Review

Reviewed Work(s): Lloyd's Introduction to Jurisprudence by M.D.A. Freeman; The Oxford

Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law by Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro
Review by: Tim Murphy
Source: Irish Jurist, New Series, Vol. 37 (2002), pp. 348-352
Published by: Irish Jurist
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/44027038
Accessed: 21-05-2019 07:20 UTC

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 348 Book Reviews

provoking perspective from which

Whyte, material which would seem d
other writer, trips along in a way w

David Gwynn Morgan

University College, Cork

M.D.A. Freeman, Lloyd's Introdu

Maxwell, London, seventh edition,

Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro (e

prudence and Philosophy of Law. O
X + 1050 pp. £60.00

The publication of each new edition

dence is a significant event for thos
Freeman presents the reader of the
volume of 1526 pages. This is a ma
edition of 505 pages (published in
sion of legal theory in the latter half
to the first edition, Lloyd stated t
students to become acquainted with
in selected texts culled from their o
ent view of the subject in introduct
combination of text and extracts from authoritative sources remains this
book's most admirable and welcome feature. It is important, as Freeman
remarks in the preface to this edition, that authors should be read in the
original and Lloyd continues to give students this opportunity (vi).
The introductory material in any textbook on jurisprudence is of criti-
cal significance given the somewhat isolated place of the subject in the
broader scheme of legal education. Lloyd introduces its subject in the first
two chapters: "Nature of Jurisprudence" and "Meaning of Law". While
the jurisprudential discussions of subjects such as epistemology, ethics and
logic are extremely incisive, these are very difficult chapters for the aver-
age undergraduate law student. There is certainly scope for more introduc-
tory philosophical material. The underlying conceptual scheme of the other
chapters in Lloyd is based on the major schools and trends in jurispru-
dence. There are chapters on the tradition of natural law theory; classical
positivism; Kelsen's "pure theory"; modern trends in analytical and nor-
mative jurisprudence (including discussions of Hart, Raz, and Hohfeld);
theories of justice (including discussion of Rawls, Nozick and Dworkin,
and economic and feminist examples); sociological jurisprudence and the
sociology of law; formalism and American realism; Scandinavian realism;
historical and anthropological jurisprudence; Marxist theories; critical le-

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 Book Reviews 349

gal studies (CLS); feminist jurisp

critical race theory; and theories
mentaries in these chapters are very
is some truth in Peter Ingram's obs
tion of Lloyd , that the book lacks
first chapter through to the last
terly 105).
Lloyd nonetheless includes analy
research shows to be the aspects of
vast majority of Jurisprudence tea
and Canada identify as comprisin
positivism, natural law, law and
realism, CLS, law and economics,
ince of jurisprudence determined
is interesting to observe, however,
the economic analysis of law - are
Law and morals is discussed in the
and normative jurisprudence while
ment are devoted to the economic
of justice, one of two new chapt
probably the most influential of th
and it is surprising that it is not d
hand Freeman's treatment of law a
justice is preferable to its place in
of, for example, HLA Hart's conc
of rights. In addition, the extrac
this edition of Lloyd is a far better
edition: it contains Richard Posne
and political basis of wealth maxim
tation of Ronald Dworkin's 1980
The second new chapter in this la
theory (CRT). This movement em
sense of disillusionment with th
grew as North American minorit
ness form of legal criticism" and
Jean Stefancic's annotated biblio
themes that they deem to fall wi
idea of "naming one's own reality"
telling. CRT has spawned other ju
ter also focuses briefly on the m
studies ("the LatCrit movement"
comment this chapter is relatively
the next edition will devote more
then an even stronger and more po
The selection of extracts from jur
edition of Lloyd is extremely com

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350 Book Reviews

classic and modern readings reprod

extracts in this edition from seve
Hart; Susan Miller Okin, Niki La
jurisprudence; Dennis Patterson o
Practice of Principle (Oxford, 200
Analysis Become? (London, 1996)
Legal Theory (Oxford, 1997). It is
ate Jurisprudence course that could
in Lloyd , and those who teach s
selective in their choice of reading
are also some omissions: William Tw
(London, 2000) is mentioned by F
Brian Bix, David Dyzenhaus, Jere
generally, Freeman notes the absenc
the implications of chaos theory fo
and the "law and ..." phenomenon
and geography, etc.).
Dennis Lloyd declared in 1959 tha
ral law philosophies almost every
that his own allegiance was with
it is Freeman's view - that if stude
be HLA Hart's The Concept of Law
extracts from this classic source. B
has undermined many of Hart's
narrowness of his approach to law
of John Austin in 1945 may well
gion; to-day he seems to be regar
view this compendium is incomplet
cept and should be revised to reflec
no one book can legitimately be reg
The treatment of the tradition
aspect of Lloyd. Freeman writes t
said to lie in the constant assertion
which depend upon the nature of t
by reason" (p.90). The precise natur
at the heart of much debate on nat
always properly appreciated in lega
tend to be overly legalistic. For exa
natural law tradition (pp. 103- 124) i
totelian-Thomist tradition of natur
Ockham's opposition to Thomism in
remarks in the first article of The
Philosophy of Law, co-edited by Ju
ing purpose of the natural law trad
it is to focus on the individual act
"to answer the parallel questions

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 Book Reviews 351

or a group's responsible officer (

should we decide, enact, require,
with judging for oneself what re
rejecting specific kinds of option
As its title suggests Coleman an
compete directly with Lloyd in the
new series of Oxford Handbooks ,
specially commissioned essays on
overviews of a selection of jurisp
own views. The editors emphasise t
growing list of "[dictionaries, en
all the rage in philosophical publish
did not attempt to include an ent
school of thought in the philosophy
risprudential topics have been exten
cent years and we did not belie
profitable"; they remark, for exa
another essay on the normative f
Other notable absences include Mar
The Oxford Handbook opens with
the classical tradition and Brian Bix
says on legal positivism, Andrei
Kenneth Einar Himma on inclusiv
also be classed as general jurisprude
such as "Formalism" (Martin Ston
gal and Political Philosophy" (Jere
and Timothy Macklem); "Right
(Timothy Endicott); and "Law an
tors' own contributions are also gen
extremely detailed examination of
in legal philosophy and Shapiro's
tions that a sceptical attitude tow
the healthiest stance to take" (p.4
Other essays in the Oxford Han
philosophy of the Common Law; Be
Ripstein on Tort Law; Jody Kraus o
erty Law; Larry Alexander on C
Golove on International Law; Edw
gender; and an excellent overview
and statutory interpretation by Ke
large extent depend for their app
Zipursky's piece, for example, as
sponses to the question of why th
who commit legal wrongs. Zipur
models of private law - deterrence
- both err by omitting a fundamen

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 352 Book Reviews

right of action. The oversight trace

framing of the question itself: w
those who commit legal wrongs?
The law empowers private parties t
to them, if they choose . The study
the first instance, focus on why
permitted by the law to act in cert
required to be sanctioned or held
The depth of analysis in most of
remarkable, as one would expect f
dential thinkers, and some may we
edition of Lloyd. While neither of
without its flaws the world of juri
publication.

Tim Murphy
University College, Cork

Hazel Carty, An Analysis of the Economic Torts. Oxford University Press,

Oxford, 2001. xxx + 295 pp. £40.00 (hardback).

The author is Senior Lecturer at the School of Law at Manchester Univer-

sity and has written extensively in this area; see, for example, her contribu-
tions to Clerk & Lindsell on Torts and "Intentional Violation of Economic
Interests" (1988) 104 LQR 250.
Those torts which have, as their primary function, the protection of a
person's economic interests are traditionally separated into general (indus-
trial action) economic torts and misrepresentation (trade competition) eco-
nomic torts. The former encompass conspiracy, inducement of breach of
contract, intimidation and unlawful interference with trade; the latter en-
compass deceit, malicious (or, as it is sometimes known, injurious) false-
hood and passing off. Carty's approach, however, is to abandon that
traditional separation and attempt to bring, in her own words, "some order
to the common law rules on liability for the infliction of pure economic
loss". Consequently, in addition to an excellent discussion (subject to one
proviso) of the seven above mentioned torts, there is a full account (in
chapter 9) on "Negligence and Pure Economic Loss".
The aforementioned proviso relates to the somewhat inconsistent treat-
ment of the leading Irish authorities. The author's focus is necessarily on
British case law; nevertheless she considers at least 19 Australian, 17 Ca-
nadian and 16 New Zealand cases. The only Irish decisions considered,
apart from Quinn v. Leathern [1901] AC 495, are Mantruck Services Ltd v.
Ballinloupe Electrical Refrigeration Ltd [1992] 1 IR 351, Northern Bank
Finance Corporation Ltd v. Charlton [1979] IR 149 and C & A Modes v. C

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