Job Hutt alleged that Ana Quinn committed perjury when she lied under oath in the

affidavit she submitted to the earlier ejectment case when she said that she was the owner of the
leased building. The statement is a material fact in the ejectment case. A civil case could only
prosper when there is a cause of action. Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure defines
cause of action as an act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.
In this case, there is no right in favor of Ana Quinn which is violated. Therefore, the
ejectment case should have been dismissed pursuant to Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure due to the lack of cause of action. Clearly, the testimony of Ana Quinn that she had the
right or authority to lease out the property was a material matter which would support the inquiry
on possession1. If she did not possessed such right, then the case would have been dismissed due
to lack of cause of action. However, due to the perjury she committed, the unlawful detainer case
prospered.
Although tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership, they constitute mere
prima facie proof of ownership or possession of the property for which taxes have been paid.
Article 541 of the Civil Code provides that “a possessor in the concept of owner has in his favor
the legal presumption that he possess with a just title and he cannot be obliged to show or prove
it.” Indeed, tax declarations as a proof of ownership or possession in relation to Article 541 of the
Civil Code is disputable. However, such presumption prevails until the contrary is proven 2.
Therefore, it is the burden on the part of Ana Quinn to debunk the presumption by presenting
evidence that she is the owner of the leased building.
Based on the copy of the tax declaration, Ana Quinn was not the real owner of the leased
building. Thus, she did not have any right nor authority to enter into a lease agreement. Pursuant
to Article 1318 and 1409 (3) of the Civil Code, the lease agreement was void because there was
no certain object nor cause of the obligation at the time of the transaction.
As a result, Job Hutt cannot be liable because he is not equally guilty with Ana Quinn.
Article 1411, par. 2 of the Civil Code mandates that the rule on pari delicto in paragraph 1 of the
same provision does not apply to the innocent party and the person who is not guilty may claim
what he has given and cannot be bound to comply with his promise. Evidently, Ana Quinn is the
only guilty party because she pretended to be the owner of the building despite the fact that it was
her cousin who owns the property. Assuming that Job Hutt was also guilty of unlawfully staying
in the building, the fact still remains that Ana Quinn is the more guilty party. Hence, Job Hutt,
being the innocent or the less guilty party can claim what he has given and cannot be bound to
comply with his promise3.
Moreover, the ejectment case did not attain finality pursuant to Section 47, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court. The principle on res judicata requires the following: the former judgment must be
final; the court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; it is a
judgment on the merits; there is an identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between

1
U.S v. Estraña, 16 Phil. 520
2
Cequena v. Bolante, G.R. No. 137944, April 6, 2000
3
De Leon and De Leon, Jr., Comments and Cases on Obligations and Contracts
the first and second actions4. Since the ejectment case lacked cause of action, the doctrine of res
judicata finds no application.