60. CITY OF BAGUIO vs. FORTUNATO DE LEON, GR No. L-24756, Oct.

31, 1968

Q: Is there a double taxation when the local government imposes license

fees on any person, firm, entity or corporation doing business in the
locality apart from the taxes they paid to the national government for
the operation of their business?

A: argument against double taxation may not be invoked where one tax is
imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city ..., it being
widely recognized that there is nothing inherently obnoxious in the
requirement that license fees or taxes be exacted with respect to the
same occupation, calling or activity by both the state and the political
subdivisions thereof

61. RAMON D. BAGATSING, ET AL. vs. PEDRO A. RAMIREZ, ET AL., G.R. No. L-
41631 December 17, 1976

Q: What law shall govern the publication of a tax ordinance enacted by

the Municipal Board of Manila, which requires publication of the
ordinance before its enactment and after its approval, or the Local Tax
Code, which only demands publication after approval?

A: Section 17 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila speaks of

"ordinance" in general, i.e., irrespective of the nature and scope
thereof, whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to
"ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in
particular. In regard, therefore, to ordinances in general, the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila is doubtless dominant, but, that dominant
force loses its continuity when it approaches the realm of "ordinances
levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. There,
the Local Tax Code controls. Here, as always, a general provision must
give way to a particular provision. Special provision governs. This is
especially true where the law containing the particular provision was
enacted later than the one containing the general provision. The City
Charter of Manila was promulgated on June 18, 1949 as against the
Local Tax Code which was decreed on June 1, 1973. The law-making
power cannot be said to have intended the establishment of conflicting
and hostile systems upon the same subject, or to leave in force
provisions of a prior law by which the new will of the legislating power
may be thwarted and overthrown. Such a result would render
legislation a useless and Idle ceremony, and subject the law to the
reproach of uncertainty and unintelligibility.

62. G.R. No. L-10405, December 29, 1960, WENCESLAO PASCUAL vs. SECRETARY
OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, ET AL.

Q: Is the law appropriating public funds for the projected feeder road is
for public use when the property to be constructed belongs to a private
individual?

A : If the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed

belonged to a private person, then result is that said appropriation sought a
private purpose, and hence, was null and void. The donation to the Government,
for the purpose of giving a "semblance of legality", or legalizing, the
appropriation, did not cure its basic defect. Consequently, a judicial nullification
of said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of said
appropriation.
63.G.R. No. L-49336 August 31, 1981
PROVINCE OF ABRA vs. HAROLD M. HERNANDO

Q: What is the difference of the present constitution with that of the 1935
Constitution with regards to the tax exemption of "lands, buildings, and
improvements? What are their legal consequences?

A: There is a marked difference. Under the 1935 Constitution: "Cemeteries,

churches, and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation." 10 The present Constitution
added "charitable institutions, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries" and required
that for the exemption of ":lands, buildings, and improvements," they should not
only be "exclusively" but also "actually and "directly" used for religious or
charitable purposes. There must be proof therefore of the actual and direct use
of the lands, buildings, and improvements for religious or charitable purposes to
be exempt from taxation.

64. G.R. No. L-19727 May 20, 1965

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. PHOENIX ASSURANCE CO., LTD.

Q: Should the running of the prescriptive period for assessment commence from the
filing of the original or amended return?

A: To our mind, the Commissioner's view should be sustained. The changes and
alterations embodied in the amended income tax return consisted of the exclusion
of reinsurance premiums received from domestic insurance companies by Phoenix
Assurance Co., Ltd.'s London head office, reinsurance premiums ceded to foreign
reinsurers not doing business in the Philippines and various items of deduction
attributable to such excluded reinsurance premiums thereby substantially
modifying the original return. Furthermore, although the deduction for head office
expenses allocable to Philippine business, whose disallowance gave rise to the
deficiency tax, was claimed also in the original return, the Commissioner could not
have possibly determined a deficiency tax thereunder because Phoenix Assurance
Co., Ltd. declared a loss of P199,583.93 therein which would have more than offset
such disallowance of P15,826.35. Considering that the deficiency assessment was
based on the amended return which, as aforestated, is substantially different from
the original return, the period of limitation of the right to issue the same should be
counted from the filing of the amended income tax return. From August 30, 1955,
when the amended return was filed, to July 24, 1958, when the deficiency
assessment was issued, less than five years elapsed. The right of the Commissioner
to assess the deficiency tax on such amended return has not prescribed.