion whenit deferred and failed to resolve
the defense of non-suability of the State amounting tolack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.

Ruling: Non-suability of the state. The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI
,Section 3 of the Constitution, to wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent." Consent takes the form of express
or implied consent. Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they
are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they
are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be
sued."Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts.
The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held
liable if itdoes not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be
sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that
the defendant is liable." Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its
employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the
municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions. Dual capacity of LGU. Municipal corporations exist in
a dual capacity, and their functions are twofold. In one they exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and while in
the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental. Their officers and agents in
such capacity, though elected or appointed by them, are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service,
and as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity the municipalities exercise a private,
proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and
agents in the performance of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity,
and not for the state or sovereign power." It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because
their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts
committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that
they were acting in aproprietary capacity. In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that
"he wason his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal
streets." In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed
pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the driver of the dump truck was
performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office. We already stressed in the case of

Palafox, et al vs Province of IlocosNorte ,the District Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer (102 Phil 1186) that "the
construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly
governmental activities." After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, We arrive at the conclusion that
the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the
discharge of governmental functions.

San Fernando v. Firme G.R. N. L-579 [April 8, 1991]

FACTS: On December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Balagot and owned by the
Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a
dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Several passengers of the
jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and 4 others suffered varying
degrees of physical injuries.

The heirs of Baniña Sr. filed a complaint for damages against the Estate of Nieveras and Balagot. However, the aforesaid
defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner. The case was
transferred to branch presided by Judge Firme. The heirs of Baniña Sr. amended the complaint wherein the petitioner
and its regular employee Bislig were impleaded as defendants. Judge Firme in its decision rendered the Municipality of
San Fernando and Bislig jointly and severally liable to pa funeral expenses, lot expected earnings, moral damages and
attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner was liable.

RULING:

The petitioner cannot be held liable by virtue of the non-suability of the State.

The general rule Is that the State may not be sued except when it gives consent to be sued (Article XVI, Sec. 3 of the
Constitution.) Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing consent of the State to be
sued in case of money claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. Consent is implied when
the government enters into business contracts and also when the State files a complaint. Municipal corporations are
agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign
immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their
charter provided that they can sue and be sued. However, the circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily
mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not
conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity,
it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.”

Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless,
they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held
answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity Here, the driver of the dump truck of
the municipality insists that “he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of
San Fernando’s municipal streets.” In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of
official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Hence, the SC held that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office. Municipality
cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of
governmental functions.

FELICIANO CATALAN, petitioners, vs. JESUS BASA, respondents

G. R. No. 159567. July 31, 2007.
Facts:
On October 20, 1948, Feliciano Catalan was discharged from active military service. The Board of Medical Officers of the
Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to render military service due to his mental disorder
(schizophrenia). On September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo. On June 16, 1951, Feliciano allegedly
donated to his sister Mercedes one-half of the real property through the execution of a document, titled, “Absolute deed
of Donation”. On December 11,

1953, People’s Bank and Trust Company filed Special Proceedings to declare Feliciano incompetent. On December 22,
1953, the trial court issued its Order of Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing Guardian for the Estate and Fixing
Allowance of Feliciano. Thus, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), which is formerly the People’s Bank and Trust
Company, was appointed to be his guardian by the trial court. On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property donated
by Feliciano to her in issue in her children Delia and Jesus Basa. On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano’s guardian filed
a case for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, as well as damages against herein
respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation of Mercedes was void ab initio, as Feliciano never donated
the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred that even if Feliciano had truly intended to give the property to her,
the donation would still be void, as he was not of sound mind and was therefore incapable of giving valid consent. On
August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. Both the lower court and Court of Appeals dismissed the case because of
insufficient evidence presented by the complainants to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was sane and
competent at the time he executed the deed of donation in favor of Mercedes Catalan.

Issue:
Whether or not Feliciano has the capacity to execute the donation

Whether or not the property donated to Mercedes and later on sold to her children is legally in possession of the latter

Are laches and prescription should be considered in the case?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals and denied the petition. A
donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it.
Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in contracts presupposes the following
requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and
(3) it should be spontaneous. The parties’ intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent, like any
contract, renders the donation voidable. A person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence
to intelligently dispose his property. By merely alleging the existing of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show
substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental
facilities. Thus, the lower court correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and this condition continued
to exist until proof to the contrary was adduced. Since the donation was valid. Mercedes has the right to sell the property
to whomever she chose. Not a shred of evidence has been presented to prove the claim that Mercedes’ sale of property to
her children was tainted with fraud or falsehood. Thus, the property in question belongs to Delia and Jesus Basa. The
Supreme Court notes the issue of prescription and laches for the first time on appeal before the court. It is sufficient for
the Supreme Court to note that even if it prospered, the deed of donation was still a voidable, not a void, contract. As
such, it remained binding as it was not annulled in a proper action in court within four years.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos V COMELEC

Imelda filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, stating that
she is 7-months resident in the said district. Montejo, incumbent Representative and a candidate for the same position,
filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification, alleging that Imelda did not meet the constitutional one-year
residency requirement. Imelda thus amended her COC, changing “seven” months to “since childhood.” The provincial
election supervisor refused to admit the amended COC for the reason that it was filed out of time. Imelda, thus, filed her
amended COC with Comelec's head office in Manila.

On April 24, 1995, the Comelec Second Division declared Imelda not qualified to run and struck off the amended as well
as original COCs. The Comelec in division found that when Imelda chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled
with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place,
she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of
domicile. The Comelec en banc affirmed this ruling.

During the pendency of the disqualification case, Imelda won in the election. But the Comelec suspended her
proclamation. Imelda thus appealed to the Supreme Court.

Imelda invoked Section 78 of B.P. 881 which provides that a petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate
of candidacy must be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than 15 days before the election. Since the Comelec
rendered the resolution on on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election, Comelec already lose jurisdiction
over her case. She contended that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the Comelec which has
jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of Representatives.

Issues:

Was Imelda a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May
9, 1995 elections.

Does the Comelec lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case after the elections?

Does the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of Imelda's
qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections?

Held:

1. Imelda was a resident of the First District of Leyte for election purposes, and therefore possessed the necessary
residence qualifications to run in Leyte as a candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives for the following
reasons:

a. Minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows
that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of
law. This domicile was established when her father brought his family back to Leyte.

b. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue.
Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be
rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal
residences at the same time. Petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None
of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.

c. It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage
to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile. What
petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin. The term residence may
mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that
insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife — the term residence
should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil
law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin
and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.

d. Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired
a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate
that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her
domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought
the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte ... to make them livable
for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in
1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman.

2. With the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the Comelec
does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the
elections.

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Moreover, it is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally
construed to be merely directory, "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that
if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it.

3. HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of
Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Imelda, not being a
member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
(Romualdez-Marcos vs Comelec, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995)

Cordora vs ComelecCarpio, J:

FACTS: Cordora filed a complaint affidavit before Comelec law department against Tambunting asserting that Gustavo
Tambunting made false assertion in his certificate of candidacy by claiming that Natural Born Filipino and resident
before the election in 2001and 2004. Cordora alleged that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office
because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements. Cordora presented a certification from
the Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in two instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an American: upon arrival
in the Philippines on 16 December 2000 andupon departure from the Philippines on 17 June 2001. According to Cordora,
these travel dates confirmed that Tambunting acquired American citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii
on 2 December 2000.Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make any misrepresentation in his
certificates of candidacy. To refute Cordora’s claim that

Tambunting is not a natural-born Filipino, Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed that he
was born ofa Filipino mother and an American father. Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as an
American citizen. The certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government after Tambunting’s father petitioned him
through INS Form I-130(Petition for Relative) merely confirmed Tambunting’s citizenship which he acquired at birth.
Tambunting’s possession of an American passport did not mean that Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen. Tambunting
also took an oath of allegiance on 18November 2003 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the
Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.The Comelec law department recommended the dismissal of
complaint because it failed to substantiate the charges. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and the resolution
of the COMELEC Law Department. The COMELEC En Banc was convinced that Cordora failed to support his accusation
against Tambunting by sufficient and convincing evidence. Commissioner Sarmiento wrote a separate opinion which
concurred with the findings of the En Banc Resolution. Commissioner Sarmiento pointed out that Tambunting could be
considered a dual citizen. Moreover, Tambunting effectively renounced his American citizenship when he filed his
certificates of candidacy in 2001 and 2004 and ran for public office. Petitioner filed a MRbut was denied, hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tambunting is natural born Filipino.

HELD: Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American father. Neither does he deny that
he under went the process involved in INS Form I-

130 (Petition for Relative) because of his father’s citizenship. Tambunting claims that because of his parents’ differing
citizenships, he is both Filipino and American by birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists thatTambunting is a
naturalized American citizen.

We agree with Commissioner Sarmiento’s observation that Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because of
thecircumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to
acquire American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the American citizenship
which Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from the Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented
contained two trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the same certification showed nine
other trips where Tambunting claimed that he isFilipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the
filing of his certificate of candidacy before the 2001elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not
disqualify him from running for public office.

Dual citizenship is involuntary and arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or
morestates, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Thus, like any other natural-born
Filipino, it isenough for a person with dual citizenship who seeks public office to file his certificate of candidacy and
swear to the oath ofallegiance contained therein.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by the individual’s active participation in the naturalization process.
states that, under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another countryis allowed to retain his
Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an oath of
allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizen’s foreign citizenship.