G.R. No.

170916 April 27, 2007

CGR CORPORATION herein represented by its President ALBERTO RAMOS, III, HERMAN
M. BENEDICTO and ALBERTO R. BENEDICTO, Petitioners,
vs.
ERNESTO L. TREYES, JR., Respondent

FACTS

CGR Corporation, Herman M. Benedicto and Alberto R. Benedicto (petitioners) claimed to have
occupied 37 of public land in Barangay Bulanon, Sagay City, Negros Occidental even before the
notarized separate Fishpond Lease Agreement in their respective favor were approved in
October 2000 by the Secretary of Agriculture for a period of twenty-five (25) years or until
December 31, 2024.

On November 18, 2000, Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr. (respondent) allegedly forcibly and unlawfully
entered the leased properties and once inside barricaded the entrance to the fishponds, set up
a barbed wire fence along the road going to petitioners’ fishponds, and harvested several tons
of milkfish, fry and fingerlings owned by petitioners.

On November 22, 2000, petitioners promptly filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Sagay
City separate complaints for Forcible Entry With Temporary Restraining Order And/Or
Preliminary Injunction And Damages.

In a separate move, petitioners filed in March 2004 with the Bacolod RTC a complaint for
damages against respondent. This was on the ground of respondent’s alleged harvesting and
carting away several tons of milkfish and other marine products in their fishponds, ransacking
and destroying of a chapel built by petitioner CGR Corporation, and stealing religious
icons and even decapitating the heads of some of them, after the act of dispossession had
occurred.

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss11 petitioners’ complaint for damages on three grounds
– litis pendentia, res judicata and forum shopping.

By the assailed Order of August 26, 2005, RTC dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground
of prematurity, it holding that a complaint for damages may only be maintained "after a final
determination on the forcible entry cases has been made."

ISSUE

Whether, during the pendency of their separate complaints for forcible entry, petitioners can
independently institute and maintain an action for damages which they claim arose from
incidents occurring after the dispossession by respondent of the premises.

HELD

Yes, petitioners can independently institute an action for damages.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 17. Judgment. – If after trial the court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true, it
shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly
due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
premises, attorney’s fees and costs. If it finds that said allegations are not true, it shall render
judgment for the defendant to recover his costs. If a counterclaim is established, the court shall
render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as justice
requires. (Emphasis supplied)

The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases thus refer to "rents" or "the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises" or "fair rental value of the
property" and attorney’s fees and costs.

The 2006 case of Dumo v. Espinas reiterates the long-established rule that the only form of
damages that may be recovered in an action for forcible entry is the fair rental value or the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property

Other damages must thus be claimed in an ordinary action.

A.M. No. MTJ-05-1580 October 6, 2010
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 04-1608-MTJ]

LOURDES B. FERRER and PROSPERIDAD M. ARANDEZ, Complainants,

vs.
JUDGE ROMEO A. RABACA, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 25, Manila, Respondent.

FACTS

This administrative case charges Hon. Romeo A. Rabaca, then the Presiding Judge of Branch
25 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC), with ignorance of the law, disregard of the
law, dereliction of duty, knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order, and violation of the
Code of Conduct for Government Officials.

The complainants were the President and the Executive Director of the plaintiff in an ejectment
suit. In the said suit, respondent Judge rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff.
Consequently, plaintiff’s counsel filed a motion for immediate execution, praying that a writ of
execution be issued "for the immediate execution of the aforesaid Judgment. Respondent
Judge denied the motion for immediate execution on the ground that notice of appeal had been
timely filed hence jurisdiction over the case is now elevated to the Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE

Whether or not a motion for issuance of writ of execution in an ejectment suit may no longer be
issued when notice of appeal had already been filed.

HELD

No, it should have been issued.

It is basic rule in ejectment cases that the execution of judgment in favor of the plaintiff is a
matter of right and mandatory. This has been the consistent ruling of the Court in a number of
cases involving the same issue posed before the respondent judge. Respondent Judge is
expected to know this and his justification of erroneous application of the law, although
mitigating, could not exculpate him from liability.

Indeed, respondent Judge should have granted the plaintiff’s motion for immediate execution
considering that the defendant did not file the sufficient supersedeas bond despite having
appealed. Granting the plaintiff’s motion for immediate execution became his ministerial duty
upon the defendant’s failure to file the sufficient supersedeas bond. Section 19, Rule 70, of the
Rules of Court clearly imposes such duty, viz:

Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. — If judgment is rendered
against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has
been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond,
approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents,
damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless,
during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due
from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial
Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the
reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period
at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each
succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial
Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is
appealed.