1)MERIDA V PEOPLE (DEFINITION OF TIMBER, AUTHORITY OF FOREST OFFICERS)

G.R. No. 158182

June 12, 2008

FACTS:

On 23 December 1998, Tansiongco learned that petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property.
Tansiongco reported the matter to Florencio Royo (Royo), the punong barangay of Ipil. On 24 December
1998, 7 Royo summoned petitioner to a meeting with Tansiongco. When confronted during the meeting
about the felled narra tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with the
permission of one Vicar Calix (Calix) who, according to petitioner, bought the Mayod Property from
Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale. Petitioner showed to Royo Calix's written
authorization signed by Calix's wife.

On 11 January 1999, Tansiongco reported the tree-cutting to the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) forester Thelmo S. Hernandez (Hernandez) in Sibuyan, Romblon.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

* DENR forester: ordered petitioner not to convert the felled tree trunk into lumber.

On 26 January 1999, Tansiongco informed Hernandez that petitioner had converted the narra trunk into
lumber. Hernandez, with other DENR employees and enforcement officers, went to the Mayod Property
and saw that the narra tree had been cut into six smaller pieces of lumber. Hernandez took custody of the
lumber, 9 deposited them for safekeeping with Royo, and issued an apprehension receipt to petitioner. A
larger portion of the felled tree remained at the Mayod Property. The DENR subsequently conducted an
investigation on the matter.

* RTC (upon complaint of Tansiongco): Petitioner was charged in the Regional Trial Court of Romblon,
Romblon, Branch 81 (trial court) with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for "cut[ting],
gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing]" a lone narra tree inside a private land in Mayod, Ipil, Magdiwang,
Romblon (Mayod Property) over which private complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco (Tansiongco) claims
ownership.

* CA: affirmed trial court.

ISSUES & RULINGS:

1) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even though it was based on
a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer; and

YES, DENR has jurisdiction.

[NOTE: This dispositive no longer applicable since the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases requires
complaint to be filed first with the DENR, but the preliminary investigation is done by the prosecutor]

Section 80 of PD 705 provides in relevant parts:

SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. - x x x x

Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses defined in this Chapter, not
committed in the presence of any forest officer or employee, or any of the deputized officers or officials,
shall immediately be investigated by the forest officer assigned in the area where the offense was
allegedly committed, who shall thereupon receive the evidence supporting the report or complaint.

If there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the investigating forest officer shall file
the necessary complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary
investigation of criminal cases and file an information in Court. (Emphasis supplied)

Here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of the deputized
officers or officials" who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but Tansiongco,
a private citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez cannot be faulted for
not conducting an investigation to determine "if there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint
or report."

At any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705 or the Revised Rules, from
filing a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's alleged violation of Section 68 of PD
705, as amended. For its part, the trial court correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2207 as the
case falls within its exclusive original jurisdiction.

2) Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.

YES.

Before his trial, petitioner consistently represented to the authorities that he cut a narra tree in the Mayod
Property and that he did so only with Calix's permission. However, when he testified, petitioner denied
cutting the tree in question. We sustain the lower courts' rulings that petitioner's extrajudicial admissions
bind him.

3) Is the narra tree timber?

YES.

The closest this Court came to defining the term "timber" in Section 68 was to provide that "timber,"
includes "lumber" or "processed log."

In other jurisdictions, timber is determined by compliance with specified dimensions or certain "stand
age" or "rotation age." In Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court was faced with a similar
task of having to define a term in Section 68 of PD 705 - "lumber" - to determine whether possession of
lumber is punishable under that provision. In ruling in the affirmative, we held that "lumber" should be
taken in its ordinary or common usage meaning to refer to "processed log or timber,"

We see no reason why, as in Mustang, the term "timber" under Section 68 cannot be taken in its common
acceptation as referring to "wood used for or suitable for building or for carpentry or joinery." Indeed,
tree saplings or tiny tree stems that are too small for use as posts, panelling, beams, tables, or chairs
cannot be considered timber. Undoubtedly, the narra tree petitioner felled and converted to lumber was
"timber" fit "for building or for carpentry or joinery" and thus falls under the ambit of Section 68 of PD
705, as amended.
2)MOMONGAN V OMIPON

FACTS: On November 14, 1992, police officers of the Municipality of Hinunangan, Southern Leyte
apprehended Dionisio Golpe while he was driving his truck loaded with illegally cut lumber. The truck and
logs were impounded. A complaint was filed against Basilio Cabig, the alleged owner of the logs. After
conducting the preliminary investigation, respondent Judge Rafael B. Omipon found that a prima facie
case exists against Mr. Cabig but he ordered the release of the truck inasmuch as the owner/driver, Mr.
Golpe, was not charged in the complaint. Regional Director Augustus L. Momongan of the DENR filed the
complaint against respondent Judge alleging that his order releasing the truck used in the transport of
illegally cut forest products violated PD 705 and AO 59 S.1990 claiming that respondent Judge has no
authority to order the release of the truck despite the non-inclusion of Mr. Golpe in the complaint. The
truck should have been turned over to the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office for
appropriate disposition as the same falls under the administrative jurisdiction of the DENR

ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge violated PD 705 by releasing the owner of the truck used in
transporting illegally cut lumbers.

RULING: The respondent Judge's order to release the truck owned and driven by Mr. Dionisio Golpe legally
justifiable because there is no mandatory duty on the part of respondent Judge to turn over the truck,
The Revised Penal Code, Art. 45, first paragraph: "[E]very penalty imposed for the commission of a felony
shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instrument or tools with which it was
committed." However, this cannot be done if such proceeds and instruments or tools "be the property of
a third person not liable for offense." In this case, the truck, though used to transport the illegally cut
lumber, cannot be confiscated and forfeited in the event accused therein be convicted because the truck
owner/driver, Mr. Dionisio Golpe was not indicted.

When respondent Judge released the truck after he conducted the preliminary investigation and satisfied
himself that there was no reason to continue keeping the truck, he did not violate Pres. Decree No. 705
and Adm. Order No. 59. The release of the truck did not render nugatory the administrative authority of
the DENR Secretary. The confiscation proceedings under Adm. Order No. 59 is different from the
confiscation under the Revised Penal Code. Despite the order of release, the truck can be seized again
either by filing a motion for reinvestigation and motion to include the truck owner/driver, as co-accused
or by enforcing Adm. Order No. 59. Section 12 thereof categorically states that "[t]he confiscation of the
conveyance under these regulations shall be without prejudice to any criminal action which shall be filed
against the owner thereof or any person who used the conveyance in the commission of the offense."

NOTE: Under Sec. 4 of Adm. Order No. 59, if the apprehension is not made by DENR field offices,
deputized military personnel and officials of other agencies apprehending illegal logs and other forest
products and their conveyances shall notify the nearest DENR field offices and turn over said forest
products and conveyances for proper action and disposition.
4)G.R. No. 104988

Mustang Lumber vs. CA

June 18, 1996

Petitioner lumber corporation assailed the nature of the seizure of its lumber products by respondents.

RULING:

The court held that the term ‘lumber’ as used in the information against petitioners, although not
mentioned in express terms as among the prohibited articles under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705(Revised
Forestry Code) must be understood in its ordinary and common usage. Lumber is to be understood as a
processed log or timber. The court said that since the law makes no distinction between raw or processed
timber, neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguere debemus. The court held that the petitioners were
then correctly charged with the offense of violating Sec68 of PD No 705 as alleged by the facts in the
information.

The court also held that the seizure of items and the truck carrying the same was done lawfully as it falls
under lawful warrantless searches. Search of moving vehicles is one of the exceptions to the general rule
that searches must be done with a warrant. Furthermore, such search and seizure was a valid exercise of
the power vested upon the forest officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D.
No. 1775.

Finally, the court stressed petitioner’s violation of Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705. The court held that
Secretary Factoran or his authorized representative indeed had the authority to seize the Lumber since
petitioner’s license, at the time of seizure, was still suspended. Thus, petitioner was in illegal possession
of the seized articles.

The Court ruled against petitioner in all three consolidated cases.

10) CALUB V CA

Facts: The Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office of the DENR apprehended 2 motor vehicles loaded with illegally sourced lumber. The
drivers of the vehicles failed to present proper documents. Thus, the apprehending team impounded the
vehicles and its load of lumber. The impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by the drivers from the
custody of DENR. Thereafter, one of the 2 vehicles was again apprehended by a composite team of DENR-
CENRO and Phil. Army elements. The vehicle was again loaded with forest products.

Private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a
complaint for the recovery of possession of the vehicle with an application for replevin against petitioners
DENR and DENR Officer Calub.

Issue: Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with an
application for replevin, is a suit against the State

Held: Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. And a suit
against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the
State ultimately liable. However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally
applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and without willfulness, malice
or corruption.

In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by
them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in nature. In
implementing and enforcing Secs. 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out,
petitioners were performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits
of their authority. There was no malice or bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who
represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the State’s consent.