NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

Article 218. Powers of the Commission. The Commission shall have the power and authority:

To promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases before it and its regional branches, as well as those pertaining to its internal
functions and such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Code; (As amended by Section 10, Republic Act No. 6715, March
21, 1989)

To administer oaths, summon the parties to a controversy, issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of such books,
papers, contracts, records, statement of accounts, agreements, and others as may be material to a just determination of the matter under investigation, and to testify
in any investigation or hearing conducted in pursuance of this Code;

To conduct investigation for the determination of a question, matter or controversy within its jurisdiction, proceed to hear and determine the disputes in the
absence of any party thereto who has been summoned or served with notice to appear, conduct its proceedings or any part thereof in public or in private, adjourn
its hearings to any time and place, refer technical matters or accounts to an expert and to accept his report as evidence after hearing of the parties upon due notice,
direct parties to be joined in or excluded from the proceedings, correct, amend, or waive any error, defect or irregularity whether in substance or in form, give all
such directions as it may deem necessary or expedient in the determination of the dispute before it, and dismiss any matter or refrain from further hearing or from
determining the dispute or part thereof, where it is trivial or where further proceedings by the Commission are not necessary or desirable; and

To hold any person in contempt directly or indirectly and impose appropriate penalties therefor in accordance with law.

A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near the Chairman or any member of the Commission or any Labor Arbiter as to obstruct or interrupt the
proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward said officials, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn, or to answer as a witness or to
subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in direct contempt by said officials and punished by fine not
exceeding five hundred pesos (P500) or imprisonment not exceeding five (5) days, or both, if it be the Commission, or a member thereof, or by a fine not
exceeding one hundred pesos (P100) or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be a Labor Arbiter.

The person adjudged in direct contempt by a Labor Arbiter may appeal to the Commission and the execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending the
resolution of the appeal upon the filing by such person of a bond on condition that he will abide by and perform the judgment of the Commission should the appeal
be decided against him. Judgment of the Commission on direct contempt is immediately executory and unappealable. Indirect contempt shall be dealt with by the
Commission or Labor Arbiter in the manner prescribed under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court; and (As amended by Section 10, Republic Act No. 6715,
March 21, 1989)

To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor
dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such
party: Provided, That no temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute as defined in this Code shall be issued except
after hearing the testimony of witnesses, with opportunity for cross-examination, in support of the allegations of a complaint made under oath, and testimony in
opposition thereto, if offered, and only after a finding of fact by the Commission, to the effect:

That prohibited or unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed and will be continued unless restrained, but no injunction or temporary restraining
order shall be issued on account of any threat, prohibited or unlawful act, except against the person or persons, association or organization making the threat or
committing the prohibited or unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the same after actual knowledge thereof;

That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant’s property will follow;

That as to each item of relief to be granted, greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the
granting of relief;

That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and

That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant’s property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.

Such hearing shall be held after due and personal notice thereof has been served, in such manner as the Commission shall direct, to all known persons against
whom relief is sought, and also to the Chief Executive and other public officials of the province or city within which the unlawful acts have been threatened or
committed, charged with the duty to protect complainant’s property: Provided, however, that if a complainant shall also allege that, unless a temporary restraining
order shall be issued without notice, a substantial and irreparable injury to complainant’s property will be unavoidable, such a temporary restraining order may be
issued upon testimony under oath, sufficient, if sustained, to justify the Commission in issuing a temporary injunction upon hearing after notice. Such a temporary
restraining order shall be effective for no longer than twenty (20) days and shall become void at the expiration of said twenty (20) days. No such temporary
restraining order or temporary injunction shall be issued except on condition that complainant shall first file an undertaking with adequate security in an amount to
be fixed by the Commission sufficient to recompense those enjoined for any loss, expense or damage caused by the improvident or erroneous issuance of such
order or injunction, including all reasonable costs, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee, and expense of defense against the order or against the granting of any
injunctive relief sought in the same proceeding and subsequently denied by the Commission.

The undertaking herein mentioned shall be understood to constitute an agreement entered into by the complainant and the surety upon which an order may be
rendered in the same suit or proceeding against said complainant and surety, upon a hearing to assess damages, of which hearing, complainant and surety shall
have reasonable notice, the said complainant and surety submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the Commission for that purpose. But nothing herein contained
shall deprive any party having a claim or cause of action under or upon such undertaking from electing to pursue his ordinary remedy by suit at law or in equity:
Provided, further, That the reception of evidence for the application of a writ of injunction may be delegated by the Commission to any of its Labor Arbiters who
shall conduct such hearings in such places as he may determine to be accessible to the parties and their witnesses and shall submit thereafter his recommendation
to the Commission. (As amended by Section 10, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)

TOLOSA vs NLRC Case Digest

[G.R. No. 149578. April 10, 2003]

EVELYN TOLOSA, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, QWANA KAIUN (through its resident-agent, FUMIO
NAKAGAWA), ASIA BULK TRANSPORT PHILS. INC., PEDRO GARATE and MARIO ASIS, respondents.

FACTS

Evelyn Tolosa, was the widow of Captain Virgilio Tolosa who was hired by Qwana-Kaiun, through its manning agent, Asia Bulk Transport Phils. Inc., (ASIA
BULK for brevity) to be the master of the Vessel named M/V Lady Dona.

CAPT. TOLOSA had a monthly compensation of US$1700, plus US$400.00 monthly overtime allowance.

“During ‘channeling activities’ upon the vessel’s departure from Yokohama sometime on November 6, 1992, CAPT. TOLOSA was drenched with rainwater. The
following day, November 7, 1992, he had a slight fever and in the succeeding twelve (12) days, his health rapidly deteriorated resulting in his death on November
18, 1992. It was alleged that the request for emergency evacuation of Capt Tolosa was too late.

Because of the death of CAPT. TOLOSA, his wife, EVELYN, as petitioner, filed a Complaint/Position Paper before the POEA against Qwana-Kaiun, thru its
resident-agent, Mr. Fumio Nakagawa, ASIA BULK, Pedro Garate and Mario Asis, as respondents. The case was however transferred to the NLRC, when the
amendatory legislation expanding its jurisdiction, and removing overseas employment related claims from the ambit of POEA jurisdiction.

Respondents aver that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, since her cause did not arise from an employer-employee relation, but from a
quasi-delict or tort. Further, there is no reasonable causal connection between her suit for damages and her claim under Article 217 (a)(4) of the Labor Code,
which allows an award of damages incident to an employer-employee relation.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the subject matter.

HELD

The SC held that the NLRC and the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction over petitioner’s claim for damages, because that ruling was based on a quasi-delict or tort per
Article 2176 of the Civil Code.

The allegations in the complaint determine the nature of the action and, consequently, the jurisdiction of the courts.

After carefully examining the complaint/position paper of petitioner, the allegations therein are in the nature of an action based on a quasi-delict or tort. It is
evident that she sued Pedro Garate and Mario Asis for gross negligence. Petitioner’s complaint/position paper refers to and extensively discusses the negligent acts
of shipmates Garate and Asis, who had no employer-employee relation with Captain Tolosa. The SC stressed that the case does not involve the adjudication of a
labor dispute, but the recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict. The jurisdiction of labor tribunals is limited to disputes arising from employer-employee
relations.

The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship which
can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining agreement.

Hence, it is not the NLRC but the regular courts that have jurisdiction over actions for damages, in which the employer-employee relation is merely incidental, and
in which the cause of action proceeds from a different source of obligation such as a tort. Since petitioner’s claim for damages is predicated on a quasi-delict or tort
that has no reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in Article 217, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements, jurisdiction
over the action lies with the regular courts -- not with the NLRC or the labor arbiters.

Eviota v. Court of Appeals

GR 152121 | 407 SCRA 394 | July 29, 2003
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
Petitioner: EDUARDO G. EVIOTA
Respondent: THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. JOSE BAUTISTA, Presiding Judge of Branch 136, Regional Trial Court of Makati, and
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK
(Effect when NO employer-employee relationship exists/ when main issue does not involve ER-EE relationship)

DOCTRINE
It is evident that the causes of action of the private respondent against the petitioner do not involve the provisions of the Labor Code and other labor laws but the
New Civil Code. Thus, the said causes of action are intrinsically civil. There is no causal relationship between the causes of action of the private respondents
causes of action against the petitioner and their employer-employee relationship.

FACTS
- Eduardo G. Eviota was employed by the respondent bank as Compensation and Benefits Manager.
- On June 19, 1998, the respondent bank filed a complaint against the petitioner with the RTC of Makati City, alleging:
o On December 22, 1997, Eviota began negotiating with the Bank on his possible employment with the latter. Taken up during these
negotiations were not only his compensation and benefit package, but also the nature and demands of his prospective position. The Bank
made sure that Eviota was fully aware of all the terms and conditions of his possible job with the Bank.
o On January 26, 1998, Eviota indicated his conformity with the Banks Offer of Employment by signing a written copy of such offer dated
January 22, 1998 (the Employment Contract).
o The bank made the following expenses, pursuant to the contract of employment: (a) payment of signing bonus; renovated and refurbished
the room which was to serve as Eviota’s office; (b) purchased a 1998 Honda CR-V for Eviota’s use; (c) purchased a desktop IBM computer
for Eviota’s use; (d) arranged the takeout of Eviota’s loans with Eviota’s former employer; (e) released Eviota’s signing bonus in the net
amount of P300,000.00; (f) booked Eviota’s participation in a Singapore conference on Y2K project scheduled; and (g) introduced Eviota to
the local and regional staff and officers of the Bank via personal introductions and electronic mail.
o Eviota suddenly resigned his employment with immediate effect to re-join his previous employer. His resignation did not comply with the
30-day prior notice rule under the law and under the Employment Contract.
o There is evidence to show that in his attempts to justify his hasty departure from the Bank and conceal the real reason for his move, Eviota
has resorted to falsehoods derogatory to the reputation of the Bank. He has been maliciously purveying the canard that he had hurriedly left
the Bank because it had failed to provide him support. His untruthful remarks have falsely depicted the Bank as a contract violator and an
undesirable employer, thus damaging the Banks reputation and business standing in the highly competitive banking community, and
undermining its ability to recruit and retain the best personnel in the labor market
o Eviota never complied with the Banks demand that he reimburse the latter for the other expenses incurred on his account
- The respondent bank alleged its causes of action against the petitioner:
 o Eviota’s actions constitute a clear violation of Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code
o Under Article 285 (a) of the Labor Code, an employee may terminate without just cause the employer-employee relationship by serving
written notice on the employer at least one (1) month in advance. In addition, Section 13 of the Employment Contract specifically provides
that: Your employment may be terminated by either party giving notice of at least one month
o Eviota’s false and derogatory statements that the Bank had failed to deliver what it had purportedly promised have besmirched the Banks
reputation and depicted it as a contract violator and one which does not treat its employees properly
- The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action for damages was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
- The RTC denied this motion.
- CA held that it was the Trial Court that had jurisdiction and not the LA.

ISSUES
Whether the LA has jurisdiction over this case – NO

PROVISIONS
ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission.(a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the
absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations.

RULING
- NO. The trial Court has jurisdiction.
- Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. A
money claim by a worker against the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter only if there is a reasonable causal
connection between the claim asserted and employee-employer relation. Absent such a link, the complaint will be cognizable by the regular courts of
justice.
- Actions between employees and employer where the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action precedes from a
different source of obligation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court.
o Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter under Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended, is limited to disputes arising from an employer-
employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor laws or their collective bargaining
agreements.
o In Singapore Airlines v. Pao, we stated that the action was for breach of a contractual obligation, which is intrinsically a civil dispute. We
further stated that while seemingly the cause of action arose from employer-employee relations, the employers claim for damages is
grounded on wanton failure and refusal without just cause to report to duty coupled with the averment that the employee maliciously and
with bad faith violated the terms and conditions of the contract to the damage of the employer. Such averments removed the controversy
from the coverage of the Labor Code of the Philippines and brought it within the purview of the Civil Law.
- In this case, the private respondent’s first cause of action for damages is anchored on the petitioner’s employment of deceit and of making the private
respondent believe that he would fulfill his obligation under the employment contract with assiduousness and earnestness.
o The petitioner when, without the requisite thirty-day notice under the contract and the Labor Code, he abandoned his office and rejoined his
former employer; thus, forcing the private respondent to hire a replacement. The private respondent was left in a lurch, and its corporate
plans and program in jeopardy and disarray. Moreover, the petitioner took off with the private respondents computer diskette, papers and
documents containing confidential information on employee compensation and other bank matters.
- On its second cause of action, the petitioner simply walked away from his employment with the private respondent absent any written notice, to the
prejudice of the private respondent, its banking operations and the conduct of its business.
- On its third cause of action, the petitioner made false and derogatory statements that the private respondent reneged on its obligations under their
contract of employment; thus, depicting the private respondent as unworthy of trust.
- It is evident that the causes of action of the private respondent against the petitioner do not involve the provisions of the Labor Code and other labor
laws but the New Civil Code. Thus, the said causes of action are intrinsically civil. There is no causal relationship between the causes of action of the
private respondent’s causes of action against the petitioner and their employer-employee relationship. The fact that the private respondent was the
erstwhile employer of the petitioner under an existing employment contract before the latter abandoned his employment is merely incidental.

DISPOSITION
The Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition of the petitioner is AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 187417

CHRISTINE JOY CAPIN-CADIZ, Petitioner,

vs.
BRENT HOSPITAL AND COLLEGES, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolutions dated July 22, 2008 2 and February 24, 20093 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. SP No. 02373-MIN, which dismissed the petition filed by petitioner Christine Joy Capin-Cadiz (Cadiz) on the following grounds: (1)
incomplete statement of material dates; (2) failure to attach registry receipts; and (3) failure to indicate the place of issue of counsel's Professional Tax Receipt
(PTR) and Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) official receipts.

Antecedent Facts

Cadiz was the Human Resource Officer of respondent Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc. (Brent) at the time of her indefinite suspension from employment in 2006.
The cause of suspension was Cadiz's Unprofessionalism and Unethical Behavior Resulting to Unwed Pregnancy. It appears that Cadiz became pregnant out of
wedlock, and Brent imposed the suspension until such time that she marries her boyfriend in accordance with law.
Cadiz then filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice, Constructive Dismissal, Non-Payment of Wages and Damages with prayer for
Reinstatement.4

Ruling of the Labor Tribunals

In its Decision5 dated April 12, 2007, the LA found that Cadiz's indefinite suspension amounted to a constructive dismissal; nevertheless, the LA ruled that Cadiz
was not illegally dismissed as there was just cause for her dismissal, that is, she engaged in premarital sexual relations with her boyfriend resulting in a pregnancy
out of wedlock. 6 The LA further stated that her "immoral conduct x x x [was] magnified as serious misconduct not only by her getting pregnant as a result thereof
before and without marriage, but more than that, also by the fact that Brent is an institution of the Episcopal Church in the Philippines operating both a hospital
and college where [Cadiz] was employed."7 The LA also ruled that she was not entitled to reinstatement "at least until she marries her boyfriend," to backwages
and vacation/sick leave pay. Brent, however, manifested that it was willing to pay her 13th month pay. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering [Brent] to pay [Cadiz] 13 th month pay in the sum of Seven Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy & 11/100
Pesos (P7,970.11).

All other charges and claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.8

Cadiz appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which affirmed the LA decision in its Resolution 9 dated December 10, 2007. Her motion for
reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC in its Resolution 10 dated February 29, 2008, Cadiz elevated her case to the CA on petition for certiorari under
Rule 65.

Ruling of the CA

The CA, however, dismissed her petition outright due to technical defects in the petition: (1) incomplete statement of material dates; (2) failure to attach registry
receipts; and (3) failure to indicate the place of issue of counsel's PTR and IBP official receipts. 11 Cadiz sought reconsideration of the assailed CA Resolution
dated July 22, 2008 but it was denied in the assailed Resolution dated February 24, 2009. 12 The CA further ruled that "a perusal of the petition will reveal that
public respondent NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction x x x holding [Cadiz's] dismissal from employment
valid." 13

Hence, the present petition.

Cadiz argues that -

THE HONORABLE [NLRC] GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT [CADIZ'S] IMPREGNATION OUTSIDE OF WEDLOCK IS
A GROUND FOR THE TERMINATION OF [CADIZ'S] EMPLOYMENT14

II

THE [NLRC] COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT UPHELD THE DISMISSAL OF [CADIZ] ON THE GROUND THAT THE
INDEFINITE SUSPENSION WAS VALID AND REQUIRED [CADIZ] TO FIRST ENTER INTO MARRIAGE BEFORE SHE CAN BE ADMITTED BACK
TO HER EMPLOYMENT15

III

RESPONDENT [NLRC] GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED [CADIZ'S] CLAIM FOR BACKWAGES, ALLOWANCES, SICK
LEAVE PAY, MATERNITY PAY AND MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 16

IV

THE [CA] MISPLACED APPLICATION OF THE MATERIAL DATA RULE RESULTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED
THE APPEAL17

Cadiz contends, among others, that getting pregnant outside of wedlock is not grossly immoral, especially when both partners do not have any legal impediment to
marry. Cadiz surmises that the reason for her suspension was not because of her relationship with her then boyfriend but because of the resulting pregnancy. Cadiz
also lambasts Brent's condition for her reinstatement - that she gets married to her boyfriend - saying that this violates the stipulation against marriage under
Article 136 of the Labor Code. Finally, Cadiz contends that there was substantial compliance with the rules of procedure, and the CA should not have dismissed
the petition. 18

Brent, meanwhile, adopts and reiterates its position before the LA and the NLRC that Cadiz's arguments are irrational and out of context. Brent argues, among
others, that for Cadiz to limit acts of immorality only to extra-marital affairs is to "change the norms, beliefs, teachings and practices of BRENT as a Church
institution of the x x x Episcopal Church in the Philippines." 19

Ruling of the Court

Ordinarily, the Court will simply gloss over the arguments raised by Cadiz, given that the main matter dealt with by the CA were the infirmities found in the
petition and which caused the dismissal of her case before it. In view, however, of the significance of the issues involved in Cadiz's dismissal from employment,
the Court will resolve the petition including the substantial grounds raised herein.
The issue to be resolved is whether the CA committed a reversible error in ruling that: (1) Cadiz's petition is dismissible on ground of technical deficiencies; and
(2) the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding her dismissal from employment.

Rules of procedure are mere tools

designed to facilitate the attainment
of justice

In dismissing outright Cadiz's petition, the CA found the following defects: (1) incomplete statement of material dates; (2) failure to attach registry receipts; and
(3) failure to indicate the place of issue of counsel's PTR and IBP official receipts.

Rule 46, Section 3 of the Rules of Court states the contents of a petition filed with the CA under Rule 65, viz, "the petition shall x x x indicate the material dates
showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and
when notice of the denial thereof was received." The rationale for this is to enable the CA to determine whether the petition was filed within the period fixed in the
rules. 20 Cadiz's failure to state the date of receipt of the copy of the NLRC decision, however, is not fatal to her case since the more important material date which
must be duly alleged in a petition is the date of receipt of the resolution of denial of the motion for reconsideration,21 which she has duly complied with. 22

The CA also dismissed the petition for failure to attach the registry receipt in the affidavit of service. 23 Cadiz points out, on the other hand, that the registry receipt
number was indicated in the petition and this constitutes substantial compliance with the requirement. What the rule requires, however, is that the registry receipt
must be appended to the paper being served.24 Clearly, mere indication of the registry receipt numbers will not suffice. In fact, the absence of the registry receipts
amounts to lack of proof of service.25 Nevertheless, despite this defect, the Court finds that the ends of substantial justice would be better served by relaxing the
application of technical rules of procedure. 26With regard to counsel's failure to indicate the place where the IBP and PTR receipts were issued, there was
substantial compliance with the requirement since it was indicated in the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, as correctly argued by Cadiz's
lawyer. 27

Time and again, the Court has emphasized that rules of procedure are designed to secure substantial justice. These are mere tools to expedite the decision or
resolution of cases and if their strict and rigid application would frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, then it must be avoided.28

Immorality as a just cause for

termination of employment

Both the LA and the NLRC upheld Cadiz's dismissal as one attended with just cause. The LA, while ruling that Cadiz's indefinite suspension was tantamount to a
constructive dismissal, nevertheless found that there was just cause for her dismissal. According to the LA, "there was just cause therefor, consisting in her
engaging in premarital sexual relations with Carl Cadiz, allegedly her boyfriend, resulting in her becoming pregnant out of wedlock." 29 The LA deemed said act to
be immoral, which was punishable by dismissal under Brent's rules and which likewise constituted serious misconduct under Article 282(a) of the Labor Code.
The LA also opined that since Cadiz was Brent's Human Resource Officer in charge of implementing its rules against immoral conduct, she should have been the
"epitome of proper conduct."30 The LA ruled:

[Cadiz's] immoral conduct by having premarital sexual relations with her alleged boy friend, a former Brent worker and her co-employee, is magnified as serious
misconduct not only by her getting pregnant as a result thereof before and without marriage, but more than that, also by the fact that Brent is an institution of the
Episcopal Church in the Philippines x x x committed to "developing competent and dedicated professionals x x x and in providing excellent medical and other
health services to the community for the Glory of God and Service to Humanity." x x x As if these were not enough, [Cadiz] was Brent's Human Resource Officer
charged with, among others, implementing the rules of Brent against immoral conduct, including premarital sexual relations, or fornication x x x. She should have
been the epitome of proper conduct, but miserably failed. She herself engaged in premarital sexual relations, which surely scandalized the Brent community.xx x. 31

The NLRC, for its part, sustained the LA's conclusion.

The Court, however, cannot subscribe to the labor tribunals' conclusions.

Admittedly, one of the grounds for disciplinary action under Brent's policies is immorality, which is punishable by dismissal at first offense.32 Brent's Policy
Manual provides:

CATEGORY IV

In accordance with Republic Act No. 1052,33 the following are just cause for terminating an employment of an employee without a definite period:

xxxx

2. Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work, such as, but not limited
to the following:

xxxx

b. Commission of immoral conduct or indecency within the company premises, such as an act of lasciviousness or any act which is sinful and vulgar in nature.

c. Immora1ity, concubinage, bigamy. 34

Its Employee's Manual of Policies, meanwhile, enumerates "[a]cts of immorality such as scandalous behaviour, acts of lasciviousness against any person (patient,
visitors, co-workers) within hospital premises"35 as a ground for discipline and discharge. Brent also relied on Section 94 of the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools (MRPS), which lists "disgraceful or immoral conduct" as a cause for terminating employment. 36

Thus, the question that must be resolved is whether Cadiz's premarital relations with her boyfriend and the resulting pregnancy out of wedlock constitute
immorality. To resolve this, the Court makes reference to the recently promulgated case of Cheryll Santos Leus v. St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove and/or Sr.
Edna Quiambao, OSB.37
Leus involved the same personal circumstances as the case at bench, albeit the employer was a Catholic and sectarian educational institution and the petitioner,
Cheryll Santos Leus (Leus ), worked as an assistant to the school's Director of the Lay Apostolate and Community Outreach Directorate. Leus was dismissed from
employment by the school for having borne a child out of wedlock. The Court ruled in Leus that the determination of whether a conduct is disgraceful or immoral
involves a two-step process: first, a consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct; and second, an assessment of the said
circumstances vis-a-vis the prevailing norms of conduct, i.e., what the society generally considers moral and respectable.

In this case, the surrounding facts leading to Cadiz's dismissal are straightforward - she was employed as a human resources officer in an educational and medical
institution of the Episcopal Church of the Philippines; she and her boyfriend at that time were both single; they engaged in premarital sexual relations, which
resulted into pregnancy. The labor tribunals characterized these as constituting disgraceful or immoral conduct. They also sweepingly concluded that as Human
Resource Officer, Cadiz should have been the epitome of proper conduct and her indiscretion "surely scandalized the Brent community."38

The foregoing circumstances, however, do not readily equate to disgraceful and immoral conduct. Brent's Policy Manual and Employee's Manual of Policies do
not define what constitutes immorality; it simply stated immorality as a ground for disciplinary action. Instead, Brent erroneously relied on the standard dictionary
definition of fornication as a form of illicit relation and proceeded to conclude that Cadiz's acts fell under such classification, thus constituting immorality. 39

Jurisprudence has already set the standard of morality with which an act should be gauged - it is public and secular, not religious. 40 Whether a conduct is
considered disgraceful or immoral should be made in accordance with the prevailing norms of conduct, which, as stated in Leus, refer to those conducts which are
proscribed because they are detrimental to conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society. The fact that a particular act does not
conform to the traditional moral views of a certain sectarian institution is not sufficient reason to qualify such act as immoral unless it, likewise, does not conform
to public and secular standards. More importantly, there must be substantial evidence to establish that premarital sexual relations and pregnancy out of wedlock is
considered disgraceful or immoral.41

The totality of the circumstances of this case does not justify the conclusion that Cadiz committed acts of immorality. Similar to Leus, Cadiz and her boyfriend
were both single and had no legal impediment to marry at the time she committed the alleged immoral conduct. In fact, they eventually married on April 15,
2008.42 Aside from these, the labor tribunals' respective conclusion that Cadiz's "indiscretion" "scandalized the Brent community" is speculative, at most, and there
is no proof adduced by Brent to support such sweeping conclusion. Even Brent admitted that it came to know of Cadiz's "situation" only when her pregnancy
became manifest.43 Brent also conceded that "[a]t the time [Cadiz] and Carl R. Cadiz were just carrying on their boyfriend-girlfriend relationship, there was no
knowledge or evidence by [Brent] that they were engaged also in premarital sex." 44 This only goes to show that Cadiz did not flaunt her premarital relations with
her boyfriend and it was not carried on under scandalous or disgraceful circumstances. As declared in Leus, "there is no law which penalizes an unmarried mother
by reason of her sexual conduct or proscribes the consensual sexual activity between two unmarried persons; that neither does such situation contravene[s] any
fundamental state policy enshrined in the Constitution. "45 The fact that Brent is a sectarian institution does not automatically subject Cadiz to its religious standard
of morality absent an express statement in its manual of personnel policy and regulations, prescribing such religious standard as gauge as these regulations create
the obligation on both the employee and the employer to abide by the same. 46

Brent, likewise, cannot resort to the MRPS because the Court already stressed in Leus that "premarital sexual relations between two consenting adults who have no
impediment to marry each other, and, consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock, gauged from a purely public and secular view of morality, does not amount
to a disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS."47

Marriage as a condition for

reinstatement

The doctrine of management prerogative gives an employer the right to "regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment,
including hiring, work assignments, working methods, the time, place and manner of work, work supervision, transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and
discipline, dismissal, and recall of employees."48 In this case, Brent imposed on Cadiz the condition that she subsequently contract marriage with her then
boyfriend for her to be reinstated. According to Brent, this is "in consonance with the policy against encouraging illicit or common-law relations that would
subvert the sacrament of marriage."49

Statutory law is replete with legislation protecting labor and promoting equal opportunity in employment. No less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that the
"State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities
for all."50 The Labor Code of the Philippines, meanwhile, provides:

Art. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman
employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to
actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.

With particular regard to women, Republic Act No. 9710 or the Magna Carta of Women51 protects women against discrimination in all matters relating to marriage
and family relations, including the right to choose freely a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent. 52

Weighed against these safeguards, it becomes apparent that Brent's condition is coercive, oppressive and discriminatory. There is no rhyme or reason for
it.1âwphi1 It forces Cadiz to marry for economic reasons and deprives her of the freedom to choose her status, which is a privilege that inheres in her as an
intangible and inalienable right. 53While a marriage or no-marriage qualification may be justified as a "bona fide occupational qualification," Brent must prove two
factors necessitating its imposition, viz: (1) that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and (2) that
there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.54 Brent
has not shown the presence of neither of these factors. Perforce, the Court cannot uphold the validity of said condition.

Given the foregoing, Cadiz, therefore, is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, and payment of backwages computed from the time
compensation was withheld up to the date of actual reinstatement. Where reinstatement is no longer viable as an option, separation pay should be awarded as an
alternative and as a form of financial assistance. 55 In the computation of separation pay, the Court stresses that it should not go beyond the date an employee
was deemed to have been actually separated from employment, or beyond the date when reinstatement was rendered impossible. 56 In this case, the records
do not show whether Cadiz already severed her employment with Brent or whether she is gainfully employed elsewhere; thus, the computation of separation pay
shall be pegged based on the findings that she was employed on August 16, 2002, on her own admission in her complaint that she was dismissed on November 17,
2006, and that she was earning a salary of P9,108.70 per month, 57 which shall then be computed at a rate of one (1) month salary for every year of service,58 as
follows:
Monthly salary P9,108.70

multiplied by number of years x

 in service (Aug 02 to Nov 06) 4

P36,434.80

The Court also finds that Cadiz is only entitled to limited backwages. Generally, the computation of backwages is reckoned from the date of illegal dismissal until
actual reinstatement. 59 In case separation pay is ordered in lieu of reinstatement or reinstatement is waived by the employee, backwages is computed from the time
of dismissal until the finality of the decision ordering separation pay. 60 Jurisprudence further clarified that the period for computing the backwages during the
period of appeal should end on the date that a higher court reversed the labor arbitration ruling of illegal dismissal. 61 If applied in Cadiz's case, then the
computation of backwages should be from November 17, 2006, which was the time of her illegal dismissal, until the date of promulgation of this decision.
Nevertheless, the Court has also recognized that the constitutional policy of providing full protection to labor is not intended to oppress or destroy
management. 62 The Court notes that at the time of Cadiz's indefinite suspension from employment, Leus was yet to be decided by the Court. Moreover, Brent was
acting in good faith and on its honest belief that Cadiz's pregnancy out of wedlock constituted immorality. Thus, fairness and equity dictate that the award of
backwages shall only be equivalent to one (1) year or P109,304.40, computed as follows:
Monthly salary P9,108.70

multiplied by one year x

or 12 months 12

P109,304.40

Finally, with regard to Cadiz's prayer for moral and exemplary damages, the Court finds the same without merit. A finding of illegal dismissal, by itself, does not
establish bad faith to entitle an employee to moral damages. 63 Absent clear and convincing evidence showing that Cadiz's dismissal from Brent's employ had been
carried out in an arbitrary, capricious and malicious manner, moral and exemplary damages cannot be awarded. The Court nevertheless grants the award of
attorney's fees in the amount of ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award, Cadiz having been forced to litigate in order to seek redress of her grievances.64

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated July 22, 2008 and February 24, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02373-MIN
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a NEW ONE ENTERED finding petitioner Christine Joy Capin-Cadiz to have been dismissed without just cause.

Respondent Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc. is hereby ORDERED TO PAY petitioner Christine Joy Capin-Cadiz:

(1) One Hundred Nine Thousand Three Hundred Four Pesos and 40/100 (Pl 09,304.40) as backwages;

(2) Thirty-Six Thousand Four Hundred Thirty-Four Pesos and 80/100 (P36,434.80) as separation pay; and

(3) Attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total award.

The monetary awards granted shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE

Republic Act No. 8293 June 6, 1997

AN ACT PRESCRIBING THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE AND ESTABLISHING THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE,
PROVIDING FOR ITS POWERS AND FUNCTIONS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::

PART I
THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE

Section 7. The Director General and Deputies Director General. - 7.1. Functions. - The Director General shall exercise the following powers and functions:

a) Manage and direct all functions and activities of the Office, including the promulgation of rules and regulations to implement the objectives, policies,
plans, programs and projects of the Office: Provided, That in the exercise of the authority to propose policies and standards in relation to the following:
(1) the effective, efficient, and economical operations of the Office requiring statutory enactment; (2) coordination with other agencies of government
in relation to the enforcement of intellectual property rights; (3) the recognition of attorneys, agents, or other persons representing applicants or other
parties before the Office; and (4) the establishment of fees for the filing and processing of an application for a patent, utility model or industrial design
or mark or a collective mark, geographic indication and other marks of ownership, and for all other services performed and materials furnished by the
Office, the Director General shall be subject to the supervision of the Secretary of Trade and Industry;

b) Exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all decisions rendered by the Director of Legal Affairs, the Director of Patents, the Director of
Trademarks, and the Director of the Documentation, Information and Technology Transfer Bureau. The decisions of the Director General in the
exercise of his appellate jurisdiction in respect of the decisions of the Director of Patents, and the Director of Trademarks shall be appealable to the
Court of Appeals in accordance with the Rules of Court; and those in respect of the decisions of the Director of Documentation, Information and
Technology Transfer Bureau shall be appealable to the Secretary of Trade and Industry; and
 c) Exercise original jurisdiction to resolve disputes relating to the terms of a license involving the author's right to public performance or other
communication of his work. The decisions of the Director General in these cases shall be appealable to the Secretary of Trade and Industry.

Section 10. The Bureau of Legal Affairs. - The Bureau of Legal Affairs shall have the following functions:

10.1. Hear and decide opposition to the application for registration of marks; cancellation of trademarks; subject to the provisions of Section 64, cancellation of
patents, utility models, and industrial designs; and petitions for compulsory licensing of patents;

10.2. (a) Exercise original jurisdiction in administrative complaints for violations of laws involving intellectual property rights: Provided, That its jurisdiction is
limited to complaints where the total damages claimed are not less than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000): Provided further, That availment of the
provisional remedies may be granted in accordance with the Rules of Court. The Director of Legal Affairs shall have the power to hold and punish for contempt all
those who disregard orders or writs issued in the course of the proceedings. (n)

(b) After formal investigation, the Director for Legal Affairs may impose one (1) or more of the following administrative penalties:

(i) The issuance of a cease and desist order which shall specify the acts that the respondent shall cease and desist from and shall require him
to submit a compliance report within a reasonable time which shall be fixed in the order;

(ii) The acceptance of a voluntary assurance of compliance or discontinuance as may be imposed. Such voluntary assurance may include one
or more of the following:

(1) An assurance to comply with the provisions of the intellectual property law violated;

(2) An assurance to refrain from engaging in unlawful and unfair acts and practices subject of the formal investigation;

(3) An assurance to recall, replace, repair, or refund the money value of defective goods distributed in commerce; and

(4) An assurance to reimburse the complainant the expenses and costs incurred in prosecuting the case in the Bureau of Legal
Affairs.

The Director of Legal Affairs may also require the respondent to submit periodic compliance reports and file a bond to guarantee
compliance of his undertaking;

(iii) The condemnation or seizure of products which are subject of the offense. The goods seized hereunder shall be disposed of in such
manner as may be deemed appropriate by the Director of Legal Affairs, such as by sale, donation to distressed local governments or to
charitable or relief institutions, exportation, recycling into other goods, or any combination thereof, under such guidelines as he may
provide;

(iv) The forfeiture of paraphernalia and all real and personal properties which have been used in the commission of the offense;

(v) The imposition of administrative fines in such amount as deemed reasonable by the Director of Legal Affairs, which shall in no case be
less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000) nor more than One hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000). In addition, an additional fine of not
more than One thousand pesos (P1,000) shall be imposed for each day of continuing violation;

(vi) The cancellation of any permit, license, authority, or registration which may have been granted by the Office, or the suspension of the
validity thereof for such period of time as the Director of Legal Affairs may deem reasonable which shall not exceed one (1) year;

(vii) The withholding of any permit, license, authority, or registration which is being secured by the respondent from the Office;

(viii) The assessment of damages;

(ix) Censure; and

(x) Other analogous penalties or sanctions. (Secs. 6, 7, 8, and 9, Executive Order No. 913 [1983]a)

IN-N-OUT BURGER, INC. VS. NI INC., ET. AL

In-N-Out Burger, Inc. vs. Sehwani Inc., et. al
Facts:
Petitioner IN-N-OUT BURGER, INC., is a business entity incorporated under the laws of California. It is a signatory to the Convention of Paris on Protection of
Industrial Property and the TRIPS Agreement. It is engaged mainly in the restaurant business, but it has never engaged in business in the Philippines.
Respondents Sehwani, Incorporated and Benita Frites, Inc. are corporations organized in the Philippines. Sometime in 1991, Sehwani filed with the BPTTT an
application for the registration of the mark “IN N OUT (the inside of the letter “O” formed like a star). Its application was approved and a certificate of registration
was issued in its name on 1993. In 2000, Sehwani, Incorporated and Benita Frites, Inc. entered into a Licensing Agreement, wherein the former entitled the latter
to use its registered mark, “IN N OUT.”
Sometime in 1997, In-N-Out Burger filed trademark and service mark applications with the Bureau of Trademarks for the “IN-N-OUT” and “IN-N-OUT Burger &
Arrow Design. In 2000, In-N-Out Burger found out that Sehwani, Incorporated had already obtained Trademark Registration for the mark “IN N OUT (the inside
of the letter “O” formed like a star).” Also in 2000, In-N-Out Burger sent a demand letter directing Sehwani, Inc. to cease and desist from claiming ownership of
the mark “IN-N-OUT” and to voluntarily cancel its trademark registration. Sehwani Inc. did not accede to In-N-Out Burger’s demand but it expressed its
willingness to surrender its registration for a consideration.
In 2001 In-N-Out Burger filed before the Bureau of Legal Affairs an administrative complaint against the Sehwani, Inc. and Benita Frites, Inc. for unfair
competition and cancellation of trademark registration.
Issues:
  Whether or not the Intellectual Property Office (an administrative body) have jurisdiction of cases involving provisions of the IPC (e.g. unfair
competition).[1]
 Whether or not there was unfair competition.
Held:
FIRST ISSUE: Yes, the IPO (an administrative body) has jurisdiction in cases involving provisions of the IPC (e.g. unfair competition) due to the following
reasons:
 Section 10 of the Intellectual Property Code specifically identifies the functions of the Bureau of Legal Affairs, thus:
Section 10. The Bureau of Legal Affairs.“The Bureau of Legal Affairs shall have the following functions:
10.1 Hear and decide opposition to the application for registration of marks; cancellation of trademarks; subject to the provisions of Section 64, cancellation of
patents and utility models, and industrial designs; and petitions for compulsory licensing of patents;
10.2 (a) Exercise original jurisdiction in administrative complaints for violations of laws involving intellectual property rights; Provided, That its
jurisdiction is limited to complaints where the total damages claimed are not less than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000): Provided, futher, That
availment of the provisional remedies may be granted in accordance with the Rules of Court. Xxx
Xxx
(vi) The cancellation of any permit, license, authority, or registration which may have been granted by the Office, or the suspension of the validity thereof
for such period of time as the Director of Legal Affairs may deem reasonable which shall not exceed one (1) year;
Xxx
(viii) The assessment of damages;
Unquestionably, petitioner’s complaint, which seeks the cancellation of the disputed mark in the name of respondent Sehwani, Incorporated, and
damages for violation of petitioner’s intellectual property rights, falls within the jurisdiction of the IPO Director of Legal Affairs.

 While Section 163 thereof vests in civil courts jurisdiction over cases of unfair competition, nothing in the said section states that the regular
courts have sole jurisdiction over unfair competition cases, to the exclusion of administrative bodies.
 Sections 160 and 170, which are also found under Part III of the Intellectual Property Code, recognize the concurrent jurisdiction of civil
courts and the IPO over unfair competition cases.
These two provisions read:
Section 160. Right of Foreign Corporation to Sue in Trademark or Service Mark Enforcement Action. Any foreign national or juridical person who meets the
requirements of Section 3 of this Act and does not engage in business in the Philippines may bring a civil or administrative action hereunder for opposition,
cancellation, infringement, unfair competition, or false designation of origin and false description, whether or not it is licensed to do business in the Philippines
under existing laws.
Section 170. Penalties. Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions imposed by law, a criminal penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5)
years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000), shall be imposed on any person who is found guilty of
committing any of the acts mentioned in Section 155, Section168, and Subsection169.1.
Based on the foregoing discussion, the IPO Director of Legal Affairs had jurisdiction to decide the petitioner’s administrative case against respondents
and the IPO Director General had exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal of the judgment of the IPO Director of Legal Affairs.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes. The evidence on record shows that Sehwani Inc. and Benita Frites were not using their registered trademark but that of In-n-Out Burger.
Sehwani and Benita Frites are also giving their products the general appearance that would likely influence the purchasers to believe that their products are that of
In-N-Out Burger. The intention to deceive may be inferred from the similarity of the goods as packed and offered for sale, and, thus, an action will lie to restrain
unfair competition. The respondents’ frauduulent intention to deceive purchasers is also apparent in their use of the In-N-Out Burger in business signages.
The essential elements of an action for unfair competition are (1) confusing similarity in the general appearance of the goods and (2) intent to deceive the public
and defraud a competitor. The confusing similarity may or may not result from similarity in the marks, but may result from other external factors in the packaging
or presentation of the goods. The intent to deceive and defraud may be inferred from the similarity of the appearance of the goods as offered for sale to the public.
Actual fraudulent intent need not be shown.

 [1] IPO – Director of Legal Affairs decision

 In-N-Out Burger has legal capacity to sue in the Philippines because the latter is a signatory of the Convention of Paris on Protection of Industrial
Property.
 IN-N-OUT Burger, Inc. – right to use its tradename and mark to the exclusion of the others
 Respondents’ use of the petitioner’s mark was made in good faith and therefore they are not guilty of unfair competition.
 IPO – Director General’s Decision
 Respondents are guilty of unfair competition.
 The following are ordered to be paid to In-N-Out Burger, inc.
 Damages in the amount of PHP 212, 574.28
 Exemplary damages in the amount of PHP 500,000
 Attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation in the amount of PHP 500,000
 CA Decision
 Regular courts, and not the BLA-IPO, have sole jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving provisions of the IPC.

Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. & Pfizer (Phil.), Inc. G.R. No. 167715, 17 November 2010

by: Alpheus D. Macalalad

Facts: Pfizer is the registered owner of a patent pertaining to Sulbactam Ampicillin. It is marketed under the brand name “Unasyn.” Sometime in January and
February 2003, Pfizer discovered that Pharmawealth submitted bids for the supply of Sulbactam Ampicillin to several hospitals without the Pfizer’s consent. Pfizer
then demanded that the hospitals cease and desist from accepting such bids. Pfizer also demanded that Pharmawealth immediately withdraw its bids to supply
Sulbactam Ampicillin. Pharmawealth and the hospitals ignored the demands.

Pfizer then filed a complaint for patent infringement with a prayer for permanent injunction and forfeiture of the infringing products. A preliminary injunction
effective for 90 days was granted by the IPO’s Bureau of Legal Affairs (IPO-BLA). Upon expiration, a motion for extension filed by Pfizer was denied. Pfizer
filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the denial.

While the case was pending in the CA, Pfizer filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati (RTC) a complaint for infringement and unfair competition, with a
prayer for injunction. The RTC issued a temporary restraining order, and then a preliminary injunction.

Pharmawealth filed a motion to dismiss the case in the CA, on the ground of forum shopping. Nevertheless, the CA issued a temporary restraining order.
Pharmawealth again filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the patent, the main basis of the case, had already lapsed, thus making the case moot, and that the CA
had no jurisdiction to review the order of the IPO-BLA because this was granted to the Director General. The CA denied all the motions. Pharmawealth filed a
petition for review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issues:

a) Can an injunctive relief be issued based on an action of patent infringement when the patent allegedly infringed has already lapsed?
b) What tribunal has jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Director of Legal Affairs of the Intellectual Property Office?
c) Is there forum shopping when a party files two actions with two seemingly different causes of action and yet pray for the same relief?

Held:

a) No. The provision of R.A. 165, from which the Pfizer’s patent was based, clearly states that "[the] patentee shall have the exclusive right to make, use and sell
the patented machine, article or product, and to use the patented process for the purpose of industry or commerce, throughout the territory of the Philippines for the
term of the patent; and such making, using, or selling by any person without the authorization of the patentee constitutes infringement of the patent."

Clearly, the patentee’s exclusive rights exist only during the term of the patent. Since the patent was registered on 16 July 1987, it expired, in accordance with the
provisions of R.A. 165, after 17 years, or 16 July 2004. Thus, after 16 July 2004, Pfizer no longer possessed the exclusive right to make, use, and sell the products
covered by their patent. The CA was wrong in issuing a temporary restraining order after the cut-off date.

b) According to IP Code, the Director General of the IPO exercises exclusive jurisdiction over decisions of the IPO-BLA. The question in the CA concerns an
interlocutory order, and not a decision. Since the IP Code and the Rules and Regulations are bereft of any remedy regarding interlocutory orders of the IPO-BLA,
the only remedy available to Pfizer is to apply the Rules and Regulations suppletorily. Under the Rules, a petition for certiorari to the CA is the proper remedy.
This is consistent with the Rules of Court. Thus, the CA had jurisdiction.

c) Yes. Forum shopping is defined as the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and possibly
favorable) opinion in another forum (other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari), or the institution of two (2) or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.

The elements of forum shopping are: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties that represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; (c) identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action
will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. This instance meets these elements.

The parties are clearly identical. In both the complaints in the BLA-IPO and RTC, the rights allegedly violated and the acts allegedly violative of such rights are
identical, regardless of whether the patents on which the complaints were based are different. In both cases, the ultimate objective of Pfizer was to ask for damages
and to permanently prevent Pharmawealth from selling the contested products. Relevantly, the Supreme Court has decided that the filing of two actions with the
same objective, as in this instance, constitutes forum shopping.

Owing to the substantial identity of parties, reliefs and issues in the IPO and RTC cases, a decision in one case will necessarily amount to res judicata in the other
action.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1008 February 4, 1985

CREATING AN ARBITRATION MACHINERY IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY OF THE PHILIPPINES

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The CIAC shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected with, contracts entered into by parties
involved in construction in the Philippines, whether the dispute arises before or after the completion of the contract, or after the abandonment or breach thereof.
These disputes may involve government or private contracts. For the Board to acquire jurisdiction, the parties to a dispute must agree to submit the same to
voluntary arbitration.

The jurisdiction of the CIAC may include but is not limited to violation of specifications for materials and workmanship; violation of the terms of agreement;
interpretation and/or application of contractual time and delays; maintenance and defects; payment, default of employer or contractor and changes in contract cost.

Excluded from the coverage of this law are disputes arising from employer-employee relationships which shall continue to be covered by the Labor Code of the
Philippines.

Sec. 5. Composition of the Board. The Commission shall consist of a Chairman and two (2) members, all to be appointed by the CIAP Board upon
recommendation by the members of the PDCB.

Sec. 6. Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall perform, among others that may be conferred by law, the following functions:

1) To formulate and adopt an arbitration program for the construction industry;

2) To enunciate policies and prescribe rules and procedures for construction arbitration;

3) To supervise the arbitration program, and exercise such authority related thereto as regards the appointment, replacement or challenging of
arbitrators; and

4) To direct its officers and employees to perform such functions as may be assigned to them from time to time.

Metropolitan Cebu Water District v. Mactan Rock Industries (G.R. No. 172438)
Facts:
Petitioner Metropolitan Cebu Water District (MCWD), a government-owned and controlled corporation, entered into a Water Supply Contract with herein
respondent, Mactan Rock Industries, Inc. (MRII), wherein the latter would supply MCWD with potable water with a minimum guaranteed annual volume.
Respondent filed a complaint against MCWD with the CIAC citing the arbitration clause of the contract and seeking the reformation of Clause 17 of the Contract
or the Price Escalation/De-Escalation Clause in order to include Capital Cost Recovery in the price escalation formula. MCWD filed its Answer, including a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that CIAC had no jurisdiction over the case, as the contract was not one for construction or infrastructure. Petitioner
then filed two petitions before the CA which were both denied, hence this petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not CIAC may exercise jurisdiction over disputes arising from a water supply contract; and if so,
(2) Whether or not CIAC have a jurisdiction over a complaint praying for a reformation of a water supply contract.
Ruling:
(1) The Court finds in the affirmative. The motion for reconsideration was denied by CA and MCWD never appealed the case. Thus, the decision of the CA
became final and executory. The Court has held time and again that a final and executory judgment, no matter how erroneous, cannot be changed even by this
Court. The CA affirming the CIAC’s jurisdiction and it becoming final, is now beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to review or modify, even supposing for the
sake of argument, that it is indeed erroneous.
(2) Where the law does not delineate, neither should we. Neither the provisions of the Civil Code on reformation of contracts nor the law creating CIAC exclude
reformation in its jurisdiction. Therefore, because the CIAC has been held to have jurisdiction over the contract, it follows that it has jurisdiction to order the
reformation of the contract as well.
CASE DIGEST: THE MANILA INSURANCE VS. SPOUSES AMURAO
G.R. No. 179628 : January 16, 2013

THE MANILA INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v. SPOUSES ROBERTO and AIDA AMURAO, Respondents.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

Spouses Roberto and Aida Amurao (Sps. Amurao) entered into a Construction Contract Agreement (CCA) with Aegean Construction and Development Corp.
(Aegean) for the construction of a six-storey commercial building. To guarantee its obligation, Aegean posted performance bonds secured by petitioner Manila
Insurance Company, Inc. (Manila Insurance) and Intra Strata Assurance Corporation (Intra Strata). Aegean failed to comply with its obligation. Hence, the spouses
filed a complaint before the RTC to enforce its claim against the sureties.

During the pre-trial, Manila Insurance and Intra Strata discovered that the CCA contained an arbitration clause. Consequently, they filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss.

Manila Insurance appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the petition.

Hence, Manila Insurance elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.

Manila Insurance argues that it cannot be held liable as a surety because the claim of Sps. Amurao is premature. Manila Insurance contends that the dispute
between the spouses and Aegean should be brought first before the CIAC for arbitration.

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not Manila Insurance can be held liable as surety of Aegean?

II. Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the dispute?

HELD:

CIVIL LAW: surety’s liability

FIRST ISSUE: Manila Insurance is liable as surety.

A contract of suretyship is defined as “an agreement whereby a party, called the surety, guarantees the performance by another party, called the principal or
obligor, of an obligation or undertaking in favor of a third party, called the obligee.

The Court has consistently held that a surety’s liability is joint and several, limited to the amount of the bond, and determined strictly by the terms of contract of
suretyship in relation to the principal contract between the obligor and the obligee.It bears stressing, however, that although the contract of suretyship is secondary
to the principal contract, the surety’s liability to the obligee is nevertheless direct, primary, and absolute. But while there is a cause of action against Manila
Insurance, the complaint must still be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

REMEDIAL LAW: arbitration

SECOND ISSUE: The CIAC has jurisdiction over the case and not the RTC.

In order for the CIAC to acquire jurisdiction two requisites must concur: “first, the dispute must be somehow connected to a construction contract; and second, the
parties must have agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration proceedings.” In this case, both requisites are present.

DISMISSED.

MILITARY COURTS MARTIAL

G.R. No. L-4663 May 30, 1951

FERDINAND E. MARCOS and MANUEL CONCORDIA, petitioners,

vs.
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. L-4671 May 30, 1951

MANUEL A. CONCORDIA and FERDINAND E. MARCOS, petitioners,
vs.
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., respondents.

Petitioners in their own behalf.

Judge Advocate General Fred Ruiz Castro and Leonardo R. Lucena for respondents.

FERIA, J.:

These are two special civil actions of mandamus instituted by the same petitioners against the respondents General Court-Martials composed each of different
members or officers of the Philippine Army, in which it is alleged that the respondents Military Tribunals excluded unlawfully the petitioners from the enjoyment
of their right to appear as counsel for the accused prosecuted before said tribunals, to which the petitioners are entitled because they are attorneys duly admitted to
practice law in the Philippine Courts, on the ground that they are disqualified or inhibited by section 17, Article 17 of the Constitution to appear as counsel for said
defendants. Said Section 17 reads as follows:

SEC. 17. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall directly or indirectly be financially interested in any contract with the
Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Congress during his term of office. He
shall not appear as counsel before the Electoral Tribunals or before any court in any civil case wherein the Government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein an offer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office. . . ..

The only question for this Court to determine in these two cases is whether the prohibition contained in the above quoted section 17 of our Constitution is
applicable to the petitioners.

We are of the opinion and therefore hold that it is applicable, because the words "any court" includes the General Court-Martial, and a court-martial case is a
criminal case within the meaning of the above quoted provisions of our Constitution.

It is obvious that the words "any court," used in prohibiting members of Congress to appear as counsel "in any criminal case in which an officer or employee of the
Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office," refers, not only to a civil, but also to a military court or a Court-Martial. Because, in
construing a Constitution, "it must be taken as established that where words are used which have both a restricted and a general meaning, the general must prevail
over the restricted unless the nature of the subject matter of the context clearly indicates that the limited sense is intended." (11 American Jurisprudence, pp. 680-
682).

In the case of Ramon Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army,* 43 Off. Gaz., 855, we did not hold that the word "court" in general used in our Constitution
does not include a Court-Martial; what we held is that the words "inferior courts" used in connection with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to
"review on appeal certiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments of inferior courts in all criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is death or life imprisonment," as provided for in section 2, Article VIII, of the Constitution, do not refer to Courts-Martial or Military Courts.

Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, quoted by the petitioners and by this Court in the case of Ramon Ruffy et al vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army,
supra, has to say in this connection the following:

Notwithstanding that the court-martial is only an instrumentality of the executive power having no relation or connection, in law, with the judicial
establishments of the country, it is yet, so far as it is a court at all, and within its field of action, as fully a court of law and justice as is any civil tribunal.
As a court of law, it is bound, like any court, by the fundamental principles of law, and, in the absence of special provision of the subject in the military
code, it observes in general the rules of evidence as adopted in the common-law courts. As a court of justice, it is required by the terms of its statutory
oath, (art. 84.) to adjudicate between the U.S. an the accused "without partiality, favor, or affection," and according, not only to the laws and customs of
the service, but to its "conscience," i.e. its sense of substantial right and justice unaffected by technicalities. In the words of the Attorney General, court-
martial are thus, "in the strictest sense courts of justice. (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, Vol. 1 and 2, 2nd Ed., p. 54.)

In re Bogart, 3 Fed. Cas., 796, 801, citing 6 Op. Attys. Gen. 425, with approval, the court said:

In the language of Attorney General Cushing, a court-martial is a lawful tribunal existing by the same authority that any other exists by, and the law
military is a branch of law as valid as any other, and it differs from the general law of the land in authority only in this: that it applies to officers and
soldiers of the army but not to other members of the body politic, and that it is limited to breaches of military duty.

And in re Davison, 21 F. 618, 620, it was held:

That court-martial are lawful tribunals existing by the same authority as civil courts of the United States, have the same plenary jurisdiction in offenses
by the law military as the latter courts have in controversies within their cognizance, and in their special and more limited sphere are entitled to as
untrammeled an exercise of their powers.

And lastly, American Jurisprudence says:

SEC. 99. Representation by Counsel. — It is the general rule that one accused of the crime has the right to be represented before the court by counsel,
and this is expressly so declared by the statues controlling the procedure in court-martial. It has been held that a constitutional provision extending that
right to one accused in any trial in any court whatever applies to a court-martial and gives the accused the undeniable right to defend by counsel, and
that a court-martial has no power to refuse an attorney the right to appear before it if he is properly licensed to practice in the courts of the state. (Citing
the case of State ex rel Huffaker vs.Crosby, 24 Nev. 115, 50 Pac. 127; 36 American Jurisprudence 253)

The fact that a judgment of conviction, not of acquittal, rendered by a court-martial must be approved by the reviewing authority before it can be executed (Article
of War 46), does not change or affect the character of a court-martial as a court. A judgment of the Court of First Instance imposing death penalty must also be
approved by the Supreme Court before it can be executed.
That court-martial cases are criminal cases within the meaning of Section 17, Article VI, of the Constitution is also evident, because the crimes and misdemeanors
forbidden or punished by the Articles of War are offenses against the Republic of the Philippines. According to section 1, Rule 106, of the Rules of Court, a
criminal action or case is one which involves a wrong or injury done to the Republic, for the punishment of which the offender is prosecuted in the name of the
People of the Philippines; and pursuant to Article of War 17, "the trial advocate of a general or special court-martial shall prosecute (the accused) in the name of
the People of the Philippines."

Winthtrop, in his well known work "Military Law and Precedents' says the following:

In regard to the class of courts to which it belongs, it is lastly to be noted that the court-martial is strictly a criminal court. It has no civil jurisdiction
whatever; cannot enforce a contract, collect a debt, or award damages in favor of an individual. . . . Its judgment is a criminal sentence not a civil
verdict; its proper function is to award punishment upon the ascertainment of guilt. (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, Vols. 1 & 2, 2nd Ed., p.
55.)

In N. Y. it was held that the term "criminal case," used in the clause, must be allowed some meaning, and none can be conceived, other than a
prosecution for a criminal offense. Ex parte Carter. 66 S. W. 540, 544, 166 No. 604, 57 L.R.A. 654, quoting People vs. Kelly, 24 N.Y. 74; Counselman
vs. Hitchcock, 12 S. Ct. 195; 142 U.S. 547, L. Ed. 111o. (Words and Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 485.)

Besides, that a court-martial is a court, and the prosecution of an accused before it is a criminal and not an administrative case, and therefore it would be, under
certain conditions, a bar to another prosecution of the defendant for the same offense, because the latter would place the accused in jeopardy, is shown by the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Grafton vs. United States, 206 U. S. 333; 51 Law. Ed., 1088, 1092, in which the following was
held:

If a court-martial has jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier for a crime, its judgment will be accorded the finality and conclusiveness as to the issues
involved which attend the judgment of a civil court in a case of which it may legally take cognizance; and restricting our decision to the above question
of double jeopardy, we judge that, consistently with the above act of 1902, and for the reasons stated, the plaintiff in error, a soldier in the Army, having
been acquitted of the crime of homicide, alleged to have been committed by him in the Philippines, by a military court of competent jurisdiction,
proceeding under the authority of the United States, could not be subsequently tried for the same offense in a civil court exercising authority in that
territory.

Furthermore, taking into consideration the apparent intention or purpose of the framers of our Constitution in enacting section 17, Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution, it is obvious that there exist the same if not more reason for prohibiting the appearance of members of the Senate and the House of Representatives as
counsel for the accused in court-martial, as for inhibiting them to appear as such in civil courts, because the independence of civil court's judges is guaranteed by
our Constitution. Ubi eadem ibi eadem lex.

Wherefore, as the petitioners are disqualified to appear as counsel for the accused in court-martial, the respondents did not unlawfully exclude them from the
enjoyment of any right, and hence the petitions for mandamus in these two cases are denied with costs against the petitioners.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Reyes, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-533 August 20, 1946

RAMON RUFFY, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, PHILIPPINE ARMY, ET AL., respondents.

Placido C. Ramos for petitioners.

Lt. Col. Fred Ruiz Castro and Capt. Ramon V. Diaz, JAGS, PA., for respondents.

TUASON, J.:

This was a petition for prohibition, praying that the respondents, the Chief of Staff and the General Court Martial of the Philippine Army, be commanded to desist
from further proceedings in the trial of petitioners before that body. Preliminary injunction having been denied by us and the General Court Martial having gone
ahead with the trial, which eventually resulted in the acquittal of one of the defendants, Ramon Ruffy, the dismissal of the case as to another, Victoriano
Dinglasan, and the conviction of Jose L. Garcia, Prudente M. Francisco, Dominador Adeva and Andres Fortus, the last-named four petitioners now seek in their
memorandum to convert the petition into one for certiorari, with the prayer that the records of the proceedings before the General Court Martial be ordered
certified to this court for review.

The ground of the petition was that the petitioners were not subject to military law at the time the offense for which they had been placed on trial was committed.
In their memorandum they have raised an additional question of law — that the 93d Article of War is unconstitutional.

An outline of the petitioner's previous connection with the Philippine Army, the Philippine Constabulary, and/or with guerrilla organizations will presently be
made. This outline is based on allegations in the petition and the answer, and on exhibits attached thereto and to the parties' memoranda, exhibits which were
offered in the course of the oral argument and admitted without objection. The said exhibits are public documents certified by the officials who had them in
custody in their official capacity. They are presumed to be authentic, as we have no doubt they are.

It appears that at the outbreak of war on December 8, 1941, Ramon Ruffy was the Provincial Commander, Prudente M. Francisco, a junior officer, and Andres
Fortus, a corporal, all of the Philippine Constabulary garrison stationed in Mindoro. When, on February 27, 1942, the Japanese forces landed in Mindoro, Major
Ruffy retreated to the mountains instead of surrendering to the enemy, disbanded his company, and organized and led a guerrilla outfit known as Bolo Combat
team of Bolo Area. Lieutenant Francisco, Corporal Fortus and Jose L. Garcia, the last then a civilian joined Major Ruffy's organization towards the latter part of
1942, while Dominador Adeva and Victoriano Dinglasan, then likewise civilians, became its members some time in 1943..

Meanwhile, Brigadier General Macario Peralta, Jr., then a lieutenant colonel of the Philippine Army, also took to the hills of Panay and led the operation of the 6th
Military District, one of the districts into which the Philippine Army had been divided before the war. About November, 1942, Colonel Peralta succeeded in
contacting the General Headquarters of General MacArthur in Australia as the result of which on February 13, 1943, the 6th Military District was recognized by
the Headquarters of the Southwest Pacific Area as a military unit and part of its command.

Even before General MacArthur's recognition of the 6th Military District Colonel Peralta had extended its sphere of operation to comprise Mindoro and
Marinduque, and had, on January 2, 1943, named Major Ruffy as Acting Commander for those two provinces and Commanding Officer of the 3rd Battalion, 66
Infantry 61st Division, Philippine Corps. After the recognition, 2d Lieut. Prudente M. Francisco, by virtue of Special Orders No. 99, dated November 2, 1943, and
signed by Enrique L. Jurado, Major, OSE, Commanding, was assigned as S-3 in the Bolo Area. Major, later Lieut. Col., Jurado, it should be noted, had been
dispatched by the 6th Military District to Mindoro to assume operational control supervision over the Bolo Area unit and to make and direct the necessary report to
the Headquarters, 6th Military District, in Panay. On April 26, 1944, by General Orders No. 40 of the 6th Military District, 2d Lieutenant Francisco was promoted
to the rank of 1st Lieutenant (Brevet), effective April 15, 1944, subject to approval by the President of the Philippines, and was re-assigned to the Bolo Area. As to
Andres Fortus he was assigned to the same Bolo Area as probationary 3d lieutenant for two-month probationary training, by the Headquarters of the 6th Military
District, as per Special Orders No. 70, dated May 15, 1944.

According to a memorandum of the Chief of Staff, 6th Military District, dated January 1943, and signed by L.R. Relunia, Lieut. Col., CE, Chief of Staff, Jose L.
Garcia and Dominador Adeva were appointed 3d lieutenants, infantry as of December 31, 1942. Garcia later was promoted to the rank of captain, effective March
15, 1943, as per Special Orders No. 82, issued in the field, 6th Military District, and dated August 28, 1943. On May 24, 1943, Jose L. Garcia took his oath before
Captain Esteban P. Beloncio, then Acting Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 66th Infantry Regiment, 61st Division, 6th Military District.

As has been said, the 6th Military District sent Lieut. Col. Enrique L. Jurado to be Commanding Officer of the Bolo Combat Team in Mindoro and to undertake
other missions of Military character. Pursuant to instructions, Colonel Jurado on November 2, 1943, assigned Major Ruffy as Commanding Officer of the Bolo
Area with 3d Lieut. Dominador Adeva and 2d Lieut. Prudente M. Francisco as members of his staff and Victoriano Dinglasan as Finance Officer, as per Special
Orders No. 99 dated November 2, 1943. In a memorandum of Colonel Jurado for Major Ruffy bearing date 25 June, 1944, it was stated that Captain Garcia had
been given P5,000 for palay and Lieut. Francisco P9,000, P5,000 for palay and P4,000 for salary of the personnel B. Company.

A change in the command of the Bolo Area was effected by Colonel Jurado on June 8, 1944: Major Ruffy was relieved of his assignment as Commanding Officer,
Bolo Battalion, and Capt. Esteban P. Beloncio was put in Ruffy's place. On October 19, 1944, Lieut. Col. Jurado was slain allegedly by the petitioners. After the
commission of this crime, the petitioners, it is alleged, seceded from the 6th Military District. It was this murder which gave rise to petitioner's trial, the legality of
which is now being contested.

On July 26, 1941, the President of the Untied States issued a military order the pertinent paragraph of which stated: ". . . as Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, I hereby call and order into the service of the armed forces of the United States Army, for the period of the existing emergency, and
place under the command of the general officer, United States Army, to be designated by the Secretary of War, from time to time, all of the organized military
forces of the Government of the Commonwealth." Following the issuance of President Roosevelt's order General Douglas MacArthur was appointed Commanding
General of the United States Armed Forces in the Far East.

It is contended, in behalf of Captain Francisco and Lieutenant Fortus, that "by the enemy occupation of the Philippines, the National Defense Act and all laws and
regulations creating and governing the existence of the Philippine Army including the Articles of War, were suspended and in abeyance during such belligerent
occupation."

The paragraph quoted in the petitioner's memorandum from Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents and the subsequent paragraph which has been omitted furnish
a complete answer to petitioner's contention of the Philippines by Japanese forces, the officers and men of the Philippine Army did not cease to be fully in the
service, though in a measure,' only in a measure, they were not subject to the military jurisdiction, if they were not active duty. In the latter case, like officers and
soldiers on leave of absence or held as prisoners of war, they could not be held guilty of a breach of the discipline of the command or of a neglect of duty, or
disobedience of orders, or mutiny, or subject to a military trial therefor; but for an act unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, or an act which constitutes an
offense of the class specified in the 95th Article of War, they may in general be legally held subject to military jurisdiction and trial. "So a prisoner of war, though
not subject, while held by the enemy, to the discipline of his own army, would, when exchanged of paroled, be not exempt from liability for such offenses as
criminal acts or injuriuos conduct committed during his captivity against other officers or soldiers in the same status." (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents,
2d Edition, pp. 91, 92.)

The rule invoked by counsel, namely, that laws of political nature or affecting political relations are considered superseded or in abeyance during the military
occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory. It is not intended for and does not bind the enemies in arms. This is self-
evident from the very nature of things. The paradox of a contrary ruling should readily manifest itself. Under the petitioner's theory the forces of resistance
operating in an occupied territory would have to abide by the outlawing of their own existence. They would be stripped of the very life-blood of an army, the right
and the ability to maintain order and discipline within the organization and to try the men guilty of breach thereof.

The surrender by General Wainright of the Fil-American Forces does not profit the petitioner's who were former members of the Philippine Constabulary any more
than does the rule of war or international law they cite. The fall of Bataan and Corregidor did not end the war. It did not, legally or otherwise, keep the United
States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines from organizing a new army, regular or irregular, out of new men and men in the old service who had refused to
surrender or who having surrendered, had decided to carry on the fight through other diverse means and methods. The fall of Corregidor and Bataan just marked
the beginning of the gigantic preparation for the gigantic drive that was to fight its way to and beyond the Philippines in fulfillment of General MacArthur's classic
promise, "I shall return." The heroic role which the guerrillas played in that preparation and in the subsequent liberation of the Philippines is now history.

Independently of their previous connection with the Philippine Army and the Philippine Constabulary, Captain Francisco and Lieutenant Fortus as well as Major
Garcia and Lieutenant Adeva were subject to military jurisdiction.

The 2d Article of War defines and enumerates the persons subject to military law as follows:

Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. — The following persons are subject to these articles and shall be understood as included in the term "any
person subject to military law" or "persons subject to military law," whenever used in these articles:

(a) All officers, members of the Nurse Corps and soldiers belonging to the Regular Force of the Philippine Army; all reservists, from the dates of their
call to active duty and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or order to
obey the same;

(b) Cadets, flying cadets, and probationary third lieutenants;

 (c) All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the Army of the Philippines in the field in time of war or when martial law is
declared though not otherwise subject to these articles;

(d) All persons under sentences adjudged by courts-martial.

It is our opinion that the petitioners come within the general application of the clause in sub-paragraph (a); "and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or
ordered into, or to duty for training in, the said service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same." By their
acceptance of appointments as officers in the Bolo Area from the General Headquarters of the 6th Military District, they became members of the Philippine Army
amendable to the Articles of War. The Bolo Area, as has been seen, was a contigent of the 6th Military District which, as has also been pointed out, had been
recognized by and placed under the operational control of the United States Army in the Southwest Pacific. The Bolo Area received supplies and funds for the
salaries of its officers and men from the Southwest Pacific Command. As officers in the Bolo Area and the 6th Military District, the petitioners operated under the
orders of duly established and duly appointed commanders of the United States Army.

The attitude of the enemy toward underground movements did not affect the military status of guerrillas who had been called into the service of the Philippine
Army. If the invaders refused to look upon guerrillas, without distinctions, as legitimate troops, that did not stop the guerillas who had been inducted into the
service of the Philippine Army from being component parts thereof, bound to obey military status of guerrillas was to be judged not by the concept of the army of
the country for which they fought.

The constitutionality of the 93d Article of War is assailed. This article ordains "that any person subject to military law who commits murder in time of was shall
suffer death or imprisonment for life, as the court martial may direct." It is argued that since "no review is provided by that law to be made by the Supreme Court,
irrespective of whether the punishment is for life imprisonment or death", it violates Article VIII, section 2, paragraph 4, of the Constitution of the Philippines
which provides that "the National Assembly may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is
death or life imprisonment."

We think the petitioners are in error. This error arose from failure to perceive the nature of courts martial and the sources of the authority for their creation.

Courts martial are agencies of executive character, and one of the authorities "for the ordering of courts martial has been held to be attached to the constitutional
functions of the President as Commander in Chief, independently of legislation." (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition, p. 49.) Unlike courts of
law, they are not a portion of the judiciary. "The Supreme Court of the United States referring to the provisions of the Constitution authorizing Congress to provide
for the government of the army, excepting military offenses from the civil jurisdiction, and making the President Commander in Chief, observes as follows: "These
provisions show that Congress has the power to provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offenses in the manner then and now practiced by
civilized nations, and that the power to do so is given without any connection between it and the 3d Article of the United States; indeed that the two powers are
entirely independent of each other."

"Not belonging to the judicial branch of the government, it follows that courts-martial must pertain to the executive department; and they are in fact simply
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by Congress for the President as Commander in Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy
and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives." (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d
Edition, p. 49.) Of equal interest Clode, 2 M. F., 361, says of these courts in the British law: "It must never be lost sight of that the only legitimate object of
military tribunals is to aid the Crown to maintain the discipline and government of the Army." (Footnote No. 24, p. 49, Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents,
2d Edition.)

Our conclusion, therefore, is that the petition has no merit and that it should be dismissed with costs. It is so ordered.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones and Padilla, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 117970 July 28, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

ULYSSES M. CAWALING, ERNESTO TUMBAGAHAN, RICARDO DE LOS SANTOS, and HILARIO CAJILO, accused-appellants.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

It is axiomatic that once an accused-appellant admits killing the victim, he bears the burden of establishing the presence of any circumstance like self-defense,
performance of a lawful duty or, for that matter, double jeopardy, which may relieve him of responsibility, or which may mitigate his criminal liability.1 If he fails
to discharge this burden, his conviction becomes inevitable. In this Decision, we also reiterate the following doctrines: (1) the regional trial court, not the
Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over informations for murder committed by public officers, including a town mayor; (2) the assessment of trial courts on
the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies deserve great respect; (3) the equipoise rule cannot be invoked where the evidence of the prosecution is
overwhelming; (4) alibi cannot be believed in the face of credible testimony identifying the appellants; and (5) conspiracy may be proven by
circumstantial evidence.

The Case

Before us is an appeal from the 34-page Decision 2 dated October 21, 1994, promulgated by the Regional Trial Court of Romblon in Criminal Case No.
OD-269. Convicted of murder were former Mayor Ulysses M. Cawaling and Policemen Ernesto Tumbagahan, 3 Ricardo De los Santos and Hilario Cajilo.

Prior to the institution of the criminal case against all the appellants, an administrative case 4 had been filed before the National Police Commission, in
which Policemen Ernesto Tumbagahan, Ricardo De los Santos, Hilario Cajilo (three of herein appellants) and Andres Fontamillas were charged by
Nelson Ilisan 5 with the killing of his brother Ronie 6 Ilisan. On April 6, 1986, Adjudication Board No. 14 7 rendered its Decision which found
Tumbagahan, De los Santos, Cajilo and Fontamillas guilty of grave misconduct and ordered their dismissal from the service with prejudice. 8 On June
26, 1986, the Board issued a resolution, 9dismissing the respondents' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Subsequently, on June 4, 1987, Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal Alexander Mortel filed, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Odiongan,
Romblon, 10 an Information for murder 11 against the appellants and Andres Fontamillas. The accusatory portion reads:

That on or about the 4th day of December 1982, at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, in the Poblacion, [M]unicipality of San Jose,
[P]rovince of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, by means of treachery and with evident
premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strenght [sic] willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
RONIE ILISAN, with the use of firearms, inflicting upon the latter multiple mortal injuries in different parts of his body which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death.

Accused Tumbagahan, De los Santos, Cajilo and Fontamillas, with the assistance of their lawyers Atty. Abelardo V. Calsado and Juanito Dimaano,
pleaded not guilty when arraigned on February 15, 1988; 12 while Accused Cawaling, assisted by Counsel Jovencio Q. Mayor, entered a plea of not guilty
on March 16, 1988. 13

After due trial, 14 the court a quo 15 rendered its Decision dated October 21, 1994, 16 the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused (1) ULYSSES M. CAWALING, (2) ERNESTO TUMBAGAHAN, (3) RICARDO
DELOS SANTOS, (4) HILARIO CAJILO, AND (5) ANDRES FONTAMILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER under the Information, dated June 4, 1987, and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with
the accessory penalties of the law.

The accused, jointly and severally, are ORDERED to pay Nelson Elisan the sum of P6,000.00 as actual damages and the heirs of the
deceased Ronie Elisan the sums of P116,666.66 by way of lost earnings and P50,000.00 as indemnity for death, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The bail bonds of all the accused are ORDERED CANCELLED and all said accused ORDERED immediately confined in jail.

The slug (Exh. A); the .38 caliber revolver (with 3 empty shells and 3 live bullets) (Exh. G); and the slug of bullet (Exh. H) are
confiscated in favor of the government.

After the judgment has become final, the Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Clerk of Court, this Court, is ordered to deliver and
deposit the foregoing Exhibits A, F, G and H, inclusive, to the Provincial Director, PNP, of the Province of Romblon properly
receipted. Thereafter, the receipt must be attached to the record of the case and shall form part of the record.

The period of preventive imprisonment the accused had undergone shall be credited in their favor to its full extent pursuant to
Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

The case against co-accused ALEX BATUIGAS who is at large is ORDERED ARCHIVED pending his arrest. 17

Hence, this appeal. 18

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The trial court gives this summary of the facts as viewed by the prosecution witnesses:

The killing occurred on December 4, 1982 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening at the ricefield of Poblacion, San Jose, Romblon
when the bright moon was already above the sea at an angle of about 45 degrees, or if it was daytime, it was about 9:00 o'clock in
the morning (Imelda Elisan Tumbagahon, on direct examination, tsn, Jan. 17, 1989, p. 5, and on cross examination, tsn, April 18,
1989, p. 22).

On December 4, 1982, about 8:00 o'clock or 8:30 o'clock in the evening, Vicente Elisan and his elder brother Ronie Elisan, the
victim, were drinking tuba at C & J-4 Kitchenette of co-accused Andres Fontamillas in Poblacion, San Jose, Romblon. When they
stood up to go home, Luz Venus, the wife of Diosdado Venus, told them not to go out because the accused were watching them
outside about three (3) meters from the restaurant. Diosdado Venus accompanied them upon their request and they went out and
walked towards home. About a hundred meters from the restaurant, the six (6) accused, that is, Mayor Cawaling, the four (4)
policemen, namely, Hilario Cajilo, Andres Fontamillas, Ernesto Tumbagahan and Ricardo delos Santos, and civilian Alex Batuigas,
the mayor's brother-in-law, flashlighted them and Diosdado Venus ran going back. The two (2) brothers also ran towards home to
the house of their elder sister Imelda Elisan Tumbagahon. Co-accused Andres Fontamillas and Hilario Cajilo blocked them on the
gate of the fence of their sister's house. Ronie Elisan ran towards the ricefield. The accused were chasing them. Vicente Elisan saw
his brother Ronie f[a]ll down on the ricefield while he ran towards the bushes and la[y] on the ground. Ronie Elisan rose up by
kneeling and raising his two (2) hands. All the six (6) accused approached him with their flashlights and shot him. Ronie fell down
about twenty (20) meters from the bushes where Vicente Elisan hid behind the coconut tree. Co-accused Cawaling said ["]you left
him, he is already dead.["] Mayor Cawaling was armed with .45 caliber, policemen Andres Fontamillas and Hilario Cajilo were
both with armalites, Ernesto Tumbagahan and Ricardo delos Santos were both with .38 caliber and so with civilian Alex Batuigas.
They left towards the house of Mayor Cawaling. After they were gone, Vicente Elisan ran towards the house of his older brother
Nelson Elisan. Upon seeing him, Vicente told Nelson that Ronie was already dead. Nelson said nothing. While they were there, elder
sister Imelda Elisan Tumbagahon, who was crying came. She said: "Manong, patay ron si Ronie." (Brother, Ronie is already dead).
Nelson said ["]do not be noisy; they might come back and kill all of us.["] Imelda stopped crying.

After a while, brothers Nelson and Vicente Elisan went to the house of barangay captain Aldolfo Tumbagahon. The three (3) went to
the townhall and called the police but there was none there. Going to the house of the Chief of Police Oscar Montero, they were told
by his wife that Commander Montero was in the house of Mayor Cawaling. They proceeded to the place where Ronie Elisan was
 shot. The cadaver was brought to the house of Nelson Elisan. Vicente Elisan found an empty shell of a .45 caliber about three (3)
arm's length from the body of the victim. They surrendered it to the Napolcom. 19

Dr. Blandino C. Flores described the gunshot wounds of the victim as follows

Version of the Defense

Appellant Cawaling, in his 47-page Brief, 22 presented his own narration of the incident as follows:

At around 7:00 in the evening of December 4, 1982, Ulysses Cawaling, then the mayor of the [M]unicipality of San Jose in the
[P]rovince of Romblon, arrived aboard a hired motorized boat from Manila in the seashore of San Jose. From the seashore, he
immediately proceeded to his home. At around 7:30 in the evening, Cawaling went to the municipal hall to check on administrative
matters that piled up in the course of his trip to Manila. He also went inside the police station (located inside the municipal building)
to be apprised of any developments, after which he went out and joined Pfc. Tumbagahan and Pfc. Cajilo who were standing near
the flagpole in front of the municipal building. The three engaged in a conversation. Cawaling learned that the two police officers
were the ones assigned for patrol/alert for that night. The three of them went inside the INP office and there Cawaling informed the
two policemen that he received information from reliable persons that certain persons were plotting to kill him and a member of the
town's police force. It is to be noted that this occurred at the height of the communist insurgency and political violence in the
countryside in the early 80's. Hence, such information was taken very seriously, having been relayed by sources independent of each
other.

Cawaling, as town chief then empowered with supervisory authority over the local police, accompanied Pfc. Tumbagahan and Pfc.
Cajilo in conducting patrol and surveillance operations around the small municipality. He usually did this as routine since Romblon
was then plagued with political assassinations and armed conflict. On their way to the seashore, they passed by C & J-4 Kitchenette,
and chanced upon Ronnie Ilisan and his brother Vicente Ilisan drinking liquor and discussing in very loud voices. They stopped
right in the front of the restaurant and there they heard Ronnie Ilisan state in a every loud voice that he will kill a person that night.
Inside the restaurant, without the knowledge then of Cawaling and the two police officers, witness Gil Palacio, who was buying
cigarettes and Luz Venus, the cook/server of the restaurant, saw Ronnie Ilisan, very drunk, brandishing in the air a .38 caliber
Smith and Wesson revolver with a protruding screw.

Initially dismissing Ronnie Ilisan's statement as just another hollow swagger of an intoxicated person ("salitang lasing"), Cawaling
and the two policemen proceeded on their way. After the patrol, they returned to the municipal building and stationed themselves in
front. At around 8:30 in the evening, Ronnie Elisan passed by the municipal hall walking towards the direction of the house of
Nelson Ilisan, another brother, and shouted the challenge, "gawas ang maisog", meaning THOSE WHO ARE BRAVE, COME
OUT. Cawaling and the two police officers again brushed aside [the] challenge as just another foolish drunken revelry [o]n the part
of Ronnie Ilisan, a well-known troublemaker in the small municipality.

A few moments later, after Ronie Ilisan had passed by, they distinctly heard a gunshot and hysterical female voices shouting, "pulis,
tabang" meaning POLICE! HELP! four times. Impelled by the call of duty, Cawaling and the two policemen immediately ran in the
direction of the gunshot and the desperate female voices until they reached the house of Nelson Ilisan in San Jose Street. At this
point, they saw Ronnie Ilisan holding a .38 caliber revolver. They also saw Vicente Ilisan, Francisco Tesnado, Fe Ilisan, the wife of
Nelson and Delma Ilisan, the wife of Vicente, the latter two being the same persons who cried "pulis, tabang" four times. Cawaling
then told Ronnie to surrender his gun but the latter responded by pointing the gun at Cawaling and pulling the trigger.

At the precise moment that the gun fired, Cawaling warned the two policemen to drop to the ground by shouting "dapa".
Fortunately, Cawaling was not hit. Ronnie Ilisan then turned around and ran towards the church. The two policemen gave chase.
Cawaling, still shaken and trembling after the mischance was initially left behind but followed shortly. When Ronnie Ilisan reached
the church, he turned around and again fired at the pursuing Pfc. Cajilo. Fortunately, the gun misfired. When they finally reached
the ricefield, Pfc. Cajilo fired two (2) warning shots in the air for Ronnie to surrender. Ronnie responded by firing once again at Pfc.
Tumbagahan but failed to hit the latter. At that instance, Pfc. Cajilo counter-fired at Ronnie Ilisan hitting him. Pfc. Tumbagahan
also fired his weapon in the heat of exchange and also hit Ronnie Ilisan. As a result of the gunshot wounds, Ronnie Ilisan later on
succumbed.

Pfc. Tumbagahan picked up the gun still in the hand of the dead Ronnie Ilisan and gave it to Pfc. Cajilo. The three, Cawaling, who
subsequently caught up with them after the incident, and the two police officers, then proceeded to the police station located in the
municipal building to formally report the incident in their station blotter. 23

The "Brief for All of the Accused-Appellants" filed by Atty. Napoleon U. Galit and the "Brief for Appellants Ernesto Tumbagahan and Hilario Cajilo"
submitted by Atty. Joselito R. Enriquez merely repeated the facts as narrated by the trial court.

Ruling of the Trial Court

Finding the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies credible, the court a quo convicted the appellants. The killing was qualified to murder because of
the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and treachery. The trial court ruled that there was a notorious inequality of forces between
the victim and his assailants, as the latter were greater in number and armed with guns. It further ruled that abuse of superior strength absorbed
treachery, as it ratiocinated:

"Certain cases," an authority wrote, "involving the killing of helpless victim by assailants superior to them in arms or numbers, or
victims who were overpowered before being killed, were decided on the theory that the killing was treacherous, when perhaps the
correct qualifying circumstance would be abuse of superiority. In these cases the attack was not sudden nor unexpected and the
element of surprise was lacking." (Id., I Aquino, pp. 423-424). In the instant case, we earlier ruled that the qualifying treachery
should be considered as an exception to the general rule on treachery because it was not present at the inception of the attack. The
killing was not sudden nor unexpected and the element of surprise was lacking. It is for this reason that we hold that alevosia should
be deemed absorbed or included in abuse of superiority. Even assuming ex-gratia argumenti that it should be the other way around,
the situation will not be of help, penaltywise, to the accused. 24
The defenses raised by the appellants were dismissed and their witnesses declared unworthy of belief for the following reasons:

1. It was highly improbable that Defense Witness Tesnado would not tell his wife (Dory) and Bebelinia Ilisan Sacapaño about the
incident he had allegedly witnessed, more so when Sacapaño was the victim's first cousin.

2. The spot report prepared by Station Commander Oscar M. Montero, the testimonies of Cajilo and Tumbagahan and the medical
findings of Dr. Flores contradicted one another on the following details: the caliber of the gun used in shooting the victim, the
wounds inflicted and the whereabouts of Cawaling during the shoot-out.

3. Cawaling and his men, armed with guns, could have immediately disarmed the victim at the initial encounter. The court could not
understand why the victim was able to fire his gun, run, then stop and again fire his gun, without being caught.

4. The positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses prevails over the alibi posed by De los Santos and Fontamillas, a
defense that was not corroborated by any other witness.

5. The .38 caliber revolver, allegedly owned by the victim, was in fact owned and used by Alex Batuigas.

6. The defense presented a photo and a sketch to prove that Imelda Ilisan Tumabagahan had an obstructed view of the killing. The
trial court ruled that such evidence was misleading, because the window, from where said witness allegedly saw the incident, was at
the eastern side of her house, and thus afforded a clear view of the incident, while the window referred to by the defense was at the
southern portion.

7. The questioned testimonies of Dr. Flores, Nelson Ilisan and Provincial Prosecutor Pedro Victoriano, Jr., though not formally
offered as evidence, may be admitted because of the failure of the defense to object thereto at the time they were called to testify.

8. The defense failed to prove that the prosecution witnesses had any ill motive to testify falsely against the appellant.

9. Appellants had a motive to kill the victim. Nelson Ilisan testified that his brother Ronie (the victim) had witnessed Bonifacio
Buenaventura (a former chief commander of the San Jose Police Force) kill a certain Ruben Ventura. Cawaling, who was
Buenaventura's first cousin, wanted Ronie dead, because the latter had not followed his instruction to leave town to prevent him
from testifying in said case.

Assignment of Errors

The appellants, through their common counsel, Atty. Napoleon Galit, assign the following errors to the lower court:

1. The trial court gravely erred in sustaining prosecutor's theory of conspiracy and thus renders nugatory or has totally forgotten
that policemen when in actual call of duty normally operate in group but not necessarily in conspiracy.

2. The trial court gravely erred in believing the theory of the prosecution that accused-appellant Ulysses Cawaling was one of the
alleged co-conspirators in the killing of the deceased Ronnie Elisan.

3. The trial court gravely erred in not believing the defense of accused-appellant Ulysses Cawaling that he has nothing to do with the
shooting incident except to shout to arrest the accused[,] which prompted his co-accused policemen to chase the accused and sho[o]t
him when he resisted, after he fired at Mayor Cawaling.

4. The trial court gravely erred in not giving weight to accused-appellant policemen['s] testimonies which carry the presumption of
regularity.

5. The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting all the accused-appellants by applying "the equipoise rule" thereby resulting [i]n
reasonable doubts on the guilt. 25

In their joint brief, 26 Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo cite these other errors:

1. The trial court gravely erred in relying on the theory of the prosecution that accused-appellants Ernesto Tumbagahan and
Hilario Cajilo were alleged co-conspirators in the killing of the victim, Ronie Ilisan.

2. The trial court gravely erred in not believing the defense that herein accused-appellants merely did a lawful duty when the
shooting incident happened which led to the death of Ronnie Ilisan.

3. The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting herein accused-appellants by applying the equipoise rule, thereby resulting in
reasonable doubt on their guilt.

4. Prescinding from the foregoing, herein accused-appellants do press and hold, that the lower court committed grave, serious and
reversible error in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia).

5. The lower court committed grave, serious and reversible error in convicting both accused-appellants of murder, instead merely of
homicide, defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code.

6. The lower court committed grave, serious and reversible error in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of
superior strength.
 7. The consummated crime being merely homicide, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be considered to
lower the penalty of homicide.

8. The lower court committed error in not considering double jeopardy.

9 The lower court committed error in not dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction. 27

Appellant Cawaling imputes these additional errors to the court a quo:

1. The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting herein accused-appellant, Ulysses M. Cawaling, considering that he had no part in
the killing and the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt;

2. The trial court gravely erred in not finding the shooting incident a result of hot pursuit and shoot-out between the deceased
Ronnie Ilisan and the police officers in the performance of their duty and self-defense, and in sustaining the prosecution's
conspiracy theory;

3. The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting Accused-Appellant Ulysses M. Cawaling considering that there was blatant
absence of due process in the proceedings tantamount to mistrial. 28

This Court's Ruling

We affirm the conviction of the appellants. In so ruling, we will resolve the following issues: (1) jurisdiction of the trial court, (2) double jeopardy, (3)
credibility of prosecution witnesses and their testimonies, (4) self-defense, (5) performance of lawful duty, (6) alibi, (7) conspiracy, (8) rule on equipoise,
(9) qualifying circumstances, (10) damages and (11) attending circumstances as they affect the penalty.

We shall address the first two issues as important preliminary questions and discuss the merits of the remaining ones, which we have culled from the
errors cited by the appellants in their aforementioned briefs.

First Issue:

Jurisdiction of the Trial Court

Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo argue that the trial court erred when it assumed jurisdiction over the criminal case. They insist that the
Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, had jurisdiction to try and hear the case against the appellants, as they were public officers at the time of the
killing which was allegedly committed by reason of or in relation to their office.

We do not agree.

The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. Once the court acquires
jurisdiction, it may not be ousted from the case by any subsequent events, such as a new legislation placing such proceedings under the jurisdiction of
another tribunal. The only recognized exceptions to the rule, which find no application in the case at bar, arise when: (1) there is an express provision in
the statute, or (2) the statute is clearly intended to apply to actions pending before its enactment. 29

The statutes pertinent to the issue are PD 1606, as amended; 30 and PD 1850, as amended by PD 1952 and BP 129.

Sec. 4 of PD 1606 31 reads:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:

(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to
their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations,
whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of
P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph
where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment
for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.

xxx xxx xxx

However, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued two presidential decrees placing the members of the Integrated National Police under the
jurisdiction of courts-martial. Section 1 of PD 1952, 32 amending Section 1 of PD 1850, reads:

Sec. 1. Court Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the Armed Forces. Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding — (a) uniformed members of the Integrated National Police who commit any crime or offense cognizable
by the civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial pursuant to and in accordance with Commonwealth Act
No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War; (b) all persons subjects to military law under Article 2 of the
 aforecited Articles of War who commit any crime or offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of
under the said Articles of War; Provided, that, in either of the aforementioned situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried by the
proper civil or judicial authorities when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under Article 38 of
Commonwealth Act Numbered 408, as amended, or court-martial jurisdiction over the person of the accused military or Integrated
National Police personnel can no longer be exercised by virtue of their separation from the active service without jurisdiction having
duly attached beforehand unless otherwise provided by law:

PROVIDED FURTHER, THAT THE PRESIDENT MAY, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, ORDER OR DIRECT, AT ANY
TIME BEFORE ARRAIGNMENT, THAT A PARTICULAR CASE BE TRIED BY THE APPROPRIATE CIVIL COURT.

As used herein, the term uniformed members of the Integrated National Police shall refer to police officers, policemen, firemen, and
jail guards.

On the other hand, the jurisdiction of regular courts over civil and criminal cases was laid down in BP 129, the relevant portion of which is quoted
hereunder:

Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. — Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within
the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter. 33

In relation to the above, Section 4-a-2 of PD 1606, as amended by PD 1861, quoted earlier, lists two requisites that must concur before the Sandiganbayan
may exercise exclusive and original jurisdiction over a case: (a) the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office; and (b)
the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or higher than a fine of six thousand pesos
(P6,000). 34 Sanchez vs. Demetriou 35 clarified that murder or homicide may be committed both by public officers and by private citizens, and that public
office is not a constitutive element of said crime, viz.:

The relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution is, in our opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall
into the intent of the Constitution, the relation has to be such that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the office. In
other words, the office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute, such as, for instance, the crimes defined
and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the Revised Penal Code.

Public office is not the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either murder or homicide whether done by a private citizen
or public servant, and the penalty is the same except when the perpetrator, being a public functionary, took advantage of his office,
as alleged in this case, in which event the penalty is increased.

But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality
arises, not from the allegations but on the proof, not from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of the
commission of the crime.

Furthermore, the Information filed against the appellants contains no allegation that appellants were public officers who committed the crime in relation
to their office. The charge was for murder, a felony punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. As clarified in Aguinaldo, et al. vs. Domagas,
et al., 36 "[I]n the absence of such essential allegation, and since the present case does not involve charges of violation of R.A. No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft etc.
Act), the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the present case. (Bartolome vs. People, 142 SCRA 459 [1986]) Even before considering the
penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged, it is thus essential to determine whether that offense was committed or alleged to have been committed
by the public officers and employees in relation to their offices."

Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. 37 In the absence of any allegation that the offense was committed in
relation to the office of appellants or was necessarily connected with the discharge of their functions, the regional trial court, not the Sandiganbayan, has
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. 38

Second Issue:

Double Jeopardy

In seeking their acquittal, Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo also invoke their right against double jeopardy. They argue that the first jeopardy
attached when a criminal case for murder was filed before the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO), which was allegedly dismissed after several
hearings had been conducted. 39 We are not persuaded.

There is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy has attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been
validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as that in the first. And the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment;
(b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the
case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. 40

For a better appreciation of appellants' argument, we must consider PD 39 41 and its implementing rules, 42which prescribe the procedure before a
military commission. A summary preliminary investigation shall be conducted before trial for the purpose of determining whether there is prima
facie evidence to pursue trial before a military commission. The investigation report shall contain a summary of the evidence, the acts constituting the
offense or offenses committed, and the findings and recommendations of the investigating officer. Thereafter, the report shall be forwarded to the judge
advocate general, who shall determine for either the defense secretary or for the AFP chief of staff whether the case shall be referred for trial to a
military commission. 43 Where a prima facie case is found against the accused, formal charges shall be signed by a commissioned officer designated by the
judge advocate general. 44 The accused shall then be arraigned, during which the charge and specification shall be read and the accused shall enter his
plea. 45After hearings, a record of the trial shall be forwarded to the AFP chief of staff for proper action. 46

In the present case, the appellants have presented no sufficient and conclusive evidence to show that they were charged, arraigned and acquitted in a
military commission, or that the case was dismissed therein without their consent. The defense merely offered as evidence certain disposition forms 47 and
a
letter, 48 dated March 8, 1983, recommending that the case against Appellants Tumbagahan, Cajilo and De los Santos be dropped and considered
closed. 49 No charge sheet and record of arraignment and trial were presented to establish the first jeopardy.

As pointed out by the solicitor general, "appellants were never arraigned, they never pleaded before the Judge Advocate General's Office, there was no
trial, and no judgment on the merits had been rendered." 50

Third Issue:

Credibility of Witnesses

As a general rule, the factual findings of trial courts deserve respect and are not disturbed on appeal, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted, and would otherwise materially affect the disposition of the case. 51 This rule,
however, does not apply when the judge who penned the decision was not the same one who had heard the prosecution witnesses testify, 52 as in the
present case. Nonetheless, we have carefully perused and considered the voluminous records of this case, and we find no reason to alter the findings of the
court a quo in regard to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies.

Vicente Ilisan, the victim's brother, narrated before the trial court the circumstances relevant to the crime:

Imelda Tumbagahan was at home feeding her child when she heard her brother Ronie shouting for help. After getting a flashlight and looking through
the window of her house, she saw Cawaling and Alex Batuigas chasing Ronie who was running towards her house. Tumbagahan and De los Santos
prevented Ronie from entering the fence of her house, as a result of which, her brother ran towards a rice field nearby. There, on bended knees and with
hands raised, Ronie was shot by Cawaling and his men. 54

Nelson Ilisan also heard his younger brother Ronie shouting for help while being chased by the group of Cawaling. As Cajilo and Fontamillas blocked
Ronie from entering the gate of Imelda's house, the victim ran towards a rice field. Nelson stopped Cawaling and asked, "Nong, basi guinalagas ninyo
and acon hali?(Nong, why do you chase my brother?)" But the mayor merely continued chasing Ronie. Thereafter, Nelson saw his brother, on his knees
with both hands raised, shot by appellants. 55

The three aforementioned witnesses narrated in detail the assault against their brother Ronie and positively identified the appellants as the perpetrators.
The trial court cannot be faulted for relying on their testimonies and accepting them as true, 56 especially when the defense failed, to prove any ill motive
on their part. 57 In addition, family members who have witnessed the killing of their loved one usually strive to remember the faces of the
assailants. 58 Thus, the relationship per se of witnesses with the victim does not necessarily mean that the former are biased. On the contrary, it is
precisely such relationship that would impel them to seek justice and put the real culprit behind bars, rather than impute the offense to the innocent. 59

Appellant Cawaling submits that the prosecution witnesses tampered with the evidence by cleaning the cadaver before an autopsy could be done. "Such
irregular washing of the cadaver by a close relative of the deceased, who is educated and who presumably knew perfectly well the need to preserve it in
its original state for the medico-legal examination[,] is highly suspicious. It points to the fact that the relatives of the deceased wanted to hide, or erase
something that would bolster and assist the defense (that is, state of drunkenness, powder burns or lack thereof, indicating the firing of a weapon or the
proximity of the weapon used on the deceased, etc.)." 60

Such contention is unavailing. First, Bebelinia Sacapaño merely cleaned the cadaver and made no further examination. Second, appellants had an
opportunity to have the body examined again to determine or prove important matters, such as whether Ronie was drunk, if he fired a gun, how many
and what caliber of guns were used in shooting him; they did not, however, avail themselves of this opportunity. As public officers, appellants knew that
it was within their power to request or secure from the court, or any other competent authority, an order for another autopsy 61 or any such evidence as
may affirm their innocence. Third, their conviction lies in the strong and convincing testimonial evidence of the prosecution, not in the corroborative
testimony of Bebelinia Sacapaño.

Relying on the testimonies of Luz Venus and Gil Palacio, Appellant Cawaling also pointed out that "[t]he power of observation of alleged eyewitness
Vicente was severely affected by his intoxication. It may be inferred that an intoxicated person's sense[s] of sight and hearing and of touch are less acute
than those of a sober person and that his observation are inexact as to what actually occurred." 62

This argument is not persuasive. The evidence presented fails to show that Vicente was so intoxicated that night as to affect his powers of observation and
retrospection. Defense Witness Palacio merely saw the witness drinking tuba on the night of the killing. 63 Meanwhile the whole testimony of Luz on the
matter mainly reveals that Ronie was the person she was referring to as drunk, as shown by this portion: 64

Q When Ronie and Vicente both surnamed Ilisan entered the C & J-4 kitchenette what if any did you observe?

A I saw them so dr[u]nk (Nakita ko sila lasing na lasing).

Q Who was lasing na lasing or so dr[u]nk?

A Ronie Ilisan sir.

Granting that Vicente was drunk, the conviction of the appellants is still inevitable in view of the positive declarations of Witnesses Nelson and Imelda,
who unequivocally identified appellants as perpetrators of the senseless killing of their brother Ronie.

Appellant Cawaling also questions the trial court's reliance on the testimonies of Dr. Blandino Flores, 65Nelson Ilisan 66 and Prosecutor Pedro Victoriano,
Jr., 67 for failure of the prosecution to offer them as evidence. In People vs. Java, 68 this Court ruled that the testimony of a witness, although not formally
offered in evidence, may still be admitted by the courts, if the other party does not object to its presentation. The Court explained: "Section 36 of [Rule
132] requires that an objection in the course of the oral examination of a witness should be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably
apparent. Since no objection to the admissibility of evidence was made in the court below, an objection raised for the first time on appeal will not be
considered." In the present case, a cursory reading of the stenographic notes reveals that the counsel for the appellants did not raise any objection when
said witnesses testified on the matters now being impugned. Moreover, they repeatedly cross-examined the witnesses, which shows that they had waived
their objections to the said testimonies of such witnesses.
Lastly, Appellant Mayor Cawaling questions the motive of Prosecutor Pedro Victoriano Jr. This contention is likewise bereft of merit. Unlike judges who
are mandated to display cold neutrality in hearing cases, 69prosecutors are not required to divest themselves of their personal convictions and refrain
from exhibiting partiality. In this case, there is reasonable ground for Prosecutor Victoriano to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
accused was probably guilty thereof. 70 Under the circumstance, it is his sworn duty to see that justice is served. 71 Thus, "[h]e may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor — indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one." 72 Further,

Under the prevailing criminal procedure, the fiscal's sphere of action is quite extensive, for he has very direct and active
intervention in the trial, assuming as the Government's representative the defense of society, which has been disturbed by the crime,
and taking public action as though he were the injured party, for the purpose of securing the offender's punishment, whenever the
crime has been proved and the guilt of the accused as the undoubted perpetrator thereof established. 73

Fourth Issue:

Self-Defense

To escape criminal liability, the appellants also invoke the justifying circumstances of self-defense and lawful performance of duty. 74 Allegedly, Ronie
was firing his gun and shouting. "Guwa ang maisog! (Come out who is brave!)." Then the mayor and the policemen arrived at the scene to pacify him.
Ronie fired at them, which forced them to chase him and return fire.

We find this scenario bereft of plausibility.

Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is a condition sine qua non for the successful invocation of self-defense. 75 As factually found by the trial
court, unlawful aggression did not start with the victim, but rather with the appellants. Cawaling and his men proceeded to the C & J-4 Kitchenette and
waited for Ronie to come out. When the victim did, they chased and shot him without giving him any opportunity to defend himself.

Granting arguendo the veracity of the defense's factual version, it is important to note that appellants admitted that Ronie was running away from them
when they chased and shot him. Thus, unlawful aggression — assuming it was initially present — had ceased, and the appellants no longer had any right
to pursue the offender. Basic is the rule that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has the right to kill or even wound the former
aggressor. Upon the cessation of the unlawful aggression and the danger or risk to life and limb, there should be a corresponding cessation of hostilities
on the part of the person defending himself. 76

Furthermore, the means employed to ward off the attack was unreasonably excessive. Being armed, the appellants could have easily ordered the victim to
surrender. Even the first shot at his shoulder would have been sufficient to immobilize him, yet they fired a succession of shots at him while he was in no
position to put up a defense.

Jurisprudence teaches that when an accused admits having committed the crime but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, the burden of proof
is reversed and shifted to him. He must then prove the elements of self-defense. 77 It necessarily follows that he must now rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution; for even if the latter evidence were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused has
admitted the
killing. 78 Thus, appellants must establish with clear and convincing evidence that the killing was justified, and that they incurred no criminal liability
therefor. 79 They failed to do so, and their conviction thus becomes inevitable. 80

Fifth Issue:

Lawful Performance of Duties

Appellants contend that the killing of Ronie resulted from the lawful performance of their duties as police officers. However, such justifying circumstance
may be invoked only after the defense successfully proves that (1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty, and (2) the injury or offense committed
is the necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of such duty. 81 These two requisites are wanting in this case.

The appellants, except Mayor Cawaling, were men in uniform who happened to be on duty when they killed Ronie. The victim was nor committing any
offense at the time. Killing the victim under the circumstances of this case cannot in any wise be considered a valid performance of a lawful duty by men
who had sworn to maintain peace and order and to protect the lives of the people. As aptly held in People vs. De la Cruz, 82"Performance of duties does
not include murder." That Ronie was a troublemaker in their town is not an excuse; as the Court declared in the same case of People vs. De la Cruz,
"Murder is never justified, regardless of the victim."

Sixth Issue:

Alibi

We likewise brush aside the defenses of alibi and denial raised by Appellant De los Santos. Prosecution witnesses positively identified him and
Fontamillas as part of the group which chased and shot Ronie Ilisan. It is elementary that alibi and denial are outweighed by positive identification that is
categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter. Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. 83

In fact, De los Santos failed to establish with clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime
during its commission. 84 The evidence he had presented demonstrated only that, at the time, he was sleeping in his house, which was near the locus
criminis.
Alibi is always considered with suspicion and received with caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it is easily
fabricated and concocted. 85 It is therefore incumbent upon the appellant to prove that he was at another place when the felony was committed, and that
it was physically impossibie for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. 86 This he failed to prove.

Seventh Issue:

Conspiracy

The trial court correctly appreciated the presence of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found, for criminals do not write down their lawless plans and plots.
The agreement to commit a crime, however, may be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point
to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of intent. 87It does not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as the act of one is the act
of all, and each incurs the same criminal liability. 88 We concur with the trial court's elucidation:

All of the accused chased the victim and his brother; four (4) of whom blocked their ways, first, to their elder brother Nelson
Elisan's house and, second, to their elder sister Imelda Elisan Tumbagahon's house. Having changed course by proceeding to the
ricefield in their desperate attempt to evade the accused, all the six (6) armed accused continued their pursuit. Their victim, having
fallen on the rice paddy, and rising and kneeling on it with raised hands, all the said accused with their flashlights beamed on their
victim, in a united and concerted manner, shot him. After Ronie Elisan had fallen down, co-accused Mayor Cawaling was even
heard as saying "(Y)ou left [sic] him, he is already dead." . . . . 89

Eighth Issue:

Equipoise Rule

90
We reject appellants' position that the equipoise rule should apply to this case. In People vs. Lagnas, 91 the Court, through Mr. Justice Florenz D.
Regalado, described this rule as follows:

Once again, albeit in effect a supportive and cumulative consideration in view of the preceding disquisition, the equipoise rule finds
application in this case, that is, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty, and is not sufficient to support a conviction.

In this case, the inculpatory facts point to only one conclusion: appellants are guilty. As amplified in the discussion above, the Court agrees with the trial
court that the guilt of the appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Ninth Issue:

Murder or Homicide?

The Information alleges three qualifying circumstances: treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength. If appreciated, any
one of these will qualify the killing to murder. However, Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo posit that there was no treachery, reasoning that Ronie was
not an unsuspecting victim, as he had been forewarned by Diosdado Venus of the presence of the appellants inside the restaurant, and there had been a
chase prior to the killing. Further, they contend that abuse of superior strength is deemed absorbed in treachery, and that "the addition of abuse of
superior strength to qualify the case to murder is nothing more than mere repetition — a legal chicanery, so to say. Similarly, where treachery is not
proved, there can be no abuse of superior strength, vice-versa." 92

We partly agree.

Treachery exists when the malefactors employ means and methods that tend directly and especially to insure their execution without risk to themselves
arising from the defense which the victims might make. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation
on the part of the person attacked. 93 While we do not disregard the fact that the victim, together with his brother Vicente, was able to run towards a rice
field, we still believe that treachery attended the killing.

In People vs. Landicho, 94 we ruled that treachery might still be appreciated even when the victim was warned of danger to his person, for "what is
decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate."

The appellants waited for Ronie to come out of the restaurant. All of them chased the victim and prevented him from seeking refuge either in the house
of his sister Imelda or that of his brother Nelson. All of them carried firearms and flashlights. They fired their guns at the victim while he was on his
knees with arms raised, manifesting his intention not to fight back.

We cannot appreciate the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, however, as we have consistently ruled that it is deemed absorbed in
treachery. 95

We also affirm the finding of the trial court that the prosecution failed to prove the attending circumstance of evident premeditation. To prove this
aggravating circumstance, the prosecution must show the following: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time, between the determination to commit the crime and the execution thereof,
sufficient to allow the offender to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 96Nothing in the records shows how and when the plan to kill was hatched, or
how much time had elapsed before it was carried out.

Tenth Issue:

Damages
The trial court awarded the following: (a) P50,000.00, as civil indemnity; (b) P6,000.00, as actual damages; and (c) P116,666.66, for lost earnings. In
computing the latter, the trial court used the following formula:

Total annual net income = 10% x total annual gross income

= .10 x P25,000.00

= P2,500.00.

xxx xxx xxx

Loss of earning capacity of Ronie Elisan = 2/3 (90-20) x P2,500.00 = P116,666.66. 97

Consistent with jurisprudence, we affirm the ruling of the trial court awarding the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim. 98

We cannot do the same to the award of actual damages and lost earnings, however. The award of actual damages has no basis, as no receipts were
presented to substantiate the expenses allegedly incurred. An alleged pecuniary loss must be established by credible evidence before actual damages may
be awarded. 99Similarly erroneous is the award for loss of earning capacity, which should be computed as follows: 100

2/3 x [80 — age of victim at the time of death] x [reasonable portion of the annual net income which would have been received as
support by heirs]

As testified to by Nelson Ilisan, the deceased had been earning an average of P100 daily or P3,000 monthly. 101 From this monthly income must be
deducted the reasonable amount of P1,000 representing the living and other necessary expenses of the deceased. Hence, the lost earnings of the deceased
should be computed as follows:

= 2/3 x [80 - 22] x [P24,000]

= 2/3 x [58] x [P24,000]

= 2[P1,392,000]

= P2,784,000

= P928,000.

Eleventh Issue:

Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances

Prior to the amendment of Section 248 of the Revised Penal Code, 102 the imposable penalty for murder was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death. In their Brief, Appellants Cajilo and Tumbagahan argue for the imposition of the lower penalty of reclusion temporal, contending that their filing
of bail bonds/property bonds, before the order for their arrest was issued, should be treated as voluntary surrender. 103

We cannot accept this contention. In the first place, it has no factual basis. The warrant for the arrest of herein appellants was issued on August 18,
1987, 104 but appellants' counsel filed the Urgent Motion for Bail only thereafter, on September 2, 1987. 105 In the second place, appellants failed to prove
the requisites for voluntary surrender, which are: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrenders himself to a person in
authority or to the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary. 106 The records reveal that a warrant of arrest was actually served on Tumbagahan
and Cajilo 107 on September 2, 1987 and that they were in fact detained. 108

In view of the absence of any other aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the trial court correctly imposed reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the award of P6,000 as
actual damages is DELETED, and (2) the award for loss of earning capacity is INCREASED to P928,000. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 138451 May 17, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SGT. ROGELIO REPIROGA, accused-appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
SGT. ROGELIO REPIROGA appeals from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal, finding him guilty of murder, aggravated by treachery and
evident premeditation, and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the deceased Sgt. Eduardo H. Dino P50,000.00 for moral
damages, another P50,000.00 for civil indemnity, and still another P50,000.00 for exemplary damages.1

Accused-appellant was a member of the Philippine Army at the NCO Academy, 2nd Infantry Division, Camp Capinpin, Tanay, Rizal. He lived inside Camp
Capinpin with his family. Sometime in 1996 a complaint was filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor charging Sgt. Rogelio Repiroga with murder for
the violent death of Sgt. Eduardo H. Dino, also a member of the Philippine Army and likewise a resident of Camp Capinpin.

Sgt. Repiroga having failed to submit his counter-affidavit in the preliminary investigation, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rolando G. Ramirez recommended on
the sole basis of complaining witness' evidence the filing of the corresponding Information. Accordingly, on 19 October 1995 an Information for murder was filed
against accused-appellant Repiroga aggravated by treachery and evident premeditation.2

On 18 April 1996, accused-appellant filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the Information on two (2) grounds: first, that the ex-parte resolution of the preliminary
investigation warranted a re-investigation; and, second, that as an enlisted serviceman, the provincial prosecutor had no authority to file the Information against
him but the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military pursuant to Administrative Order No. 8 of the Office of the Ombudsman. 3

In his Comment/Opposition to the Urgent Motion to Quash, State Prosecutor Marianito C. Santos claimed that the accused was not deprived of his right to refute
the charges against him and to present counter-affidavits, but it was the accused in fact who failed to do so within the reglementary period of ten (10) days. The
State Prosecutor also asserted that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor was proper for two (2) reasons: first, the shooting
was not related to the performance of the official duties of the accused; and, second, the accused was no longer under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman since he
had already been discharged from the service.4

On 30 July 1996 the trial court denied the motion; reconsideration was likewise denied.

Editha Dino, widow of Sgt. Eduardo H. Dino, and their son Darwin narrated at the trial that on 19 June 1995 at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Sgt. Dino, his
wife Editha, and son Darwin were in a huddle in their tricycle parked in front of their house some five (5) to ten (10) meters below the road level. Sgt. Dino and
Editha were seated on the saddle while Darwin was in the sidecar. They were talking about Sgt. Dino being suspected by Sgt. Repiroga as the one responsible for
the former's water disconnection. Earlier, at around 3:00 o'clock that afternoon, accused-appellant Repiroga had gone to the house of Dino to ask about the
disconnection although the latter disclaimed any knowledge of it. Thereafter, accused-appellant Repiroga left.1âwphi1.nêt

In the midst of their discussion, Editha happened to look behind her and saw Sgt. Repiroga approaching with an M-16 rifle. Alarmed, she exclaimed, "Pa, si
Repiroga may dalang baril." "Takbo!" Sgt. Dino answered "Takbo kayo Ma!" then Editha and Darwin scampered away. When she stopped to look back, Editha
saw Sgt. Repiroga approach her husband, cock his rifle and call out, "Pare!" Immediately, Sgt. Dino raised his hands as if to ward off Sgt. Repiroga. Sgt. Dino
pleaded, "Pare, Pare," and turned around to run but Sgt. Repiroga shot him.

As Sgt. Dino stumbled on the grass, Sgt. Repiroga sprayed him with bullets. Later, Sgt. Repiroga turned over his rifle to Sgt. Nodo and gave himself up at the
NCO Headquarters.

Although Sgt. Dino was rushed to Camp Capinpin Station Hospital, he could not be saved. He died in the hospital. Dr. Jesusa N. Vergara medico-legal officer,
reported that hemorrhage was the cause of Dino's death as a result of the gunshot wounds on his trunk. Dr. Vergara also found multiple lacerated wounds and
abrasions on various parts of his body.5

Accused-appellant, in his defense, claimed that on 19 June 1995, at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he and his wife were walking home after his duty at the
NCO Headquarters. According to him, he was advised by his superior that the battalion should be ready for any attack so he brought his M-16 rifle with him.
When they passed in front of the house of Sgt. Dino, accused-appellant noticed a tricycle parked along the road. Suddenly, Sgt. Dino came out of the tricycle and
aimed his 9-mm pistol at him. Sgt. Dino fired at him but missed. To protect himself, he raised his M-16 rifle and shot Sgt. Dino who fell to the ground. After he
fell, Sgt. Dino aimed his pistol at accused-appellant who let out another burst of gunfire at the fallen Dino.1âwphi1.nêt

At this juncture, Editha and Darwin appeared from the direction of their house and ran towards Sgt. Dino. Darwin picked up the 9-mm pistol of his father.
Thereafter, Repiroga turned over his rifle to Sgt. Nodo who happened to be passing by. Sgt. Repiroga, accompanied by his wife, later went back to the NCO
Headquarters and gave himself up to Col. de Vela and Sgt. Delito who immediately placed him in the military stockade.

Among those who testified for the defense were Vicky Ercilla, a komadre of Sgt. Dino; Roberto Joaquin, a carpenter working on a house being constructed inside
the camp; and, Josefina Gorgon, a laundry woman. The crux of their testimonies was that while walking on the road they saw Sgt. Dino suddenly emerge from the
tricycle and fire at Sgt. Repiroga. In essence, their testimonies corroborated that of accused-appellant that he only fired back to defend himself from Sgt. Dino.

But the trial court rejected accused-appellant's claim of self-defense, holding that from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Repiroga had fired at the
defenseless Dino. The court a quo also appreciated the presence of treachery and evident premeditation considering that a few hours before the shooting Sgt.
Repiroga inquired about the water pipe that was disconnected from their house supposedly upon instigation of Sgt. Dino. The court below concluded that Repiroga
failed to present clear and convincing evidence to establish his theory of self-defense.6

Accused-appellant's contentions may be narrowed down to four (4) issues: first, whether the trial court, a civil court and not a court-martial, had jurisdiction over
his person who was then a military officer as well as over the offense; second, whether the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor had jurisdiction to conduct the
preliminary investigation; third, whether the filing of the Information was proper since he failed to file his counter-affidavit during preliminary investigation; and,
fourth, whether he acted in lawful self-defense.7

Accused-appellant contends that at the time of the incident he was a member of the AFP with the rank of staff sergeant. As such, he was subject to CA 408, as
amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War, which vests jurisdiction over members of the AFP with the courts-martial.

As early as 1938 jurisdiction was already vested in courts-martial over any crime or offense punishable under CA 408 as amended, otherwise known as
the Articles of War, committed by soldiers belonging to the regular force of the Philippine Army. 8 Thereafter, PD 1822 qualified the jurisdiction of courts-martial
to include offenses committed in relation to the performance of their duties.9 Subsequently, PD 185010 provided that a case shall be disposed of or tried by the
proper civil or judicial authorities when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under Art. 38 of CA 408, as amended, or court-martial
jurisdiction over the person of the accused military personnel can no longer be exercised by virtue of their separation from the active service without jurisdiction
having duly attached beforehand unless otherwise provided by law. 11 Later, Sec. 1 of PD 1850 was amended by PD 1852 to include the situation where the
President may in the interest of justice order or direct, at any time before arraignment, that a case involving a military officer be tried by the appropriate civil
court.12

In 1991, due to the several failed coups d' etat, RA 705513 was enacted. It repealed PDs 1822, 1822-A, 1850 and 1852, and all other acts, general orders,
presidential issuances, rules and regulations inconsistent therewith. It effectively placed upon the civil courts the jurisdiction over certain offenses involving
members of the AFP and other members subject to military law. RA 7055 provides that when these individuals commit crimes or offenses penalized under The
Revised Penal Code (RPC), other special penal laws, or local government ordinances, regardless of whether civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties
which may be natural or juridical persons, they shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil
court, is service-connected in which case it shall be tried by court-martial.14

Hence, under RA 7055, the jurisdiction to try members of the AFP who commit crimes or offenses covered by the RPC, and which are not service-connected, lies
with the civil courts. The fact of accused-appellant's separation from the service is of no moment since from the outset, the civil courts have jurisdiction over his
offense and his person.

Accused-appellant also contends that under Art. 71 of CA 408, preliminary investigation should be conducted by an authorized military officer before any
information could be filed against AFP members.

We disagree. There is nothing in Art. 71 of CA 408 that exclusively vests the authority on a military officer to conduct preliminary investigation in cases involving
members of the AFP. It simply mentions an "investigating officer" who shall examine available witnesses requested by the accused,15 without reference to his
being a military officer.

Given the foregoing, we cannot uphold the contention of accused-appellant that the authority to file charges against him lies within the jurisdiction of the Office of
the Ombudsman. It is true that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over complaints filed against members of the armed forces as they are deemed public officials of
an instrumentality of the government within the contemplation of the law. However, under AO 08, the power of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary
investigation over a military case may be exercised together with any provincial or city prosecutor or his assistants since all prosecutors are now deputized
Ombudsman prosecutors.16 It is only in the prosecution of cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan where the Ombudsman enjoys exclusive control and
supervision.17

We agree with accused-appellant that a preliminary investigation guarantees the accused his right to submit counter-affidavits and present evidence. However, if
the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the 10-day period, the investigating officer shall base his
resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant.18 During the prescribed period, accused-appellant failed to present his counter-affidavit despite due
notice. Hence, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor conducting the preliminary investigation did not err when he resolved the case solely on the basis of
complainant's evidence and, for his own negligence, accused-appellant cannot now blame the investigating officer.

We now dispose of the case on its merits.

It is elementary that an accused who sets up the plea of self-defense has the burden to show, to the satisfaction of the court, the concurrence of all the elements
constituting self-defense, to wit: (a) that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) that there was a reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel it; and, (c) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part. Accused-appellant claims that all of these elements are present in the case at
bar.

A resolution of the matter requires a hard look into the credibility of the witnesses. The Court has consistently recognized that the trial court's assessment of their
credibility is to be respected in view of its unique position to observe their demeanor. The Court may however set aside the trial court's findings and appreciate the
evidence anew in exceptional circumstances as the instant case will show.

Appearing as witnesses for the prosecution were Editha and Darwin Dino, wife and son of the deceased, respectively. Owing to their relationship with the
deceased, their testimonies must at the outset be viewed with caution, if not suspicion.

Editha and Darwin claimed that they were present during the killing. Editha testified that upon seeing Sgt. Repiroga carrying an M-16 rifle she was immediately
alarmed and told her husband to run.19 The cause of her alarm however perplexes the Court.

On cross-examination, Editha told the court that the mere sight of Sgt. Repiroga approaching them with a gun was the sole reason why she told her husband to run.
While reference to an earlier argument regarding the water disconnection between her husband and the accused would seem to be a plausible motive for the
killing, Editha denied this as the cause for her alarm.20 She also denied knowing of any misunderstanding between the two (2) soldiers prior to the incident; 21 yet,
she claimed that she instantly panicked at the sight of Sgt. Repiroga carrying a gun when it was inside a military camp where the sight of gunslinging soldiers is, to
state the obvious, very common and normal. The testimony of Darwin neither clarified this matter. It was laconic and bereft of details. He even disclaimed any
recollection of a family discussion regarding the water disconnection, 22 and even denied knowledge of any feud between his father and accused-appellant.23

The gaps and inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses seem to indicate that they did not actually witness the commission of the crime and their
narration was a mere fabrication. This failure to show proof beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant feloniously and willfully killed the deceased validated
accused-appellant's claim of self-defense.

Accused-appellant claims that the deceased was waiting in ambush behind a tricycle when he and his wife passed by his house; that the deceased allegedly shot
him with his .9 mm pistol but missed; that instinctively he raised his rifle and shot the victim as an act of self-preservation; and that he shot him once again even
when he was already down on the ground because the latter attempted to shoot him once more.

After reviewing the evidence spread on records, we are persuaded that it was the deceased who initiated the attack on the accused amounting to unlawful
aggression against him and the aggression continued even when deceased was already down on the ground. The records do not disclose any sufficient provocation
on the part of accused-appellant prior to the attack. He and his wife were simply walking on the road on their way home. His prior inquiry regarding the water
disconnection could not be a form of sufficient provocation contemplated by law to negate his claim of self-defense. In fact, he denied being in an unpleasant
mood when he made the inquiry, such denial being even corroborated by the wife of the deceased who testified that accused-appellant appeared calm and
composed when he asked about the water disconnection. On the other hand, accused-appellant claimed that it was the deceased who had been harboring ill will
since his request for water connection was denied while his was granted.
The use by accused-appellant of his M-16 service rifle to counter the attack of the deceased who was using a .9 mm pistol was reasonably necessary and justified
to repel the aggression, although this .9 mm pistol was never presented in evidence. The prosecution claimed that it was returned to the artillery prior to the
commission of the crime. Accused-appellant positively testified that it was picked up by the son of the deceased immediately after the shooting incident. The
failure of accused-appellant to present the pistol may have weakened, to a considerable degree, his claim of self-defense. But the witnesses for the defense
consistently maintained that the deceased utilized a pistol in initiating his attack against accused-appellant, and we find no reason to disbelieve them.

The three (3) witnesses for the defense are disinterested witnesses. They are not related to accused-appellant. They do not hold any grudge against the deceased
and his family. To note, one of them is even the komadre of the deceased. They repeatedly professed that they testified not at the behest of accused-appellant but
out of their own volition in the interest of truth and justice. They also denied having been coached by the defense counsel. They were walking on the same road,
individually, when Sgt. Dino appeared from behind the tricycle and fired at accused-appellant with a .9 mm pistol. They were also there when accused-appellant
returned fire from his M-16 rifle. They unanimously asserted that the deceased was alone when he made the attack on accused-appellant. Their testimonies were
clear, corroborative and consistent with accused-appellant's claim of self-defense; at the very least, the guilt of the accused-appellant was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo convicting accused-appellant SGT. ROGELIO REPIROGA of murder, aggravated by treachery and evident
premeditation, and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua as well as ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim moral damages, civil indemnity and
exemplary damages is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused-appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The Director of Prisons is ordered to
facilitate his immediate release from custody and to report thereon to this Court within five (5) days from notice hereof unless accused-appellant is being held for
some other lawful cause. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt

G.R. No. L-108208 March 11, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 104 of Quezon City, and ALEXANDER DIONISIO Y
MANIO, respondents. HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman, intervenor-respondent.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

De Guzman, Florentino, Celis, Moncupa & Torio for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Section 46 of Republic Act No. 69751 provides that "criminal cases involving PNP members shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts." The
principal issue in this case is whether the term "regular courts" includes the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner maintains that it does not while the respondent Judge and
the intervenor-respondent hold otherwise.

Section 46 reads as follows:

Sec. 46. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. — Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, criminal cases involving PNP members
shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts: Provided, That the courts-martial appointed pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 1850 shall continue to try PC-INP members who have already been arraigned, to include appropriate actions thereon by the reviewing
authorities pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as the Articles of War, as amended, and Executive Order No. 178,
otherwise known as the Manual for Courts-Martial: Provided, further, That criminal cases against PC-INP members who may have not yet
been arraigned upon the effectivity of this Act shall be transferred to the proper city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge.

The factual and procedural antecedents in this case are as follows:

On 31 July 1991, private respondent Alexander Dionisio y Manio, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned to the Central Police District
Command Station 2 in Novaliches, Quezon City, was dispatched by his Commanding Officer to Dumalay Street in Novaliches to respond to a complaint that a
person was creating trouble there. Dionisio proceeded to that place, where he subsequently shot to death T/Sgt. Romeo Sadang.

On 7 August 1991, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City an Information2 charging Dionisio with the crime of homicide committed as follows:

That on or about the 31st day of July, 1991, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with intent to kill, and without any justifiable motive, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and employ personal violence upon the person of one T/SGT. ROMEO SADANG Y MACABEO, by then and there shooting the latter with
the use of a gun, .45 caliber pistol, thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on his neck and on his thorax, which were the direct
and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said T/SGT. ROMEO SADANG Y MACABEO in such
amount as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil Code.

Contrary to law.

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 and was raffled off to Branch 104 of the RTC, prescribed over by the respondent Judge.

On 4 September 1992, while trial was already in progress, the respondent Judge issued, motu proprio, an order3requiring the prosecution and the defense to
comment on whether the Court should still proceed with the trial of the case:

[i]n view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Deloso vs. Domingo (Vol. 191 SCRA, 545), quoted as follows:
 The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officials when penalty prescribed by law for
the offense is higher than prision correccional (Sec. 4, subpar. (c), P.D. 1606). The murder charge against the
petitioner carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period of death (Art. 248, Revised Penal Code),
hence, it is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate it.

In his Order of 24 September 1992,4 the respondent Judge dismissed Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 "for re-filing with the Sandiganbayan" on the ground that the
Sandiganbayan, and not the Regional Trial Court, has jurisdiction over the case. The body of the order reads:

Which Court has jurisdiction over police officers who are charged with the crime of homicide or murder?

Accused Quezon City Patrolman Alexander Dionisio y Manio is being tried for homicide for killing T/Sgt. Romeo Sadang y Macabeo on
July 31, 1991 in Quezon City. Several witnesses were already presented by the prosecution. Nobody raised the issue of jurisdiction. On
September 4, 1992, the Court issued an order requiring the prosecution and the defense to comment on whether the Court has jurisdiction
over the matter in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Deloso vs. Domingo, 191 SCRA 945 [sic] which rules as follows:

The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officials when the penalty prescribed by law
for the offense is higher than prision correccional (Sec. 4, subpar. (c), P.D. 1606). The murder charge against the
petitioner carries
the penalty of reclusion temporal in maximum period to death
(Art. 248, Revised Penal Code), hence, it is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and the Ombudsman has primary
jurisdiction to investigate it.

As a matter of fact, even if the act or crime is not related to or connected with or arising from the performance of official duty, it must be
investigated by the Ombudsman or any of its duly deputized representative:

The clause "any (illegal) act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a
public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that
the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or
arise from, the performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we.

The Sandiganbayan, although trying only certain special classes of crimes, still can be classified as a regular court functioning within the
framework of the judicial department of the government. It is a "trial court and bound by the rules governing trial courts. It is one of the
'inferior courts' in Article X of the Constitution whose jurisdiction may be questioned before the Supreme Court and whose judgments are
subject to its review, revision, affirmance or setting aside. The independence of the judiciary enshrined in the Constitution calls for the
unitary judicial system with the Supreme Court at the top of the hierarchical set-up" (Rules of Criminal Procedures by Dr. Fortunato Gupit,
Jr., 1986 Edition, p. 26).

Conformably therefore to the foregoing consideration, the regular court referred to in Section 46 of Republic Act 6975 (An Act establishing
the Philippine National Police) is the Sandiganbayan. Since the penalty for homicide, the charge against the accused, carries the penalty
of reclusion temporal, said case is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman has the primary jurisdiction to investigate it. (Art.
249, RPC).

WHEREFORE, the above-entitled case is hereby dismissed for refiling with the Sandiganbayan.

On 6 October 1992, the private prosecutor moved for a reconsideration 5 of the dismissal, citing the opinion of the Secretary of Justice of 31 July 1991 6 that "crimes
committed by PNP members are not cognizable by the Sandiganbayan" because "[t]hey fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts" as provided in
Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 and "[t]he Sandiganbayan is not a regular court but a special court."

The respondent Judge denied the motion in the Order of 7 October

1992:7

The opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated July 31, 1992 [sic] . . . is not binding to this Court.

This Court still holds that the regular Courts referred to in Sec. 46 of RA 6975 (An Act establishing the Philippine National Police) includes
the Sandiganbayan which has exclusive original jurisdiction to try offenses on felonies committed by public officers in relation to their
office, whether simple or complex with other crimes where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional (Sec. 4, par. c,
PD 1606)

What is contemplated in the law is the regular civil court to the exclusion of non-regular courts such as military courts which had previous
jurisdiction over police officers. The police force being civilian in character should be under the jurisdiction of the civil court. What is meant
by "regular courts" mentioned in Sec. 46, RA 6975 are the "inferior courts" in Article X of the constitution which calls for a unitary judicial
system with the Supreme Court at the top of the hierarchical set-up (Rules in Crim. Procedure by Dr. Fortunato Gupit, page 26, 1986
edition).

On 6 January 1993, petitioner filed the instant petition. We required the respondents to comment thereon.

On 5 February 1993, the office of the Ombudsman filed a motion for leave to intervene and to file comment 8 alleging that its constitutional duty to investigate
criminal cases against public officers, including PNP members, and to prosecute cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan are affected by the issue raised; and that
the office of the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice (DOJ) had issued a joint circular on 14 October 1991 9 wherein (a) both agencies agreed that, subject to
the final determination by competent authorities, the term "regular courts" in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 refers to "civilian courts" as distinguished from military
courts, and (b) certain guidelines were adopted to govern the investigation and prosecution of PNP members. Attached to the motion is the Ombudsman's
Comment10 on the petition. We granted this motion to intervene, admitted the Comment, and required petitioner to reply thereto. 11
In their separate Comments, 12 the respondent Judge reiterates the reasons stated in the assailed orders, and the private respondent concurs with the position and
amplifies the arguments of the Ombudsman.

Petitioner filed its Reply 13 to the Comments of the respondents and the intervenor.

On 6 July 1993, we resolved to consider the separate comments of the respondents as answers, to give due course to the petition, and to require the parties to file
simultaneously their respective memoranda within twenty days from notice, which they did, with the petitioner submitting its memorandum only on 29 December
1993 after obtaining several extensions of time to do so.

In the main, petitioner insists that the dismissal of the criminal case below, "for refiling with the Sandiganbayan" was erroneous because Section 46 of R.A. No.
6975 vests the exclusive jurisdiction in criminal cases involving PNP members only in the "regular courts" which excludes the Sandiganbayan since it is,
constitutionally and statutorily, a "special court" and not a regular court. To bolster this claim, petitioner points to Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution
which described the Sandiganbayan as "a special court" and Section 4, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "[t]he present anti-graft court
known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law."

It further asserts that (a) if it were the intention of R.A. No. 6975 to grant to the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over PNP members, then Section 46 should have
explicitly stated or used the term "civil courts" considering that members of the Integrated National Police (INP) were then integrated with and under the
operational control and administrative set-up of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) and, under P.D. No. 1850, were subject to court-martial proceedings for all
crimes cognizable by the civil courts; (b) if it were the intention of R.A.
No. 6975 to include the Sandiganbayan in the term "regular courts" in
Section 46, then it should not have provided therein that "criminal cases against PC-INP members who may have not yet been arraigned upon the effectivity of this
Act shall be transferred to the proper city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge"; instead, it should have directed such transfer to "the Ombudsman
or the Special Prosecutor since the Ombudsman or the Special Prosecutor is mandated by law to entertain cases cognizable only by the Sandiganbayan" under
Section 15 of R.A. No. 6770; and (c) there is an irreconcilable conflict between Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 and Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 (revising P.D. No.
1486 which created the Sandiganbayan), as amended, which vests in the Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction over "[o]ther offenses or felonies
committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office . . . where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional . . . or a fine of
P6,000.00"; the latter then should be deemed impliedly repealed by the former, which is a later law.

Petitioner finally contends that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, is a general law of it applies to all public officers, while R.A. No. 6975 is a special law for it sets out a
special rule of jurisdiction for PNP members. The latter should thus prevail.

Petitioner then prays that the assailed orders of respondent Judge of

24 September 1992 and 7 October 1992 be reversed and set aside and that the respondent Judge be directed to reinstate and continue the trial of Criminal Case No.
Q-91-23224.

On the other hand, the Ombudsman maintains the view that it is the Sandiganbayan and not the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the subject
criminal case in view of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 and the Joint Circular of 14 October 1991. It asserts that the term "regular courts" in
Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 includes the Sandiganbayan and that R.A.
No. 6975 has not repealed Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606.

Amplifying its view, it opines that: (a) while the Sandiganbayan is a special court, it is a regular court within the context of Section 46 of R.A.
No. 6975 because it is a "court normally functioning with continuity within the jurisdiction vested in it," and that the term "regular courts" is used in Section 46 of
R.A. No. 6975 to distinguish the said courts from the court-martial for it seeks to divest the latter of such jurisdiction and mandates its transfer to the former
pursuant to the policy of the law to establish a police force national in scope and civilian in character; and (b) since the creation of the Sandiganbayan is mandated
by the Constitution 14 to take cognizance of crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office and P.D. No. 1606 created it pursuant to such mandate,
then the repeal of the latter, as suggested by petitioner, would diminish and dilute the constitutional jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and would operate to amend
the Constitution, which no statute can do. Moreover, there is no irreconcilable inconsistency between the two laws to warrant an implied repeal.

Finally, the Ombudsman asserts that the proviso in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 that "criminal cases against PC-INP members who may have not yet been
arraigned upon the effectivity of this Act shall be transferred to the proper city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge" only means a referral to the
proper city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge for appropriate preliminary investigation and not the filing of the criminal information with the
proper court it being a fact that all city and provincial prosecutors have been deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation of cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

As to which law is the special law, the Ombudsman maintains that it is P.D. No. 1606 because it deals specifically with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while
Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 does not specifically mention any particular court.

The resolution of the principal issue hinges on the interpretation of the term regular courts in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 which, in turn, requires an inquiry into
the legislative intent and purpose of the law.

There can be no doubt that the provisions of R.A. No. 6975 on the PNP are intended to implement Section 6, Article XVI (General Provisions) of the 1987
Constitution which reads:

Sec. 6. The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered
and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided
by law.

The sponsors of House Bill No. 23614, 15 which together with Senate Bill No. 463 16 eventually became R.A. No. 6975 were unequivocal on this. Representative
Antonio Cerilles, after referring to the aforementioned mandate, declared:

Today is a date with history, Mr. Speaker, when this august chamber will try its best to pursue what is mandated by the Constitution. Today,
we shall insist, though legislative fiat, that the State should establish and maintain one police force. Its civilian character on a national scope
shall be paramount. Today, we should insist that no office in any element or unit of the police force can be occupied or run by military
personnel and officer. We should also insist that the only way to professionalize our police force is to separate them from the Armed Forces
of the Philippines. 17
In this sponsorship speech, Representative Nereo Joaquin stated:

First and foremost among all these is, as already mentioned earlier, the fact that the bill is undoubtedly in harmony and in conformity not
only with the letter but more importantly with the spirit of the new Constitution particularly Section 6 of Article XVI, the General
Provisions. . . . 18

Police forces have traditionally been under civilian authority. However, the dictatorial regime of then President Ferdinand Marcos, consistent with his own agenda
to strengthen the machinery of martial law rule, exploited to his advantage the provision of the 1973 Constitution which mandated the establishment and
maintenance of "an integrated national police force whose organization, administration, and operation shall be provided by law." 19 First, he issued a series of
decrees consolidating and integrating various local police forces and placing them under the operational control, direction, and supervision of the Philippine
Constabulary (PC); 20 then on 8 August 1975, he promulgated P.D. No. 765 which "established and constituted the Integrated National Police which shall be
composed of the Philippine Constabulary as the nucleus, and the integrated police forces as established by Presidential Decrees Nos. 421, 482, 531, 585 and 641,
as components, under the Department of National Defense." By this decree, Mr. Marcos succeeded in militarizing the police forces by making them mere
components of the PC which was then one of the four major commands of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). He did not stop there. For, even after the
farcical lifting of Martial Law in 1981 through Proclamation No. 2045, and pursuant to the infamous Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution, 21 he
promulgated on 4 October 1982 P.D. 1850 which provided for court-martial jurisdiction over police officers, policemen, firemen, and jail guards. Section 1 thereof
reads:

Sec. 1. Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the Armed Forces. — Any provision of the law to the
contrary notwithstanding — (a) uniformed members of the Integrated National Police who commit any crime or offense cognizable by the
civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial pursuant to and in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 408, as
amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War; (b) all persons subject to military law under Article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War
who commit any crime or offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of under the said Articles of
War; Provided, that, in either of the aforementioned situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper civil or judicial authorities
when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under Article 38 of Commonwealth Act Numbered 408, as amended, or court
martial jurisdiction over the person of the accused military or Integrated National Police personnel can no longer be exercised by virtue of
their separation from the active service without jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand unless otherwise provided by law.

As used herein, the term uniformed members of the Integrated National Police shall refer to police officers, policemen, firemen and jail
guards.

In a manner of speaking, this decree completed the militarization of the INP and consummated the aberration in the police organization. Two years later, or on 5
September 1984, he issued P.D. No. 1952 which amended
P.D. No. 1850 by inserting a proviso to the first paragraph of Section 1 granting himself the authority "in the interest of justice, [to] order or direct, at any time
before arraignment, that a particular case be tried by the appropriate civil court."

Before P.D. No. 1850, or specifically on 16 January 1981, Mr. Marcos, through P.D. No. 1822, placed under court-martial jurisdiction, pursuant to the Articles of
War, all officers, soldiers, and personnel in the active service of the AFP or of the PC, charged with any crime or offense related to the performance of their duties.

Needless to state, the overwhelming sentiment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution against the martial law regime 22 and the militarization of the police forces
prompted them to explicitly direct the establishment and maintenance of one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character. This civilian
character is unqualified and unconditional and is, therefore, all-embracing. The Declaration of Policy (Section 2) of R.A. No. 6975 faithfully carried out this
mandate when it declared therein that:

The police force shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for the performance of police functions. Its national scope and civilian
character shall be paramount. No element of the police force shall be military nor shall any position thereof be occupied by active members
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

That civilian character refers to its orientation and structure. Thus, during a bicameral conference committee meeting on House Bill No. 23614 and Senate Bill No.
463, Senator Edgardo Angara remarked:

SENATOR ANGARA:

That's what we're trying to interpret nga eh. Civilian in character meaning, were separating the police both in
orientation and structure from the military discipline and structure, I think that's essentially the mandate we're trying
to implement.

Civilian character necessarily includes, according to him:

SENATOR ANGARA:

Civilian system of justice na. 23

It is thus evident that the mandate of Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 is to divest courts-martial of any jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members and to
return or transfer that jurisdiction to the civil courts. This return or transfer of jurisdiction to the civil courts was explicitly provided for in the original Section 68
of House Bill No. 23614 which reads as follows:

Sec. 68. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. — Any provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, criminal cases involving PNP members
shall, immediately upon effectivity of this Act, be exclusively tried by the Civil Courts: Provided, however, That in cases where a member
of the PNP is unable to post bail, he may be placed upon order by the court under the custody of his supervisor upon petition of the latter. 24

Upon motion of Representative Rodolfo Albano, accepted by the Committee and approved in plenary session, this section was amended, to read as follows:
 ANY PROVISION OF LAW TO THE CONTRARY NOTWITHSTANDING, CRIMINAL CASES INVOLVING PNP MEMBERS
SHALL BE WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE CIVIL COURTS. 25

In the course of the interpellation on his amendment, Mr. Albano had the occasion to emphasize the purpose of the law and the transfer of jurisdiction to civil
courts of criminal cases involving members of the PNP:

MR. ALBANO:

Considering that we are creating here a purely civilian police force, he [the PNP member] should, therefore, also fall
under our civil force, and there should be no iota of military syndrome [referring to the proviso in Sec. 68] so to
speak. 26

During the deliberation by the Bicameral Conference Committee on National Defense on House Bill No. 23614 and Senate Bill No. 463, more specifically on
Section 68 of the former, its Chairman, Senator Ernesto Maceda, used the term "regular courts" in lieu of civil courts. Thus:

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA):

Okay, Rey at saka iyong House, you work on the flow chart.

So other than that in that particular section, ano ba itong "Jurisdiction in criminal cases?" What is this all about?

REP. ZAMORA:

In case they are charged with crimes.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA):

Ah, the previous one is administrative, 'no. Now, if it is charged with a crime, regular courts. 27

The term regular courts was finally carried into the reconciled bill, 28 entitled "An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police Under a Reorganization
Department of the Interior and Local Government, and for Other Purposes," and incorporated in the Conference Committee Report received by the Office of the
Secretary of the Senate on 19 November 1990. Section 46 of the proposed reconciled bill is Section 68 of House Bill No. 23614, with further modifications and
amendments. The reconciled bill was approved by such both House of Congress and became R.A. No. 6975.

The foregoing considered, we have no doubt that the terms civil courts and regular courts were used interchangeably or were considered as synonymous by the
Bicameral Conference Committee and then by the Senate and the House of Representatives. Accordingly, the term regular courts in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975
means civil courts. There could have been no other meaning intended since the primary purpose of the law is to remove from courts-martial the jurisdiction over
criminal cases involving members of the PNP and to vest it in the courts within our judicial system, i.e., the civil courts which, as contradistinguished from courts-
martial, are the regular courts. Courts-martial are not courts within the Philippine judicial system; they pertain to the executive department of the government and
are simply instrumentalities of the executive power. 29 Otherwise stated, courts-martial are not regular courts.

Parenthetically, in Quiloña vs. The General Court Martial, 30 this Court found correct and impliedly adopted as its own a statement of the Office of the Solicitor
General in its Comment that Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 mandates the transfer of criminal cases against members of the PNP to the civilian courts. Thus:

Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General in his comment —

xxx xxx xxx

The civilian character with which the PNP is expressly invested is declared by RA 6975 as paramount, and, in line therewith, the law
mandates the transfer of criminal cases against its members to civilian courts. 31

Having thus ruled that the term "regular courts" in Section 46 of R.A.
No. 6975 refers to the civil courts, we must now determine if the Sandiganbayan is included in that term.

Regular courts are those within the judicial department of the government, namely, the Supreme Court and such lower courts as may be established by law. 32 Per
Section 16, Chapter 4, Book II of the Administrative Code of 1987, 33 such lower courts "include the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals,
Regional Trial Courts, Shari'a District Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and Shari'a Circuit Courts."

The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486 34 pursuant to the mandate of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution. 35 This was revised by P.D. No.
1606. 36 The latter was amended by P.D. No. 1860 37 and lastly by P.D. No. 1861. 38 Under the amendments introduced by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the following cases:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:

(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where
 the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of
P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty
prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall
be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit
Trial Court.

(b) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction:

(1) On appeal, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in cases originally decided
by them in their respective territorial jurisdiction.

(2) By petition for review, from the final judgments, resolution or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise
of their appellate jurisdiction over cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdiction. . . .

Undoubtedly then, the Sandiganbayan is a regular court and is thus included in the term regular courts in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975.

Petitioner's insistence that it is not because, by the Constitution and by the statutes, the Sandiganbayan is a special court and, therefore, not a regular court is
untenable. In the first place, a comparison between the words regular and special is inappropriate since the opposite of the latter is not the former and vice
versa. Special means "designed for a particular purpose; confined to a particular purpose, object, person, or class," 39 and is, therefore, the antonym
of general. 40 On the other hand, regular means "steady or uniform in course, practice, or occurrence," as opposed to casual or occasional. 41 In other
words, special and general are categories in the distributive order. 42 With reference then to the courts, they principally relate to jurisdiction. Thus, there are courts
of general jurisdiction and courts of special jurisdiction. It is, of course, incorrect to say that only courts of general jurisdiction are regular courts. Courts of
special jurisdiction, which are permanent in character, are also regular courts. The Sandiganbayan is a court with special jurisdiction because its creation as a
permanent anti-graft court is constitutionally mandated and its jurisdiction is limited to certain classes of offenses.

That the Sandiganbayan is among the regular courts is further strongly indicated by Section 1 of P.D. No. 1606 which vests upon it "all the inherent powers of a
court of justice" and places it on "the same level as the Court of Appeals," and by Section 4 thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, which grants it appellate
jurisdiction over certain cases decided by the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

There is, as well, no merit in the theory of petitioner that Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 impliedly repealed Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No.
1861, as regards the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over members of the PNP. First, the argument is based on the faulty assumption that the Sandiganbayan,
being a special court, is not a regular court within the contemplation of Section 46. Second, both provisions are not irreconcilable and the presumption against an
implied repeal has not been overcome. Implied repeal may be indulged in only if the two laws are inconsistent, or the former law must be repugnant as to be
irreconcilable with the latter law. Necessarily then, an attempt must be made to harmonize the two laws. In Valera vs.
Tuason, 43 this Court stated:

One of the well-established rules of statutory construction enjoins that endeavor should be made to harmonize the provisions of a law or of
two laws so that each shall be effective. In order that one law may operate to repeal another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent.
The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconciliable [sic] with the latter act. (U.S. vs. Palacios, 33 Phil., 208). Merely because a later
enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the latter,
since the new law may be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. (Statutory Construction, Crawford, p. 634).

In Gordon vs. Veridiano, 44 this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, emphasized the task of courts to reconcile and harmonize laws:

Courts of justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor to reconcile the same instead of declaring outright
the invalidity of one as against the other. Such alacrity should be avoided. The wise policy is for the judge to harmonize them if this is
possible, bearing in mind that they are equally the handiwork of the same legislature, and so give effect to both while at the same time also
according due respect to a coordinate department of the government.

Indeed, it has been appropriately said:

The presumption against implied repeals is classically founded upon the doctrine that the legislature is presumed to envision the whole body
of the law when it enacts new legislation, and, therefore, if a repeal of the prior law is intended, expressly to designate the offending
provisions rather than to leave the repeal to arise by necessary implication from the later enactment. Still more basic, however, is the
assumption that existing statutory and common law, as well as ancient law, is representative of popular will. As traditional and customary
rules, the presumption is against their alteration of repeal. The presumption has been said to have special application to important public
statutes of long standing. 45

It can thus be reasonably presumed that in the enactment of R.A. No. 6975, Congress had the whole body of the law in mind and, for consistency, coherence, and
harmony, took into account the provisions of the Constitution regarding the Sandiganbayan, the law creating it, and the amendments thereto relative to its
jurisdiction. Since under the law, the Sandiganbayan is a special anti-graft court with exclusive original jurisdiction over (a) violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and (b) other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees (including
those in government-owned or controlled corporations) in relation to their office where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, and since members of the PNP are public officers or employees, 46 Congress can be logically presumed to have
read into Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 the constitutional and statutory provisions regarding the Sandiganbayan. The alleged inconsistency seen by petitioner is non-
existent for, on the contrary, the two provisions can well go together with full and unhampered effect to both and without doing violence to either, thereby giving
spirit to the maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to
form a uniform system of jurisprudence. 47 As harmonized, the conclusion is inevitable that members of the PNP, as public officers and employees, are subject to
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan with respect to (a) violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code, and (b) other offenses or felonies committed by them in relation to their office where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00. All other offenses committed by them are cognizable by the appropriate courts within the
judicial system such as the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
That the public officers or employees committed the crime in relation to their office must, however, be alleged in the information for the Sandiganbayan to have
jurisdiction over a case under Section 4(a) (2). 48 This allegation is necessary because of the unbending rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the
information. 49

In the instant case, the trial court dismissed Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 on the ground that since the penalty prescribed for the crime charged — which is
homicide — is higher than prision correccional, 50 then pursuant to Deloso vs. Domingo, 51 it is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the case. In order to
avoid a misapprehension of the ruling in Deloso, which was based on P.D. No. 1606 alone, it must be stressed that we had unequivocally ruled in Aguinaldo vs.
Domagas 52 that for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses or felonies committed by public officers or employees, under Section
4(a) (2) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D.
No. 1861, it is not enough that the penalty prescribed therefor is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years, or a fine of P6,000.00; it is also
necessary that such offenses or felonies were committed in relation to their office. We then concluded:

Even before considering the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged, it is thus essential to determine whether that offense was
committed or alleged to have been committed by the public officers and employees in relation to their offices.

In the recent case of Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 53 we reiterated our ruling on the requirement that the offenses or felonies covered by Section 4(a) (2) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, have to be committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office and likewise elucidated on the meaning of
offenses committed in relation to their office by reiterating the principle in Montilla vs. Hilario 54 that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the
office if "the offense cannot exist without the office," or that "the office must be a constituent element of the crimes as . . . defined and punished in Chapter Two to
Six, Title Seven, of the Revised Penal Code," and the principle in People vs. Montejo 55 that the offense must be intimately connected with the office of the
offender and perpetuated while he was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions. Further, we intimated that the fact that the
offense was committed in relation to the office must be alleged in the information.

Just recently, in Natividad vs. Felix, 56 we explicitly declared that we had re-examined the Deloso case in Aguinaldo and in Sanchez and reiterated the requisites for
an offense under Section 4(a) (2) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, to fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

In the light then of the foregoing, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City would be without jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 if the information
therein would show that the offense of homicide charged was committed by the accused (private respondent) in relation to his office. The information has failed to
do so. The pleadings of the parties are of little help. We can only speculate therefrom that the crime charged might have been committed while the private
respondent was in the pursuit of his mission. Under the sub-heading in the petition entitled "Relevant Antecedents," the petitioner merely states:

1. On July 31, 1991, private respondent . . . then a member of the PNP-NCR assigned to the Central Police District Command Station 2,
based in Novaliches, Quezon City, was dispatched by his Commanding Officer to Dumalay Street in Novaliches to check on a complaint
regarding a person creating trouble in the place. While in Novaliches, private respondent shot Romeo Sadang to death.

There is no indication at all that the trouble-maker was the victim and that he was shot by the private respondent in the course of the latter's mission. On the other
hand, the private respondent asserts in his Comment that he "shot Romeo Sadang in the performance of a lawful duty and in lawful defense of his
life." 57 Petitioner ignored this claim in its Reply to the Comment. This claim is an anticipatory defense yet to be proved and its assertion in the Comment does not
cure the deficiency, pointed out earlier, of the information. It would appear to us that with respect to the issue of jurisdiction, the parties only took into account the
prescribed penalty, relying upon Deloso vs. Domingo, for which reason they did not consider important and relevant the issue of whether the offense charged was
committed by the private respondent in relation to his office. But as stated earlier, Deloso vs. Domingo was modified by Aguinaldo vs. Domagas.

The dismissal then of Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 solely on the basis of Deloso vs. Domingo was erroneous. In the light of Aguinaldo and Sanchez, and
considering the absence of any allegation in the information that the offense was committed by private respondent in relation to his office, it would even appear
that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the case. However, it may yet be true that the crime of homicide charged therein was committed by the private
respondent in relation to his office, which fact, however, was not alleged in the information probably because Deloso vs. Domingo did not require such an
allegation. In view of this eventuality and the special circumstances of this case, and to avoid further delay, if not confusion, we shall direct the court a quo to
conduct a preliminary hearing in this case to determine whether the crime charged in Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 was committed by the private respondent in
relation to his office. If it be determined in the affirmative, then it shall order the transfer of the case to the Sandiganbayan which shall forthwith docket and
proceed with the case as if the same were originally filed with it. Otherwise, the court a quo shall set aside the challenged orders, proceed with the trial of the case,
and render judgment thereon.

Henceforth, any officer authorized to conduct a preliminary

investigation 58 who is investigating an offense or felony committed by a public officer or employee (including a member of the PNP) where the penalty prescribed
by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, must determine if the crime was committed by the respondent in
relation to his office. If it was, the investigating officer shall forthwith inform the Office of the Ombudsman which may either (a) take over the investigation of the
case pursuant to Section 15(1) of R.A. No. 6770, 59 or (b) deputize a prosecutor to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and
prosecution of the case pursuant to Section 31 thereof. 60 If the investigating officer determines that the crime was not committed by the respondent in relation to
his office, he shall then file the information with the proper court.

In the light of the foregoing, further discussion on the other collateral issues raised has become unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ORDERING the respondent Judge to conduct, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy of this Decision, a
preliminary hearing in Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 to determine whether the crime charged was committed by the private respondent in relation to his office,
and

(1) If he determines that the crime charged was committed by the private respondent in relation to his office, DIRECTING the respondent
Judge to forthwith transmit the records of the case to the Sandiganbayan which shall docket and proceed with the case as if the same were
originally filed with it; or

(2) If he determines otherwise, DIRECTING him to set aside the challenged Orders of 24 September 1992 and 7 October 1992, to proceed
with the hearing of Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224, and to render judgment thereon.

No pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.

G.R. No. 105597 September 23, 1994

LT. GENERAL LISANDRO ABADIA in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the AFP, MAJ. GENERAL ARTURO ENRILE, in his capacity as
Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and COL. DIONISIO SANTIAGO, in his capacity as the Commanding Officer of the ISG Detention
Center, Fort Bonifacio, Makati, Metro Manila, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, TWELFTH DIVISION and LT. COL. MARCELINO G. MALAJACAN, respondents.

Marlon Alexandre Cruz and Armando M. Marcelo for private respondent.

KAPUNAN, J.:

Private respondent Lt. Col. Marcelino Malajacan was arrested on April 27, 1990 in connection with the December 1989 coup attempt. He was brought to the ISG
Detention Center in Fort Bonifacio, Makati where he was detained for nine months without charges. On January 30, 1991, a charge sheet was filed against private
respondent by the office of the Judge Advocate General alleging violations of the 67th, 94th and 97th Articles of War for Mutiny, Murder and Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman, respectively. A petition for habeas corpus was filed by the private respondent with the Court of Appeals on March 7,
1991 which was, however, dismissed by the said court's Fourth Division in a decision promulgated on June 28, 1991 on the ground that pre-trial investigation for
the charges against the respondent was already ongoing before a Pre-Trial and Investigative (PTI) Panel of the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO). The
pertinent portions of the Court of Appeals' decision state:

As in the Elepante case also, we cannot at this time order the release of petitioner on a writ of habeas corpus without giving the military
from here on a reasonable time within which to finish the investigation of his case and determine whether he should be formally charged
before the court martial or released for insufficiency of evidence, especially since, as manifested by respondents, petitioner has already filed
his counter-affidavits to those supporting the charge sheet against him and that the matter is now ready for resolution.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED, but the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines is
directed to take appropriate action in petitioner's case with all deliberate speed, consistent with his constitutional right to a speedy
disposition of his case. 1

Three months after these charges were filed, the Pre-Trial Investigative Panel came out with a Resolution dated 27 May 1991 finding no evidence of direct
participation by the private respondent in the December 1989 coup. Said panel nonetheless recommended that respondent be charged with violation of Article 136
of the Revised Penal Code (Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit Rebellion or Insurrection) and the 96th Article of War in relation to the 94th Article of
War. 2 Consequently, all existing charges against respondent were dismissed and a new charge for violation of Article of War No. 96 for Conduct Unbecoming an
Officer and a Gentleman for having allegedly been involved in a series of conferences with other military officers for the purpose of overthrowing the government,
carrying with it the penalty of dismissal from service was filed with the General Court Martial (GCM) No. 8.

Additionally, the Judge Advocate General's Office endorsed the filing of charges for violation of Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code to the Quezon City
Prosecutor's Office on October 29, 1991. 3 The City Prosecutor eventually came out with a resolution dated February 4, 1992, dismissing the charges. 4

Upon private respondent's arraignment (and before entering his plea) in General Court Martial No. 8 for violation of the 96th Article of War, private respondent
entered a special motion to dismiss the case on grounds of prescription under AW 38. The said article states:

Art. 38. As to time. — Except for desertion, murder or rape committed in time of war, or for mutiny or for war offenses, no person subject to
military law shall be liable to be tried or punished by a court martial for any crime of offense committed more than two years before the
arraignment of such person. . . . . (Emphasis supplied)

The private respondent contended that the offense was supposed to have been committed between August to November, 1989, more than two years before his
arraignment on April 22, 1992. Favorably resolving the motion to dismiss for being "substantial . . . meritorious and legally tenable," the General Court Martial
dropped the last remaining charge against private respondent. 5 On April 23, 1992, the Assistant Trial Judge Advocate submitted a report to the Chief of Staff
quoting the Resolution of GCM No. 8 for "info/notation".

On May 27, 1992 respondent filed a second petition for habeas corpus before the Court of Appeals where he assailed his continued detention at the ISG Detention
Center in spite of the dismissal of all the charges against him. He contended that his continued confinement under the circumstances amounted to an "illegal
restraint of liberty" correctable only by the court's "issuance of the high prerogative writ of habeas corpus." 6

In a Resolution dated May 29, 1992, the 12th Division of the Court of Appeals ordered petitioners Lt. General Lisandro Abadia, Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and Maj. General Arturo Enrile, Commanding General of the Philippine Army "(t)o produce the person of Lt. Col. Marcelino Q.
Malajacan" and to show lawful cause for the latter's continued detention. 7 On June 3, 1992, respondent court promulgated the questioned decision issuing a writ
of habeas corpus and commanding herein petitioners to release the private respondent. In its decision, respondent court held:

While we recognize the fact that under military law, a decision of a military tribunal, be it of acquittal or conviction, or dismissal is merely
recommendatory and subject to review by the convening authority and the reviewing authority, We find a glaring hiatus in the rules and
procedure being followed by the military in general and the respondents in this particular case, that inevitably leads to unbridled injustice,
which if not corrected by the proper authorities concerned including this court, will subject any member of the military to indefinite
confinement. The lack of time limit within which the Chief of Staff and/or reviewing authority may approve or disapprove the order of
dismissal on the ground of prescription may be subject to abuse. 8

Consequently, on June 11, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to annul and set aside respondent court’s
decision alleging that:
 1. The respondent court may not impose a time frame for the Chief of Staff to act on the respondent's case where the law itself provides
none; and,

2. The Resolution of June 3, 1992 contravenes a previous decision by a co-equal body, the Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals
which on September 27, 1991 dismissed respondent's petition for habeas corpus.

We disagree.

In the context of the constitutional protection guaranteeing fair trial rights to accused individuals particularly the Right to a Speedy Trial, we cannot accept
petitioners' submission that the absence of any specific provision limiting the time within which records of general courts martial should be forwarded to the
appropriate reviewing authority and for the reviewing authority to decide on the case would deny private respondent — or any military personnel facing charges
before the General Courts Martial, for that matter — a judicial recourse to protect his constitutional right to a speedy trial. What petitioners suggest is untenable. In
the case at bench, the records of the case may indefinitely remain with the General Court Martial, and our courts, because of a procedural gap in the rules, cannot
be called upon to ascertain whether certain substantive rights have been or are being denied in the meantime. That is not the spirit ordained by inclusion of the
second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which mandates the "duty of the Courts of Justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." 9 Moreover, the absence of rules and regulations mandating a reasonable period within
which the appropriate appellate military authority should act in a case subject to mandatory review is no excuse for denial of a substantive right. The Bill of Rights
provisions of the 1987 Constitution were precisely crafted to expand substantive fair trial rights and to protect citizens from procedural machinations which tend to
nullify those rights. Moreover, Section 16, Article III of the Constitution extends the right to a speedy disposition of cases to cases "before all judicial, quasi-
judicial and administrative bodies." This protection extends to all citizens, including those in the military and covers the periods before, during and after the trial,
affording broader protection than Section 14(2) which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial.

The 1987 Constitution reflects both the recognition by the Constitutional Commission of the necessity of a military force and the widespread concern, after two
decades of authoritarian rule, over its role in a democratic society. Thus, while the Constitution recognizes the need for a military force to protect its citizens, it
emphatically ordains the supremacy, at all times of civilian authority over the military. Through numerous provisions scattered all over the fundamental law, the
constitutional injunction mandating the principle of civilian supremacy over the military has been given substantive detail. 10 This detail has been further
elaborated by the Rules of Court and our jurisprudence. 11 Petitioners' thesis, however, would deny the intent and spirit of these
provisions. 12

A consideration of the history of Philippine military law, moreover, exposes the fallacy of the petitioner's averments. The first military law enacted by the National
Assembly of the Philippines (Commonwealth Act No. 408 which remains that backbone of existing military law in our country) is essentially American in
origin. 13 With a few minor amendments, Commonwealth Act No. 408, similar to the American military code of 1928, continues to be the organic law of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. 14 Our system of court martial proceedings therefore on the surface remains essentially identical to the system in force in the
United States. 15

Paradoxically, developments in our military law have failed to keep up with developments in law both here and in the United States. While the Constitution and
the Rules of Court have together expanded the fair trial rights of the accused, military law on the matter has remained static, if not anachronistic. While admittedly,
military law is a jurisprudence which exists separate and apart from the law which governs most of us, 16 because "it is the primary business of armies and navies
to fight or to be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise," 17 it is distinct only in so far as it addresses the general recognition of the unique concerns of the
military establishment in safeguarding the government and citizens it has been sworn to protect, but it cannot exist as an entity wholly separate from our laws,
particularly our Constitution. In the United States, this recognition has led to the evolution of two basic sources of specialized jurisprudence: the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), enacted in 1950 by the US Congress and revised in 1968 and the Manual for Court Martial (MCM), most recently revised in 1975. These
statutory enactments and the revisions which followed essentially reflected the growth of jurisprudence in the sphere of civil rights to the extent that, in some
aspects involving the fair trial rights of the accused, the military statutory requirements have become more stringent. This is at least true as far as the right to a
speedy disposition of cases is concerned. A few examples are in order.

Article 33 of the UCMJ requires the forwarding to the convening authority of all documents related to the case within eight (8) days of the accused's arrest and
confinement. Causing unnecessary delay in the disposition of criminal cases constitutes an actionable offense under Article 98. In general, the Uniform Code of
Military Justice mandates that immediate steps be taken to try or dismiss cases against an accused member of the armed forces imposing an unusually heavy
burden on government in establishing diligence in the disposition of cases. In the arena of military jurisprudence, decisions interpreting speedy trial requirements
adhere to standards more rigorous than those involving normal Sixth Amendment Rights. These decisions have required stringent "Sixth Amendment balancing of
1) length of delay, 2) reasons for delay, 3) timely assertion of speedy trial right and 4) prejudice to the
accused." 18

Thus, ironically, while U.S. military law has dynamically reflected changes and trends in fair trial jurisprudence in enacting provisions giving life to the changes in
the law, our military law has been stunted by legislative inaction. Obviously, current military law and jurisprudence in the Philippines have failed to respond to
actual changes in the fundamental law guaranteeing and expanding the fair trial rights to the accused thereby leaving gaps in military law which enables our
system of military justice to ignore on a wholesale basis substantive rights available to all citizens. The absence of a provision mandating a period within which
appeals may be taken to the corresponding appellate authority underscores this deficiency.

Yet our Constitution is clear, Section 14 Article III thereof states:

Sec. 14. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and
public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

These rights are clearly available to all citizens even in the absence of statutory enactment. They cannot be denied to certain individuals because of gaps in the law
for which they are not responsible. They cannot be taken away from certain individuals because of the nature of their vocation. Members of the military
establishment do not waive individual rights on taking up military uniform. That they become subject to uniquely military rules and procedures does not imply that
they agree to exclusively fall under the jurisdiction of only those rules and regulations, and opt to stand apart from those rules which govern all of the country's
citizens. As the respondent Court correctly held:

As admitted by counsel for respondents, there is no time frame within which to transmit the records of the case to the reviewing authority as
well as time limitation within which the Chief of Staff must act on the recommendation of dismissal However, it must be stressed that the
 absence of a rule does not give to the Chief of Staff indefinite time within which to act at the expense of the constitutional right of a citizen
to enjoy liberty and to be protected from illegal or arbitrary detention.

Respondent court, therefore, did not commit an abuse of discretion in ordering the petitioners to act with dispatch in dealing with the private respondent's case.
Over three years have elapsed since the respondent's arrest. To this day, there is no indication — and it has not been alleged — that records of the case have been
forwarded to the appropriate military appellate authority.

This case does not even involve complex issues of fact and law. The central issue which the appropriate military appellate authority will have to review is whether
or not the General Court Martial was correct in dismissing the case on grounds of prescription under Article 38 of the Articles of War. We cannot see why the
military appellate review authority should take an interminable length of time in coming up with a decision on the case. The unjustified delay in dealing with the
respondent's case is a deliberate injustice which should not be perpetrated on the private respondent a day longer.

II

Petitioner next contends that the Decision of the respondent court dated June 3, 1992, issuing a writ of habeas corpus in favor of the private respondent
contravenes a previous decision of a co-equal body, the Court of Appeal's Fourth Division which earlier denied the same. This is untenable. The factual
circumstances surrounding both decisions are different.

First, at the time of the first petition, the private respondent was being held in the detention center for eleven months without charges being filed against him. The
pre-trial investigative panel had not yet been constituted. Because of his confinement without charges, a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus was
filed in his behalf on the basis of respondent's averment that his arrest and continued detention without charges violated his constitutional rights. 19 The Fourth
Division found adequate support upholding military jurisdiction over the case of the private respondent under the Articles of War. It also noted that the case
against the private respondent was ongoing and that it would be difficult to order respondent's release on a writ of habeas corpus without giving military
authorities reasonable time within which to investigate and try the case. The Court nonetheless urged the Chief of Staff to act on the petitioner's case "with all
deliberate speed, consistent with his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case."

Second, by the time the subsequent petition for habeas corpus was before the court's Twelfth Division (herein respondent court), the JAGO's
Pre-trial Investigative Panel had dismissed all cases against the petitioner and endorsed the filing of charges (under Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code) with
the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. The latter subsequently dismissed the case. Moreover at the time the Twelfth Division rendered its assailed decision,
respondent was already languishing in a military detention center for three years, half of those spent in the limbo between the GCM's decision dismissing the cases
filed against him and the uncertainty of when the military appellate process would finally come around in either exonerating him or overturning the GCM's
findings. This in spite of the fact that even during the first petition before the Fourth Division, the court had already urged speedy disposition of the case.

Finally, in dismissing the cases against the private respondent, the General Court Martial had made a determination that the charges against respondent had
prescribed under Article 38 of the Articles of War. Conformably with this conclusion and with the Court's ruling in Domingo vs. Minister of National
Defense, 20 the lower court was correct in stating that the respondent could no longer be tried by the General Court Martial if a period of two years had elapsed
prior to the arraignment of the accused. Clearly, the circumstances, noted above, had changed so radically in the intervening period that the appellate court's
Twelfth Division had no choice, given the incredible delay in forwarding the documents to the military appellate authority, but to issue the writ.

These finding obviously militate against petitioners' contention that the appellate court's Twelfth Division abused its discretion in issuing an order allegedly in
contravention to the Fourth Division's earlier orders. The factual circumstances are hardly similar. The respondent court, under these changed circumstances could
be hardly faulted for issuing the writ of habeas corpus in favor of the private respondent.

The mantle of protection accorded by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus "extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which a person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." 21 As we emphasized hereinbefore, and we repeat
it once more, petitioners cannot seek shelter in the absence of specific rules relating to review of cases dismissed by military tribunals in violating the right of the
accused to a speedy trial and in justifying his continued confinement. Were we to uphold the proposition that our courts should decline to exercise jurisdiction
because the law itself provides no time frame for the proper military authorities to review the general court martial's dismissal of the respondent's case would mean
that we would be sanctioning the suggestion implicit in petitioner's argument that the Constitution's guarantees are guarantees available not to all of the people but
only to most of them.

Petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 107328 September 26, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EFREN DULOS, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Midpantao L. Adil for accused-appellant.

KAPUNAN, J.:

In Criminal Case No. 1114 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, Branch 13, Efren Dulos was charged with murder allegedly committed in this wise:

That on or about March 15, 1987, in the City of Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a caliber. 45 pistol, with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with firearm one Apolinario Tamse, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds
which caused his death.
 1
CONTRARY TO LAW.

On arraignment held on March 9, 1988, accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. 2

After examining and assessing the evidence respectively adduced by the prosecution and the defense, the trial court found Efren Dulos guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder and was accordingly adjudged as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that accused Efren Dulos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder committed with treachery,
as charged in the Information and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim
the amount of P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED. 3

The operative facts of this case are as follows:

At around ten o'clock in the evening of March 15, 1987, Susan Almazar and Alice Tipudan, both professional entertainers, were sitting at the lobby of the New
Imperial Hotel in Cotabato City, waiting for prospective clients. 4Moments later, a certain Mr. Gara, a Military Police assigned at the said hotel as watchman,
approached them and told them that the accused-appellant, Efren Dulos, had some male guests who wishes to be entertained. 5Thereafter, they were introduced to
herein accused-appellant. Both parties agreed to a charge of P100.00 each for Susan and Alice as fee for their services. 6

The parties then proceeded to the Sampaguita Disco located at the Old Imperial Hotel to join the accused-appellant's guests. 7 Alice Tipudan left early and decided
to wait for Susan Almazar at the lobby of the New Imperial Hotel. 8

Apparently, Susan, who stayed until midnight to entertain accused-appellant, decided to check in with one of the latter's guests at the upper floor of the disco house
for an additional fee of P500.00 9 When she received the money, she changed her mind, thus, spawning a fight with her customer. 10 When Alice learned of the
disagreement, she requested MP Gara to intervene and buy
peace. 11

In the meantime, Susan came down to the lobby of the Imperial Hotel to meet her boyfriend, Apolinario "Paul" Tamse 12 who was waiting for her. Upon hearing
about the reneged deal, the irate accused-appellant confronted Susan and Paul. 13 Paul apologized to the accused-appellant saying that his girlfriend does not accept
intimate dates. 14 Then, they, together with Alice and another female companion, proceeded to go home to the Federal Lodging House which was only a few
meters away from the hotel. 15

Accused-appellant, angered by the aforesaid incident, quickly followed the group. 16 Upon noticing the accused-appellant who then drew his .45 caliber pistol,
Alice shouted a warning of the threat to Susan and Paul, who were walking ahead. 17 They tried to run but they were overtaken by the accused-
appellant. 18 Accused-appellant demanded the return of his money. Susan handed the P100.00 to accused-appellant, at the same time shielding Paul with her
body. 19 She denied having received P500.00 from accused-appellant's guest lest her boyfriend would find out that she agreed to check in with a customer. 20 Susan
pleaded with the latter's gun still pointed towards them, she tried to grapple with him for possession of the same 21 but she was violently pushed. 22 She fell to the
ground. 23 At this juncture, Paul pleaded for mercy by kneeling down and raising both his hands up. 24 His plea fell on deaf ears as accused-appellant fired his gun
hitting Paul on the left breast. 25 Paul fell face down to the ground. Accused-appellant then fired another shot at Paul's back, killing him on the spot. 26

The autopsy conducted on the victim revealed the following findings, viz:

1. Wound with smooth edges at the chest along the left anterior clavicular line at the level of the 4th intercostal space;

2. Wound with rough edges just above the left nipple;

3. Wound with smooth edges at the left palm;

4. Wound with rough edges at the posterior portion of the base of the left thumb; and

5. Wound with smooth edges at the post axillary line 3 inches below the armpit.

CAUSE OF DEATH:

Cardio-Respiratory Arrest Secondary to Massive Hemorrhage due to gunshot wounds. 27

Accordingly, accused-appellant was charged with murder. After arraignment where he pleaded not guilty, accused-appellant was tried and found guilty of the
crime charged as previously stated.

Now before us on appeal, accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors, to wit:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER PERSON OF APPELLANT, A MEMBER OF THE AFP AT
THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT;

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT OF MURDER AND NOT HOMICIDE AND SENTENCING HIM
TO RECLUSION PERPETUA DESPITE THE SUDDENNESS OF KILLING AND PROOFS OF UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION ON THE
PART OF THE DECEASED AND LACK OF SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION ON THE PART OF APPELLANT AND THE
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER; and
 III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING SELF-DEFENSE OR AT LEAST INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE IN
FAVOR OF APPELLANT.28

The appeal lacks merit.

In his first assigned error, accused-appellant contends that the trial court did not acquired jurisdiction to try him, hence, the decision rendered against him should
be declared null and void. He vigorously claims that as a member of the 12th MSSU AFP (Military Southern Support Command, Armed Forces of the
Philippines), he should be tried by the military courts pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1850, and not by civil courts.

Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1850, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1952, reads in full:

Sec. 1. Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the Armed Forces. — Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding — (a) uniformed members of the Integrated National Police who commit any crime or offense cognizable by the
civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial pursuant to and in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 408, as
amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War; (b) all persons subject to military law under Article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War
who commit any crime or offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of under the said Articles of
War; Provided, that, in either of the aforementioned situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper civil or judicial
authorities when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under Article 38 of Commonwealth Act Numbered 408, as
amended, or court-martial jurisdiction over the person of the accused military or Integrated National Police personnel can no longer be
exercised by virtue of their separation from the active service without jurisdiction having duly attached before hand unless otherwise
provided by law: Provided further, that the president may, in the interest of justice order or direct, at any time before arraignment, that a
particular case be tried by the appropriate civil court. (Emphasis ours)

While it is true that the foregoing provision vests exclusively upon courts-martial trial of criminal offenses committed by members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, whether or not done in the actual performance of their official duties, accused-appellant’s case falls under the exception contained in the proviso of the
section which allows civil courts to assume jurisdiction over criminal offenses and over the person of the accused where the latter was discharged from active
military service without military jurisdiction having duly attached on him before his separation.

In the case at bench, accused-appellant himself concedes that he was readily discharged from active military service as soon as he was made to answer for the
criminal offense without any initiative on the part of the military to try and prosecute him for the offense charged. Verily, it was the civil court which first acquired
jurisdiction over his person.

In an attempt to elude civil court jurisdiction, accused-appellant seeks refuge in the case of Abadilla v. Ramos. 29Said case, however, cannot apply here.
In Abadilla, Colonel Rolando Abadilla was dropped from the roll of officers for his alleged participation in several criminal offenses. Before his separation from
the service, however, Abadilla was subjected to military investigation, hence, military jurisdiction had fully attached on his person. In contrast, when accused-
appellant was discharged from the service, no initiatory proceedings nor any investigation were conducted, consequently, military jurisdiction did not attach on his
person.

Besides, records reveal that the issue of jurisdiction was not raised by the accused-appellant in the trial court. Such being the case, raising it at this point would be
useless and futile. It is well settled that when the question of jurisdiction over the person was not raised in the trial, the same cannot be belatedly raised on appeal,
thus, in People v. Lozano, 30 we held that:

The record shows that the issue of jurisdiction in the trial court was not raised by the accused-appellant Lozano, so much so that if the issue
be raised at this point in time it would be useless and futile because the question of jurisdiction over the person which was not raised in the
trial court cannot be raised on appeal (Vda. de Alberto v. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 436 [1989]).

Besides, a party is estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of a court after voluntarily submitting himself to its jurisdiction (Tejones v.
Gironella, 159 SCRA 100 [1988]). Accused-appellant Lozano's appearance in the arraignment and pleading not guilty to the crime charged,
is an sign that he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, so that jurisdiction has been acquired by the court over his
person and continues until the termination of his case.

In the second and third assigned errors, accused-appellant questions the findings of fact of the court a quo. However, as we have consistently ruled in a long line of
cases, findings of the trial court as to credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect by the appellate court. 31 Unless there is a showing that the trial
court had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have altered the outcome of the case, the
appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower court. 32

Accused-appellant disputes the trial court finding that the killing was committed in a treacherous manner. He maintains that the horizontal trajectory of the bullet
wound and the fact the victim was facing him when the gun was discharged, negate the existence of treachery.

We are not persuaded.

There is treachery when the victim is shot, albeit frontally, with his hands raised to show that he would not fight, or because of fright, or to try to ward off the shots
that were to come. 33 This circumstance constitutes treachery because the victim was clearly in a defenseless position. In the case at bench, the prosecution
eyewitnesses Susan Almazar and Alice Tipudan, categorically testified that when the accused-appellant fired his first shot, Paul Tamse was on his knees with his
hands up pleading for mercy. 34 Evidently, the victim was in a defenseless position when accused-appellant shot him. While the victim was already lying prostrate
on the ground in prone position, accused-appellant pumped one more bullet on his back. This constituted teachery and qualified the offense to murder.

Accused-appellant's lengthy argument on the absence of the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation in the commission of the crime serves no purpose as
the trial court never considered such circumstance against him. In fact, the trial court declared that the prosecution failed to establish and prove the existence of the
said qualifying circumstance. Thus:

From the facts as determined by the court, the court is of the view that the prosecution failed to establish the qualifying circumstance of
evident premeditation’s alleged in the information. It failed to establish that the criminal act of shooting the deceased with a handgun was
preceded by cool thought and reflection on the part of the accused to carry out such a criminal intent to kill within a space of time sufficient
to arrive at a calm judgment. 35
The generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated in accused-appellant's favor. In order that voluntary surrender may be
appreciated, it is necessary that "it must be spontaneous and made in such manner that it shows the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the
authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses necessarily incurred in his search and
capture." 36 Here, there was no conscious effort on the part of accused-appellant to voluntarily surrender to the military authorities when he went to Camp Siongco,
Dinaig, Maguindanao after the fate incident. As he himself admitted in his testimony, he was not placed under custody by the military authorities as he was free to
roam around as he pleased. He declared:

Q. And no one was guarding you? In other words you can get in and out at the BOQ (Bachelor's Officers Quarters) at
your will?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You could even leave Camp Siongco at your will?

A. Yes, sir.37

Verily, he went to the said camp to take up residence, not to voluntarily surrender to the authorities. Likewise, his claim that he surrendered his 0.45 caliber pistol
to a certain Major Bermones, one of his guests at the Old Imperial Hotel, is not substantiated by evidence. Assuming that the gun was surrendered, that fact cannot
be appreciated in his favor. This Court in the case of People v. Palo 38 held that where an accused merely surrendering his person to the authorities, there is no
voluntary surrender.

Finally, accused-appellant avers that he shot Paul Tamse in self-defense. He contends that:

(1) There was unjust provocation on the part of the deceased when he refused to refund the P600 of the accused, and instead he and his
girlfriend Susana Almazar tried to run away to avoid returning said amount;

(2) There was an unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased when he tried to grab the pistol of the accused, as earlier stated; and,

(3) There was reasonable necessity of the means used by the accused to repel or prevent the aggression. 39

This contentions belied by the evidence adduced by the prosecution. In fact, accused-appellant did not present any evidence to sustain his plea of self-defense. Not
only were the elements of self-defense absent, but the claim is likewise negated by the physical evidence. 40 The accused-appellant suffered no harm or injury
physically. The number and nature of the wounds inflicted on the victim prove that the attack came from the accused-appellant and that the victim had no chance
to defend himself as he was not armed at the time of the
incident. 41 In addition, the victim never manifested a posture of belligerence. When he saw accused-appellant approaching him menacingly with a gun, Apolinario
knelt down, raised his two hands and pleaded with accused-appellant to spare his life.

All told, we find no cogent reason to reverse the assailed judgment of conviction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED and the appeal DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 79173 December 1, 1987
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROLANDO N. ABADILLA, SUSAN S. ABADILLA, in her own behalf and in
behalf of the minors JUNE ELIZABETH, ROLANDO, JR., DAPHINE JENNIFER, MA. THERESA, ANNA ROSANNA, VINCENT MARCUS and
BART JOSEPH, all surnamed ABADILLA, petitioners,
vs.
General FIDEL V. RAMOS, Chief of Staff, AFP; Major General RENATO DE VILLA, Commanding General, Philippine Constabulary & Vice-Chief of
Staff, AFP; and Brigadier General ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, Commanding General, CAPCOM, PC, respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:
The validity of the detention of an individual is challenged in this Petition for habeas corpus. The petitioners are the spouse and minor children of the detainee
while the respondents are ranking officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
The record of the case discloses that on January 27, 1987, a group of officers and enlisted men of the AFP seized control of the radio-television broadcasting
facilities of the Republic Broadcasting System (GMA-Channel 7) located in Quezon City ostensibly for the purpose of toppling the existing constitutional
government. While the takeover might have been a prelude to similar operations throughout the national capital, it did not succeed. On January 29, 1987, the
mutineers surrendered to the military authorities and the possession of the facility was restored to the owners and managers thereof. Soon thereafter, the military
authorities conducted an investigation of the matter.
On April 18, 1987, a group of enlisted men staged a mutiny inside the Fort Bonifacio military facility in Makati, Metropolitan Manila. The mutiny, dubbed as "The
Black Saturday Revolt," 1 did not succeed either. After the incident, the military authorities also conducted an investigation.
The first investigation was concluded on March 12, 1987. The investigation disclosed that Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) of the
AFP was one of the leaders of the unsuccessful takeover of the GMA radio-television facilities. 2 The Board of Officers investigating the matter recommended that
the case of Colonel Abadilla be endorsed for pre-trial investigation and that the appropriate charges be filed against him for violation of Article of War 67 (Mutiny
or Sedition). Article of War 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 139 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, and such
other offenses that may be warranted by the evidence. Accordingly, a charge sheet was prepared against the Colonel.
The investigation conducted on "The Black Saturday Revolt" ended on May 27, 1987. It was found at said investigation that Colonel Abadilla was also involved in
the mutiny. The Board of Officers conducting the investigation and recommended that the case be endorsed for pre-trial investigation and that the appropriate
charges be filed against the Colonel. 3 The Colonel was likewise charged, accordingly.
Colonel Abadilla was at large when both investigations were conducted.
On May 4, 1987 or some two weeks before the second investigation was concluded, herein respondent Major General Renato De Villa, Commanding General of
the PC and Vice-Chief of Staff of the AFP issued an Order for the arrest and confinement of Colonel Abadilla. 4
On May 21, 1987, respondent AFP Chief of Staff General Fidel V. Ramos issued General Orders No. 342 dropping Colonel Abadilla from the rolls of regular
officers of the AFP. 5 The pertinent portions of the said General Orders are as follows-
DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF REGULAR OFFICERS
The names of the following officers are dropped from the rolls of Regular Officers, Armed Forces of the Philippines for cause effective as of
9 May 1987 pursuant to Article of War 117. (Authority: Letter from the President, dated 9 May 1987).
 BRIGADIER GENERAL JOSE MARIA CARLOS ZUMEL ...
COLONEL ROLANDO N ABADILLA 0-4937 PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY (GENERAL STAFF CORPS)
MAJOR REYNALDO C CABAUATAN ...
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE:
xxx xxx xxx
On July 7, 1987, the Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City filed an Information for Slight Physical Injuries with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metropolitan
Manila in Quezon City against Colonel Abadilla. 6 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 0237558.
On July 27, 1987, a combined element of the Philippine Army and Philippine Constabulary arrested Colonel Abadilla. 7 He was detained first in Camp Crame in
Quezon City and later, up to the present, in Fort Bonifacio in Makati.
On July 30, 1987, another Information, this time for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition) was filed by the
Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City against Colonel Abadilla. 8 The case was assigned to Branch 104 of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City and was
docketed as Criminal Case No. Q- 53382.
On the same date, July 30, 1987, Mrs. Susan S. Abadilla the spouse of Colonel Abadilla together with their minor children June Elizabeth, Rolando, Jr. Daphine
Jennifer, Ma. Theresa, Anna Rosanna, Vincent Marcus and Bart Joseph, went to this Court and filed the instant Petition for habeas corpus, challenging the validity
of the detention of Colonel Abadilla. 9
The main arguments in the Petition are as follows —
(1) When Colonel Abadilla was dropped from the rolls of officers effective May 9, 1987, he became a civilian and as such, the order for his
arrest and confinement is null and void because he was no longer subject to military law;
(2) His detention is illegal because he is not charged with any criminal offense, either before a civil court or a court-martial;
(3) Even assuming that the order for the arrest and confine- ment of Colonel Abadilla was valid at the initial stage, the said order
became functus officio and/or moot and academic when the Colonel was dropped from the rolls of officers;
(4) Even assuming that Colonel Abadilla is subject to military law, his detention remains illegal because under Article of War 70, a person
subject to military law can be detained only if he is charged with a crime or a serious offense under the Articles of War.
In the meantime, the Regional Trial Court, with Judge Maximiano O. Asuncion presiding therein, granted the Motion to Quash and the Supplement thereto filed by
the counsel of Colonel Abadilla. Accordingly, the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-53382 was dismissed by the trial court. 10
In a resolution dated August 4, 1987, this Court resolved to issue the writ of habeas corpus. The respondents were required to make a return of the writ on August
10, 1987. 11
On August 10, 1987, the respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), submitted the Return of the writ. 12 The main arguments in the
Return are as follows —
(1) In the event that proceedings with a view to military trial are commenced against a Person subject to military law before the termination
of military service, military jurisdiction will fully attach on the said person.;
(2) The confinement of Colonel Abadilla as a person subject to military jurisdiction is authorized by Article of War 70; and
(3) The continued confinement of Colonel Abadilla in Fort Bonifacio is imperative and justified on account of the criminal case/s filed
against him by both the military and civil authorities.
As instructed by this Court, the petitioners submitted their Reply to the Return of the writ on September 7, 1987. 13The main arguments in the Reply are as
follows —
(1) The pendency of a case in the civil courts has no relevance to the issue of military jurisdiction over Colonel Abadilla. This view
notwithstanding, Criminal Case No. Q-53382 filed against Colonel Abadilla has been dismissed by the trial court. The pendency of Criminal
Case No. 0237558 filed against the Colonel does not warrant his continued confinement inasmuch as the Colonel has posted bail for his
provisional liberty;
(2) Colonel Abadilla is not in the active service of the AFP nor is he a person under sentence adjudged by courts-martial. As such, he does
not fall under the category of a person subject to military law as defined by Article of War 2;
(3) An officer dropped from the rolls by order of the President is fully separated from the service and is no longer subject to military law
(Citing Gloria, Philippine Military Law Annotated).;
(4) Under Section 10 of the Manual for Courts-Martial, Philippine Army, court-martial jurisdiction over officers in the military service of
the Philippines ceases on discharge or separation from the service. The case of Colonel Abadilla does not fall under any of the exceptions to
this rule. This observation has been upheld in Martin v. Ver, 123 SCRA 745 (1983);
(5) The pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court in Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955), cited in Olaguer v. Military Commission
No. 34, G.R. Nos. 54558 and 69882, May 22, 1987, supports the stand taken by the herein petitioners and
(6) Under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1850, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1952, court-martial jurisdiction over the
person of accused military personnel Cannot be exercised if they are already separated from the active service, provided that jurisdiction has
not attached beforehand unless otherwise provided by law.
On September 9, 1987, the petitioners submitted their Traverse to the Return of the writ. 14 It is contended therein that, contrary to the view of the Solicitor
General, jurisdiction over a person is acquired not by the mere filing of a charge or information, or by the commencement of an investigation, but by the arrest of
the defendant. The petitioners stress that inasmuch as Colonel Abadilla was arrested after he had become a civilian, the charge sheets prepared against him by the
military authorities are nun and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the Colonel.
On September 24, 1987, the petitioners submitted their Additional Traverse together with a Motion to Decide the Petition. 15 On the issue of military jurisdiction,
and in support of their contentions, they cite the treatise of Colonel William Winthrop entitled Military Law and Precedents. 16
Inasmuch as the parties herein had already presented their respective arguments, the case was, therefore, deemed submitted for deliberation.
The sole issue in habeas corpus proceedings is the legality of the detention. 17 Therefore, the issue that must be resolved by this Court is this: Is the detention of
Colonel Abadilla illegal? The resolution of this issue will, of course, relate to the jurisdiction of the military authorities over the person of Colonel Abadilla.
I.
We shall first resolve the problem of jurisdiction.
In Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 18 this Court held that a military commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses
allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and
void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned. For the same reasons, the doctrine announced in Aquino, Jr. v. Military Commission No.
2 19 and all decided cases affirming the same, in so far as they are inconsistent with the Olaguer pronouncement, were deemed abandoned. There is no doubt,
therefore, that military authorities cannot try civilians.
The petitioners contend that the Olaguer doctrine applies to Colonel Abadilla on the ground that he had become a civilian since May 9, 1987 when he was dropped
from the rolls of officers of the AFP. They argue that on account of his civilian status, Colonel Abadilla is no longer subject to military law. In support of their
arguments, the petitioners cite the Articles of War, 20 the Manual for Courts-Martial of the AFP, 21 Presidential Decree No. 1850, as amended, as well as the
dissertations on military law of Colonel William Winthrop 22 and Colonel Claro Gloria. 23 They likewise invoke the pronouncement of this Court in Martin v.
Ver 24 and that of the Supreme Court of the United States in Toth v. Quarles. 25
On the other hand, the Solicitor General contends that military jurisdiction had fully attached on Colonel Abadilla inasmuch as proceedings were initiated against
him before the termination of his service in the military.
We agree.
As early as March, 1987, months before Colonel Abadilla was dropped from the rolls of officers, the military authorities began the institution of proceedings
against him. As of that time, he was certainly subject to military law. He was under investigation for his alleged participation in the unsuccessful mutinies when he
was an officer of the AFP. As a military officer, it was incumbent upon him to appear before his superior officers conducting the investigation even for the purpose
of clearing his name. He did not do so. His superiors could not confine him during the period of investigation because as stated earlier, he was at large. This
disregard for military duty and responsibility may have prompted his superiors to cause him to be dropped from the rolls of officers.
It is clear that from the very start of this controversy, the military authorities intended to try Colonel Abadilla as a person subject to military law. This can be
gleaned from the charge sheets prepared against him.
The fact that Colonel Abadilla was dropped from the rolls of officers cannot and should not lead to the conclusion that he is now beyond the jurisdiction of the
military authorities. If such a conclusion were to prevail, his very own refusal to clear his name and protect his honor before his superior officers in the manner
prescribed for and expected from a ranking military officer would be his shield against prosecution in the first place. His refusal to report for duty or to surrender
when ordered arrested, which led to his name being dropped from the roll of regular officers of the military, cannot thereby render him beyond the jurisdiction of
the military courts for offenses he committed while still in the military service. This Court cannot countenance such an absurd situation. Established principles in
remedial law call for application.
The military authorities had jurisdiction over the person of Colonel Abadilla at the time of the alleged offenses. This jurisdiction having been vested in the military
authorities, it is retained up to the end of the proceedings against Colonel Abadilla. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the
instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. 26
The petitioners stress that jurisdiction over a person is acquired not by the mere filing of a charge or an information, or by the commencement of an investigation,
but by the arrest of the defendant. They maintain that the Colonel was arrested when he was already a civilian.
The argument is untenable.
The rule that jurisdiction over a person is acquired by his arrest applies only to criminal proceedings instituted before the regular courts. It does not apply to
proceedings under military law. At the time the military investigations were commenced, Colonel Abadilla was an officer of the AFP subject to military law. As
such, the military authorities had jurisdiction over his person pursuant to Article of War 2 and Section 8 of the Manual for Courts-Martial, AFP, which provide as
follows-
Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. — The following persons are subject to these articles and shall be understood as included in the
term 'any person subject to military law or persons subject to military law whenever used in these articles:
(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or of the Philippine Constabulary; ... ; and
8. COURTS-MARTIAL — Jurisdiction in general — Persons. — The following persons are subject to military law:
(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippine Constabulary; ...
xxx xxx xxx
As mentioned earlier, his earlier arrest could not be effected because he was at large. The initial stages of the investigations had against him before his arrest were,
therefore, not improper.
As a whole, the authorities cited and relied upon by the petitioners do not satisfactorily support their contentions.
Article of War 2 enumerates who are subject to military law. In March, 1987, Colonel Abadilla was a military officer. Under this Article, he was subject to
military law.
Section 10 of the Manual for Courts-Martial, AFP, which discusses court- martial jurisdiction in general, states the general rule to be:
The general rule is that court-martial jurisdiction over officers, cadets, soldiers, and others in the military service of the Philippines ceases
on discharge or other separation from such service, and that jurisdiction as to an offense committed during a period of service thus
terminated is not revived by a re-entry into the military service.
Attention is called to the exception mentioned in the last sentence of the Section, to wit —
So also, where a dishonorably discharged general prisoner is tried for an offense committed while a soldier and prior to his dishonorable
discharge, such discharge does not terminate his amenability to trial for the offense.
This exception applies to the case of Colonel Abadilla inasmuch as he is at present confined in Fort Bonifacio upon the orders of his superior officers, and his
having been dropped from the rolls of officers amounts to a dishonorable discharge.
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1850, as amended, even acknowledges instances where military jurisdiction fully attaches on an individual even after he shall
have been separated from active service, to wit —
SECTION 1. Court martial jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the Amed Forces ...
(b) all persons subject to military law under Article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War who commit any crime or offense shall be
exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of under the said Articles of War; Provided, that in either of the aforementioned
situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper civil or judicial authorities when court- martial jurisdiction over the offense
has prescribed under Article 38 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, or court-martial jurisdiction over the person of the accused
military or Integrated National Police can no longer be exercised by virtue of their separation from the active service without jurisdiction
having duly attached beforehandunless otherwise provided by law; ... (Emphasis supplied.)
The dissertations of Colonels Winthrop and Gloria are, at most, persuasive authorities. Indeed, this Court has cited the treatise of Colonel Winthrop in at least three
27
cases on account of the scholarly discussions contained therein. Works of this nature provide insight and information which have been of tremendous help to this
Court in many judicial controversies. Regardless of their great value, they cannot prevail over opposing but nonetheless settled doctrines in Philippine
jurisprudence.
These observations notwithstanding, We have gone through the treatise of Colonel Winthrop and We find the following passage which goes against the contention
of the petitioners, viz —
3. Offenders in general — Attaching of jurisdiction. It has further been held, and is now settled law, in regard to military offenders in
general, that if the military jurisdiction has once duly attached to them previous to the date of the termination of their legal period of service,
they may be brought to trial by court-martial after that date, their discharge being meanwhile withheld. This principle has mostly been
applied to cases where the offense was committed just prior to the end of the term. In such cases the interests of discipline clearly forbid that
the offender should go unpunished. It is held therefore that if before the day on which his service legally terminates and his right to a
discharge is complete, proceedings with a view to trial are commenced against him — as by arrest or the service of charges, — the military
jurisdiction will fully attach, and once attached may be continued by a trial by court-martial ordered and held after the end of the term of
the enlistment of the accused ... 28
The case of Martin v. Ver 29 cited by the petitioners is not in point. In Martin this Court took the opportunity to discuss the general rule that "court-martial
jurisdiction over persons in the military service of the Philippines ceases upon discharge or separation from such service" and an exception to the general rule
recited in Article of War 95 regarding frauds against the Government.
The case of Toth v. Quarles 30 decided by the Supreme Court of the United States is also inapplicable.
Toth involves a former serviceman named Audrey M. Toth who, five months after his honorable discharge from the U.S. Air Force, was arrested by military
authorities on a charge of murder allegedly committed in Korea when he was still an airman. A divided Supreme Court 31 held that Congress has no power to
subject a discharged serviceman to trial by court-martial for offenses committed by him while in the military service and so to deprive him of the constitutional
safeguards protecting persons accused of crime in a federal court.
The Toth ruling is inapplicable to the instant case for two reasons.
First — Toth was honorably discharged from the military service. The arrangement was voluntary on the part of the serviceman. There was an ostensible intention
on his part to live the life of a civilian again. Colonel Abadilla was not honorably discharged. On the contrary, he was dropped from the rolls of regular officers of
the AFP. This arrangement did not have his express consent. In fact, he was at large at that time.
Second — The proceedings against Toth began after his honorable discharge from the service. The proceedings against Colonel Abadilla were commenced when
he was still a regular officer of the AFP.
Moreover, the doctrine in Toth is not a unanimous pronouncement as there were some persuasive dissenting views.
Although Toth was cited in Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 32 the citation should not be construed as a sweeping endorsement of the entire doctrine
therein. Toth was cited in Olaguer only for the purpose of emphasizing that military commissions or tribunals cannot try civilians. In Olaguer, this Court relied on
the doctrine announced in Ex-parte Milligan, 33 and not the one in Toth, in arriving at the Decision of the Court.
Another point should be mentioned regarding the matter of jurisdiction. We agree with the respondents in their assertion that the pendency of a case in the civil
courts has no relevance to the problem of military jurisdiction over Colonel Abadilla. The argument is well-taken.
II.
The matter of jurisdiction having been settled, We now proceed to discuss the remaining contentions of the petitioners.
The petitioners argue that even if it were to be assumed that Colonel Abadilla is subject to military law, his confinement remains illegal because under Article of
War 70, a person subject to military law can be detained only if he is charged with a crime or a serious offense under the Articles of War.
The record of the case discloses that Colonel Abadilla has been charged by the military authorities for violation of Article of War 67 (Mutiny or Sedition) which is
a serious offense, and the corresponding charge sheets have been prepared against him.
The important issue in this Petition has been resolved-the detention of Colonel Abadilla under the circumstances obtaining in this case is not illegal. For this
reason, the instant Petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed for lack of merit.
In the light of the foregoing discussion, the motion of petitioners to hold respondent General Ramos in contempt of court for approving the filing of court martial
proceedings against Colonel Abadilla during the pendency of this case should be and is hereby denied. The Court has not issued a restraining order enjoining such
proceedings. In fact We now find that the court martial proceedings may proceed inasmuch as the military authorities have jurisdiction over Colonel Abadilla in
the above-stated cases.
One last word. The man in uniform belongs to the elite in public service. His eminent credential is his absolute loyalty to the Constitution, the flag, his country and
his people. He is the guardian against external and internal aggression.
He is a man of honor and courage. He is a gentleman. He is given arms to insure his capability as an instrument of peace. When he is drafted in the Philippine
Constabulary he becomes a peace officer, a law enforcer, a law man. Respect for the law is his article of faith.
However, when he wavers and fails to live up to the highest standard of fidelity to his country and people, when he defies authority and discipline, when he
commits offenses or when he turns against the very people and government he is sworn to protect, he becomes an outlaw and a disgrace to his uniform. The state
has a right to hold him to account for his transgressions and to see to it that he can not use the awesome powers of his status to jeopardize the security and peace of
the citizenry.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

S/SGT. JOSE SANTIAGO vs. LT. COL. CELSO ALIKPALA, ET AL G.R. No. L-25133 September 28, 1968

Facts: Petitioner Jose Santiago, a sergeant in the Philippine Army and the accused in a court-martial proceeding, through a writ of
Certiorari and prohibition, filed on April 17, 1963, with the lower court, sought to restrain respondents, the officers, constituting the court-martial, that was then in
the process of trying petitioner for alleged violation of two provisions of the Articles of War, from continuing with the proceedings on the ground of its being
without jurisdiction. There was likewise a plea for a restraining order, during the pendency of his petition, but it was unsuccessful. The arraignment of the
petitioner on December 17, 1962 was for the purpose of avoiding prescription pursuant to Article of War 38 of one of the offenses with which the accused is
charged since the same was allegedly committed on or about December 18, 1960. Prior to the said arraignment, no written summons or subpoena was issued
addressed to the petitioner or his counsel, informing them of said arraignment. Instead of said written summons or subpoena Col. Eladio Samson, Constabulary
Staff Judge Advocate called up First Sergeant Manuel Soriano on December 16, 1962 by telephone with instructions to send the petitioner to Camp Crame under
escort for arraignment and only for arraignment. Upon arrival therein, the petitioner was directed to proceed to the PC Officer's Clubhouse, where a General Court-
Martial composed of the respondents, created to try the criminal case for violation of Articles of War 96 and 97', was to resume, as scheduled, the trial of 'People
vs. Pfc. Numeriano Ohagan, for violation of Articles of War 64, 85, and 97'. It was only at the time (December 17, 1962) that petitioner learned that he will be
arraigned for alleged violation of Articles of War 85 and 97, after being informed by Capt. Cuadrato Palma as Trial Judge Advocate why he was there. Prior to that
arraignment on December 17, 1962 there was no special order published by the Headquarters Philippine Constabulary creating or directing the General Court-
Martial composed of the respondents to arraign and try the case against the petitioner, there however was already an existing court trying another case.

Issue: W/N writ of habeas corpus together with certiorari and mandamus can be validly issued to court-martial which lacks jurisdiction on due process grounds

Held : Yes. There is such a denial not only under the broad standard which delimits the scope and reach of the due process requirement, but also under one of the
specific elements of procedural due process. The conviction which was overturned on both certiorari, prohibition and habeas corpus was by a court-martial which
was not legally convened and therefore was without any authority to convict the petitioner. Habeas corpus may go along with certiorari and mandamus.

Ognir vs Director of Prisons

NOVEMBER 4, 2014 | KAAARINA
Ognir vs Director of Prisons
G.R. No. L-1870, February 27, 1948
Facts:
Convicted by the General Court Martial appointed or convened during the year 1943 by Colonel Wendel W. Fertig, Commanding Officer of the 10th Military
District of Mindanao, and sentenced to life imprisonment, for violation of the 93rd Article of War of the Philippine Army, petitioner Ognir filed for habeas corpus,
claiming that his imprisonment is null and void because the said General Court-Martial was not legally constituted, inasmuch as District Commander that
appointed or convened it had no authority to do so, and therefore the judgment of said court is null and void for want of jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether or not the General Court-Martial which sentenced the petitioner to life imprisonment, was legally appointed or convened

Ruling:
No. The General Court-Martial which sentenced the petitioner to life imprisonment, was not legally appointed or convened. The appointment of Colonel Fertig as
Commander of the 10th Military District of Mindanao does not carry with it the power to convene the General Court-Martial.
According to Article 8 of Commonwealth No. 408, the only officers who have such inherent power by virtue of their position are the President of the
Commonwealth and the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army. All other officers such as the Provost Marshall and Commanding Officer of a separate brigade or
body of troops, and Colonel Fertig may come within the latter category, can not appoint a General Court Martial unless expressly empowered by the President to
do so.
The Judge Advocate General of the Philippine Army and Solicitor Antonio A. Torres, filed a motion for reconsideration, raising the ground, among others, that
“that the decision of the General Court-Martial which convicted the petitioner may be given the same effects as the actuation of the civil courts during the Japanese
occupation.”
The court, in denying the motion, ruled that:
The contention that the proceedings of the General Court-Martial under consideration “may be given effect as the actuation of de facto officers in the same manner
as the pronouncement of Civil Tribunals set up during the second Republic.” is untenable; because there is no analogy between the decision of the courts
established by the Military Government or the so-called second Republic, and that of the General Court-Martial which convicted the petitioner. The Courts of the
Commonwealth legally constituted which were continued during the so-called Philippine Republic, and the other courts during the Japanese occupation were
legally created by laws which, under the International Law, the military occupant had the right to promulgate. While the said General Court-Martial was created or
convened by an officer having no power or authority to do so.