GASHEEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs.
CA
219 SCRA 115
FACTS:
Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint
dated October 27, 1987 for damages
against the petitioner for the alleged
breach of their agreement to get
married. She met the petitioner in
Dagupan, he was an Iranian medical
exchange student. He later courted
her and proposed marriage. The
petitioner even went to Marilou’s
house to secure approval of her
parents.
The petitioner forced the respondent
to live with him in his apartment. She
filed a complaint because the
petitioner started maltreating and
threatening her. He even tied the
respondent in the apartment while he
was in school and drugged
her. Marilou at one time became
pregnant but the petitioner
administered a drug to abort the
baby.
Petitioner repudiated the marriage
agreement and told Marilou to not live
with him since he is already married
to someone in Bacolod. He claimed
that he never proposed marriage,
neither sought consent and approval
of Marliou’s parents. He claimed
that he asked Marilou to stay out of
his apartment since the latter
deceived him by stealing money and
his passport. The private
respondent prayed for damages and
reimbursements of actual expenses.
ISSUE:
Whether breach of promise to marry
can give rise to cause claim for
damages.
HELD:
Breach of promise to marry per se is
not an actionable wrong. The court
held that when a man uses his
promise of marriage to deceive a
woman to consent to his malicious
desires, he commits fraud and
willfully injures the woman. In that
instance, the court found that
petitioner’s deceptive promise to
marry led Marilou to surrender her
virtue and womanhood.
Moral damages can be claimed when
such promise to marry was a
deceptive ploy to have carnal
knowledge with the woman and
actual damages should be paid for
the wedding preparation
expenses. Petitioner even
committed deplorable acts in
disregard of the laws of the country.
DE JESUS vs. SYQUIA
G.R. No. L-39110, November 28,
1933
FACTS:
Antonia Loanco was a cashier in a
barber shop owned by the
defendant’s brother in law Vicente
Mendoza. Cesar Syquia,the
defendant was an unmarried scion of
a prominent family in Manila. He got
acquainted with Antonio and had an
amorous relationship.As a
consequence, Antonia got pregnant
and a baby boy was born on June 17,
1931.
In the early months of Antonia’s
pregnancy, defendant was a constant
visitor. On February 1931, he even
wrote a letter to a Rev Father
confirming that the child is his and he
wanted his name to be given to the
child. Though he was out of the
country, he continuously wrote letters
which are solicitous of Antonia and
the baby’s welfare. He made
hospital arrangements through his
friend for Antonia’s delivery.
After giving birth, they lived together
for about a year. When Antonia
showed signs of second pregnancy,
defendant suddenly departed and
married another woma.
It should be noted that during the
christening of the child, the defendant
who was in charge of the
arrangement of the ceremony caused
the name Ismael Loanco to be given
instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was
first planned.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the note to the padre
and the other letters written by
defendant to Antonia during her
pregnancy proves
acknowledgement of paternity.
2. Whether the defendant should
be compelled to acknowledge the
child Ismael Loanco.
HELD:
The letter written by Syquia to Rev.
Father and the other letters to
Antonia are sufficient proof of
paternity. The mere requirement is
that the writing shall be indubitable.
“The law fixes no period during which
a child must be in the continuous
possession of the status of a natural
child; and the period in this case was
long enough to reveal the father’s
resolution to admit the status”.
The Supreme Court upheld the
decision of the lower court
compelling Syquia to provide support
for the child Ismael Loanco.
WASSMER vs. VELEZ
12 SCRA 648
FACTS:
Beatriz Wassmer and Francisco
Velez decided to get married. They
applied and acquired marriage
license and set the wedding on
September 4, 1954. Necessary
publication and preparations
including sending off invitations were
done.
Two days before the scheduled
wedding, Francisco went home to his
province without properly notifying
Beatriz. He sent a telegram that they
have to postpone the wedding
because his mother opposes it. He
gave an assurance that he will return
but he never did.
Beatriz sued for damages, Francisco
filed no answer and was declared in
default. The Court ordered Francisco
to pay for actual damages, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees. Francisco filed a petition for
relief from orders and motion for a
new trial. The court then proposed
for amicable settlement.
Francisco contended that his failure
to marry beatriz was due to fortuitous
event and circumstances beyond his
control.
ISSUE:
Can a person be held liable for
walking out of his own wedding?
HELD:
YES. Breech of promise to marry per
se is not an actionable wrong
however, that the extent to which
acts not contrary to law may be
perpetrated with impunity, is not
limitless for Article 21 of said Code
provides that “any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.”
Plaintiff and defendant applied for a
license to contract marriage, which
was subsequently issued and their
wedding was set. Necessary
preparation and publicity were done
only for the defendant to walk out of it
when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized. This is contrary to good
customs for which defendant must
be held answerable in damages.
Per express provision of Article 2219
(10) of the New Civil Code, moral
damages are recoverable in the
cases mentioned in Article 21 of said
Code. This Court’s opinion,
considering the particular
circumstances of this case, P15,
000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages is deemed to be a
reasonable award.
GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner
vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, defendant
G.R. No. 107125. January 29, 2001
FACTS:
In the evening of September 25, 1982,
at the National Highway of Malvar,
Santiago, Isabela, George Manantan
was driving a Toyota car going home.
At that time, he was with Fiscal
Ambrocio, Miguel Tabangin and
Ruben Nicolas. Suddenly, a jeepney,
coming from the
opposite direction hit the driver side
of the car, driven by
Manantan. Consequently, Manantan,
Ambrocio and Tabangin were injured
while Nicolas died. Trial followed.
The lower court acquitted the
accused of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide.
The respondents filed their notice of
appeal on the civil aspect of the lower
court’s judgment. Even if the accused
was acquitted from his criminal
liability, the Appellate Court held him
civilly liable and ordered him to
indemnify the aggrieved party for the
death of Nicolas.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acquittal of
petitioner extinguished his civil
liability.
HELD:
The acquittal was based on
reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused. Article 29 of the Civil Code
provides that a civil liability is not
extinguished in criminal cases.
Therefore, the accused cannot be
exempted from paying
civil damages which may only be
proven by preponderance of
evidence.
Manantan claimed that he was
placed on double jeopardy but the
courts did not give merit to
this contention. The following
elements must be present for double
jeopardy to exist: (1) A first jeopardy
must have attached prior to the
second; (2) The first jeopardy must
have terminated; and (3) the third
jeopardy must be for the same
offense as the first.
In the case at bar, the initially put into
jeopardy but he it was terminated by
his discharge. When the case was
elevated to the Court of Appeals, the
issue was about the civil aspect of
the criminal case. Thus, there could
be no double jeopardy.
SAFEGUARD SECURITY VS.
TANGCO (G.R No. 165732,
December 14, 2006)
FACTS:
The victim Evangeline Tangco was
depositor of Ecology Bank. She was
also a licensed-fire arm holder, thus
during the incident, she was entering
the bank to renew her time deposit
and along with her was her firearm.
Suddenly, the security guard of the
bank, upon knowing that the victim
carries a firearm, the security guard
shot the victim causing the latter’s
instant death. The heirs of the victim
filed a criminal case against security
guard and an action against
Safeguard Security for failure to
observe diligence of a goof
father implied upon the act of its
agent.
ISSUE:
WON Safeguard Security can be
held liable for the acts of its agent.
HELD:
Yes. The law presumes that any
injury committed either by fault or
omission of an employee reflects the
negligence of the employer. In
quasi-delicts cases, in order to
overcome this presumption, the
employer must prove that there was
no negligence on his part in the
supervision of his employees.
It was declared that in the selection
of employees and agents, employers
are required to examine them as to
their qualifications, experience and
service records. Thus, due diligence
on the supervision and operation of
employees includes the formulation
of suitable rules and regulations for
the guidance of employees and the
issuance of proper instructions
intended for the protection of the
public and persons with whom the
employer has relations through his
employees. Thus, in this case,
Safeguard Security committed
negligence in identifying the
qualifications and ability of its agents.