Ventura v. Atty.
Samson
Facts: Sometime in Dec.2001, while Ventura was sleeping in the maid’s
room at respondent’s house, respondent entered the room and went on
top of her and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She
struggled to free herself and shouted but respondent but her efforts
proved futile.
Issue: WON or not the disbarment is proper.
Held: Yes.
The possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and
a continuing requirement to warrant admission to bar and to retain
membership in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of members of
the bar to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the
integrity of the Bar. Consequently, any errant behaviour on the part of a
lawyer may be it in the lawyer’s public or private activities, which tends to
show said lawyer deficient in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.
From the undisputed facts, the Court finds that the respondent’s act of
engaging in sex with the petitioner constitutes gross immoral conduct
manifesting his disrespect for the laws. Moreover, his enticing a very
young woman with money showed his utmost moral depravity and low
regard for the dignity of the human person and the ethics of his
profession.
Ciocon-Reer v. Judge Lubao
Facts: Complainants including Karaan filed an administrative case against
Judge Lubao because of his failure to render his decision in a civil case in
which the complainants are the plaintiffs. Judge Lubao countered that the
deference of the rendition of his decision is to allow the respondents in
the civil case to file their memoranda and for furtherance of justice and
equity. He, however, added that Karaan is engaging in the practice of law
even though he is not a lawyer. He asked the Court to require Karaan to
show cause why he should not be cited in contempt for unauthorized
practice of law. He stated that he assists organizations which represent
the interests of senior citizens, the indigents, and members of the
community with limited means.
Issue: Whether or not Karaan is engaging in the unauthorized practice of
law and therefore liable for indirect contempt?
Ruling: Yes. Karaan is engaged in the practice of law and thus liable for
indirect contempt.
To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually
performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law
is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge
or skill. Here, the OCA was able to establish the pattern in Karaan’s
unauthorized practice of law. He would require the parties to execute a
special power of attorney in his favor to allow him to join them as one of
the plaintiffs as their attorney-in-fact. Then, he would file the necessary
complaint and other pleadings "acting for and in his own behalf and as
attorney-in-fact, agent or representative" of the parties. The fact that
Karaan did not indicate in the pleadings that he was a member of the Bar,
or any PTR, Attorney’s Roll, or MCLE Compliance Number does not
detract from the fact that, by his actions, he was actually engaged in the
practice of law.
Bongalonta v. Atty. Castillo
FACTS: Sally Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M.
Martija, members of the Philippine Bar, with unjust and unethical
conduct, to wit: representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme
to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which complainant
might obtain. It is alleged that in all the pleadings filed in the cases, Atty.
Pablito Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the
same PTR and the same IBP receipt number. Thus, complainant concluded
that the civil case filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a part of the
scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money
judgment which complainant might obtain in the civil case he filed.
Issue: WON respondent Atty. Castillo is guilty of violating CPR.
Held: Yes. The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and
recommendations. It is well to stress again that the practice of law is not a
right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for
the conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the
observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to expect only
complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading
before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to
satisfy that expectation. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.
Moreno v. Atty. Araneta
Facts: Respondent issued 2 checks to Elena Moreno for his indebtedbess
which amounts to P11,000 but such checks were dishonored bec the
account against which is drawn is closed. Petitioner filed a complaint for
disbarment against respondent for deceit and non-payment of debts.
Issue: WON Araneta be disbarred due to the issuance of checks drawn
against a closed account.
Held: Though BP Blg. 22 had not yet been passed at that time, the IBP
correctly found this act "abhorrent and against the exacting standards of
morality and decency required of a member of the Bar," which "belittles
the confidence of the public in him and reflects upon his integrity and
morality.” The Court held that the act of a person in issuing a check
knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient
funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in
full upon its presentment, is a manifestation of moral turpitude. In the
instant case, however, herein respondent has, apparently been found
guilty by final judgment of estafa thru falsification of a commercial
document, a crime involving moral turpitude, for which he has been
indefinitely suspended. Considering that he had previously committed a
similarly fraudulent act, and that this case likewise involves moral
turpitude, the Court is constrained to impose disbarment as a more
severe penalty.
In re: Almacen
FACTS: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a “Petition to Surrender the
Lawyer’s Certificate of Title” to the Supreme Court as a sign of his protest
as against to what he call a tribunal “peopled by people who are calloused
to our pleas for justice…”. He also expressed strong words as against the
judiciary like “justice… is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.” . The
petition rooted from the case he lost due to the absence of time and place
in his motion in the trial court. His appeal was dismissed in the Court of
Appeals by reason of jurisprudence. In a petition for certiorari in the
Supreme Court, it was again dismissed thru a minute resolution. With the
disappointments, he thought of this sacrificial move. He claimed that this
petition to surrender his title is only in trust, and that he may obtain the
title again as soon as he regained confidence in the justice system.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Almacen be given disciplinary actions for his acts.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: It has been pointed out by the Supreme Court that there is no one
to blame but Atty. Almacen himself because of his negligence. Even if the
intentions of his accusations are so noble, in speaking of the truth and
alleged injustices,so as not to condemn the sinners but the sin, it has
already caused enough damage and disrepute to the judiciary. Since this
particular case is sui generis in its nature, a number of foreign and local
jurisprudence in analogous cases were cited as benchmarks and
references. Between disbarment and suspension, the latter was imposed.
Indefinite suspension may only be lifted until further orders, after Atty.
Almacen may be able to prove that he is again fit to resume the practice of
law.
Abella v. Barrios Jr.
FACTS: Complainant obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of
Appeals involving a Labor Case. Complainant then filed a Motion for
Issuance of a Writ of Execution before the Regional Arbitration Branch
which the respondent was the Labor Arbiter. After the lapse of five (5)
months, complainant’s motion remained unacted, prompting him to file a
Second Motion for Execution. However, still, there was no action until the
complainant agreed to give respondent a portion of the monetary award
thereof after the latter asked from the former how much would be his
share. Thereafter, respondent issued a writ of execution but the employer
of the complainant moved to quash the said writ. Eventually, issued a new
writ of execution wherein complainant’s monetary awards were reduced
to the effect that it modifies the DECISION of the CA. Complainant now
filed the instant disbarment complaint before IBP averring that
respondent violated the CPR for (a) soliciting money from complainant in
exchange for a favorable resolution; and (b) issuing a wrong decision to
give benefit and advantage to PT&T, complainant’s employer.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross immorality for his
violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the
Code.
HELD: YES. The above-cited rules, which are contained under Chapter 1 of
the Code, delineate the lawyer’s responsibility to society: Rule 1.01
engraves the overriding prohibition against lawyers from engaging in any
unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct; Rule 1.03 proscribes
lawyers from encouraging any suit or proceeding or delaying any man’s
cause for any corrupt motive or interest; meanwhile, Rule 6.02 is
particularly directed to lawyers in government service, enjoining them
from using one’s public position to: (1) promote private interests; (2)
advance private interests; or (3) allow private interests to interfere with
public duties.
It is well to note that a lawyer who holds a government office may be
disciplined as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The infractions of the
respondent constitute gross misconduct. Jurisprudence illumines that
immoral conduct involves acts that are wilful, flagrant, or shameless, and
that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and
respectable members of the community. It treads the line of grossness
when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as
to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense
of decency. On the other hand, gross misconduct constitutes "improper or
wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, wilful in character, and
implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment." In this
relation, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that when a
lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct or gross misconduct, he
may be suspended or disbarred. However, the Court takes judicial notice
of the fact that he had already been disbarred in a previous administrative
case, entitled Sps. Rafols, Jr. v. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr., which therefore
precludes the Court from duplicitously decreeing the same. In view of the
foregoing, the Court deems it proper to, instead, impose a fine in the
amount of P40,000.00 in order to penalize respondent’s transgressions as
discussed herein and to equally deter the commission of the same or
similar acts in the future.
Villatuya v. Atty. Tabalingcos
MANUEL G. VILLATUYA vs. ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS
- disbarment case on the ff issues:
1. Whether respondent violated the CPR by nonpayment of fees to
complainant
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having
married thrice.
Complainant’s Accusations:
1. He was employed by respondent as a financial consultant to
assist the latter on technical and financial matters in the latter's
numerous petitions for corporate rehabilitation filed with
different courts
They had a verbal agreement whereby he would be entitled to
P50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases
they would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees
paid by their clients
2. Respondent set up two financial consultancy firms, Jesi and
Jane Management, Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc., and
used them as fronts to advertise his legal services and solicit
cases
3. He submitted a Certification issued by the Office of the Civil
Registrar General-National Statistics Office (NSO) certifying
that Bede S. Tabalingcos, herein respondent, contracted
marriage thrice.
Respondent’s Defense:
1. - Denied the charges
- Complainant was not an employee of his law firm —
Tabalingcos and Associates Law Office — but of Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc.
2. - Denied committing any
- His law firm had an agreement with Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc., whereby the firm would handle the legal
aspect of the corporate rehabilitation case; and that the latter
would attend to the financial aspect of the case' such as the
preparation of the rehabilitation plans to be presented in court
3. Respondent did not specifically address the allegations
regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two other
women
The Court’s Ruling - affirms the recommendations of the IBP.
1. The first charge of complainant against respondent for the
nonpayment of the former's share in the fees, if proven to be
true is based on an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed
by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal
services rendered with a person not licensed to practice law.
Based on the allegations, respondent had agreed to share with
complainant the legal fees paid by clients that complainant
solicited for the respondent. Complainant, however, failed to
proffer convincing evidence to prove the existence of that
agreement.
2. A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used
the business entities mentioned in the report to solicit clients
and to advertise his legal services, purporting to be specialized
in corporate rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the case,
he violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from
soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other
lawful occupation. Impropriety arises, though, when the
business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner
as to be inconsistent with the lawyer's duties as a member of
the bar.
 3. We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis.
Its focus is on the qualification and fitness of a lawyer to
continue membership in the bar and not the procedural
technicalities in filing the case. Thus, we explained in Garrido v.
G arrido:

“Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure — such

as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in
this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of
desistance by the complainant — do not apply in the
determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness for
membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see
no reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission to the
practice of law is a component of the administration of justice
and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to
the public. The admission qualifications are also
qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege
to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation
of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a
matter of public concern that the State may inquire into
through this Court.

We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.

Marriage Contracts bearing the name of respondent are
competent and convincing evidence proving that he committed
bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of
the bar. Respondent's regard for marriage contracts as ordinary
agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of the
sanctity of marriage or his gross ignorance of the law on what
course of action to take to annul a marriage under the old Civil
Code provisions.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of

morality required of him as a member of the bar. He made a
mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity. His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted
grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Thus,
we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent
and order that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

De Leon v. CA

Petitioner points to Section 2 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court and argues

that since the trial court never ordered that service of the judgment be
made upon Estelita, she was not entitled to service of the judgment. The
fact that she received a copy of the judgment separately from her counsel
cannot prejudice the legal consequences arising out of prior receipt of
copy of the decision by her counsel. It was thus clear error for the Court of
Appeals to accept Estelita's argument that the reglementary period
commenced not from receipt of a copy of the decision by counsel of
record but from the time she received a copy of the decision. The appeal
having been filed out of time, the Court of Appeals did not have
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal of Estelita.

ISSUE: When does the period to appeal should actually commence, from
June 6, 1997, as petitioner contends; or from June 10, 1997, as private
respondent Estelita Batungbacal claims?

HELD: We hold that the period began to run on June 6, 1997 when
counsel for private respondents received a copy of the decision dated June
2, 1997. When a party is represented by counsel of record, service of
orders and notices must be made upon said attorney and notice to the
client and to any other lawyer, not the counsel of record, is not notice in
law. The exception to this rule is when service upon the party himself has
been ordered by the court. In this case, it does not appear that there was
any substitution of counsel or that service upon private respondent
Estelita Batungbacal had been specifically ordered by the trial court;
hence, the counsel of record for the private respondents is presumed to be
their counsel on appeal and the only one authorized to receive court
processes. Notice of the judgment upon such counsel, therefore, was
notice to the clients for all legal intents and purposes.