New Era University
College of Law
AGRARIAN LAWS AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION PART 1
INTRODUCTION: - ANTIOJO
Agrarian Law- The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program, more commonly known as CARP, is an agrarian
reform law of the Philippines whose legal basis is the Republic
Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). It is the redistribution of private
and public agricultural lands to help the beneficiaries survive
as small independent farmers, regardless of the “tenurial”
arrangement.
Its goals are to provide landowners equality in terms of
income and opportunities, empower land owner beneficiaries
to have an equitable land ownership, enhance the
agricultural production and productivity, provide
employment to more agricultural workers, and put an end to
conflicts regarding land ownership.
The agrarian reform is part of the long history of attempts of
land reform in the Philippines. The law was outlined by
former President Corazon C. Aquino through Presidential
Proclamation 131 and Executive Order 229 on June 22,
1987, and it was enacted by the 8th Congress of the
Philippines and signed by Aquino on June 10, 1988. In 1998,
which was the year that it was scheduled to be completed,
the Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8532 to allocate
additional funds for the program and extending the
automatic appropriation of ill-gotten wealth recovered by
the Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) for
CARP until the year 2008.
An amendatory law, CARPER or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program Extension with Reforms or the Republic Act.
9700 was passed. It extended the deadline of distributing
agricultural lands to the farmers for an additional five years.
This law also amends other provisions and regulations
formerly stated in the CARP. It was signed into law on August
7, 2009 and was set to be accomplished by the year 2014.
Social Legislation- Social Legislation consists of laws that
provide particular kinds of protection or benefits to society
or segments thereof in furtherance of social justice.
Constitutional basis
ARTICLE XIII
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of
all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition,
ownership, use, and disposition of property and its
increments.
Section 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the
commitment to create economic opportunities based on
freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
LABOR
Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local
and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for
all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of
tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They
shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility
between workers and employers and the preferential use of
voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation,
and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster
industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and
employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in
the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to
reasonable
returns to
investments,
and to
expansion
and growth.
AGRARIAN
AND
NATURAL
RESOURCES
REFORM
Section 4. The
State shall, by
law,
undertake an
agrarian
reform
program
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers who
are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till
or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of
the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and
undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands,
subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as
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the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the
payment of just compensation. In determining retention
limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners.
The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-
sharing.
Section 5. The State shall recognize the right of farmers,
farmworkers, and landowners, as well as cooperatives, and
other independent farmers’ organizations to participate in
the planning, organization, and management of the program,
and shall provide support to agriculture through appropriate
technology and research, and adequate financial, production,
marketing, and other support services.
Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian
reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance
with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural
resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or
concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights,
homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of
indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in
its own agricultural estates which shall be distributed to them
in the manner provided by law.
Section 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence
fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential
use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both
inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such
fishermen through appropriate technology and research,
adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance,
and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and
conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to
offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against
foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from
their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.
Section 8. The State shall provide incentives to landowners to
invest the proceeds of the agrarian reform program to
promote industrialization, employment creation, and
privatization of public sector enterprises. Financial
instruments used as payment for their lands shall be honored
as equity in enterprises of their choice.
URBAN LAND REFORM AND HOUSING
Section 9. The State shall, by law, and for the common good,
undertake, in cooperation with the private sector, a
continuing program of urban land reform and housing which
will make available at affordable cost, decent housing and
basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in
urban centers and resettlement areas. It shall also promote
adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the
implementation of such program the State shall respect the
rights of small property owners.
Section 10. Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted
nor their dwelling demolished, except in accordance with law
and in a just and humane manner.
No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be
undertaken without adequate consultation with them and
the communities where they are to be relocated.
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social
services available to all the people at affordable cost. There
shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick,
elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall
endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective
food and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate
health, manpower development, and research, responsive to
the country’s health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for
disabled persons for their rehabilitation, self-development,
and self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream
of society.
WOMEN
Section 14. The State shall protect working women by
providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking into
account their maternal functions, and such facilities and
opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable
them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation.
ROLE AND RIGHTS OF PEOPLE’S ORGANIZATIONS
Section 15. The State shall respect the role of independent
people’s organizations to enable the people to pursue and
protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate
and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and
lawful means.
People’s organizations are bona fide associations of citizens
with demonstrated capacity to promote the public interest
and with identifiable leadership, membership, and structure.
Section 16. The right of the people and their organizations to
effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social,
political, and economic decision-making shall not be
abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate the establishment
of adequate consultation mechanisms.
HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 17. (1) There is hereby created an independent office
called the Commission on Human Rights.
(2) The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and
four Members who must be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the
Bar. The term of office and other qualifications and
disabilities of the Members of the Commission shall be
provided by law.
(3) Until this Commission is constituted, the existing
Presidential Committee on Human Rights shall continue to
exercise its present functions and powers.
(4) The approved annual appropriations of the Commission
shall be automatically and regularly released.
Section 18. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the
following powers and functions:
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all
forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights;
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(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure,
and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance
with the Rules of Court
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of
human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as
Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose
human rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention
facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education,
and information to enhance respect for the primacy of
human rights;
(6) Recommend to Congress effective measures to promote
human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of
violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government’s compliance with
international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose
testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in
any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office,
or agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with
law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be
provided by law.
Section 19. The Congress may provide for other cases of
violations of human rights that should fall within the
authority of the Commission, taking into account its
recommendations.
II. RA 3844, as amended-BASCO /PAVICO
1. Social justice
“The Agricultural Land Reform Code has been designed to
promote economic and social stability. Being a social
legislation, it must be interpreted liberally to give full force
and effect to its clear intent, which is ‘to achieve a dignified
existence for the small farmers’ and to make them ‘more
independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens, and a
source of genuine strength in our democratic society’.”
(Coderias v. Estate of Chioco, GR 180476, June 26, 2013)
Raymundo Coderias vs. Estate of Chioco
G.R No. 180476 June 26, 2013
Facts: The deceased Juan O. Chioco owned a 4-hectare
farm in Lupao Nueva Ecija. Petitioner as a tiller of the farm
was issued a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) on April 23,
1974. On 1980, individuals connected with Chioco – who was
a former Governor of Nueva Ecija – threatened to kill
petitioner if he did not leave the farm. His standing crops and
house were bulldozed. For fear of his life petitioner and his
family left the farm. In 1993 upon learning of Chioco’s death,
petitioner and his family reestablished themselves o the farm.
On March 9 1995 petitioner filed with the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board a Petition against the
estate of Chioco praying that his possession and cultivation of
the farm be respected; that the corresponding agricultural
leasehold contract be executed; that he be awarded actual
damages for the destruction of his house, his standing crops,
unrealized harvest from 1980 to 1993, attorney’s fees and
cost of litigation. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the
petition on the ground of prescription under Section 38 of
Republic Act No. 3844. The (PARAD) Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator issued a decision in favor of the
respondent stating that the action of petitioner had already
prescribed. On appeal to DARAB, it issued a decision
reversing the decision of PARAD and ordering that
Respondent –Appellee to respect and maintain the
Petitioner-Appellant in his peaceful possession and
cultivation of the subject landholding and the prayed
monetary damages was awarded. Respondent went up to the
CA by Petition for Review, insisting the prescription of the
cause of action. The CA rendered the assailed decision which
set aside the decision of the DARAB and reinstated the
decision of PARAB. Hence, this Petition for Review on
Certiorari which seeks the reversal of the CA pronouncement
and reinstatement of the DARAB decision.
Issue: Whether or Not the action of petitioner has prescribed
under Section 38 of R.A 3844.
Ruling: No, the prescription of Petitioner has not yet
prescribed.
Section 38. Statute of Limitations - An action to
enforce any cause of action under this Code shall be barred if
not commenced within three years after such action accrued.
Respondent insists that petitioner’s cause of action had
prescribed. It also argues that the CA correctly found that
Section 38 of RA 3844 should apply.
Petitioner on the other hand argues that the three year
prescriptive period under Section 38 of RA 3844 should be
counted from the time that the intimidation by Chioco ceased
upon his death.
It is undisputed a tenancy relationship existed between
petitioner and Chioco under RA 3488. In fact, a CLT had been
issued in favore of the Petitioner; thus, petitioner already had
an expectant right to the farm. A CLT serves as “a provisional
title of ownership over the landholding while the lot owner is
awaiting full payment of just compensation or for as long as
the tenant-farmer in an amortizing owner. Chioco had no
right to evict petitioner and enter the property. More
significantly, Chioco had no right to claim that petitioner’s
cause of action had presicribed. The CA failed to recognize
this vinculum juris, this juridical tie, that exist between the
petitioner and Chioco, which the latter is bound to respect.
Under Section 8 of RA 3844 the agricultural leasehold
relationship shall be extinguished only under any of the
following three circumstances, to wit “(1) abandonement of
the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural
lessor; (2) voluntary surrender of the landholding by the
agricultural lessee, written notice of which shall be served
three months in advance; or (3) absence of the persons under
Section 9 to succeed the lessee x x x.” None of these is
obtaining in this case.
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In this case, the Supreme Court deemed it proper to reckon
petitioner’s cause of action to have accrued only upon his
knowledge of the death of Chioco in 1993, and not at the
time he was forcibly ejected from the landholding in 1980.
For as long as intimidation and threats to petitioner’s life and
limb existed, petitioner had a cause of action to enforce the
recognition of the juridical tie. Since the threat and
intimidation ended with Chioco’s death, petitioner’s
obligation to file a case to assert his right as grantee of the
farm under the agrarian laws within the prescriptive period
commenced.
It is worth reiterating at this juncture that respondent had no
right to claim prescription because a CLT had already been
issued in favor of petitioner. The farm is considered
expropriated and placed under the coverage of land reform
law.
This Court should not allow respondent’s ratiocination, It is a
better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not
be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the
doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice
would result. It must also be emphasized that the statute of
limitations has been devised to operate primarily against
those who slept on their rights and not against those desirous
to act but cannot do so for causes beyond their control.
Petition granted CA decision annulled and set aside DARAB
decision reinstated and affirmed.
2. RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389 abolished and
outlawed share tenancy and put in its stead the agricultural
leasehold system. (Tan v. Pollescas, GR 145568, Nov. 17,
2005) – CAMASO
TAN VS. POLLESCAS, GR 145568, Nov. 17, 2005
FACTS
Petitioners are co-owners of a coconut farmland in Labo
Ozamis City. Enrique Pollescas succeeded from his deceased
father the tenancy relationship of Tan’s coconut farmland.
Reynalda Pollescas (Reynalda), the surviving second spouse,
filed a case with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) – Ozamis, demanding the Tan
Heirs to recognize her as the successor instead. Reynalda was
declared by the DARAB – Ozamis as the lawful tenant.
Harvests were then apportioned between the Tan Heirs and
Reynalda into 2/3 and 1/3 respectively. Reynalda failed to
deliver the 2/3 share and ignored the demands of Tan Heirs.
Tan Heirs filed an estafa case against Reynalda with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC), which found her guilty.
Subsequently, the Heirs of Tan filed an ejectment case for
Reynalda’s continued failure to deliver their share. DARAB –
Misamis Occidental ruled in favor of the Tan Heirs
terminating the tenancy relationship with Reynalda, and
ordered her to turn-over its possession to Tan Heirs.
Reynalda appealed to DARAB – Diliman, Quezon City, which
reversed the decision of DARAB – Misamis Occidental but
ordered her to pay the unpaid leasehold rentals. Tan Heirs
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed
DARAB’s decision. According to the CA, mere failure of a
tenant to pay the landholders share does not necessarily give
the latter the right to eject the former when there is lack of
deliberate intent on the part of the tenant to pay.
ISSUE
Whether or not there is ground for extinguishment of
leasehold relation?
HELD
The Supreme Court finds no ground for the extinguishment of
leasehold relation. Only in the instances stated in Sections 8
and 28 of RA 3844 can leasehold relation be terminated, to
wit: Sec. 8 Extinguishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relation.
The agricultural leasehold relation established under this
Code shall be extinguished by: (1) Abandonment of the
landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor;
(2) Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural
lessee, written notice of which shall be served three months
in advance; or (3) Absence of the persons under Section nine
to succeed to the lessee, in the event of death or permanent
incapacity of the lessee. SEC. 28. Termination of Leasehold by
Agricultural Lessee During Agricultural Year. The agricultural
lessee may terminate the leasehold during the agricultural
year for any of the following causes: (1) Cruel, inhuman or
offensive treatment of the agricultural lessee or any member
of his immediate farm household by the agricultural lessor or
his representative with the knowledge and consent of the
lessor; (2) Non-compliance on the part of the agricultural
lessor with any of the obligations imposed upon him by the
provisions of this Code or by his contract with the agricultural
lessee; (3) Compulsion of the agricultural lessee or any
member of his immediate farm household by the agricultural
lessor to do any work or render any service not in any way
connected with farm work or even without compulsion if no
compensation is paid; (4) Commission of a crime by the
agricultural lessor or his representative against the
agricultural lessee or any member of his immediate farm
household; or (5) Voluntary surrender due to circumstances
more advantageous to him and his family.
“Sec. 3. Composition of Code. – In pursuance of the policy
enunciated in Section two, the following are established
under this Code:
"(1) An agricultural leasehold system to replace all existing
share tenancy systems in agriculture;”
"Sec. 4. Automatic Conversion to Agricultural Leasehold. -
Agricultural share tenancy throughout the country, as herein
defined, is hereby declared contrary to public policy and shall
be automatically converted to agricultural leasehold upon the
effectivity of this section.”
3. Agricultural leasehold – CASTRO A
The Agricultural Leasehold System is established by RA 3844.
Under this leasehold system, farmers pay fixed rentals to
landlords, rather than a percentage of harvest. This is
established to replace all existing share tenancy systems in
agriculture.
The agricultural tenancy is classified into two;
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Leasehold tenancy and share tenancy (no longer sanctioned
under RA No. 6657).
Agricultural Tenancy is the physical possession by a person of
land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed
by another for the purpose of production through the labor
of the former and of the members of his/ her immediate farm
household, in consideration of which the former agrees to
share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain or
ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both. (Sec.
3, RA 1199, as amended)
Share Tenancy exists whenever two persons agree on a joint
undertaking for agricultural production wherein one party
furnished the land and the other his labor, with either or both
contributing any one or several of the items of production,
the tenant cultivating the land personally with aid available
from members of his/her immediate farm household, and the
produce thereof to be divided between the landholder and
the tenant. (Sec. 166 (25), RA 3844)
Leasehold Tenancy exists when a person who, either
personally or with the aid of labor available from members of
his/ her immediate farm household undertakes to cultivate a
piece of agricultural land belonging to or legally possessed by,
another in consideration of a fixed amount in money or in
produce or in both. (Sec 4, RA 1199)
a. Form – Sec. 5
VALENCIA vs COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Petitioner Valencia entered into a 10-year civil law
lease agreement over his two parcels of land with a certain
Glicerio Henson. Before the lease expired, petitioner leased
the property to Fr. Andres Flores for 5-year civil law lease
concept. The latter agreement was subject to a prohibition
against subleasing or encumbering the land without
Valencia’s written consent. The prohibition apparently
included the prohibition against installing a leasehold tenant
thereon.
During the period of the lease, Henson instituted Cresenciano
and Marciano Frias to work on the property. During the lease
of Fr. Flores, private respondents (including Cresenciano)
were designated to cultivate the land. They shared their
produce to Fr. Flores.
When the lease agreement between petitioner and Fr. Flores
expired, petitioner demanded that private respondents
vacate the premises. They refused and continued cultivating
the land. Petitioner then filed a letter of protest with the
Minister of Agrarian Reform to take back the actual
possession of his property. Meanwhile, without knowledge of
petitioner, private respondents applied for Certificate of Land
Transfer (CLT) under the Operation Land Transfer pursuant to
PD 27 claiming they were bona fide tenants of the property.
DAR issued the CLTs to private respondents.
Subsequently, petitioner filed another letter of protest and
requested an investigation and subsequent cancellation of
the CLTs. The investigation found that Bernie Bautista
(designated overseer by Valencia) received shares from
private respondents; that none of those shares were remitted
to Valencia; that when Bautista and his wife refused to give
receipts, the private respondents appropriated to themselves
the landowner’s share; the right of private respondents to the
land ceased upon the termination of the lease agreement
except to that of Catalino Mantac to whom petitioner
entered into a tenancy agreement; and that petitioner did
not receive anything from private respondents as
consideration for tilling his land. It was recommended that
the CLTs be cancelled.
Notwithstanding the investigation report and
recommendation, DAR dismissed Valencia’s protest. He then
appealed to the Office of the President but he only got a
modification which excluded the area petitioner acquired as
homestead. On appeal to the Court of Appeals it was
dismissed for being filed out of time.
ISSUE: Can petitioner’s civil law lessee, install tenants despite
express prohibition in the lease agreement?
HELD: No. The Court ruled that Sec. 6 of RA 3844 does not
automatically authorize a civil law lessee to employ a tenant
without the consent of the landowner. The lessee must be so
specifically authorized. The right to hire a tenant is basically a
personal right of the landowner, except as may be provided
by law.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
A different interpretation would create perverse
and absurd situation where a tenant would technically have a
better right over the property than the landowner himself. He
would then gain security of tenure and eventually become
owner of the land by operation of law.
Moreover, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform held
that a written civil law lease contract between petitioner and
Fr. Flores was on file contained in clear and precise terms the
stipulation prohibiting the subleasing or encumbering of his
parcels of land without the written consent of petitioner. The
Court upheld this and concluded that there is no tenurial
security for private respondents designated by the civil law
lessee.
Even as it uphold time and again the existence and
validity of implied agricultural tenancy agreements, the Court
encourage the forging of written documents. This is to
prevent ambiguity as to the terms set by both parties and for
them to express their intent in clear language. This is because
the principal factor in determining whether there is tenancy
relationship is intent. Furthermore, this would minimize and
prevent the “shotgun approach” to tenancy relations
imposed by some officials of the Government without
complying with the essential requisites of tenancy as
provided by law. Agreements must be entered freely and
voluntarily by the parties concerned without the influence of
third parties, much less the Government, making
representations for either side. An express tenancy
agreement would facilitate the aims of the agricultural
tenancy laws and promote social justice for both landowner
and tenant.
b. Parties – Sec. 6 – CASTRO J
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b.) Section 6. Parties to Agricultural Leasehold Relation - The
agricultural leasehold relation shall be limited to the person
who furnishes the landholding, either as owner, civil law
lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the person who
personally cultivates the same.
Agricultural Lessor - shall mean a person, natural or juridical,
who, either as owner, lessee, usufructuary, or legal
possessor, lets or grants to another the use or cultivation of
his land for a consideration either in shares under the share
tenancy system, or a price certain or ascertainable under the
leasehold tenancy system.
Agricultural Lessee - shall mean a person who, himself and
with the aid available from within his immediate farm
household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by,
another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production,
sharing the produce with the landholder under the share
tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or
ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the
leasehold tenancy system.
Immediate farm household – This concept is enshrined in
Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 3844. The purpose of which is to limit the
tenancy relation to the landholder and the person who
actually works the land himself with the aid of labor available
from within his immediate farm household thereby
eliminating the nominal tenant or middleman from the
picture. Another purpose is to discourage absenteeism on the
part of the lessor and the custom of “co-tenancy” under
which the tenant (lessee) employs another to do the farm
work for him, although it is he whom the landholder (lessor)
deals directly. With this principle, exploitation, discontent,
and confusion will be avoided.
Case:
Valencia vs CA
Facts:
Victor G. Valencia is the owner of two (2) parcels of land
which he leased through the years to different people while
he is in the government service. Before retiring he leased the
property again, this time to Fr. Andres Flores under a civil law
lease subject to a prohibition against subleasing or
encumbering the land without Valencia’s written consent.
Such prohibition also included the prohibition against
installing a leasehold tenant thereon. During the lease of Fr.
Flores he designated more than 15 individuals to cultivate the
land and shared their produce with him. Subsequently, the
farmhands, collectively referred to herein as private
respondents, became recipients of CLT’s (Certificate of Land
Title). When the lease agreement expired, Valencia
demanded the private respondents to vacate the property
but they refused to do so because they contend that they
have Tenancy Relations as prescribed under Sec. 6 of R.A. No.
3844.The lower court favored the private respondents which
deprived the petitioner of his property for 12 years.
Issue:
Whether or not the private respondents are considered as
tenants of the property.
Ruling:
No. Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, does not
automatically authorize a civil law lessee to employ a tenant
without the consent of the land owner. The lessee must first
be specifically authorized. For the right to hire a tenant is
basically a personal right of the land owner. A different
interpretation would create a perverse and absurd situation
where a person who wants to be a tenant, and taking
advantage of this perceived ambiguity in the law, asks a third
person to become a civil law lessee of the landowner.
Incredibly, this tenant would technically have a better right
over the property than the landowner himself. This tenant
would then gain security of tenure, and eventually become
owner of the land by operation of law.
In the present case, the Decision of the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, as modified by the Office of the President through
the Executive Secretary, held that private respondents were
deemed leasehold tenants. They anchored their proposition
on Sec. 6 of R. A. No. 3844, as amended, otherwise known as
The Agricultural Land Reform Code, which states that since
the civil law lessees had a valid contract with Valencia, the
sublessees were automatically deemed his tenants by
operation of law. This conclusion espoused by the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform is arbitrary and unfounded.
The following essential requisites must concur in order to
establish a tenancy relationship: (a) the parties being
landowner and tenant; (b) the subject matter is agricultural
land; (c) there is consent by the landowner; (d) the purpose is
agricultural production; (e) there is personal cultivation by
the tenant; and, (f) there is sharing of harvests between the
parties. An allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the
land in question does not make the case an agrarian dispute.
Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to
security of tenure. The elements of tenancy must first be
proved in order to entitle the claimant to security of tenure.
The security of tenure guaranteed by our tenancy laws may
be invoked only by tenants de jure, not by those who are not
true and lawful tenants.
c. Term – Sec. 7 - CERAS
Section 7. Tenure of Agricultural Leasehold Relation - The
agricultural leasehold relation once established shall confer
upon the agricultural lessee the right to continue working on
the landholding until such leasehold relation is extinguished.
The agricultural lessee shall be entitled to security of tenure
on his landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless
authorized by the Court for causes herein provided. (Section
7 of RA No. 3844)
EMILIA MICKING VDA. DE CORONEL and BENJAMIN
CORONEL, Petitioners vs. MIGUEL TANJANGCO, JR.,
Respondent
G.R. No. 170693, August 8, 2010
Facts:
Miguel Tanjangco, Jr., respondent, is the alleged owner of lot
nos. 37, 38, and 39 which were initially being cultivated by
Emilia Micking Coronel (Emilia) and her husband as
agricultural lessees, and when the latter died, Emilia was
given by force of the government Operations Land Transfer
6
(CLT) covering the lots. Over time, saltwater gradually
saturated the property making it unsuitable for rice
cultivation, thus, an agreement denominated as Kasunduan
sa Pagbabago ng Kaurian ng Lupang Sakahan (Palayan na
Gagawing Palaisdaan) was allegedly entered between
petitioners and respondent to convert lot no. 38 into a fish
farm.
On the other hand, respondent claimed that for a
consideration of P6,000.00, petitioners had bound to
relinquish their rights as tenants not only on lot no. 38 but
also on lot nos. 37 and 39 which were likewise converted into
fish farms following the execution of the agreement and that
the latter purportedly subleased lot no. 38 to a certain Jess
Santos for a term of five years and then to one Dionisio
Toribio, both of whom successively operated fishing ponds on
the land. When respondent supposedly learned about these
leases, he demanded that petitioners vacate not only Lot No.
38 but also Lot Nos. 37 and 39.
In 1976, respondent had filed before the then Ministry of
Agrarian Reform (MAR) a petition for the retention of not
more than seven hectares of inherited land acquired from his
grandparents which include lot no. 38 tenanted by Emilia. On
July 27, 1986, MAR granted respondent’s application and
accordingly, it declared exempt from Operation Land
Transfer the lots subject of the petition and directed that
existing tenants in the covered area be maintained in their
peaceful possession as agricultural lessees.
Issue:
Whether or not the confirmation of respondent’s retention
right over lot no. 38 extinguished petitioner’s leasehold right.
Ruling:
The confirmation of respondent’s retention right over lot no.
38 did not extinguish petitioner’s leasehold right.
Despite the confirmation of respondents retention rights over
lot no. 38, petitioners leasehold right to the land have not
been extinguished. In other words, the placing of lot no. 38
under respondent’s retention limits have made the tenant as
lessee only on said lot. Such status is protected by Section 7
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, which affords security of
tenure.
Section 7 of the law enunciates the principle of security of
tenure of the tenant, such that it prescribes that the
relationship of landholder and tenant can only be
terminated for causes provided by law. Security of tenure is
a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as
life itself and deprivation of their land holdings is tantamount
to deprivation of their only means of livelihood. Perforce, the
termination of the leasehold relationship can take place only
for causes provided by law. The causes are specified in
Sections 8, 28 and 36 of R.A. No. 3844.
In the given case, the respondent questioned the rights of the
petitioner citing Section 36 of RA No. 3844 relative to the
conversion of the subject landholding under the Kasunduan
and the lease agreement allegedly entered by the petitioners.
The court ruled that first, the conversion of the subject
landholding under the Kasunduan is not the conversion of
landholding that is contemplated by Section 36 of the law.
Alarcon v. Court of Appeals defined conversion as the act of
changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into
some other use as approved by the DAR. More to the point is
that for conversion to avail as a ground for dispossession the
opening paragraph of Section 36 implies the necessity of prior
court proceedings in which the issue of conversion has been
determined and a final order issued directing dispossession
upon that ground. In the case at bar, however, respondent
does not profess that at any time there had been such
proceedings or that there was such court order. Neither does
he assert that Lot No. 38and Lot Nos. 37 and 39 for that
matter had undergone conversion with authority from the
DAR.
Second, it is evident from the records that the lease
agreement over Lot No. 38 in favor of Jess Santos was
executed not by petitioners but rather by respondent
himself. It was respondent’s name that appears therein as the
lessor, with Jess Santos acceding to operate a fishing pond on
the land. With respect to the lease agreement with Daniel
Toribio executed after the expiration of the first lease, it was
found out that although it was Boy Coronel who signed in as
lessor, still, this will not suffice as a ground to dispossess
petitioners of the three lots and eject them from the property
inasmuch as dispossession on account of having employed a
sub-lessee under Sections 36 and 27 of R.A. No. 3844 requires
a final judgment of the court in that respect which judgment
was not shown.
d. Mode of payment of rental – Secs. 33, 34 – DALAFU
Section 33. Manner, Time and Place of Rental Payment - The
consideration for the lease of the land shall be paid in an
amount certain in money or in produce, or both, payable at
the place agreed upon by the parties immediately after
threshing or processing if the consideration is in kind, or
within a reasonable time thereafter, if not in kind.
In no case shall the agricultural lessor require the agricultural
lessee to file a bond, make a deposit or pay the rental in
advance, in money or in kind or in both, but a special and
preferential lien is hereby created in favor of the agricultural
lessor over such portion of the gross harvest necessary for
the payment of the rental due in his favor.
Section 34. Consideration for the Lease of Riceland and Lands
Devoted to Other Crops - The consideration for the lease of
riceland and lands devoted to other crops shall not be more
than the equivalent of twenty-five per centum of the average
normal harvest during the three agricultural years
immediately preceding the date the leasehold was
established after deducting the amount used for seeds and
the cost of harvesting, threshing, loading, hauling and
processing, whichever are applicable: Provided, That if the
land has been cultivated for a period of less than three years,
the initial consideration shall be based on the average normal
harvest during the preceding years when the land was
7
actually cultivated, or on the harvest of the first year in the
case of newly-cultivated lands, if that harvest is normal:
Provided, further, That after the lapse of the first three
normal harvests, the final consideration shall be based on the
average normal harvest during these three preceding
agricultural years: Provided, furthermore, That in the absence
of any agreement between the parties as to the rental, the
maximum allowed herein shall apply: Provided, finally, That if
capital improvements are introduced on the farm not by the
lessee to increase its productivity, the rental shall be
increased proportionately to the consequent increase in
production due to said improvements. In case of
disagreement, the Court shall determine the reasonable
increase in rental.
Tan v. Pollescas, GR 145568, Nov. 17, 2005
Heirs of Enrique Tan Sr. vs. Pollescas
Facts:
Petitioners “Tan Heirs” are co-owner of a coconut
farmland located at Labo, Ozamis City. Respondent Reynalda
Pollescas, Esteban’s surviving second spouse, demanded that
Tan recognized her as Esteban’s successor. Reynalda, filed
with DARAB-Ozamis a complaint for annulment of
compromise Agreement, Quieting of Tenancy Relationship
and damages. The DARAB-Ozamis declared Reynalda as the
lawful tenant of the Land. The DARAB-Ozamis apportioned
the harvest between the Tan Heirs and Reynalda based on
the customary sharing system which is 2/3 to the landowner
and 1/3 to the tenant.
On the following harvest dates, 11 and 19 of June, 9
September, 6 and 13 of December 1993, Reynalda failed to
deliver to the Tan Heirs 2/3 of the harvests amounting
toP3,656.70. The Tan Heirs demanded Reynalda to pay such
amount. However, Reynalda ignored the demand.
Consequently, the Tan Heirs filed a complaint
for estafa against Reynalda with the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Ozamis City, Branch 2. Subsequently, for Reynaldas
continued failure to deliver their share, the Tan Heirs filed
with the DARAB, Misamis Occidental (DARAB-Misamis
Occidental) an ejectment case. The DARAB-Misamis
Occidental ruled in favor of the Tan Heirs. Aggrieved by the
decision, Reynalda appealed to the DARAB, Diliman, Quezon
City (DARAB). Respondent-Appellant is hereby ordered to pay
her unpaid leasehold rentals.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE GROUNDS FOR THE
EJECTMENT OF RESPONDENT WAS SERIOUS TO JUSTIFY
EJECTMENT OF RESPONDENT REYNALDA POLLESCAS.
HELD:
The Court of Appeals held that Reynaldas failure to
deliver the full amount of the Tan Heirs share could not be
considered as a willful and deliberate intent to deprive the
Tan Heirs of their share. The Court of Appeals held that
Reynalda honestly believed that she was entitled to a share of
the harvests in 1992-1993 while the case for Annulment of
Compromise Agreement was pending before the DARAB-
Ozamis. Reynalda also believed that she could effect a set-off
for her 1992-1993 share from the 1994 share of the Tan
Heirs. The Court of Appeals further declared that the rental
must be legal to consider non-payment of such as a ground
for ejectment.
Section 7 of RA 3844 as amended provides that once there is
a leasehold relationship, as in the present case, the
landowner cannot eject the agricultural tenant from the land
unless authorized by the court for causes provided by law. RA
3844 as amended expressly recognizes and protects an
agricultural leasehold tenants right to security of
tenure. Section 34 of RA 3844 as amended mandates that not
x x x more than 25% of the average normal harvest shall
constitute the just and fair rental for leasehold. In this case,
the Tan Heirs demanded Reynalda to deliver 2/3 of the
harvest as lease rental, which clearly exceeded the 25%
maximum amount prescribed by law. Therefore, the Tan
Heirs cannot validly dispossess Reynalda of the landholding
for non-payment of rental precisely because the lease rental
claimed by the Tan Heirs is unlawful.
Even assuming Reynalda agreed to deliver 2/3 of the harvest
as lease rental, Reynalda is not obliged to pay such lease
rental for being unlawful. There is no legal basis to demand
payment of such unlawful lease rental. The courts will not
enforce payment of a lease rental that violates the law. There
was no validly fixed lease rental demandable at the time of
the harvests. Thus, Reynalda was never in default.
Reynalda and the Tan Heirs failed to agree on a lawful lease
rental. Accordingly, the DAR must first fix the provisional
lease rental payable by Reynalda to the Tan Heirs pursuant to
the second paragraph of Section 34 of RA 3844 as amended.
Until the DAR has fixed the provisional lease rental, Reynalda
cannot be in default in the payment of lease rental since such
amount is not yet determined. There can be no delay in the
payment of an undetermined lease rental because it is
impossible to pay an undetermined amount. That Reynalda is
not yet in default in the payment of the lease rental is a basic
reason why she cannot be lawfully ejected from the Land for
non-payment of rental.
e. Agricultural leasehold tenancy distinguished from
civil law lease - DINGLASAN
LEASEHOLD CIVIL LAW LEASE
TENANCY
Subject Matter Limited to May be either
agricultural lands rural or urban
property
Attention & Law required the Need not
Cultivation leasehold tenant to personally
personally attend to cultivate or work
, and cultivate the the thing to be
agricultural land leased
Purpose Devoted to Purpose may be
agriculture for any other
lawful pursuit
Law Governing Governed by special Governed by the
Relationship laws Civil Code
8

Gabriel v. Pangilinan, L-27797, 58 SCRA 590
FACTS:
In 1923, Potenciano Gabriel , the original owner of a 16
hectare land in Pampanga entered into a verbal contract with
Eusebio Pangilinan that the former will lease the property to
him at P400 per annum as long as he wanted on the
condition that he would convert the major portion into a
fishpond and improve the existing fishpond therein at his
expense, to be reimbursed by Potenciano or his heirs upon
termination of lease for whatever cause.
Palintiff Trinidad inherited the property when Potenciano
died and honored the her father’s contract with Eusebio but
progressively increased the lease amount to P1,200. In 1957,
Eusebio became ill and incapacitated His daughter, Pilar took
over the administration and hired people to work for
her.Eusebio’s other children were all professionals and
resided in Manila. None of them had been seen working on
the fishpond.
In 1960, Trinidad filed a complaint in the CFI-Pampanga
against Eusebio Pangilinan demanding that the possession of
the property be surrendered to her as she desired to develop
and cultivate the fishpond herself. The defendant impugned
the jurisdiction of the court contending that their case should
have been filed before the Court of Agrarian Relations, which
has original and exclusive jurisdiction, as their relationship is
one of leasehold tenancy.
In 1962, the CFI determined that it had jurisdiction to try and
decide the case, and held that the defendant surrender
possession of the property to plaintiff, and the plaintiff to pay
the defendant P1000 as reimbursement for the improvement
of the fishpond.
ISSUE : WON the case presents a relationship of leasehold
tenancy under RA 1199 or WON the CFI had jurisdiction over
the case.
HELD: No/No
The requisites for leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural
Tenancy Act to exist:
1. land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;
2. land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person
together with members of his immediate
farm household;
3. must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with
the aid of labor available from
members of his immediate farm household;
4. land belongs to another; and
5. use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a
fixed amount in money or in produce or
in both
There is no doubt that the land is agricultural land. It is a
fishpond and the Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to
"agricultural land", specifically mentions fishponds and
prescribes the consideration for the use thereof. The mere
fact that a person works an agricultural land does not
necessarily make him a leasehold tenant within the purview
of Sec 4 of Republic Act No. 1199. He may still be a civil law
lessee unless the other requisites as above enumerated are
complied with.
The court doesn’t want to decide on the second requisite
since it wasn’t raised. For the third requisite, the tenancy
agreement was severed in 1956 when he ceased to work the
fishpond personally because he became ill and incapacitated.
Not even did the members of appellant's immediate farm
household work the land. Only the members of the family of
the tenant and such other persons, whether related to the
tenant or not, who are dependent upon him for support and
who usually help him to operate the farm enterprise are
included in the term "immediate farm household".
Republic Act No. 1199 is explicit in requiring the tenant and
his immediate family to work the land. A person, in order to
be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid
available from his immediate farm household cultivate the
land. Persons, therefore, who do not actually work the land
cannot be considered tenants; and he who hires others
whom he pays for doing the cultivation of the land, ceases to
hold, and is considered as having abandoned the land as
tenant within the meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic
Act. No. 1199, and ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and
privileges of one.
The SC agreed with the court a quo that the relationship
between the appellee Trinidad Gabriel and appellant Eusebio
Pangilinan was not a leasehold tenancy under Republic Act
No. 1199. Hence, this case was not within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1823,
appealed from, was affirmed, with costs against the
appellants.
Valencia v. CA, GR 122363, April 29, 2009 –
GALICINAO/CASTRO J
Valencia vs CA
Facts:
Victor G. Valencia is the owner of two (2) parcels of land
which he leased through the years to different people while
he is in the government service. Before retiring he leased the
property again, this time to Fr. Andres Flores under a civil law
lease subject to a prohibition against subleasing or
encumbering the land without Valencia’s written consent.
Such prohibition also included the prohibition against
installing a leasehold tenant thereon. During the lease of Fr.
Flores he designated more than 15 individuals to cultivate the
land and shared their produce with him. Subsequently, the
farmhands, collectively referred to herein as private
respondents, became recipients of CLT’s (Certificate of Land
Title). When the lease agreement expired, Valencia
demanded the private respondents to vacate the property
but they refused to do so because they contend that they
have Tenancy Relations as prescribed under Sec. 6 of R.A. No.
3844.The lower court favored the private respondents which
deprived the petitioner of his property for 12 years.
Issue:
9
Whether or not the private respondents are considered as
tenants of the property.
Ruling:
No. Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, does not
automatically authorize a civil law lessee to employ a tenant
without the consent of the land owner. The lessee must first
be specifically authorized. For the right to hire a tenant is
basically a personal right of the land owner. A different
interpretation would create a perverse and absurd situation
where a person who wants to be a tenant, and taking
advantage of this perceived ambiguity in the law, asks a third
person to become a civil law lessee of the landowner.
Incredibly, this tenant would technically have a better right
over the property than the landowner himself. This tenant
would then gain security of tenure, and eventually become
owner of the land by operation of law.
In the present case, the Decision of the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, as modified by the Office of the President through
the Executive Secretary, held that private respondents were
deemed leasehold tenants. They anchored their proposition
on Sec. 6 of R. A. No. 3844, as amended, otherwise known as
The Agricultural Land Reform Code, which states that since
the civil law lessees had a valid contract with Valencia, the
sublessees were automatically deemed his tenants by
operation of law. This conclusion espoused by the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform is arbitrary and unfounded.
The following essential requisites must concur in order to
establish a tenancy relationship: (a) the parties being
landowner and tenant; (b) the subject matter is agricultural
land; (c) there is consent by the landowner; (d) the purpose is
agricultural production; (e) there is personal cultivation by
the tenant; and, (f) there is sharing of harvests between the
parties. An allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the
land in question does not make the case an agrarian dispute.
Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to
security of tenure. The elements of tenancy must first be
proved in order to entitle the claimant to security of tenure.
The security of tenure guaranteed by our tenancy laws may
be invoked only by tenants de jure, not by those who are not
true and lawful tenants.
Jusayan v. Sombilla, GR 163928 (2015)- LUCINARIO/TTO
G.R. No. 163928, January 21, 2015
JUSAYAN v. SOMBILLA
TOPIC : Agricultural Leasehold Tenancy vs Civil Law Lease
Facts:
Jesena, owner of four parcels of land, entered into
an agreement with respondent Sombilla wherein Jesena
designated Jorge as his agent to supervise the tilling and
farming of his riceland in crop year 1970-1971. Before the
expiration of the agreement, Jesena sold the four parcels of
land to Jusayan. They verbally agreed that Sombilla would
retain possession of the parcels of land and would deliver 110
cavans of palay annually to Jusayan without need for
accounting of the cultivation expenses provided that Sombilla
would pay the irrigation fees. From 1971 to 1983, Jusayan
and Sombilla followed the arrangement. In 1975, the parcels
of land were transferred in the names of Jusayan’s sons,
(petitioners). In 1984, Jusayan sent several letters to Jorge
terminating his administration and demanding the return of
the possession of the parcels of
land.hanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Due to the failure of Sombillo to render accounting and
to return the possession of the parcels of land despite
demands, Jusayan filed a complaint for recovery of
possession and accounting against Simbillo, following
Jusayan’s death in 1991, the petitioners substituted him as
the plaintiffs.
Simbillo asserted that he enjoyed security of tenure as
the agricultural lessee of Timoteo; and that he could not be
dispossessed of his landholding without valid cause.cralawred
RTC rendered decision in favor of the petitioners. Simbillo
appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the decision of RTC and
dismissed the case, declaring that the contractual relationship
between the parties was one of agricultural tenancy.
Issue:
Whether a lease of agricultural land between the
respondent and the predecessor of the petitioners was a
civil law lease or an agricultural lease
Held:
The lease is an agricultural lease.
To prove the tenancy relationship, Jorge presented
handwritten receipts indicating that the sacks of palay. In this
regard, rental was the legal term for the consideration of the
lease. Consequently, the receipts substantially proved that
the contractual relationship between Jusayan and Simbillo
was a lease.
Yet, the lease of an agricultural land can be either a
civil law or an agricultural lease.
In the civil law lease, one of the parties binds himself to give
to another the enjoyment or use of a thing for a price certain,
and for a period that may be definite or indefinite.
In the agricultural lease, also termed as a leasehold tenancy,
the physical possession of the land devoted to agriculture is
given by its owner or legal possessor (landholder) to another
(tenant) for the purpose of production through labor of the
latter and of the members of his immediate farm household,
in consideration of which the latter agrees to share the
harvest with the landholder, or to pay a price certain or
ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both.
The Court differentiated between a leasehold tenancy and a
civil law lease in the following manner, namely:
the subject matter of a leasehold tenancy is limited to
agricultural land, but that of a civil law lease may be rural or
urban property;
as to attention and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold
tenant to personally attend to and cultivate the agricultural
land; the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or
work the thing leased;
as to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is
devoted to agriculture; in civil law lease, the purpose may be
for any other lawful pursuits;
10
as to the law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by
the Civil Code, but the leasehold tenancy is governed by
special laws.
Simbillo, proved all the requisites of his agricultural
tenancy by substantial evidence. His knowledge of and
familiarity with the landholding, its production and the
instances when the landholding was struck by drought
definitely established that he personally cultivated the land.
The parties are ordered to comply with
their undertakings as agricultural lessor and agricultural
lessee.
4. Requisites for the existence of tenancy relations -
REYES
a) The parties are the landholder and the tenant;
b) The subject is agricultural land;
c) There is consent by the landholder for the tenant to
work on the land, given either orally or in writing, expressly
or impliedly;
d) The purpose is agricultural production;
e) There is personal cultivation or with the help of the
immediate farm household; and
f) There is compensation in terms of payment of a
fixed amount in money and/or produce.
Pagarigan v. Yague, GR No. 195203, 756 SCRA 133 (2015)
FACTS: Present case is a petition for review of the decision
of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the
consistent decisions of Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator to eject Pagarigan
from the subject rice land.
The tenancy relationship in the subject land
started with Anastacio Yague (father of Angelita
and Shirley) and Macario Pagarigan, Anastacio’s
stepfather and Antonio’s grandfather. Anastacio
permitted Macario’s son and Antonio’s father,
Alfonso, to replace Macario as tenant of the land
when Macario’s health was failing. Eventually,
Anastacio transferred ownership of the land to her
daughters Angelita and Shirley.
Some time after, Angelita and Shirley noticed a
decline in the quantity of palay delivered to them
in relation to the subject land and when they
conducted an investigation, they were surprised to
know that Antonio, and not Alfonso, was
cultivating the land. In addition to the decline in
their share of the harvest, Angelita and Shirley
took notice of the construction of the house of
Antonio’s son and 2 fishponds within the subject
land’s premises. For these reasons, they filed a
case to eject Antonio from their land.
Antonio primarily contends that Angelita and
Shirley’s father gave him permission to succeed in
cultivating the land. However, he was not able to
provide evidence to support this contention. He
also argues that an implied tenancy has already
been established between him and Angelita and
Shirley due to the latter’s acceptance of a share in
the harvest.
ISSUE: WON tenancy relationship exists between Antonio
and Angelita and Shirley pertinent to the subject
land?
HELD: No, tenancy relations do not exist between
Antonio and Angelita and Shirley. Before a tenancy
relationship can exist between agricultural parties,
the following essential elements/requisites must
concur:
(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant
or agricultural lessee;
(2) the subject matter of the relationship is
agricultural land;
(3) there is consent between the parties to the
relationship;
(4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring
about agricultural production;
(5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant or agricultural lessee; and
(6) the harvest is shared between the landowner
and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
No 3 requirement is lacking. There is definitely no
consent given by Angelita and Shirley for Antonio
to be a tenant in the land. The consent for
Antonio’s tenancy allegedly given by Angelita and
Shirley’s father Anastacio was not corroborated by
any evidence from Antonio.
As for the contention of Antonio that an implied
tenancy was established, the Court held that in
order for an implied tenancy to arise, all the
aforementioned requisites must first arise and
must be corroborated by clear evidence as a
tenancy relationship cannot be presumed.
Caluzor v. Llanillo, GR 155580, 761 SCRA 68 (2015) - TITO
CALUZOR vs LLANILLO
761 SCRA 68
TOPIC: REQUISITES FOR THE EXISTENCE OF TENANCY
RELATION
FACTS:
Llanillo (Lorenzo) owned the parcel of land. The petitioner
averred that Lorenzo took him into the land as a tenant in
1970, giving to him a sketch that indicated the boundaries of
11
the portion he would be cultivating. Even after the death of
Lorenzo, the petitioner continued giving a share of his
produce to the family of Lorenzo through Lorenzo's overseer.
In 1990, respondent Deogracias Lanillo, the son of
Lorenzo, offered to pay the petitioner P17,000.00/hectare of
the cultivated land in exchange for turning his tillage over to
Deogracias. In the end, Deogracias did not pay the petitioner.
Instead, on August 5, 1994, Deogracias and persons acting
under his orders forcibly ejected the petitioner and his family
by levelling their shanty and plantation with the use of a
bulldozer.
Deogracias denied that any tenancy relationship
between him and the petitioner existed; and that to show
that the land in controversy had not been tenanted, he
presented several documents
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) dismissed
the complaint of the petitioner for lack of essential requisites
of a tenancy relationship.
Complainant failed to submit any evidence to prove that the
landowners gave their consent for him to work on the land
except the sketch of the land which he alleged that Lorenzo
Llanillo gave him.
DARAB rendered decision in favor of the petitioner. That the
petitioner verbally instituted as such by Llanillo.
However, CA reversed the ruling of the DARAB and reinstated
the PARAD's decision
ISSUE: Whether or not tenancy relationship existed between
the parties.
HELD: NO
For tenancy relationship to exist, therefore, the following
elements must be shown to concur, to wit: (1) the parties
are the landowner and the tenant;
(2) the subject matter is agricultural land;
(3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
(4) the purpose is of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production;
(5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and
(6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or
agricultural lessee.
The presence of all these elements must be proved by
substantial evidence; this means that the absence of one will
not make an alleged tenant a de jure tenant. Unless a person
has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not
entitled to security of tenure or to be covered by the Land
Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy
laws.
The third and sixth elements of agricultural tenancy
were not shown to be presented in this case.
To prove the element of consent between the parties, the
petitioner testified that Lorenzo had allowed him to cultivate
the land by giving to him the sketch of the lot in order to
delineate the portion for his tillage. Yet, the sketch did not
establish that Lorenzo had categorically taken the petitioner
in as his agricultural tenant. This element demanded that the
landowner and the tenant should have agreed to the
relationship freely and voluntarily, with neither of them
unduly imposing his will on the other. The petitioner did not
make such a showing of consent.
Independent and concrete evidence is necessary
to prove personal cultivation, sharing of harvest, or consent
of the landowner. Substantial evidence necessary to establish
the fact of sharing cannot be satisfied by a mere scintilla of
evidence; there must be concrete evidence on record
adequate to prove the element of sharing. To prove sharing
of harvests, a receipt or any other credible evidence must be
presented, because self serving statements are inadequate.
Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed; the elements for
its existence are explicit in law and cannot be done away with
by conjectures. Leasehold relationship is not brought
about by the mere congruence of facts but, being a legal
relationship, the mutual will of the parties to that relationship
should be primordial. For implied tenancy to arise it is
necessary that all the essential requisites of tenancy must be
present.
The Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari for lack of
merit.
Ofilada v. Andal, GR 192270 (2015)- ANTIOJO
OFILADA vs. ANDAL
FACTS:
Irene, together with her husband Carlos Ofilada (Carlos),
bought from the heirs of Teresita Liwag (Teresita) a 27,974-
square meter parcel of land principally planted with
rambutan, a number of coconut trees and other fruit-bearing
plants located in Barrio Puri, Tiaong, Quezon. The sale is
evidenced by an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate with
Absolute Sale, wherein respondent Miraflor Andal, who
brokered the sale of the property, signed as ‘tenant.’
Ten days prior to the sale, Miraflor appeared before
Anastacio Lajara, the then Barangay Agrarian Reform Council
(BARC) Chairman of Barangay Puri, San Antonio, and
executed a Pagpapatunay that there was no tenant in the
said land.
Two weeks after the sale, Miraflor, with the consent of her
husband, respondent Ruben, executed a Sinumpaang
Salaysay wherein she acknowledged Irene and Carlos as the
new owners of the property. And that she nevertheless
waived any tenancy rights that she and her husband might
have over the land. Then, the land was registered in the
names of Irene and Carlos.
Eight years later, Irene filed against the spouses Andal a
Complaint for Ejectment and Damages before the MTC of San
Antonio, Quezon. She averred that she and Carlos also
acquired an 8,640-square meter ricefield located in Pulo, San
Antonio, Quezon. For humanitarian reasons, she acceded to
the spouses Andal’s request to take care of her two parcels of
land, provided that they would not be considered as tenants.
12
The spouses Andal denied Irene’s allegations and claimed
that they were tenants of Irene’s predecessor-in-interest and
continued to be such despite the transfer of ownership of the
properties to Irene.
Irene averred that her real properties are not covered by
agrarian reform laws as they are within the retention limit
allowed by law. She stressed that the spouses Andal had
already voluntarily surrendered their rights as tenants way
back in 1997 as evidenced by the Pagpapatunay and
the Sinumpaang Salaysay. She added the said spouses
voluntarily waived their rights and received P1.1 million as
commission for brokering the sale.
The MTC rendered its Decision holding that spouses Andal
failed to adduce proof that they are tenants. The RTC
Decision affirmed in toto the MTC ruling. CA reversed and
ratiocinated that since the existence of tenancy relations
between the previous owners of the properties and the
spouses Andal is undisputed, the question of whether the
said spouses may be dispossessed therefrom constitutes an
agrarian dispute, hence, jurisdiction is in the DARAB.
ISSUE:
WON tenancy relationship between Irene and the spouses
Andal exist, as to strip off the MTC of its jurisdiction over
Irene’s suit for unlawful detainer.
RULING: NO Tenancy relationship between Irene and spouses
Andal. MTC has jurisdiction.
The Court holds that absent any tenurial relationship
between them, the spouses Andal’s possession of Irene’s
properties was by mere tolerance of the latter. The action to
dispossess the spouses Andal therefrom is therefore a clear
case of summary action for ejectment cognizable by the
regular courts.
The tenancy relationship between the former owners of the
properties and the spouses Andal was clearly severed prior to
Irene’s purchase of the same; no such relationship was
subsequently created between Irene and the spouses Andal.
** For tenancy to be proven, all indispensable elements must
be established, the absence of one or more requisites will not
make the alleged tenant a de facto one. These are: 1) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant; 2) the subject is
agricultural land; 3) there is consent by the landowner; 4) the
purpose is agricultural production; 5) there is personal
cultivation; and 6) there is sharing of the harvests.
Anent the proof of sharing of harvest, what the spouses
Andal merely presented was a single receipt representing
Irene’s ‘share’ in the harvest. This even militates against the
spouses Andal’s claim of tenancy considering that they did
not present the receipts for the alleged sharing system prior
to 2005 or from 1997, the year when Irene purchased the
land. Notably, the receipt they submitted is dated July 27,
2005 or just a few months before the filing of the complaint.
To the Court’s mind, such act of the spouses Andal to give
Irene a share is a mere afterthought, the same having been
done during the time that Irene was already making serious
demands for them to account for the produce of the lands
and vacate the properties.
The fact of receipt, without an agreed system of sharing, does
not ipso facto create a tenancy.”
Caballes v. DAR, L-78214, 168 SCRA 247- BASCO/Internet
source
CABALLES vs. DAR
G.R. No. 78214 December 5, 1988
YOLANDA CABALLES, petitioner, vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. HEHERSON T.
ALVAREZ and BIENVENIDO ABAJON, respondents.
FACTS:
The landholding situated at Lawaan Talisay, Cebu which
consists of only sixty (60) square meters wasacquired by the
spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated July 24, 1978executed by Andrea
Millenes .
In 1975, before the sale of the land in favor of the Caballes
spouses, private respondent Bienvenido Abajon constructed
his house on a portion of the said landholding, paying a
monthly rental of P2.00 to the previous owner, Andrea
Millenes. Millenes likewise allowed Abajon to plant on a
portion of the land, agreeing that theproduce thereof would
be shared by both on a fifty-fifty basis. From 1975-1977,
Abajon planted corn and bananas on the landholding. In
1978, he stopped planting corn but continued to plant
bananas and camote.
Sometime in March 1979, after the property was sold, the
new owners, Arturo and Yolanda Caballes, told Abajon that
the poultry they intended to build would be close to his
house and pursuaded him to transfer hisdwelling to the
opposite or southern portion of the landholding. Abajon
offered to pay the new owners rental on the land occupied
by his house, but his offer was not accepted. Later, the new
owners asked Abajon to vacatethe premises, saying that they
needed the property. But Abajon refused to leave. The
parties had a confrontation before the Barangay Captain but
failed to reach an agreement. All the efforts exerted by the
landowners to oust Abajon from the landholding were in vain
as Abajon simply refused to budge.
On April 1, 1982, Yolanda Caballes, executed an Affidavit
stating that immediately after she reprimandedAbajon for
harvesting bananas and jackfruit from the property without
her knowledge, Abajon, with malicious and ill intent, cut
down the banana plants on the property worth about P50.00.
A criminal case for malicious mischief was filed against
Abajon. (Obviously, all the planting on the property, including
that of the banana plants, had been done by Abajon.)
CONTENTION OF THE STATE:
DAR, through its new Minister, Heherson Alvarez, held that
said criminal case is not proper for trial, since there is the
existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties, and
that the case was designed to harass Abajon into vacating his
tillage. The Caballes are legally bound to respect the tenancy
13
of Abajon, since Abajon is still considered as an agricultural
tenant even if he is cultivating only a 60-square meter portion
of the commercial lot of the Caballes.
CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER:
Public respondents, DAR & Hon. Alvarez, gravely erred in
holding that the criminal case is not proper for trial and
hearing by the court since the private respondent, Abajon, is
not an agricultural tenant. (The criminal case for malicious
mischief filed against Abajon should be declared as proper for
trial so that proceedings in the lower court can resume.)
RESOLUTION: The SC dismissed the criminal case. They held
that “The private respondent can not be held criminally liable
for malicious mischief in cutting the banana trees because, as
an authorized occupant or possessor of the land, and as
planter of the banana trees, he owns said crops including the
fruits thereof. The private respondent's possession of the
land is not illegal or in bad faith because he was allowed by
the previous owners to enter and occupy the premises. In
other words, the private respondent worked the land in
dispute with the consent of the previous and present owners.
Consequently, whatever the private respondent planted and
cultivated on that piece of property belonged to him and not
to the landowner. Thus, an essential element of the crime of
malicious mischief, which is "damage deliberately caused to
the property of another ," is absent because the private
respondent merely cut down his own plantings .
Gabriel v. Pangilinan, L-27797, 58 SCRA 590 – CAMASO
GABRIEL VS. PANGILINAN, L-27797, 58 SCRA 590
FACTS
Gabriel filed a complaint before the CFI against Pangilinan
alleging that she is the owner of a fishpond situated in
Pampanga which she started leasing to Pangilinan by virtue of
an oral contract of lease on a yearly basis. At some point
thereafter, Gabriel decided to develop the fishpond by herself
and informed Pangilinan that she is not amenable to renewal
of the lease for another year to which Pangilinan requested
for a postponement. Gabriel agreed and deferred another
demand to terminate the lease in the succeeding year to
which Eusebio refused yielding to the instant complaint.
Pangilinan avers the improper taking of cognizance of the CFI
asserting that proper jurisdiction should be with the Court of
Agrarian Relations there being an agricultural leasehold
tenancy relationship between the parties. (Court of Agrarian
Relations has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
leasehold tenancy.) The records show that Pangilinan ceased
to work personally over the fishpond and used the aid of
helpers since he became ill and incapacitated. From this
moment, his daughter, Pilar Pangilinan, took over the tasks
related in managing the fishpond.
ISSUE
Whether or not tenancy relationship exist?
HELD
There exist no tenancy relationship. In order that leasehold
tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act may exist, the
following requisites must concur: 1. That the land worked by
the tenant is an agricultural land; 2. That the land is
susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with
members of his immediate farm household; 3. That the land
must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with the
aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm
household; 4. That the land belongs to another; and 5. That
the use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a
fixed amount in money or in produce or in both. First
requisite is complied with. The subject land is classified as an
agricultural land as this term includes fishponds. Second
requisite not complied with considering the humongous area
of the land (17 hectares). Third requisite was not complied
with. The antecedents of the case show that Pangilinan
ceased to be a tenant when he stopped personally cultivating
the land after he became physically incapacitated. His
daughter had not been personally cultivating the fishpond
but merely does acts of administration over the fishpond.
Furthermore, the persons named as working the fishpond are
not members of the immediate farm household of Pangilinan.
The law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate
family to work the land. A person, in order to be considered a
tenant, must himself and with the aid available from his
immediate farm household cultivate the land. Persons,
therefore, who do not actually work the land cannot be
considered tenants; and he who hires others whom he pays
for doing the cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is
considered as having abandoned the land as tenant, and
thereby ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and privileges of
such.
Oarde v. CA,GR 104774-75, 280 SCRA 235- CASTRO A
*Requisites for the existence of tenancy relations
OARDE vs COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Petitioners Oarde and Moral seeks to enjoin the
private respondents from removing them as tenant-tillers of
the land in question.
The original tiller of the land was Francisco Molar
who happens to be the father of petitioner Presentacion
Molar, Basilio Molar and Melicia Oarde (petitioner Oarde’s
wife). The land was previously owned by Private respondents
Sps. Wilfredo and Lourdes Guerrero. They sold the involved
parcels of land to co-private respondents Sps. Rogelio and
Vilma Moral. Rogelio is the son of Basilio.
Oarde, testified that he began to till the land in
question when he got married to his wife Melicia. He
presented witnesses to corroborate his claims. One of the
witnesses was Gregorio Magnaye, an employee of the Bureau
of Lands and was the chief of the survey team that conducted
the survey in Gotob. Based on the survey, Oarde was tilling
two lots, Lots 17 and 18.
On the claim of Petitioner Presentacion Molar, she
alleged that she started tilling the land in 1965. She caused
the land to be worked on pakyaw basis, hiring different
persons for different work. She actually does not till the land.
She submitted documentary evidences, however, Jose Neo,
14
an employee of DAR, testified that he did not participate in
the preparation of the document presented in evidence.
The trial court ruled that both petitioners are not
lawful tenants. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the
ruling in regard to petitioner Molar but reversed in respect to
petitioner Oarde.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner Molar is a lawful tenant.
HELD: No, petitioner Molar is not a lawful tenant.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are
the following:
The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
The subject is an agricultural land;
There is consent;
The purpose is agricultural production;
There is personal cultivation; and
There is sharing of harvests
All of these must concur to establish the juridical relationship
of tenancy. In this case, both the trial court and court of
appeals found that Molar herself did not actually cultivate the
land, nor did her immediate family or farm household.
Instead, she hired other people to do all phases of farm work.
Even her co-petitioner testified that she did not actually till
the land and that she merely paid laborers to perform such
task.
As to the documentary exhibits she presented and her
allegation that she “has been a registered tenant-tiller of Lot
1 since 1977” as evidenced by certifications from a team
leader of the DAR, the Court ruled that the certifications
issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain
person is a tenant are merely provisional and not conclusive
on courts.
The cited case1 of petitioner does not support her claim as
well. The conclusion reached by the Court in that case as to
the existence of tenancy relationship was based on the
evidence presented before the trial court and not on the
certifications issued by DAR; said certifications merely
“reaffirmed” and “strengthened” the conclusion of the court.
As to the argument that the Respondent court failed to apply
certain laws2, the Court ruled that those laws enumerate the
benefits available to a tenant. Since, petitioner Molar failed
to prove that she was a tenant, those provisions are
inapplicable to her.
Qua v. CA, GR 95318, 198 SCRA 236 – CASTRO J
Qua vs CA
Facts:
Petitioner Lourdes Pena Qua is the owner of a parcel of a
residential land in Albay. Inside the land in question is an auto
repair shop and three (3) houses, all owned by herein private
respondents. The said property also had 500 coconut trees
and other plantation but only 50 of them survived. The stay
1
Don Pepe Henson Enterprises vs Pangilinan
2Sec.6, RA 6657, Sec.106, PD 1529, Sec.10 RA 3844, Sec. 9 RA 1199, Sec. 4 PD 583,
Sec.12 RA 6389
of said respondents was only by mere tolerance and they are
in fact nothing but squatters. In their answer, private
respondents aver that they are tenants of the land instituted
by the former owner who passed away and allegedly
permitted them to construct the auto repair shop and the
houses. Because of their refusal to leave, a complaint for
ejectment was filed by Qua. The RTC modified the judgment
of the MTC and dismissed the case in so far as Carmen Carillo
who was allowed to stay in the property. Believing that even
private respondent Carmen Carillo does not qualify as an
agricultural tenant, Qua pursued her case until it reached the
SC.
Issue:
WON private respondent Carillo is an agricultural tenant and
should be allowed to stay in the property?
Ruling:
No. It is clear from the foregoing that the source of livelihood
of private respondents is not derived from the lots they are
allegedly tenanting. This conclusion is further supported by
private respondent Carmen Carillo's assertion that the auto
repair shop was constructed with the consent of petitioner's
predecessor-in-interest for whom her husband served as a
driver-mechanic.
From private respondents' manner of caring for the lots, it is
also apparent that making the same agriculturally viable was
not the main purpose of their occupancy, or else they should
have immediately replanted coconut trees in place of those
that did not survive. Indeed, the location of their auto repair
shop being near the poblacion and along the highway, private
respondents chose to neglect the cultivation and propagation
of coconuts, having earned, through the automobile repair
shop, more than enough not only for their livelihood but also
for the construction of two other dwelling houses thereon. It
is also intimated by the Regional Trial Court that there is no
direct evidence to confirm that the parties herein observed
the sharing scheme allegedly set-up between private
respondents and petitioner's predecessor-in-interest.
Tan vs. Pollescas
Facts:
The Tan Heirs are co-owners of a coconut farmland where
Esteban Pollescas was the original tenant. When Esteban
died, his son, Enrique Pollescas succeeded him and became
the tenant. However, respondent Reynalda Pollescas,
Esteban’s surviving second spouse opposed to the said
succession and filed a case before the DARAB-Ozamis for her
to be recognized as Esteban’s successor. Subsequently, the
DARAB-Ozamis declared her as the successor and
apportioned the harvests between the Tan Heirs and
Reynalda based on the customary sharing system between
the parties which is 2/3 to the land owner and 1/3 to the
tenant. In 1993, Reynalda failed to deliver to the Tan Heirs
their share. The Tan Heirs demanded Reynalda to pay the
amount but the latter ignored them. Because of this the Tan
Heirs filed a case for estafa against Reynalda to which she
was found guilty. Subsequently, for Reynaldas continued
15
failure to deliver their share, the Tan Heirs filed with the
DARAB, Misamis Occidental an ejectment case.
Issue:
WON Reynalda can be ejected for non-payment of lease
rental.
Ruling:
No. The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that for non-
payment of the lease rental to be a valid ground to dispossess
the agricultural lessee of the landholding, the amount of the
lease rental must first of all be lawful. If the amount of lease
rental claimed exceeds the limit allowed by law, non-
payment of lease rental cannot be a ground to dispossess the
agricultural lessee of the landholding. Section 34 of RA 3844
as amended mandates that not more than 25% of the
average normal harvest shall constitute the just and fair
rental for leasehold. In this case, the Tan Heirs demanded
Reynalda to deliver 2/3 of the harvest as lease rental, which
clearly exceeded the 25% maximum amount prescribed by
law. Therefore, the Tan Heirs cannot validly dispossess
Reynalda of the landholding for non-payment of rental
precisely because the lease rental claimed by the Tan Heirs is
unlawful.
Even assuming Reynalda agreed to deliver 2/3 of the harvest
as lease rental, Reynalda is not obliged to pay such lease
rental for being unlawful. There is no legal basis to demand
payment of such unlawful lease rental. The courts will not
enforce payment of a lease rental that violates the law. There
was no validly fixed lease rental demandable at the time of
the harvests. Thus, Reynalda was never in default.
Reynalda and the Tan Heirs failed to agree on a lawful lease
rental. Accordingly, the DAR must first fix the provisional
lease rental payable by Reynalda to the Tan Heirs pursuant to
the second paragraph of Section 34 of RA 3844 as
amended.[30] Until the DAR has fixed the provisional lease
rental, Reynalda cannot be in default in the payment of lease
rental since such amount is not yet determined. There can be
no delay in the payment of an undetermined lease rental
because it is impossible to pay an undetermined amount.
That Reynalda is not yet in default in the payment of the
lease rental is a basic reason why she cannot be lawfully
ejected from the Land for non-payment of rental.
Bejasa v. CA, GR 108941, July 6, 2000 - CERAS
REYNALDO BEJASA AND ERLINDA BEJASA, petitioners vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Special Sixteenth
Division, ISABEL CANDELARIA and JAIME DINGLASAN,
respondents
G.R. No. 108941, July 6, 2000
Facts:
Isabel Candelaria indisputably owned two parcels of land
covered by TCT Nos. T-58191, and T-59172. She entered into
a three-year lease agreement with over said parcels of land to
Pio Malabanan wherein the latter agreed to clear, clean, and
cultivate the land, to purchase or procure calamansi, citrus
and rambutan seeds or seedlings, to attend and care for
whatever plants are thereon, to make the necessary harvest
of fruits, etc.
Malabanan, hired petitioners to plant on the land and clean
it. The latter claimed that they planted on the land and
shouldered all the expenses of production.
A modification to the previous agreement between
Candelaria and Malabanan was effected wherein the former
gave to the latter the usufruct over the land in which no
obligation on the part of Malabanan to share the harvest.
Sometime in 1983, Malabanan died. On 1984, Candelaria
entered into a one-year new lease contract with Victoria
Dinglasan. On the same year, petitioners agreed to pay
Dinglasan rent of P15,000.00 in consideration of aryenduhan
or pakyaw na bunga with a term of one year. After
aryenduhan expired, the petitioner continued to stay without
any consideration for its use despite repeated demand of
Dinglasan to vacate said land.
Issue:Whether or not there is a tenancy relationship in favor
of the petitioners.
Ruling: No tenancy relationship in favor of the petitioners.
The elements of a tenancy relationship are:
(1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
(2) The subject is agricultural land;
(3) There is consent;
(4) The purpose is agricultural production;
(5) There is personal cultivation; and
(6) There is sharing of harvests.
After the court examined the three relevant relationships in
this case, it ruled that no tenancy relationship between the
parties existed.
Malabanan and the Bejasas: There was no proof that they
shared the harvests. Reynaldo Bejasa testified that as
consideration for the possession of the land, he agreed to
deliver the landowners share (1/5 of the harvest) to
Malabanan. Only Reynaldo Bejasas word was presented to
prove this. Even this is cast into suspicion. At one time
Reynaldo categorically stated that 25% of the harvest went to
him, that 25% was for Malabanan and 50% went to the
landowner, Candelaria. Later on he stated that the
landowners share was merely one fifth. "Self serving
statements ... are inadequate; proof must be adduced.
Candelaria and the Bejasas: Candelaria as landowner never
gave her consent.The Bejasas admit that prior to 1984, they
had no contact with Candelaria. They acknowledge that
Candelaria could argue that she did not know of Malabanans
arrangement with them. True enough Candelaria disavowed
any knowledge that the Bejasas during Malabanans lease
possessed the land.
Dinglasan and the Bejasas: There was no agreement as to
harvest sharing. The only agreement between them is the
"aryenduhan", which states in no uncertain terms the
monetary consideration to be paid, and the term of the
contract.
Therefore, not all the elements of tenancy were met.
16
Salmorin v. Zaldivar, GR 169691, July 23, 2008-
DALAFU/REYES
Salmorin vs. Zaldivar
Facts:
On July 15, 1989, respondent Dr. Pedro Zaldivar, as
legal possessor of a lot in Antique, entered into an agreement
(Kasugtanan) with Salmorin designating him as administrator
of the lot with a monthly salary of P150. Salmorin allegedly
did not comply with the terms of the Kasugtanan when he
failed to till the vacant areas. This compelled Zaldivar to
terminate his services and eject him from the lot. When
Salmorin refused to vacate the property, Zaldivar filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer against him in the MCTC. In
his answer, Salmorin alleged the existence of a tenancy
relationship between him and Zaldivar. Thus, he claimed that
the case was an agrarian matter over which the MCTC had no
jurisdiction. MCTC found that the case was in the nature of an
agrarian dispute and dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction Zaldivar appealed to RTC which ruled in his favor.
The RTC found that the consent of the landowner and sharing
of the harvest, which were requisites for the existence of a
tenancy relationship, did not exist. Thus, it ruled that the
MCTC had jurisdiction over the case and ordered therein
statement of Civil Case. Salmorin appealed the RTC decision
to the CA but the latter upheld the decision of the RTC. He
now seeks a reversal of the RTC and CA decisions.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a tenancy relationship between the
petitioner and the respondent.
Held:
Contrary to the findings of the MCTC, both the RTC and the
CA found that there was no tenancy relationship between
Salmorin and Zaldivar. A tenancy relationship cannot be
presumed. In Saul v. Suarez, we held: There must be evidence
to prove the tenancy relations such that all its indispensable
elements must be established, to wit: (1) the parties are
the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural
land; (3) there is consent by the landowner; (4) the purpose is
agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and
(6) there is sharing of the harvests. All these requisites are
necessary to create tenancy relationship, and the absence of
one or more requisites will not make the alleged tenant a de
facto tenant. All these elements must concur. It is not enough
that they are alleged. To divest the MCTC of jurisdiction,
these elements must all be shown to be present.
Tenancy is a legal relationship established by the existence of
particular facts as required by law. In this case, the RTC and
CA correctly found that the third and sixth elements, namely,
consent of the landowner and sharing of the harvests,
respectively, were absent. We find no compelling reason to
disturb the factual findings of the RTC and the CA.
The fact alone of working on another's landholding does not
raise a presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy.
There must be substantial evidence on record adequate to
prove the element of sharing. Salmorin’s attempt topersuade
us by way of a certification coming from the Barangay
Agrarian Reform Committee attesting that he was a Bonafide
tenant of Zaldivar deserves scant consideration. Certifications
issued by municipal agrarian reform officers are not
binding on the courts. In a given locality, merely preliminary
or provisional are the certifications or findings of the
secretary of agrarian reform (or of an authorized
representative) concerning the presence or the absence of a
tenancy relationship between the contending parties; hence,
such certifications do not bind the judiciary. SC noted that
agricultural share tenancy was declared contrary to public
policy and, thus, abolished bythe passage of RA 3844,
as amended.
Share tenancy exists: Whenever two persons agree on a joint
undertaking for agricultural production wherein one party
furnishes the land and the other his labor, with either or both
contributing any one or several of the items of production,
the tenant cultivating the land personally with the aid of
labor available from members of his immediate farm
household, and the produce thereof to be divided between
the landholder and the tenant.
Saul v. Suarez, GR 166664, 473 SCRA 628 – DINGLASAN
SUAREZ VS SAUL
FACTS:
Petitioner Domingo Suarez owns a 23 hectare agricultural
land in South Cotabato. Respondents are his agricultural
tenants on a 25-75 sharing agreement. After 2 croppings,
Suarez voluntarily offered the land for sale to the government
under a VOS in 1993, and the respondents are the farmer-
beneficiaries under CARP, and the same was approved by the
local Land Valuation Officer of the Land Bank of the
Philippines.
While the VOS was being processed, respondents alleged that
petitioner entered into a grower’s agreement with contract
to buy with T’boli Agro-Industrial Development Inc (TADI) .
TADI planted pineapples in the land occupied by the
respondents.
Respondents filed a complaint before the DARAB Regional
Adjudicator for reinstatement with preliminary mandatory
injunction, recovery of possession and damages against
Suarez and TADI, contending that they were deprived of their
landholdings.
The Regional Adjudicator dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit, for the failure of the respondents to prove their
tenancy over the petitioner’s land. And that the respondents
were only potential farmer-beneficiaries of the land subject
to VOS and they only have “inchoate right” to the land since
its coverage under CARP has yet to be completed.
On Appeal, the DARAB Central Office reversed above
decision, declaring the respondents bona fide tenants of the
subject landholding ; ordered the MARO to determine the
disturbance compensation to be awarded to the
respondents; and their reinstatement in their landholdings
after harvest.
17
Petitioner appealed to the CA, which in 2004 affirmed the
decision of the DARAB. Upon denial of the motion for
reconsideration, petitioner filed this instant appeal.
ISSUES:
WON there was a tenancy relationship between petitioner
and respondents.
WON DARAB has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
NO/NO
Indeed, there is nothing in the records to suggest that
respondents were petitioner’s bona fide tenants prior to their
designation by the DAR as potential farmer-beneficiaries
under the CARP. There is no evidence to prove tenancy
arrangement between petitioner and respondents before the
formers voluntary offer to convey the land to the
government.
While petitioner admitted that respondents were tenants in
the land, he qualified in his answer that it was Wennie
Gonzaga of the DAR who installed them as such. Clearly, it
was the DAR who placed respondents in actual possession of
the land upon petitioners offer to transfer the same to the
government. Other than this supposed admission, there is no
evidence on record to prove the tenancy relations.
Even assuming that a tenancy relationship exists between
petitioner and respondents, we find that the latter has no
cause of action against petitioner. It should be noted that the
complaint for ejectment was brought against petitioner
based on the growers contract he had executed with
TADI.[19] Respondents alleged that petitioner deprived them
of their landholdings by entering into a growers contract,
thereby allowing TADI to plant pineapples in respondents
lands. However, an examination of the contract reveals that it
pertains to other lands and not the land being claimed by
respondents.
Petitioners application for VOS covers the land that
respondents are claiming as their landholdings and measures
13.9269 hectares, and is covered by OCT No. (P-31540) P-
11967.[20] The tax declaration and sketch plan describe the
lot as Cadastral Lot No. 111-B, Pls-555, and bounded on the
northeast by Lot Nos. 108 and 105; on the southeast by Lot
No. 114; on the southwest by Lot Nos. 112 and 113; and on
the northwest by Lot No. 111-A.[21]
On the other hand, the lands subject of the growers contract
between petitioner and TADI are Lot No. 117, Pls-555[22]
covered by TCT No. T-26810, Lot No. 119-E, Psd-017487[23]
covered by TCT No. T-41460[24] and Lot No. 119-F, Psd-11-
017487[25] covered by TCT No. T-41461.[26]
It is clear therefore that the subject matter of the growers
contract did not include the land subject of the VOS. Thus,
petitioner could not have caused respondents ejectment
from the subject property by virtue of his transactions with
TADI, since he never authorized the latter to plant on the
subject land. Respondents ejectment from the land was not
pursuant to the contract petitioner had entered into with
TADI who appears to have entered the land without
petitioners consent.
In this case, there is no showing that there exists a tenancy
relationship between petitioner and respondents. Likewise,
respondents have no tenancy relationship with TADI, against
whom they principally have a cause of action. The
controversy is civil in nature since it involves the issue of
material possession, independent of any question
pertaining to agricultural tenancy. Hence, the case falls
outside the jurisdiction of DARAB; it is cognizable by the
regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The DARAB
Decision dated December 14, 2000 in DARAB Case No. 5468
and the Court of Appeals Decision dated August 31, 2004 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 71516, as well as its Resolution dated January
6, 2005, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in
DARAB Case No. XI-249-SC-95 is hereby DISMISSED.
Soliman v. PASUDECO, GR 169589, June 16, 2009 –
GALICINAO
Soliman vs PASUDECO
Facts:
PASUDECO bought a parcel of land to be used as a housing
complex for its laborers and employees. However, PASUDECO
suffered financial setbacks after the imposition of the Martial
Law and deferred the housing project. PASUDECO averred
that no one was authorized to occupy and/or cultivate the
subject property.
On the other hand, petitioners claimed that they were
tenant-tillers of the subject property. They averred that Gerry
(manager of PASUDECO) made one Ciriaco his overseer
tasked to collect the lease rentals from the petitioners.
Ciriaco certified the same.
The Petitioners filed a complaint when PASUDECO decided to
pursue the housing project.
The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)
dismissed the complaint, holding that the petitioners had not
shown direct and convincing proof that they were tenants of
the subject property.
The petitioners filed an appeal with the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which reversed
the PARAD’s decision, holding that it could not be
substantiated that the subject property was indeed
residential property intended for residential housing
purposes. Because of this, and the fact that petitioners tilled
the subject property for almost twenty (20) years, the same
remained agricultural in character.
The CA reversed the DARAB's ruling and reinstated the
PARAD's decision. The CA held that, while the subject
property was agricultural, there was no tenancy relationship
between the parties, express or implied.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a tenancy relationship between the
parties.
Held:
No. the essential elements of tenancy are the following: 1)
the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an
18
agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to
the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to
bring about agricultural production; 5) there is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee;
and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant
or agricultural lessee. The presence of all these elements
must be proved by substantial evidence. Unless a person has
established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to
security of tenure and is not covered by the Land Reform
Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.
Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. Claims that one is
a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure.
Tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of
the true and lawful landholder who is either the owner,
lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the property, and
not through the acts of the supposed landholder who has no
right to the property subject of the tenancy. To rule
otherwise would allow collusion among the unscrupulous to
the prejudice of the true and lawful landholder. As duly found
by the PARAD and the CA, Gerry was not authorized to enter
into a tenancy relationship with the petitioners. In fact, there
is no proof that he, indeed, entered into one.
Valencia v. CA, GR 122363, April 29, 2009 –
LUCINARIO/CASTRO J
Valencia vs CA
Facts:
Victor G. Valencia is the owner of two (2) parcels of land
which he leased through the years to different people while
he is in the government service. Before retiring he leased the
property again, this time to Fr. Andres Flores under a civil law
lease subject to a prohibition against subleasing or
encumbering the land without Valencia’s written consent.
Such prohibition also included the prohibition against
installing a leasehold tenant thereon. During the lease of Fr.
Flores he designated more than 15 individuals to cultivate the
land and shared their produce with him. Subsequently, the
farmhands, collectively referred to herein as private
respondents, became recipients of CLT’s (Certificate of Land
Title). When the lease agreement expired, Valencia
demanded the private respondents to vacate the property
but they refused to do so because they contend that they
have Tenancy Relations as prescribed under Sec. 6 of R.A. No.
3844.The lower court favored the private respondents which
deprived the petitioner of his property for 12 years.
Issue:
Whether or not the private respondents are considered as
tenants of the property.
Ruling:
No. Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, does not
automatically authorize a civil law lessee to employ a tenant
without the consent of the land owner. The lessee must first
be specifically authorized. For the right to hire a tenant is
basically a personal right of the land owner. A different
interpretation would create a perverse and absurd situation
where a person who wants to be a tenant, and taking
advantage of this perceived ambiguity in the law, asks a third
person to become a civil law lessee of the landowner.
Incredibly, this tenant would technically have a better right
over the property than the landowner himself. This tenant
would then gain security of tenure, and eventually become
owner of the land by operation of law.
In the present case, the Decision of the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, as modified by the Office of the President through
the Executive Secretary, held that private respondents were
deemed leasehold tenants. They anchored their proposition
on Sec. 6 of R. A. No. 3844, as amended, otherwise known as
The Agricultural Land Reform Code, which states that since
the civil law lessees had a valid contract with Valencia, the
sublessees were automatically deemed his tenants by
operation of law. This conclusion espoused by the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform is arbitrary and unfounded.
The following essential requisites must concur in order to
establish a tenancy relationship: (a) the parties being
landowner and tenant; (b) the subject matter is agricultural
land; (c) there is consent by the landowner; (d) the purpose is
agricultural production; (e) there is personal cultivation by
the tenant; and, (f) there is sharing of harvests between the
parties. An allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the
land in question does not make the case an agrarian dispute.
Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to
security of tenure. The elements of tenancy must first be
proved in order to entitle the claimant to security of tenure.
The security of tenure guaranteed by our tenancy laws may
be invoked only by tenants de jure, not by those who are not
true and lawful tenants.
5. Burden of proof – REYES
Lumayog v. Pitcock, GR 169628, March 14, 2012
FACTS: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the decisions
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and Municipal
Trial Court (MTCC) holding that no tenancy
relationship existed between Lumayog and Sps
Pitcock and to vacate the barn/stable for
racehorses of the Sps Pitcock accordingly.
In view of Lumayog and his family’s refusal to
vacate the portion of the barn/stable they
occupied as temporary quarters, Sps Pitcock filed
a case for unlawful detainer.
MTCC Ruling: The main issue resolved by the
MTCC was WON Sps Pitcock has the standing to
eject Lumayog and his family from the
bard/stable. It found through sufficient evidence
that the contested occupancy of Lumayog and his
family was only by mere tolerance of the Sps
Pitcock.
RTC Ruling: Affirmed MTCC Ruling.
19
 CA Ruling: Affirmed MTCC and RTC ruling by
holding that there was no tenancy relationship
existing between Lumayog and the Sps Pitcock.
The decision was based on failure of Lumayog to
present any evidence supporting the alleged
tenancy relationship.
ISSUE: WON tenancy relationship exists between
Lumayog (and his family) and Sps Pitcock?
HELD: No, the Court held that there is no tenancy
relationship existing between Lumayog and Sps
Pitcock primarily due to failure of Lumayog to
adduce evidence to support claim of tenancy
status. The elements of tenancy must be proven
through presentation of concrete evidence. The
fact of working on another’s landholding does not
raise a presumption of the existence of tenancy.
Again, there must be concrete evidence to support
tenancy claims. For example, in order to prove the
element of sharing in the harvested product, a
receipt may be presented for the courts’
consideration.
The evidence on record as included in the CA
decision showed the reports of concerned
agencies that the subject land was never used for
agricultural purposes but instead was used for
commercial purposes such as livestock raising,
particularly, horses. On the contrary, no evidence
is presented during trial of the case showing that
the subject land was ever used for agricultural
purposes. Though, there were tax declarations
classifying subject land as cocoland and riceland,
these are insufficient and inconclusive. Tax
declarations do not preclude further inquiry on
the proper classification of a land. The Court, in
this case, placed more credence to the reports
made by concerned agencies.
The Court also made emphasis on its function
relative to review on certiorari and said that It is
not a trier of facts and that facts established by
the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are conclusive
upon the Court. Tenancy relationship is factual in
nature. Hence, the finding of RTC and CA that no
tenancy relationship existed between Lumayog
and Sps Pitcock is conclusive and binding and may
not be subject to review by the Court.
Definition of “tenant” under RA 1199 entitled
Agricultural Tenancy Act:
A tenant is a person, who, himself, and with the
aid available from within his immediate farm
household, cultivates the land belonging to or
possessed by another, with the latter’s consent for
purposes of production, sharing the produce with
the landholder, under the share tenancy system,
or paying to the landholder a price certain or
ascertainable in produce or in money or both
under the leasehold system.
Ceneze v. Ramos, GR 172287, January 15, 2010 – TITO
G.R. No. 172287 : January 15, 2010]
CENEZE VS. RAMOS
TOPIC: BURDEN OF PROOF
FACTS:
Petitioner Ceneze filed an action for declaration as bona
fide tenant-lessee of two parcels of agricultural land owned
by respondent Ramos. Petitioner alleged that in 1981, Julian
Ceneze, Sr. (Julian, Sr.), petitioner's father, transferred his
tenurial rights over the landholding to him with the consent
and approval of respondent and that, since then, petitioner
had been in actual and peaceful possession of the
landholding until April 12, 1991, when respondent forcibly
entered and cultivated the land for the purpose of
dispossessing petitioner of his right as tenant.
Respondent denied that a tenancy relationship existed
between her and petitioner, asserting that she had never
instituted petitioner as a tenant in any of her landholdings.
She averred that petitioner had never been in possession of
the landholding, but admitted that it was Julian, Sr. who was
the tenant of the landholding. When Julian, Sr. migrated to
the (USA) in 1985, respondent allowed Julian, Sr.'s wife to
cultivate the land, but she herself migrated to the USA in June
1988. Respondent later allowed Julian, Sr.'s son, Julian
Ceneze, Jr. (Julian, Jr.), to cultivate the landholding, but he
likewise migrated to the USA in 1991 without informing
respondent. From then on, she took possession of the
landholding, cultivated it and appropriated for herself the
harvest therefrom. On April 8, 1991, she reported to
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) the abandonment
of the landholding by Julian, Sr., his wife and his son, Julian,
Jr.
The Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in favor
of petitioner. The Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) affirmed the decision.
Respondent elevated the case to the CA. The CA resolved the
petition in favor of respondent landowner and reversed the
decision of DARAB
Issue: Whether or not petitioner proved his tenancy
relationship with respondent (landowner)
Held: NO
The Court is guided by the principle that tenancy is
not purely a factual relationship dependent on what the
alleged tenant does upon the land; it is also a legal
relationship. A tenancy relationship cannot be presumed.
20
There must be evidence to prove the presence of all its
indispensable elements, to wit:
(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
(2) the subject is agricultural land;
(3) there is consent by the landowner;
(4) the purpose is agricultural production;
(5) there is personal cultivation; and
(6) there is sharing of the harvest.
The absence of one element does not make an occupant of a
parcel of land, its cultivator or planter, a de jure tenant.
Petitioner failed to establish the existence of a
tenancy relationship between him and respondent. To prove
a tenancy relationship, the requisite quantum of evidence is
substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. The Certification of the BARC Chairman and the
affidavits of Julian, Sr. and of the tenants of the adjacent
landholdings certainly do not suffice. By themselves, they do
not show that the elements of consent of the landowner and
of sharing of harvests are present.
There must be concrete evidence on record adequate
enough to prove the element of sharing. To prove sharing of
harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be presented,
because self-serving statements are inadequate. In this case,
petitioner failed to present a receipt for respondent's share in
the harvest, or any other solid evidence proving that there
was a sharing of harvest.
The petition is DENIED.
6. Security of tenure – Sec. 7 – ANTIOJO
6. Security of Tenure—Section 7. Tenure of Agricultural
Leasehold Relation - The agricultural leasehold relation once
established shall confer upon the agricultural lessee the
right to continue working on the landholding until such
leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee
shall be entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and
cannot be ejected therefrom unless authorized by the Court
for causes herein provided.
DE JESUS vs. IAC GR 72282
Issue posed by petitioner is: whether or not he is an
agricultural lessee or a civil law lessee.
Agricultural lessee- security of tenure is guaranteed by the
Tenancy Law (Sec. 5(b) R.A. 1199)
Civil law lessee- right to work on the land expires in
accordance with the terms of the Lease Agreement.
FACTS:
Private respondents are owners of some 7.162 hectares of
land in Pilar, Bataan. About four (4) hectares of the above lot
is a fishpond possessed by petitioner since 1962 as a lessee.
Private respondents, as heirs of Spouses Eustacio Calimbas
and Modesta Paguio (the registered owners of the land)
entered into a civil law contract of lease, with petitioner de
Jesus and one Felicisima Rodriguez, effective for 2-1/2 years
starting January 1, 1972 to July 1, 1974.
Upon the expiration of the civil law lease contract, Rodriguez
gave up the lease but petitioner de Jesus refused to vacate
the leased premises.
Private respondents filed a complaint for "Recovery of
Possession with Damages" against the petitioner before the
CFI of Bataan Branch II. The CFI Bataan ruled in favor of
petitioner and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
According to the lower court, the fishpond is an agricultural
land as held in the case of Tawatao & del Rosario v. Garcia, et
al. Also, petitioner is an agricultural lessee and not a civil law
lessee, therefore jurisdiction belongs to the Court of Agrarian
Relations (CAR) and not to the CFI. Private respondents filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. They appealed
to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) but was denied
again.
On Motion for Reconsideration, IAC reversed itself holding
that petitioner is not an agricultural lessee but a civil law
lessee and further ordered the latter to vacate the land.
Hence, this petition.
RULING: IAC DECISION AFFIRMED BY SC. Petitioner is not an
agricultural lessee. No security of tenure.
The Agricultural Land Reform Code was enacted by Congress
to institute land reforms in the Philippines. It was passed to
establish owner-cultivatorship and the family size farm as the
basis of Philippine agriculture; to achieve a dignified existence
for the small farmers free from pernicious industrial restraints
and practices; to make the small farmers more independent,
self-reliant and responsible citizens and a source of a genuine
strength in our democratic society.
Petitioner de Jesus contends that he is an agricultural lessee
because a fishpond is an agricultural land as held in the case
of Tawatao v. Garcia, supra. While this is true, the mere fact
that the land is agricultural does not ipso facto make him an
agricultural lessee.
The law is meant to assist and help the small farmers as
enunciated in its Declaration of Policy. Petitioner de Jesus is
not a small farmer but a businessman. To consider him an
agricultural lessee would render nugatory the letter and
intent of the Agricultural Reform Code. He admitted that he
cultivated an adjacent fishpond of 11-1/2 hectares by
employing other laborers, whereby he was more correctly
categorized as a business enterpreneur engaged in the
fishpond industry, and not a small-farmer.
Bernardo v. CA, L-30821, 168 SCRA 439 – BASCO/GALICINAO
Bernardo vs CA
Facts:
The petitioners are the agricultural lessees of Mercedes
Tomas of a rice landholding who had apparently sold the
landholding to Tropical Homes, Inc to be converted for
residential purposes, without giving them notice.
Tropical proceeded to bulldoze the landholding of the
petitioners so latter filed a complaint with a prayer for the
issuance ex parte of a writ of preliminary injunction with the
Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) against Mercedes Tomas
and Tropical Homes, Inc.
CAR issued a temporary restraining order and later issued a
writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of a bond.
21
The CA ruled in favor of Tropical, holding that the restraining
order issued by the Agrarian Court dated 31 January 1969 as
"practically a writ of preliminary injunction" and therefore
irregularly issued as no prior hearing was conducted and that
no bond was posted as required under Sections 4 and 5 of
Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the TRO is valid.
Whether or not petitioners may be ejected.
Held:
Yes. Applying Section 5 of Rule 58, the CAR can issue a
restraining order which is to last for only twenty (20) days
and which is clearly distinct from the writ of injunction
applied for. This restraining order may be issued by the judge
despite the absence of a prior hearing as long as it could be
shown by affidavits or in the verified complaint that great or
irreparable injury would be suffered by the applicant.
No. Pursuant to section 36 of R.A. 3844, the agricultural
lessee cannot be dispossessed of his landholding except by a
Court order that is final and executory.
Section 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions -
Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future
surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in
the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except
when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a
judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is
shown that:
(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his
immediate family will personally cultivate the landholding or
will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into
residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful
non-agricultural purposes: Provided; That the agricultural
lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation
equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in addition
to his rights under Sections twenty-five and thirty-four,
except when the land owned and leased by the agricultural
lessor, is not more than five hectares, in which case instead of
disturbance compensation the lessee may be entitled to an
advanced notice of at least one agricultural year before
ejectment proceedings are filed against him: Provided,
further, That should the landholder not cultivate the land
himself for three years or fail to substantially carry out such
conversion within one year after the dispossession of the
tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and
the tenant shall have the right to demand possession of the
land and recover damages for any loss incurred by him
because of said dispossessions.
Primero v. CIR, L-10594, 101 Phil. 675 – CAMASO/PAVICO
G.R. No. L-10594 May 29, 1957
PONCIANO PRIMERO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF AGRARIAN
RELATIONS and SINFOROSO QUION, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner, Primero, is an owner of a riceland
situated in the barrio of San Juan, municipality of Gen. Trias,
province of Cavite, containing an area of 27,837 square
meters, with Torrens title registered in the Registry of Deeds
for the province of Cavite, while respondent Quion is his
tenant in said land. Petitioner, desiring to lease the land to
Porfirio Potente to be converted into a ZACATE (a species of
grass for horses' feed), on March 3, 1956, petitioner served a
written notice thereof to respondent and requested him to
vacate the premises, but the latter refused to do so. On
March 7, 1956 petitioner executed a lease in favor of
Potente, but respondent continued to occupy the land
hindering the delivery of the land to Potente. This prompted
petitioner to file a case before the CAR(Court of Agrarian
Relations) to order respondent to vacate the land. The
respondent moved for the dismissal of the case on the
ground that the petition states no cause of action because
the petitioner seeks the dispossession of the respondent-
tenant on a ground not recognized by law. The CAR dismissed
the case on the basis that the petition states no cause of
action and the ground for the dispossession is not recognized
by law. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the lease of petitioner's land to Porfirio
Potente constitutes just cause for dispossessing the
respondent of his holding on the land as tenant thereof.
Rulig: No, petitioner’s lease agreement with Potente does not
constitute just cause for dispossessing the respondent of his
holding on the land as tenant.
The controlling laws on the case are sections 9, 49 and 50 of
Republic Act No. 1199, which read as follows:
SEC. 9. Severance of Relationship. — The tenancy relationship
is extinguished by the voluntary surrender of the land by, or
the death or incapacity of, the tenant, but his heirs or the
members of his immediate farm household may continue to
work the land until the close of the agricultural year. The
expiration of the period of the contract as fixed by the
parties, and the sale or alienation of the land do not of
themselves extinguish the relationship. In the latter case, the
purchaser or transferee shall assume the rights and
obligations of the former-landholder in relation to the tenant.
In case of death of the landholder, his heirs or heirs shall
likewise assume his rights and obligations.
SEC. 49. Ejectment of Tenant. — Notwithstanding any
agreement or provision of law as to the period, in all cases
where land devoted to any agricultural purpose is held under
any system of tenancy, the tenant shall not be dispossessed
of his holdings except for any of the causes hereinafter
enumerated and only after the same has been proved before,
and the dispossession is authorized by, the court.
SEC. 50. Causes for the Dispossession of a Tenant. — Any of
the following shall be a sufficient cause for the dispossession
of a tenant from his holdings:
22
(a) The bona fide intention of the landholder to cultivate the
land himself personally or through the employment of farm
machinery and implements: . . . .
(b) When the tenant violates or fails to comply with any of
the terms and conditions of the contract or any of the
provisions of this Act: Provided, however, That this
subsection shall not apply when the tenant has substantially
complied with the contract or with the provisions of this Act.
(c) The tenant's failure to pay the agreed rental or to deliver
the landholder's share: Provided, however, That this shall not
apply when the tenant's failure is caused by a fortuitous
event or force majeure.
(d) When the tenant uses the land for a purpose other than
that specified by agreement of the parties.
(e) When a share-tenant fails to follow those proven farm
practices which will contribute towards the proper care of the
land and increased agricultural production.
(f) When the tenant through negligence permits serious injury
to the land which will impair its productive capacity.
(g) Conviction by a competent court of a tenant or any
member of his immediate family or farm household of a
crime against the landholder or a member of his immediate
family.
Under the foregoing clear provisions of law, the Supreme
Court finds that the agrarian court committed no reversible
error when it dismissed the petition, firstly, because under
the aforequoted section 9 of Rep. Act 1199, the contract of
lease entered into by the petitioner and Porfirio Potente did
not of itself extinguish the relationship of landlord and tenant
between the petitioner and the respondent, and the lessee
Potente should assume the obligations of the former
landholder, the herein petitioner, in relation to his tenant,
the herein respondent; secondly, because under section 49, a
tenant cannot be dispossessed of his holding except for any
of the causes enumerated in said section 50, and certainly the
lease of the land in question to Potente is not one of those
causes for the dispossession of a tenant enumerated in
section 50 of the Tenancy Law quoted above. Consequently,
we hold that under the provisions of law governing the case,
the petition under consideration is completely untenable, for
once a tenancy relationship is established, the tenant is
entitled to security of tenure with right to continue working
on and cultivating the land until he is dispossessed of his
holdings for just cause provided by law or the tenancy
relationship is legally terminated.
Pineda v. de Guzman, L-23773, 21 SCRA 1450 – “Once a
tenant, always a tenant.” – CASTRO A
* Security of Tenure - “Once a tenant, always a tenant.”
PINEDA vs DE GUZMAN
FACTS:
Private respondent, Beatriz, filed two petitions
before the Court of Agrarian Relations against herein
petitioners. She alleged that she is the owner of several
parcels of land which are tenanted by herein petitioners. She
has duly notified petitioners and the Agrarian court within
the time and in the manner prescribed by law of her
intentions to mechanize her landholdings and the
respondents be ordered to vacate. The petitioners averred
that the petitions were filed only to harass them.
After trial, a decision was rendered in favor of
private respondent Beatriz. The decision became final and
executory. A motion for execution was subsequently filed.
Petitioners then opposed the motion on the grounds, among
others, that: a) the petitioners had planted their respective
landholdings and are to be harvested next month; and b) that
they are not willing to be resettled, and thus the execution of
the decision should be held in abeyance until the lapse of one
year from the date the decision became final.
The motion for execution was, however, granted.
Hence this petition.
The respondents contend that with the enactment
of RA 3844 and the subsequent adoption of the Rules of
Court (its first and revised versions); the procedural rule of
execution in Section 50 of RA 11993 is abrogated. The
petitioner counters such contention saying that the latter is a
substantive law and therefore cannot be deemed abrogated
since the rule-making power of the Supreme Court cannot
not diminish increase or modify substantive rights.
ISSUE: Whether the respondents’ contention that Sec.50 of
RA 1199 is abrogated?
Did the Court act without and in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, in ordering the execution in
disregard of Section 50(a) of RA 1199?
HELD: No. the respondents’ contention is not correct.
Yes, the Court acted without and in excess of jurisdiction in
ordering the execution in disregard of Section 50(a) of RA
1199.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
Sec.50 of Act 1199, is a substantive law in character
conferring substantive right in favor of persons contemplated
to be protected therefrom. It contemplates giving to the
3
"Sec. 50. Causes for the Dispossession of Tenant. — Any of the following,
and no other shall be sufficient cause for the dispossession of a tenant from his
landholdings:
"(a) The bona fide intention of the landholder-owner or his relative
within the first degree by consanguinity to cultivate the land himself
personally or through the employment of farm machinery and
equipment and implements. . . Provided, further, That in case any
dispossessed tenant is not willing to be resettled, his possession
(dispossession) shall not be enforced until the lapse of one year from
the date the decision becomes final . . .." [Emphasis supplied]
23
tenants a protection from sudden change of condition of
livelihood, and it is a reasonable exercise by the State of its
police power to regulate and control the relationship
between landholders and tenants, in compliance with the
principle of social justice embedded in the Constitution. The
law simply provides that the tenancy relationship should be
preserved in order to insure the well-being of the tenant and
protect him from being unjustly dispossessed of the land. Its
termination can take place only for causes and reasons
provided by law.
Sec.49 of Act 1199, as amended, enunciates the
principle of security of tenure, such that it prescribes that the
relationship of landholder and tenant can only be terminated
for causes provided by law. The principle is axiom in land
tenure that – once a tenant, always a tenant. Attacks on its
constitutionality will amount to limitation on freedom of
contract, denial of equal protection of the law and
impairment or limitation on property rights.
When RA 3844 was passed, the petitions filed by
private respondent Beatriz were still pending trial before the
Court of Agrarian Relations. Said cases being applications for
mechanization of farmlands, they are to conform to Sec.168
of RA 3844 which provides that they are to be “decided in
accordance with the pertinent provisions and Requirements
of Republic Act Eleven hundred Ninety-nine as amended.”
Therefore, they are to be proceeded in accordance
with RA 1199 which includes Section 50 providing that the
judgment of dispossession of the tenant shall not be enforced
until the lapse of one year from the date the decision
becomes final.
Tan v. Pollescas, GR 145568, Nov. 17, 2005 – CASTRO J
Tan vs. Pollescas
Facts:
The Tan Heirs are co-owners of a coconut farmland where
Esteban Pollescas was the original tenant. When Esteban
died, his son, Enrique Pollescas succeeded him and became
the tenant. However, respondent Reynalda Pollescas,
Esteban’s surviving second spouse opposed to the said
succession and filed a case before the DARAB-Ozamis for her
to be recognized as Esteban’s successor. Subsequently, the
DARAB-Ozamis declared her as the successor and
apportioned the harvests between the Tan Heirs and
Reynalda based on the customary sharing system between
the parties which is 2/3 to the land owner and 1/3 to the
tenant. In 1993, Reynalda failed to deliver to the Tan Heirs
their share. The Tan Heirs demanded Reynalda to pay the
amount but the latter ignored them. Because of this the Tan
Heirs filed a case for estafa against Reynalda to which she
was found guilty. Subsequently, for Reynaldas continued
failure to deliver their share, the Tan Heirs filed with the
DARAB, Misamis Occidental an ejectment case.
Issue:
WON Reynalda can be ejected for non-payment of lease
rental.
Ruling:
No. The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that for non-
payment of the lease rental to be a valid ground to dispossess
the agricultural lessee of the landholding, the amount of the
lease rental must first of all be lawful. If the amount of lease
rental claimed exceeds the limit allowed by law, non-
payment of lease rental cannot be a ground to dispossess the
agricultural lessee of the landholding. Section 34 of RA 3844
as amended mandates that not more than 25% of the
average normal harvest shall constitute the just and fair
rental for leasehold. In this case, the Tan Heirs demanded
Reynalda to deliver 2/3 of the harvest as lease rental, which
clearly exceeded the 25% maximum amount prescribed by
law. Therefore, the Tan Heirs cannot validly dispossess
Reynalda of the landholding for non-payment of rental
precisely because the lease rental claimed by the Tan Heirs is
unlawful.
Even assuming Reynalda agreed to deliver 2/3 of the harvest
as lease rental, Reynalda is not obliged to pay such lease
rental for being unlawful. There is no legal basis to demand
payment of such unlawful lease rental. The courts will not
enforce payment of a lease rental that violates the law. There
was no validly fixed lease rental demandable at the time of
the harvests. Thus, Reynalda was never in default.
Reynalda and the Tan Heirs failed to agree on a lawful lease
rental. Accordingly, the DAR must first fix the provisional
lease rental payable by Reynalda to the Tan Heirs pursuant to
the second paragraph of Section 34 of RA 3844 as
amended.[30] Until the DAR has fixed the provisional lease
rental, Reynalda cannot be in default in the payment of lease
rental since such amount is not yet determined. There can be
no delay in the payment of an undetermined lease rental
because it is impossible to pay an undetermined amount.
That Reynalda is not yet in default in the payment of the
lease rental is a basic reason why she cannot be lawfully
ejected from the Land for non-payment of rental.
Tarona v. CA, GR 170182, June 18, 2009 - CERAS
LEONARDO TARONA, EUGENIA TARONA, NITA TARONA,
LUIS TARONA, ROSALINDA TARONA, APOLONIA TARONA,
CARLOS TARONA, LOURDES TARONA and ROGELIO TARONA,
Petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION), GAY T.
LEAO, LEMUEL T. LEAO, NOEL T. LEAO, JEDD ANTHONY LEAO
CUISON and JASON ANTHONY LEAO CUISON, Respondents
G.R. No. 170182, June 18, 2009
Facts:
The parcel of land subject of this case is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 6986 and registered in the name of
Antonia T. Leao married to Federico Leao. Said land is
allegedly covered by a Leasehold Agreement between Juanito
Tarona and Federico Leao, the father of the petitioners and
the deceased husband of Antonia, respectively.
Private respondents are the alleged co-owners of the land
which they inherited from their late mother, Antonia T. Leao,
in whose name said property is titled.
24
Petitioners Leonardo, Eugenia, Nita, Luis and Rosalinda, and
the intervenors, Apolonia, Carlos, Lourdes and Rogelio, are
the nephews and nieces and the lawful heirs of the original
agricultural lessee, Juanito Tarona, where they have allegedly
succeeded the tenancy rights and are, therefore, bona
fide leasehold tenants.
Issue:
Whether or not succession of tenancy rights is limited to
direct descendants only.
Whether or not tenancy relations existed between the
parties.
Ruling:
As correctly held by the CA, succession of tenancy rights is
limited to direct descendants only.
Section 9 of R.A. No. 3844 clearly provides:
Section 9. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by
Death or Incapacity of the Parties - In case of death or
permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee to work his
landholding, the leasehold shall continue between the
agricultural lessor and the person who can cultivate the
landholding personally, chosen by the agricultural lessor
within one month from such death or permanent incapacity,
from among the following: (a) the surviving spouse; (b) the
eldest direct descendant by consanguinity; or (c) the next
eldest descendant or descendants in the order of their age:
Provided, That in case the death or permanent incapacity of
the agricultural lessee occurs during the agricultural year,
such choice shall be exercised at the end of that agricultural
year: Provided, further, that in the event the agricultural
lessor fails to exercise his choice within the periods herein
provided, the priority shall be in accordance with the order
herein established.
In case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural
lessor, the leasehold shall bind his legal heirs.
In the case at bar petitioners Leonardo, Eugenia, Nita, Luis,
and Rosalinda Tarona admitted repeatedly in their pleadings
that they are the nephews and nieces of Juanito Tarona. As
for petitioners Apolonia, Carlos, Lourdes and Rogelio
(intevernors in the proceedings a quo), allegedly the wife and
children of Juanito Tarona, the Court cannot give credence to
their claim of bona fide tenancy over any part of the subject
property. To begin with, a careful perusal of the records of
the case showed that not a shred of evidence was ever
presented to buttress petitioners assertion of relationship to
Juanito Tarona.
Tenancy relations did not exist among the parties.
In order to establish a tenancy relationship, the following
essential requisites must concur: (1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the
subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3)
there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4)
the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared
between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
All these requisites are necessary to create a tenancy
relationship and the absence of one or more will not make
the alleged tenant a de facto tenant.
In the case at bar, petitioners failed to refute the private
respondents contention that petitioners did not personally
cultivate the subject property as supported by Certification
dated issued by the Barangay Captain of Mauban, now
Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan, stating that Apolonia, Carlos,
Lourdes and Rogelio Tarona are not residents therein and
that they do not personally cultivate the subject property;
and the Certification of the election officer of Caloocan City
showing that said persons are residents and registered voters
of Caloocan City.
It has been held that personal cultivation is an important
factor in determining the existence of an agricultural lease
relationship such that in its absence, an occupant of a tract of
land, or a cultivator thereof, or planter thereon, cannot
qualify as a de jure lessee. Thus, no tenancy relations existed
between the private respondents and he petitioners.
Coronel v. Tanjanco, GR 170693, Aug. 8, 2010-
DALAFU/CERAS
EMILIA MICKING VDA. DE CORONEL and BENJAMIN
CORONEL, Petitioners vs. MIGUEL TANJANGCO, JR.,
Respondent
G.R. No. 170693, August 8, 2010
Facts:
Miguel Tanjangco, Jr., respondent, is the alleged owner of lot
nos. 37, 38, and 39 which were initially being cultivated by
Emilia Micking Coronel (Emilia) and her husband as
agricultural lessees, and when the latter died, Emilia was
given by force of the government Operations Land Transfer
(CLT) covering the lots. Over time, saltwater gradually
saturated the property making it unsuitable for rice
cultivation, thus, an agreement denominated as Kasunduan
sa Pagbabago ng Kaurian ng Lupang Sakahan (Palayan na
Gagawing Palaisdaan) was allegedly entered between
petitioners and respondent to convert lot no. 38 into a fish
farm.
On the other hand, respondent claimed that for a
consideration of P6,000.00, petitioners had bound to
relinquish their rights as tenants not only on lot no. 38 but
also on lot nos. 37 and 39 which were likewise converted into
fish farms following the execution of the agreement and that
the latter purportedly subleased lot no. 38 to a certain Jess
Santos for a term of five years and then to one Dionisio
Toribio, both of whom successively operated fishing ponds on
the land. When respondent supposedly learned about these
leases, he demanded that petitioners vacate not only Lot No.
38 but also Lot Nos. 37 and 39.
In 1976, respondent had filed before the then Ministry of
Agrarian Reform (MAR) a petition for the retention of not
more than seven hectares of inherited land acquired from his
grandparents which include lot no. 38 tenanted by Emilia. On
July 27, 1986, MAR granted respondent’s application and
accordingly, it declared exempt from Operation Land
Transfer the lots subject of the petition and directed that
25
existing tenants in the covered area be maintained in their
peaceful possession as agricultural lessees.
Issue:
Whether or not the confirmation of respondent’s retention
right over lot no. 38 extinguished petitioner’s leasehold right.
Ruling:
The confirmation of respondent’s retention right over lot no.
38 did not extinguish petitioner’s leasehold right.
Despite the confirmation of respondents retention rights over
lot no. 38, petitioners leasehold right to the land have not
been extinguished. In other words, the placing of lot no. 38
under respondent’s retention limits have made the tenant as
lessee only on said lot. Such status is protected by Section 7
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, which affords security of
tenure.
Section 7 of the law enunciates the principle of security of
tenure of the tenant, such that it prescribes that the
relationship of landholder and tenant can only be
terminated for causes provided by law. Security of tenure is
a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as
life itself and deprivation of their land holdings is tantamount
to deprivation of their only means of livelihood. Perforce, the
termination of the leasehold relationship can take place only
for causes provided by law. The causes are specified in
Sections 8, 28 and 36 of R.A. No. 3844.
In the given case, the respondent questioned the rights of the
petitioner citing Section 36 of RA No. 3844 relative to the
conversion of the subject landholding under the Kasunduan
and the lease agreement allegedly entered by the petitioners.
The court ruled that first, the conversion of the subject
landholding under the Kasunduan is not the conversion of
landholding that is contemplated by Section 36 of the law.
Alarcon v. Court of Appeals defined conversion as the act of
changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into
some other use as approved by the DAR. More to the point is
that for conversion to avail as a ground for dispossession the
opening paragraph of Section 36 implies the necessity of prior
court proceedings in which the issue of conversion has been
determined and a final order issued directing dispossession
upon that ground. In the case at bar, however, respondent
does not profess that at any time there had been such
proceedings or that there was such court order. Neither does
he assert that Lot No. 38and Lot Nos. 37 and 39 for that
matter had undergone conversion with authority from the
DAR.
Second, it is evident from the records that the lease
agreement over Lot No. 38 in favor of Jess Santos was
executed not by petitioners but rather by respondent
himself. It was respondent’s name that appears therein as the
lessor, with Jess Santos acceding to operate a fishing pond on
the land. With respect to the lease agreement with Daniel
Toribio executed after the expiration of the first lease, it was
found out that although it was Boy Coronel who signed in as
lessor, still, this will not suffice as a ground to dispossess
petitioners of the three lots and eject them from the property
inasmuch as dispossession on account of having employed a
sub-lessee under Sections 36 and 27 of R.A. No. 3844 requires
a final judgment of the court in that respect which judgment
was not shown.
Coderias v. Estate of Chioco, GR 180476, June 26, 2013 –
DINGLASAN
CORDERIAS VS ESTATE OF JUAN CHICO
FACTS:
The deceased Juan O. Chioco (Chioco) owned a 4-hectare
farm in Lupao, Nueva Ecija (the farm). As tiller of the farm,
petitioner Raymundo Coderias was issued a Certificate of
Land Transfer (CLT) on April 26, 1974.
In 1980, individuals connected with Chioco – who was a
former Governor of Nueva Ecija – threatened to kill petitioner
if he did not leave the farm. His standing crops (corn and
vegetables) and house were bulldozed. For fear of his life,
petitioner, together with his family, left the farm.
In 1993 upon learning of Chioco’s death, petitioner and his
family re-established themselves on the farm.On March 9,
1995 petitioner filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Talavera, Nueva Ecija a
Petition against respondent Chioco’s estate praying that his
possession and cultivation of the farm be respected; that the
corresponding agricultural leasehold contract between them
be executed; that he be awarded actual damages for the
destruction of his house, his standing crops, unrealized
harvest from 1980 up to 1993, attorney’s fees and costs of
litigation.
In 1996, the PARAD issued a Decision dismissing the Petition
on the ground of prescription. It adopted respondent’s
argument, adding that although petitioner was forcibly
evicted from the farm, he was not without remedy under the
law to assert his rights. Yet, he filed the Petition only after 14
years, or in 1995. He is thus guilty of laches and is deemed to
have abandoned his rights and privileges under the agrarian
laws.
On appeal , DARAB issued a decision upholding the
possession and cultivation by the petitioner of the subject
landholding and ordered the respondent to reimburse
petitioner of the money equivalent to the unrealized harvest
from 1980-93.Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was
denied.
On review by the CA, it reinstated the decision of the PARAB.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE: WON the principle of equity should be applied in this
case.
HELD:
"It is a better rule that courts, under the principle of equity,
will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of
limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest
wrong or injustice would result." It must also be emphasized
that "the statute of limitations has been devised to operate
primarily against those who slept on their rights and not
against those desirous to act but cannot do so for causes
beyond their control."
26
Petitioner’s tenure on the farm should be deemed
uninterrupted since he could not set foot thereon. And if he
could not make the required payments to Chioco or the Land
Bank of the Philippines, petitioner should not be faulted. And,
since his tenure is deemed uninterrupted, any benefit or
advantage from the land should accrue to him as well.
Our law on agrarian reform is a legislated promise to
emancipate poor farm families from the bondage of the soil.
P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in the exact same spirit, with
mechanisms which hope to forestall a reversion to the
antiquated and inequitable feudal system of land ownership.
It aims to ensure the continued possession, cultivation and
enjoyment by the beneficiary of the land that he tills which
would certainly not be possible where the former owner is
allowed to reacquire the land at any time following the award
– in contravention of the government’s objective to
emancipate tenant-farmers from the bondage of the soil.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The April 27, 2007
Decision and November 5, 2007 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86149 are hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The December 8, 2003 Decision of the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board is ordered
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
Jusayan v. Sombilla, 746 SCRA 437 (2015) – GALICINAO/TITO
G.R. No. 163928, January 21, 2015
JUSAYAN v. SOMBILLA
TOPIC : Agricultural Leasehold Tenancy vs Civil Law Lease
Facts:
Jesena, owner of four parcels of land, entered into
an agreement with respondent Sombilla wherein Jesena
designated Jorge as his agent to supervise the tilling and
farming of his riceland in crop year 1970-1971. Before the
expiration of the agreement, Jesena sold the four parcels of
land to Jusayan. They verbally agreed that Sombilla would
retain possession of the parcels of land and would deliver 110
cavans of palay annually to Jusayan without need for
accounting of the cultivation expenses provided that Sombilla
would pay the irrigation fees. From 1971 to 1983, Jusayan
and Sombilla followed the arrangement. In 1975, the parcels
of land were transferred in the names of Jusayan’s sons,
(petitioners). In 1984, Jusayan sent several letters to Jorge
terminating his administration and demanding the return of
the possession of the parcels of
land.hanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Due to the failure of Sombillo to render accounting and
to return the possession of the parcels of land despite
demands, Jusayan filed a complaint for recovery of
possession and accounting against Simbillo, following
Jusayan’s death in 1991, the petitioners substituted him as
the plaintiffs.
Simbillo asserted that he enjoyed security of tenure as
the agricultural lessee of Timoteo; and that he could not be
dispossessed of his landholding without valid cause.cralawred
RTC rendered decision in favor of the petitioners. Simbillo
appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the decision of RTC and
dismissed the case, declaring that the contractual relationship
between the parties was one of agricultural tenancy.
Issue:
Whether a lease of agricultural land between the
respondent and the predecessor of the petitioners was a
civil law lease or an agricultural lease
Held:
The lease is an agricultural lease.
To prove the tenancy relationship, Jorge presented
handwritten receipts indicating that the sacks of palay. In this
regard, rental was the legal term for the consideration of the
lease. Consequently, the receipts substantially proved that
the contractual relationship between Jusayan and Simbillo
was a lease.
Yet, the lease of an agricultural land can be either a
civil law or an agricultural lease.
In the civil law lease, one of the parties binds himself to give
to another the enjoyment or use of a thing for a price certain,
and for a period that may be definite or indefinite.
In the agricultural lease, also termed as a leasehold tenancy,
the physical possession of the land devoted to agriculture is
given by its owner or legal possessor (landholder) to another
(tenant) for the purpose of production through labor of the
latter and of the members of his immediate farm household,
in consideration of which the latter agrees to share the
harvest with the landholder, or to pay a price certain or
ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both.
The Court differentiated between a leasehold tenancy and a
civil law lease in the following manner, namely:
the subject matter of a leasehold tenancy is limited to
agricultural land, but that of a civil law lease may be rural or
urban property;
as to attention and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold
tenant to personally attend to and cultivate the agricultural
land; the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or
work the thing leased;
as to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is
devoted to agriculture; in civil law lease, the purpose may be
for any other lawful pursuits;
as to the law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by
the Civil Code, but the leasehold tenancy is governed by
special laws.
Simbillo, proved all the requisites of his agricultural
tenancy by substantial evidence. His knowledge of and
familiarity with the landholding, its production and the
instances when the landholding was struck by drought
definitely established that he personally cultivated the land.
The parties are ordered to comply with
their undertakings as agricultural lessor and agricultural
lessee.
7. Rights of pre-emption (Sec. 11) and redemption (Sec.
12) LUCINARIO/CERAS
Coronel v. Tanjangco, GR 170693, Aug. 8, 2010
27
EMILIA MICKING VDA. DE CORONEL and BENJAMIN
CORONEL, Petitioners vs. MIGUEL TANJANGCO, JR.,
Respondent
G.R. No. 170693, August 8, 2010
Facts:
Miguel Tanjangco, Jr., respondent, is the alleged owner of lot
nos. 37, 38, and 39 which were initially being cultivated by
Emilia Micking Coronel (Emilia) and her husband as
agricultural lessees, and when the latter died, Emilia was
given by force of the government Operations Land Transfer
(CLT) covering the lots. Over time, saltwater gradually
saturated the property making it unsuitable for rice
cultivation, thus, an agreement denominated as Kasunduan
sa Pagbabago ng Kaurian ng Lupang Sakahan (Palayan na
Gagawing Palaisdaan) was allegedly entered between
petitioners and respondent to convert lot no. 38 into a fish
farm.
On the other hand, respondent claimed that for a
consideration of P6,000.00, petitioners had bound to
relinquish their rights as tenants not only on lot no. 38 but
also on lot nos. 37 and 39 which were likewise converted into
fish farms following the execution of the agreement and that
the latter purportedly subleased lot no. 38 to a certain Jess
Santos for a term of five years and then to one Dionisio
Toribio, both of whom successively operated fishing ponds on
the land. When respondent supposedly learned about these
leases, he demanded that petitioners vacate not only Lot No.
38 but also Lot Nos. 37 and 39.
In 1976, respondent had filed before the then Ministry of
Agrarian Reform (MAR) a petition for the retention of not
more than seven hectares of inherited land acquired from his
grandparents which include lot no. 38 tenanted by Emilia. On
July 27, 1986, MAR granted respondent’s application and
accordingly, it declared exempt from Operation Land
Transfer the lots subject of the petition and directed that
existing tenants in the covered area be maintained in their
peaceful possession as agricultural lessees.
Issue:
Whether or not the confirmation of respondent’s retention
right over lot no. 38 extinguished petitioner’s leasehold right.
Ruling:
The confirmation of respondent’s retention right over lot no.
38 did not extinguish petitioner’s leasehold right.
Despite the confirmation of respondents retention rights over
lot no. 38, petitioners leasehold right to the land have not
been extinguished. In other words, the placing of lot no. 38
under respondent’s retention limits have made the tenant as
lessee only on said lot. Such status is protected by Section 7
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, which affords security of
tenure.
Section 7 of the law enunciates the principle of security of
tenure of the tenant, such that it prescribes that the
relationship of landholder and tenant can only be
terminated for causes provided by law. Security of tenure is
a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as
life itself and deprivation of their land holdings is tantamount
to deprivation of their only means of livelihood. Perforce, the
termination of the leasehold relationship can take place only
for causes provided by law. The causes are specified in
Sections 8, 28 and 36 of R.A. No. 3844.
In the given case, the respondent questioned the rights of the
petitioner citing Section 36 of RA No. 3844 relative to the
conversion of the subject landholding under the Kasunduan
and the lease agreement allegedly entered by the petitioners.
The court ruled that first, the conversion of the subject
landholding under the Kasunduan is not the conversion of
landholding that is contemplated by Section 36 of the law.
Alarcon v. Court of Appeals defined conversion as the act of
changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into
some other use as approved by the DAR. More to the point is
that for conversion to avail as a ground for dispossession the
opening paragraph of Section 36 implies the necessity of prior
court proceedings in which the issue of conversion has been
determined and a final order issued directing dispossession
upon that ground. In the case at bar, however, respondent
does not profess that at any time there had been such
proceedings or that there was such court order. Neither does
he assert that Lot No. 38and Lot Nos. 37 and 39 for that
matter had undergone conversion with authority from the
DAR.
Second, it is evident from the records that the lease
agreement over Lot No. 38 in favor of Jess Santos was
executed not by petitioners but rather by respondent
himself. It was respondent’s name that appears therein as the
lessor, with Jess Santos acceding to operate a fishing pond on
the land. With respect to the lease agreement with Daniel
Toribio executed after the expiration of the first lease, it was
found out that although it was Boy Coronel who signed in as
lessor, still, this will not suffice as a ground to dispossess
petitioners of the three lots and eject them from the property
inasmuch as dispossession on account of having employed a
sub-lessee under Sections 36 and 27 of R.A. No. 3844 requires
a final judgment of the court in that respect which judgment
was not shown.
Reyes v. Heirs of Floro, GR 200713, Dec. 11, 2013 – REYES
FACTS: Petition for review on certiorari against the Court of Appea
him to vacate subject property owned by heirs of Floro prim
The property in question was originally owned by Carmen B
Reyes alleged that he was one of her tenant-lessees to whi
that he is an agricultural lessee of Carmen and a document
she was the original owner of the land and acknowledging
The land was sold by Carmen to Zenaida as evidenced by a
Conformity. However, without knowledge of Reyes, Zenaid
Nevertheless, Zenaida acquired anew title to the land throu
executed in her favor and then subsequently entered into a
brother.
Reyes contends that as an agricultural lessee, he has the rig
redemption as provided to him through the Agricultural La
by RA 6389). With this ground, he prays for an injunction o
28
 TOPIC: EXTINGUISHMENT OF LEASEHOLD RELATION
Reyes further argues that the Pagpapatunay by Carmen, the Facts:
original owner of the land, stating that Reyes was one of
her tenants; and the Certification issued by MARO stating thatMacaraeg
Reyes hadis anbeen
agricultural
the lessee
lessee
of the
over
property
the landofowned
Teodoro
by for
Zenaida, are enough evidence to prove that he is a tenant. the Reyes
pastinsists
seventhat(7) the
yearsconsent
when he of the
wasFloros
advisedis not
by the latter to
necessary since tenancy relations is not terminated by changesvacate in the
ownership
property in because
case of sale
it would
or transfer
be given
of legal
to another
possession under Section 10 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms. tenant. Thereafter, a new tenant was installed who forbade
Macaraeg from working on the riceland. On the other hand,
Teodoro denied that Macaraeg was his tenant and claimed
ISSUE: WON Reyes is an agricultural lessee of the subject land in order
that he forhad
himalways
to be entitled
leased all
toof
thehisrights
39-hectare
of pre-emption
riceland under
and redemption under the Code of Agrarian Reforms (RA 3844)? civil lease. He further claimed that after the expiration of his
"Contract of Lease" with Macaraeg in 1961, the latter did not
anymore renew his contract.
HELD: No, Reyes is not an agricultural lessee of the subject land and hence, is not entitled to the rights of pre-emption and
redemption. Issue:
Whether or not that the parties did actually enter into a
In order for one to be considered an agricultural lessee, it isleasehold
a conditiontenancy
precedent
relation.
that tenancy relationship exists
between the landowner and the tenant. Hence, the Court resolved
Whetherthis or not
caseexpiration
mainly byofidentifying
contract extinguishes
whether a tenancy
the
relationship exists between the lawful/legitimate owner ofleasehold
the land tenancy
and tenant. relation

The Court ruled that the Agricultural Leasehold Contract entered

Held: into by and between Zenaida and Reyes void
because of the fact that Zenaida has no right to enter into such an 1.agreement
YES. The Contract
since she of illegally
Lease between
acquiredthe title
parties
to the
subject land by forging Pablo’s signature in the pertinent deed
contains
of sale.
the essential elements of a leasehold tenancy
agreement. The landholding in dispute is unmistakably an
As to Reyes’ contention that being an agricultural lessee ofagricultural
Carmen, heland is considered
devoted to anagricultural
agriculturalproduction.
lessee of the More
land indefinitely despite of transfers in ownership as provided
specifically,
under Section
the parties
10 ofstipulated
the Code of that
Agrarian
"the property
Reforms, leased
the
Court ruled that the documents submitted by Reyes for consideration
shall be used ofortheutilized
courtsfor (i.e.,
agricultural
Pagpapatunayenterprise
and MARO only."
certification) are not sufficient evidence to establish the existence
Furthermore,
of a tenancy
the parties
relationship
also agreedso asthat
to make
the farmland
Reyes anmust
agricultural lessee of Carmen entitled to the right of pre-emption
be usedandfor redemption,
rice production for as
thecould
following
be inferred
reasons: from the
1. The MARO certification is merely preliminary and does not stipulation
bind thethatcourts
"theasrental
conclusive
of nine evidence
(9) cavans
thatofReyes
palayisper
a
lessee who cultivates the land for purposes of agricultural production.
hectare for one In Bautista
agricultural
v. Araneta,39
year, must webeheld
of the
thatsame variety
certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that
(of palay)
a certain
as that
person
produced
is a tenant
by the areLESSEE."
merely provisional
and not conclusive on the courts. Here, the certification from Bautista Leasehold
has littletenancy
evidentiary
existsvalue,
whenwithout
a personany who, either
corroborative evidence. The certification was not notarizedpersonally
and Bautistaor with
was the
not aid
even ofpresented
labor available
as a witness.
from members of
Similarly, Reyes was not included as a legitimate and properlyhis immediate
registered agricultural
farm household, tenantundertaken
in the supposed
to cultivate
Deed aof
Absolute Sale with Agricultural Tenants Conformity which Bautista
piece of executed
agricultural in land
favorsusceptible
of Zenaida.of cultivation by a single
2. The records show that respondent heirs submitted two documentary
person together evidence
with members
with the of PARAD
his immediate
which thefarm
provincial adjudicator disregarded: (1) a MARO Certification40household,
dated 9belonging
May 2005to manifesting
a legally possessed
that there byisanother
no copyin
on file, with the Municipal Land Reform Office of Malolos, Bulacan,
consideration
of theofsupposed
a fixed amount
leasehold in money
contract;
or in
and produced
(2) a or
Pagpapatunay41 dated 8 June 2004 from the Punong Barangay in bothof Malolos, Bulacan attesting that since the year
1995 until the date of the affidavit, the subject land was not being 2.NO.
used for The
farming,
mere fact cultivation
that theor parties
any agricultural
fixed and limited
purpose. These evidence can only mean that the leaseholdthe contract
duration
wasoffalsified.
their lease contract to only one agricultural
year, does not remove the relationship which they created
The Court once again stressed that the person claiming to be from
an the
agricultural
purview lessee/tenant
of leasehold tenancy,has the considering
burden to show, the
by substantial evidence, that all the essential elements of ageneral
tenancyimport
relationship
of theirare
agreement
present. Since
whichReyes
irreversibly
failed to
leads to
produce the needed quantum of evidence, he was declaredand by clearly
the Courtjustifies
as never
tenancy
a de coverage.
jure tenantIt oris fundamental
lessee, and that
thus, he is not entitled to the benefits of redemption, preemption,
the tenant-lessee's
peaceful possession,
security ofoccupation
tenure subsists
and cultivation
of the subject land, as provided under existing tenancy laws. notwithstanding the termination of the contract which
initially established the tenancy relation. In the language of
8. Extinguishment of the leasehold relation – Sec. 8 - the law, the "expiration of the period of the contract as fixed
TITO by the parties does not of itself extinguish the relationship".
a. Causes This is a "practical consequence of the distinction between
1. Abandonment of the landholding without the the tenancy contract which is fixed by the parties, and the
knowledge of the agricultural lessor tenancy relationship which is maintained and governed by
Teodoro v. Macaraeg, L-20700, 27 SCRA 7 law". Furthermore, section 49 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act
Teodoro vs. Macaraeg provides that
27 SCRA 7 (1969)

29
Notwithstanding any agreement or provision of law as to the
period of future surrender of the land, in all cases where land
devoted to any agricultural purpose is held under any system
of tenancy, the tenant shall not be dispossessed of his
holdings by the landholder except for any of the causes
hereinafter enumerated and only after the same has been
proved before and the dispossession is authorized by the
court."
The decision and resolution under review are hereby
affirmed.
2. Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the
agricultural lessee, written notice of which shall be served 3
months in advance – ANTIOJO
NISNISAN vs. CA GR 126425
FACTS:
Spouses Gavino and Florencia Nisnisan are the owners of a
parcel of land. Petitioner Policarpio Nisnisan, son of Gavino
Nisnisan, has been cultivating 1 hectare of the land since
1961. Gavino and petitioner Policarpio entered into a
leasehold tenancy contract which stipulates a sharing
arrangement of 1/3:2/3 of the harvest, the bigger share being
given to the Policarpio.
Gavino then sold two hectares of their land, including the
land tenanted by petitioner Policarpio Nisnisan, to private
respondents-spouses Mancera, resulting to petitioners-
spouses being ousted from their landholding. Hence,
petitioners-spouses instituted an action for reinstatement of
tenancy holding against private respondent spouses Mancera
before the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR). The said
complaint was dismissed.
Gavino Nisnisan demanded from the Mancera spouses to
repurchase the said land but the latter refused. Gavino
Nisnisan, together with the petitioner Policarpio Nisnisan,
filed a complaint with the RTC.
With regard to the prayer for reinstatement of tenancy
holding of petitioners Nisnisan spouses, the private
respondents Mancera spouses countered that the Nisnisan
spouses have no cause of action because Gavino voluntarily
surrendered their landholding- provided under the
annotation that the land was not tenanted.
Trial Court favored the Manceras. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON petitioners Nisnisan voluntarily surrendered
their tenancy holding.
RULING: NO. Petitioners did not voluntarily surrender their
tenancy holding. Annotations are not binding upon the court.
Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3844, voluntary
surrender, as a mode of extinguishing agricultural leasehold
tenancy relations, must be convincingly and sufficiently
proved by competent evidence. The tenants intention to
surrender the landholding cannot be presumed, much less
determined by mere implication.
Petitioner Policarpio have sufficiently shown that they are the
tenants of the spouses Gavino and Florencia Nisnisan as
evidenced by a document entitled Panagsabutan Sa Abang Sa
Yuta. It clearly shows that the subject land is agricultural; that
petitioner Policarpio Nisnisan is obligated to cultivate the
same by planting rice thereon; and, that there is sharing of
the harvests between the said parties.
It is clear that essential elements of tenancy relationship are
present in this case, namely:
1. the parties are the landowner and the tenant
2. the subject matter is agricultural land
3. there is consent
4. the purpose is agricultural production
5. there is personal cultivation by the tenants
6. there is sharing of harvests between parties
Based on the foregoing disquisition, it is clear
that petitioners-spouses are agricultural lessees and are
therefore entitled to security of tenure as mandated by
Section 10 of Republic Act 3844.
3. Absence of an heir to succeed the lease in the event
of his death or permanent incapacity (Sec. 8, RA 3844) BASCO
/ CERAS
b. Burden of proof – Sec. 37, RA 3844
Coronel v. Tanjangco, GR 170693, Aug. 8, 2010
EMILIA MICKING VDA. DE CORONEL and BENJAMIN
CORONEL, Petitioners vs. MIGUEL TANJANGCO, JR.,
Respondent
G.R. No. 170693, August 8, 2010
Facts:
Miguel Tanjangco, Jr., respondent, is the alleged owner of lot
nos. 37, 38, and 39 which were initially being cultivated by
Emilia Micking Coronel (Emilia) and her husband as
agricultural lessees, and when the latter died, Emilia was
given by force of the government Operations Land Transfer
(CLT) covering the lots. Over time, saltwater gradually
saturated the property making it unsuitable for rice
cultivation, thus, an agreement denominated as Kasunduan
sa Pagbabago ng Kaurian ng Lupang Sakahan (Palayan na
Gagawing Palaisdaan) was allegedly entered between
petitioners and respondent to convert lot no. 38 into a fish
farm.
On the other hand, respondent claimed that for a
consideration of P6,000.00, petitioners had bound to
relinquish their rights as tenants not only on lot no. 38 but
also on lot nos. 37 and 39 which were likewise converted into
fish farms following the execution of the agreement and that
the latter purportedly subleased lot no. 38 to a certain Jess
Santos for a term of five years and then to one Dionisio
Toribio, both of whom successively operated fishing ponds on
the land. When respondent supposedly learned about these
leases, he demanded that petitioners vacate not only Lot No.
38 but also Lot Nos. 37 and 39.
In 1976, respondent had filed before the then Ministry of
Agrarian Reform (MAR) a petition for the retention of not
more than seven hectares of inherited land acquired from his
grandparents which include lot no. 38 tenanted by Emilia. On
July 27, 1986, MAR granted respondent’s application and
accordingly, it declared exempt from Operation Land
Transfer the lots subject of the petition and directed that
30
existing tenants in the covered area be maintained in their
peaceful possession as agricultural lessees.
Issue:
Whether or not the confirmation of respondent’s retention
right over lot no. 38 extinguished petitioner’s leasehold right.
Ruling:
The confirmation of respondent’s retention right over lot no.
38 did not extinguish petitioner’s leasehold right.
Despite the confirmation of respondents retention rights over
lot no. 38, petitioners leasehold right to the land have not
been extinguished. In other words, the placing of lot no. 38
under respondent’s retention limits have made the tenant as
lessee only on said lot. Such status is protected by Section 7
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, which affords security of
tenure.
Section 7 of the law enunciates the principle of security of
tenure of the tenant, such that it prescribes that the
relationship of landholder and tenant can only be
terminated for causes provided by law. Security of tenure is
a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as
life itself and deprivation of their land holdings is tantamount
to deprivation of their only means of livelihood. Perforce, the
termination of the leasehold relationship can take place only
for causes provided by law. The causes are specified in
Sections 8, 28 and 36 of R.A. No. 3844.
In the given case, the respondent questioned the rights of the
petitioner citing Section 36 of RA No. 3844 relative to the
conversion of the subject landholding under the Kasunduan
and the lease agreement allegedly entered by the petitioners.
The court ruled that first, the conversion of the subject
landholding under the Kasunduan is not the conversion of
landholding that is contemplated by Section 36 of the law.
Alarcon v. Court of Appeals defined conversion as the act of
changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into
some other use as approved by the DAR. More to the point is
that for conversion to avail as a ground for dispossession the
opening paragraph of Section 36 implies the necessity of prior
court proceedings in which the issue of conversion has been
determined and a final order issued directing dispossession
upon that ground. In the case at bar, however, respondent
does not profess that at any time there had been such
proceedings or that there was such court order. Neither does
he assert that Lot No. 38and Lot Nos. 37 and 39 for that
matter had undergone conversion with authority from the
DAR.
Second, it is evident from the records that the lease
agreement over Lot No. 38 in favor of Jess Santos was
executed not by petitioners but rather by respondent
himself. It was respondent’s name that appears therein as the
lessor, with Jess Santos acceding to operate a fishing pond on
the land. With respect to the lease agreement with Daniel
Toribio executed after the expiration of the first lease, it was
found out that although it was Boy Coronel who signed in as
lessor, still, this will not suffice as a ground to dispossess
petitioners of the three lots and eject them from the property
inasmuch as dispossession on account of having employed a
sub-lessee under Sections 36 and 27 of R.A. No. 3844 requires
a final judgment of the court in that respect which judgment
was not shown.
9. Dispossession – Sec. 36 - CAMASO
Tan v. Pollescas, GR 145568, Nov. 17, 2005
TAN VS. POLLESCAS, GR 145568, Nov. 17, 2005
FACTS
Petitioners are co-owners of a coconut farmland in Labo
Ozamis City. Enrique Pollescas succeeded from his deceased
father the tenancy relationship of Tan’s coconut farmland.
Reynalda Pollescas (Reynalda), the surviving second spouse,
filed a case with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) – Ozamis, demanding the Tan
Heirs to recognize her as the successor instead. Reynalda was
declared by the DARAB – Ozamis as the lawful tenant.
Harvests were then apportioned between the Tan Heirs and
Reynalda into 2/3 and 1/3 respectively. Reynalda failed to
deliver the 2/3 share and ignored the demands of Tan Heirs.
Tan Heirs filed an estafa case against Reynalda with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC), which found her guilty.
Subsequently, the Heirs of Tan filed an ejectment case for
Reynalda’s continued failure to deliver their share. DARAB –
Misamis Occidental ruled in favor of the Tan Heirs
terminating the tenancy relationship with Reynalda and
ordered her to turn-over its possession to Tan Heirs.
Reynalda appealed to DARAB – Diliman, Quezon City, which
reversed the decision of DARAB – Misamis Occidental but
ordered her to pay the unpaid leasehold rentals. Tan Heirs
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed
DARAB’s decision. According to the CA, mere failure of a
tenant to pay the landholders share does not necessarily give
the latter the right to eject the former when there is lack of
deliberate intent on the part of the tenant to pay.
ISSUE
Whether or not there is ground for dispossession of
landholding?
HELD
The Supreme Court finds no ground for dispossession of
landholding. Section 7 of RA 3844 as amended provides that
once there is a leasehold relationship, the landowner cannot
eject the agricultural tenant from the land unless authorized
by the court for causes provided by law. RA 3844 as
amended expressly recognizes and protects an agricultural
leasehold tenants right to security of tenure. Section 36 of
RA 3844 as amended enumerates the grounds for
dispossession of the tenants landholding, to wit: SEC. 36.
Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. Notwithstanding any
agreement as to the period or future surrender of the land,
an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and
possession of his landholding except when his dispossession
has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final
and executory if after due hearing it is shown that: (1) The
landholding is declared by the department head upon
recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be
suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other
31
urban purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall
be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five
times the average of the gross harvests on his landholding
during the last five preceding calendar years; (2) The
agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of
the terms and conditions of the contract or any of the
provisions of this Code unless his failure is caused by
fortuitous event or force majeure; (3) The agricultural lessee
planted crops or used the landholding for a purpose other
than what had been previously agreed upon; (4) The
agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as
determined under paragraph 3 of Section twenty-nine; (5)
The land or other substantial permanent improvement
thereon is substantially damaged or destroyed or has
unreasonably deteriorated through the fault or negligence of
the agricultural lessee; (6) The agricultural lessee does not
pay the lease rental when it falls due: Provided, That if the
non-payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to the
extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous
event, the non-payment shall not be a ground for
dispossession, although the obligation to pay the rental due
that particular crop is not thereby extinguished; or (7) The
lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation
of the terms of paragraph 2 of Section twenty-seven.
10. Prescription of the action – Sec. 38 – CASTRO A
Coderias v. Estate of Chioco, GR 180476, June 26, 2013
Coderias vs Estate of Juan Chioco
Facts:
The deceased Juan O. Chioco (Chioco) owned a 4-hectare
farm in Lupao, Nueva Ecija. As tiller of the farm, petitioner
Raymundo Coderias was issued a Certificate of Land Transfer
(CLT) on April 26, 1974. In 1980, individuals connected with
Chioco who was a former Governor of Nueva Ecija threatened
to kill petitioner if he did not leave the farm. His standing
crops (corn and vegetables) and house were bulldozed. For
fear of his life, petitioner, together with his family, left the
farm. Several years later, upon learning of Chioco’s death,
petitioner and his family re-established themselves on the
farm. Petitioner then filed a petition against respondent
Chioco’s estate praying that his possession and cultivation of
the farm be respected. Respondent moved to dismis the
Petition, contending that petitioner’s cause of action has
prescribed under Section 3813 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3844,
as amended, since the alleged dispossession took place in
1980 but the Petition was filed only in 1995, or beyond the
statutory three-year period for filing such claims. Petitioner
filed an opposition arguing that his tenure/tillage should be
deemed uninterrupted since his departure was due to threats
made by Chioco’s henchmen; thus, the three-year
prescriptive period should not be applied to his case.
Issue:
WON the three year prescriptive period should be applied to
Coderias?
Ruling:
No. Petitioner may not be faulted for acting only after Chioco
passed away for his life and the lives of members of his family
are not worth gambling for a piece of land. The bulldozing of
his house is only an example of the fate that could befall
them. Under the circumstances, it is therefore
understandable that instead of fighting for the farm,
petitioner opted to leave and keep his family safe. Any man
who cherishes his family more than the most valuable
material thing in his life would have done the same. Force
and intimidation restrict or hinder the exercise of the will,
and so long as they exist, petitioner is deprived of his free
will. He could not occupy his farm, plant his crops, tend to
them, and harvest them. He could not file an agrarian case
against Chioco, for that meant having to return to Nueva
Ecija. He could not file the case anywhere else; any other
agrarian tribunal or agency would have declined to exercise
jurisdiction. It is worth reiterating at this juncture that
respondent had no right to claim prescription because a CLT
had already been issued in favor of petitioner. The farm is
considered expropriated and placed under the coverage of
the land reform law. As such, respondent had neither the
right to evict petitioner nor to claim prescription.
11. Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) –
implementing arm of the agrarian reform program – CASTRO
J
CHAPTER XII R.A. No. 6657 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program
Administrative Adjudication
SECTION 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is
hereby vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture
(DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). It shall not be bound by technical rules of
procedure and evidence but shall proceed to hear and decide
all cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious
manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity and
the merits of the case. Toward this end, it shall adopt a
uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and
inexpensive determination for every action or proceeding
before it. It shall have the power to summon witnesses,
administer oaths, take testimony, require submission of
reports, compel the production of books and documents and
answers to interrogatories and issue subpoena, and
subpoena duces tecum, and enforce its writs through sheriffs
or other duly deputized officers. It shall likewise have the
power to punish direct and indirect contempts in the same
manner and subject to the same penalties as provided in the
Rules of Court. Responsible farmer leaders shall be allowed to
represent themselves, their fellow farmers, or their
organizations in any proceedings before the DAR: Provided,
however, That when there are two or more representatives
32
for any individual or group, the representatives should
choose only one among themselves to represent such party
or group before any DAR proceedings. Notwithstanding an
appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the DAR shall
be immediately executory.

Bank of the Philippines (LBP) – financial arm of the agrarian

reform program- CERAS/PAVICO
Land Bank of the Philippines
Charter/mandate. The Land Bank of the Philippines
was established on 8 August 1963 as a government-owned
financial institution by virtue of Republic Act 3844, otherwise
known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code. The Land Bank
was primarily mandated to serve as the financial arm of the
land reform programme that advances payments to
landowners and collects amortization from farmer
beneficiaries. In 1973, the Land Bank was given a
comprehensive commercial or universal banking status
through a presidential decree. It then established its
commercial banking arm to cater to agribusiness projects and
rural industries.
With the enactment of Republic Act 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988, the Land Bank
expanded its agrarian operations as the law covered all
agricultural lands, both private and public, regardless of
tenurial arrangement or commodity produced. Cooperatives
emerged as the main conduit of the Land Bank’s support to
agrarian reform beneficiaries.
Until it was give a new charter under Republic Act
7907 on 23 February 1995, the Land Bak utilized a structure
that tried to balance its universal banking and countryside
development mission through a unique combination of
branches and field offices that are scattered throughout the
archipelago. Its branch network handled commercial banking
while its field offices were in charge of its developmental or
agrarian reform functions. The profits derived from its
commercial banking operations finance development
initiatives that benefit small farmers, fishfolk and other
countryside-based small and medium-sized entrepreneurs.
However, under its new charter wherein the Land Bank was
authorized to pursue a developmental approach in banking, it
implemented the Unified System Project. While the balancing
act remains, the United States Project merged the field
banking and agrarian operations and placed them under one
roof in order to operate as a one-stop-shop. The Project was
meant to enable the Land Bank to cut down on operating
expenses and ensure a more efficient delivery of services.
Moreover, this was intended to provide more convenience to
clients and enable the bank to undertake more ambitious
projects for the development of the rural areas and ensure
food security for the country.
Sourced from: Rejuvenating Bank Finance for Development in
Asia and the Pacific
By United Nations. Economic and Social Commission for Asia
and the Pacific, Asian Development Bank

33