All property acquired during marriage is presumed conjugal

Since Jose Sr. and Ligaya were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, their property
relations were governed by the conjugal partnership of gains as provided under Article 119 of the
Civil Code. Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it can be proven that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife."

G.R. No. 182839 June 2, 2014

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE GARCIA and CHILDREN NORA GARCIA, JOSE GARCIA, JR., BOBBY GARCIA and
JIMMY GARCIA and HEIRS OF ROGELIO GARCIA NAMELY: CELEDONIO GARCIA, DANILO
GARCIA, ELSA GARCIA, FERMIN GARCIA, HEHERSON GARCIA, GREGORIO GARCIA,
IMELDA GARCIA and JANE GARCIA,

Xxx

Registration of a property alone in the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature.
What is material is the time when the property was acquired.9 The registration of the property is not
conclusive evidence of the exclusive ownership of the husband or the wife. Although the property
appears to be registered in the name of the husband, it has the inherent character of conjugal
property if it was acquired for valuable consideration during marriage.10

G.R. No. 182839 June 2, 2014

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE GARCIA and CHILDREN NORA GARCIA, JOSE GARCIA, JR., BOBBY GARCIA and
JIMMY GARCIA and HEIRS OF ROGELIO GARCIA NAMELY: CELEDONIO GARCIA, DANILO
GARCIA, ELSA GARCIA, FERMIN GARCIA, HEHERSON GARCIA, GREGORIO GARCIA,
IMELDA GARCIA and JANE GARCIA,

Citing: Tarrosa v. De Leon, G.R. No. 185063, July 23, 2009, 593 SCRA 768, 779.
9

10
Bucoy v. Paulino, 131 Phil. 790, 800 (1968).

9
Tarrosa v. De Leon, G.R. No. 185063, July 23, 2009, 593 SCRA 768, 779.

10
Bucoy v. Paulino, 131 Phil. 790, 800 (1968).

***************************

While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond and
dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such declaration
continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the
partnership. This conclusion holds true whether we apply Art. 129 of the Family Code on liquidation
of the conjugal partnership’s assets and liabilities which is generally prospective in application, or
Section 7, Chapter 4, Title IV, Book I (Arts. 179 to 185) of the Civil Code on the subject, Conjugal
Partnership of Gains. For, the relevant provisions of both Codes first require the liquidation of the
conjugal properties before a regime of separation of property reigns.

In Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we ruled that pending its liquidation following its dissolution,
the conjugal partnership of gains is converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership among the
surviving spouse and the other heirs of the deceased.17

In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property relationship
between the former spouses, where:

Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of
 the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership. (Emphasis supplied.)

G.R. No. 163744 February 29, 2008

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., petitioner,

vs.
NICHOLSON PASCUAL a.k.a. NELSON PASCUAL, r

88888888888888

n deciding the case in favor of the plaintiff, the justice of the peace court made the following
observations:

The plaintiff having acquired in good faith the possession of the property in question and
recorded it in the registry, the court believes that under these circumstances, the sworn
declaration made by the defendant Monico Aglahi in Exhibit 1 favorable to his wife, his
codefendant, to the effect that the latter is the exclusive owner of the property in question,
cannot prevail over the document Exhibit B which proves that said property is conjugal
property of the defendants, said property being conjugal, the defendant Monico Aglahi was
within his right when he executed the Exhibit A in favor of the plaintiff. (Art. 1413, Civil Code.)
The property in question being conjugal, the Exhibit 2 is null and void for it is in contravention
of the provisions of article 1432 of the Civil Code.

In view of the foregoing, the court hereby renders decision ordering the defendants to vacate
the house mentioned in the complaint and in the Exhibit C and turn it over to the plaintiff, and
to pay the latter (plaintiff) such amount as may be due from January 22, 1935, up to the time
they leave the house at the rate of P10 per month, and to pay the costs.

************

It was, indeed, with the foregoing precepts in mind that in our judgment herein, we said: "At stake
here is the husband's power of administration and the wife's right to be protected from abuse
thereof... Absent that proof, the wife's right does not exist." And we there concluded that: "Petitioner
may not be forced to surrender his statutory right to administer the conjugal properties by the simple
expedient of merely charging him with the naked averment that he has forfeited that right." In short,
evidence of abuse of administration is a condition precedent to deprivation of the husband's right of
administration. Respondent judge's dissolution of the injunction in question produced exactly the
effect of what this Court rule out in the aforesaid decision: It allowed administration by the wife upon
mere filing of a bond pending presentation of evidence on maladministration by the husband. Bond
is no substitute for proof of maladministration.

Since the property was paraphernal, and the creditors and purchasers were aware of it, the fact
being clearly spread on the land records, it is plain that Plata's possession, therefore, was not
derived from Gaudencio Begosa. The illegal detainer judgment against the husband alone cannot
bind nor affect the wife's possession of her paraphernal, which by law she holds and administers
independently, and which she may even encumber or alienate without his knowledge or consent
(Civ. Code, Arts. 136. 137, 140). Hence, as she was not made party defendant in the eviction suit,
the petitioner-wife could validly ignore the judgment of eviction against her husband, and it was no
contempt of court for her to do so, because the writ of execution was not lawful against her (Chanco
vs. Madrilejos, 9 Phil. 356; A. Jose Realty vs. Galao, et al., 76 Phil. 201; Segarro vs. Maronilla, L-
14428, July 26, 1960; Weigall vs. Shuster, 11 Phil. 340).

We need not decide here whether the property was validly conveyed to respondents Villanueva,
since that issue is the subject of an independent proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City, Civil. Case No. Q6510 (Petition, Annex F).

********
Ultimately, respondents do not have a cause of action to eject petitioner based on tolerance because
the latter is also entitled to possess and enjoy the subject property. Corollarily, neither of the parties can
assert exclusive ownership and possession of the same prior to any partition. If at all, the action for
unlawful detainer only resulted in the recognition of co-ownership between the parties over the
residential house.
FORTUNATO ANZURES
SPOUSES ERLINDA VENTANILLA and ARTURO VENTANILLA

G.R. No. 222297, July 9, 2018

Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real property. This action
may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land
or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by
virtue of any contract, express or implied.

G.R. No. 169380 November 26, 2012

FIORELLO R. JOSE, Petitioner,

vs.
ROBERTO ALFUERTO, ERNESTO BACAY, ILUMINADO BACAY, MANUEL BANTACULO,
LETTY BARCELO, JING BERMEJO, MILNA BERMEJO, PABLO BERMEJO, JHONNY BORJA,
BERNADETTE BUENAFE, ALFREDO CALAGOS, ROSAURO CALAGOS, ALEX CHACON, AIDA
CONSULTA, CARMEN CORPUZ, RODOLFO DE VERA, ANA DELA ROSA, RUDY DING, JOSE
ESCASINAS, GORGONIO ESPADERO, DEMETRIO ESTRERA, ROGELIO ESTRERA,
EDUARDO EVARDONE, ANTONIO GABALEÑO, ARSENIA GARING, NARCING GUARDA, NILA
LEBATO, ANDRADE LIGAYA, HELEN LOPEZ, RAMON MACAIRAN, DOMINGO NOLASCO, JR.,
FLORANTE NOLASCO, REGINA OPERARIO, CARDING ORCULLO, FELICISIMO PACATE,
CONRADO P AMINDALAN, JUN PARIL, RENE SANTOS, DOMINADOR SELVELYEJO, VILLAR,
JOHN DOE, JANE DOE and Unknown Occupants of Olivares Compound, Phase II, Barangay
San Dionisio, Parañaque City, Respondents.

the complainant must either be a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld. In other words, the complainant in an
unlawful detainer case must have some right of possession over the property.

Where the plaintiff does not prove her alleged tolerance of the defendant's occupation, the
possession is deemed illegal from the beginning. Hence, the action for unlawful detainer is an
improper remedy. But the action cannot be considered as one for forcible entry without any
allegation in the complaint that the entry of the defendant was by means of force, intimidation,
threats, strategy or stealth.
8888888888888

To be sure, the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint.20 Thus, in
ascertaining whether or not an action is one for unlawful detainer falling within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the inferior courts, the averments of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought should be examined. G.R. No. 148126 November 10, 2003

GEORGE T. VILLENA, CARLOS N. VILLENA, AURORA M. BONDOC and RONNIE C.

FERNANDEZ, and their Respective Spouses, Petitioners,
vs.
Spouses ANTONIO C. CHAVEZ and NOEMI MARCOS-CHAVEZ and CARLITA C.
CHAVEZ, Respondents.

DECISION

Citiing:
20
Spouses Tirona v. Hon. Alejo, 419 Phil. 285, October 10, 2001; Oronce v. CA, 358 Phil. 616,
October 19, 1998;