1. ENRILE V. AMIN FACTS: In the afternoon of October 31, 1998 at about 2:30 p.m.
both the
DOCTRINE: If a person cannot be charged with the complex crime of rebellion,
he can neither be charged separately for two different offenses, where one is
a constitutive or component element or committed in furtherance of rebellion.
FACTS: An information was charged against Senator Juan Ponce Enrile for
having committed rebellion complexed with murder with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. Another information was subsequently filed with the
Regional Trial Court 9of Makati, charging the former with a violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1829 for willfully and knowingly obstructing or delaying
the apprehension of Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan.
Allegedly, Senator Enrile entertained and accommodated Col. Gringo
Honasan by giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house
and not doing anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. It was the
prosecution’s contention that harboring or concealing a fugitive is punishable
under a special law while rebellion is based on Revised Penal Code; thus, the
two crimes can be separately punished.
ISSUE: W/N a separate case under PD 1829 can be filed against Enrile?
RULING: NO. The Supreme Court used the doctrine that if a person cannot be
charged with the complex crime of rebellion, he can neither be charged
separately for two different offenses, where one is a constitutive or component
element or committed in furtherance of rebellion.
It was also noted that petitioner was already facing charges of rebellion in
conspiracy with Honasan. Being in conspiracy thereof, the act of harboring or
concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component or ingredient of rebellion
or an act done in furtherance of rebellion. It cannot be made the basis of a
separate charge.
Also, the High Court reiterated that in cases of rebellion, all crimes committed
in furtherance thereof shall be absolved. Hence, the other charge of rebellion
complexed with murder cannot prosper. All crimes, whether punishable under
a special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or
committed in furtherance of rebellion, become absorbed and it cannot be
charged as separate crimes.
2. PEOPLE V. GONZALES
DOCTRINE: Chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes committed at the
spur of the moment or that were preceded by heated altercations are generally
not attended by treachery for lack of opportunity of the accused to deliberately
employ a treacherous mode of attack.
families of the private complainant Noel Andres and that of the accused-
appellant Inocencio Gonzalez were on their way to the exit of the Loyola
Memorial Park. The appellant was driving a white Isuzu Esteem with his
grandson and three housemaids, while the private complainant was driving a
maroon Toyota FX with his pregnant wife Feliber Andres, his two year old son,
Kenneth, his nephew Kevin and his sister-in-law, Francar Valdez. At the
intersection near the Garden of Remembrance, while the accused-appellant
Gonzalez was turning left towards the exit and the complainant Noel Andres
was headed straight along the road to the exit their two vehicles almost
collided. Noel Andres was able to timely step on the brakes. The appellant
continued driving along his way while Noel Andres drove behind the appellants
vehicle for some time and cut him off when he found the opportunity to do so.
Noel Andres then got out of his vehicle and knocked on the appellants car
window. This is as far as their versions of the incident coincide.
The prosecutions version of the incident is that Noel Andres calmly told the
appellant to be careful with his driving and informed the latter that he, Andres,
is with his family and to this Gonzalez allegedly replied, Accidents are
accidents, whats your problem. Andres stated that he saw the appellant turning
red in anger so he decided to go back to his vehicle when he was blocked by
the appellants son who said, Anong problema mo sa erpat ko. Andres testified
that he felt threatened and so he immediately boarded his vehicle, sat at the
drivers seat, closed the door, and partially opened the car window just wide
enough to talk back to appellants son, Dino. Suddenly, one of his passengers
said Binaril kami. He turned to his wife Feliber Andres and saw her bloodied
and unconscious. He turned around and saw his son Kenneth and nephew
Kevin were also wounded. Andres admitted in court that he and Dino were
shouting at each other so that he did not hear the shot. Andres then got out of
his vehicle to warn the appellant not to flee. He then took the wounded
members of his family to the exit where there was an ambulance standing by.
The three were then taken to the Sta. Monica Hospital and were later
transferred to the Quezon City Medical Center.
On November 4, 1998 an Information for the complex crime of Murder, Double
Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder was filed against herein accused-
appellant.
On June 25, 1999 the trial court rendered judgement finding that the shooting
was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery and held the
appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder for the death of Feliber Andres
and for two counts of frustrated murder for the injuries sustained by Kenneth
Andres and Kevin Valdez and sentenced the appellant to the maximum of the
imposable penalty which is death.
The Solicitor-General agrees with the appellant that the crime was not
attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery and hence the crime
committed by the appellant for the death of Feliber Andres is homicide, not
murder. The appellee takes into consideration that the shooting was preceded
by a heated argument and that the supposed victim was placed on guard that
attack was imminent. It also appears that the shooting was done impulsively.
There is no evidence that the appellant deliberately employed the means of
attack to insure execution of the crime and at the same time eliminate the risk
of retaliation from the private complainant. The appellee also agrees with the
appellant that the trial court erred in equating the use of an automatic pistol
with treachery. The trial court made the factual finding that the appellants
automatic pistol would not fire unless aimed and the trigger is deliberately
pulled and hence treachery attended the shooting. The appellee submits that
if we follow the reasoning of the trial court it would appear that the appellant
intended to shoot at the complainants vehicle only as the shot was fired at the
last window on the left side of the FX away from where Andres was allegedly
seated. The fact that the gun was drawn and fired does not mean that the
mode of attack was consciously and deliberately employed.
In sum, the appellee asserts that considering that the appellant fired a single
shot and in the process committed four offenses the appellant should be held
liable for the complex crime of homicide for the death of Feliber Andres, double
frustrated homicide against Kevin and Kenneth and attempted homicide
against Noel Andres. Under the rules on complex crimes the penalty for the
gravest offense, i.e., reclusion temporal for homicide, should be imposed in its
maximum period.
ISSUE: W/N the killing was qualified with treachery?
RULING: NO. Treachery under par.16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code
is defined as the deliberate employment of means, methods or forms in the
execution of a crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure
its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the
intended victim might raise. For treachery to be appreciated two elements must
concur: 1) the employment of means of execution that would insure the safety
of the accused from retaliatory acts of the intended victim and leaving the latter
without an opportunity to defend himself and 2) the means employed were
deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. Accordingly, it has been
consistently held by this court that chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes
committed at the spur of the moment or that were preceded by heated
altercations are generally not attended by treachery for lack of opportunity of
the accused to deliberately employ a treacherous mode of attack.
We affirm the recommendation of the Solicitor-General that the shooting was
not attended by treachery and accordingly the crime committed for the death
of Feliber Andres is homicide and not murder.
The encounter between Noel Andres and the appellant was a chance
encounter. They were total strangers before their vehicles almost collided at
an intersection inside the memorial park. Unfortunately, heated exchange of
remarks that followed the near collision was fanned by a short temper, which
in the case of the appellant, was augmented by the improvident use of a
firearm.
3. AGUIRRE V. SOJ
DOCTRINE: In the male sterilization procedure of vasectomy, the tubular
passage, called the vas deferens, through which the sperm (cells) are
transported from the testicle to the urethra where they combine with the
seminal fluid to form the ejaculant, is divided and the cut ends merely tied. That
part, which is cut, that is, the vas deferens, is merely a passageway that is part
of the duct system of the male reproductive organs. Though undeniably,
vasectomy denies a man his power of reproduction, such procedure does not
deprive him, either totally or partially, of some essential organ for reproduction.
Notably, the ordinary usage of the term mutilation is the deprivation of a limb
or essential part (of the body), with the operative expression being deprivation.
In the same manner, the word castration is defined as the removal of the
testies or ovaries. Such being the case in this present petition, the bilateral
vasectomy done on Larry could not have amounted to the crime of mutilation
as defined and punished under Article 262, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal
Code.
FACTS: Laureano Larry Aguirre used to be a charge of the Heart of Mary Villa,
a child caring agency run by the Good Shepherd Sisters and licensed by the
Department of Social Work and Development (DSWD). Sometime in 1978,
respondent Pedro Aguirre; the latters spouse, Lourdes S. Aguirre (Lourdes
Aguirre); and their four daughters, who included petitioner Gloria Aguirre and
respondent Olondriz, came to know Larry, who was then just over a year old.
The Aguirres would have Larry spend a few days at their home and then return
him to the orphanage thereafter. In June 1980, Larry, then two years and nine
months of age, formally became the ward of respondent Pedro Aguirre and his
spouse Lourdes Aguirre by virtue of an Affidavit of Consent to Legal
Guardianship executed in their favor by Sister Mary Concepta Bellosillo,
Superior of the Heart of Mary Villa. On 19 June 1986, the Aguirre spouses
guardianship of Larry was legalized when the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 3 of Balanga, Bataan, duly appointed them as joint co-guardians over
the person and property of Larry.
As Larry was growing up, the Aguirre spouses and their children noticed that
his developmental milestones were remarkably delayed. His cognitive and
physical growth did not appear normal in that at age 3 to 4 years, Larry could
only crawl on his tummy like a frog x x x; he did not utter his first word until he
was three years of age; did not speak in sentences until his sixth year; and
only learned to stand up and walk after he turned five years old. At age six, the
Aguirre spouses first enrolled Larry at the Colegio de San Agustin, Dasmarias
Village, but the child experienced significant learning difficulties there. In 1989,
at age eleven, Larry was taken to specialists for neurological and psychological
evaluations. The psychological evaluation done on Larry revealed the latter to
be suffering from a mild mental deficiency. Consequent thereto, the Aguirre
spouses transferred Larry to St. John Ma. Vianney, an educational institution
for special children.
In November of 2001, respondent Dr. Agatep, a urologist/surgeon, was
approached concerning the intention to have Larry, then 24 years of age,
vasectomized. Prior to performing the procedure on the intended patient,
respondent Dr. Agatep required that Larry be evaluated by a psychiatrist in
order to confirm and validate whether or not the former could validly give his
consent to the medical procedure on account of his mental deficiency. Later,
Pedro Aguirres written consent was deemed sufficient in order to proceed with
the conduct of the vasectomy. Hence, on 31 January 2002, respondent Dr.
Agatep performed a bilateral vasectomy on Larry.
On 11 June 2002, petitioner Gloria Aguirre, respondent Pedro Aguirres eldest
child, instituted a criminal complaint for the violation of the Revised Penal
Code, particularly Articles 172 and 262, both in relation to Republic Act No.
7610 against respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep, Dr. Pascual
and several John/Jane Does before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City.
ISSUE: W/N the RESPONDENTS should be held guilty of the crime charged
(mutilation)?
RULING: YES. The elements of mutilation under the first paragraph of Art. 262
of the Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be a castration, that is, mutilation
of organs necessary for generation; and 2) that the mutilation is caused
purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive the offended party of some
essential organ for reproduction. According to the public prosecutor, the facts
alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation as defined and penalized
above, i.e., [t]he vasectomy operation did not in any way deprived Larry of his
reproductive organ, which is still very much part of his physical self. Petitioner
Gloria Aguirre, however, would want this Court to make a ruling that bilateral
vasectomy constitutes the crime of mutilation.
In the male sterilization procedure of vasectomy, the tubular passage, called
the vas deferens, through which the sperm (cells) are transported from the
testicle to the urethra where they combine with the seminal fluid to form the
ejaculant, is divided and the cut ends merely tied. That part, which is cut, that
is, the vas deferens, is merely a passageway that is part of the duct system of
the male reproductive organs. The vas deferens is not an organ, i.e., a highly
organized unit of structure, having a defined function in a multicellular
organism and consisting of a range of tissues. Be that as it may, even
assuming arguendo that the tubular passage can be considered an organ, the
cutting of the vas deferens does not divest or deny a man of any essential
organ of reproduction for the simple reason that it does not entail the taking
away of a part or portion of the male reproductive system. The cut ends, after
they have been tied, are then dropped back into the incision.
Though undeniably, vasectomy denies a man his power of reproduction, such
procedure does not deprive him, either totally or partially, of some essential
organ for reproduction. Notably, the ordinary usage of the term mutilation is
the deprivation of a limb or essential part (of the body), with the operative
expression being deprivation. In the same manner, the word castration is
defined as the removal of the testies or ovaries. Such being the case in this
present petition, the bilateral vasectomy done on Larry could not have
amounted to the crime of mutilation as defined and punished under Article 262,
paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. And no criminal culpability could be
foisted on to respondent Dr. Agatep, the urologist who performed the
procedure, much less the other respondents. Thus, ACCUSED is
ACQUITTED.
4. PEOPLE V. ORITA
DOCTRINE: In the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal
knowledge of his victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment
also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished.
Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the
last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated.
[Art. 266 and Art. 6]
We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect
penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male
organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture
of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction
FACTS: March 20, 1983 Early Morning: Cristina S. Abayan, 19-year old
freshman student at the St. Joseph's College, arrived at her boarding house
after her classmates brought her home from a party. She knocked at the door
of her boarding house when a frequent visitor of another boarder held her and
poked a knife to her neck. Despite pleading for her release, he ordered her to
go upstairs with him. Since the door which led to the 1st floor was locked from
the inside, they used the back door to the second floor. With his left arm
wrapped around her neck and his right hand poking a "balisong" to her neck,
he dragged her up the stairs. When they reached the second floor, he
commanded herwith the knife poked at her neck, to look for a room. They
entered Abayan's room. He then pushed her hitting her head on the wall. With
one hand holding the knife, he undressed himself. He then ordered her to take
off her clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt, bra, pants and panty. He
ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He made her hold
his penis and insert it in her vagina. Still poked with a knife, she did as told but
since she kept moving, only a portion of his penis entered her. He then laid
down on his back and commanded her to mount him. Still only a small part of
his penis was inserted into her vagina. When he had both his hands flat on the
floor. She dashed out to the next room and locked herself in. When he pursued
her and climbed the partition, she ran to another room then another then she
jumped out through a window.

Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, 18 meters in front of the
boarding house and knocked on the door. When there was no answer, she ran
around the building and knocked on the back door. When the policemen who
were inside the building opened the door, they found her naked sitting on the
stairs crying. Pat. Donceras, took off his jacket and wrapped it around her. Pat.
Donceras and two other policemen rushed to the boarding house where they
heard and saw somebody running away but failed to apprehend him due to
darkness. She was taken to Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital where she
was physically examined.

RTC convicted Orita the crime of frustrated rape.

ISSUE: W/N there was a proper conviction?

RULING: NO. In the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal
knowledge of his victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment
also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished. Any
penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the
labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of
the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if
there is no penetration of the female organ.

Hence, in this case, the crime of rape was consummated.