UP Pre-Week Poli PDF

2016 University of the Philippines
College of Law
Pre-Week Reviewer
PRE-WEEK
POLITICAL
LAW
UP Law Bar Operations Commission 2016

UP LAW
BAR OPS 2016
UP LAW BOC POLITICAL LAW PRE-WEEK
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
Q1: Under what circumstances can the President suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?
A1: Three conditions must concur for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to be
valid:
(a) there must be invasion or rebellion;
(b) the public safety must require the suspension of the privilege;
(c) for a period not exceeding sixty (60 days).
[Lansang v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-33964 December 11, 1971; 1987 CONST., ART. III, Section 15 and ART. VII,
Section 18]
Q2: Can the Congress review the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
proclamation of martial law by the President?
A2: Yes. The Congress can either revoke or extend such suspension or proclamation.
Within forty-eight (48) hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session,
may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and
public safety requires it. [1987 CONST., ART. VII, Section 18].
Q3: Can the President declare the existence of a state of national emergency without the approval of
the Congress?
A3: Yes. The President can validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the
absence of a Congressional enactment. Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution grants the
President such power. [David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396 (2006)].
Q4: During the existence of a state of national emergency, the President ordered the taking over of
privately owned public utilities and businesses affected with public interest. Can the President do this
without a delegation from Congress?
A4: No. The taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest requires
a delegation from Congress.
Q5: On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial
law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Province of Maguindanao. On
December 9, 2009, Congress convened to review the validity of the President’s action. But, two days
later or on December 12 before Congress could act, the President issued Presidential Proclamation
1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao. Can
the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation 1959 be still challenged before the Supreme Court?
A5: No. The case has become moot. President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint
houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions
challenging Proclamation 1959 have become moot and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of
martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a
supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.
PAGE 1 OF 34
Q6: A concerned citizen filed an ethics complaint against Senator Sixto, due to acts committed during
his term as a Department Secretary in the immediately preceding administration. As a result of the
investigation, the Senate Ethics Committee issued a Resolution finding her guilty of the charges. On
the basis of such resolution, the Senate issued a resolution suspending him for 30 days. Senator Sixto
questioned such resolution before the Supreme Court, arguing that the acts alleged did not constitute
“disorderly behavior” since the acts questioned took place before he was elected Senator. Can the
Supreme Court reverse the Senate resolution?
A6: No. Each House of Congress is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the
Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual
circumstances of which that House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black and white for
presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to
determine whether Senator Sixto’s conduct constituted disorderly behavior, it would thereby have
assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate
branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers demands in such situation a prudent
refusal to interfere. (Osmeña v. Pendatun [G.R. No. L-17144 (1950)]).
Q7: Does the Sandiganbayan have the power to decree a ninety-day preventive suspension of an
incumbent Senator charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
A7: Yes. The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public
official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and
jurisprudential support. The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the
power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each-
x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and,
with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of
suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed
upon determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring
member. On the other hand, the suspension under Section 13 of RA 3019 is not a penalty but a
preliminary, preventive measure. The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to
have effectively excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions
[Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001].
Q8: A Special Committee found Congressman Osmeña guilty of serious disorderly behavior for having
made serious imputations of bribery against the President in a speech he delivered on the floor of
Congress. The House issued Resolution No. 175 declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending
him from office for fifteen months. Senator Osmeña questioned the constitutionality of the suspension.
He argued that he enjoys absolute parliamentary immunity. Is he correct?
A8: No. He is not correct. Section 15 [now Section 11] of Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any
speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be
questioned in any other place." Although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered
in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that
"they shall not be questioned in any other place" than Congress.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize
the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate." [Osmeña v. Pendatun, G.R.
No. L-17144 (1950)]
PAGE 2 OF 34
Q9. Can the Supreme Court review the determination of the Congress that the delivery of speeches
attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which an erring Senator may be
disciplined or suspended?
A9: No. The Supreme Court cannot review such determination made by Congress. The House is the judge
of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon
it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best
but which cannot be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For
one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether a Senator’s conduct constituted
disorderly behavior, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never
intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers
fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each
department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme
within its own sphere. [Osmeña v. Pendatun, G.R. No. L-17144 (1950)].
Q10. The Madrid Protocol, concluded in 1989, governs the Madrid System for the International
Registration of Marks, which is the centralized system providing a one-stop solution for registering and
managing marks worldwide. This System allows the trademark owner to file one application in one
language, and to pay one set of fees to protect his mark in the territories of up to 97 member-states.
Conformably with its express authority under Section 9 of Executive Order No. 459, the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) determined that the Madrid Protocol was an executive agreement. Thus, the
President ratified it through an instrument of accession. The Intellectual Property Association assailed
the constitutionality of such instrument. It argued that the DFA Secretary committed grave abuse of
discretion in determining the Madrid Protocol as an executive agreement. Does the Madrid Protocol
need to be ratified by the Senate?
A10: No. The Madrid Protocol is an executive agreement that does not require legislative concurrence or
Senate ratification to be binding, unlike treaties. The registration of trademarks and copyrights has been
the subject of executive agreements entered into without the concurrence of the Senate. Some executive
agreements have been concluded in conformity with the policies declared in the acts of Congress with
respect to the general subject matter. After examining the Declaration of State Policy under the
Intellectual Property Code (Republic Act No. 8293, IP Code), the Supreme Court held that the Madrid
Protocol was concluded in conformity with the IP Code, a policy declared in acts of Congress with respect
to the general subject matter. [Intellectual Property Association of the Philippines Vs. Hon. Paquito Ochoa,
et al., G.R. No. 204605. July 19, 2016]
Q11: What are the differences between a treaty and an executive agreement?
A11:
TREATIES EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
formal documents which require become binding through executive action without the
ratification with the approval of two-thirds need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress
of all the members of the Senate
PAGE 3 OF 34
TREATIES EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS

agreements involving political issues or merely involve arrangements on the implementation
changes in national policy, as well as those of existing policies, rules, laws, or agreements.
involving international agreements of a
perm anent character generally intended to im plem ent a treaty already
enforced or to determ ine the details of the
im plem entation thereof that do not affect the
sovereignty of the State
They are concluded:

(1) to adjust the details of a treaty;
(2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the
Legislature; or
(3) in the exercise of the President's independent
powers under the Constitution.
can create new international obligations cannot create new international obligations that are
not expressly allowed or reasonably implied in the law
they purport to implement
Products of the acts of the Executive and the Solely an executive act
Senate
Same level as a statute Not of the same level as a statute
A later law or a later treaty takes precedence Executive agreements that are inconsistent with either
over one that is prior if there is an a law or a treaty are considered ineffective.
irreconcilable conflict.
[Saguisag v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016]
Q12: What are the requirements for validity of an international agreement allowing foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities in the Philippines?
A12: An international agreement allowing foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the Philippines
must be:
1. Under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate;
2. Ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that
purpose, when the Congress so requires; and
3. Recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. [Article XVIII, Section 25 of the 1987
Constitution]
Q13: What is the doctrine of incorporation?

A13: Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the and land no
further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere. The doctrine of
incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal
standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex
posterior derogat priori takes effect — a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In
states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both
statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution [Secretary of Justice v.
Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000].
PAGE 4 OF 34
Q14: Should members of the House who are outside the country be counted for the purpose of
computing the required quorum?
A14: No. Members of the House who are incapacitated to discharge their duties because of death,
incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the house, such as those outside the Philippines, or for
other causes which make attendance of the member concerned impossible, even through coercive
process which each house is empowered to issue to compel attendance, are not included for the purpose
of computing the quorum [Avelino v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821 (1949)].
Q15: With the impending vacancy of one of the positions of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, the
Chair of the Senate Committee on Justice suggested to his counterpart in the House of Representatives
that they split their votes to ensure the participation of both Houses in the formation of the shortlist.
The Chair of the House Committee on Justice, who is currently sitting on the Judicial and Bar Council,
cited the ruling in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council in declining the suggestion. His Senate
counterpart responded that the Supreme Court in Chavez only prevented two members from sitting in
the Council at any given time, but did not prevent them from splitting their votes. Can the two chairs
split the vote among themselves?
A15: No. In the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of Representatives,
is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress. Thus, when the Constitution envisioned
one member of Congress sitting in the JBC, it is sensible to presume that this representation carries with
him one full vote. [Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242 (2013)].
Q16: Mr. Samonte was appointed Civil Service Commissioner on February 2, 2011. His term ends seven
years later. On October 5, 2014, he was appointed Chairperson of the Commission to replace Mr. Dela
Vega, whose full seven-year term ended February 2, 2013. On February 1, 2018, the President
appointed Ms. Jayme as Chairperson, whose term would take effect the next day. Mr. Samonte
protested, arguing that due to his appointment as Chairperson, his term ends only on October 5, 2020.
Is Mr. Samonte correct?
A16: No. Mr. Samonte is not correct. In no case can one be a COA member, either as chairman or
commissioner, or a mix of both positions, for an aggregate term of more than 7 years. The promotional
appointment as COA Chairman of Samonte for a stated fixed term of less than seven (7) years is void for
violating a clear, but mandatory constitutional prescription. There can be no denying that the vacancy in
the position of COA chairman when Dela Vega stepped down in February 2, 2013 resulted from the
expiration of his 7-year term. Hence, the appointment to the vacancy thus created ought to have been one
for seven (7) years in line with the verba legis approach of interpreting the Constitution. In net effect, the
President could not have had, under any circumstance, validly appointed Mr. Samonte as COA Chairman,
for a full 7-year appointment, as the Constitution decrees, was not legally feasible in light of the 7-year
aggregate rule. Mr. Samonte had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A
shorter term, however, to comply with said rule would also be invalid as the corresponding appointment
would effectively breach the clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed
subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA
commissioner like respondent Villar who serves for a period less than seven (7) years cannot be appointed
as chairman when such position became vacant as a result of the expiration of the 7-year term of the
predecessor. Such appointment to a full term is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee will be
allowed to serve more than seven (7) years under the constitutional ban. [Funa v. Villar, G.R. No. 192791
(2012)].
PAGE 5 OF 34
Q17: Ms. Tengco filed a petition praying for a writ of amparo before the Court of Appeals, impleading
the President, the Philippine National Police, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. She alleged
that elements of the military had abducted and interrogated her, and after her release, has continued
to harass her and her family. The Court of Appeals dropped the President from the suit. Ms. Tengco
questions this before the Supreme Court, arguing that the President is no longer immune from suit
during his tenure since the constitutional provision granting it is not present in the Constitution. Is Ms.
Tengco correct?
A17: NO. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under the present system of government,
albeit not expressly reserved in the Constitution. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his
tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need
to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President,
the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is
important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully
attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch,
only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of
the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the
operation of the Government. [Rubico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871 (2010)].
Q18: Francesca filed a petition for cancellation of Mario’s certificate of candidacy before the
Commission on Elections. She argued that Mario, a foundling, is not a natural born Filipino since the
issuance of a foundling certificate in his favor constitute an act to acquire or perfect Philippine
citizenship. Is Francesca correct?
A18: No. Francesca is not correct. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship 1987 CONST.,
ART IV, Section 2]. Firstly, "having to perform an act" means that the act must be personally done by the
citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by the
authorities. Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the parents,
not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization
proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien
father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it. [Poe v. Llamanzares,
G.R. No. 221697 (2016)].
Q19: Differentiate naturalization from repatriation.

A19: Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship
due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War
II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time;(4) marriage of a Filipino woman
to an alien; and (5) political and economic necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of
an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil
Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
The person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in
court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to
register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the
Philippines.
PAGE 6 OF 34
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. [Bengson v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001]
Q20: Who are citizens of the Philippines?

A20: The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine Citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in the accordance with law. [1987 CONST, ART. IV, Section 1]
Q21: Who are natural born citizens?

A21: Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Those who are born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
Q22: Petitioner Go raised the defense of res judicata and estoppel against the Government in
questioning his status as a Filipino citizen. Go argued that the grounds raised by the government have
been raised before or during the hearing of the petition for his naturalization. Is Go correct?
A22: No. Go is incorrect. It is settled that the doctrine of estoppel or of laches does not apply against the
Government suing in its capacity as Sovereign or asserting governmental rights. It has been held that the
Government is never estopped by mistakes or errors on the part of its agents, and that estoppel cannot
give validity to an act that is prohibited by law or is against public policy.
Furthermore, unlike final decisions in actions and other proceedings in court, a decision or order granting
citizenship to the applicant does not really become executory and a naturalization proceeding not being a
judicial adversary proceeding, the decision rendered therein is no res judicata as to any of the reasons or
matters which would support a judgment cancelling the certificate of naturalization for illegal or
fraudulent procurement. As a matter of fact, it is settled in this jurisdiction that a certificate of
naturalization may be cancelled upon grounds or conditions subsequent to the granting of the certificate
o naturalization. Thus, a certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is found subsequently that the
applicant for citizenship secured the same by misleading the courts on any material fact.
Q23: Does the operative fact doctrine apply to executive acts?

A23: Yes. The operative fact doctrine does not only apply to laws subsequently declared unconstitutional
or unlawful, as it also applies to executive acts subsequently declared as invalid. Evidently, the operative
fact doctrine is not confined to statutes and rules and regulations issued by the executive department
that are accorded the same status as that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in nature. The
Court can apply the operative fact doctrine to acts and consequences that resulted from the reliance not
only on a law or executive act which is quasi-legislative in nature but also on decisions or orders of the
executive branch which were later nullified. This Court is not unmindful that such acts and consequences
must be recognized in the higher interest of justice, equity and fairness. [Hacienda Luisita v. PARC, G.R.
No. 171101, November 22, 2011]
PAGE 7 OF 34
Q24: In an investigation in aid of legislation, Senator Estrada asked Atty. Francisco I. Chavez, as
resource person, on the facts and issues the latter raised with the Supreme Court in Chavez v. National
Housing Authority. The said case has already been decided by the Court with finality. Is the subject
matter of the legislative inquiry sub judice?
A24: No. The subject matter of the legislative inquiry is no longer sub judice or before a court or judge for
consideration. The Court already denied with finality the motion of Chavez, as the petitioner in Chavez v.
National Housing Authority, for reconsideration of the Decision of the Court. The sub judice issue has
been rendered moot and academic by the supervening issuance of the en banc Resolution. An issue or a
case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a
determination of the issue would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual
substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal
of the petition. In fine, it will not avail petitioners any to invoke the sub judice effect of Chavez and resist,
on that ground, the assailed congressional invitations and subpoenas. [Romero v. Senator Estrada, G.R.
No. 174105, April 2, 2009]
Q25: Will a pending case before the Supreme Court bar the continuance of a Senate Committee
investigation?
A25: No. On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation.
While Sabio and Standard Chartered Bank advert only to pending criminal and administrative cases
before lower courts as not posing a bar to the continuation of a legislative inquiry, there is no rhyme or
reason that these cases’ doctrinal pronouncement and their rationale cannot be extended to appealed
cases and special civil actions awaiting final disposition before the Supreme Court. The mere filing of a
criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar
the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended
inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint.
Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an
essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or administrative investigation.
Q26: Can cabinet secretaries invoke executive privilege and excuse themselves from appearing in
Senate investigations?
A26: No. They cannot invoke the executive privilege in their own capacities. In light of this highly
exceptional nature of the executive privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the
power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege
on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of the
President," which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary
power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the
President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power.
It follows, therefore, that when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own
judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the
President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary in
order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the
matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither
the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect
the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal
means to compel his appearance. [Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006]
PAGE 8 OF 34
Q27: What are the elements of presidential communications privilege?

A27:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the President
or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity with
the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by
a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important evidence
and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
[Neri v. Senate, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008]
Q28: Can the government share the control and supervision of the exploration, development, and
utilization of its natural resources with other states or corporations?
A28: No. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into
co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may
be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under
such terms and conditions as may be provided by law.
The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
Q29: What are the three modes of amending the Constitution?

A29: Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution.
The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members.
The second mode is through a constitutional convention.
The third mode is through a people's initiative.
The system of initiative as a mode of effecting changes in the Constitution is strictly limited to
amendments – not to a revision – thereof.
Amendments to the Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative, upon
a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment
under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor
oftener than once every five years thereafter.
Q30: Would a shift from presidential to a parliamentary form of government merely require an
amendment to the Constitution?
A30: No. It would require a revision, not a mere amendment, of the Constitution. Revision broadly implies
a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of
powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial
entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the
other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the
PAGE 9 OF 34
basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while
amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-
equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation
of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a
radical change in the structure of government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of
powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber
of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of
the Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one
chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment.
The petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution if in truth and in fact a proposal for the
revision thereof is barred from the system of initiative upon any legally permissible construction of
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
[Lambino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006]
Q31: When is an impeachment proceeding deemed initiated?

A31: An impeachment proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to
the Committee on Justice for action.
No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period
of one year. [Francisco v. HOR, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003]
Q32: What is a political question?

A32: A political question refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
The political question doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr, applies when there is
found, among others:
1. a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department;
2. a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it or
3. the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-
judicial discretion.
Q33. What are the constitutional safeguards on the exercise of the President’s power to proclaim
martial law?
A33: The following are the constitutional safeguards to the exercise of the power of the President to
proclaim martial law:
PAGE 10 OF 34
1) There must be actual invasion or rebellion;

2) The duration of the proclamation shall not exceed sixty (60) days;
3) Within forty-eight (48) hours, the President shall report his action to Congress. If Congress is not
in session, it must convene within forty-eight (48) hours;
4) Congress may by majority vote of all its members voting jointly revoke the proclamation, and the
President cannot set aside the revocation;
5) By the same vote and in the same manner, upon initiative of the President, Congress may extend
the proclamation if the invasion or rebellion continues and public safety requires the extension;
6) The Supreme Court may review the factual sufficiency of the proclamation, and the Supreme
Court must decide the case within thirty (30) days from the time it was filed;
7) Martial law does not automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the
operation of the Constitution. It does not supplant the functioning of the civil courts and of
Congress. Military courts have no jurisdiction over civilians where civil courts are able to function
[Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1995 ed., pp. 213-214]
Q34: Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from
which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or
beneficiary that they themselves also determine. Is this constitutional?
A34: No. It is unconstitutional. The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification
authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are
effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation which is lodged in Congress. The
power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation. Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law." The power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain
sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose.
As these two (2) acts under the 2013 PDAF Article comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation,
and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly,
said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however,
allow. Thus, the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain
the similar legislative identification feature is unconstitutional. [Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
208566, November 19, 2013]
PAGE 11 OF 34
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
Q35: What is the knock and announce principle?
A35: Police officers are obliged to give the appellant notice, show to her their authority, and demand that
they be allowed entry. They may only break open any outer or inner door or window of a house to execute
the search warrant if, after such notice and demand, such officers are refused entry to the place of
directed search. This is known as the knock and announce principle which is embodied in Anglo-
American Law. The method of entry of an officer into a dwelling and the presence or absence of such
notice are as important considerations in assessing whether subsequent entry to search and/or arrest is
constitutionally reasonable. The proper trigger point in determining, under the knock and announce rule,
whether the police waited long enough before entering the residence to execute a warrant, is when those
inside should have been alerted that the police wanted entry to execute a warrant. [People v. Huang Zhen
Hua, G.R. No. 139301, September 29, 2004]
Q36: Differentiate searches incidental to lawful arrests from “stop and frisk” searches.
A36: Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and the
search conducted within the vicinity and within reach by the person arrested is done to ensure that there
are no weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence. On the other hand, "stop and frisk" searches are
conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime. "Stop and frisk" search should be used when dealing
with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably there is no
time to secure a search warrant. [People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014].
Q37: Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance that the male person
had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to
police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. When this male person tried to avoid the
policemen, the latter approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen
then asked the male person what he was holding in his hands. The male person tried to resist.
Patrolman Espiritu asked the male person if he could see what said male person had in his hands. The
latter showed the wallet and allowed Patrolman Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the
wallet and examined it. He found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. Was there a valid
search?
A37: Yes. The search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, a
stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on
the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s). The interest of effective crime prevention and
detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and manner, for
purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to
make an actual arrest.
Q38: Is a tip given by a police informant sufficient to justify a valid warrantless arrest?
A38: No. A reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in
addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. [People v. Raquero, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010].
Q39: What is a custodial investigation?

A39: Custodial investigation refers to any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. This
presupposes that he is suspected of having committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit
PAGE 12 OF 34
information or a confession from him.The rule begins to operate at once, as soon as the investigation
ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, and direction is aimed upon a particular suspect
who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory questions which
tend to elicit incriminating statements. [Jesalva v. People, G.R. No. 187725, January 19, 2011]
Q40: What is a writ of amparo?

A40: The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
For the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are
missing are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the
disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law
for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by
substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation.
A writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held
accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still, government
involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element. [Navia v. Pardico, G.R. No. 184467,
June 19, 2012]
Q41: Are checkpoints legal?

A41: Checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of
organized government is on the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril,
checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the government. Implicit in this proposition is that when the
situation clears and such grave perils are removed, checkpoints will have absolutely no reason to remain.
Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorist's right to "free
passage without interruption", but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of
travellers during which the vehicle's occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long
as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's
right against unreasonable search.[Valmonte v de Villa, G.R. No. 83988 May 24, 1990]
Q42: A tarpaulin within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each
tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. It was posted on the front walls of the
cathedral within public view. This tarpaulin contains the heading "Conscience Vote" and lists
candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an
"X" mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic
Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising "Team Patay," while those who voted against it form "Team
Buhay". COMELEC ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days from receipt for being
oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size requirement of two feet (2’) by three feet
(3’). Is the COMELEC order constitutionally valid?
PAGE 13 OF 34
A42: No. The COMELEC order is unconstitutional. Regulation of speech in the context of electoral
campaigns made by persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party
which are, taken as a whole, principally advocacies of a social issue that the public must consider during
elections is unconstitutional. Such regulation is inconsistent with the guarantee of according the fullest
possible range of opinions coming from the electorate including those that can catalyze candid,
uninhibited, and robust debate in the criteria for the choice of a candidate.
First, the principal message in the tarpaulin consists of a social advocacy which is constitutionally
protected speech. Second, the present law — Section 3.3 of Republic Act No. 9006 and Section 6(c) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 — if applied to this case, will not pass the test of reasonability. A fixed size
for election posters or tarpaulins without any relation to the distance from the intended average audience
will be arbitrary. At certain distances, posters measuring 2 by 3 feet could no longer be read by the
general public and, hence, would render speech meaningless. It will amount to the abridgement of
speech with political consequences. [Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015]
Q43: What are the requisites for a valid classification under the equal protection clause?
A43:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and;
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
[Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commision, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010]
Q44: What is the strict scrutiny standard?

A44: According to the strict scrutiny standard, a legislative classification that impermissibly interferes
with the exercise of fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is
presumed unconstitutional. The burden is on the government to prove that the classification is necessary
to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.
The strict scrutiny standard was used to assess the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech,
gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights, as expansion from its earlier applications to equal
protection. [Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335 , February 11, 2014]
Q45: Section 19 of the Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, also known as the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012
states that when a computer data is prima facie found to be in violation of the provisions of this Act,
the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block access to such computer data. Is the grant to the DOJ of
the power to restrict or block access to computer data constitutional?
A45: No. It is unconstitutional. The content of the computer data can also constitute speech. In such a
case, Section 19 operates as a restriction on the freedom of expression over cyberspace. For an executive
officer to seize content alleged to be unprotected without any judicial warrant, it is not enough for him to
be of the opinion that such content violates some law, for to do so would make him judge, jury, and
executioner all rolled into one.
Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards jurisprudential
guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech. Restraints on free speech are
generally evaluated on one of or a combination of three tests: the dangerous tendency doctrine, the
balancing of interest test, and the clear and present danger rule.
Section 19, however, merely requires that the data to be blocked be found prima facie in violation of any
provision of the cybercrime law. It does not take into consideration any of the three tests mentioned
above.
PAGE 14 OF 34
Section 19 therefore is violative of the constitutional guarantees to freedom of expression and against
unreasonable searches and seizures. [Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335 , February 11, 2014]
Q46: (Section 4(a)(3) of the Cybercrime Law provides that the “intentional or reckless alteration,
damaging, deletion or deterioration of computer data, electronic document, or electronic data
message, without right, including the introduction or transmission of viruses” constitute the offense of
cybercrime.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to discourage
data interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and
deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms. Are the petitioners correct?
A46: No. The petitioners are not correct. Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose,
constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its
subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms. But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach
on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism, he act of willfully
destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic
document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no
freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and private documents.
All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling effect, an in terrorem effect or
the fear of possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens who are minded to step beyond the
boundaries of what is proper. But to prevent the State from legislating criminal laws because they instill
such kind of fear is to render the state powerless in addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct.
Here, the chilling effect that results in paralysis is an illusion since Section 4(a)(3) clearly describes the
evil that it seeks to punish and creates no tendency to intimidate the free exercise of one’s constitutional
rights.
Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the heavy burden of proving that under no set of
circumstances will Section 4(a)(3) be valid. Petitioner has failed to discharge this burden. [Disini v.
Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335 , February 11, 2014]
Q47. Filipinas Computer Corporation (FCC), a local manufacturer of computers and computer parts,
owns a sprawling plant in a 5,000-square meter lot in Pasig City. To remedy the city's acute housing
shortage, compounded by a burgeoning population, the Sangguniang Panglungsod authorized the
City Mayor to negotiate for the purchase of the lot. The Sanggunian intends to subdivide the property
into small residential lots to be distributed at cost to qualified city residents. But FCC refused to sell
the lot. Hard pressed to find a suitable property to house its homeless residents, the City filed a
complaint for eminent domain against FCC.
If FCC hires you as lawyer, what defense or defenses would you set up in order to resist the
expropriation of the property? Explain.
A47: I will raise the defense that the selection of lot to be expropriated violates due process, because it is
arbitrary. Since it is devoted to commercial use, the beneficiaries of the expropriation will not settle there
and will instead merely lease out or resell the lot for a profit. [Manotok v. National Housing Authority, 150
SCRA 89 (1987)]
Q48. If the Court grants the City's prayer for expropriation, but the City delays payment of the amount
determined by the court as just compensation, can FCC recover the property from Pasig City? Explain.
A48: The mere delay in the payment of the just compensation will not entitle the Filipinas Computer
Corporation to recover the property. Instead, legal interest on the just compensation should be paid
PAGE 15 OF 34
[National Power Corp. v. Henson, 300 SCRA 751 (1998)] However, if payment was not made within five (5)
years from the finality of judgment in the expropriation case, Filipinas Corporation can recover the
property. To be just, the compensation must be paid within a reasonable time. [Republic v. Lim, 462 SCRA
265 (2005)]
Q49: Suppose the expropriation succeeds, but the City decides to abandon its plan to subdivide the
property for residential purposes having found a much bigger lot, can FCC legally demand that it be
allowed to repurchase the property from the City of Pasig? Why or why not?
A49: If the lot was expropriated with the condition that it can be used only for low-cost housing, it should
be returned to Filipinas Computer Corporation upon abandonment of the purpose [Heirs of Timoteo
Moreno v. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, 413 SCRA 502 (2003)]
Q50. Section 23 (3) of Republic Act No. 10354 otherwise known as The Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 states that the conscientious objection of a health care service
provider based on his/her ethical or religious beliefs shall be respected. However, the conscientious
objector shall immediately refer the person seeking such care and services to another health care
service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible: Provided, further, That
the person is not in an emergency condition or serious case as defined in Republic Act No. 8344, which
penalizes the refusal of hospitals and medical clinics to administer appropriate initial medical
treatment and support in emergency and serious cases.
Is the imposition on conscientious objectors of the duty to refer the person seeking reproductive care
and services to another health care service provider constitutional?
A50: No. It is unconstitutional. The obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief
and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient
seeking information on modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his
conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs.
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise
because it makes pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally
repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may
not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the
interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products,
services, procedures and methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of
the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers,
whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be
exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to
his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the
constitutional right to free exercise of religion. [Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014]
PAGE 16 OF 34
PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW

Q51: Emilio, as a candidate for the position of Provincial Governor, is only authorized to incur an
election expense amounting to PhP 4,576,566.00, under par. (a), Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 9615 or otherwise known as the Rules and Regulations Implementing FAIR ELECTION ACT.
However, for television campaign commercials alone, Emilio already spent the sum of PhP23,730.784.
A petition for disqualification was filed against Emilio for having committed an election offense.
Emilio argued that it is clear from COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 that the limit set by law applies only
to election expenditures of candidates and not to contributions made by third parties. Is Emilio correct?
A51: No. Emilio is wrong. Section 103 of the Omnibus Election Code states that expenditures duly
authorized by the candidate or the treasurer of the party shall be considered as expenditures of such
candidate or political party. By virtue of the legal requirement that a contribution or donation should bear
the written conformity of the candidate, a contributor/supporter/donor certainly qualifies as "any person
authorized by such candidate or treasurer. The inclusion of the amount contributed by a donor to the
candidate’s allowable limit of election expenses does not trample upon the free exercise of the voters’
rights of speech and of expression. As a content-neutral regulation, the law’s concern is not to curtail the
message or content of the advertisement promoting a particular candidate but to ensure equality
between and among aspirants with "deep pockets" and those with less financial resources. Any
restriction on speech or expression is only incidental and is no more than necessary to achieve the
substantial governmental interest of promoting equality of opportunity in political advertising. [Ejercito v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 212398, November 25, 2014]
Q52: Francisco T. Duque III, Chairman of the CSC, was designated as a member of the Board of
Directors or Trustees in an ex officio capacity of the (a) Government Service Insurance System (GSIS);
(b) Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH), (c) the Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC), and (d) the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF). Was Duque validly
designated to the said Boards in ex-officio capacity?
A52: No. Duque was not not designated to said governing boards in ex-officio capacity. The term ex
officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official character
merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position."
Ex officio likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without
any other appointment or authority other than that conferred by the office." An ex officio member of a
board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or
appointment.
The ex officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that
the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position.
The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his
principal office.
When the CSC Chairman sits as a member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and
HDMF, he may exercise these powers and functions, which are not anymore derived from his position as
CSC Chairman, such as imposing interest on unpaid or unremitted contributions, issuing guidelines for
the accreditation of health care providers,or approving restructuring proposals in the payment of unpaid
loan amortizations. Duque’s designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF entitles him to receive per diem, a form of additional compensation that is disallowed by
PAGE 17 OF 34
the concept of an ex officio position by virtue of its clear contravention of the proscription set by Section 2,
Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. This situation goes against the principle behind an ex officio position,
and must, therefore, be held unconstitutional.
Q53: What are the four groups of officers whom the President shall appoint?
A53: There are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the president may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
[Sarmiento III v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549 (1987)]
Q54: Do the appointments of NLRC Chairman and Commissioners require the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments?
A54: No. Their appointments do not require the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees mentioned
in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose appointments are expressly
vested by the Constitution itself in the president
The NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of Section 16 , Article VII of the
Constitution, more specifically under the "third groups" of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those
whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the
NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose
appointments requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Q55: The President issued an Executive Order which states that a member of the Cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in
addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor. Is the executive order
constitutional?
A55: No The executive order is unconstitutional.. Appointive officials shall not hold any other
governmental position, unless otherwise allowed by law or his position’s primary functions [Sec. 7(2), Art.
IX-B] The Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided
in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. [Par. 1, Sec. 13, Art. VII,
Const.]
Exceptions:
(1) Unless otherwise provided in the Constitution (e.g. Secretary of Justice as ex officio member of the
JBC); or
(2) Ex Officio positions.
PAGE 18 OF 34
Q56: Perfecto is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship after he was
naturalized as citizen of USA. Perfecto applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 before the Consul
General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA. He took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on July 10, 2008 and, on even date, an Order of Approval of Citizenship Retention and Re¬
acquisition was issued in his favor. On April 3, 2009, Perfecto executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of
his foreign citizenship. On November 30, 2009, Perfecto filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the
mayoralty post of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections.
A rival mayoralty candidate, however, filed a petition to disqualify Perfecto and/or to cancel his CoC on
the ground that Perfecto remained a US citizen because he continued to use his US passport for entry
to and exit from the Philippines after executing aforesaid Affidavit of Renunciation. COMELEC issued a
Resolution holding that Perfecto's continued use of his US passport effectively negated his April 3,
2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. Thus, he was disqualified to run for public office for failure to comply
with the requirements of RA 9225. Is the COMELEC correct?
A56: Yes. The COMELEC did not err, nor did it commit grave abuse of discretion, in disqualifying Perfecto
from running for public office.
Natural-born citizens who reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 may now run for public
office in the Philippines provided that they:
(1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws; and,
(2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC.
Perfecto’s Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport after
executing said affidavit. Consequently, at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 for purposes of the
May 13, 2013 elections, Perfecto had yet to comply with said second requirement. [Arnado v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 210164, August 18, 2015]
Q57: What are the only instances in which the President may not extend pardon?
A57: The only instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment
cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of
election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from the
COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to
delimit the pardoning power of the President.
Q58: Can Congress limit the power of the President to grant pardon?
A58: No. The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action. Any act of
Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President. [Risos-Vidal v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666 , January 21, 2015]
Q59: Can a COMELEC Commissioner be removed from office administratively?

A59: No. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment. [Section 2, ARTICLE XI, 1987 Constitution]
PAGE 19 OF 34
Q60: Regina filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the lone district of
Marinduque. A registered voter in the said district filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of Regina on the ground that it contained material misrepresentations
i.e. she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American citizen.
The COMELEC En Banc, on 14 May 2013, found that, contrary to the declarations that she made in her
COC, Regina is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the requirements
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. Thus, she
is ineligible to run for the position of Representative for the lone district of Marinduque. Four days
thereafter or on 18 May 2013, Regina was proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 Elections. On 5 June
2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the 14 May 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc final and executory, considering that more than twenty-one (21) days have elapsed
from the date of promulgation with no order issued by this Court restraining its execution. On the same
day, Regina took her oath of office before Feliciano R. Belmonte Jr., Speaker of the House of
Representatives.
Regina argued that the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed because
pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribuna (HRET) has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the "sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications" of the Members of the House of Representatives. Is she correct?
A60: No. The COMELEC retains jurisdiction over the case. HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a
candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Regina not being a member of the
House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.
Here, Regina cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because, primarily, she
has not yet assumed office. The term of office of a Member of the House of Representatives begins only
"at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." Thus, until such time, the COMELEC
retains jurisdiction. [Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013]
Q61: Distinguish ad-interim appointments from appointments in an acting capacity.

A61: Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during
a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy.
Moreover, ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation
or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting
appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of
circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. [Pimentel v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005, citing Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary 772 (1996)]
Q62: Are courtesy resignations valid?

A62: A "courtesy resignation" cannot properly be interpreted as resignation in the legal sense for it is not
necessarily a reflection of a public official's intention to surrender his position. Rather, it manifests his
submission to the will of the political authority and the appointing power. Resignation is defined as the
act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office and renounces the further right to
use it. To constitute a complete and operative act of resignation, the officer or employee must show a
clear intention to relinquish or surrender his position accompanied by the act of relinquishment.
PAGE 20 OF 34
Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to
surrender, renounce and relinquish the office, and its acceptance by competent and lawful authority.
[Ortiz c. COMELEC, G.R. No. 78957, June 28, 1988].
Q63: What are the exceptions to the prohibition on nepotic appointments?

A63: The prohibition on nepotic appointments in the Civil Service Law does not apply if the appointee is:
(a) person employed in a confidential capacity
(b) teachers
(c) physicians
(d) member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Q64: The Civil Service Law prohibits all appointments in the national and local governments or any
branch or instrumentality thereof made in favor of the relative of:
appointing authority; recommending authority; chief of the bureau or office; or person exercising
immediate supervision over the appointee.
Up to what civil degree does the prohibition on nepotism apply?
A64: Within the third degree of either consanguinity or of affinity. [Sec. 59, Civil Service Law]
Q65. Does the Ombudsman have disciplinary power over members of Congress?
A65. No. The Ombudsman has no disciplinary power over the following [Sec. 21, RA 6770]
(1) Officials who may be removed only by impeachment
(2) Members of Congress
(3) Members of the Judiciary
However, the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office
committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for
impeachment, if warranted. [Sec. 22, RA 6770]
Q66: A criminal complaint against a judge was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. Should the
Ombudsman defer action on said criminal complaint against the judge where the same arises from his
administrative duties?
A66: Yes. The Ombudsman should defer action on the criminal complaint and and refer the same to the
Supreme Court for determination whether said judge had acted within the scope of their administrative
duties.
The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it,
referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether and administrative aspect is involved
therein. This rule should hold true regardless of whether an administrative case based on the act subject
of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For, aside from the fact that
the Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect for
and recognition of the administrative authority of the Court, because in determining whether an
administrative matter is involved, the Court passes upon not only administrative liabilities but also other
administrative concerns. [Caoibes v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 132177. July 19, 2001]
Q67. Can private individuals be subject to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan?

A67: Yes. In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the
public officers or employees including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations,
they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees. [Section 4, P.D. No. 1606].
PAGE 21 OF 34
Q68: When is substitution of a candidate allowed?

A68: If after the last day for filing of the certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered
political party (a) dies, (b) withdraws or (c) is disqualified for any cause, he may be substituted by a
candidate belonging to and nominated by the same political party.
Only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to
replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified.
The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy
for the office affected not later than mid-day of the day of the election.
If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day
of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political
subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of
the country, with the COMELEC.[Sec. 77, B.P. 881]
Q69: What are the grounds to declare a duly registered candidate as a nuisance candidate?
A69: When his or her certificate of candidacy has been filed:
(1) To put the election process in mockery or disrepute or
(2) To cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates
or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide
intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus
prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.
Q70: What are the respective compositions of the Senate and House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunals? What are their jurisdictions?
A70: Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under
the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
The Senate and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunals shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members, respectively.
These electoral tribunals exercise jurisdiction over election contests only after a candidate has already
been proclaimed winner in an election. [1987 CONST. , ART. VI, Section 7, Macalintal v. PET, G.R. No.
191618, November 23, 2010]
Q71: What are the grounds for impeachment of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman?
A71:
1. culpable violation of the Constitution
2. treason
3. bribery
4. graft and corruption
PAGE 22 OF 34
5. other high crimes, or

6. betrayal of public trust.
Q72: Can a person whose Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) is cancelled or denied due course under Sec.
78 for false material representation be validly substituted?
A72: No. He cannot be validly substituted. A cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there
can be no valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be
clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a person
without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed
a CoC is not at all a candidate. [Talaga v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 196804, October 9, 2012]
Q73: Does a person who files a certificate of candidacy automatically become a candidate?
A73: No. A person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign
period. A candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the campaign period, not
before. Before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be committed and any
partisan political activity is lawful. [Penera v. COMELEC (2009)]
Q74: In case the certificate of candidacy (COC) of the candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes in the elections is subsequently cancelled, who should be proclaimed as winner?
A74: The one who obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates. A void
COC cannot produce any legal effect.Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not
considered at all in determining the winner of an election.
The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the
sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and
must also be respected.As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the
qualifications and disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are
participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in
rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules
to be eligible as candidates. [Maquiling v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013]
PAGE 23 OF 34
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
Q75: What is the legal status of the territorial sea, of the air space over the territorial sea, and its bed
and subsoil?
A75: The sovereignty of a coastal State extends beyond its land territory and internal waters and, in the
case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the
territorial sea. The breadth of the territorial sea shall not exceed 12 nautical miles, measured from
baselines determined in accordance with the UNCLOS.The sovereignty of a State extends to the air space
over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil.
Q76: What is a low-tide elevation?

A76: According to Article 13 of the UNCLOS, a low-tide elevation is a naturally formed area of land which
is surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at high tide.
Where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the
territorial sea from the mainland or an island, the low-water line on that elevation may be used as the
baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea.
Where a low-tide elevation is wholly situated at a distance exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea
from the mainland or an island, it has no territorial sea of its own.
Except where a low-tide elevation falls within the breadth of a territorial sea generated from a high-tide
feature or mainland, it generates no territorial sea of its own. Necessarily, such a low-tide elevation is not
entitled to an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf [Philippines v. China, 2016].
Q77: How is an island defined under international law?

A77: According to Article 121 of the UNCLOS, an island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by
water, which is above water at high tide. Save for the cases of rocks, marine entitlements of islands, such
as a territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf, are determined in
accordance with the provisions of the Convention.
Q78: How is a rock defined under international law?

A78: Rocks are features which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own. [UNCLOS,
Art. 121(3)] Rocks are not entitled to an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. Rocks are a category
of island. Rocks may be composed of solid rock or matter that is rock-like in nature [Philippines v. China,
2016]. In the Territorial and Maritime Dispute case between Nicaragua and Colombia, the International
Court of Justine ruled that a miniscule protrusion of coral qualified as a rock since it satisfied the
definition under Art. 121(3) of the UNCLOS.
Q79: What are the rights, jurisdiction, and duties of the coastal State with respect to the Exclusive
Economic Zone?
A79: According to Art. 56 of the UNCLOS, the coastal state has sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of
the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities
for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone.
PAGE 24 OF 34
The coastal state has jurisdiction with regard to (1) the establishment and use of artificial islands,
installations and structures, (2) marine scientific research, (3) the protection and preservation of the
marine environment.
The EEZ shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured. [UNCLOS, Art. 57]
Q80: What is the difference between a rock and island in international law?
A80: Unlike islands, rocks cannot sustain human habitation or economic life.
In Philippines v. China, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that to sustain human habitation is to
provide that which is necessary to keep humans alive and healthy over a continuous period of time,
according to proper standard. It further ruled that to sustain economic life is to sustain means to provide
that which is necessary not just to commence, but also to continue, an activity over a period of time in a
way that remains viable on an ongoing basis.
While islands are generally entitled to the marine entitlements of territorial sea, exclusive economic zone,
and continental shelf, rocks are not.
Q81: What is the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)?

A81: According to Art. 36 of the ICJ Statute, the jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the
parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties
and conventions in force. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter
shall be settled by the decision of the Court.
Q82: Define a treaty under international law.

A82: Under Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty means an international
agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether
embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular
designation.
Q83: What is an erga omnes obligation?

A83: Obligations erga omnes are obligations of a State owed to international community as a whole.
These obligations are the concerns of all States, and for whose protection all States have a legal interest.
Examples include the right to self-determination and the protection of basic human rights.
Q84: Who are entitled to immunity from local jurisdiction?

A84:
1. Diplomatic agent and members of the family of the diplomatic agent forming part of his
household, who are not nationals of the receiving state;
2. Administrative and technical staff
As to criminal jurisdiction, members of the administrative and technical staff of the diplomatic
mission, as well as members of their families forming part of their respective households, who are
not nationals of or permanent residents in the receiving state;
As to civil and administrative jurisdiction, immunity shall not extend to acts performed outside the
course of their duties; and
PAGE 25 OF 34
3. Service staff: Members of the service staff of the diplomatic mission, who are not nationals of or
permanent residents in the receiving state, with respect to acts performed in the course of their
duties [VCDR, art. 37].
Q85: Define innocent passage.

A85: Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal
State.
Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the
coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the following activities:
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of
the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of international law
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal
State;
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the coastal State;
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device;
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State;
(h) any act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention;
(i) any fishing activities;
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities;
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other facilities or
installations of the coastal State;
(l) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.
Q86: Identify the two elements the combination of which gives rise to binding international customary
rules.
A86: International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the combination of two
elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological
element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter
element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it. [Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697 (2016) ]
PAGE 26 OF 34
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Q87: May the MMDA confiscate a driver’s license for illegal parking by virtue of an MMDA Circular by
the Metro Manila Council prescribing for such penalty?
A87: No. The MMDA is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with
the various national government agencies, people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and
the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area,
and all its functions are administrative. It is not a local government unit vested with police power; as such,
there is no grant of authority under its Charter to enact ordinances and regulations for the general
welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. Sec. 5(f) of R.A. No. 7924 authorizes the MMDA to suspend
or revoke drivers’ licenses, but only in the enforcement of existing traffic rules and regulations by the
Legislature or those agencies to whom legislative powers have been delegated, i.e. the City of Manila.
[MMDA v. Garin, G.R. No. 130230, April 15, 2005]
Q88: What are the exceptions to barangay conciliation as pre-condition for filing a complaint in court
or any government offices?
A88:
a) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his
official functions;
c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 1 year or a fine exceeding P5,000;
d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;
e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the
parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;
f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities,
except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their
differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;
g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or
upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice [Section 408, LGC]
h) Where the accused is under detention;
i) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus
proceedings;
j) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment,
delivery of personal property and support pendent lite;
k) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations [Section 412, LGC]
l) Any complaint by or against corporations, partnerships or juridical entities, since only individuals
shall be parties to Barangay conciliation proceedings either as complainants or respondents;
m) Offenses where there is no private offended party;
n) Where the dispute arises from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL);
o) Labor disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relations;
p) Actions to annul judgment upon a compromise which may be filed directly in court
[Supreme Court Administrative Circular 14-93]
PAGE 27 OF 34
Q89: Differentiate the grounds for preventive suspension imposed on public officials under the
Ombudsman Act and the Local Government Code.
A89: The Ombudsman can impose the 6-month preventive suspension to all public officials, whether
elective or appointive, who are under investigation. To justify the preventive suspension of a public official
under Section 24, R.A. No. 6770, the evidence of guilt should be strong, and a) the charge against the
officer or employee should involve dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; b) the charges should warrant removal from the service; or c) the respondent’s
continued stay in office would prejudice the case filed against him.
Upon the other hand, in imposing the shorter period of 60 days of preventive suspension prescribed in the
LGC on an elective official (at any time after the issues are joined), it would be enough that a) there is
reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, b) the
evidence of culpability is strong, c) the gravity of the offense so warrants, or d) the continuance in office of
the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records
and other evidence. [Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole, G.R. No. 108072, December 12, 1995]
Q90: Does reelection to office operate as a condonation of administrative liability for previous
misconduct committed during a prior term?
A90: No. The Aguinaldo doctrine providing for condonation has been abandoned by Carpio-Morales v. CA,
G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015. The Court held that election is not a mode of condoning an
administrative offense, as the same is plainly inconsistent with the concept ordained by the Constitution
that a public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all
times. However, the abandonment of the doctrine is prospective in effect.
Q91: What is the extent of a mayor’s operational supervision and control over the police force, fire
protection unit, and jail management personnel assigned in the mayor’s jurisdiction?
A91: “Operational supervision and control” shall mean the power to direct, superintend, and oversee the
day-to-day functions of police investigation of crime, crime prevention activities, and traffic control in
accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission. It includes the power to
direct the employment and deployment of units or elements of the PNP, through the station commander,
to ensure public safety and effective maintenance of peace and order within the locality. [Section 62, R.A.
No. 6975 (DILG Act)]
Q92: A dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, while on its regular route for garbage
collection, collided with a passenger jeepney, killing the driver. The heirs of the deceased filed a
complaint for damages against the dump truck driver and the municipality. Will it prosper?
A92: No. While municipal corporations are subject to suit even in the performance of governmental
functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued, they are generally not liable for
torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it
can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the
State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental
capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law.
Failing this, the claimant cannot recover. In the case at bar, the municipality cannot be held liable for the
torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental
functions. [Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme, G.R. No. 52179, April 8, 1991]
PAGE 28 OF 34
Q93: What are the grounds for which Commonwealth Avenue may be temporarily closed by the local
government unit concerned?
A93: Commonwealth Avenue, being a national road, may be temporarily closed during an actual
emergency, fiesta celebrations, public rallies, agricultural or industrial fairs, or an undertaking of public
works and highways, telecommunications, and waterworks projects, the duration of which shall be
specified by the local chief executive concerned in a written order. It may also be closed for athletic,
cultural, or civic activities officially sponsored, recognized, or approved by the local government unit
concerned. [Section 21, LGC]
Q94: Who are disqualified from running for any elective local position?
A94: The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad
and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
[R.A. No. 7160, Section 40]
Q95: A law created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring
the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. Petitioner Aquino III was one of two
senators who voted against the approval of the Bill by the Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the
Mayor of Naga City, which was a part of the former second district from which the municipalities of
Gainza and Milaor were taken for inclusion in the new second district. Petitioners contend that the
reapportionment introduced runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum
population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. The
petitioners claim that the reconfiguration of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is
unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000
or only 176,383. Are the petitioners correct?
A95: No. They are not correct. There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000
minimum population that must compose a legislative district. The second sentence of Section 5(3),
Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one
hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at
least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase each city with a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand from the phrase or each province point to no other conclusion than that the
250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province.
PAGE 29 OF 34
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be
entitled to a representative, but not so for a province. [Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 7,
2010].
Q96: Is the conduct of plebiscite required in a legislative apportionment?

A96: No. A plebiscite is not required in a legislative apportionment. The Constitution and the Local
Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the
apportionment or reapportionment provision.
Q97: Differentiate a resolution from an ordinance.

A97: A resolution is upon a specific matter of a temporary nature while an ordinance is a law that is
permanent in character. No rights can be conferred by and be inferred from a resolution, which is nothing
but an embodiment of what the lawmaking body has to say in the light of attendant circumstances.
[Spouses Antonio v. CA, G.R. No. 156684, April 6, 2011]
PAGE 30 OF 34
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Q98: What is the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency?

A98: As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in
person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members. Under this doctrine, which
recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally,
the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Carpio v. Executive Secretary, 1992, citing
Villena v. Secretary of Interior, 1939)
Q99: Distinguish between the subpoena power and contempt power of an administrative agency
A99: The administrative agency shall have the power, in any contested case, to require the attendance of
witnesses or the production of books, papers, documents and other pertinent data, upon request of any
party before or during the hearing upon showing of general relevance.
However, unless otherwise provided by law, the agency may, in case of disobedience, invoke the aid of the
Regional Trial Court within whose jurisdiction the contested case being heard falls. The Court may punish
contumacy or refusal as contempt. (Sec. 13, Book VII, Administrative Code of 1987)
Q100: The Civil Service Commission (an administrative agency vested with quasi-judicial powers), upon
motion of H, who is one of the parties to a case before the Commission, issued a writ of execution to
enforce its order which had become final and executory. The other party, G, opposed and argued that
the Commission had no such power to issue a writ of execution. Is G’s contention correct? Explain.
A100: NO. The authority to decide cases is inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that what
has been decided is carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the
authority to hear and adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of
authority to enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise provides. [GSIS v.
Civil Service Commission, Oct. 15, 1991]
Q101: Under the law, D, the head of the agency, is the officer vested with the power to decide cases
brought before him. Under the rules of procedure promulgated by the agency, D is authorized to
delegate the power to conduct hearings to his subordinates or persons duly designated by him. Is this
rule valid? Explain.
A101: Yes. While the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law, this does
not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the
administrative agency will be made. The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own
judgment and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative
procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the
officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of
the officer authorized by law. Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require
that the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision in the case. As
PAGE 31 OF 34
long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof,
and the decision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question that the requirements of
due process and fair trial are fully met. [American Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents, 1975]
Q102: Differentiate the binding nature of an administrative rule and an administrative interpretation of
a law.
A102: A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed, and
its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in
agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom. On the other hand, administrative
interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law
means. [Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 1962]
Q103: What are the requirements on publication for the effectivity of administrative rules and
regulations?
A103: Pursuant to the ruling in Tañada v. Tuvera (1986) interpreting Article 2 of the New Civil Code,
administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. It must also comply with Sec. 3, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987 which provides that every agency shall file with the University of the
Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it.
The requirements of publication and filing with the Office of National Administrative Register (ONAR)
were put in place as safeguards against abuses on the part of lawmakers and as guarantees to the
constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern and, therefore, require
strict compliance. [Republic v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp., 2008]
(Note: Article 2, NCC has been amended by E.O. 200 to read: Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.)
Q104: What are the requirements for an administrative regulation to have the force of a penal law?
A104: For an administrative regulation to have the force of penal law, (1) the violation of the
administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute itself; and (2) the penalty for
such violation must be provided by the statute itself. [Perez v. LPG Refillers Association of the Phils., Inc.,
2006]
Q105: Does the doctrine of res judicata apply to administrative proceedings?

A105: YES. While the Court has declared that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers, the latter has also been limited to
proceedings purely administrative in nature. Therefore, when the administrative proceedings take on an
adversary character, the doctrine of res judicata certainly applies. [Heirs of Maximino Derla v. Heirs of
Catalina Derla Vda. De Hipolito, Apr. 13, 2011]
Q106: When is prior notice and hearing required for a valid exercise of an administrative agency’s rule-
making power?
A106: As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process,
are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of
its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need
PAGE 32 OF 34
not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing. [Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association of the
Philippines, 1997, citing PHILCOMSAT v. Alcuaz, 1989]
Where the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency applies exclusively to a particular
party, predicated upon a finding of fact, it is held that in making said finding of fact said agency
performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of which demands
previous notice and hearing.
When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises
of a given kind throughout the Philippines - they may partake of a legislative character. [Vigan Electric
Light Co., Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 1963]
However, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. CA (1996), the SC held that when the administrative rule
goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the burden of those governed, it
behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to
be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law. Thus, the due observance
of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and of publication should not have been then ignored. (This
ruling was later cited in GMA Network, Inc. v. COMELEC, 2014)
Note: Under the Administrative Code of 1987, as regards rate-fixing, it is provided in Sec. 9 (2) of Book VII
that “in the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been
published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon”.
Q107: May a respondent in an administrative case compel that he be furnished with a copy of the report
of the investigating committee created to inquire into the charges against him?
A107: NO. A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and
recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is
entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a
reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against him during the hearings
of the investigation committee. [Pefianco v. Moral, 2000, citing Ruiz v. Drilon, 1992]
Q108: What are the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies?
A108:
(1) Purely legal questions.
(2) There is grave doubt as to the availability of the administrative remedy
(3) Steps to be taken are merely matters of form
(4) Administrative remedy not exclusive but merely cumulative or concurrent to a judicial remedy.
(5) There are circumstances indicating urgency of judicial intervention
(6) Rule does not provide plain, speedy, adequate remedy
(7) Resort to exhaustion will only be oppressive and patently unreasonable.
(8) Where the administrative remedy is only permissive or voluntary and not a prerequisite to the
institution of judicial proceedings.
(9) Application of the doctrine will only cause great and irreparable damage which cannot be
prevented except by taking the appropriate court action.
(10) When it involves the rule-making or quasi-legislative functions of an administrative agency
(11) Administrative agency is in estoppel.
PAGE 33 OF 34
(12) Doctrine of qualified political agency (respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an
alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter)
(13) Subject of controversy is private land in land case proceedings.
(14) Violation of due process.
(15) Where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant
(16) Administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(17) Resort to administrative remedy will amount to a nullification of a claim v. CA (1997); [Alzate v.
Aldana, (1960)]
(18) No administrative review provided for by law
(19) Issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies rendered moot
(20) When the claim involved is small
(21) When strong public interest is involved
(22) In quo warranto proceedings
(23)Law expressly provides for a different review procedure.
Note: The exceptions may be condensed into three:

(1) Grave abuse of discretion;
(2) Pure question of law;or
(3) No other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.
PAGE 34 OF 34

UP Pre-Week Poli PDF

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Título original

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

UP Pre-Week Poli PDF

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

2016 University of the Philippines

UP Law Bar Operations Commission 2016

TREATIES EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS

They are concluded:

[Saguisag v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016]

Q13: What is the doctrine of incorporation?

Q19: Differentiate naturalization from repatriation.

Q20: Who are citizens of the Philippines?

Q21: Who are natural born citizens?

Q23: Does the operative fact doctrine apply to executive acts?

Q27: What are the elements of presidential communications privilege?

Q29: What are the three modes of amending the Constitution?

Q31: When is an impeachment proceeding deemed initiated?

Q32: What is a political question?

1) There must be actual invasion or rebellion;

Q39: What is a custodial investigation?

Q40: What is a writ of amparo?

Q41: Are checkpoints legal?

Q44: What is the strict scrutiny standard?

PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW

Q59: Can a COMELEC Commissioner be removed from office administratively?

Q61: Distinguish ad-interim appointments from appointments in an acting capacity.

Q62: Are courtesy resignations valid?

Q63: What are the exceptions to the prohibition on nepotic appointments?

Q67. Can private individuals be subject to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan?

Q68: When is substitution of a candidate allowed?

5. other high crimes, or

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Q76: What is a low-tide elevation?

Q77: How is an island defined under international law?

Q78: How is a rock defined under international law?

Q81: What is the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)?

Q82: Define a treaty under international law.

Q83: What is an erga omnes obligation?

Q84: Who are entitled to immunity from local jurisdiction?

Q85: Define innocent passage.

Q96: Is the conduct of plebiscite required in a legislative apportionment?

Q97: Differentiate a resolution from an ordinance.

Q98: What is the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency?

Q105: Does the doctrine of res judicata apply to administrative proceedings?

Note: The exceptions may be condensed into three:

Você também pode gostar