Fernandez vs.

Dimagiba
G.R. No. L-23638 October 12, 1967

Facts:
Ismaela Dimagiba, filed a petition for probate of the will of Benedicta de los Reyes. Such
Petition was opposed by Dionisio Fernandez et al. on the ground .The court ruled in favour of
the probate. Fernandez et al. appealed but it was beyond the reglementary period. They argued
that they were entitled to await the other grounds for oppositions before appearing and the
will to probate should be considered interlocutory, because it fails to resolve the issues of
estoppel and revocation propounded in their opposition.

The CA later ruled that the case had become final and executor due to failure to appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the probate of the will become final for lack of appeal.
Ruling:

Yes, The Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the appellant's stand is
untenable. It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions
concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last will and
testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. As
such, the probate order is final and appealable; and it is so recognized by express provisions of
Section 1 of Rule 109, that specifically prescribes that "any interested person may appeal in
special proceedings from an order or judgment where such order or judgment: (a) allows or
disallows a will."

Gago vs. Mamuyac

G.R. No. L-26317 January 29, 1927
Johnson, J. (Ponente)

Facts:
This case stemmed when Francisco Gago filed a petition for the probate of a will of Miguel
Mamuyac executed on July 27, 1918. The oppositors alleged that the said will was already
annulled and revoked. It appeared that on April 16, 1919, the deceased executed another will.
The lower court denied the probate of the first will on the ground of the existence of the
second will.

Another petition was filed by Gago, this time for the probate of the second will, however it was
opposed again, this time the oppositor alleged that the second will presented was merely a
copy. According to the witnesses, the said will was allegedly revoked as per the testimony of
Jose Tenoy, one of the witnesses who typed the document. Another witness testified that on
December 1920 the original will was actually cancelled by the testator.

The lower court denied the probate and held that the same has been annulled and revoked.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid revocation of the will thus it cannot be probated.
RULING:
Yes. The will was already cancelled in 1920. This was inferred when after due search, the
original will cannot be found. When the will which cannot be found in shown to be in the
possession of the testator when last seen, the presumption is that in the absence of other
competent evidence, the same was deemed cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption
applies when it is shown that the testator has ready access to the will and it can no longer be
found after his death.

AIR FRANCE
vs
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R.No. L-21438, September 28, 1966)

FACTS:

This case started on March 1958, when Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos
were tourists en route to Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first class round
trip ticket by Air France. But during a stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked by the
plane manager of Air France to vacate his seat because a white man allegedly has a
“better right” than him. Carrascoso protested but when things got heated, and upon
advice of other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and were transferred
to the plane’s tourist class.

After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air
France for damages for the embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court,
Carrascoso testified, among others, that he when he was forced to take the tourist
class, he went to the plane’s pantry where he was approached by a plane purser who
told him that he noted in the plane’s journal the following:

First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and
that the captain refused to intervene

The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court eventually
awarded damages in favor of Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the
issuance of a first class ticket to Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be
seated in first class because allegedly in truth and in fact, that was not the true intent
between the parties.

Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascoso’s testimony regarding the
note made by the purser because the said note was never presented in court.

ISSUE :

Whether or not the testimony of Carrascoso regarding the note which was not
presented in court is admissible in evidence.

HELD: Yes. The testimony of Carrascoso must be admitted based on res gestae. The
subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry
does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is
admissible. Besides, when the dialogue between Carrascoso and the purser happened,
the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The
excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are
admissible as part of the res gestae. The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in
the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster
incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the
hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.

The court therefore holds that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible
in evidence.
 G.R. No. 122290 April 6, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
REYNALDO BAGO y MADRID, accused-appellant, ARMANDO CAPARAS
y CUENCO and RODOLFO ONGSECO y VEGO, accused.

FACTS:
This stemmed when Accused Bago is a trusted employee of Azkcon and detailed with
Power Construction Supply Company in charge of the Cutting Department; and that
as such he was authorized by Mr. William Hilo, Controller Manager of Azkcon, to
pull out from the Power Construction Supply the cut materials and to deliver the
same to Azkcon;
On April 21, 1992, accused Bago, together with his co-employees, Danilo Baylosis
and Candido Querobin entered the Azkcon premises with deliveries of two cold
rolled sheets loaded in the truck. Security Guard Manangan inspected the materials in
the truck and after confirming that the materials were loaded in the truck, he stamped
the receipts upon request of accused Bago. Thereafter, accused Bago brought out
another receipt and requested Security Guard Manangan to likewise stamp the same.
Security Guard Manangan checked the goods covered by the third receipt and found
there were no cold rolled sheets for the third receipt. The third receipt carried a
different date. Security Guard Manangan asked accused Bago as to the whereabouts
of the materials covered by the third receipt and the latter replied that they had long
been delivered. Nevertheless, Security Guard Manangan stamped this last receipt
because he trusted that accused would not do anything bad;
On April 21, 1992, William Hilo, the material controller of Azkcon, discovered that
there were three (3) receipts which came in, but only two materials were delivered
inside the company compound. The materials covered by the two (2) receipts were
delivered but the materials covered by the third receipt were not. Hilo conducted an
inventory and asked accused Bago the whereabouts of the materials in question.
Accused Bago insisted that the materials had long been delivered. Hilo proceeded
with his investigation and was able to secure from the Power Construction Supply
Company Gatepass Invoice No. 51111 dated March 22, 1992 (Exh. "D") which
shows that the materials covered by the third receipt were taken out by accused Bago
from the premises of Power Construction Supply on March 23, 1992;
Hilo was able to secure from Power Construction Supply a document dated March
23, 1992 (Exh. "E") which contained information on the truck used in pulling out the
materials from Power Construction Supply on March 22, 1992. The truck bears Plate
No. PRC-513 and is not owned by Azkcon. As per copy of the certificate of
registration secured from the Land Transportation Office, the truck is owned by a
certain Ruel Fernando who has no contractual relations with Azkcon. Said vehicle is
likewise not authorized to pull out materials from the Power Construction Supply.
The trial court concluded that the foregoing circumstances lead to a reasonable
conclusion that appellant asported the materials covered by Exhibit "C".

ISSUES:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF QUALIFIED THEFT BASED
ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
THE PROSECUTION HAS PROVEN THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED,
REYNALDO BAGO, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

RULING:
 YES. Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove even by
circumstantial evidence that he asported the cold rolled sheets in question. He asserts
that these materials were delivered to Azkcon as evidenced by the receipt duly
stamped by the guard on duty. He states:
The best evidence that the materials were actually delivered at Azkcon Metal
Industries is the receipt duly stamped by the guard on duty. Res ipsa loquitor. To
receive the testimony of the security guard, that he stamped the receipt even without
the goods because he trusted the accused, would set a precedent that will eventually
convict an innocent person. After duly stamping the receipt, it is very easy for the
security guard to claim otherwise to avoid liability.
Appellant cannot rely on the best evidence rule which states:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;