PETRONAS TECHNICAL STANDARDS

Offshore Facilities Design For Simultaneous Production

& Drilling (SIPROD)

PTS 16.01.01
December 2016

© 2016 PETROLIAM NASIONAL BERHAD (PETRONAS)

All rights reserved. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form
or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the permission of the copyright
owner. PETRONAS Technical Standards are Company’s internal standards and meant for authorized users only.
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FOREWORD

PETRONAS Technical Standards (PTS) has been developed based on the accumulated knowledge,
experience and best practices of the PETRONAS group supplementing National and International
standards where appropriate. The key objective of PTS is to ensure standard technical practice across
the PETRONAS group.

Compliance to PTS is compulsory for PETRONAS-operated facilities and Joint Ventures (JVs) where
PETRONAS has more than fifty percent (50%) shareholding and/or operational control, and includes
all phases of work activities.

Contractors/manufacturers/suppliers who use PTS are solely responsible in ensuring the quality of
work, goods and services meet the required design and engineering standards. In the case where
specific requirements are not covered in the PTS, it is the responsibility of the
Contractors/manufacturers/suppliers to propose other proven or internationally established
standards or practices of the same level of quality and integrity as reflected in the PTS.

In issuing and making the PTS available, PETRONAS is not making any warranty on the accuracy or
completeness of the information contained in PTS. The Contractors/manufacturers/suppliers shall
ensure accuracy and completeness of the PTS used for the intended design and engineering
requirement and shall inform the Owner for any conflicting requirement with other international
codes and technical standards before start of any work.

PETRONAS is the sole copyright holder of PTS. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored
in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, recording or
otherwise) or be disclosed by users to any company or person whomsoever, without the prior written
consent of PETRONAS.
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ANNOUNCEMENT

Please be informed that the entire PTS inventory is currently undergoing transformation exercise from
2013 - 2015 which includes revision to numbering system, format and content. As part of this change,
the PTS numbering system has been revised to 6-digit numbers and drawings, forms and requisition
to 7-digit numbers. All newly revised PTS will adopt this new numbering system, and where required
make reference to other PTS in its revised numbering to ensure consistency. Users are requested to
refer to PTS 00.01.01 (Index to PTS) for mapping between old and revised PTS numbers for clarity. For
further inquiries, contact PTS administrator at ptshelpdesk@petronas.com.my
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Table of Contents
1.0 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 5
1.1 SCOPE ............................................................................................................................ 5
1.2 GLOSSARY OF TERMS..................................................................................................... 5
1.3 SUMMARY OF CHANGES ............................................................................................... 6
2.0 BASIC PHILOSOPHY .......................................................................................................... 7
2.1 DOUBLE BARRIER CONCEPT........................................................................................... 7
2.2 SAFEGUARDING CONCEPT ............................................................................................. 9
2.3 BLOWDOWN SYSTEM .................................................................................................. 10
3.0 FACILITIES REQUIREMENT .............................................................................................. 12
3.1 INSTRUMENT AIR/GAS SUPPLY.................................................................................... 12
3.2 FIRE WATER SYSTEM.................................................................................................... 12
3.3 SUMP AND DRAIN........................................................................................................ 12
3.4 POWER SUPPLY ............................................................................................................ 12
3.5 PRESSURE VESSEL OPERATION .................................................................................... 13
3.6 MUDWALL ................................................................................................................... 13
4.0 RISK ASSESSMENT .......................................................................................................... 14
4.1 HAZARDOUS AREA CLASSIFICATION ............................................................................ 14
5.0 DELIVERABLES................................................................................................................ 15
5.1 SIPROD PHILOSOPHY DOCUMENT............................................................................... 15
5.2 DESIGN DRAWINGS ..................................................................................................... 15
6.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................... 16
APPENDIX I SHUTDOWN SEQUENCE ......................................................................................... 17
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

This PETRONAS Technical Standards (PTS) provides the minimum technical requirement to
design an offshore facilities based on PETRONAS best practices and lesson learnt, where
simultaneous production and drilling (SIPROD) operation is proposed.

1.1 SCOPE

This PTS covers design requirement for offshore facilities with SIPROD operation, which is
defined as the conduct of any well drilling and intervention activities (i.e. infill, workover,
abandonment) while offshore facilities is in live production operation.

Any temporary equipment, for example Well Test Unit (WTU) used or installed within SIPROD
affected area shall be designed and operated as per requirement in this PTS.

1.2 GLOSSARY OF TERMS

1.2.1 General Definition of Terms & Abbreviations

Refer to PTS 00.01.03 for PTS Requirements, General Definition Of Terms, Abbreviations &
Reading Guide.

1.2.2 Specific Definitions of Terms

No Term Definition

1 BOP fall damage area
The area with the highest risk of damage by a
falling BOP stack. Area with a radius of the
height of the BOP (bottom flange of lowest BOP
to top flange of upper BOP, excluding the riser),
plus 3 feet. BOP height range from 12 to 15 ft.
The BOP fall area will be in the ranges between
15 and 18 ft. This “BOP fall damage area” shall
be projected on the top deck of the platform
and on any deck below.

2 Dropped Object Study Detailed risk assessment (quantitative) to

determine damage category based on dropped
frequency, excursions of objects, hit probability
and frequency, and damage capacity.

3 ESD-F Emergency shutdown, on activation, causes

total shutdown and depressurisation/
blowdown. The SCSSVs are closed and deluge
valve is open.

4 ESD-P Emergency shutdown, on activation, causes

total shutdown and depressurisation/
blowdown. The SCSSVs are closed.
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No Term Definition

5 Process Shutdown Involves activation of all shutdown valves, SDV,

except SCSSVs and riser valve, and without
blowdown.

6 PST (Process Safety Time)
Time period between a failure occurring in the
process or the basic process control system
(with the potential to give rise to a hazardous
event) and the occurrence of the hazardous
event if the safety instrumented function is not
performed.

7 Unit Shutdown Characterize limited hazard situations enabling

containment by isolation or shutdown of an
individual or pre-selected group of equipment.
Table 1.1: Specific Definition of Terms

1.2.3 Specific Abbreviations

No Term Definition

2 USD Unit shutdown

Table 2.2: Specific Abbreviations

1.3 SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This is a new PTS.

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2.0 BASIC PHILOSOPHY

The ‘SIPROD affected area’ refers to the area within the limit identified to be operating under
SIPROD mode during simultaneous drilling and production activities.

For a remote drilling platform, the whole facility shall be the identified as SIPROD affected
area.

For drilling platform which is bridge-linked to or integrated with processing/production

platform, the SIPROD Affected Area shall be defined based on the risks and hazards identified
and evaluated.

The ‘SIPROD affected area’ shall be subjected to risk assessment as per section 3.5.

2.1 DOUBLE BARRIER CONCEPT

Individual operation shall be protected by a minimum of two (2) independent and tested
barriers. The examples of double barrier concept are:

i. Production or injection well protected by an SCSSV and an SSV

ii. Drilling Well protected by overbalanced fluid column and a blow-out preventer

iii. Process lines isolation using double block and valves, except for ANSI 300# rating
below and toxic fluids

2.1.1 Surface Safety Valves (SSV)

The closed SSV is regarded as a valid barrier if the valve has been checked, within the previous
one month, in accordance with API RP 14C, APPENDIX D with additional test to confirm the
closing time of the SSV from its fully open to fully close position within the time limit specified
based on the identified Process Safety Time or fifteen (15) seconds, whichever is faster.

2.1.2 Surface Controlled Subsurface Safety Valve (SCSSV)

Upon ESD-P or F, the SSV is normally closed first, followed by the SCSSV. The closed SCSSV is
regarded as a valid barrier, if it has been tested in accordance with API RP 14C ANNEX E within
the previous one month.

2.1.3 Barriers for Gaslift Annuli

Due to limited reliability of check valves, the following shall be adhered to during SIPROD
mode:

i. The check valve shall only be regarded as a valid barrier if the valve has been
tested within the previous 60 days by bleeding off to achieve maximum
differential pressure.

ii. Two (2) dissimilar check valves in series at each gaslift line (see Figure 2.1) OR a
check valve and a shutdown valve on each gaslift injection line (see Figure 2.2),
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directly mounted onto the manual wellhead side outlet valve. Gate valve (API 6A)
are preferred for this purpose. The actuated valve shall only be regarded as a valid
barrier, if it has been checked within the previous 60 days by bleeding off to
achieve the differential pressure that the valve may become exposed to, as per
API RP 14C.

PSHL TSE
FSV FSV

Figure 2.1: Two dissimilar check valve in series on gaslift injection line

PSHL SDV TSE

FSV

Figure 2.2: A check valve and a shutdown valve in series on gaslift injection line

Legend:

Shutdown Valve/actuated
valve
Check valve

Well

Pressure Relief/Safety Valve

PSHL Pressure Safety High Low

TSE Temperature Safety Element

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2.2 SAFEGUARDING CONCEPT

2.2.1 Control and Shutdown Concept

For SIPROD, all PSD's and USD's shall be converted to ESD-P, except for the following:

i. Low-low level on a separator/ scrubber

ii. High-high pressure of a well flowline with history of frequent slugging

Time delay shall not exceed Process Safety time, except for shutdown valve in an IPF loop (SIS)
to prevent overpressure. Other SDVs should be sequenced. Only pneumatic or hydraulic based
timer using volume bottle and/or needle valve that delay the closing of the SDV by restricting
the actuating medium relief/bleed, shall be used.

The closing of SDVs should be sequenced with time-delay (Appendix I Shutdown Sequence) to
ensure complete depressurization of topside hydrocarbon inventory as per requirements
stated in section 2.3.1.

ESD-F shall only be initiated by confirmed fire detection or manual activation (ESD
breakglass/kill knob).

2.2.2 Interfacing between Remote and Its Main Processing Platforms

For remote drilling platform without any hardwired interface i.e. copper or fibre optic cable,
the control and shutdown system shall be designed to be ‘self-sustaining’ to mitigate all the
identified risks to ALARP i.e. without any remote intervention either manual or automatic
from the facility in which it is monitored and controlled from e.g. Central Processing Platform
(CPP).

2.2.3 IPS

An integrated programmable electronic/pneumatic/hydraulic IPS shall be available to control

the automatic shutdown, depressurization and other effects stipulated the Cause and Effect
Matrix (CEM) developed that takes in account the requirements specified in this PTS.

The IPS logic for SIPROD shall be developed to facilitate the conversion from Normal to SIPROD
modes and vice versa with minimum hardware and software modification on the main IPS.
Following are the requirements in handling the logic switch-over for each IPS type,

i. Programmable electronic type IPS e.g. PLC - the SIPROD logic shall be developed
separately from the logic for Normal operation. The logic program shall be readily
uploaded into the IPS controller. Switching over between SIPROD and Normal
mode logic shall be by a single keyswitch or password protected ‘softswitch’.

ii. Pneumatic & Hydraulic type IPS – separate panels e.g. Flowline and Gaslift SIPROD
panels shall be provided to accommodate the shutdown logic change from
Normal to SIPROD mode. The panels are used to integrate the
pneumatic/hydraulic initiators signals and provide integrated
pneumatic/hydraulic signal(s) to the main Instrument Control Panel (ICP).
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2.2.4 Fire and Gas Detection

Fire and gas detection requirement shall be as per PTS 14.12.07. In addition to the fixed gas
detectors, if provided, personnel who are qualified as Authorized Gas Tester (AGT) shall be
available throughout SIPROD period to conduct periodic gas tests using portable gas detector
at Identified SIPROD Affected Area.

2.2.5 Interface with Drilling Rig

The following shall be provided as the minimum for interfacing with drilling:

i. For Jack-up Rig: SIPROD Alarm Panel with sounder and ESD Manual Breakglass/
Kill Knob to be located at drilling console or location identified by drilling
supervisor.

ii. For Tender Assisted Rig:

a) SIPROD Alarm Panel with either pneumatic or electrical based sounder
and electrical based manual ESD initiator (breakglass or pushbutton)/
pneumatic based kill knob to be located at drilling console or location
identified by drilling supervisor.

Pneumatic ESD Manual Kill Knob Station to be located on tender barge, preferably close to
Personnel Access Ramp (PAR). The ESD Manual Kill Knob station shall be connected to
platform IPS using flexible hose and quick-connect terminated at Rig Interface Panel located
on the platform. This to allow isolation of the kill knob signal in case of tender barge has to
be ‘pulled-away’ from the platform during bad weather.

2.3 BLOWDOWN SYSTEM

2.3.1 Depressurisation System Basic Criteria

The general philosophy of the blowdown system shall be based on API Standard 521.

2.3.2 Discharge Facilities

Local vents shall not be utilized for discharging hydrocarbon, except for liquids with flash point
at least 10 degree Celcius higher than maximum ambient temperature.

Venting for depressurization shall use adequately designed vent/ flare system as per PTS
16.52.04 and 11.22.06 considering the presence of drilling rig during SIPROD. The following
guidelines, in order of preference, shall be applied in the design of facilities for the discharge
of depressurisation fluids:

i. A dedicated blowdown line, tied into a liquid knockout vessel and routed to
platform vent/ flare shall be first preference.

ii. To Drilling Rig Vent. To ensure that rig vent has sufficient ullage to cater for
depressurized fluids from the platform.
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iii. Depressurize to subsea pipeline, subject to endorsement from Technical

Authority.

Floating vent/flare unit is not allowed. Application of new technology shall comply with PTS
18.53.07.
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3.0 FACILITIES REQUIREMENT

3.1 INSTRUMENT AIR/GAS SUPPLY

Hydrocarbon instrument gas shall be replaced with instrument air.

3.2 FIRE WATER SYSTEM

3.2.1 General

In addition to the standard drilling rig and platform fire fighting equipment, firewater ringmain
system shall be installed. The objective is to contribute to cooling equipment/environment and
to provide time for personnel evacuation from the wellhead area in the event of fire.

For remote drilling platform, firewater dry ringmain shall be provided on the drilling platform
and to be fed by the drilling rig. The required firewater pressure shall be identified via firewater
demand and hydraulic calculation. The provision of booster pump shall be provided to cater the
shortage of pressure from drilling rig firewater pump.

For drilling platform which is bridge-linked to processing platform with firewater pump, the
firewater supply may come from the processing platform or drilling rig. The fire water design
philosophy shall refer to PTS 16.54.01.

A fail-open (air-to-close) actuated deluge valve shall be provided in the feed line to the ring main.
The deluge valve shall be controlled by the platform IPS or directly from pneumatic kill knob and
fusible plug loop which open the deluge valve automatically upon ESD-F initiation. The deluge
valve shall be provided with independent nitrogen gas supply that will automatically replace the
pneumatic supply upon loss of instrument air.

When the platform is not under ESD-F, deluge valve is in close position, the firewater ringmain,
upstream of deluge valve shall be continuously pressurized.

At least three adjustable fire monitors with minimum capacity of 120m3/hr each at minimum
operating pressure of 7barg shall be installed; two on the cellar deck to cover the drilling stack
and the other on the main deck to provide a protective spray or fog over the access ramp
between the jack-up rig or tender barge with the platform. Sufficient flanged spare connections
shall be provided in the ring main at the cellar deck to ensure that the position of the monitors
can be optimised after each stack relocation. The monitor location shall not be obstructed by
any structural e.g. mudwall.

3.3 SUMP AND DRAIN

Sump shall be isolated in such a manner that no backflow (water seal) of gas into the open
drain system can occur.

3.4 POWER SUPPLY

Depending on location and options, power supply to the platform during SIPROD can be either
from rig, platform generator, portable generator, or submarine cable. For rig power supply,
power tie-in equipment and their auxiliaries shall be provided and shall be located in the non-
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hazardous area. The use of portable generator or any other portable electrical equipment
during SIPROD shall comply with PTS 13.60.01.

3.5 PRESSURE VESSEL OPERATION

Pressure vessels handling flammable hydrocarbon on the platform such as production

separator, test separator and fuel gas scrubber, shall not be in operation during SIPROD unless
all of the following conditions are met:

i. The vessel is automatically depressurised (criteria defined in section 2.3) upon

ESD-P or F.

ii. The vessel is located clear of the BOP Fall Damage Area, and the impact area
below the rig floor unless all the following conditions are met but subject to
Project-TA’s approval:

a) The platform is provided with a deck that can withstand falling BOP stack
from passing through the top deck of the platform or jacket. That impact
shall not damage any facility below. Alternatively, a 4-point lifting system
can be used and proven to demonstrate ALARP. Typically, a 4-point lifting
chain has minimum capacity 50% of the heaviest BOP on each of its chain.

b) An impact resistant rig floor is used with necessary precautions such as

ensuring all opening on the floor e.g. ‘mouse’ and ‘rat’ holes are
adequately covered at all times when not in use.

iii. Permit to Work (PTW) is required for well testing operation.

3.6 MUDWALL

Temporary mudwall shall be installed around the wellhead area as per PTS 11.22.02.
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4.0 RISK ASSESSMENT

All SIPROD designs and operation shall be subjected to a risk assessment e.g. HAZID, HAZOP,
Thermal Radiation and Gas Dispersion study, and etc. The applicability of Fire and Explosion
Analysis (FEA) and Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) shall be identified if the new
parameters and inventory exceed the data used in the existing assessment report.

4.1 HAZARDOUS AREA CLASSIFICATION

HAC development shall in accordance to PTS 16.71.01 and EI 15. Topside HAC schedule and
drawing shall include SIPROD scope.

Equipment protection for hazardous area shall be as per PTS 13.42.01.

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5.0 DELIVERABLES

5.1 SIPROD PHILOSOPHY DOCUMENT

The requirement for SIPROD shall be detailed in SIPROD philosophy document. The document
shall contain the following as a minimum:

i. HSE and Fire Safety Design Philosophy

ii. Relief system description

iii. Roles and responsibilities

iv. Communication

v. Activity planning

vi. Philosophy for utilities

vii. Risk Assessment e.g. HAZID, HAZOP etc.

5.2 DESIGN DRAWINGS

Produce and/or update the SIPROD related drawings and segregate them as per following
packages:

i. SIPROD Preparation

ii. Rig-Up

iii. Well Tie-In

iv. Rig Down and Reinstatement

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6.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY

In this PTS, reference is made to the following Standards/Publications. Unless specifically

designated by date, the latest edition of each Standards/Publications shall be used, together
with any supplements/revisions thereto:

PETRONAS TECHNICAL STANDARDS

Index to PTS PTS 00.01.01
PTS Requirements, General Definition of Terms, Abbreviations & PTS 00.01.03
Reading Guide
Design Of Fixed Offshore Structures (Working Stress Design) PTS 11.22.02
Ex Equipment Selection Requirement (Ex ESR) PTS 13.42.01
Portable Electrical Equipment And Temporary Installation PTS 13.60.01
(Guidelines)
Design, Installation, Maintenance of Fire and Gas Detection System PTS 14.12.07
Design Of Pressure Relief, Flare And Vent Systems PTS 16.52.04
Water Based Fire Protection Systems for Offshore Facilities PTS 16.54.01
Hazardous Area Classification (Supplements/Amendments To PTS 16.71.01
International Standards)
Proprietary Licensed and Technology Assessment (PLTA) PTS 18.53.07

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
Pressure-relieving and Depressuring Systems API 521

Recommended Practice for Analysis, Design, Installation, and Testing API RP 14C
of Basic Surface Safety Systems for Offshore Production Platforms

Specification for Wellhead and Christmas Tree Equipment API 6A

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APPENDIX I Shutdown Sequence

Without Time Delay

- SSV and SCSSV (01) Close

- Gaslift ABV (02) Close

- Riser ABV's (03-09) Close

- Test Separator Gas Outlet c/v Open

- Test separator Liquid outlet ABV's (45-46)

Close With Short Time Delay (30-90 secs)

- Test separator blowdown (21) Open

- Gaslift Blowdown (22) Open

- Flowline Blowdown (23-24)

Open With Long Time Delay (200-600 sec)

- Header ABV's (41-44) Close