1. TITLE: PEDRO BONGALON now substituted by FILIPINA BONGALON, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF
APPEALS, CECILIO BONGALON and AMPARO BONGALON, respondents.
G.R. No. 142441. November 10, 2004

FACTS: Pedro Bongalon, the late husband of petitioner Filipina Bongalon (“petitioner”), respondents Cecilio
Bongalon (“Cecilio”) and Amparo Bongalon (“Amparo”) and four4 others are the children of the late Cirila Bonga
(“Cirila”) and Bernabe Bongalon (“Bernabe”). Cirila is one of the five children of Rosalia Buenaflor (“Rosalia”) and
Cornelio Bonga (“Cornelio”). The other children of Rosalia and Cornelio are Trinidad Bonga Bobier (“Trinidad”),
Jacoba Bonga Faustino (“Jacoba”), Emilio Bonga (“Emilio”) and Benito Bonga (“Benito”). Jacoba had three
children, namely, Conchita Faustino Base (“Conchita”), Catalina Faustino Conlo (“Catalina”), and Leonardo
Faustino (“Leonardo”). Emilio also had three children, namely, Teodora Bonga Bien (“Teodora”), Francisca Bonga
Camba (“Francisca”), and Maxima Bonga Diaz (“Maxima”). It appears that Jacoba and Emilio predeceased their
children.

Rosalia was the owner of Lot No. 525-A in A. A. Berces St., Tabaco, Albay measuring 149 square meters and
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. RO-17402 (23825) (“OCT No. RO-17402”) issued in her name. OCT
No. RO-17402 was later cancelled and replaced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-67656 (“TCT No. T-67656”)
also issued in Rosalia’s name. Rosalia died intestate in 1940, survived by her husband and five children. Trinidad,
Conchita, and Teodora executed a Deed of Absolute Sale (“Exhibit 2”) conveying to Cirila “apart of” Lot No. 525-A
for P100. On the same day, Cirila, and again Trinidad, Conchita, and Teodora, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
(“Exhibit B”) conveying to Pedro Bongalon “apart of” Lot No. 525-A also for P100. The same notary public
notarized both deeds of sale on that same day. On 22 February 1971, Cirila executed another Deed of Absolute
Sale (“22 February 1971 Deed of Sale”) conveying Lot No. 525-A to Amparo for P4,500. Amparo subsequently
declared Lot No. 525-A in her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes in 1977 and 1978. Even before
the execution of the 22 February 1971 Deed of Sale, Amparo and her family were already occupying a 32-square
meter portion of Lot No. 525-A where her house stands.

Meanwhile, on 30 January 1979, Pedro Bongalon executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (“Extrajudicial
Settlement”) declaring that Cirila is the only heir of Rosalia and that he (Pedro Bongalon) is, in turn, the only heir of
Cirila. Based on this Extrajudicial Settlement, Pedro Bongalon secured the cancellation of TCT No. T-67656 and
obtained Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-67780 (“TCT No. T-67780”) issued in his name.

In March 1988, Pedro Bongalon sued respondents in the RTC for “Quieting of Title, Recovery of Portion of
Property and Damages.” Pedro Bongalon alleged in his complaint that: (1) he is the registered owner of Lot No.
525-A under TCT No. T-67780; (2) respondents occupied Lot No. 525-A through his tolerance; (3) he had several
times asked respondents to vacate Lot No. 525-A but they refused to do so; and (4) respondents’ occupancy of
Lot No. 525-A and their claim of ownership over the property cast a cloud over his title. Pedro Bongalon prayed
that the RTC declare his title free of any cloud and order respondents to vacate Lot No. 525-A and pay him
damages and litigation expenses.

Respondents denied Pedro Bongalon’s allegations. Respondents claimed that Pedro Bongalon fraudulently
obtained TCT No. T-67780 by executing the Extrajudicial Settlement. Amparo claimed that on the contrary, she is
the owner of Lot No. 525-A based on the 22 February 1971 Deed of Sale. As counterclaim, respondents sought
the nullification of the Extrajudicial Settlement and of TCT No. T-67780. Respondents also prayed for the award of
damages and attorney’s fees.

During the trial, Pedro Bongalon introduced in evidence other documents to prove his ownership of Lot No. 525-A,
such as (1) Exhibit “B” and (2) Conchita’s Affidavit dated 22 May 1978 (“Exhibit C”)13 confirming the sale under
Exhibit “B”. The RTC admitted these documents in evidence over the objection of respondents. For their part,
respondents also presented in evidence Exhibit “2” to prove that Cirila owned the entire Lot No. 525-A which she
later sold to Amparo in the 22 February 1971 Deed of Sale.

The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants appealed the decision of the trial court before the court
of appeals, the CA affirm the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals is in accord with the facts, evidence and the pertinent
laws, particularly the provisions of the civil code on sale, possession and ownership.

HELD: The Supreme found that the petition is partly meritorious.

The fact that a party did not mention certain exhibits in his complaint is not a reason to rule them inadmissible. It
was error for the Court of Appeals to rule that the RTC should not have admitted in evidence Exhibits “B” and “C”
because Pedro Bongalon failed to allege these documents in his complaint. What was at issue before the RTC, as
raised in the pleadings filed by the parties, was the ownership of Lot No. 525-A. Pedro Bongalon offered the
pieces of evidence in question to support his claim of ownership over Lot No. 525-A. The fact that Pedro Bongalon
did not mention Exhibits “B” and “C” in his complaint is not a reason to rule them inadmissible. While TCT No. T-
67780 was Pedro Bongalon’s principal proof of ownership, it did not preclude him from presenting other pieces of
evidence to prove his claim. This is especially relevant because of his testimony that he executed the Extrajudicial
Settlement only because the Register of Deeds of Albay required it for the issuance of TCT No. T-67780.

There is no dispute that Lot No. 525-A was Rosalia’s paraphernal property. Thus, when Rosalia died intestate, she
passed on this piece of property to her surviving spouse Cornelio and their five children, namely, Cirila, Trinidad,
Jacoba, Emilio, and Benito. These heirs inherited Lot No. 525-A in co-ownership, at 1/6 undivided share each.
After Cornelio died, his 1/6 undivided share passed to his surviving five children per stirpes, thus increasing their
undivided shares to 1/5 each. The 1/5 undivided share of Jacoba, who apparently predeceased her children
Conchita, Catalina, and Leonardo, passed to Jacoba’s children as co-owners in equal shares. Likewise, the
undivided 1/5 share of Emilio, who also apparently predeceased his children Teodora, Francisca, and Maxima,
passed to Emilio’s children as co-owners in equal shares.

Under Exhibit “2”, Trinidad, Teodora, and Conchita sold to Cirila “a part” of Lot No. 525-A on 26 July 1943.23 Since
these co-owners could alienate their undivided shares,24 they sold under Exhibit “2” their undivided shares in Lot
No. 525-A to Cirila. Similarly, on the same day, Cirila (and again Trinidad, Teodora, and Conchita), executed
Exhibit “B” conveying to Pedro Bongalon a “part of” Lot No. 525-A. Thus, Cirila sold to Pedro Bongalon her original
1/5 share and the combined undivided shares of Trinidad, Teodora and Conchita she earlier acquired under
Exhibit “2”.25 The participation of Trinidad, Teodora and Conchita in Exhibit “B”, while superfluous (as they had
earlier sold their undivided shares to Cirila), does not detract from the validity of Exhibit “B”. In sum, Pedro
Bongalon’s interest in Lot No. 525-A covers only the undivided shares of Cirila, Trinidad, Teodora, and Conchita.

Pedro Bongalon did not acquire ownership of the entire Lot No. 525-A under Exhibit “B”. As the other co-owners,
namely, the heirs of Benito Bongalon, and the other children of Jacoba (Catalina and Leonardo) and Emilio
(Francisca and Maxima) did not sign either Exhibit “B” or Exhibit “2”, they remained co-owners of Lot No. 525-A.
While each co-owner has full ownership of his part and may alienate it, the alienation affects only the portion which
pertains to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

3. TITLE : PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. COURT

OF APPEALS and CARMELO H. FLORES, respondents.
G.R. No. 116181. April 17, 1996.

FACTS: On 11 July 1989, private respondent Carmelo H. Flores (Flores) purchased from petitioner at its
Manila Pavilion. Hotel unit, two (2) managerÊs checks worth P500,000.00 each, paying a total of P1,000,040.00,
including the service charge.1 A receipt for said amount was issued by the petitioner.
On 12 July 1989, Flores presented these checks at the Baguio Hyatt Casino unit of petitioner. Petitioner refused to
encash the checks but after a lengthy discussion, it agreed to encash one (1) of the checks.3 However, it deferred
the payment of the other check until after Flores agreed that it be broken down to five (5) managerÊs checks of
P100,000.00 each. Furthermore, petitioner refused to encash one of the five checks until after it is cleared by the
Manila Pavilion Hotel unit.
However, upon his return to Manila, he made representations to petitioner through its Malate Branch so that the
check may be encashed but to no avail.5 Flores, thereafter, wrote a letter to his counsel informing the latter of the
aforementioned events.6 A Formal Demand was made by private respondentÊs counsel but petitioner persisted in
its refusal to honor the check.7
Left with no other choice, Flores filed a case with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 100. In its
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, petitioner insisted that only P900,000.00 and P40.00 bank charges were
actually paid by Flores when he purchased the two (2) manager's check worth P1,000,000.00. It alleged that due
to Flores, demanding attitude and temper, petitioner's money counter, Rowena Montes, who, at that time was still
new at her job, made an error in good faith in issuing the receipt for P1,000,040.00.
After trial, the court rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Philippine National
Bank. Petitioner interposed an appeal with the respondent court, one of the issue raise was that there is abject
absence of evidence that PNB acted fraudulently or maliciously, even as good faith is presumed. the Court of
Appeals rendered the questioned decision the appealed decision of the lower court in Civil Case No. Q-89-4033 is
hereby AFFIRMED by the Court. A motion for reconsideration was filed but it was likewise denied. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN LAW IN HOLDING THAT, THE BEST EVIDENCE TO SHOW
WHETHER MR. FLORES PAID THE PNB CASINO UNIT P900,040 OR P1,000,040 IN PURCHASING
THE TWO MANAGERÊS CHECKS EACH WORTH P500,000 IS THE RECEIPT FOR P1,000,040.
2. WHETHER OR NOT PNB CAN PRESENT COMPETENT AND RELEVANT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
ITS ALLEGATION IN THE ANSWER THAT MR. FLORES ACTUALLY PAID P900,040 AND NOT
P1,000,040 FOR THE SUBJECT MANAGERÊS CHECKS.
HELD: The Supreme Court (SC) found that the contention of the petitioner are unmeritorious.

The SC deal with the first and second issues raised by petitioner together as they are interrelated.
Although a receipt is not conclusive evidence, in the case at bench, an exhaustive review of the records fails to
disclose any other evidence sufficient and strong enough to overturn the acknowledgment embodied in petitioner's
own receipt (as to the amount of money it actually received).

Petitioner contends that it offered in court evidence of the particulars or the actual denominations of the money it
received from Flores in exchange for its managerial checks. However, aside from the self-serving testimonies of
petitioner's witnesses, we fail to discover any such evidence in the records.

Evidence based solely on the testimonies of bank employees who were the very ones involved in the
fiasco, and not on any other independent evidence, is not sufficient to rebut the contents of the receipt
issued by the bank·the subject receipt remains to be the primary or best evidence or that which affords
the greatest certainty of the fact in question. In the instant case, petitioner's contention that Flores paid
P900,000.00 only instead of P1,000,000.00 (exclusive of bank charges) in the following denominations: a
manager's check worth P450,000.00; P430,000.00 in P100.00 bills; and P20,000.00 in P500.00 bills, was based
solely on the testimonies of petitioner's bank employees – the very ones involved in the fiasco, and not on any
other independent evidence. Hence, having failed to adduce sufficient rebuttal evidence, petitioner is bound by the
contents of the receipt it issued to Flores. The subject receipt remains to be the primary or best evidence or „that
which affords the greatest certainty of the fact in question.

5. TITLE: JOSELITA SALITA, petitioner, vs. HON. DELILAH MAGTOLIS, in her capacity as Judge of the
RTC, Quezon City, Br. 107, and ERWIN ESPINOSA, respondents.
G.R. No. 106429. June 13, 1994

FACTS: Erwin Espinosa, 32, and Joselita Salita, 22, were married at the Roman Catholic Church in Ermita,
Manila, on 25 January 1986. A year later, their union turned sour. They separated in fact in 1988. Subsequently,
Erwin sued for annulment on the ground of Joselita’s psychological incapacity. The petition for annulment was
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on 7 January 1992. Therein it is alleged that “sometime in
1987, petitioner came to realize that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of their marriage, which incapacity existed at the time of the marriage although the same
became manifest only thereafter. Dissatisfied with the allegation in the petition, Joselita moved for a bill of
particulars which the trial, which the trial court granted it.

Edwin filed his Bill of Particulars and specified that—

x x x at the time of their marriage, respondent (Joselita) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to understand and accept the demands made
by his profession—that of a newly qualified Doctor of Medicine—upon petitioner’s time and efforts so that she
frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to
lose his job.
Still his wife was not contented with the Bill of Particulars. She argued that the “assertion " is a statement of legal
conclusion made by petitioner’s counsel and not an averment of ‘ultimate facts,’ as required by the Rules of Court,
from which such a conclusion may properly be inferred x x x x”. But finding the questioned Bill of Particulars
adequate, the trial court issued an order upholding its sufficiency and directing Joselita to file her responsive
pleading. She was not convinced on the decision of the trial court, then she filed a petition for certiorari with us.
However, the Supreme Court referred her petition to the Court of Appeals for resolution. The Court of Appeals
denied due course to her petition.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by Joselita questioning the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals denying due course to her petition.

Petitioner insists that the allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute a legal conclusion, not an averment of
facts, and fail to point out the specific essential marital obligations she allegedly was not able to perform, and thus
render the Bill of Particulars insufficient if not irrelevant to her husband’s cause of action. She rationalizes that her
insistence on the specification of her particular conduct or behavior with the corresponding circumstances of time,
place and person does not call for information on evidentiary matters because without these details she cannot
adequately and intelligently prepare her answer to the petition.
Private respondent on the other hand believes that his allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute the ultimate
facts which the Rules of Court requires at this point. He defines ultimate facts as—

x x x important and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of the primary right and duty, or which
directly make upon the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. The term does not refer to the details of
probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be established. It refers to
principetal, derminate facts upon the existence of which the entire cause of action rests.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Bill of Particulars submitted by herein respondent is of sufficient definiteness or
particularity as to enable herein petitioner to properly prepare her responsive pleading or for trial.

HELD: The Supreme Court sustain the view of respondent Court of Appeals that the Bill of Particulars filed by
private respondent is sufficient to state a cause of action, and to require more details from private respondent
would be to ask for information on evidentiary matters. Indeed, petitioner has already been adequately apprised of
private respondent’s cause of action against her thus—

x x x x (she) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage in
that she was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession—that of a newly qualified
Doctor of Medicine—upon petitioner’s time and efforts so that she frequently complained of his lack of attention to
her even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.

A complaint only needs to state the “ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause or causes of action.” Ultimate
facts have been defined as “those facts which the expected evidence will support.” As stated by private
respondent, “[t]he term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by
which these material elements are to be established.” It refers to “the facts which the evidence on the
trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to prove the existence of those facts.” And a
motion for bill of particulars will not be granted if the complaint, while not very definite, nonetheless already states
a sufficient cause of action. A motion for bill of particulars may not call for matters which should form part of the
proof of the complaint upon trial. Such information may be obtained by other means.
The Supreme Court stated that base on the aforequoted allegations, it is evident that petitioner can already
prepare her responsive pleading or for trial. To demand for more details would indeed be asking for information on
evidentiary facts—facts necessary to prove essential or ultimate facts. For sure, the additional facts called for by
petitioner regarding her particular acts or omissions would be evidentiary, and to obtain evidentiary matters is not
the function of a motion for bill of particulars. Therefore, the petition is denied.

7. TITLE: W-RED CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and ASIA INDUSTRIES, INC., respondents. G.R. No. 122648. August 17, 2000

FACTS: On several occasions between May 28, 1980 and May 23, 1981, petitioner W-Red Construction and
Development Corporation purchased from respondent Asia Industries, Inc. various electrical equipment worth
P976,487.18, covered by a total of eighteen sales invoices.1 Petitioner was able to pay the sum of P701,877.93,
leaving a balance of P298,183.05, inclusive of interest at the rate of 14% per annum computed as of January 20,
1982.2 For petitioner’s failure to settle its remaining obligation despite demands, respondent instituted on
November 8, 1982 an action for sum of money and damages, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
Petitioner denying the receipt of some of the items stated in the sales invoices and alleging that certain electrical
equipment delivered to it were defective or faulty, for which proper demands for replacement were ignored by
respondent. Petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence which, however, was denied by the trial court. Then the
petitioner was given opportunity to adduce evidence but it failed to appear at the several hearings scheduled
therefor. The trial court, thus, declared petitioner as having waived its right to present evidence. The trial court
rendered judgment for respondent ordering petitioner to pay the sum of P298,163.05 plus 14% interest from the
date of filing of the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in a
decision. Hence, this petition for review.

Respondent failed to file its comment on the petition for review despite the Resolution of Supreme Court, for which
reason the SC required it to show cause why it should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt. The
Resolution requiring respondent to comment was sent to its office address. Respondent, still, failed to file its
comment and, according to information furnished by its former counsel, it was in the process of winding up its
business. The Supreme Court dispensed with respondent’s comment.

Petitioner maintains that the sales invoices presented by respondent during the trial were inadmissible for being
mere photocopies which, moreover, were not authenticated by respondent’s lone witness. Likewise, the Statement
of Account showing petitioner’s unpaid obligation to respondent was not identified and authenticated by the person
who prepared it.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals as well as the trial court committed a grave abuse of
discretion when they admitted and considered private document as evidence when said documents were not
authenticated nor identified.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals as well as the trial court did not committee grave
abuse of discretion when they admitted and considered private document as evidence when said documents were
not authenticated nor identified. Even if only photocopies of the documents are submitted to the court, the record
shows that the originals of these documents were presented during the trial. Hence, it is not accurate to say that
the original exhibits were not presented before the trial court. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals,
respondent’s only witness, Alma Ramas, was not entirely incompetent to testify on petitioner’s obligation. It was
sufficiently established that Ms. Ramas, who was connected with the credit and collection department, was in
charge of monitoring the credit purchases of customers, including petitioner.

Having ruled on the admissibility of respondent’s documentary evidence, the next issue to be resolved is the
weight of said exhibits, for admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. On this score,
the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, which are not shown to be manifestly erroneous or
unsupported by the record, deserve great respect. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. The Supreme Court
affirm the appealed decision.