G.R. No.

225973, November 08, 2016

Saturnino Ocampo
vs.
Rear Admiral Enriquez

FACTS:

Public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the public
respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP, General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the interment of Marcos at the Libingan
Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB) in reference to the Verbal Order of President Duterte. Respondent AFP Rear Admiral
Ernesto C. Enriquez issued directives to the Philippine Army (PA) Commanding General for the Funeral Honors and
Service to former President Marcos.

Dissatisfied with the said issuance, the following were filed by petitioners:

1. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Saturnino Ocampo and several others, in their capacities as human
rights advocates or human rights violations victims as defined under Section 3 (c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10368
(Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013).

2. Petition for Certiorari-in-Intervention filed by Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. and his son, as members of the Bar and
human rights lawyers, and his grandchild.

3. Petition for Prohibition filed by Representative Edcel C. Lagman, in his personal capacity, as member of the House
of Representatives and as Honorary Chairperson of Families of Victims of Involuntary Disappearance (FIND), a duly-
registered corporation and organization of victims and families of enforced disappearance, mostly during the martial
law regime of the former President Marcos, and several others, in their official capacities as duly-elected
Congressmen of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.

4. Petition for Prohibition filed by Loretta Ann Pargas-Rosales, former Chairperson of the Commission on Human
Rights, and several others, suing as victims of State-sanctioned human rights violations during the martial law regime
of Marcos.

5. Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition filed by Heherson T. Alvarez, former Senator of the Republic of the
Philippines, who fought to oust the dictatorship of Marcos, and several others, as concerned Filipino citizens and
taxpayers.

6. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Zaira Patricia B. Baniaga and several others, as concerned Filipino
citizens and taxpayers.

7. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Algamar A. Latiph, former Chairperson of the Regional Human Rights
Commission, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by himself and on behalf of the Moro who are victims of
human rights during the martial law regime of Marcos.

8. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Leila M. De Lima as member of the Senate of the Republic of the
Philippines, public official and concerned citizen.

ISSUES:

1. Whether President Duterte’s determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB poses a justiciable
controversy.
2. Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions.

3. Whether petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts.

4. Whether the Issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive violate the Constitution,
domestic and international laws.

RULING:

It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard
and decided by the Court unless the following requisites for judicial inquiry are present:

(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;

(b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;

(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and

(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

In this case, the absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders the discussion of the last
two superfluous.

An “actual case or controversy” is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.

Moreover, the limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies carries the assurance that
the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. Those areas pertain to
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government.cralawred As they are concerned with questions of policy and issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality of a particular measure, political questions used to be beyond the ambit of judicial review.

The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte’s decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB
involves a political question that is not a justiciable controversy.

In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and E.O. No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) to allow the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public domain devoted for national military cemetery and
military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote
national healing and forgiveness.

Locus standi, a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question, requires that a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

Unless a person has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of an act complained of,
such proper party has no standing.
Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in their capacities as citizens,
human rights violations victims, legislators, members of the Bar and taxpayers, have no legal standing to file such
petitions because they failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a result of the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB.

Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law. In this case, what is essentially being assailed is the wisdom behind the decision of the
President to proceed with the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. As taxpayers, petitioners merely claim illegal
disbursement of public funds, without showing that Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by either
express or implied provision of the Constitution, the laws or jurisprudence.

As concerned citizens, petitioners are also required to substantiate that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the
court, one should have availed first of all the means of administrative processes available. If resort to a remedy within
the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to
decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s
judicial power can be sought.

For reasons of comity and convenience, courts of justice shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity
to correct its error and dispose of the case.

While there are exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners failed to prove the
presence of any of those exceptions.

Constitutionality

The President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence.
Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB should not be allowed because it has the effect of not just
rewriting history as to the Filipino people’s act of revolting against an authoritarian ruler but also condoning the
abuses committed during the Martial Law, thereby violating the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution, which is a
“post-dictatorship charter” and a “human rights constitution.” For them, the ratification of the Constitution serves as a
clear condemnation of Marcos’ alleged “heroism.” To support their case, petitioners invoke Sections 2, 11, 13, 23, 26,
27 and 28 of Article II, Sec. 17 of Art. VII, Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV, Sec. 1 of Art. XI, and Sec. 26 of Art. XVII of the
Constitution.

There is no merit to the contention.

As the OSG logically reasoned out, while the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its entirety
should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about anything remotely related to the Martial Law
period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.

Tañada v. Angara already ruled that the provisions in Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing. Thus:

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a “declaration of principles and state policies.” The counterpart of this
article in the 1935 Constitution is called the “basic political creed of the nation” by Dean Vicente Sinco. These
principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They
are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in
its enactment of laws.
As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state policies enumerated in
Article II x x x are not “self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the
courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.”
xxx

The petitions must be dismissed.

G.R. No. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424, May 3, 2006
RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL.
VS.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL.

FACTS:

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo
issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and
the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country.
The Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary
celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments
and dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA. The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a
professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald
Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.

In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the
PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and attempt to arrest was
made against representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom suspected of inciting to sedition
and rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has
ceased to exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court and three (3) of those petitions
impleaded President Arroyo as respondent questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that it encroaches
the emergency powers of Congress and it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech
and assembly.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional.

2. Whether or not the warantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas and the dispersal of KMU and
NAFLU-KMU members during rallies were valid.

3. Whether or not proper to implead President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as respondent in the petitions.

4. Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the constitutionality of the proclamation.

5. Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law
are used.

RULING:

The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP
to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution. However, there were extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power:

(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1,
Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of thePhilippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.")
 (B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as
decrees promulgated by the President[The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and
oppression on the part of the police or military]; and

(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra
vires andunconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in
the absence of legislative legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with
public interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly unconstitutional.

The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and
NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies are illegal, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing
acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or
any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure
of its articles for publication and other materials, are declared unconstitutional because there was no clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.

It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his
tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide
for it in the Constitution or law.

This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns
the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain direct injury as a result.” Therefore, the court ruled that the petitioners have a locus standi, for they suffered
“direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, in times of national emergency, when the public
interest so requires, the President may temporarily take over a privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest only if there is congressional authority or approval. There must enactment of appropriate legislation
prescribing the terms and conditions under which the President may exercise the powers that will serves as the best
assurance that due process of law would be observed.

G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991

PEOPLE
VS
ANDREI MARTI

FACTS:

On 14 August 1987, appellant Andre Marti and his common-law wife went to the booth of the Manila Packing and
Export Forwarders to send four (4) packages to a fiend in Zurich, Switzerland. When asked if the packages could be
examined and inspected, appellant refused, assuring that they were simply gifts of books cigars, and gloves. The
packages were then placed in a box and was sealed with masking tape for shipment.

As a standard operating procedure before delivering packages to the Bureau of Customs and/or Burueau of Posts,
the proprietor of the forwarding agency opened the box for final inspection. A peculiar odor emitted therefrom and he
found dried leaves inside. He brought samples to NBI, and informed them that the rest of the shipment was still in his
office. Agents of the NBI went to his office and found the shipment containing bricks of dried marijuana leaves, some
of which were packed inside the gloves and neatly stocked underneath tabacalera cigars. Thereafter, an information
was filed against the appellant in violation of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), for which he was found guilty.
Appellant assailed the decision, claiming that the evidence was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights
against unreasonable search and seizure, and further, that the court erred in admitting in evidence the illegally
searched and seized packages.

ISSUE:
May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant’s constitutional rights be invoked against the
State?

HELD:

No. As the Court held in several other cases, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against
the State in the absence of governmental interference. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and
seizure) refers to the immunity of one’s person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government; and the
search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private individuals. In the
present case, it was the proprietor of the forwarding agency who made search/inspection of the packages and the
contraband came into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing appellant’s rights against
unreasonable search and seizure. The NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one. Thus, the
alleged act of the private individual in violation of a constitutional right cannot be invoked against the State.

NB:
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked
against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the
test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police
authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual,
not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government.

Reference:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the
court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.

G.R. No. 113271, October 16, 1997

WATEROUS DRUG
VS
NLRC

FACTS:

Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp. YSP Inc., a supplier of medicine, sold to
Waterous, thru Catolico, 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, previews P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc.
showed that the price per bottle is P320.00. Verification was made to YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy and it
was found that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced.YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes)
confirmed that the difference represents refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice, which
was paid to Ms. Catolico. Said check was sent in an envelope addressed to Catolico.Catolico denied receiving the
same. However, Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. confirmed that she saw an open envelope with a check
amounting P640 payable to Catolico.
Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty. NLRC dismissed the Petition.
Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked
by complainants.

Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person from interference by government and cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the check is admissible as evidence

HELD:

Yes. In People vs. Marti, it was ruled that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and
seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no
recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both
criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of
Catolico from employment Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of
Employment.