Judge Jose Madrid vs Atty. Juan Dealca, AC No. 7474, Sept.

9, 2014

Facts:

On Feb 7, 2007. Atty. Juan Dealca entered his appearance in a criminal case entitled People of the
Philippines v Philip William Arsenault, presided by complainant judge Jose Madrid, to replace Atty. Vicente
Judar. Atty. Dealca also moved that said criminal case be re-raffled to another branch of RTC, considering
the adverse incidents between Judge Madrid and himself. Judge Madrid denied the motion on the ground
that a case cannot be removed from the Court due to “personal sentiments of counsel who was not even
the original counsel of the litigant”.

Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint in the Office of the Bar Confidant citing Atty. Dealca’s
unethical practice of entering his appearance and then moving for the inhibition of the presiding judge on
the pretext of previous adverse incidents between them. Atty. Dealca asserted in his comment-complaint
that Judge Madrid’s order unconstitutionally and unlawfully deprived the accused of the right to counsel,
due process, and to a fair and impartial trial, that he exhibited bias in failing to act on the motion to lift
and set aside the warrant of arrest issued against accused, and that it should be him who should be
disbarred and dismissed from the Judiciary for gross ignorance of the law.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Dealca’s contravened his duties as a lawyer.

Ruling:

No. In this case, the Supreme Court cites Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

Canon 11: A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due the courts and to the judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others.

Rule 11.04: A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case.

All lawyers are thus bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts, and to promote confidence
in the fair administration of justice. It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the stability of the
judicial institution. It was incumbent of Atty. Dealca to establish the ground of bias and prejudice in order
to disqualify Judge Madrid from participating in a particular trial in which the former was participating as
a counsel. His allegations of Judge Madrid’s partiality or hostility did not suffice, because the presumption
that Judge Madrid would undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and the evidence
and without fear or favor should only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. As
such, Atty. Dealca clearly contravened his duties as a lawyer as expressly stated in Canon 11 and Rule
11.04.
Robert Victor Seares, Jr. vs. Atty. Saniata Liwliwa Gonzales-Alzate, ADM Case no. 9058, Nov. 14. 2012

Facts:

Robert Seares, Jr. alleges that Atty Gonzales-Alzate was his legal counsel when he ran for the position of
Municipal Mayor of Dolores, Abra in the 2007 elections. She filed a Petition of Protest Ad Cautelam in his
behalf after he lost by a 50-vote margin to Albert Guzman. Said petition was dismissed for being fatally
defective. She filed another Petition of Protest in the RTC which was also dismissed on the ground that it
was already time-barred, and for forum shopping. Seares ran again for Municipal Mayor in the 2010
elections and won; he later learned that his political opponents retained her as their counsel. Barely two
months in office, he was charged with abuse of authority, oppression and grave misconduct in the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Atty. Gonzales-Alzate represented Turqueza, the complainant, as counsel.
Seares Jr. further alleges that Atty. Gonzales-Alzate intentionally made false and hurtful statements in the
memorandum she prepared in that administrative case in order in order to attack him.

Seares, Jr. asserts that Atty. Gonzales-Alzate thereby violated Canon 15, Canon 17 and Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for negligently handling his election protest, for prosecuting him, her
former client, and for uttering false and hurtful allegations against him. Atty. Gonzales-Alzate denies the
charges against her.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Gonzales-Alzate is guilty of professional negligence and incompetence in her
handling .of Seares, Jr.’s electoral protest.

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that for administrative liability to attach, the negligent act of the attorney
should be gross and inexcusable as to lead to a result that was highly prejudicial to the client’s interest.
The court has found the attendance of inexcusable negligence when and attorney resorts to a wrong
remedy, or belatedly files an appeal, or inordinately delays the filing of a complaint. Gross misconduct on
the part of an attorney is determined from the circumstances of the case, the nature of the act done and
the motive that induced the attorney to commit the act. Thus in this case, the court sees no trace of
professional negligence or incompetence on the part of Atty. Gonzales-Alzate in her handling of Seares,
Jr.’s protest. Had Seares, Jr. been prejudiced by her negligent and incompetent handling of his election
protest, he should have denounced her not after nearly five years have passed.
Lily Flores-Salado, Minda Flores-Lura, & Fe V. Flores vs Atty. Roman Villanueva, RR AC No. 11099, Sept.
27, 2016

Facts:

Lily Flores-Salado, Mida Flores-Lura, Anacorito Flores, Angel Flores, Jr. and Fe Flores presented their
adverse claim on the parcel of land situated in Nasipit, Agusan del Norte and registered under a Transfer
Certificate of Title in the names of Spouses Roman Villanueva, Jr. and Rosario Alipao. The adverse caim
was annotated and the Transfer Certificate of Title of the spouses was canceled. In 2009, complainants
Lily Flores-Salado, Minda Flores-Lura, and Fe Flores lodged their complaint with the IBP charging the
respondent with gross dishonestly on the basis of their assertion that they had not signed the affidavit of
waiver/withdrawal. They further averred that he was disqualified for the position because he had already
been 70 years old at the time of his appointment. The respondent denied the charges, and imputed ill-
motives to the complainants in filing the disbarment complaint against him. Complainants further prayed
for respondent’s disbarment.

The respondent was found liable for gross misconduct in relation to the forged affidavit of
waiver/withdrawal, and was recommended his two-year suspension from the practice of law. The charge
of dishonesty in relation to respondent’s age was dismissed because his birth certificate prevailed over
the documents submitted by the complainants.

Issue:

Whether or not the IBP was in the right when it decided on the complaint against respondent Atty. Roman
Villanueva, Jr.

Ruling:

No. Although it may entertain a disbarment or suspension complaint brought against a lawyer employed
in the government service whether or not the complaint pertained to an act or conduct unrelated to the
discharge of his official functions, the investigation should be carried out by the agency or office having
administrative supervision over him or her when the allegations of the complaint relate to the
qualifications of the respondent to be appointed to the public office. The complaint for disbarment is sui
generis, and the proceeding thereon should focus only on the qualification and fitness of the respondent
lawyer to continue membership in the Bar.
Lourdes Ferrer and Prosperidad Arandez vs Judge Romeo Rabaca, AM No. MTj-05-1580, Oct. 6, 2010

Facts:

An ejectment suit entitled Young Women’s Christian Association Inc v. Conrado Cano was decided by
respondent Judge Romeo Rabaca, the complainants being the President and the Executive Director of the
plaintiff. Judge Rabaca thereafter denied a motion for Immediate Execution filed by the plaintiff’s counsel.
The complainants averred that respondent Judge’s denial of their motions had rendered their victory
inutile, and had unfairly deprived the plaintiff of the possession of the premises, and that his refusal to
perform an act mandated by the Rules of Court had given undue advantage to the defendant to the
plaintiff’s damage and prejudice. Respondent Judge denied the charges, claiming the Court was already
divested of its jurisdiction over the case when he ordered the elevation of the records to the appellate
court at the time the complainants filed their motion for Immediate Execution.

Issue:

Whether or not judge Romeo Rabaca had lost jurisdiction over the case by virtue of defendant’s appeal.

Ruling:

No. The Court, upholding the memorandum of the Court Administrator, ruled that the perfection of the
appeal by the defendant did not forbid the favorable action on the plaintiff’s motion for immediate
execution. Only the filing of the sufficient supersedeas bond and the deposit with the appellate court of
the amount of rent due from time to time, coupled with the perfection of the appeal, could stay the
execution of the decision. Secondly, he could not claim good faith or honest belief, as it justifies a non-
compliance only when there is an as-yet unsettled doubt on the meaning or applicability of a rule or legal
provision. Thirdly, given that his court had been assigned many such cases, he was not a trial judge bereft
of the pertinent prior experience to act on the issue of immediate execution.

This case is thus an opportune occasion to remind judges of the first level courts to adhere always to the
mandate under Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court to issue writs of execution upon motion of the
plaintiffs action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer when the defendant has appealed but has not filed
a sufficient supersedeas bond. The purpose is to prevent the plaintiffs from being further deprived of their
rightful possession, should always be borne in mind. Judge Rabaca is therefore imposed a fine of 5,000
pesos with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
Re: Complaint filed by Lucena B. Rallos against Justices Gabriel Ingles, Pamela Ann Maxino and Carmelita
S. Manahan, AM No. 12-9-08-CA, Dec. 10, 2013

Facts:

In Civil Case NO. CEB-20388 of the RTC of Cebu City, the Heirs of Vicente Rallos, one of whom is
complainant Lucena B. Rallos, sought just compensation from the city government for two parcels of land
pertaining to the estate that Cebu City had been maintaining as public roads without their consent. The
RTC rendered its decision in 2000 holding Cebu City liable to pay just compensation to the heirs, and in
2001 ordering the city to compensate the heirs in the amount of 34.9M pesos plus 12% per annum interest
and attorney’s fees. The RTC granted the motion of the heirs for the execution pending appeal. In
implementing the execution pending appeal, the RTC issued 3 separate orders. Both parties sought the
reconsideration of the orders, and later the RTC issued its consolidated order in 2002. Both parties
appealed to the CA, Visayas Station.

In 2012, Cebu City brought in the CA, Visayas Station a petition for the annulment of the RTC’s decisions,
alleging that Rallos and his heirs had been obliged under a compromise agreement called Convenio. Cebu
City filed for a TRO. The CA granted Cebu City’s application for the writ of preliminary injunction, with
Justice Ingles as Chairman of the 18th Division, Justice Pamella Maxino and Justice Carmelita Manahan and
the senior and junior members of the Division. The heirs moved for reconsideration and plaintiff wrote a
letter-complaint requesting an investigation of the allegedly unlawful and unethical conduct of Justices
Abarintos, Hernando, and Paredes as previous members of the 18th Division. The court also received an
affidavit-complaint where she also charged the current justices of the 18th Division with administrative
and criminal offences. Rallos asserted that respondent Justices had knowingly disobeyed the resolutions
promulgated by their granting of Cebu City’s application for the writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue:

Whether or not voluntarily inhibiting oneself from hearing a case is sufficient proof of bias, negligence, or
improper motives.

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court cites the case of Abrajano v. Heirs of Augusto F. Salas, Jr. wherein it held that the
issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the
judge. This discretion is an acknowledgement of the fact that judges are in a better position to determine
the issue of inhibition, as they are the ones who directly deal with the parties-litigants in their courtrooms.
The rule does not give the judge the unfettered discretion to decide whether he should desist from
hearing a case.it must be for just and valid cases. The mere imputation of bias, partiality and prejudgment
will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the
judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or
favor.