TORTS AND DAMAGES

Transition term (April-July) SY 2014-2015

Judge Cawed
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
I. Concept of Torts
II. Concept of Quasi-delict

ARTICLE 2176

Case: BARREDO V. GARCIA (73 scra 607)

BOCOBO, J:
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows:
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein,
Fausto Barredo, liable in damages for the death of Garcia caused by the negligence CIVIL CODE
of Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo. "ART. 1089. Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi- contracts, and
from acts and omissions which are unlawful or in which any kind of fault or
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon
negligence intervenes."
and Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the
xxx xxx xxx
Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro
Dimapilis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy "ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be
Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal action governed by the provisions of the Penal Code.
was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was
convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to "ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or
two years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the petition negligence, not punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the provisions of
that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals Chapter II, Title XVI of this book."
affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and xxx xxx xxx
Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased, on March 7, 1939, brought an action in "ART. 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his
the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.
the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of
First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus "ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not
legal interest from the date of the complaint. This decision was modified by the Court only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another
of Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the is responsible.
action was instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla's negligence was the cause of "The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any
the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As damages caused by the minor children who live with them.
to Barredo's responsibility, the Court of Appeals found: "Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons subject
". . . It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is no proof that he to their authority and living with them.
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. (See p. "Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any
22, appellant's brief.) In fact it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who damages caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the service in
had been caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding which employed, or on occasion of the performance of their duties.
(Exhibit A) violations which appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public Works
available to the public and to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under "The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but
the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code." not if the damage shall have been caused by the official upon whom properly
devolved the duty of doing the act performed, in which case the provisions of the
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by
next preceding article shall be applicable.
the Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been
no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot "Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused
be held responsible in this case. The petitioner's brief states on page 10: by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.
". . . The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to "The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned
exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision therein prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to
of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent damages suffered by the respondents. In other words, prevent the damage.".
the Court of Appeals insists on applying in this case article 1903 of the Civil Code.
"Art. 1904.Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may recover
Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil
from the latter what he may have paid.".
Code. This fact makes said article inapplicable to a civil liability arising from a crime
as in the case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of the Civil REVISED PENAL CODE
Code, in the precise words of article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is applicable only to
"Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. Every person criminally liable for a
"those (obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts or omissions not
felony is also civilly liable.
punishable by law.'"
"Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. The exemption from criminal
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4
". . . We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be
imposed upon him in this action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a enforced subject to the following rules:
misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla), but an obligation imposed in article
"First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts
1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the selection or supervision of
committed by any imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of
his servant or employee."
age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority
action against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly responsible or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part.
under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The
"Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his
defendant maintains that Fontanilla's negligence being punishable by the Penal
authority, legal guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane,
Code, his (defendant's) liability as an employer is only subsidiary, according to said
imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt
Penal Code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has
from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
not been exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must cut through the tangle that
has, in the minds of many, confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, "Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the persons for whose
or crimes under the Penal Code and fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit
the Civil Code. This should be done, because justice may be lost in a labyrinth, which they may have received.
unless principles and remedies are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in
"The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for
our inquiry by the luminous presentation of this perplexing subject by renown jurists
which each one shall be liable.
and we are likewise guided by the decisions of this Court in previous cases as well
"When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even approximately,
as by the solemn clarity of the considerations in several sentences of the Supreme
or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the
Tribunal of Spain.
inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damage has been caused
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana" is a with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in
separate legal institution under the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own, and the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. Upon this
"Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using
principle, and on the wording and spirit of article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary
violence or causing the fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be
and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that dicha, que en ningun caso lleva aparejada responsabilidad criminal alguna, y otra
part of their property exempt from execution. que es consecuencia indeclinable de la penal que nace de todo delito o falta."
"ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of "The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises
establishment. In default of persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, different persons. Thus, there is a civil responsibility, properly speaking, which in no
and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in case carries with it any criminal responsibility, and another which is a necessary
their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some consequence of the penal liability as a result of every felony or misdemeanor."
general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had
employees.
been a collision between two trains belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril
"Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee of the latter had been
or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the prosecuted in a criminal case, in which the company had been made a party as
value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The employee had been acquitted in the
himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril del Norte, had also been exonerated.
and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his The question asked was whether the Ferrocarril Cantabrico could still bring a civil
representative may have given them with respect to the care of and vigilance over action for damages against the Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion was in the
such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or affirmative, stating in part:
intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.
"Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos,
"ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability todavia menos parece sostenible que exista cosa juzgada acerca de la obligacion
established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, civil de indemnizar los quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el choque de los
persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by trenes. El titulo en que se funda la accion para demandar el resarcimiento, no puede
their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their confundirse con las responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, siquiera exista en
duties." este, sea el cual sea, una culpa rodeada de notas agravatorias que motivan
xxx xxx xxx sanciones penales, mas o menos severas. La lesion causada por delito o falta en los
derechos civiles, requiere restituciones, reparaciones o indemnizaciones, que cual la
"ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence,
pena misma atañen al orden publico; por tal motivo vienen encomendadas, de
shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony,
ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro es que si por esta via se enmiendan los
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional
quebrantos y menoscabos, el agraviado excusa procurar el ya conseguido
in its minimum period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of
desagravio; pero esta eventual coincidencia de los efectos, no borra la diversidad
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
originaria de las acciones civiles para pedir indemnizacion.
"Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which
"Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no vendrian
would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in
a cuento y que tienen otro regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo
its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony,
Civil, de toda accion u omision, causante de daños o perjuicios, en que intervenga
the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed."
culpa o negligencia. Es trivial que acciones semejantes son ejercitadas ante los
It will thus be seen that while the terms of article 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente, sin que la Justicia punitiva tenga que
broad enough to cover the driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless mezclarse en los asuntos. Los articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al 128 del Codigo Penal,
article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not punishable by law." But atentos al espiritu y a los fines sociales y politicos del mismo, desenvuelven y
inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but ordenan la materia de responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, en terminos
even simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under article 1902 of separados del regimen por ley comun de la culpa que se denomina aquiliana, por
the Civil Code has apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the alusion a precedentes legislativos del Corpus Juris. Seria intempestivo un paralelo
"confusion worse confounded." However, a closer study shows that such a entre aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion de indemnizar a titulo de culpa
concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction civil; pero viene al caso y es necesaria una de las diferenciaciones que en el tal
between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi- delitos paralelo se notarian.
or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce
"Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las
civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or
responsabilidades civiles, entre los que sean por diversos conceptos culpables del
create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910
delito o falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los establecimientos al servicio
of the Civil Code.
de los cuales estan los delincuentes; pero con caracter subsidiario, o sea, segun el
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and texto literal, en defecto de los que sean responsables criminalmente. No coincide en
unmistakable. This legal institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo articulo 1903, dice; La obligacion que impone el articulo
being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this anterior es exigible, no solo por los actos y omisiones propios, sino por los de
responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to aquellas personas de quienes se debe responder; personas en la enumeracion de
the genealogy of the present fault or negligence under the Civil Code, for instance, las cuales figuran los dependientes y empleados de los establecimientos o
Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda, porque, como quier empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea con ocasion de sus funciones. Por esto
que el non fizo a sabiendas el daño al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa." acontece, y se observa en la jurisprudencia, que las empresas, despues de
intervenir en las causas criminales con el caracter subsidiario de su responsabilidad
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article civil por razon del delito, son demandadas y condenadas directa y aisladamente,
1089, one of the five sources of obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or cuando se trata de la obligacion, ante los tribunales civiles.
culpa extra- contractual: "los actos . . . en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa
o negligencia." Then article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation shall be "Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando verdadero
governed by postulado de nuestro regimen judicial la separacion entre justicia punitiva y
Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning articles 1902-1910. This portion of the tribunales de lo civil, de suerte que tienen unos y otros normas de fondo en distintos
Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal institution of culpa aquiliana. cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos de proceder, habiendose por añadidura,
abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la Compañia del Ferrocarril Cantabrico, que se
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece innegable que la de indemnizacion por los
aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:. daños y perjuicios que le irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub judice ante el Tribunal del
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private Jurado, ni fue sentenciada, sino que permanecio intacta, al pronunciarse el fallo de
concern. 21 de marzo. Aun cuando el veredicto no hubiese sido de inculpabilidad, mostrose
mas arriba, que tal accion quedaba legitimamente reservada para despues del
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while
proceso; pero al declararse que no existio delito, ni responsabilidad dimanada de
the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
delito, materia unica sobre que tenian jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores, se redobla el
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished motivo para la obligacion civil ex lege, y se patentiza mas y mas que la accion para
only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, pedir su cumplimiento permanece incolume, extraña a la cosa juzgada."
include all acts in which "any kind of fault or negligence intervenes." However, it
"As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems less
should be noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility,
tenable that there should be res judicata with regard to the civil obligation for
such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction
damages on account of the losses caused by the collision of the trains. The title upon
of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant
which the action for reparation is based cannot be confused with the civil
4. "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.). responsibilities born of a crime, because there exists in the latter, whatever each
Let u now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts nature, a culpa surrounded with aggravating aspects which give rise to penal
and the employer's primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code. measures that are more or less severe. The injury caused by a felony or
misdemeanor upon civil rights requires restitutions, reparations, or indemnifications
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsabilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica
which, like the penalty itself, affect public order; for this reason, they are ordinarily
Española" (Vol. XXVII, p. 414) says:
entrusted to the office of the prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by this means
"El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y the losses and damages are repaired, the injured party no longer desires to seek
comprende a diferentes personas. Asi, existe una responsabilidad civil propiamente another relief; but this coincidence of effects does not eliminate the peculiar nature of
civil actions to ask for indemnity.
"Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults which
are not pertinent and belong to another scope) are derived, according to article 1902
of the Civil Code, from every act or omission causing losses and damages in which
culpa or negligence intervenes. It is unimportant that such actions are every day filed
before the civil courts without the criminal courts interfering therewith. Articles 18 to
21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal Code, bearing in mind the spirit and the social and
political purposes of that Code, develop and regulate the matter of civil
responsibilities arising from a crime, separately from the regime under common law,
of culpa which is known as aquiliana, in accordance with legislative precedent of the
Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to make a detailed comparison between the
former provisions and that regarding the obligation to indemnify on account of civil
culpa; but it is pertinent and necessary to point out to one of such differences.
"Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distributing in their own way the civil
responsibilities among those who, for different reasons, are guilty of felony or
misdemeanor, make such civil responsibilities applicable to enterprises and
establishments for which the guilty parties render service, but with subsidiary
character, that is to say, according to the wording of the Penal Code, in default of
those who are criminally responsible. In this regard, the Civil Code does not coincide
because article 1903 says: `The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is
demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons
for whom another is responsible.' Among the persons enumerated are the
subordinates and employees of establishments or enterprises, either for acts during
their service or on the occasion of their functions. It is for this reason that it happens,
and it is so observed in judicial decisions, that the companies or enterprises, after
taking part in the criminal cases because of their subsidiary civil responsibility by
reason of the crime, are sued and sentenced directly and separately with regard to
the obligation, before the civil courts.
"Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between
punitive justice and the civil courts being a true postulate of our judicial system, so
that they have different fundamental norms in different codes, as well as different
modes of procedure, and inasmuch as the Compañia del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has
abstained from taking part in the criminal case and has reserved the right to exercise
its actions, it seems undeniable that the action for indemnification for the loses and
damages caused to it by the collision was not sub judice before the Tribunal del
Jurado, nor was it the subject of a sentence, but it remained intact when the decision
of March 21 was rendered. Even if the verdict had not been that of acquittal, it has
already been shown that such action had been legitimately reserved till after the
criminal prosecution; but because of the declaration of the non-existence of the
felony and the non- existence of the responsibility arising from the crime, which was
the sole subject matter upon which the Tribunal del Jurado had jurisdiction, there is
greater reason for the civil obligation ex lege, and it becomes clearer that the action
for its enforcement remain intact and is not res judicata."
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on
which the Spanish Civil Code is largely based and whose provisions on cuasi-delito
or culpa extra-contractual are similar to those of the Spanish Civil Code, says,
referring to article 1384 of the French Civil Code which corresponds to article 1903,
Spanish Civil Code:
"The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another),
without including the author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory
in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the
employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted till after the
judgment against the author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal
action; the action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal action."
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430),
declares that the responsibility of the employer is principal and not subsidiary. He
writes:
"Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las acciones u
omisiones de aquellas personas por las que se debe responder, es subsidiaria? es
principal? Para contestar a esta pregunta es necesario saber, en primer lugar, en
que se funda el precepto legal. Es que realmente se impone una responsabilidad por
una falta ajena? Asi parece a primera vista; pero semejante afirmacion seria
contraria a la justicia y a la maxima universal, segun la que las faltas son personales,
y cada uno responde de aquellas que le son imputables. La responsabilidad de que
tratamos se impone con ocasion de un delito o culpa, pero no por causa de ellos,
sino por causa del cuasi delito, esto es, de la imprudencia o de la negligencia del
padre, del tutor, del dueño o director del establecimiento, del maestro, etc. Cuando
cualquiera de las personas que enumera el articulo citado (menores de edad,
incapacitados, dependientes, aprendices) causan un daño, la ley presume que el
padre, el tutor, el maestro, etc., han cometido una falta de negligencia para prevenir
o evitar el daño. Esta falta es la que la ley castiga. No hay, pues, responsabilidad por
un hecho ajeno, sino en la apariencia; en realidad la responsabilidad se exige por un
hecho propio. La idea de que esa responsabilidad sea subsidiaria es, por lo tanto,
completamente inadmisible."
"Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or
omissions of those persons for whom one is responsible, subsidiary or principal? In
order to answer this question it is necessary to know, in the first place, on what the
legal provision is based. Is it true that there is a responsibility for the fault of another
person? It seems so at first sight; but such assertion would be contrary to justice and
to the universal maxim that all faults are personal, and that everyone is liable for
those faults that can be imputed to him. The responsibility in question is imposed on First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the
the occasion of a crime or fault, but not because of the same, but because of the street car company. This is precisely what happens in the present case: the driver,
cuasi-delito, that is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the father, guardian, Fontanilla, has not been sued in a civil action, either alone or with his employer.
proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever anyone of
the persons enumerated in the article referred to (minors, incapacitated persons,
employees, apprentices) causes any damage, the law presumes that the father,
guardian, teacher, etc. have committed an act of negligence in not preventing or
avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is condemned by the law. It is, therefore, only
apparent that there is a responsibility for the act of another; in reality the
responsibility exacted is for one's own act. The idea that such responsibility is
subsidiary is, therefore, completely inadmissible."
"Es decir, no se responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su propia
culpa, doctrina del articulo 1902; mas por excepcion, se responde de la ajena
respecto de aquellas personas con las que media algun nexo o vinculo, que motiva o
razona la responsabilidad. Esta responsabilidad, es directa o es subsidiaria? En el
orden penal, el Codigo de esta clase distingue entre menores e incapacitados y los
demas, declarando directa la primera (articulo 19) y subsidiaria la segunda (articulos
20 y 21); pero en el orden civil, en el caso del articulo 1903, ha de entenderse
directa, por el tenor del articulo que impone la responsabilidad precisamente por los
actos de aquellas personas de quienes se deba responder.'"
"That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable
only for his own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one
is liable for the acts of those persons with whom there is a bond or tie which gives
rise to the responsibility. Is this responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the order of the
penal law, the Penal Code distinguishes between minors and incapacitated persons
on the one hand, and other persons on the other, declaring that the responsibility for
the former is direct (article 19), and for the latter, subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but
in the scheme of the civil law, in the case of article 1903, the responsibility should be
understood as direct, according to the tenor of that article, for precisely it imposes
responsibility 'for the acts of those persons for whom one should be responsible."
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has
upheld the principles above set forth: that a quasi- delict or culpa extra-contractual is
a separate and distinct legal institution, independent from the civil responsibility
arising from criminal liability, and that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil
Code, primarily and directly responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.
One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In
that case, Ramon Lafuente died as the result of having been run over by a street car
owned by the "Compañia Electrica Madrileña de Traccion." The conductor was
prosecuted in a criminal case but he was acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a civil
action against the street car company, praying for damages in the amount of 15,000
pesetas. The lower court awarded damages; so the company appealed to the
Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code
because by final judgment the non-existence of fault or negligence had been
declared. The Supreme Court of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:.
"Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado supuesto
de que el Tribunal a quo, al condenar a la Compañia Electrica Madrileña al pago del
daño causado con la muerte de Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y
efectos juridicos de la sentencia absolutoria dictada en la causa criminal que se
siguio por el mismo hecho, cuando es lo cierto que de este han conocido las dos
jurisdicciones bajo diferentes aspectos, y como la de lo criminal declaro dentro de
los limites de su competencia que el hecho de que se trata no era constitutivo de
delito por no haber mediado descuido o negligencia graves, lo que no excluye,
siendo este el unico fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el concurso de la culpa o
negligencia no calificadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el articulo 1902 del
Codigo Civil, y que alcanzan, segun el 1903, entre otras personas, a los Directores
de establecimientos o empresas por los daños causados por sus dependientes en
determinadas condiciones, es manifiesto que la de lo civil, al conocer del mismo
hecho bajo este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la Compañia recurrente a la
indemnizacion del daño causado por uno de sus empleados, lejos de infringir los
mencionados textos, en relacion con el articulo 116 de la Ley de Enjuiciamiento
Criminal, se ha atenido estrictamente a ellos, sin invadir atribuciones ajenas a su
jurisdiccion propia, ni contrariar en lo mas minimo el fallo recaido en la causa."
"Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken supposition
that the trial court, in sentencing the Compañia Madrileña to the payment of the
damage caused by the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo, disregards the value and
juridical effects of the sentence of acquittal rendered in the criminal case instituted on
account of the same act, when it is a fact that the two jurisdictions had taken
cognizance of the same act in its different aspects, and as the criminal jurisdiction
declared within the limits of its authority that the act in question did not constitute a
felony because there was no grave carelessness or negligence, and this being the
only basis of acquittal, it does not exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence
which is not qualified, and is a source of civil obligations according to article 1902 of
the Civil Code, affecting, in accordance with article 1903, among other persons, the
managers of establishments or enterprises by reason of the damages caused by
employees under certain conditions, it is manifest that the civil jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the same act in this latter aspect and in ordering the company,
appellant herein, to pay an indemnity for the damage caused by one of its
employees, far from violating said legal provisions, in relation with article 116 of the
Law of Criminal Procedure, strictly followed the same, without invading attributes
which are beyond its own jurisdiction, and without in any way contradicting the
decision in that cause." ( talics supplied.).
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but the
Supreme Tribunal of Spain said that this did not exclude the co-existence of fault or
negligence, which is not qualified, on the part of the conductor, under article 1902 of
the Civil Code. In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal
negligence, so that if he had even sued for his civil responsibility arising from the
crime, he would have been held primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo would
have been held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing
Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his own presumed negligence —
which he did not overcome — under article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of
Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising
from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary liability as an
employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take,
and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their
rights. It might be observed in passing, that the plaintiffs chose the more expeditious
and effective method of relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just
been released, and besides, he was probably without property which might be seized
in enforcing any judgment against him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer
was held liable civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee (the conductor)
in a previous criminal case, with greater reason should Barredo, the employer in the
case at bar, be held liable for damages in a civil suit filed against him because his
taxi driver had been convicted. The degree of negligence of the conductor in the
Spanish case cited was less than that of the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the
former was acquitted in the previous criminal case while the latter was found guilty of
criminal negligence and was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year
and one day to two years of prision correccional. " 'SEC. 1903.
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an action demandable,
was brought against a railroad company for damages because the station agent, persons for whom they should be responsible.
employed by the company, had unjustly and fraudulently, refused to deliver certain " 'The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages
articles consigned to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Spain held that this action caused by the minors who live with them.
was properly under article 1902 of the Civil Code, the court saying: xxx
"Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos que
consigna con relacion a las pruebas del pleito: 1.°, que las expediciones facturadas
por la compañia ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de las vasijas vacias que en
su demanda relacionan tenian como fin el que este las devolviera a sus remitentes
con vinos y alcoholes; 2.°, que llegadas a su destino tales mercancias no se
quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario por el jefe de la estacion sin motivo
justificado y con intencion dolosa, y 3.°, que la falta de entrega de estas
expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el demandante le originaron daños y
perjuicios en cantidad de bastante importancia como expendedor al por mayor que
era de vinos y alcoholes por las ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse privado de
servir los pedidos que se le habian hecho por los remitentes en los envases:
"Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro motivos
que integran este recurso, porque la demanda inicial del pleito a que se contrae no
contiene accion que nazca del incumplimiento del contrato de transporte, toda vez
que no se funda en el retraso de la llegada de las mercancias ni de ningun otro
vinculo contractual entre las partes contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, de
aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo de Comercio, en que principalmente descansa
el fallo recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir la reparacion de los daños y perjuicios
producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la injustificada y dolosa negativa del
porteador a la entrega de las mercancias a su nombre consignadas, segun lo
reconoce la sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente sancionada en el
articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la Compañia demandada
como ligada con el causante de aquellos por relaciones de caracter economico y de
jerarquia administrativa."
"Considering that the sentence in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts which it
declares, in relation to the evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice issued by the
railroad company in favor of the plaintiff contemplated that the empty receptacles
referred to in the complaint should be returned to the consignors with wines and
liquors; (2) that when the said merchandise reached their destination, their delivery to
the consignee was refused by the station agent without justification and with
fraudulent intent, and (3) that the lack of delivery of these goods when they were
demanded by the plaintiff caused him losses and damages of considerable
importance, as he was a wholesale vendor of wines and liquors and he failed to
realize the profits when he was unable to fill the orders sent to him by the consignors
of the receptacles:
"Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four assignments of
error, as the original complaint did not contain any cause of action arising from non-
fulfilment of a contract of transportation, because the action was not based on the
delay of the goods nor on any contractual relation between the parties litigant and,
therefore, article 371 of the Code of Commerce, on which the decision appealed from
is based, is not applicable; but it limits itself to asking for reparation for losses and
damages produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff on account of the unjustified and
fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods consigned to the plaintiff as
stated by the sentence, and the carrier's responsibility is clearly laid down in article
1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in virtue of the next article, the defendant
company, because the latter is connected with the person who caused the damage
by relations of economic character and by administrative hierarchy."
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under
"The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears
both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was
from the briefs before us to have arisen from the interpretation of the words of article
unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal
1093, `fault or negligence not punished by law,' as applied to the comprehensive
action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article
definition of offenses in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has been shown
that the liability of an employer arising out of his relation to his employee who is the
1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the
employee who was being sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365
[year 1907]), the trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of the
defendant, because the latter had negligently failed to repair a tramway, in
consequence of which the rails slid off while iron was being transported, and caught
the plaintiff whose leg was broken. This Court held:.
"It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the necessary
conclusion from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries through negligence
lies only in a criminal action in which the official criminally responsible must be made
primarily liable and his employer held only subsidiarily to him. According to this
theory the plaintiff should have procured the arrest of the representative of the
company accountable for not repairing the track, and on his prosecution a suitable
fine should have been imposed, payable primarily by him and secondarily by his
employer.
"This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject.
Article 1093 of the Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults or negligence not
punished by the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Title XVI. Section 1902
of that chapter reads:
" 'A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault
or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
The obligation imposed by the preceding article is
not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the
xxx xxx
" 'Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter
may be employed or in the performance of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
" 'The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid
the damage.'"
"As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to
point out that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to
provide or maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His obligation therefore is one
`not punished by the laws' and falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But
the answer may be a broader one. We should be reluctant, under any conditions, to
adopt a forced construction of these scientific codes, such as is proposed by the
defendant, that would rob some of these articles of effect, would shut out litigants
against their will from the civil courts, would make the assertion of their rights
dependent upon the selection for prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and
render recovery doubtful by reason of the strict rules of proof prevailing in criminal
actions. Even if these articles had always stood alone, such a construction would be
unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon their meaning by the provisions of the
Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though
never in actual force in these Islands, was formerly given a suppletory or explanatory
effect. Under article 111 of this law, both classes of action, civil and criminal, might
be prosecuted jointly or separately, but while the penal action was pending the civil
was suspended. According to article 112, the penal action once started, the civil
remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had been waived by the party injured or
been expressly reserved by him for civil proceedings for the future. If the civil action
alone was prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be enforced only on private
complaint, the penal action thereunder should be extinguished. These provisions are
in harmony with those of articles 23 and 133 of our Penal Code on the same subject.
"An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of these
articles suffices to show that the civil liability was not intended to be merged in the
criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as expressly provided in the law.
Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required
that the injured party should seek out a third person criminally liable whose
prosecution must be a condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil right.
"Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be
regarded as subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees only
while they are in process of prosecution, or in so far as they determine the existence
of the criminal act from which liability arises, and his obligation under the civil law and
its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred thereby unless by the election of the
injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding had been instituted, growing out
of the accident in question, the provisions of the Penal Code can not affect this
action. This construction renders it unnecessary to finally determine here whether
this subsidiary civil liability in penal actions has survived the laws that fully regulated
it or has been abrogated by the American civil and criminal procedure now in force in
the Philippines.
offender is not to be regarded as derived from negligence punished by the law, within civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded
the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093. More than this, however, it cannot be said to damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of
fall within the class of acts unpunished by the law, the consequences of which are the Civil Code.
regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. The acts to which these
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915]), the action was for
articles are applicable are understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing
damages for the death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by the
duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already formed give rise to
negligence of the servant in driving an automobile over the child. It appeared that the
duties, whether springing from contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those
cause of the mishap was a defect in the steering gear. The defendant Leynes had
duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. A typical
rented the automobile from the International Garage of Manila, to be used by him in
application of this distinction may be found in the consequences of a railway accident
carrying passengers during the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was ordered by the
due to defective machinery supplied by the employer. His liability to his employee
lower court to pay P1,000 as damages to the plaintiff. On appeal this Court reversed
would arise out of the contract of employment, that to the passengers out of the
the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had shown that he exercised the
contract for passage, while that to the injured bystander would originate in the
care of a good father of a family, thus overcoming the presumption of negligence
negligent act itself."
under article 1903. This Court said:
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 or 9-year-
"As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and
old child Salvador Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to recover damages
diligence of a good father of a family. He obtained the machine from a reputable
resulting from the death of the child, who had been run over by an automobile driven
garage and it was, so far as appeared, in good condition. The workmen were
and managed by the defendant. The trial court rendered judgment requiring the
likewise selected from a standard garage, were duly licensed by the Government in
defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This Court in affirming
their particular calling, and apparently thoroughly competent. The machine had been
the judgment, said in part:
used but a few hours when the accident occurred and it is clear from the evidence
"If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana Street, that the defendant had no notice, either actual or constructive, of the defective
had to stop his auto before crossing Real Street, because he had met vehicles which condition of the steering gear."
were going along the latter street or were coming from the opposite direction along
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:.
Solana Street, it is to be believed that, when he again started to run his auto across
said Real Street and to continue its way along Solana Street northward, he should "Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence,
have adjusted the speed of the auto which he was operating until he had fully but also provides when the liability shall cease. It says:
crossed Real Street and had completely reached a clear way on Solana Street. But,
" 'The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
as the child was run over by the auto precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid
accident could not have occurred if the auto had been running at a slow speed, aside
the damage.'"
from the fact that the defendant, at the moment of crossing Real Street and entering
Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have seen the child in the act of "From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the
crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that on the left, and if the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that
accident had occurred in such a way that after the automobile had run over the body there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of
of the child, and the child's body had already been stretched out on the ground, the the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and
automobile still moved along a distance of about 2 meters, this circumstance shows (2) that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently,
the fact that the automobile entered Solana Street from Real Street, at a high speed may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction
without the defendant having blown the horn. If these precautions had been taken by of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence
the defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the death of the child would not of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from
have occurred." liability.
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in "This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence
a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was and not on that of his servant."
punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33
negligence being a proper subject-matter either of a criminal action with its Phil., 37 [year 1915]). In the latter case, the complaint alleged that the defendant's
consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and servant had so negligently driven an automobile, which was operated by defendant
independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. as a public vehicle, that said automobile struck and damaged the plaintiff's
Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana motorcycle. This Court, applying article 1903 and following the rule in Bahia vs.
under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:
negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in
a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for "The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or
this civil liability arising from his crime. director of a business or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while the
servant is engaged in his master's employment as such owner"
Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine. In
Bernal and Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was
the parents of the five- year-old child, Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil action to Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The latter case was an
recover damages for the child's death as a result of burns caused by the fault and action for damages brought by Cuison for the death of his seven-year-old son
negligence of the defendants. On the evening of April 10, 1925, the Good Friday Moises. The little boy was on his way to school with his sister Marciana. Some large
procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter pieces of lumber fell from a truck and pinned the boy underneath, instantly killing
Purificacion Bernal had come from another municipality to attend the same. After the him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya and Francisco Bautista, who were working for
procession the mother and the daughter with two others were passing along Gran Ora, an employee of defendant Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded guilty to the crime of
Capitan Street in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., owned homicide through reckless negligence and were sentenced accordingly. This Court,
by defendant J. V. House, when an automobile appeared from the opposite direction. applying articles 1902 and 1903, held:
The little girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened by the automobile "The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship of pater
that she turned to run, but unfortunately she fell into the street gutter where hot water familias. This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence
from the electric plant was flowing. The child died that same night from the burns. and not on that of his servant."
The trial court dismissed the action because of the contributory negligence of the
plaintiffs. But this Court held, on appeal, that there was no contributory negligence, In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year
and allowed the parents P1,000 in damages from J. V. House who at the time of the 1930) the plaintiff brought an action for damages for the demolition of its wharf, which
tragic occurrence was the holder of the franchise for the electric plant. This Court had been struck by the steamer Helen C belonging to the defendant. This Court held:
said in part: "The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed was
"Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he a duly licensed captain, authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage,
nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory and that the appellee contracted his services because of his reputation as a captain,
negligence of the plaintiffs. It is from this point that a majority of the court depart from according to F. C. Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the opinion that the
the stand taken by the trial judge. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be presumption of liability against the defendant has been overcome by the exercise of
on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious the care and diligence of a good father of a family in selecting Captain Lasa, in
procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court in the cases cited above, and
few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an the defendant is therefore absolved from all liability."
automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is
with hot water. The doctrine announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. negatived by the six cases above set forth. He is, on the authority of these cases,
Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907], 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil primarily and directly responsible in damages under article 1903, in relation to article
Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and her 1902, of the Civil Code.
mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could
only result in reduction of the damages." Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We study
first, City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article between a truck of the City of Manila and a street car of the Manila Electric Co. took
1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally place on June 8, 1925. The truck was damaged in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto
prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made
Eustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for the crime of damage to property and have been little understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to indicate their
slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was found guilty and sentenced to foundations.
pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the City of Manila for P1,788.27, with subsidiary
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio,
simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code
the City of Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric Company to obtain
refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of
payment, claiming that the defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main defense was
article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very
that the defendant had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to
the damage. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This Court
property through any degree of negligence even the slightest would have to be
held, in part, that this case was governed by the Penal Code, saying:
indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a
"With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are
the provisions of the Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and
language authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil Code anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter
negatives its application by providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of
misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. The the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling under article 604 of the Penal such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved
Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or negligent act or omission not and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up with the Penal Code
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In other words, the Penal Code affirms its
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is
jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal
sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of
negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case of civil negligence."
criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be
xxx xxx xxx
proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and
"Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Civil Code. Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling would permit Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi
the master to escape scot- free by simply alleging and proving that the master had jus ibi remedium.
exercised all diligence in the selection and training of its servants to prevent the
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and
damage. That would be a good defense to a strictly civil action, but might or might
that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be
not be to a civil action either as a part of or predicated on conviction for a crime or
tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of
misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis, it may be said further that the statements here
obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more
made are offered to meet the argument advanced during our deliberations to the
expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the
effect that article 1902 of the Civil Code should be disregarded and codal articles
defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to
1093 and 1903 applied.)"
facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the defendant
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition, is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that
because the Court of Appeals based its decision in the present case on the professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyances usually do not have
defendant's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code and not on his sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why then, should the plaintiff be
subsidiary liability arising from Fontanilla's criminal negligence. In other words, the required in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably
case of City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is predicated on an entirely useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and
different theory, which is the subsidiary liability of an employer arising from a criminal facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
act of his employee, whereas the foundation of the decision of the Court of Appeals
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of
in the present case is the employer's primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil
employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect
Code. We have already seen that this is a proper and independent remedy.
society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap
defendant. A motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric Company had been the profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right
convicted of homicide by simple negligence and sentenced, among other things, to that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel and
pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P1,000. An action was then brought to patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach
enforce the subsidiary liability of the defendant as employer under the Penal Code. themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all
The defendant attempted to show that it had exercised the diligence of a good father for their negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just
of a family in selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed exemption from civil that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or director who could have
liability. But this Court held: chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who could
not exercise such selection and who used such employee because of his confidence
"In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that the
in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this
exemption from civil liability established in article 1903 of the Civil Code for all who
primary responsibility of the employer on the principle of representation of the
have acted with the diligence of a good father of a family, is not applicable to the
principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747)
subsidiary civil liability provided in article 20 of the Penal Code."
that before third persons the employer and employee "vienen a ser como una sola
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant case, personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien le emplea y
because the action there had for its purpose the enforcement of the defendant's utiliza." ("become as one personality by the merging of the person of the employee in
subsidiary liability under the Penal Code, while in the case at bar, the plaintiff's cause that of him who employs and utilizes him.") All these observations acquire a peculiar
of action is based on the defendant's primary and direct responsibility under article force and significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of
1903 of the Civil Code. In fact, the above case destroys the defendant's contention stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
because that decision illustrates the principle that the employer's primary
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and
responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code is different in character from his
the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence
subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.
of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to
to recognize the distinction between civil liability arising from a crime, which is seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting
governed by the Penal Code, and the responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
under the Civil Code, and has likewise failed to give due importance to the latter type Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless
of civil action. rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are
need not be set forth. Suffice it to say that the question involved was also civil liability asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed
arising from a crime. Hence, it is as inapplicable as the two cases above discussed. out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for
fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi- high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own
delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime
distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding of
Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of private rights because it re- establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the
the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues,
arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party
negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress.
authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer — in this
case the defendant-petitioner — is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is
the Civil Code. hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendant- petitioner.

The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be Yulo, C.J., Moran, Ozaeta and Paras, JJ., concur.
sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that
CASE: ELCANOVS.GIL(77scra98)
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple
Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil
Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in
Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property- through any degree of
son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said negligence - even the slightest - would have to be Idemnified only through the principle of civil
accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito
kill, coupled with mistake." or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a
situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds: uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court; such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata; enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was
relieved as guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage. Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant
of such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following order was issued: pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown
beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases,
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14, 1965 and the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910
after thoroughly examining the arguments therein contained, the Court finds the same to be of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi
meritorious and well-founded. jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil
ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case. SO ORDERED. Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it
resolution the following assignment of errors:
has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked
DEFENDANTS THAT - to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harms
I done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of
RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no
3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE; longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for
II the better safeguarding or private rights because it realtor, an ancient and additional remedy,
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES- and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues,
ADJUDICTA; limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or
III his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE,
ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts
IV from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper
HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in
THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.) fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to the
Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here
Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or
of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of
because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline
favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants do not qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo
dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth
filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render
the death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to. almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission
resolution are: that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law,"
wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed? thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in
character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill, provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this
though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already legally married? Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification the new code provides:
of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate
was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff
Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault, with pertinent
citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight
earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not only startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil
under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds: negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or
quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come under both from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa
the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of
fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish
be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal
noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued. negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action,
not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal
'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code)
case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code.
Commission, p. 162.)
Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter
either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the
separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift-
Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in
under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act applying the same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new
for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for
which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime
crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2 fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under
Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the
with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow
Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for
the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold,
reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his
as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not
criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on
understood, in the past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their foundations. both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article SUPERGUARD was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury, while the
100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having
quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision and
case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
control of its employee to avoid the injury.
accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.4 xxx xxx xxx"

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished (Rollo, pp. 117-118)
his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him. Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on attorney's fees. The said Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 was raffled to Branch 84 of the
the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided by respondent Judge Teodoro Regino.
conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
On March 2, 1989, private respondent SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327,
Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor the ground that the complaint does not state a valid cause of action. SUPERGUARD
(child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the claimed that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties,
minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo),
concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which
administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or states:
encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue
and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian." "Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. - Every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint for damages based on
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-
minor children who live in their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the private
Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the respondent argued that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature considering
time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and
that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the
dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
employer's subsidiary liability (Rollo, p. 55-59).
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary
liability of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as
parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third defendant on the ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees.
persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against the
emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the
private respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil
parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do
any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And Code, which provides:
surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor "Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property
which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent. responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are
son. not engaged in any business or industry.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in xxx xxx xxx"
accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees. Petitioners contended that a suit against alternative defendants is allowed under
Rule 3, Section 13 of the Rules of Court. Therefore, the inclusion of private
respondents as alternative defendants in the complaint is justified by the following:
CASE: DULAY VS. CA (243scra 220)
the Initial Investigation Report prepared by Pat. Mario Tubon showing that Torzuela
BIDIN, J.:
is an employee of SAFEGUARD; and through overt acts, SUPERGUARD extended
This petition for certiorari prays for the reversal of the decision of the Court of its sympathies to petitioners (Rollo, pp. 64 and 98).
Appeals dated October 29, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 24646 which affirmed the order
of the Regional Trial Court dismissing Civil Case No. Q-89-1751, and its resolution Meanwhile, an Information dated March 21, 1989 charging Benigno Torzuela with
dated November 17, 1991 denying herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration. homicide was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati and was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 89-1896.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino issued an order granting
On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon SUPERGUARD'S motion to dismiss and SAFEGUARD'S motion for exclusion as
Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result defendant. The respondent judge held that the complaint did not state facts
of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and necessary or sufficient to constitute a quasi-delict since it does not mention any
killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay. negligence on the part of Torzuela in shooting Napoleon Dulay or that the same was
done in the performance of his duties. Respondent judge ruled that mere allegations
Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in
of the concurring negligence of the defendants (private respondents herein) without
her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed on February 8, 1989 an
stating the facts showing such negligence are mere conclusions of law (Rollo, p.
action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and herein private respondents
106). Respondent judge also declared that the complaint was one for damages
Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard
founded on crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal
Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"), alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. The
Code as distinguished from those arising from quasi-delict. The dispositive portion of
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 among others alleges the
the order dated April 13, 1989 states:
following:
"WHEREFORE, this Court holds that in view of the material and ultimate facts
1. . . ."Defendants SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC,
alleged in the verified complaint and in accordance with the applicable law on the
(Defendant Safeguard) and SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION
matter as well as precedents laid down by the Supreme Court, the complaint against
(Defendant Superguard) are corporations duly organized and existing in accordance
the alternative defendants Superguard Security Corporation and Safeguard
with Philippine laws, with offices at 10th Floor, Manufacturers Building, Inc., Plaza
Investigation and Security Co., Inc., must be and (sic) it is hereby dismissed."
Santa Cruz, Manila. They are impleaded as alternative defendants for, while the
former appears to be the employer of defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA (defendant The above order was affirmed by the respondent court and petitioners' motion for
TORZUELA), the latter impliedly acknowledged responsibility for the acts of reconsideration thereof was denied.
defendant TORZUELA by extending its sympathies to plaintiffs. Petitioners take exception to the assailed decision and insist that quasi-delicts are
"Defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA is of legal age, an employee of defendant not limited to acts of negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary,
SAFEGUARD and/or defendant SUPERGUARD and, at the time of the incident citing Andamo v. IAC (191 SCRA 195 [l990]). Thus, petitioners insist that Torzuela's
complained of, was under their control and supervision. . . . act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Article
2176 of the New Civil Code.
"3. On December 7, 1988 at around 8:00 a.m., defendant TORZUEIA, while he was
on duty as security guard at the "Big Bang sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa, Petitioners further contend that under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, private
Metro Manila shot and killed NAPOLEON V. DULAY with a .38 caliber revolver respondents are primarily liable for their negligence either in the selection or
belonging to defendant SAFEGUARD, and/or SUPERGUARD (per police Report supervision of their employees. This liability is independent of the employee's own
dated January 7, 1989, copy attached as Annex A); liability for fault or negligence and is distinct from the subsidiary civil liability under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The civil action against the employer may
"4. The incident resulting in the death of NAPOLEON V. DULAY was due to the
therefore proceed independently of the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111 Section
concurring negligence of the defendants. Defendant TORZUELA'S wanton and
3 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners submit that the question of whether Torzuela is an
reckless discharge of the firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or
employee of respondent SUPERGUARD or SAFEGUARD would be better resolved criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
after trial. committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that
culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by
Moreover, petitioners argue that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable
law."
under Article 33 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate
"Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
Court (191 SCRA 195 [1990]), wherein the Court held:
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal "Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a civil action lies against the offender in a
In the same vein, petitioners cite Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which
criminal act, whether or not he is prosecuted or found guilty or acquitted, provided
provides:
that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually also charged
"Rule 111. . . . criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently - In the cases provided for in eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent cases vary." [Citing Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472]
civil-action which has been reserved may be brought by the offended party, shall Private respondents submit that the word "intentional" in the Andamo case is
proceed independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a preponderance inaccurate obiter, and should be read as "voluntary" since intent cannot be coupled
of evidence." with negligence as defined by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence
The term "physical injuries" under Article 33 has been held to include consummated, of more substantial reasons, this Court will not disturb the above doctrine on the
frustrated and attempted homicide. Thus, petitioners maintain that Torzuela's prior coverage of Article 2176.
conviction is unnecessary since the civil action can proceed independently of the Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to
criminal action. On the other hand, it is the private respondents' argument that since injuries intentionally committed pursuant to the ruling in Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193
the act was not committed with negligence, the petitioners have no cause of action [1983]), and that the actions for damages allowed thereunder are ex-delicto.
under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the New Civil Code. The civil action contemplated in However, the term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to
Article 2177 is not applicable to acts committed with deliberate intent, but only include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the
applies to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Torzuela's Philippines 121 Phil. 638 [1965]; Carandang v. Santiago 97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is not
act of shooting Atty. Dulay to death, aside from being purely personal, was done with the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only
deliberate intent and could not have been part of his duties as security guard. And physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja
since Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers only acts done within the scope of v. Caro 126 SCRA 293 [1983]). Although in the Marcia case (supra), it was held that
the employee's assigned tasks, the private respondents cannot be held liable for no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result
damages. of criminal negligence, it must be noted however, that Torzuela, the accused in the
We find for petitioners. case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the
defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case,
It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for homicide for the fatal a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
shooting of Napoleon Dulay. Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Private respondents also contend that their liability is subsidiary under the Revised
"Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, Penal Code; and that they are not liable for Torzuela's act which is beyond the scope
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal of his duties as a security guard. It having been established that the instant action is
action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute not ex-delicto, petitioners may proceed directly against Torzuela and the private
it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. respondents. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as aforequoted, when an
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer
arising from the same act or omission of the accused." either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after
selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court 167 SCRA 363 [1988]).
It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not
the criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing
requirement of an express reservation (Yakult Philippines v. Court of Appeals 190 of the insolvency of such employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado 176 SCRA
SCRA 357 [1990]). This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case. 792 [1989]). Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that
However, the private respondents opposed the civil action on the ground that the they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
same is founded on a delict and not on a quasi-delict as the shooting was not supervision of their employee.
attended by negligence. What is in dispute therefore is the nature of the petitioner's
cause of action. Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are
intentional and voluntary, it was therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court to
The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as dismiss petitioner's complaint simply because it failed to make allegations of
constituting the cause of action (Republic v. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]). The attendant negligence attributable to private respondents.
purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the
claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the With respect to the issue of whether the complaint at hand states a sufficient cause
complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief (De Tavera v. Philippine of action, the general rule is that the allegations in a complaint are sufficient to
Tuberculosis Society, 112 SCRA 243 [1982]). An examination of the complaint in the constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, admitting the facts alleged, the
present case would show that the plaintiffs, petitioners herein, are invoking their right court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer
to recover damages against the private respondents for their vicarious responsibility therein. A cause of action exists if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a
for the injury caused by Benigno Torzuela's act of shooting and killing Napoleon right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
Dulay, as stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint. created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to
violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides: of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to
"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. (Del
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, 210 SCRA 33 [1992]); Development Bank of the
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi- Philippines v. Pundogar 218 SCRA 118 [1993]).
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter." This Court finds, under the foregoing premises, that the complaint sufficiently alleged
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the an actionable breach on the part of the defendant Torzuela and respondents
scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD. It is enough that the complaint alleged that
negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the
committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or
back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts. This does not
held that: operate however, to establish that the defendants below are liable. Whether or not
the shooting was actually reckless and wanton or attended by negligence and
". . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not whether it was actually done within the scope of Torzuela's duties; whether the
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and private respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD failed to exercise the
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender diligence of a good father of a family; and whether the defendants are actually liable,
in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or are questions which can be better resolved after trial on the merits where each party
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged can present evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses.
also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to
cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset;
Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case (Del Bros Hotel
Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasi- Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a sufficient
delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Revised
regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants (Rava Dev't. Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extracontractual under the
Corp. v. CA 211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Civil Code, and the party seeking recovery is free to choose which remedy to
Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of enforce.
cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist In dismissing the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 2850, the lower court
rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or sustained the arguments of respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro
uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). Since the petitioners clearly Tumala, and declared that whether or not "the action for damages is based on
sustained an injury to their rights under the law, it would be more just to allow them to criminal negligence or civil negligence known as culpa aquiliana in the Civil Code or
present evidence of such injury. tort under American law" there "should be a showing that the offended party
expressly waived the civil action or reserved his right to institute it separately" and
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED.
that "the allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be tainted by any
The decision of the Court of Appeals as well as the Order of the Regional Trial Court
assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations" and because of the prayer
dated April 13, 1989 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-89-
in the complaint asking the Court to declare the defendants jointly and severally
1751 is remanded to the Regional Trial Court for trial on the merits. This decision is
liable for moral, compensatory and exemplary damages, the Court is of the opinion
immediately executory.SO ORDERED.
that the action was not based on "culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict."
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on January 21,
1972, hence this appeal on certiorari.
CASE: GARCIA VS. FLORIDO (52 scra 420)
There is no question that from a careful consideration of the allegations contained in
the complaint in Civil Case No. 2850, the essential averments for a quasi-delictual
ANTONIO, J:
action under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present, namely: a) act or
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis
omission of the private respondents; b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of
Occidental, Branch III, in Civil Case No. 2850 (German C. Garcia, et al. vs. Marcelino
due care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala
Inesin, et al.) dated October 21, 1971, dismissing petitioners' action for damages
resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car; c) physical injuries and
against respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, "without prejudice
other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision; d) existence of
to refiling the said civil action after conviction of the defendants in the criminal case
direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or
filed by the Chief of Police of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte", and from the order
negligence of private respondents; and e) the absence of pre-existing contractual
of said Court dated January 21, 1972, denying petitioners' motion for
relations between the parties. The circumstance that the complaint alleged that
reconsideration.
respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove the vehicle "at a fast clip in a
On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental
reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic rules and
Hospital, together with his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco,
without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car" does not
bookkeeper of said hospital, hired and boarded a PU car with plate No. 241-8 G
detract from the nature and character of the action, as one based on culpa aquiliana.
Ozamis 71 owned and operated by respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and driven by
The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to
respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a roundtrip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City,
observe for the protection of the interests of others, that degree of care, precaution
for the purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of government hospitals, hospital
and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in the
administrative officers, and bookkeepers of Regional Health Office No. 7 at
injury on petitioners. Certainly excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear
Zamboanga City. At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve
indication of negligence. Since the same negligent act resulted in the filing of the
on the national highway at kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan, Zamboanga
criminal action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court (Criminal Case No.
del Norte, said car collided with an oncoming passenger bus (No. 25) with plate No.
4960) and the civil action by petitioners, it is inevitable that the averments on the
77-4 W Z.N. 71 owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by
drivers' negligence in both complaints would substantially be the same. It should be
defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid collision, petitioners sustained
emphasized that the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil
various physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and
liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code or create an
hospitalization.
action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New
Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of
Civil Code. This distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs. Garcia, et all (73
the accident driving their respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a reckless, grossly
Phil. 607, 620-621). 1
negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic rules and without due
It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car, petitioners, German C.
Court which became effective on January 1, 1964, in the cases provided for by
Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, filed on September 1, 1971 with
Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code, an independent civil action entirely
respondent Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental an action for damages
separate and distinct from the civil action, may be instituted by the injured party
(Civil Case No. 2850) against the private respondents, owners and drivers,
during the pendency of the criminal case, provided said party has reserved his right
respectively, of the PU car and the passenger bus that figured in the collision, with
to institute it separately, but it should be noted, however, that neither Section 1 nor
prayer for preliminary attachment.
Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit when such reservation shall be made. In
On September 16, 1971, Marcelino Inesin and Ricardo Vayson filed their answer in
Tactaquin v. Palileo, 2 where the reservation was made after the tort-feasor had
the aforementioned Civil Case No. 2850 admitting the contract of carriage with
already pleaded guilty and after the private prosecutor had entered his appearance
petitioners but alleged, by way of defense, that the accident was due to the
jointly with the prosecuting attorney in the course of the criminal proceedings, and
negligence and reckless imprudence of the bus driver, as when Ricardo Vayson,
the tort-feasor was convicted and sentenced to pay damages to the offended party
driver of the PU car, saw the oncoming passenger bus No. 25 coming from the
by final judgment in said criminal case, We ruled that such reservation is legally
opposite direction ascending the incline at an excessive speed, chasing another
ineffective because the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same
passenger bus, he had to stop the PU car in order to give way to the passenger bus,
act or ommission of the defendant. We explained in Meneses v. Luat 3 that when
but, in spite of such precaution, the passenger bus bumped the PU car, thus causing
the criminal action for physical injuries against the defendant did not proceed to trial
the accident in question, and, therefore, said private respondents could not be held
as he pleaded guilty upon arraignment and the Court made no pronouncement on
liable for the damages caused on petitioners.
the matter or damages suffered by the injured party, the mere appearance of private
On September 29, 1971, respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala,
counsel in representation of the offended party in said criminal case does not
filed a motion to dismiss on three (3) grounds, namely: 1) that the plaintiffs
constitute such active intervention as could impart an intention to press a claim for
(petitioners) had no cause of action; 2) that the complaint carries with it a prayer for
damages in the same action, and, therefore, cannot bar a separate civil action for
attachment but without the requisite verification, hence defective under the provision
damages subsequently instituted on the same Found under Article 33 of the New
of Sec. 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court; and 3) that the defendants (respondents),
Civil Code.
Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and its driver, accused Pedro Tumala, had operated said
In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the
passenger bus with maximum care and prudence.
criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala,
The principal argument advanced in said motion to dismiss was that the petitioners
much less has the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or
had no cause of action for on August 11, 1971, or 20 days before the filing of the
acquittal of said accused.
present action for damages, respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal
It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages,
Case No. 4960 of the Municipal Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in a
petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the
complaint filed by the Chief of Police for "double serious and less serious physical
criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in the present civil case.
injuries through reckless imprudence", and that, with the filing of the aforesaid
As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the
criminal case, no civil action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal
former has ceased to be involved in the criminal action. Undoubtedly an offended
case has been finally adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when
Court, and, therefore, the filing of the instant civil action is premature, because the
he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute, but also
liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until after final
when he has actually instituted the civil action. For by either of such actions his
judgment has been rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala, guilty of negligence;
interest in the criminal case has disappeared.
that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art 33 applied only to
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may
the crimes of physical injuries or homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence of
produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa
the driver.
extracontractual. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a
On October 14, 1971, petitioners filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss
distinct and independent negligence, having always had its own foundation and
alleging that the aforesaid action for damages was instituted not to enforce the civil
individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the
liability of the respondents under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code but for their civil
civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal
liability on quasi-delicts pursuant to Articles 2176-2194, as the same negligent act
proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence,
"the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to . . . Articles 32, 33 and 34 of
the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles
were drafted . . . and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule
stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural, may
also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33
and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the
proviso." 4 But in whatever way We view the institution of the civil action for recovery
of damages under quasi-delict by petitioners, whether as one that should be
governed by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which require
reservation by the injured party considering that by the institution of the civil action
even before the commencement of the trial of the criminal case, petitioners have
thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where reservation to file the
civil action need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil
Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so
does not bar him from bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the
case, We find no legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the decision and order appealed from are hereby reversed and set
aside, and the court a quo is directed to proceed with the trial of the case. Costs
against private respondents.
CASE: ANDAMO vs. IAC
FERNAN, J.:
substantial justice due to legal technicalities, pleadings as well as remedial laws
should be liberally construed so that the litigants may have ample opportunity to
prove their respective claims. 9
Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil Case
No. TG-748:
4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang, Cavite,
adjacent on the right side of the aforesaid land of plaintiffs, defendant constructed
waterpaths starting from the middle-right portion thereof leading to a big hole or
opening, also constructed by defendant, thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-
blocks fence situated on the right side of its cemented gate fronting the provincial
highway, and connected by defendant to a man-height inter-connected cement
culverts which were also constructed and lain by defendant cross-wise beneath the
tip of the said cemented gate, the left-end of the said inter-connected culverts again
connected by defendant to a big hole or opening thru the lower portion of the same
concrete hollow-blocks fence on the left side of the said cemented gate, which hole
or opening is likewise connected by defendant to the cemented mouth of a big canal,
also constructed by defendant, which runs northward towards a big hole or opening
which was also built by defendant thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks
fence which separates the land of plaintiffs from that of defendant (and which serves
as the exit-point of the floodwater coming from the land of defendant, and at the
same time, the entrance-point of the same floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year
after year, during rainy or stormy seasons.

The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is whether a
corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and
contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent
land, can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil
Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of
the criminal case.
"5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside the land of
plaintiffs, defendant also constructed an artificial lake, the base of which is soil, which
utilizes the water being channeled thereto from its water system thru inter-connected
galvanized iron pipes (No. 2) and complimented by rain water during rainy or stormy
seasons, so much so that the water below it seeps into, and the excess water above
it inundates, portions of the adjoining land of plaintiffs.

The antecedent facts are as follows: "6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's aforementioned
water conductors, contrivances and manipulators, a young man was drowned to
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of death, while herein plaintiffs suffered and will continue to suffer, as follows:
land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private
respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation. "a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded and converted to deep, wide and
long canals, such that the same can no longer be planted to any crop or plant.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an
artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' "b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on several occasions, washed
land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away.
away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during "c) during rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and their laborers are
rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to always in danger.
destruction.
"d) Plants and other improvements on other portions of the land of plaintiffs are
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal Case No. exposed to destruction. . . ." 10
TG 907-82, before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City),
against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one
herein respondent corporation, for destruction by means of injunction under Article under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a
324 of the Revised Penal Code. quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond;
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
respondent corporation, this time a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11
damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the
same court. 1 Clearly, from petitioners' complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by
respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners.
On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building
opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hearings were these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven
conducted including ocular inspections on the land. However, on April 26, 1984, the constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
trial court, acting on respondent corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the civil
action, issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case No. TG-748 until In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court applied Article 1902, now Article
after judgment in the related Criminal Case No. TG-907-82. 2176 of the Civil Code and held that "any person who without due authority
constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984, the trial lake and a river, thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who, like the rest
court issued on August 27,1984 the disputed order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 of the residents, is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be
for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party."
case was still unresolved. Said order was anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a),
Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the
from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has property subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that
been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will
rendered in the criminal action." 2 continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by
respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of
Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. 3
damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly
On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division, constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the
promulgated a decision, 4 affirming the questioned order of the trial court. 5 damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear
A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court in case of a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
its resolution dated May 19, 1986. 6 It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article
Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case: No. TG-748 in 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in
accordance with Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Pules of Court. Petitioners contend such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT
that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and
since it is predicated on a quasi-delict. Petitioners have raised a valid point. reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable
manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must
alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action. 7 The purpose of an be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be
action or suit and the law to govern it, including the period of prescription, is to be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces
determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a
brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. 8 The third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
nature of an action is not necessarily determined or controlled by its title or heading
but by the body of the pleading or complaint itself. To avoid possible denial of Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused
by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence, thus:
 After watching the operation of the traveling crane used in handling the defendant's
"Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
coal, they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
company dumped the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These caps are
delict is governed by the provisions of this chapter."
approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts attached to it two long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use
of electricity. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of
"not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and dynamite, and have in themselves considerable explosive power. After some
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender discussion as to the ownership of caps, and their right to take them, the boys picked
in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or up all they could find, hung them of a stick, of which each took one end, and carried
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian,
charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled less than 9 years old, and all three went to the home of the boy Manuel. The boys
in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in then made a series of experiments with the caps. They thrust the ends of the wires
the two cases vary. into an electric light socket and obtained no result. They nest tried to break the cap
The distinctness of quasi-delicts is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which with a stone and failed. Manuel looked for a hammer, but could not find one. They
states: then opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a
yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied
"Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the injuries to all three. Jessie, who, when the boys proposed purring a match to the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or contents of the cap, became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut
omission of the defendant." in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to
first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact such an extent as to necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to
nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, care for his wounds.
while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" The evidence does not definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came to be
or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and on the defendant's premises, not how long they had been there when the boys found
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal them. It appeared, however, that some months before the accident, during the
negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by construction of the defendant's plant, detonating caps of the same kind as those
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain . . ." 14 found by the boys were used in sinking a well at the power plant near the place
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that a quasi-delict or where the caps were found; and it also appears that at or about the time when these
culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity caps were found, similar caps were in use in the construction of an extension of
all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or defendant's street car line to Fort William McKinley. The caps when found appeared
crime a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the to the boys who picked them up to have been lying there for a considerable time, and
responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence from the place where they were found would seem to have been discarded as
causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal defective or worthless and fir only to be thrown upon the rubbish heap.
Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil No measures seem to have been adapted by the defendant company to prohibit or
Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant prevent visitors from entering and walking about its premises unattended, when they
in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has felt disposed as to do. As admitted in defendant counsel's brief, "it is undoubtedly
declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the true that children in their play sometimes crossed the footbridge to the island;" and,
extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability. we may add, roamed about at will on the unenclosed premises of the defendant, in
the neighborhood of the place where the caps were found. There is no evidence that
In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil any effort ever was made to forbid these children from visiting the defendant
action is entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 company's premises, although it must be assumed that the company or its
of the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the employees were aware of the fact that they not infrequently did so.
civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution
Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four months at sea, as a cabin boy on
whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent one of the interisland transports. later he took upon work in his father's office learning
character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may
mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. About a month after his accident
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
he obtained employment as a mechanical draftsman and continued in the
latter." employment for six months at a salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then boy of more than average intelligence, taller and more mature both mentally and
Intermediate Appellate Court affirming the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial physically than most boys of fifteen.
Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay City) dated August 17, 1984 is hereby The facts set our in the foregoing statement are to our mind fully and conclusively
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. established by the evidence of record, and are substantially admitted by counsel.
TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel R. Andamo vs. Missionaries The only questions of fact which are seriously disputed are plaintiff's allegations that
of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc." and to proceed with the hearing of the case with the caps which were found by plaintiff on defendant company's premises were the
dispatch. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against respondent property of the defendant, or that they had come from its possession and control, and
corporation. SO ORDERED that the company or some of its employees left them exposed on its premises at the
point where they were found.

CASE: TAYLOR VS. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. 16 phil 8 The evidence in support of these allegations is meager, and the defendant company,
apparently relying on the rule of law which places the burden of proof of such
CARSON, J.: allegations upon the plaintiff, offered no evidence in rebuttal, and insists that plaintiff
An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by failed in his proof. We think, however, the plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to sustain a
David Taylor, a minor, by his father, his nearest relative. findings in accord with his allegations in this regard.

The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway
and an electric light system in the city of Manila. Its power plant is situated at the
eastern end of a small island in the Pasig River within the city of Manila, known as
the Isla del Provisor. The power plant may be reached by boat or by crossing a
footbridge, impassable for vehicles, at the westerly end of the island.
The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the same time when he received the injuries
complained of, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than
the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in
mechanics.
On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about
12 years of age, crossed the footbridge of the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of
visiting one Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who had promised to make them
a cylinder for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his
quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the
unusual interest which both seem to have taken in machinery, spent some time in
wandering about the company's premises. The visit made on a Sunday afternoon,
and it does not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the power
house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy.
It was proven that caps, similar to those found by the plaintiff, were used, more or
less extensively, on the McKinley extension of the defendant company's track; that
some of these caps were used in blasting a well on the company's premises a few
months before the accident; that not far from the place where the caps were found
the company has a storehouse for the materials, supplies, and so forth, used by it in
its operations as a street railway and a a purveyor of electric light; and that the place,
in the neighborhood of which the caps were found, was being used by the company
as a short of dumping ground for ashes and cinders. Fulminating caps or detonators
for the discharge by electricity of blasting charges by dynamite are not articles in
common use by the average citizen, and under all the circumstances, and in the
absence of all evidence to the contrary, we thing that the discovery of twenty or thirty
of these caps at the place where they were found by the plaintiff on defendant's
premises fairly justifies the inference that the defendant company was either the
owner of the caps in question or had these caps under its possession and control.
We think also that the evidence tends to disclose that these caps or detonators were
willfully and knowingly thrown by the company or its employees at the spot where
they were found, with the expectations that they would be buried out of sight by the
ashes which it was engaged in dumping in that neighborhood, they being old and
perhaps defective; and, however this may be, we are satisfied that the evidence is
sufficient to sustained a finding that the company or some of employees either
willfully or through an oversight left them exposed at a point on its premises which entered upon defendant's premised, and strolled around thereon without the express
the general public including children at play, were not prohibited from visiting, and permission of the defendant, and had he not picked up and carried away the property
over which the company knew or ought to have known that young boys were likely to of the defendant which he found on its premises, and had he not thereafter
roam abound in pastime or in play. deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a match to its contents.
Counsel for appellant endeavors to weaken or destroy the probative value of the But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and inexperience,
facts on which these conclusions are based by intimating or rather assuming that the his entry upon defendant company's premises, and the intervention of his action
blasting worked on the company's well and on its McKinley extension was done by between the negligent act of defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises
contractors. It was conclusively proven, however, that while the workman employed and the accident which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in
in blasting the well was regularly employed by J.G. White & Co., a firm of contractors, any wise accident, which should be deemed to be the direct result of defendant's
he did the work on the well directly and immediately under the supervision and negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the pace where they were found by the
control of one of defendant company's foremen, and there is no proof whatever in the plaintiff, and this latter the proximate cause of the accident which occasioned the
record that the blasting on the McKinley extension was done by independent injuries sustained by him.
contractors. Only one witness testified upon this point, and while he stated that he In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relied on the doctrine laid down in
understood that a part of this work was done by contract, he could not say so of his many of the courts of last result in the United States in the cases known as the
own knowledge, and knew nothing of the terms and conditions of the alleged "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, and the cases based thereon.
contract, or of the relations of the alleged contractor to the defendant company. The
In the typical cases, the question involved has been whether a railroad company is
fact having been proven that detonating caps were more or less extensively
liable for an injury received by an infant of tender years, who from mere idle curiosity,
employed on work done by the defendant company's directions and on its behalf, we
or for purposes of amusement, enters upon the railroad company's premises, at a
think that the company should have introduced the necessary evidence to support its
place where the railroad company's premises, at a place where the railroad company
contention if it wished to avoid the not unreasonable inference that it was the owner
knew, or had a good reason to suppose, children who would likely to come, and
of the material used in these operations and that it was responsible for tortious of
there found explosive signal torpedoes left exposed by the railroad company's
negligent acts of the agents employed therein, on the ground that this work had been
employees, one of which when carried away by the visitor, exploded and injured him;
intrusted to independent contractors as to whose acts the maxim respondent
or where such infant found upon the premises a dangerous machine, such as a
superior should not be applied. If the company did not in fact own or make use of
turntable left in such condition as to make it probable that children in playing with it
caps such as those found on its premises, as intimated by counsel, it was a very
would be exposed to accident or injury therefrom and where the infant did in fact
simple matter for it to prove that fact, and in the absence of such proof we think that
suffer injury in playing with such machine.
the other evidence in the record sufficiently establishes the contrary, and justifies the
court in drawing the reasonable inference that the caps found on its premises were In these, and in a great variety of similar cases, the great weight of authority holds
its property, and were left where they were found by the company or some of its the owner of the premises liable.
employees.
As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout ( 17 Wall. (84 U.S.), 657), (wherein the
Plaintiff appears to have rested his case, as did the trial judge his decision in principal question was whether a railroad company was liable for an injury received
plaintiff's favor, upon the provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read together by an infant while upon its premises, from idle curiosity, or for purposed of
with articles 1902, 1903, and 1908 of that Code. amusement, if such injury was, under the circumstances, attributable to the
negligence of the company), the principles on which these cases turn are that "while
"ART. 1089. Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi----contracts, and
railroad company is not bound to the same degree of care in regard to mere
by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence
strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers conveyed
occurs."
by it, it is not exempt from responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising from its
"ART. 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when negligence or from its tortious acts;" and that "the conduct of an infant of tender
there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. years is not to be judged by the same rule which governs that of an adult. While it is
the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an
"ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not
injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been
only for personal acts and omission, but also for those of the persons for whom they
free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care
should be responsible.
and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this
"The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages is to be determined in such case by the circumstances of the case."
caused by the minors who alive with them.
The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout was vigorously controverted
xxx xxx xxx
and sharply criticized in severally state courts, and the supreme court of Michigan in
"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprises are equally liable for the the case of Ryan vs. Towar (128 Mich., 463) formally repudiated and disapproved
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter the doctrine of the Turntable cased, especially that laid down in Railroad Company
may be employed or on account of their duties. vs. Stout, in a very able decision wherein it held, in the language of the syllabus: (1)
xxx xxx xxx That the owner of land is not liable to trespassers thereon for injuries sustained by
them, not due to his wanton or willful acts; (2) that no exception to this rule exists in
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned favor of children who are injured by dangerous machinery naturally calculated to
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid attract them to the premises; (3) that an invitation of license to cross the premises of
the damage." another can not be predicated on the mere fact that no steps have been taken to
"ART. 1908. The owners shall be also be liable for the damages caused ---- interfere with such practice; (4) that there is no difference between children and
adults of an invitation or a license to enter upon another's premises.
"1. By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due
diligence, and for kindling of explosive substance which may not have been placed in Similar criticisms of the opinion in the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout were
a safe and proper place." indulged in by the courts in Connecticut and Massachusetts. (Nolan vs. Railroad Co.,
53 Conn., 461; 154 Mass., 349). And the doctrine has been questioned in Wisconsin,
Counsel for defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his contention that Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and perhaps in other States.
the facts proven at the trial do not establish the liability of the defendant company
under the provisions of these articles, and since we agree with this view of the case, On the other hand, many if not most of the courts of last resort in the United States,
it is not necessary for us to consider the various questions as to the form and the citing and approving the doctrine laid down in England in the leading case of Lynch
right of action (analogous to those raised in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf & vs. Nurding (1 Q.B., 29, 35, 36), lay down the rule in these cases in accord with that
Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359), which would perhaps, be involved in a decision announced in Railroad Company vs. Stout (supra), and the Supreme Court of the
affirming the judgment of the court below. United States, in a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Harlan in the case of
Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. McDonald (152 U.S, 262) on the 5th of March, 1894,
We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the generally reexamined and reconsidered the doctrine laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout, and
accepted doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff in an action such as that under after an exhaustive and critical analysis and review of may of the adjudged cases,
consideration, in order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by both English and America, formally declared that it adhered "to the principles
competent evidence: announced in the case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout."
(1) Damages to the plaintiff. In the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. McDonald (supra) the facts were as
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for follows: The plaintiff, a boy 12 years of age, our of curiosity and for his own pleasure,
whose acts it must respond, was guilty. entered upon and visited the defendant's premises, without defendant's express
permission or invitation, and, while there, was by an accident injured by failing into a
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage. burning slack pile of whose existence he had knowledge, but which had been left by
The propositions are, or course, elementary, and do not admit of discussion, the real defendant on its premises without any fence around it or anything to give warning of
difficulty arising in the application of these principles to the particular facts developed its dangerous condition, although defendant knew or had reason to believe that it
in the case under consideration. was in a place where it would attract the interest or curiosity of passers-by. On these
facts the court held that the plaintiff could not be regarded as a mere trespasser, for
It is clear that the accident could not have happened had not the fulminating caps whose safety and protection while on the premises in question, against the unseen
been left exposed at the point where they were found, or if their owner had exercised danger referred to, the defendant was under no obligation to make provision.
due care in keeping them in a appropriate place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff
would not have been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and convenience,
We quote at length from the discussion by the court of the application of the omission, for which he may and should be held responsible, if the child is actually
principles involved to the facts in that case, because what is said there is strikingly injured, without other fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a
applicable in the case at bar, and would seem to dispose of defendant's contention stranger without his express invitation or permission. To hold otherwise would be
that, the plaintiff in this case being a trespasser, the defendant's company owed him expose to all the children in the community to unknown perils and unnecessary
no duty, and in no case could be held liable for injuries which would not have danger at the whim of the owners or occupants of land upon which they might
resulted but for the entry of plaintiff on defendant's premises. naturally and reasonably be expected to enter.
"We adhere to the principle announced in Railroad Co., vs. Stout (supra). Applied to This conclusion is founded on reason, justice, and necessary, and neither the
the case now before us, they require us to hold that the defendant was guilty of contention that a man has a right to do what he will with his own property of that
negligence in leaving unguarded the slack pile, made by it in the vicinity of its depot children should be kept under the care of the parents or guardian, so as to prevent
building. It could have forbidden all the persons from coming to its coal mine for their entering on the premises of others is of sufficient weight to put it in doubt. In this
purposes merely of curiosity and pleasure. But it did not do so. On the contrary, it jurisdiction as well as in the United States all private property is acquired and held
permitted all, without regard to age, to visit its mine, and witness its operation. It under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of
knew that the usual approach to the mine was by a narrow path skirting its slack pit, others or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the community (see U.S. vs.
close to its depot building, at which the people of the village, old and young, would Toribio, 1 No. 5060, decided January 26, 1910), and except as to infants of very
often assemble. It knew that children were in the habit of frequenting that locality and tender years it would be absurd and unreasonable in community organized as is that
playing around the shaft house in the immediate vicinity of the slack pit. The slightest in which we live to hold that parents or guardians are guilty of negligence or
regard for the safety of these children would have suggested that they were in imprudence in every case wherein they permit growing boys and girls to leave the
danger from being so near a pit, beneath the surface of which was concealed (except parental roof unattended, even if in the event of accident to the child the negligence
when snow, wind, or rain prevailed) a mass of burning coals into which a child might of the parents could in any event be imputed to the child so as to deprive it of a right
accidentally fall and be burned to death. Under all the circumstances, the railroad to recover in such cases ---- a point which we neither discuss not decide.
company ought not to be heard to say that the plaintiff, a mere lad, moved by
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without
curiosity to see the mine, in the vicinity of the slack pit, was a trespasser, to whom it
defendant's express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from
owed no duty, or for whose protection it was under no obligation to make provisions.
responsibility for injuries incurred there by the plaintiff, without other fault on his part,
"In Townsend vs. Wathen (9 East., 277, 281) it was held that if a man place if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion
dangerous traps, baited with flesh, in his own ground, so near to a highway, or to the that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in
premises of another, that dogs passing along the highway, or kept in his neighbors leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury
premises, would probably be attracted by their instinct into the traps, and in received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to
consequence of such act his neighbor's dog be so attracted and thereby injured, an the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that
action on the case would lie. 'What difference,' said Lord Ellenborough, C.J., 'is there plaintiff's action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting a match to its contents
a reason between drawing the animal into the trap by means of his instinct which he was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon
can not resist, and putting him there by manual force?' What difference, in reason we the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore, is not civilly responsible for the injuries
may observe in this case, is there between an express license to the children of this thus incurred.
village to visit the defendant's coal mine, in the vicinity of its slack pile, and an
Plaintiff contends, upon the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that
implied license, resulting from the habit of the defendant to permit them, without
because of plaintiff's youth the intervention of his action between the negligent act of
objection or warning, to do so at will, for purposes of curiosity or pleasure? Referring
the defendant leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the explosion which
to the case of Townsend vs. Wathen, Judge Thompson, in his work on the Law of
resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the
negligence, volume 1, page 305, note, well ways: "It would be a barbarous rule of
accident; and it is because we can not agree with this proposition, although we
law that would make the owner of land liable for setting a trap thereon, baited with
accept the doctrine on the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that we have thought of
stinking meat, so that his neighbor's dog attracted by his natural instincts, might run
proper to discuss and to consider that doctrine at length in this decision. As was said
into it and be killed, and which would exempt him from liability for the consequences
in case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra), "While it is the general rule in regard to an
of leaving exposed and unguarded on his land a dangerous machine, so that his
adult that entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or
neighbor's child attracted to it and tempted to intermeddle with it by instincts equally
negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule
strong, might thereby be killed of maimed for life."
in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is
Chief Justice Cooley, voicing the opinion of the supreme court of Michigan, in the according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case
case of Powers vs. Marlow (53 Mich., 507), said that (p. 515): by the circumstance of the case." As we think we have shown, under the reasoning
on which rests the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, no fault which would
"Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childlike instincts and
relieve defendant of responsibility for injuries resulting from negligence can be
impulses; and others who are chargeable with a duty of care and caution toward
attributed to the plaintiff, a well-grown boy of 15 years of age, because of his entry
them must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly. If they leave
upon defendant's uninclosed premises without express permission or invitation; but it
exposed to the observation of children anything which would be tempting to them,
is a wholly different question whether such a youth can be said to have been free
and which they in their immature judgment might naturally suppose they were at
from fault when he willfully and deliberately cut upon the detonating cap, and placed
liberty to handle or play with, they should expect that liberty to be taken."
a match to the contents, knowing, as he undoubtedly did, that his action would result
And the same eminent jurist in his treaties on torts, alluding to the doctrines of in an explosion. On this point, which must be determined by "the particular
implied invitations to visit the premises of another, says: circumstances of this case," the doctrine laid down in the Turntable and Torpedo
cases lends us no direct aid, although it is worthy of observation that in all of the
"In the case of young children, and other persons not fully sui juris, an implied license "Torpedo" and analogous cases to which our attention has been directed, the record
might sometimes arise when it would not on behalf of others. Thus leaving a discloses that the plaintiffs, is whose favor judgments have been affirmed, were of
tempting thing for children to play with exposed, where they would be likely to gather such tender years that they were held not to have the capacity to understand the
for that purpose, may be equivalent to an invitation to them to make use of it; and, nature or character of the explosive instruments which fell into their hands.
perhaps if one were to throw away upon his premises, near the common way, things
tempting to children, the same implication should arise." (Chap. 10, p. 303.) In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was well----grown youth of 15,
more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had
The reasoning which led the Supreme Court of the United States to its conclusions in been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman
the cases of Railroad Co., vs. Stout (supra) and Union Pacific Railroad Co. vs. thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he
McDonald (supra) is not less cogent and convincing in this jurisdiction than in that was exceptionally well qualified to take care. The evidence of record leaves no room
than in that wherein those cases originated. Children here are actuated by similar for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stands, he well knew the explosive
childish instincts and impulses. Drawn by curiosity and impelled by the restless spirit character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments
of youth, boys here as well as there will usually be found wherever the public made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by the little girl
permitted to congregate. The movement of machinery, and indeed anything which who was present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by
arouses the attention of the young and inquiring mind, will draw them to the the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer,
neighborhood as inevitably as does the magnet draw the iron which comes within the and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the applications of a match
range of its magnetic influence. The owners of premises, therefore, whereon things to the contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can
attractive to children are exposed, or upon which the public are expressively or there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion
impliedly permitted to enter to or upon which the owner knows or ought to know might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was
children are likely to roam about for pastime and in play, "must calculate upon this, with him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap, became
and take precautions accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises can not frightened and ran away.
be heard to say that because the child has entered upon his premises without his
express permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner owes no duty or obligation True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the
whatever. The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent the child explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and
form entering premises at a place where he knows or ought to know that children are of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well
accustomed to roam about or to which their childish instincts and impulses are likely knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and
to attract them is at least equivalent to an implied license to enter, and where the yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going
child does not enter under such conditions the owner's failure to make reasonable far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such "care and
precaution to guard the child against the injury from unknown or unseen dangers, caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or that the defendant or anyone
placed upon such premises by the owner, is clearly a breach of duty, a negligent
else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such establish their existence. The decisions of April 9, 1896, and March 18, July 6, and
circumstances. September 27, 1898, have especially supported the principle, the first setting forth in
detail the necessary points of the proof, which are two: An act or omission on the part
The law fixed no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary
of the person who is to be charged with the liability, and the production of the
capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts,
damage by said act or omission.
so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise with due care an precaution
in the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps "This includes, by inference, the establishment of a relation of cause or effect
impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the question of negligence between the act or the omission and the damage; the latter must be direct result of
necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the character of his one of the first two. As the decision of March 22, 1881, said, it is necessary that
own acts and their consequences; and the age at which a minor can be said to have damages result immediately and directly from an act performed culpably and
such ability will necessarily vary in accordance with the varying nature of the infinite wrongfully' 'necessarily presupposing a legal ground for imputability.'"
variety of acts which may be done by him. But some idea of the presumed capacity
"Negligence is not presumed, but be proven by him who alleges it."
of infants under the laws in force in these Islands may be gathered from an
examination of the varying ages fixed by our laws at which minors are conclusively Finally, we think the doctrine is in this jurisdiction applicable to the case at bar was
presumed to be capable to exercising certain rights and incurring certain definitely settled in this court in the maturely considered case of Rakes vs. Atlantic,
responsibilities, through it can not be said that these provisions of law are of much Gulf and Pacific Co. (supra), wherein we held that while "There are many cases
practical assistance in cases such as that at bar, except so far as they illustrate the (personal injury cases) in the supreme court of Spain in which the defendant was
rule that the capacity of a minor to become responsible for his own acts varies with exonerated." on the ground that "the negligence of the plaintiff was immediate cause
the varying circumstances of each case. Under the provisions of the Penal code a of the casualty" (decisions of the 15th of January, the 19th of February, and the 7th
minor over fifteen years of age is presumed to be capable of committing a crime and of March, 1902, stated in Alcubilla's Index of that year); none of the cases decided by
is to be held criminally responsible therefore, although the fact that he is less than the supreme court of Spain "define the effect to be given the negligence of a plaintiff
eighteen years of age will be taken into consideration as an extenuating which contributed to his injury as one of its causes, though not the principal one, and
circumstance (Penal code, arts, 8 and 9). At 10 years of age a child may, under we left to seek the theory of the civil law in the law in the practice of another
certain circumstances, choose which parent it prefers to live with (Code of Civil countries;" and in such cases we declared the law in this jurisdiction to require the
Procedure, sec. 771). At 14 it may petition for the appointment of a guardian (Id., application of 'the principle of proportional damages," but expressly and definitely
sec. 551), and may consent or refuse to be adopted (Id., sec. 765). And males of 14 denied the right of recovery when the acts of the injured party were the immediate
and females of 12 are capable of contracting of legal marriage (Civil Code, art. 83; causes of the accident.
G.O., No., 68, sec. 1).
The doctrine as laid down in that case as follows:
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and
"Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall
understanding to be sensible to the danger to which he exposed himself when he put
be considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must
the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his age
be made between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which
and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the
there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it,
exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which
independence of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt. For instance, the cause of
resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held
the accident under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to
to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so
replace it. This produced the event giving occasion for damages ---- that is, sinking of
that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the
the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the act of the plaintiff in
negligent act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises,
walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was an element of the
nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident
damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or
which inflicted the injury.
partly through this act or omission of duty, that would have been one of the
The rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non determining causes of the event or accident, for which he would have been
intelligitur damnum sentire. (Digest, book 50, tit. 17, rule 203.) responsible. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its
determining factors, he can not recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence,
The partidas contain the following provisions:
he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant
"The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable
his own fault, and that he can not demand reparation therefore from another." equivalent for his own imprudence."
"And they even said that when a man received an injury through his own negligence We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated, the immediate cause of
he should blame himself for it." (Rule 22, tit. 34 Partida 7.) the explosion , the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was his own act of
putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that having "contributed to the
"According to ancient sages, when a man received an injury through his own acts the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover."
grievance should be against himself and not against another."
We have not deemed it necessary to examine the effect of plaintiff's action in picking
And while there does not appear to be anything in the Civil Code which expressly up upon defendant's premises the detonating caps, the property of the defendant,
lays down the law touching contributory negligence in this jurisdiction, nevertheless, and carrying them sway to the home of his friend, as interrupting the relation of
the interpretation placed upon its provisions by the supreme court of Spain, and by cause and effect between the negligent act or omission of the defendant in leaving
this court in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., (7 Phil. Rep., 359), the caps exposed on its premises and the injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff by the
clearly deny to the plaintiff in the case at bar the right to recover damages from the explosion of one of these caps. Under the doctrine of the Torpedo cases, such action
defendant, in whole or in part, for the injuries sustained by him. on the part of an infant of very tender years would have no effect in relieving
The judgment of the supreme court of Spain of the 7th of March, 1902 (93 defendant of responsibility, but whether in view of the well known facts admitted in
Jurispredencia Civil, 391), is directly in point. In that case the court said: defendant's brief that "boys are snappers-up of unconsidered trifles," a youth of the
age and maturity of plaintiff should be deemed without fault in picking up the caps in
"According to the doctrine expressed in article 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or question under all the circumstances of this case, we neither discuss not decide.
negligence is a source of obligation when between such negligence and the injury
there exists, the relation of cause and effect: but if the injury produced should not be Twenty days after the date of this decision let judgment be entered reversing the
the result of acts or omissions of a third party, the latter has no obligation to repair judgment of the court below, without costs to either party in this instance, and ten
the same, although such acts or omissions were imprudent or unlawful, and much days thereafter let the record be returned to the court wherein it originated, where
less when it is shown that the immediate cause of the injury was the negligence of judgment will be entered in favor of the defendant for the costs in first instance and
the injured party himself." the complaint dismissed without day. So ordered.

The same court, in its decision of June 12, 1900, said that "the existence of the
alleged fault or negligence is not sufficient without proof that it, and no other cause,
gave rise to the damage."
III. DISTINCTIONS
1. QUASI DELICT vs. DELICT
See also judgment of October 21, 1903. Article 2177
Article 365 RPC
To similar effect Scaevola, the learned Spanish writer, writing under that title in his
Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil (1902 Anuario, p. 455), commenting on the decision
of March 7, 1902, says that "in accordance with the doctrine expressed by article CASE: PADILLA vs. CA 129 SCRA 558
1902 of the Civil Code, fault or negligence gives rise to an obligation when between it GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
and the damage there exists the relation of cause and effect' but if the damage
caused does not arise from acts or omissions of a third person, there is no obligation This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals' decision which
to make good upon the latter, even though such acts or omissions be imprudent or reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction and acquitted the petitioners of the
illegal, and much less so when it is shown that the immediate cause of the damage crime of grave coercion on the ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal
has been the recklessness the injured party himself." ordered them to pay jointly and severally the amount of P9,000.00 to the
complainants as actual damages.
And again ----
The petitioners were charged under the following information:
"In accordance with the fundamental principle of proof, that the burden thereof is
upon the plaintiff, it is apparent that it is the duty of him who shall claim damages to
"The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, PEPITO PETITIONERS COMMITTED AN UNLAWFUL ACT, THAT IS, 'TAKING THE LAW
BEDEÑA, YOLLY RICO, DAVID BERMUNDO, VILLANOAC, ROBERTO ROSALES, INTO THEIR HANDS, DESTRUCTING (sic) 'COMPLAINANTS' PROPERTIES',
VILLANIA, ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE ORTEGA, JR., RICARDO CELESTINO, AFTER HOLDING IN ITS MAIN DECISION OF NOVEMBER 6, 1974 THAT THE
REALINGO alias "KAMLON", JOHN DOE alias TATO, and FOURTEEN (14) ACTS FOR WHICH THEY WERE CHARGED DID NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE
RICARDO DOES of the crime of GRAVE COERCION, committed as follows: COERCION AND THEY WERE NOT CHARGED OF ANY OTHER CRIME.
IV
"That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, in the
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS HEREIN,
municipality of Jose Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and
APPELLANTS IN CA-G.R. NO. 13456-CR, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, TO PAY
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Roy
COMPLAINANTS P9,600.00 IN SUPPOSED ACTUAL DAMAGES.
Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedeña, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo, Villanoac,
Roberto Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo Celestino, The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the respondent court
Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the
confederating and mutually helping one another, and acting without any authority of complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.
law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats, force
Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is included in the
and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall located at the
criminal action is that arising from and as a consequence of the criminal act, and the
Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by
defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the
subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally
criminal case), no civil liability arising from the criminal charge could be imposed
demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other
upon him. They cite precedents to the effect that the liability of the defendant for the
massive instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise, to the
return of the amount received by him may not be enforced in the criminal case but
damage and prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and his family in the amount of
must be raised in a separate civil action for the recovery of the said amount (People
P30,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and moral damages and further the
v. Pantig, 97 Phil. 748; following the doctrine laid down in Manila Railroad Co. v.
sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar, 49 O.G. 3874; Pueblo contra Abellera, 69 Phil. 623;
"That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their public positions: People v. Mañago, 69 Phil. 496; People v. Miranda, 5 SCRA 1067; Aldaba v.
Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being Elepaño, 116 Phil. 457).
policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban,
In the case before us, the petitioners were acquitted not because they did not commit
Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident premeditation."
the acts stated in the charge against them. There is no dispute over the forcible
The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth Judicial District rendered a opening of the market stall, its demolition with axes and other instruments, and the
decision, the dispositive portion of which states that: carting away of the merchandize. The petitioners were acquitted because these acts
were denominated coercion when they properly constituted some other offense such
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Roy Padilla, Filomeno
as threat or malicious mischief.
Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedeña guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of grave coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:
imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to
"For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision, the violence must be
pay actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P10,000.00; moral
employed against the person, not against property as what happened in the case at
damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary
bar. . . .
damages, jointly and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for by law;
xxx xxx xxx
and to pay the proportionate costs of this proceedings.
"The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of an offense other than
"The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David Bermudo, Christopher
coercion?
Villaoac, Godofredo Villania, Romeo Garrido, Roberto Rosales, Ricardo Celestino
and Jose Ortega, are hereby ordered acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for From all appearances, they should have been prosecuted either for threats or
their criminal participation in the crime charged." malicious mischief. But the law does not allow us to render judgment of conviction for
The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. They either of these offenses for the reason that they were not indicted for these offenses.
contended that the trial court's finding of grave coercion was not supported by the The information under which they were prosecuted does not allege the elements of
evidence. According to the petitioners, the town mayor had the power to order the either threats or malicious mischief. Although the information mentions that the act
clearance of market premises and the removal of the complainants' stall because the was 'by means of threats', it does not allege the particular threat made. An accused
municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which the market stall person is entitled to be informed of the nature of the acts imputed to him before he
was a nuisance per se. The petitioners stated that the lower court erred in finding can be made to enter into trial upon a valid information.
that the demolition of the complainants' stall was a violation of the very directive of "We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved in accordance with
the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate law.
the market premises. The petitioners questioned the imposition of prison terms of five
months and one day and of accessory penalties provided by law. They also "While appellants are entitled to acquittal, they nevertheless are civilly liable for the
challenged the order to pay fines of P500.00 each, P10,000.00 actual and actual damages suffered by the complainants by reason of the demolition of the stall
compensatory damages, P30,000.00 moral damages, P10,000.00 exemplary and loss of some of their properties, The extinction of the penal action does not carry
damages, and the costs of the suit. with it that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3
The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals states: (c), Rev. Rules of Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51 OG.R. 1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG.
"WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment appealed from in the sense that the 1811). In the instant case, the fact from which the civil might arise, namely, the
appellants are acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt, but they are ordered to pay demolition of the stall and loss of the properties contained therein; exists, and this is
jointly and severally to complainants the amount of P9,600.00, as actual damages." not denied by the accused. And since there is no showing that the complainants
have reserved or waived their right to institute a separate civil action, the civil aspect
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the therein is deemed instituted with the criminal action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev. Rules of
defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil Court).
liability. The Court of Appeals denied the motion holding that: xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that
". . . 'appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt - whether the crime of when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising
coercion was committed, not on facts that no unlawful act was committed; as their from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it. There is no implied institution
taking the law into their hands, destructing (sic) complainants' properties is unlawful, when the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to
and, as evidence on record established that complainants suffered actual damages, institute it separately. (Morte Sr. v. Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).
the imposition of actual damages is correct."
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers
Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action, contending that: exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
I Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words,
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW OR the civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONERS liability arising from the act as a crime.
PAYMENT OF DAMAGES TO COMPLAINANTS AFTER ACQUITTING
PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME CHARGED FROM WHICH SAID LIABILITY As early as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Bocobo in
AROSE. Barredo v. Garcia et al. 73 Phil. 607 laid down the rule that the same punishable act
II or omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities against the accused and, where
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED provided by law, his employer. There is the civil liability arising from the act as a
DECEMBER 26, 1974 THAT SINCE APPELLANTS' ACQUITTAL WAS BASED ON crime and the liability arising from the same act as a quasi-delict. Either one of these
REASONABLE DOUBT, NOT ON FACTS THAT NO UNLAWFUL ACT WAS two types of civil liability may be enforced against the accused. However, the
COMMITTED, THE IMPOSITION OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IS CORRECT. offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability. For instance, in
III cases of criminal negligence or crimes due to reckless imprudence, Article 2177 of
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL INCONSISTENCY, IF NOT the Civil Code provides:
PLAIN JUDICIAL ERROR, IN HOLDING IN ITS APPEALED RESOLUTION THAT
"Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate "On the morning of February 8th, because the said Vergaras had not up to that time
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But complied with the order to vacate, the co-accused Chief of Police Galdones and
the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the some members of his police force, went to the market and, using ax, crowbars and
defendant" hammers, demolished the stall of the Vergaras who were not present or around, and
after having first inventoried the goods and merchandise found therein, they had
Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:
them brought to the municipal building for safekeeping. Inspite of notice served upon
"Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. - In all cases not included in the the Vergaras to take possession of the goods and merchandise thus taken away, the
preceding section the following rules shall be observed: latter refused to do so.
xxx xxx xxx
"The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them were:
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless
Cost of stall construction P1,300.00
the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
Value of furniture and equipment destroyed 300.00
the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action
Value of goods and equipment taken 8,000.00
may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the
========
person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for
P9,600.00
the damage suffered.
"It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of the complainants
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only
Vergaras and carted away its contents. The defense that they did so in order to
when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not
abate what they considered a nuisance per se is untenable. This finds no support in
exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is
law and in fact. The couple has been paying rentals for the premises to the
based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of
government which allowed them to lease the stall. It is, therefore, far-fetched to say
evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the
that the stall was a nuisance per se which could be summarily abated.
liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96
Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they caused the destruction of
and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil the complainant's market stall and had its contents carted away. They state:
liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does not
"On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas on Vergaras by the Mayor to vacate
arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted
the passageways of Market Building No. 3, the Vergaras were still in the premises,
(Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial
so the petitioners Chief of Police and members of the Police Force of Jose
Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623).
Panganiban, pursuant to the Mayor's directives, demolished the store of the
Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that: Vergaras, made an inventory of the goods found in said store, and brought these
goods to the municipal building under the custody of the Municipal Treasurer, . . ."
"When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier
same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance cited, that "when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground
of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious. damages for the same act or omission may be instituted." According to some
scholars, this provision of substantive law calls for a separate civil action and cannot
"If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the
be modified by a rule of remedial law even in the interests of economy and simplicity
court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be
and following the dictates of logic and common sense.
inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground." As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco:
More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case would ". . . if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil action but inadequate
not constitute an obstacle to the filing of a civil case based on the same acts which to justify a conviction in the criminal action, may it render judgment acquitting the
led to the criminal prosecution: accused on reasonable doubt, but hold him civilly liable nonetheless? An affirmative
answer to this question would be consistent with the doctrine that the two are distinct
". . . The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum for and in the
and separate actions, and will (a) dispense with the reinstituting of the same civil
interest of the Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School and for his personal benefit is
action, or one based on quasi-delict or other independent civil action, and of
not a declaration that the fact upon which Civil Case No. V-3339 is based does not
presenting the same evidence; (b) save the injured party unnecessary expenses in
exist. The civil action barred by such a declaration is the civil liability arising from the
the prosecution of the civil action or enable him to take advantage of the free
offense charged, which is the one impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
services of the fiscal; and (c) otherwise resolve the unsettling implications of
(Section I, Rule III, Rules of Court.) Such a declaration would not bar a civil action
permitting the reinstitution of a separate civil action whether based on delict, or
filed against an accused who had been acquitted in the criminal case if the criminal
quasi-delict, or other independent civil actions.
action is predicated on factual or legal considerations other than the commission of
the offense charged. A person may be acquitted of malversation where, as in the ". . . But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner here suggested, Art. 29
case at bar, he could show that he did not misappropriate the public funds in his of the Civil Code should be amended because it clearly and expressly provides that
possession, but he could be rendered liable to restore said funds or at least to make the civil action based on the same act or omission may only be instituted in a
a proper accounting thereof if he shall spend the same for purposes which are not separate action, and therefore, may not inferentially be resolved in the same criminal
authorized nor intended, and in a manner not permitted by applicable rules and action. To dismiss the civil action upon acquittal of the accused and disallow the
regulations." (Republic v. Bello, 120 SCRA 203). reinstitution of any other civil action, would likewise render, unjustifiably, the acquittal
on reasonable doubt without any significance, and would violate the doctrine that the
There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed
two actions are distinct and separate.
considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been
established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due "In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems evident that there is much sophistry
process has been accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal and no pragmatism in the doctrine that it is inconsistent to award in the same
charged. The constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts proceedings damages against the accused after acquitting him on reasonable doubt.
on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all Such doctrine must recognize the distinct and separate character of the two actions,
witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration by the nature of an acquittal on reasonable doubt, the vexatious and oppressive effects
the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require of a reservation or institution of a separate civil action, and that the injured party is
a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean entitled to damages not because the act or omission is punishable but because he
needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all was damaged or injured thereby.
its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to
The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the evidence adduced grant damages despite a judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt. What
by both the prosecution and the defense: Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the
xxx xxx xxx defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil
"(9) In the morning of February 8, 1964, then Chief Galdones, complying with the
action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or
instructions contained in said Memorandum No. 32 of the Mayor, and upon seeing
omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of
that Antonio Vergara had not vacated the premises in question, with the aid of his
only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no
policemen, forced upon the store or stall and ordered the removal of the goods inside
statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of
the store of Vergara, at the same time taking inventory of the goods taken out, piled
recovering damages.
them outside in front of the store and had it cordoned with a rope, and after all the
goods were taken out from the store, ordered the demolition of said stall of Antonio There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of
Vergara. Since then up to the trial of this case, the whereabouts of the goods taken acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two
out from the store nor the materials of the demolished stall have not been made can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal
known." liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing
that the act from which civil liability might arise did not exist.
The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that:
A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial requirement, a blocked the Kombi while the jeep pulled up right behind it. The two men on board the
provision which imposes an uncalled for burden before one who has already been jeep turned out to be police officers, Patrolmen Leonardo Pugao and Peter Ignacio.
the victim of a condemnable, yet non-criminal, act may be accorded the justice which They drew their guns and told the driver, Rogelio Ligon, and his companion,
he seeks. Fernando Gabat, to alight from the Kombi. It was found out that there was a third
person inside the Kombi, a certain Rodolfo Primicias who was sleeping at the rear
We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the intent
seat. 4 The three were all brought by the police officers to the Western Police District
of the legislator that they could not possibly have intended to make it more difficult for
and turned over to Pfc. Fermin Payuan. The taxicab driver, Prudencio Castillo, also
the aggrieved party to recover just compensation by making a separate civil action
went along with them. The written statements of Castillo and Rodolfo Primicias were
mandatory and exclusive:
taken by the traffic investigator, Pfc. Fermin Payuan. 5 Payuan also prepared a
"The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him Traffic Accident Report, dated October 23, 1983. 6 Fernando Gabat and Rodolfo
from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has Primicias were released early morning the following day, but Rogelio Ligon was
given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was detained and turned over to the City Fiscal's Office for further investigation.
due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The
Investigating Fiscal Alfredo Cantos, filed an information in court against Rogelio
reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the
Ligon dated December 6, 1983 charging him with Homicide thru Reckless
criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
Imprudence. 7 Six months later, however, or on June 28, 1984, Assistant Fiscal
"This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and Cantos filed another information against Rogelio Ligon and Fernando Gabat for
deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation Robbery with Homicide. 8 He filed the latter information on the basis of a
between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of Supplemental Affidavit of Prudencio Castillo 9 and a joint affidavit of Armando Espino
the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other, One and Romeo Castil, cigarette vendors, who allegedly witnessed the incident on
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or October 23, 1983. 10 These affidavits were already prepared and merely sworn to
correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the before Fiscal Cantos on January 17, 1984.
aggrieved party. . . . It is just and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of
On October 31, 1983, an autopsy was conducted by the medico-legal officer of the
or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
National Bureau of Investigation, Dr. Orlando V. Salvador, who stated in his autopsy
But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense
report that the cause of death of Rosales was "pneumonia hypostatic, bilateral,
also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every
secondary to traumatic injuries of the head." 11
private right to be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the
aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the The prosecution tried to establish, through the sole testimony of the taxicab driver,
criminal law? (Code Commission, pp. 45-46). Prudencio Castillo, that Gabat grabbed the box of cigarettes from Rosales and pried
loose the latter's hand from the window of the Kombi, resulting in the latter falling
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be
down and hitting the pavement. In its decision, the trial court summarized the
established or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been
testimony of Castillo as follows: At about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of October 23,
fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more
1983, Castillo was then driving his taxicab along Lerma Street near Far Eastern
expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was
University, and at the intersection of Lerma and Quezon Boulevard, the traffic light
decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The offended party may,
changed from green to red. The vehicular traffic stopped and Prudencio Castillo's
of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not exist in this case.
taxi was right behind a Volkswagon Kombi. While waiting for the traffic light to
Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and
change to green, Castillo idly watched the Volkswagon Kombi and saw Gabat, the
review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this
passenger sitting beside the driver, signal to a cigarette vendor. The cigarette
time a separate civil action to be filed.
vendor, Rosales, approached the right side of the Kombi. While Rosales was
With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err handing the cigarettes to Gabat, the traffic light suddenly changed to green. When
in awarding damages despite a judgment of acquittal. the Kombi moved forward, Gabat suddenly grabbed the cigarette box held by
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals Rosales. Taken aback, Jose Rosales ran beside the Kombi and was able to hold on
and dismiss the petition for lack of merit.SO ORDERED. to the windowsill of the right front door with his right hand. While Rosales was
clinging to the windowsill, with both feet off the ground, the Kombi continued to speed
CASE: PEOPLE VS. LIGON 152 scra 419 towards the C.M. Recto underpass. Castillo, who was closely following the Kombi,
then saw Gabat forcibly remove the hand of Rosales from the windowsill and the
YAP, J.: latter fell face down on Quezon Boulevard near the Recto underpass. 12

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch The version of the defense, on the other hand, was summarized by the court as
XX, rendered on February 17, 1986, convicting the accused-appellant, Fernando follows: On the date and time in question, Fernando Gabat, 31 years old, an
Gabat, of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to reclusion underwriter, was or board the Volkswagon Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon. The
perpetua. The victim was Jose Rosales y Ortiz, a seventeen-year old working Kombi had to stop at the intersection of Lerma Street and Quezon Boulevard when
student who was earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. He was allegedly robbed of the traffic light turned red. Fernando Gabat, who wanted to buy cigarettes, called a
his cigarette box containing cigarettes worth P300.00 more or less. 1 cigarette vendor who approached the right side of the Kombi. Gabat bought two
sticks of cigarettes and handed to the cigarette vendor, Rosales, a P5.00 bill. In order
Only Fernando Gabat was arrested and brought to trial and convicted. The other to change the P5.00 bill, Rosales placed his cigarette box containing assorted
accused, Rogelio Ligon, was never apprehended and is still at large. cigarettes on the windowsill of the front door of the Kombi between the arm of Gabat
and the window frame. Suddenly, the traffic light changed from red to green and
The fatal incident happened on a Sunday, October 23, 1983 at about 6:10 p.m. The
Rogelio Ligon moved the vehicle forward, heedless of the transaction between Gabat
accused, Fernando Gabat, was riding in a 1978 Volkswagon Kombi owned by his
and the cigarette vendor. As the vehicle sped onward, the cigarette box which was
father, Antonio Gabat, and driven by the other accused, Rogelio Ligon. The Kombi
squeezed between the right arm of Gabat and the window frame fell inside the
was coming from España Street going towards the direction of Quiapo. Fernando
Kombi. Rosales then ran beside the vehicle and clung to the windowsill of the moving
Gabat was seated beside the driver, in the front seat by the window on the right side
vehicle. Gabat testified that when he saw the cigarette vendor clinging on the side of
of the Kombi. At the intersection of Quezon Boulevard and Lerma Street before
the front door, he told Ligon to veer to the right in order that Rosales could get off at
turning left towards the underpass at C.M. Recto Avenue, the Kombi had to stop as
the sidewalk. However, Gabat declared, that Ligon said that it could not be done
the traffic light was red. While waiting for the traffic light to change, Fernando Gabat
because of the moving vehicular traffic. Then, while the vehicle slowed down and
beckoned a cigarette vendor, Jose Rosales y Ortiz (Rosales for short) to buy some
Ligon was maneuvering to the right in an attempt to go toward the sidewalk, Rosales
cigarettes from him. Rosales approached the Kombi and handed Gabat two sticks of
lost his grip on the window frame and fell to the pavement of Quezon Boulevard.
cigarettes. While this transaction was occurring, the traffic light changed to green,
Gabat allegedly shouted at Ligon to stop but Ligon replied that they should go on to
and the Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon suddenly moved forward, As to what
Las Piñas, and report the incident to the parents of Gabat, and later they would come
precisely happened between Gabat and Rosales at the crucial moment, and
back to the scene of the incident. However, while the Kombi was speeding along
immediately thereafter, is the subject of conflicting versions by the prosecution and
Dewey Boulevard, it was blocked by the taxi of Prudencio Castillo and a jeep driven
the defense. It is not controverted, however, that as the Kombi continued to speed
by policemen. Gabat and Ligon were brought to police headquarters, but neither of
towards Quiapo, Rosales clung to the window of the Kombi but apparently lost his
them executed any written statement.
grip and fell down on the pavement. Rosales was rushed by some bystanders to the
Philippine General Hospital, where he was treated for multiple physical injuries and The trial court gave full credence to the prosecution's version, stating that there can
was confined thereat until his death on October 30, 1983. be no doubt that Gabat forcibly took or grabbed the cigarette box from Rosales
because, otherwise, there could be no reason for the latter to run after the Kombi and
Following close behind the Kombi at the time of the incident was a taxicab driven by
hang on to its window. The court also believed Castillo's testimony that Gabat
Prudencio Castillo. He was behind the Kombi, at a distance of about three meters,
forcibly removed or pried off the right hand of Rosales from the windowsill of the
travelling on the same lane in a slightly oblique position ("a little bit to the right"). 2 As
Kombi, otherwise, the latter could not have fallen down, having a ready been able to
the Kombi did not stop after the victim fell down on the pavement near the foot of the
balance himself on the stepboard.
underpass, Castillo pursued it as it sped towards Roxas Boulevard, beeping his horn
to make the driver stop. When they reached the Luneta near the Rizal monument, On the other hand, the trial court dismissed as incredible the testimony of Gabat that
Castillo saw an owner-type jeep with two persons in it. He sought their assistance in the cigarette vendor placed the cigarette box on the windowsill of the Kombi, holding
chasing the Kombi, telling them "nakaaksidente ng tao." 3 The two men in the jeep it with his left hand, while he was trying to get from his pocket the change for the 5-
joined the chase and at the intersection of Vito Cruz and Roxas Boulevard, Castillo peso bill of Gabat. The court said that it is of common knowledge that cigarette
was able to overtake the Kombi when the traffic light turned red. He immediately vendors plying their trade in the streets do not let go of their cigarette box; no vendor
lets go of his precious box of cigarettes in order to change a peso bill given by a "For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under
customer. discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible
source of injustice ---- a cause for disillusionment on the part of the innumerable
As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court are accorded great respect and are not
persons injured or wronged." 19
disturbed on appeal, unless it is shown that the findings are not supported by the
evidence, or the court failed to consider certain material facts and circumstances in In the instant case, we find that a preponderance of evidence exists sufficient to
its evaluation of the evidence. In the case at bar, a careful review of the record establish the facts from which the civil liability of Gabat arises. On the basis of the
shows that certain material facts and circumstances had been overlooked by the trial trial court's evaluation of the testimonies of both prosecution and defense witnesses
court which, if taken into account, would alter the result of the case in that they would at the trial and applying the quantum of proof required in civil cases, we find that a
introduce an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the accused to preponderance of evidence establishes that Gabat by his act and omission with fault
acquittal. and negligence caused damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the damage
done. Gabat's wilfull act of calling Rosales, the cigarette vendor, to the middle of a
While the prosecution witness, Castillo, may be a disinterested witness with no
busy street to buy two sticks of cigarettes set the chain of events which led to the
motive, according to the court a quo, "other than to see that justice be done," his
death of Rosales. Through fault and negligence, Gabat (1) failed to prevent the driver
testimony, even if not tainted with bias, is not entirely free from doubt because his
from moving forward while the purchase was completed; (2) failed to help Rosales
observation of the event could have been faulty or mistaken. The taxicab which
while the latter clung precariously to the moving vehicle, and (3) did not enforce his
Castillo was driving was lower in height compared to the Kombi in which Gabat was
order to the driver to stop. Finally, Gabat acquiesced in the driver's act of speeding
riding - a fact admitted by Castillo at the trial. 14 Judicial notice may also be taken of
away, instead of stopping and picking up the injured victim. These proven facts taken
the fact that the rear windshield of the 1978 Volkswagon Kombi is on the upper
together are firm bases for finding Gabat civilly liable under the Civil Code 20 for the
portion, occupying approximately one-third (1/3) of the rear end of the vehicle, thus
damage done to Rosales.
making it visually difficult for Castillo to observe clearly what transpired inside the
Kombi at the front end where Gabat was seated. These are circumstances which WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered acquitting the appellant Gabat for the crime of
must be taken into consideration in evaluating Castillo's testimony as to what exactly Robbery with Homicide. However, he is hereby held civilly liable for his acts and
happened between Gabat and the cigarette vendor during that crucial moment omissions, there being fault or negligence, and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of
before the latter fell down. As the taxicab was right behind the Kombi, following it at a Jose Rosales y Ortiz in the amount of P15,000.00 for the latter's death, P1,733.35 for
distance of about three meters, Castillo's line of vision was partially obstructed by the hospital and medical expenses, and P4,100.00 for funeral expenses. The alleged
back part of the Kombi. His testimony that he saw Gabat grab the cigarette box from loss of income amounting to P20,000.00, not being supported by sufficient evidence,
Rosales and forcibly pry loose the latter's hand from the windowsill of the Kombi is is DENIED. Costs de officio.SO ORDERED.
thus subject to a reasonable doubt, specially considering that this occurrence
happened in just a matter of seconds, and both vehicles during that time were
moving fast in the traffic. 2. QUASI DELICT VS BREACH OF CONTRACT
We find it significant that in his statement given to the police that very evening, 15 Article 1170-1174 civ
Castillo did not mention that he saw Gabat forcibly prying off the hand of Rosales Article 2178 civ
from the windowsill of the Kombi, although the police report prepared by the
investigating officer, Pfc. Fermin M. Payuan, on the same date, stated that when the CASE: CANGCO VS. MANILA RAILROAD 38 phil 768
traffic signal changed to green and the driver stepped on the gas, the cigarette box of
the cigarette vendor (Rosales) was grabbed by the passenger (Gabat) and "instantly FISHER, J .:
the former clung to the door and was dragged at a distance while at the same time At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this litigation the plaintiff, Jose
the latter punched the vendor's arm until the same (sic) fell to the pavement," thus Cangco, was in the employment of the Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of
showing that during the police investigation Castillo must have given a statement to clerk, with a monthly wage of P25. He lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, in the
the police which indicated that Gabat did something to cause Rosales to fall from the province of Rizal, which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad company;
Kombi. 16 It was by way of a supplementary affidavit prepared by the lawyer of the and in coming daily by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he
complainant and sworn to by Castillo before the Assistant City Fiscal on January 17, worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride upon
1984 that this vital detail was added. This supplementary affidavit was made the the company's trains free of charge. Upon the occasion in question, January 20,
basis for filing another information charging both Gabat and the driver with the crime 1915, the plaintiff was returning home by rail from his daily labors; and as the train
of Robbery with Homicide. drew up to the station in San Mateo the plaintiff arose from his seat in the second
Considering the above circumstances, the Court is not convinced with moral certainty class-car where he was riding and, making his exit through the door, took his position
that the guilt of the accused Fernando Gabat has been established beyond upon the steps of the coach, seizing the upright guardrail with his right hand for
reasonable doubt. In our view, the quantum of proof necessary to sustain Gabat's support.
conviction of so serious a crime as robbery with homicide has not been met in this On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a
case. He is therefore entitled to acquittal on reasonable doubt. cement platform which begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away
from the company's office and extends along in front of said office for a distance
However, it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from
sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. As the train slowed down another
civil liability. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be
passenger, named Emilio Zuniga, also an employee of the railroad company, got off
established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required
the same car, alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the
in a civil action for damages. 17 The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil
level of the ground. When the train had proceeded a little farther the plaintiff Jose
liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which
Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of
the civil liability might arise did not exist. 18
watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently
The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the on the platform. His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the
acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that
reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters
or omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as follows: before it came to a full stop.
"The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the railroad
from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has station was lighted dimly by a single light located some distance away, objects on the
given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was platform where the accident occurred were difficult to discern, especially to a person
due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The emerging from a lighted car.
reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the
The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform where the
criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
plaintiff alighted is found in the fact that it was the customary season for harvesting
"This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and these melons and a large lot had been brought to the station for shipment to the
deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation market. They were contained in numerous tow sacks which had been piled on the
between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of platform in a row one upon another. The testimony shows that this row of sacks was
the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One so placed that there was a space of only about two feet between the sacks of melons
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or and the edge of the platform; and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the
correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the fact that his foot alighted upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped upon
aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article the platform. His statement that he failed to see these objects in the darkness is
1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise readily to be credited.
upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it
the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the
appeared that the injuries which he had received were very serious. He was
purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be
therefore brought at once to a certain hospital in the city of Manila where an
proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the
examination was made and his arm was amputated. The result of this operation was
complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt?
unsatisfactory, and the plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where a second
Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a
operation was performed and the member was again amputated higher up near the
preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private
shoulder. It appears in evidence that the plaintiff expended the sum of P790.25 in the
because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?
form of medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in connection with the creates a presumption that he has been negligent in the selection or direction of his
process of his curation. servant, but the presumption is rebuttable and yields to proof of due care and
diligence in this respect.
Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of
the city of Manila to recover damages of the defendant company, founding his action The supreme court of Porto Rico, in interpreting identical provisions, as found in the
upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the Porto Rican Civil Code, has held that these articles are applicable to cases of extra-
sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a menace contractual culpa exclusively. (Carmona vs. Cuesta, 20 Porto Rico Reports, 215.)
to the security of passenger alighting from the company's trains. At the hearing in the
This distinction was again made patent by this Court in its decision in the case of
Court of First Instance, his Honor, the trial judge, found the facts substantially as
Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, (30 Phil. Rep., 624), which was an action brought
above stated, and drew therefrom his conclusion to the effect that, although
upon the theory of the extra-contractual liability of the defendant to respond for the
negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of
damage caused by the carelessness of his employee while acting within the scope of
melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars,
his employment The Court, after citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil
nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the
Code, said:
coach and was therefore precluded from recovering. Judgment was accordingly
entered in favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed. "From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that
It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of
there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of
negligence in piling these sacks on the platform in the manner above stated; that
the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and
their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train; and that they
(2) that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may
therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff.
be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the
It necessarily follow s that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby
court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a
occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence.
good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
In resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these conceptions of liability, to-
wit, the primary responsibility of the defendant company and the contributory "This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence
negligence of the plaintiff should be separately examined. and not on that of his servant. This is the notable peculiarity of the Spanish law of
negligence. It is, of course, in striking contrast to the American doctrine that, in
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the
relations with strangers, the negligence of the servant is conclusively the negligence
contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff
of the master."
has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure
of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That is to say, its liability is The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in case of extra-
direct and immediate, differing essentially, in the legal viewpoint from that contractual culpa based upon negligence, it is necessary that there shall have been
presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 some fault attributable to the defendant personally, and that the last paragraph of
of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their article 1903 merely establishes a rebuttable presumption, is in complete accord with
selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the authoritative opinion of Manresa, who says (vol. 12, p. 611) that the liability
obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations - or to use created by article 1903 is imposed by reason of the breach of the duties inherent in
the technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to the special relations of authority or superiority existing between the person called
culpa contractual. upon to repair the damage and the one who, by his act or omission, was the cause of
it.
Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil
Code, clearly points out this distinction, which was also recognized by this Court in its On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or
decision in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Cc. (7 Phil. Rep., 359). In omissions of their servants or agents, when such acts or omissions cause damages
commenting upon article 1093 (vol. 8, p. 30) Manresa clearly points out the which amount to the breach of a contract, is not based upon a mere presumption of
difference between "culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes the master's negligence in their selection or control, and proof of exercise of the
the source of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie" utmost diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the master of his liability for
and culpa considered as an "accident in the performance of an obligation already the breach of his contract.
existing . . .."
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-
In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was made to rest squarely upon contractual obligation has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties
the proposition that article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of which civilized society imposes upon its members, or which arise from these
negligence which constitute the breach of a contract. relations, other than contractual, of certain members of society to others, generally
Upon this point the Court said: embraced in the concept of status. The legal rights of each member of society
constitute the measure of the corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in
"The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code] are applicable are character, which the existence of those rights imposes upon all other members of
understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one society. The breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent or to mere
another But where relations already formed give rise to duties, whether springing inattention, if productive of injury, gives rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured
from contract or quasi-contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to articles party. The fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and those
1101, 1103 and 1104 of the same code." which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual
This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liability, which, under the Spanish obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the
law, is, in certain cases imposed upon employers with respect to damages vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of
occasioned by the negligence of their employees to persons to whom they are not the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the
bound by contract, is not based, as in the English Common Law, upon the principle contractual relation.
of respondent superior - if it were, the master would be liable in every case and With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or
unconditionally - but upon the principle announced in article 1902 of the Civil Code, omission, it is competent for the legislature to elect - and our Legislature has so
which imposes upon all persons who by their fault or negligence, do injury to another, elected - to limit such liability to cases in which the person upon whom such an
the obligation of making good the damage caused. One who places a powerful obligation is imposed is morally culpable or, on the contrary, for reasons of public
automobile in the hands of a servant whom he knows to be ignorant of the method of policy, to extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to
managing such a vehicle, is himself guilty of an act of negligence which makes him include responsibility for the negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions
liable for all the consequences of his imprudence. The obligation to make good the are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a position to exercise an
damage arises at the very instant that the unskillful servant, while acting within the absolute or limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code
scope of his employment, causes the injury. The liability of the master is personal has elected to limit extra contractual liability - with certain well-defined exceptions - to
and direct. But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be
selection and direction of the servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter, charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care
whether done within the scope of his employment or not, if the damage done by the in one's own acts, or in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and control
servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between the master and the of one's agents or servants, or in the control of persons who, by reason of their
person injured. status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person made liable for
It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection and control of their conduct.
the servant relieves the master from liability for the latter's acts - on the contrary, that The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by contract to render
proof shows that the responsibility has never existed. As Manresa says (vol. 8, p. 68) service to another, is wholly different from that to which article 1903 relates. When
the liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act the source of the obligation upon which plaintiff's cause of action depends is a
or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has negligent act or omission, the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the
caused damage to another. A master who exercises all possible care in the selection negligence - if he does not his action fails. But when the facts averred show a
of his servant, taking into consideration the qualifications they should possess for the contractual undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that
discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs them plaintiff has failed or refused to perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to
with equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he is bound specify in his pleadings whether the breach of the contract is due to willful fault or to
by no contractual ties, and he incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence on the part of the defendant, or of his servants or agents. Proof of the
negligence of his servants, even within the scope of their employment, such third contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery.
persons suffer damage. True it is that under article 1903 of the Civil Code the law
"As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing that the questions of law were in fact discussed upon this theory. Viewed from the
creditor should assume the burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon standpoint of the defendant the practical result must have been the same in any
which his action is based; while on the contrary, in a case of negligence which event. The proof disclosed beyond doubt that the defendant's servant was grossly
presupposes the existence of a contractual obligation, if the creditor shows that it negligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. It also
exists and that it has been broken, it is not necessary for him to prove the affirmatively appeared that defendant had been guilty of negligence in its failure to
negligence." (Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71 [1907 ed., p. 76].) exercise proper discretion in the direction of the servant. Defendant was therefore,
liable for the injury suffered by plaintiff, whether the breach of the duty were to be
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach of a contract to show
regarded as constituting culpa aquilina or culpa contractual. As Manresa points out
that the breach was due to the negligent conduct of defendant or of his servants,
(vol. 8, pp. 29 and 69) whether negligence occurs as an incident in the course of the
even though such be in fact the actual cause of the breach, it is obvious that proof on
performance of a contractual undertaking or is itself the source of an extra-
the part of defendant that the negligence or omission of his servants or agents
contractual obligation, its essential characteristics are identical. There is always an
caused the breach of the contract would not constitute a defense to the action. If the
act or omission productive of damage due to carelessness or inattention on the part
negligence of servants or agents could be invoked as a means of discharging the
of the defendant. Consequently, when the court holds that a defendant is liable in
liability arising from contract, the anomalous result would be that persons acting
damages for having failed to exercise due care, either directly, or in failing to
through the medium of agents or servants in the performance of their contracts,
exercise proper care in the selection and direction of his servants, the practical result
would be in a better position than those acting in person. If one delivers a valuable
is identical in either ease. Therefore, it follows that it is not to be inferred, because
watch to a watchmaker who contracts to repair it, and the bailee, by a personal
the court held in the Yamada ease that the defendant was liable for the damages
negligent act causes its destruction, he is unquestionably liable. Would it be logical to
negligently caused by its servant to a person to whom it was bound by contract, and
free him from his liability for the breach of his contract, which involves the duty to
made reference to the fact that the defendant was negligent in the selection and
exercise due care in the preservation of the watch, if he shows that it was his servant
control of its servants, that in such a case the court would have held that it would
whose negligence caused the injury? If such a theory could be accepted, juridical
have been a good defense to the action, if presented squarely upon the theory of the
persons would enjoy practically complete immunity from damages arising from the
breach of the contract, for defendant to have proved that it did in fact exercise care in
breach of their contracts if caused by negligent acts of omission or commission on
the selection and control of the servant.
the part of their servants, as such juridical persons can of necessity only act through
agents or servants, and it would no doubt be true in most instances that reasonable The true explanation of such cases is to be found by directing the attention to the
care had been taken in the selection and direction of such servants. If one delivers relative spheres of contractual and extra-contractual obligations. The field of non-
securities to a banking corporation as collateral, and they are lost by reason of the contractual obligation is much more broader than that of contractual obligation,
negligence of some clerk employed by the bank, would it be just and reasonable to comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical human relations. These two
permit the bank to relieve itself of liability for the breach of its contract to return the
fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is
collateral upon the payment of the debt by proving that due care had been exercised bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to
in the selection and direction of the clerk? such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the
contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the
This distinction between culpa aquiliana, as the source of an obligation, and culpa
contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no
contractual as a mere incident to the performance of a contract has frequently been
contract existed between the parties.
recognized by the supreme court of Spain. (Sentencias of June 27, 1894; November
20, 1896; and December 13 1896.) In the decision of November 20, 1896, it The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty
appeared that plaintiff s action arose ex contractu, but that defendant sought to avail to carry him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains
himself of the provisions of article 1902 of the Civil Code as a defense. The Spanish (Civil Code, article 1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate,
Supreme Court rejected defendant's contention, saying: and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally
imputable to defendant's servants.
"These are not cases of injury caused, without any pre-existing obligation, by fault or
negligence, such as those to which article 1902 of the Civil Code relates, but of The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the
damages caused by the defendant's failure to carry out the undertakings imposed by negligent conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a
the contracts . . .." breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and
leaving its trains, the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was
A brief review of the earlier decision of this court involving the liability of employers
his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a
for damage done by the negligent acts of their servants will show that in no case has
complete stop before alighting. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence
the court ever decided that the negligence of the defendant's servants [has] been
announced in the Rakes case (supra), if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own
held to constitute a defense to an action for damages for breach of contract.
negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant, whereas if the accident was
In the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the court held that the owner of caused by defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his
a carriage was not liable for the damages caused by the negligence of his driver. In injury, the damages should be apportioned. It is, therefore, important to ascertain if
that case the court commented on the fact that no evidence had been adduced in the defendant was in fact guilty of negligence.
trial court that the defendant had been negligent in the employment of the driver, or
It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop
that he had any knowledge of his lack of skill or carefulness.
before alighting, the particular injury suffered by him could not have occurred.
In the case of Baer Senior & Co.'s Successors vs. Compañia Maritima (6 Phil. Rep., Defendant contends, and cites many authorities in support of the contention, that it is
215), the plaintiff sued the defendant for damages caused by the loss of a barge negligence per se for a passenger to alight from a moving train. We are not disposed
belonging to plaintiff which was allowed to get adrift by the negligence of defendant's to subscribe to this doctrine n its absolute form. We are of the opinion that this
servants in the course of the performance of a contract of towage. The court held, proposition is too broadly stated and is at variance with the experience of every-day
citing Manresa (vol. 8, pp. 29, 69) that if the "obligation of the defendant grew out of life. In this particular instance, tat the train was barely moving when plaintiff alighted
a contract made between it and the plaintiff . . . we do not think that the provisions of is shown conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six meters from the place
articles 1902 and 1903 are applicable to the case." where he stepped from it. Thousands of persons alight from trains under these
conditions every day of the year, and sustain no injury where the company has kept
In the case of Chapman vs. Underwood (27 Phil. Rep., 374), plaintiff sued the
its platform free from dangerous obstructions. There is no reason to believe that
defendant to recover damages for personal injuries caused by the negligence of
plaintiff would have suffered any injury whatever in alighting as he did had it not been
defendant's chauffeur while driving defendant's automobile in which defendant was
for defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to provide a safe alighting place.
riding at the time. The court found that the damages were caused by the negligence
of the driver of the automobile, but held that the master was not liable, although he We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that
was present at the time, saying: expressed in Thompson's work on Negligence (vol. 3, sec. 3010) as follows:
" . . . unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for such a length of time as "The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence
to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct the driver to in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable
desist therefrom. . . . The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the care. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and
owner for such a length of time that the owner by his acquiescence, makes the condition of the passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the
driver's acts his own." circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the
care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which
In the case of Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. and Rachrach Garage & Taxicab Co. a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury."
(33 Phil. Rep., 8), it is true that the court rested its conclusion as to the liability of the
defendant upon article 1903, although the facts disclosed that the injury complained Or, if we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in Picart vs. Snith
of by plaintiff constituted a breach of the duty to him arising out of the contract of (37 Phil. Rep., 809), we may say that the test is this; Was there anything in the
transportation. The express ground of the decision in this case was that article 1903, circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the time he alighted from the train which
in dealing with the liability of a master for the negligent acts of his servants "makes would have admonished a person of average prudence that to get off the train under
the distinction between private individuals and public enterprise;" that as to the latter the conditions then existing was dangerous ? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted
the law creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence in the selection or direction of from alighting; and his failure so to desist was contributory negligence.
the servants; and that in the particular case the presumption of negligence had not As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from which a conclusion can
been overcome. be drawn to the effect that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is that he
It is evident, therefore, that in its decision in the Yamada case, the court treated stepped off the car without being able to discern clearly the condition of the platform
plaintiff's action as though founded in tort rather than as based upon the breach of and while the train was yet slowly moving. In considering the situation thus
the contract of carriage, and an examination of the pleadings and of the briefs shows presented, it should not be overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we find, ignorant of
the fact that the obstruction which was caused by the sacks of melons piled on the Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be rendered
platform existed; and as the defendant was bound by reason of its duty as a public by any court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and
carrier to afford to its passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains, the plaintiff the law on which it is based". 5 This is echoed in the statutory demand that a
had a right to assume, in the absence of some circumstance to warn him to the judgment determining the merits of the case shall state "clearly and distinctly the
contrary, that the platform was clear. The place, as we have already stated, was facts and the law on which it is based", 6 and that "Every decision of the Court of
dark, or dimly lighted, and this also is proof of a failure upon the part of the defendant Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before
in the performance of a duty owing by it to the plaintiff; for if it were by any possibility it." 7
conceded that it had a right to pile these sacks in the path of alighting passengers, A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct attack.
the placing of them in that position gave rise to the duty to light the premises 8 The law, however, solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts"
adequately so that their presence would be revealed. upon which the court's conclusion is drawn. 9 A court of justice is not hidebound to
write in its decision every bit and piece of evidence 10 presented by one party and
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in
the other upon the issues raised. Neither is it to be burdened with the obligation "to
this case the following circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was
specify in the sentence the facts" which a party "considered as proved". 11 This is
constructed upon a level higher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground.
but a part of the mental process from which the Court draws the essential ultimate
The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting passenger
facts. A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not
would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk
confusion, may result. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains the
incident to stepping off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement
necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is no error for said court to withhold
material, also assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight.
therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the defense".
Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood,
Because, as this Court well observed, "There is no law that so requires". 12
and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as
Indeed, "the mere failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant
the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. In determining the
and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same
question of contributory negligence in performing such act - that is to say, whether
contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and the Constitution". It is in this
the passenger acted prudently or recklessly - the age, sex, and physical condition of
setting that in Manigque, it was held that the mere fact that the findings "were based
the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger,
entirely on the evidence for the prosecution without taking into consideration or even
and should be considered. Women, it has been observed, as a general rule, are less
mentioning the appellant's side in the controversy as shown by his own testimony",
capable than men of alighting with safety under such conditions, as the nature of
would not vitiate the judgment. 13 If the court did not recite in the decision the
their wearing apparel obstructs the free movement of the limbs. Again, it may be
testimony of each witness for, or each item of evidence presented by, the defeated
noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff, as it was his daily custom to
party, it does not mean that the court has overlooked such testimony or such item of
get on and off the train at this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his
evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal presumptions are that official duty has been
mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take or the
regularly performed, and that all the matters within an issue in a case were laid
character of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct
before the court and passed upon by it. 15
of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, may be defined as
not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory
"the written statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court . . . and essential to
negligence.
support the decision and judgment rendered thereon". 16 They consist of the
The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was earning P25 a court's "conclusions with respect to the determinative facts in issue" 17 A question
month as a copyist clerk, and that the injuries he has suffered have permanently of law, upon the other hand, has been declared as "one which does not call for an
disabled him from continuing that employment. Defendant has not shown that any examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties." 18
other gainful occupation is open to plaintiff. His expectancy of life, according to the 2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari
standard mortality tables, is approximately thirty-three years. We are of the opinion from a judgment of the Court of Appeals 19 That judgment is conclusive as to the
that a fair compensation for the damage suffered by him for his permanent disability facts. It is not appropriately the business of this Court to alter the facts or to review
is the sum of P2,500, and that he is also entitled to recover of defendant the the questions of fact. 20
additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention, hospital services, and other With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of fact of the
incidental expenditures connected with the treatment of his injuries. Court of Appeals support its judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
The decision of the lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from
for the sum of P3,290.25, and for the costs of both instances. So ordered.
petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent
the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew
that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight,
CASE: AIR FRANCE vs. CARRASCOSO 18 scra 156
although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first
class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such
SANCHEZ, J.:
would depend upon the availability of first class seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in its
The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent
brief before the Court of Appeals under its third assignment of error, which reads:
Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary
"The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff had confirmed reservations for, and a
damages; P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist
right to, first class seats on the 'definite' segments of his journey, particularly that
class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these various amounts with interest at
from Saigon to Beirut." 21
the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:
attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
"Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class
On appeal, 2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on
ticket was no guarantee that the passenger to whom the same had been issued,
Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed
would be accommodated in the first-class compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff
decision "in all other respects", with costs against petitioner.
he had yet to make arrangements upon arrival at every station for the necessary first
The case is now before us for review on certiorari.
class reservation. We are not impressed by such a reasoning. We cannot understand
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as "fully supported by the evidence of
how a reputable firm like defendant airplane company could have the indiscretion to
record", are:
give out ticket it never meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in
"Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left
payment of first-class tickets end yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of
Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
its employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of business that the
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent,
company should know whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or not."
Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a 'first class' round trip airplane ticket from
Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of petitioner's
Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff traveled in 'first class', but at
contention, thus:
Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the 'first
"On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a 'First class ticket, there can be no
class' seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G.
question. Apart from his testimony, see plaintiffs Exhibits 'A', 'A-1' 'B', 'B-1', 'B-2', 'C'
Cuento, there was a 'white man', who, the Manager alleged, had a 'better right to the
and 'C-1', and defendant's own witness, Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's
seat. When asked to vacate his 'first class' seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected,
testimony and testified as follows:
refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead
Q. In these tickets there are marks 'O.K.' From what you know, what does
body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, many of the
this O.K. mean?
Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr.
A. That the space is confirmed.
Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all
Q. Confirmed for first class?
across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the 'white
A. Yes, 'first class'. (Transcript, p. 169)
man' (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and plaintiff reluctantly gave his
xxx xxx xxx
'first class' seat in the plane." 3
"Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and
1. The thrust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the
Rafael Altonaga that although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a 'first class' airplane
findings" 4 of respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioner charges that respondent court
ticket, the ticket was subject to confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give
failed to make complete findings of fact on all the issues properly laid before it. We
credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail over written
are asked to consider facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to overturn the appellate
evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits 'A', 'A1', 'B', 'B-1', 'C' and 'C- 1' belie the testimony of
court's decision.
said witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first
class ticket without any reservation whatever.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right at the start of the trial, respondent's
testified that the reservation for a 'first class' accommodation for the plaintiff was counsel placed petitioner on guard on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while
confirmed. The court cannot believe that after such confirmation ,defendant had a sitting in the plane in Bangkok, Carrascoso was ousted by petitioner's manager who
verbal understanding with plaintiff that the 'first class' ticket issued to him by gave his seat to a white man; 35 and (b) evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of
defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong." 23 the contract was presented without objection on the part of the petitioner. It is,
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of a few therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in
pesos in the amount refunded on Carrascoso's ticket, the decision of the Court of the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if
First Instance was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in all other respects. We hold the any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence
view that such a judgment of affirmance has merged the judgment of the lower court. is not even required. 36 On the question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals
24 Implicit in that affirmance is a determination by the Court of Appeals that the declared:
proceeding in the Court of First Instance was free from prejudicial error and that 'all
"That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the
questions raised by the assignments of error and all questions that might have been
plane belonging to the defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was transferred
so raised are to be regarded as finally adjudicated against the appellant". So also,
to the tourist class not only without his consent but against his will, has been
the judgment affirmed "must be regarded as free from all error" 25 We reached this
sufficiently established by plaintiff in his testimony before the court, corroborated by
policy construction because nothing in the decision of the Court of Appeals on this
the corresponding entry made by the purser of the plane in his notebook which
point would suggest that its findings of fact are in any way at war with those of the
notation reads as follows:
trial court. Nor was said affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon a ground or
'First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will and that
grounds different from those which were made the basis of the conclusions of the
the captain refused to intervene',
trial court.
and by the testimony of an eye-witness Ernesto G Cuento, who was a co-passenger.
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class
The captain of the plane who was asked by the manager of defendant company at
seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein
Bangkok to intervene even refused to do so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of
confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline.
defendant ever contradicted or denied this evidence for the plaintiff. It could have
What security then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an
been easy for defendant to present its manager at Bangkok to testify at the trial of
airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say
the case, or yet to secure his deposition; but defendant did neither. 37
that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had a
The Court of Appeals further stated —
schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a written document speaks a
"Neither is there evidence as to whether or ,not a prior reservation was made by the
uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to
white man. Hence, if the employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class
achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the
ticket to him when all the seats had already been taken, surely the plaintiff should not
ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts refused to
have been picked out as the one to suffer the consequences and to be subjected to
believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket.
the humiliation and indignity of being ejected from his seat in the presence of others.
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there are
Instead of explaining to the white man the improvidence committed by defendant's
facts upon which the Court of Appeals predicated the finding that respondent
employees, the manager adopted the more drastic step of ousting the plaintiff who
Carrascoso had a first class ticket and was entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok,
was then safely ensconced in his rightful seat. We are strengthened in our belief that
which is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight, 27 We perceive no
this probably was what happened there, by the testimony of defendant's witness
"welter of distortions by the Court of Appeals of petitioner's statement of its position",
Rafael Altonaga who, when asked to explain the meaning of the letters 'O.K.,
as charged by petitioner. 28 Nor do we subscribe to petitioners accusation that
appearing on the tickets of plaintiff, said that 'the space is confirmed' for first class.
respondent Carrascoso "surreptitiously took a first class seat to provoke an issue".
Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another witness for defendant, who was the chief of the
29 And this because, as petitioner states, Carrascoso went to see the Manager at his
Reservation Office of defendant, testified as follows:
office in Bangkok "to confirm my seat and because from Saigon I was told again to
'Q. How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what reservation the
see the Manager. 30 Why, then, was he allowed to take a first class seat in the
passenger has arranged with you?
plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if another had a better right to the seat?
A. They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation.' (t.s.n., p. 247,
4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages. Petitioner's
June 19, 1959)
trenchant claim is that Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of contract; that to
In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has said on this point:
authorize an award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad
'Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, 'white man' have a
faith; 31 and that the decision of the Court of Appeals fails to make a finding of bad
'better right' to the seat occupied by Mr. Carrascoso? The record is silent. The
faith. The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on this issue are:
defendant airline did not prove 'any better', nay, any right on the part of the 'white
"3. That . . . plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the Philippine
man' to the 'First class' seat that the plaintiff was occupying and for which he paid
Air Lines for a valuable consideration, the latter acting as general agents for and in
and was issued a corresponding 'first class' ticket.
behalf of the defendant, under which aid contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as
'If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's Manager in Bangkok,
defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff, First Class passage on defendant's plane during
the defendant could have easily proven it by having taken the testimony of the said
the entire duration of plaintiff's tour of Europe with Hongkong as starting point up to
Manager by deposition, but defendant did not do so; the presumption is that
and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, . . .
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par. (e) Rules
4. That during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and
of Court]; and, under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to find, as it does
from Saigon to Bangkok, defendant furnished to the plaintiff First Class
find, that the Manager of the defendant airline in Bangkok not merely asked but
accommodation but only after protestations, arguments and/or insistence were made
threatened the plaintiff to throw him out of the plane if he did not give up his 'first
by the plaintiff with defendant's employees.
class' seat because the said Manager wanted to accommodate using the words of
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but instead
the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, the 'white man'." 38
furnished plaintiff only Tourist Class accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first
and/or Casablanca, . . . the plaintiff has been compelled by defendant's employees to
transcribed did not use the term "bad faith". But can it be doubted that the recital of
leave the First Class accommodation berths at Bangkok after he was already seated.
facts therein points to bad faith? The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the
enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly
inconvenience and embarrassments brought by defendant's breach of contract was
ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the
forced to take a Pan American World Airways plane on his return trip from Madrid to
tourist class compartment — just to give way to another passenger whose right
Manila.
thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad
xxx xxx xxx
faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law. For, "bad
2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class
faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with
accommodations aforesaid, plaintiff suffered inconveniences, embarrassments, and
some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes." 39
humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding of bad faith in
feelings, social humiliation, and the like injury, resulting in moral damages in the
the judgment of the Court of First Instance, thus:
amount of P30,000.00." 33
"The evidence shows that defendant violated its contract of transportation with
xxx xxx xxx
plaintiff in bad faith, with the aggravating circumstances that defendant's Manager in
The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to
Bangkok went to the extent of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many
furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran
passengers to have him thrown out of the airplane to give the 'first class' seat that he
leg; Second, That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first
was occupying to, again using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a 'white man'
class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, That there was bad faith when
whom he (defendant's Manager) wished to accommodate, and the defendant has not
petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation
proven that this 'white man' had any 'better right' to occupy the 'first class' seat that
berth "after he was already seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason
the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for which the corresponding 'first class'
of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby
ticket was issued by the defendant to him." 40
causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social
5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortuous act of its employees-
humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that there is no specific mention of
need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of
the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there; it may be
petitioner's manager, petitioner's his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil
drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. 34 The contract was
Code says:
averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is
"Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
put on wrongful expulsion.
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage."
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that
upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable.
42 6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree
from any other contractual relation. 43 And this, because of the relation which an
air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It
invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air
carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for
damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a light to be treated
by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.
They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rude or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for
damages against the carrier. 44
Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's check, it was
a breach of contract and a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of
third persons to falsely notify her that the check was worthless and demand payment
under threat of ejection, though the language used was not insulting and she was not
ejected. 46 And this, because, altho the relation of passenger and carrier is
"contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract
may be also a tort". 47 And in another case, "Where a passenger on a railroad
train, when the conductor came to collect his fare, tendered him the cash fare to a
point where the train was scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as the
train reached such point he would pay the cash fare from that point to destination,
there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger which justified the conductor in
using insulting language to him, as by calling him a lunatic," 48 and the Supreme
Court of South Carolina there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said
passenger.
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of
Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a
violation of public duty by the petitioner-air carrier — a case of quasi-delict. Damages
are proper.
7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony, thus
"Q. You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser?
A. When we left already — that was already in the trip — I could not help it.
So one of the flight attendants approached me and requested from me my ticket and
I said, What for? and she said, 'We will note that you were transferred to the tourist
class'. I said, 'Nothing of that kind. That is tantamount to accepting my transfer.' And I
also said, You are not going to note anything there because I am protesting to this
transfer.
Q. Was she able to note it?
A. No, because I did not give my ticket.
Q. About that purser?
A. Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you
don't have enough leg room, I stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to me
and the purser was there. He told me, 'I have recorded the incident in my notebook.'
He read it and translated it to me — because it was recorded in French — 'First class
passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain
refused to intervene.'
MR. VALTE —
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because
the best evidence would be the notes. Your Honor.
COURT —
I will allow that as part of his testimony." 49
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an
entry in his notebooks reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist
class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon
evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above] which is incompetent. We do not think so.
The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony of the entry
does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is
admissible. 49
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened,
the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The
excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are
admissible as part of the res gestae. 50 For, they grow "out of the nervous
excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". 51 The utterance
of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the
circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. 52 It
thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of
petitioner. It would have been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted
Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true that no such entry was made, the
deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in
evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the Court
ample power to grant exemplary damages — in contracts and quasi-contracts. The
only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner". 53 The manner of ejectment of respondent
Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in addition to
moral damages. 54
9. The right to attorneys' fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary
damages justifies a similar judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is
that the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that attorneys' fees be given.
55 We do not intend to break faith with the tradition that discretion well exercised —
as it was here —should not be disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way
of exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as attorney's fees. The task of fixing these
amounts is primarily with the trial-court. 56 The Court of Appeals did not interfere
with the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur
thereto. Because, the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from
reversible error. We accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So
ordered.
CONCURRENCE OF CAUSE OF ACTION
CASE: LOADMASTER CUSTOM SERVICES vs. GLOBAL
BROKERAGE corp.
CASE: LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT VS. MARJORIE NAVIDAD
VITUG, J.:
The case before the Court is an appeal from the decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals, promulgated on 27 April 2000 and 10 October 2000, respectively, in CA-
G.R. CV No. 60720, entitled "Marjorie Navidad and Heirs of the Late Nicanor
Navidad vs. Rodolfo Roman, et. al.," which has modified the decision of 11 August
1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 266, Pasig City, exonerating Prudent
Security Agency (Prudent) from liability and finding Light Rail Transit Authority
(LRTA) and Rodolfo Roman liable for damages on account of the death of Nicanor
Navidad.
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven o’clock in the evening, Nicanor
Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token"
(representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near
the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area
approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two
apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to
indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how
Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT
train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by
the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.
On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad,
along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin,
Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and
Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against
Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer,
denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its security guards.
The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead
of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove
that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. On 11 August 1998, the trial court
rendered its decision; it adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly
and severally the plaintiffs the following:
a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00;
2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00;
3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00;
b) Moral damages of P50,000.00;
c) Attorney’s fees of P20,000;
d) Costs of suit.
The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are dismissed for lack
of merit.
The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are likewise dismissed."[1]
Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate court
promulgated its now assailed decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for the
death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and
severally liable thusly:
"WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby MODIFIED, by exonerating the
appellants from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad, Jr. Instead, appellees
Rodolfo Roman and the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) are held liable for his
death and are hereby directed to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs-appellees,
the following amounts:
a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;
b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages;
c) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and
e) P20,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees."[2]
The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet
boarded the train, a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the
victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the
fare and getting the corresponding token therefor. In exempting Prudent from liability,
the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort
Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the under the provisions of Article 2176[12] and related provisions, in conjunction with
victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of Article 2180,[13] of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employer’s liability
his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the
the time by Roman. The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that
expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and
not have stopped the train. supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by
showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual
The appellate court denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in its resolution of
matter that has not been shown. Absent such a showing, one might ask further, how
10 October 2000.
then must the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent
In their present recourse, petitioners recite alleged errors on the part of the appellate contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual
court; viz: obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the
"I. injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED BY DISREGARDING 2194[14] of the Civil Code can well apply.[15] In fine, a liability for tort may arise even
THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE TRIAL COURT under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract.[16] Stated
II. differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between
PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD, JR. the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing
III. the rules on tort to apply.[17]
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late
RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA."[3]
Nicanor Navidad, this Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of
Petitioners would contend that the appellate court ignored the evidence and the Appeals that "there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for
factual findings of the trial court by holding them liable on the basis of a sweeping the reason that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven x
conclusion that the presumption of negligence on the part of a common carrier was x x." This finding of the appellate court is not without substantial justification in our
not overcome. Petitioners would insist that Escartin’s assault upon Navidad, which own review of the records of the case.
caused the latter to fall on the tracks, was an act of a stranger that could not have
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of
been foreseen or prevented. The LRTA would add that the appellate court’s
any culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to
conclusion on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between Roman
say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation
and LRTA lacked basis because Roman himself had testified being an employee of
between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault
Metro Transit and not of the LRTA.
or negligence.
Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended that a The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal
contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated
the LRT station and entered the premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the
rights and protection under a contractual relation, and that the appellate court had purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.[18] It is an
correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory
extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier. damages.[19]
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED with
business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and
utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers.[4] The Civil Code, governing (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. No costs.
the liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its passengers, provides:
SO ORDERED.
“Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. CASE: SANTOS VS PIZARRO
"Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."
Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers IV. NEGLIGENCE
through the negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees, although such CONCEPT OF NEGLIGENCE
employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the Article 20 civ
orders of the common carriers.
"This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised ARTICLE 1173 CIVIL CODE
all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their CASE: PICART VS. SMITH 37 PHIL
employees."
STREET, J .:
"Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger
on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the In this action the plaintiff, Amado Picart, seeks to recover of the defendant, Frank Smith,
common carrier’s employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of jr., the sum of P31,100, as damages alleged to have been caused by an automobile
a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission." driven by the defendant. From a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of
La Union absolving the defendant from liability the plaintiff has appealed.
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances.[5] Such The occurrence which gave rise to the institution of this action took place on December
duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only 12, 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union. It appears that upon the
during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises occasion in question the plaintiff was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had
and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage.[6] The statutory gotten half way across, the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an
provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the defendant
neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his
through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts
approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more
or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees
successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not
through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or observing the rule of the road.
omission.[7] In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at
fault or been negligent, and[8] by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals.
the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and However, being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach,
the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of
event or to force majeure.[9] In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have
sufficient time to get over to the other side. The bridge is shown to have a length of about
on how the accident occurred, which petitioners, according to the appellate court,
75 meters and a width of 4.08 meters. As the automobile approached, the defendant
have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault,[10] an
guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing
exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved.[11] the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. The pony had
The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop.
indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right
exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the
commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no
employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his
undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it was
then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal
responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the respective parties in order to apportion the damage according to the degree of their
railing. In so doing, it was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car relative fault. It is enough to say that the negligence of the defendant was in this case the
and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. immediate and determining cause of the accident and that the antecedent negligence of
From the evidence adduced in the case we believe that when the accident occurred the the plaintiff was a more remote factor in the case.
free space where the pony stood between the automobile and the railing of the bridge was
A point of minor importance in the case is indicated in the special defense pleaded in the
probably less than one and one half meters. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The
defendant's answer, to the effect that the subject matter of the action had been previously
plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required
adjudicated in the court of a justice of the peace. In this connection it appears that soon
medical attention for several days.
after the accident in question occurred, the plaintiff caused criminal proceedings to be
The question presented for decision is whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his instituted before a justice of the peace charging the defendant with the infliction of serious
car in the manner above described was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil injuries (lesiones graves). At the preliminary investigation the defendant was discharged
obligation to repair the damage done; and we are of the opinion that he is so liable. As the by the magistrate and the proceedings were dismissed. Conceding that the acquittal of the
defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and rider defendant at a trial upon the merits in a criminal prosecution for the offense mentioned
would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was would be res adjudicata upon the question of his civil liability arising from negligence - a
demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have point upon which it is unnecessary to express an opinion - the action of the justice of the
perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving peace in dismissing the criminal proceeding upon the preliminary hearing can have no
vehicle. In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was such effect. (See U.S. vs. Banzuela and Banzuela, 31 Phil. Rep., 564.)
yet some distance away; and from this moment it was not longer within the power of the
From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower court must be reversed,
plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. The control of the
and judgment is here rendered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the sum of two
situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his
hundred pesos (P200), with costs of both instances. The sum here awarded is estimated
car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to
to include the value of the horse, medical expenses of the plaintiff, the loss or damage
take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of
occasioned to articles of his apparel, and lawful interest on the whole to the date of this
collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the
recovery. The other damages claimed by the plaintiff are remote or otherwise of such
horse. He was, we think, deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet
characters as not to be recoverable. So ordered.
exhibited fright. But in view of the known nature of horses, there was an appreciable risk
that, if the animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles, he might get excited
and jump under the conditions which here confronted him. When the defendant exposed
the horse and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye of the law. CASE: JARCO VS. AGUILAR 12792
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable
CASE: GAN VS. CA 165 SCRA
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard CASE: NORMAN GAID VS PEOPLE GR 171636
supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the
Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to CASE: CHINA AIRLINE VS. CA GR 46036
the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what
would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given
situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in
view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculation cannot here be of
much value but his much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by
the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not
supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only
when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man,
in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued?
If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this
prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these
terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is
this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor
would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant
his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that
negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant,
would, in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught
with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and rider as a reasonable
consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the
defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of
antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have
already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is
to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the
negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the
defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under
these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference
to the prior negligence of the other party.
The decision in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co.(7 Phil. Rep., 359)
should perhaps be mentioned in this connection. This Court there held that while
contributory negligence on the part of the person injured did not constitute a bar to
recover, it could be received in evidence to reduce the damages which would otherwise
have been assessed wholly against the other party. The defendant company had there
employed the plaintiff, a laborer, to assist in transporting iron rails from a barge in Manila
harbor to the company's yards located not far away. The rails were conveyed upon cars
which were hauled along a narrow track. At a certain spot near the water's edge the track
gave way by reason of the combined effect of the weight of the car and the insecurity of
the road bed. The car was in consequence upset; the rails slid off; and the plaintiff's leg
was caught and broken. It appeared in evidence that the accident was due to the effects
of a typhoon which had dislodged one of the supports of the track. The court found that
the defendant company was negligent in having failed to repair the bed of the track and
also that the plaintiff was, at the moment of the accident, guilty of contributory negligence
in walking at the side of the car instead of being in front or behind. It was held that while
the defendant was liable to the plaintiff by reason of its negligence in having failed to keep
the track in proper repair, nevertheless the amount of the damages should be reduced on
account of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. As will be seen the defendant's
negligence in that case consisted in an omission only. The liability of the company arose
from its responsibility for the dangerous condition of its track. In a case like the one now
before us, where the defendant was actually present and operating the automobile which
caused the damage, we do not feel constrained to attempt to weigh the negligence of the