(REBELLION)
would not be absorbed by the crime rebellion.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELIAS LOVEDIORO y
CASTRO, defendant-appellant.
FACTS: Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking when a man suddenly
walked beside him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his waist, aimed the gun at the
policeman's right ear and 8red. The man who shot Lucilo had three other companions
with him, one of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the ground.
After taking the latter's gun, the man and his companions boarded a tricycle and fled.
The incident was witnessed from a distance by Nestor Armenta who
claimed that he knew both the victim and the man who fired the fatal shot. Armenta
identified the man who fired at the deceased as Elias Lovedioro y Castro, his
nephew. An Information charging accused-appellant Elias Lovedioro y Castro of the
crime of Murder under Article 248.
Appellant cites the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness, Nestor
Armenta, as supporting his claim that he should have been charged with the crime of
rebellion, not murder. He asseverates that Armenta, a police informer, identified him
as a member of the New People's Army. Additionally, he contends that because the
killing of Lucilo was "a means to or in furtherance of subversive ends," the said
killing should have been deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion under Arts. 134
and 135 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: WON the appellant should be convicted with rebellion, and not murder? -
NO
RULING: The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising
against the government. By its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses
or multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot be confined a priori within
predetermined bounds. One aspect noteworthy in the commission of rebellion is that
other acts committed in its pursuance are, by law, absorbed in the crime itself
because they acquire a political character.
In fact, even in cases where the act complained of were committed
simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion, if the killing, robbing, or etc.,
were accomplished for private purposes or profit, without any political motivation, it
has been held that the crime would be separately punishable as a common crime and
The crime committed by appellant may be considered as rebellion only
if the defense itself had conclusively proven that the motive or intent for the
killing of the policeman was for "political and subversive ends. In deciding if the
crime committed is rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to
ascertain whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a political end. The
political motive of the act should be conclusively demonstrated.
It bears emphasis that nowhere in his entire extrajudicial confession did
appellant ever mention that he was a member of the New People's Army. A thorough
reading of the same reveals nothing which would suggest that the killing in which
he was a participant was motivated by a political purpose. Moreover, the
information filed against appellant, based on sworn statements, did not contain any
mention or allusion as to the involvement of the NPA in the death of SPO3 Lucilo.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, appellant's contentions are
couched in terms so general and non-specific that they offer no explanation as to
what contribution the killing would have made towards the achievement of the
NPA's subversive aims. SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, a mere policeman, was never alleged to
be an informer. No acts of his were specifically shown to have offended the NPA.
In the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence pointing to a political
motive for the killing of SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, we are satisfied that the trial court
correctly convicted appellant of the crime of murder.
PEOPLE VS. DASIG
In the case at bar, there is no evidence to prove that appellant Dasig headed
the crime committed. Appellant merely participated in committing the act, or just
FACTS:
executed the command of an unknown leader. Hence, he should be made to suffer
On August 4, 1987, Pfc. Catamora noticed eight (8) persons, one of whom the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor. Appellant being a
he identified as Edwin Nuñez, acting suspiciously. He noticed one of them giving confessed member of the sparrow unit, the liquidation squad of the New People's
instructions to two of the men to approach Pfc. Manatad. He followed the two, and Army whose objective is to overthrow the duly constituted government, the crime
heard a series of shots from the other group and thereafter saw Pfc. Manatad committed is simple rebellion and not murder with direct assault.
sprawled on the ground. He then saw two (2) persons take Pfc. Manatad's gun and
again fired at him to make sure that he is dead while the rest of the group including
Nuñes acted as back up. Thereafter, the Nuñes group commandeered a vehicle and
fled from the scene of the shooting.

On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officers were tasked to conduct
surveillance on a suspected safehouse of members of the sparrow unit. The group
saw Rodrigo Dasig and Edwin Nuñes trying to escape.

Dasig confessed that he and the group of Edwin Nuñes killed Pfc. Manatad.
He likewise admitted that he and Nuñes were members of the sparrow unit and that
their aliases were "Armand" and "Mabi," respectively.

ISSUE: Is appellant Dasig guilty of Rebellion – YES

RULING:
The crime of rebellion consists of may acts. It is a vast movement of men
and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion
though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion.
The act of killing a police officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person in
authority is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance
of the rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate charge.

Moreover, in the case of People v. Mangallan, We held that where the

accused who was charged with murder admitted his membership with the NPA and
the killing of a suspected PC informer, the crime committed is not murder but
rebellion punishable under Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.
Ocampo vs. Abando, 715 SCRA 673, G.R. No. 190005 February 11 2014
FACTS: A mass graveyard was found at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan,
Inopacan, Leyte by the 43rd Infantry Brigade containing 67 skeletal remains of those
believed to be victims of “Operation Venereal Disease (VD)” by the Communist
Party of the Philippines/ New People’s Army/National Democratic Front
(CPP/NPA/NPDF) of the Philippines. This was done to purge their ranks of
suspected military informers.
Members of the Scene of the Crime Operation team conducted forensic
crime analysis to identify the bodies by way of DNA sample. The initial report of the
PNP Crime Laboratory on their identities remained inconclusive, but, in a Special
Report, the Case Secretariat of the Regional and National Inter-Agency Legal Action
Group came up with ten names of possible victims after comparing the testimonies
of relatives and witnesses.
Police Chief Inspector George L. Almaden and Staff Judge Advocate
Captain Allan Tiu sent undated letters to Pros. Vivero, requesting for legal action on
the twelve attached complaint affidavits. These were from relatives of the alleged
victims of Operation VD who all swore that their relatives had been abducted or last
seen with members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP.
Charging them with murder, the affidavits were directed to 71 named
members of the group, including the petitioners. Namely, the petitioners were
Ocampo, Echanis, Baylosis and Ladlad who were all pointed out to be members of
the Central Committee that ordered the campaign to be carried out in 1985.
On this basis, Pros. Vivero issued a subpoena requiring them to submit their
counter-affidavits and Ocampo complied. However, Echanis and Baylosis did not do
so because allegedly they were not served the copy of a subpoena. As for Ladlad,
though his counsel made formal appearance during the preliminary investigation, he
also did not submit for the same reason as the two.
Pros. Vivero, in a resolution, directed the filing of information for 15 counts
of multiple murder against the 54 named members, including the petitioners. He also
caused some respondents to be used as state witnesses for their testimony is vital to
the prosecution. Said information was filed before RTC Hilongos, Leyte branch 18
presided by Judge Abando.
Prior to receiving the resolution, Ocampo filed an Ex Parte Motion to Set
Case for Clarificatory Hearing. Judge Obando found probable cause and ordered the
issuance of warrants of arrest against them with no recommended bail.
Ocampo went to the Supreme Court by way of special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 and asked for the abovementioned order and
the prosecutor’s resolution to be annulled. He said that a case for rebellion against
him and 44 others was then already pending before RTC Makati and so, the crime of
murder was absorbed by the rebellion in line with the political offense doctrine.
The Court ordered the Solicitor General to comment on the issue and also
ordered the parties to submit their memoranda. From the oral arguments, the Court
found that the single Information charging them all of 15 counts of murder was
defective. The prosecution moved to admit amended and new information, but Judge
Abando suspended the proceedings during the pendency of the case before the Court.
Meanwhile, Echanis was arrested and he, along with Baylosis, filed a
Motion for Judicial Reinvestigation/ Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to
Dismiss the Case Outright and Alternative Prayer to Recall/ Suspend Service of
Warrant, but it was dismissed by Judge Abando. Around this time, Ladlad filed a
Motion to Quash/Dismiss with the RTC Manila.
Echanis and Baylosis moved to reconsider but it was not acted because, as
per request of the DOJ Secretary to change the venue of the trial, the records were
transmitted to RTC Manila. Echanis and Baylosis continued to seek relief from the
Supreme Court in response to Judge Abando’s orders. Echanis also prayed for his
release.
Both Ocampo and Echanis were granted provisional release by the Supreme
Court under cash bonds.
 As to Ladlad’s Motion to Quash, it was denied by respondent judge and the
same happened to his Motion for Reconsideration. Ladlad sought to annul the latter’s
Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have
orders by way of special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
been simple rebellion, the trial court shall dismiss the murder charges upon the filing
of the Information for simple rebellion, as long as petitioners would not be placed in
double jeopardy.
As to their bail, Ladlad filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail whereas Baylosis
filed a Motion to Allow Petitioner to Post Bail which were granted, with no
opposition from the OSG (bec. they’re consultants of the NDFP negotiating team,
then having talks with the GRP peace panel).

ISSUE: Should the murder charges against petitioners be dismissed under the
political offense doctrine?

RULING: Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in

furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as "common"
offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are
mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the
principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver
penalty." People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515

Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime
of rebellion. Thus, when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing
is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the political complexion of
rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion
alone.

But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial
court, it becomes crucial for the court to determine whether the act of killing was
done in furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive of the act to be
conclusively demonstrated.

Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v. CA, 401

Phil 905 if during trial, petitioners are able to show that the alleged murders were
indeed committed in furtherance of rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court provides the remedy of Amendment or substitution.
(INCITING TO SEDITION)

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN

FELEO, defendant-appellant .

FACTS: This appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the CFI finding the
appellant, Juan Feleo, guilty of the offense of inciting sedition in violation of article
142 of the Revised Penal Code.
The legislative committee on labor held a public meeting in to hear the
complaints and grievances of farmers. Many people were present at said meeting,
and after addresses had been delivered by the official speakers, Juan Feleo made a
talk:
"My brothers: Nobody violates the law but he who makes it; and it is
necessary that we should all unite to overthrow that power. A soviet
government is necessary here; Russia is the first country where the
laborers have had their emancipation from oppression, imperialism
and capitalism. It is necessary that all property should be delivered to
the government for its administration, and from this we will see the
redemption of the Filipino people."

ISSUE: WON the CFI erred in the conviction of the appellant of the crime
Inciting to Sedition? -NO

RULING: The action thus taken was correct. The words used by the accused
are clearly directed to the end of inciting sedition, contrary to the provisions of
article 142 of the Revised Penal Code.
According to that article, one of the various forms of sedition
consists in preventing the Insular Government or any provincial or municipal
government, or any public officer thereof, from freely exercising its or his
functions. The language imputed to the appellant incites the auditors to the
overthrowing of the lawmaking power; and as the greater includes the less,
this language necessarily involves preventing the Government and public
officials from freely exercising their functions.
People vs Nabong
FACTS: The appellant is an attorney and had been retained to defend one
Juan Feleo against a charge of sedition that had been preferred against him.
Feleo was in those days a recognized leader of the communists in Nueva
Ecija, and was related by marriage to the appellant. One Antonio D. Ora, the
head of the communists in the Philippine Islands, died in the municipality of
Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija, and a necrological service in his memory was
appointed by his followers to be held at Santa Rosa.
The fact that said meeting was to be held came to the attention of Major
Silvino Gallardo, in charge of the Philippine Constabulary, and he was
informed that the red flag would be displayed in this meeting as an emblem of
the communists. Major Gallardo accordingly had an interview with the
provincial fiscal over the question whether the display of the flag should be
prevented. The fiscal gave an opinion to the effect that the display of the red
flag would be unlawful, and a copy of his opinion to this effect was placed in
the hands of Major Gallardo. As Major Gallardo left the court-house, he met
the appellant Nabong, he requested Nabong to interfere and prevent the
display of the red flag at the meeting referred to. Nabong said that he did not
agree with the conclusion of the fiscal; and he, therefore, refused to
accompany the Constabulary officers and the deputy provincial fiscal to Santa
Rosa.
The Constabulary officers arrived at the meeting place where they found
Feleo making a speech which appeared to be seditious in nature. At the same
time the red flag was being displayed. They then arrested Feleo. After the
arrest, the proceedings at the meeting were continued, and Jacinto Manahan
spoke to the crowd. He was followed by Ignacio Nabong who delivered a
speech. In the course of this speech Nabong criticized the members of the
Constabulary, using words substantially to the following effect:
"They committed a real abuse in seizing the flag. The members of the
Constabulary are bad because they shoot even innocent women, as it
happened in Tayug. — In view of this, we ought to be united to
suppress that abuse. Overthrow the present government and
establish our own government, the government of the poor. Use
your whip so that there may be marks on their sides."
ISSUE: Is appellant guilty of Sedition? – YES
RULING:
The language used by the appellant clearly imported an overthrow of the
Government by violence, and it should be interpreted in the plain and obvious
sense in which it was evidently intended to be understood.
The word "overthrow" could not have been intended as referring to an
ordinary change by the exercise of the elective franchise. The use of the whip,
an instrument designed to leave marks on the sides of adversaries, is
inconsistent with the mild interpretation which the appellant would have us
impute to the language. It was the purpose of the speaker, beyond a doubt, to
incite his hearers to the overthrow of organized government by unlawful
means.
The words used by the appellant manifestly tended to induce the people to
resist and use violence against the agents of the Constabulary and to instigate
the poor to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes. They also
suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies, thereby tending to stir up the
people against the lawful authorities and to disturb the peace of the
community and the order of the Government. It is not necessary, in order to be
seditious, that the words used should in fact result in a rising of the people
against the constituted authorities. The law is not aimed merely at actual
disturbance, and its purpose is also to punish utterances which may endanger
public order. Further, the acts contemplated in the provisions of law relating to
sedition are not protected by the constitutional provision, being abuses rather
than the exercise of the right of speech and of the use of the press.
Inciting to Sedition
Espuelas vs. People, 90 Phil. 524, No. L-2990, December 17, 1951
FACTS: Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to
appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended
from the limb of a tree, when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a
barrel, After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same
to several newspapers throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their
publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was
written by a Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the Alberto’s supposed wife
To top it all, the appellant proclaimed to his readers that he
committed suicide because he had "no power to put under juez de cuchillo all
the Roxas people now in power." Knowing, that the expression Juez de
Cuchillo means to the ordinary layman as the Law of the Knife, a "summary
and arbitrary execution by the knife", the idea intended by the appellant to be
conveyed was no other than bloody, violent and unpeaceful methods to free
the government from the administration of Roxas and his men. It is clear that
the letter suggested the decapitation or assassination of all Roxas officials (at
least members of the Cabinet and a majority of Legislators including the Chief
Executive himself).

The accused admitted the fact that he wrote the note or letter above
and caused its publication in different publications and that he had
impersonated one Alberto Reveniera by signing said pseudonymous name in
said note or letter and posed himself as Alberto Reveniera in a picture taken
wherein he was shown hanging by the end of a rope tied to a limb of a tree.
Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code punishes those who shall
write, publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the
Philippines or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof or which suggest
or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots or which tend to stir up the people
against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community.

ISSUE: Whether or not Espuelas’ act of writing and publishing the letter
constitutes a violation of Article 142 - Inciting to Sedition

RULING: Yes, Espuelas’ act of writing and publishing the letter constitutes a
violation of Article 142 - Inciting to Sedition

The letter is a scurrilous libel against the Government.

The publication suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots

and tends to stir up the people against the constituted authorities, or to
provoke violence from opposition groups who may seek to silence the writer.
The essence of seditious libel may be said to be its immediate tendency to stir
up general discontent to the pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to induce
people to resort to illegal methods other than those provided by the
Constitution, in order to repress the evils which press upon their minds.
(FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES)
ROBIN CARIÑO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD PADILLA, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS: Enrique Manarang and his compadre Danny Perez were inside a
restaurant where they took shelter from the heavy downpour. Manarang
noticed a vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero, running fast down the highway
prompting him to remark that the vehicle might get into an accident
considering the inclement weather. True enough, immediately after the
vehicle had passed the restaurant, Manarang and Perez heard a screeching
sound produced by the sudden and hard braking of a vehicle running very fast.
Manarang, being a member of both the Spectrum, a civic group and
the Barangay Disaster Coordinating Council, decided to report the incident to
the Philippine National Police. By the time Manarang completed the call, the
vehicle had started to leave the place of the accident taking the general
direction to the north, while he went back to the restaurant, rode on his
motorcycle and chased the vehicle. During the chase he was able to make out
the plate number of the vehicle as PMA 777. He called the Viper through the
radio once again reporting that a vehicle heading north.
When apprehended, the driver rolled down the window and put his
head out while raising both his hands. They recognized the driver as Robin C.
Padilla, appellant in this case. The police officer made the move to confiscate
the gun but appellant held the former' s hand alleging that the gun was
covered by legal papers. After disarming appellant, SPO2 Borja told him
about the hit and run incident which was angrily denied by appellant. (Also
in the course thereof, nakuhaan din siya ng iba pang mga baril and bala
hahaha pampabaha kasi eh sorryz). During the investigation, appellant
admitted possession of the firearms stating that he used them for shooting. He
was not able to produce any permit to carry or memorandum receipt to cover
the three firearms.
ISSUE: WON the appellant can be convicted with the crime Illegal
Possession of Firearm? -YES
RULING: Two requisites must be established: (1) the existence of the subject
firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm
does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess. The first
element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms and ammunitions were
seized from petitioner's possession. As to the second element, the same was
convincingly proven by the prosecution.
Petitioner's alternative excuses that the subject firearms were
intended for theatrical purposes, or that they were owned by the Presidential
Security Group, or that his Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were left
at home, further compound their irregularity.
In several occasions, the Court has ruled that either the testimony of
a representative of, or a certification from, the. PNP Firearms and Explosives
Office (FEO) attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would
suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal
possession of firearm.
"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Robin C. Padilla of 59 Labo
St., Quezon City is a licensed/registered holder of Pistol
Smith and Wesson Cal 9mm with serial number TCT8214
covered by License No. RL M76C4476687.
"Further certify that the following firearms are not
registered with this Office per verification from available
records on file this Office as of this date: M16 Baby
Armalite, Revolver Cal, and Pistol Cal 380 Pietro Beretta
The certification may even be dispensed with in the light of
the evidence that an M-16 rifle and any short firearm higher than a .38
caliber pistol, akin to the confiscated firearms, cannot be licensed to a
civilian, 82 as in the case of petitioner. Therefore, petitioner's
conviction of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions is AFFIRMED.
Palaganas vs. People
FACTS: On the evening of January 16, 1998, brothers Servillano,
Melton and Michael Ferrer were having a drinking spree in Tidbitd
Videoke bar. Jaime Palaganas arrived together with Ferdinand
Palagnas and Virgilio Bautista. The two groups occupied separate
tables. Later, when Jaime Palaganas was singing, Melton Ferrer sang
along with him as he was familiar with the song [My Way]. Jaime
however, resented this and went near the table of the Ferrer brothers
and said in Pangasinan dialect "As if you are tough guys." Jaime
further said "You are already insulting me in that way." Then, Jaime
struck Servillano Ferrer with the microphone, hitting the back of his
head. A rumble ensued between the Ferrer brothers on the one hand,
and the Palaganases, on the other hand. Virgilio Bautista did not join
the fray as he left the place. During the rumble, Ferdinand went out of
the bar. He was however pursued by Michael. When Servillano saw
Michael, he also went out and told the latter not to follow Ferdinand.
Servillano and Michael then went back inside the bar and continued
their fight with Jaime.
Ferrer brothers then went outside the bar. They saw Ferdinand. He
was pointing at them and said to his companion, later identified as
petitioner [Rujjeric] Palaganas, "Oraratan paltog mo lara", meaning
"They are the ones, shoot them." Petitioner then shot them hitting
Servillano first at the left side of the abdomen, causing him to fall on
the ground, and followed by [Melton] who also fell to the ground.
When Servillano noticed that [Melton] was no longer moving, he told
Michael "Bato, bato." Michael picked up some stones and threw them
at petitioner and Ferdinand. The latter then left the place. Afterwards,
the police officers came and the Ferrer brothers were brought to the
Manaoag Hospital and later to Villaflor Hospital in Dagupan.
Servillano later discovered that [Melton] was fatally hit in the head
while Michael was hit in the right shoulder.
RULING:
(Mahaba discussion regarding sa crime nila if attempted or frustrated
homicide ba pero ung nilagay ko ung regarding lng sa unlicensed
firearm)
With regard to the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of use
of an unlicensed firearm, we agree with the trial court and the
appellate court that the same must be applied against petitioner in the
instant case since the same was alleged in the informations filed
against him before the RTC and proven during the trial. However,
such must be considered as a special aggravating circumstance, and
not a generic aggravating circumstance
Aside from the aggravating circumstances abovementioned, there is
also an aggravating circumstance provided for under Presidential
Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294, which is a
special law. Its pertinent provision states:
"If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance."
In interpreting the same provision, the trial court reasoned that such
provision is "silent as to whether it is generic or qualifying." Thus, it
ruled that "when the law is silent, the same must be interpreted in
favor of the accused." However, since we already held in several cases
that with the passage of Republic Act. No. 8294 on 6 June 1997, the
use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is now considered
as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not a generic
aggravating circumstance. Republic Act No. 8294 applies to the
instant case since it took effect before the commission of the crimes in
21 April 1998. Therefore, the use of an unlicensed firearm by the
petitioner in the instant case should be designated and appreciated as a
SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not merely a generic
aggravating circumstance.
(POPULAR REPRESENTATION)
MANUEL MARTINEZ Y FESTIN, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE JESUS P. MORFE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA, and THE CITY WARDEN OF
MANILA, respondents. Di ko gets huhuhuhu
FACTS: Petitioner Martinez y Festin alleged that on June 10, 1971,
an information against him for falsification of a public document was
filed. Its basis was his stating under oath in his certificate of candidacy
for delegate to the Constitutional Convention that he was born on June
20, 1945, when in truth and in fact he knew that he was born on June
20, 1946. A special appearance on his part questioning the power of
respondent Judge to issue a warrant of arrest and seeking that the
information be quashed. However, it was not favorably acted on.
He was arrested by the City Sheriff while was on his way to
attend the plenary session of the Constitutional Convention. Such
arrest was against his will and over his protest. On the very same day,
he filed the petition for certiorari and habeas corpus, but having been
released thereafter on bail, the petition is now in the nature solely of a
certiorari proceeding.
As for petitioner Fernando Bautista, Sr., it was alleged that he
is a duly elected and proclaimed delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. He book his oath of office and assumed the functions of
such office. Two criminal complaints were directly filed by a certain
Moises Maspil, a defeated delegate-aspirant who placed 15th in the
order of votes garnered, against the petitioner, and his co-accused for
alleged violation of Section 51 of the Revised Penal Code in that they
gave and distributed free of charge food, drinks and cigarettes at two
public meetings. Before a warrant of arrest in said criminal cases
could be issued, petitioner in a motion invoked the privilege of
immunity from arrest and search. Petitioner however did not prevail
notwithstanding his vigorous insistence on his claim for immunity, a
warrant of arrest being ordered on the same day.
In the case of petitioner Martinez y Festin, he is proceeded
against for falsification of a public document punishable by prision
mayor. As for petitioner Bautista, Sr., the penalty that could be
imposed for each of the Revised Election Code offense, of which he is
charged, is not higher than prision mayor.
ISSUE: WON the Petitioners can be accorded with the constitutional
immunity as senators and representatives from arrest during their
attendance in session of Congress and in going to and returning from
the same? -NO
RULING: As noted at the outset, certiorari does not lie to quash the
warrants of arrest issued against petitioner Martinez y Festin as well
as petitioner Bautista, Sr. Their reliance on the constitutional
provision which for them should be supplemented by what was
provided for in the Revised Penal Code is futile. There is no
justification then for granting their respective pleas.
As is made clear in Section 15 of Article VI, the immunity
from arrest does not cover any prosecution for treason, felony and
breach of the peace. Treason exists when the accused levies war
against the Republic or adheres to its enemies giving them aid and
comfort. A felony is act or omission punishable by law. Breach of the
peace covers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code
or any special statute. Petitioners cannot justify their claim to
immunity.
Nor does Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code come to
their rescue. The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered
and fortified by policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full
recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and
likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the
utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities,
bowing to no other force except the dictates of their conscience.
Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded
them.
When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would
amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in
reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they
would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and
in going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no
dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform
his functions efficiently and well, without the need for any
transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event
come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that
there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go
unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed that the prosecuting
arm of the government might unjustly go after legislators belonging to
the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards
thrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights
of an individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at
abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary would
remain independent. It is trite to say that in each and every
manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and habeas corpus
by Delegate Manuel Martinez by Festin in and the petitions for
certiorari and prohibition by Delegate Fernando Bautista, Sr. are
hereby dismissed.
Person in Authority
People vs. Sion, 277 SCRA 127, G.R. No. 109617, August 11, 1997
FACTS: Cesar Abaoag, while inside his house heard the sound of
stone throwing at the nearby house of his brother, Fernando Abaoag.
He saw Johnny Juquilon hurl a big stone against Fernando. Upon
being hit on the left eyebrow, Fernando turned his back towards Felix
Sion, Edong Sion and Miguel Disu who were also throwing stones
towards his direction. Appellant Felipe Sion, who was near the victim,
stabbed Fernando. When he heard Felipe Sion shouting to his
companions to kill Cesar, he fled and ran to his brother's house and
informed Fernando's wife, who went to the place of the incident and
saw her husband lying prostate on the ground very weak in the state of
dying. When she inquired what happened, Fernando answered
"naalaak" which in English means "I was hit." Fernando also told his
wife that his assailants were Felipe Sion, Miguel Disu, Edong Sion,
Johnny Juquilon and Felix Sion. The victim was rushed to the hospital
but he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Lagman who, in turn, "escorted and surrendered” him to the police in
the poblacion. His admission that he surrendered because he was
already suspected as one of the perpetrators of the crime does not
make his surrender "forced by circumstances" as ruled by the trial
court. His arrest at that time was neither imminent nor inevitable. At
the time of his surrender, no warrant of arrest against him had yet been
issued, the same having been issued only on 19 November 1991
This law expands the definition of a person in authority under
the Revised Penal Code, wherein among the barangay official, only
the barangay captain or chairman, now called Punong Barangay , is
expressly considered a person in authority, as provided in Article 152
thereof. Thus, in addition to the Punong Barangay, the members of the
Sangguniang Barangay, or Kagawads, and members of the Lupong
Tagapayapa are now considered not merely as agents of, but as
persons, in authority.

ISSUE: WON Sion be entitled to the benefit of the mitigating

circumstance when he surrendered himself to a person in authority

RULING: We agree with appellants that appellant Sion is entitled to

the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender,
which requires that "the offender voluntarily surrendered himself
to a person in authority." Its requisites are: (a) the offender had not
been actually arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a
person in authority or to the latter's agent; and (c) the surrender was
voluntary. For a surrender to be voluntary, it must be spontaneous and
show the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to
the authorities, either: (1) because he acknowledges his guilt; or (2)
because he wishes to save them the trouble and expense incidental to
his search and capture.

As shown by the records, in the afternoon of 17 October

1991, appellant Sion "presented" himself to Kagawad Modesto
Resistance RULING: Going over the records, it is fairly clear that what triggered
the confrontational stand-off between the police team, on one hand,
Sydeco vs. People, 740 SCRA 288, G.R. No. 202692, November 12,
and Sydeco on the other, was the latter’s refusal to get off of the
2014 vehicle for a body and vehicle search juxtaposed by his insistence on a
plain view search only. Petitioner's twin gestures cannot plausibly be
considered as resisting a lawful order. He may have sounded boorish
FACTS: P/Insp. Aguilar and 3 other police officers spotted a
or spoken cruel at that time, but none of this would make him a
swerving red Ford Ranger pick up Petitioner was behind the wheel.
criminal. It remains to stress that the petitioner has not, when
The team members, all in uniform, flagged the vehicle down and
flagged down, committed a crime or performed an overt act
asked the petitioner to alight from the vehicle so he could take a rest at
warranting a reasonable inference of criminal activity. He did not
the police station situated nearby, before he resumes driving.
try to avoid the road block established. He came to a full stop when so
Petitioner, who the policemen claimed was smelling of liquor, denied
required to stop.
being drunk and insisted he could manage to drive. Then in a raised
voice, petitioner started talking rudely to the policemen and in fact
yelled at P/Insp. Aguilar blurting: "P. . . g ina mo, bakit mo ako The two key elements of resistance and serious disobedience
hinuhuli." At that remark, P/Insp. Aguilar proceeded to arrest punished under Art. 151 of the RPC are: (1) That a person in authority
petitioner who put up resistance. The police eventually succeeded in or his agent is engaged in the performance of official duty or gives a
subduing him who was then brought to the Ospital ng Maynila where lawful order to the offender; and (2) That the offender resists or
he was examined and found to be positive of alcoholic breath. seriously disobeys such person or his agent. Surely petitioner’s act of
exercising one's right against unreasonable searches to be conducted
in the middle of the night cannot, in context, be equated to
Sydeco, on the other hand, averred that he was on the way
disobedience let alone resisting a lawful order in contemplation of Art.
home when they were signaled to stop by police officers who asked
151 of the RPC.
him to open the vehicle’s door and alight for a body and vehicle
search. When Sydeco instead opened the vehicle window and insisted
on a plain view search, one of the policemen told him he was drunk, Petitioner is acquitted
pointing to three empty beer bottles in the trunk of the vehicle. The
officers then pulled Sydeco out of the vehicle and brought him to the
Ospital ng Maynila where they secured a medical certificate as
positive of alcoholic breath, although no alcohol breath examination
was conducted. Sydeco was detained and released only in the
afternoon of the following day when it was discovered that he was
negative for alcohol breath.

ISSUE: WON Sydeco’s acts can be considered as resisting a lawful

order.
 challenged the policeman. Finally, with the help of Policemen Dayap
and Bongcado, the accused was subdued.
(DIRECT ASSAULT)

ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty of the crime Direct Assault? -YES
ENRIQUE "TOTOY" RIVERA Y DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
RULING: Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be
committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a
FACTS: A police inspector, deputy chief of police, and a police
public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment
officer were conducting routinary patrol on board a police car in
of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion
benguet when they came upon a truck unloading sacks of chicken
dung at the stall of accused Enrique "Totoy" Rivera which was and sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a
public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or
located along the Highway. Inspector Leygo advised the driver to stop
resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in
unloading the manure as it violates La Trinidad Municipal Ordinance
the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such
No. I-91 which prohibits, among others, the loading and unloading of
performance.
chicken manure along the sidewalks or road shoulders or within 15
meters from the center of the Halsema Highway. The driver complied Petitioner's case falls under the second mode, which is the
with the police directive. more common form of assault and is aggravated when: (a) the assault
The accused arrived before the group of Inspector Leygo did is committed with a weapon; or (b) when the offender is a public
officer or employee; or (c) when the offender lays hand on a person in
and ordered the driver not to obey the policemen but instead obey
authority.
him, as he (accused) was the boss. The truck driver followed the
accused's order and drove the truck. Petitioner next contends that Lt. Leygo was not in the
performance of his official duties as a police officer at the time he was
Not long after, another police officers conducting patrol
attacked. The Court disagrees. It is a matter of record that at the time
aboard a police car when they observed a truck loaded with chicken
dung proceeding towards Shilan, La Trinidad. Having in mind that the of the assault, Lt. Leygo was engaged in the actual performance of his
truck was the same truck that was recently apprehended, Inspector official duties. He was wearing the designated police uniform and was
on board a police car conducting a routinary patrol when he first came
Leygo confronted the truck driver and asked him why he still insisted
upon the truck unloading chicken manure.
on proceeding to Shilan to unload chicken manure despite the fact that
he was ordered to go back earlier in the evening. The truck driver Because there was a violation of ordinance, the lieutenant
stated that he was just following the orders of the accused. ordered the truck driver to return from where he came, but petitioner,
in defiance of such lawful order, commanded the truck driver to return
Inspector Leygo asked the accused why he insisted on
defying the ban on the unloading and loading of chicken manure. to the place where the truck was first intercepted, and on being
informed that the same truck had returned, the lieutenant had to
Instead of answering however, the accused pointed a Enger on the
stopped it again from doing so. Under the circumstances, it simply
policeman and uttered words like "Babalian kita ng buto" (I'll break
defies reason to argue that Lt. Leygo was not in the performance of his
your bones). "Ilalampaso kita" (I'll scrub you). "Pulis lang kayo" (you
lawful duties as a police officer when the assault upon him was
are only policemen) and other unsavory and insulting words. The
perpetrated by the petitioner.
accused removed his jacket and he assumed a fighting stance and
PEOPLE VS RECTO
FACTS: In the early afternoon of April 18, 1994, Barangay Captain
Percival Orbe was in his residence together with Barangay Kagawad
Antonio Macalipay and Barangay Tanod Melchor Recto, appellant's
cousin. They were trying to settle a land dispute involving Linda
Rance and Cornelio Regis, Jr. While the meeting was in progress,
Orbe was summoned by SPO4 Fortunato Rafol to proceed to the
bodega of Rance. There, they noticed that the padlock of the bodega
was destroyed, and the palay stored therein, stolen. Forthwith,
Barangay Kagawad Macalipay, who happened to be the chairman of
the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), conducted an
investigation.
At this point, Barangay Tanod Melchor Recto passed by. He saw
SPO4 Rafol, Wilfredo Arce, Spouses Crestito and Linda Rance at the
bodega. He went to Barangay Captain Orbe and inquired why they
were there. Barangay Captain Orbe told him that the padlock of the
bodega was destroyed and the palay, stolen. Thereupon, Barangay
Tanod Melchor Recto began his own ocular investigation. While
making their investigation, the group of the appellant arrived. The
group stopped at the first 'trampa' near the bodega. Barangay Captain
Orbe advised them not to create trouble, but, Dante Regis pulled a
piece of wood and threw it towards them. Thereafter, appellant Recto,
while holding a balisong or fan knife, approached Barangay Captain
Orbe. Appellant stepped backward, opened his jacket and pulled out a
gun, a de sabog. Upon seeing the gun, Barangay Captain Orbe
retreated, while Barangay Kagawad Antonio Macalipay stepped
forward with both arms raised and uttered the words: 'Do not do it.
We'll just settle this. Julio Recto, however, immediately pulled the
trigger, hitting Barangay Kagawad Macalipay, causing him to fall
down on the ground. Then Cornelio Regis, Jr. approached the fallen
Macalipay and flipped his bolo at the latter who rolled and fell into the
rice paddy.
Melchor Recto saw the shooting from his hiding place behind a
concrete pillar. He then ran inside the old dilapidated bathroom of the
bodega. Barangay Captain Orbe also followed. Inside the bathroom,
Melchor Recto peeped through the window and saw appellant Recto
fire his gun at Emilio Santos. Santos also fired his revolver at
appellant and later, turned around and crawled. While crawling,
Santos fired another shot towards Regis, Jr, but, the latter was able to
reach and hack the former with a bolo. hen Melchor could no longer
see Julio Recto, he jumped out of the bathroom window and ran.
While running, Julio Recto shot him hitting the latter's thigh.
Barangay Captain Orbe also got out of the bathroom through the top
and landed onto the ricefield. Before he could take a step, he was also
shot by appellant Julio Recto at his right elbow, but was still able to
continue running and cross the southern portion of the ricefield. He
caught up with the wounded Melchor Recto and both went their
separate ways. On the other hand, both Barangay Kagawad Antonio
Macalipay and Emiliano 'Renato' Santos died due to multiple wounds
inflicted on them by herein appellant.
ISSUES:
1. WON appellant is guilty of direct assault and attempted
homiced against victim Melchor Recto? – NO, attempted
homicide only
2. WON appellant is guilty of complex crime of qualified
direct assault with attempted homicide against victim Percibal
Obre? – YES
3. WON appellant is guilty of direct complex crime of
qualified direct assault with attempted homicide against Antonio
Macalipay? – YES
4. WON appellant is guilty of homicide against late Emiliano
Santos? - YES
RULING:
Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two
ways: first, by "any person or persons who, without a public uprising,
shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the
purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition;"
and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising,
"shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person
in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of
official duties, or on occasion of such performance." The first mode is
tantamount to rebellion or sedition, without the element of public
uprising. The second mode, on the other hand, is the more common
form of assault, and is aggravated when: (a) the assault is committed
with a weapon, or (b) when the offender is a public officer or
employee, or (c) when the offender lays a hand upon a person in
authority.
On the third case, considering that Antonio Macalipay was a kagawad
who was in the actual performance of his duties when he was shot, the
attack on him constituted direct assault. Applying the provisions of
Articles 148 (direct assault), 249 (homicide) and 48 (penalty for
complex crimes), appellant should be held liable for the complex
crime of qualified direct assault with homicide in this case. The
penalty to be imposed on him should be for homicide, which is the
more serious crime, to be imposed in the maximum period. This
penalty shall comprise the maximum of his indeterminate sentence,
and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower
than that prescribed for homicide.

An agent of a person in authority is "any person who, by direct

provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent Lastly, the court sustains appellant's conviction for homicide in
authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the Criminal Case No. 1973 because, in the words of the trial judge: "The
protection and security of life and property, such as barrio late Emiliano Santos was only beaten to the draw by co-accused Julio
councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person Recto). It was a gun duel between the two.”
who comes to the aid of persons in authority." In the case at bar, the
victim, Melchor Recto being then the barangay chief tanod of
Ambulong, Magdiwang, Romblon was clearly an agent of a person in
authority. However, contrary to the findings of the trial court, he was
not "engaged in the performance of his official duties" at the time he
was shot. Neither was he attacked "on the occasion of such
performance". Melchor's arrival of the scene of the crime to his
departure, was not engaged in the performance of his duties.
Unquestionably, Melchor Recto was a barangay chief tanod; however,
at the crime scene he was a mere bystander. Apparently, he was not
acting and had no occasion to act in the performance of his official
duties that afternoon. Thus, the attack on him did not amount to direct
assault. Appellants liability is only frustrated homicide.

With regard to the case of the attack on Percibal Obre, then a barangay
captain, a person in authority amounted to qualified direct assault,
because he was attacked on the occasion of the performance of his
duty. At the time, he was attempting to pacify appellant and to keep
the peace between the two groups.
PEOPLE VS ABALOS
FACTS: Pol. Major Abalos - fatther of the appellant, was scolding his
employees during a barangay fiesta. While Major Abalos was thus
berating his employees, appellant arrived and asked his father not to
scold them and to just let them take part in the barangay festivities.
This infuriated the elder Abalos and set off a heated argument
between father and son. While the two were quarelling, victim, Pfc.
Sofrino Labine then apeared and saluted Major Abalos. As Major
Abalos leveled his carbine at Labine, appellant hurriedly left and
procured a piece of wood. He then swiftly returned and
unceremoniously swung with that wooden piece at Labine from
behind, hitting the policeman at the back of the right side of his head.
Labine collapsed unconscious in a heap, and he later expired from the
severe skull fracture he sustained from that blow.
sufficiently deterred appellant from attacking him, and his defiant
conduct clearly demonstrates that he really had the criminal intent to
assault and injure an agent of the law.
When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in
authority for that matter, there arises the complex crime of direct
assault with murder or homicide. The killing in the instant case
constituted the felony of murder qualified by alevosia through
treacherous means deliberately adopted Pfc. Labine was struck from
behind while he was being confronted at the same time by appellant’s
father. The evidence shows that appellant deliberately went behind the
victim whom he then hit with a piece of wood which he deliberately
got for that purpose.

ISSUE: WON appellant is guilty of direct assault? – YES

RULING:
Appellant committed the second form of assault, the elements of
which are that there must be an attack, use of force, or serious
intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent; the
assault was made when the said person was performing his duties or
on the occasion of such performance, and the accused knew that the
victim is a person in authority or his agent, that is, that the accused
must have the intention to offend, injure or assault the offended party
as a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority.

Here, Labine was a duly appointed member of the then INP in

Catbalogan, Samar and, thus, was an agent of a person in authority
pursuant to Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. There
is also no dispute that he was in the actual performance of his duties
when assaulted by appellant, that is, he was maintaining peace and
order during the fiesta in Barangay Canlapwas. Appellant himself
testified that he personally knew Labine to be a policeman and, in
fact, Labine was then wearing his uniform. These facts should have