Canon 22

Mercado vs. Ubay

G.R. No. L-35830 July 24, 1990

Facts:
A civil case was filed by the petitioners against the Samonte siblings in the CFI of Cavite.
The defendants filed their answer and amended answer through Atty, Pine. On July 31,
1970, the court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, and since no appeal was made,
it became final and executory and a writ of execution was issued by the court. But before
the said writ be executed, Pine filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and mandamus but
was dismissed for lack of merit. On May 27, 1972, Lucina and Trinidad Samonte, 2 of the
defendants in the civil case, filed with the CFI of Rizal seeking for the annulment of the
writ of execution alleging that they didn’t authorized anyone, including Atty. Pine to file an
answer and the petition for certiorari in their behalf. Petitioners’ filed a motion to dismiss
said case, thus the petition in the SC.

Issue:
Whether or not a lawyer need a written power of attorney in order to appear in the court in
behalf of his client.

Held:
No. An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he
appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for
his client (Sec. 21, Rule 138, Rules of Court). The fact that private respondents had not
personally appeared in the hearings of Case TM-223 in the trial court is immaterial. The
filing of the answer by and appearance of Atty. Danilo Pine in their behalf are sufficient to
give private respondents standing in court. It is hard to believe that a counsel who has no
personal interest in the case would fight for and defend a case with persistence and vigor if
he had not been authorized or employed by the party concerned. It is obvious that since the
appellate court had decided adversely against private respondents in their petition for
certiorari, the latter filed the annulment suit for a second chance at preventing petitioners
from enforcing the decision rendered by the Cavite court in favor of the latter.

Canon 21
Uy Chico vs. The Union Life Assurance Society, Limited
G.R. No. L-9231 January 6, 1915

Facts:
In 1897, petitioner’s father died. He continued the business still in the name of his father
after buying the share of his brother in the said business. Petitioner filed a case seeking the
recovery of the proceeds of 2 insurance policies on stock of dry goods that was destroyed
in a fire. These policies were surrendered by the petitioner’s lawyer to the administrator of
his father’s estate, who had compromised with the defendant for ½ of the face value of the
insurance that was paid to the court. He alleged that said policies belong to him and that he
was not bound by the compromised agreement made by the administrator. The company
introduced evidence showing that the petitioner had agreed to the settlement of the policies
when his lawyer surrendered the same to the estate’s administrator. Petitioner, on the
witness stand had been asked if he had any objection as to his lawyer testifying concerning
the surrender of the policies to which he negatively replied. Whereupon, the lawyer of the
petitioner formally withdraw the waiver given by the petitioner and objected to the
testimony on the ground of privileged communication.

Issue:
Whether or not instruction of the client to be delivered to a third person is considered
privilege

Held:
No. A similar provision is inserted in section 383, No. 4, of the same Act. It will be noted
that the evidence in question concerned the dealings of the plaintiff's attorney with a third
person. Of the very essence of the veil of secrecy which surrounds communications made
between attorney and client, is that such communications are not intended for the
information of third persons or to be acted upon by them, put of the purpose of advising the
client as to his rights. It is evident that a communication made by a client to his attorney for
the express purpose of its being communicated to a third person is essentially inconsistent
with the confidential relation. When the attorney has faithfully carried out his instructions
be delivering the communication to the third person for whom it was intended and the latter
acts upon it, it cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal sense as a
privileged communication between the attorney and his client. It is plain that such a
communication, after reaching the party for whom it was intended at least, is a
communication between the client and a third person, and that the attorney simply occupies
the role of intermediary or agent.

Canon 20
Perez vs SCOTTISH UNION AND NATIONAL INSURANCE CO
C.A. No. 8977 March 22, 1946

Facts:
Petitioner was seeking the payment of attorney’s fees in the criminal case of arson and
other cases against defendant, who had in a written contract, agreed to pay the same out of
the proceeds of a fire insurance policy issued by defendant insurance company. Defendant
Mitre acknowledged the professional services rendered by Perez but alleged that the
agreement as to the payment of attorney’s fees out of the insurance proceeds was only a
simulation to bar other claims against the said policy. The CFI of Albay rendered a
judgment in favor Perez, from which Mitre now appeals.

Issue:
Whether or not a written contract for services shall be controlling.

Held:
Yes. Exhibit D should be given its full force and effect. "A written contract for services
shall control the amount to be paid thereof unless found by the court to be unconscionable
or unreasonable." (Rule of Court 127, section 22.) The arson case required several days of
trial. The gravity of the situation confronted by the appellant after the rendition of the
judgment of the court of first instance is shown by the fact that he was sentenced to
undergo imprisonment for the period of from ten to twelve years and to pay an indemnity
of P101,115. That the plaintiff had handled appellant's defense with competence and
success cannot be gainsaid, it being enough to state that the appellant was acquitted in the
Court of Appeals before which the plaintiff orally argued, in addition to a 78-page brief
which had filed therein. We are thus not prepared to rule that the amount of P6,000 is
excessive or unjust, especially because said fee is in a sense contingent upon the acquittal
of the appellant, since no insurance money (P6,000 of which was ceded to the plaintiff
under Exhibit D) was of course forthcoming if the fire which destroyed the insured
property could be proven to have resulted from incendiarism for which the appellant was
criminally liable.
rtualawlibrary virtual law library

Canon 19
Galofa VS Nee Bon Sing
G.R. No. L-22018 January 17, 1968

Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent in the CFI of Sorsogon for the recovery
of possession and to quiet title over a parcel of land in the said province. He alleged prior
ownership and possession of his father and that the same was adjudicated to him in an oral
partition among his co-heirs. Respondent on the other hand alleged that he has title to the
property by virtue of a deed of conveyance issued in his favor by Fe Nicolas. Trial court
rendered judgment in favor of petitioner based on the pleadings declaring petitioner as
owner of the property.

(pre mar, hnd ko makuha kung alin ang dapat n issue… sorry)
Canon 18
Alcala vs De vera
A.C. No. 620 March 21, 1974

Facts:
An action for annulment of sale of 2 parcels of land was filed against petitioner in the CFI
of Albay. Petitioner engaged the services of respondent lawyer who represented them in the
civil case. On April 17, 1963, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the buyer
rescinding the said sale. The lawyer received the copy of the decision but did not inform
the petitioners of it. On July 17, a sheriff went to their house serving the writ of execution
against them. Caught by surprise, they wrote inquiring about the status of their case, which
the Clerk of Court replied that it was already been decided and since no appeal was taken, a
writ of execution was issued upon the motion. On September 12, they instituted a case for
damages against de Vera for having failed to inform them of the trial courts decision thus,
they lost their right to appeal. The trial court found that the respondent did not inform his
client but denied damages. Thus, petitioner instituted this case for disbarment.

Issue: whether or not a lawyer is bound to exercise extraordinary diligence.

Held: No.An attorney is not bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a
reasonable degree of care and skill, having reference to the character of the business he
undertakes to do. Fallible like any other human being, he is answerable to every error or
mistake, and will be protected as long as he acts honestly and in good faith to the best of
his skill and knowledge. Moreover, a party seeking damages resulting from a judgment
adverse to him which became final by reason of the alleged fault or negligence of his
lawyer must prove his loss due to the injustice of the decision. He cannot base his action on
the unsubstantiated and arbitrary supposition of the injustice of the decision. (Tuzon vs.
Donato, 58 O.G. 6480)."