1

G.R. No. 14851 September 13, 1919

ANTONIA RIERA Y BOTELLAS, petitioner,

vs.
VICENTE PALMAROLI, Consul General for Spain, VICENTE PALMAROLI, Administrator of the
Estate of Juan Pons y Coll, and the Honorable Pedro Concepcion, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila, respondents.

Wolfson and Wolfson for petitioner.

Antonio V. Herrero for respondents.

STREET, J.:

This is an original petition filed in the Supreme Court under section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure by
Antonio Riera y Botellas, the purpose of which is to vacate an order of the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila admitting to probate the will of Juan Pons y Coll, and to cause the application for probate to
be set for rehearing in the Court of First Instance. The respondents having been required to answer, the
cause is now here heard on petition and answer, no formal proof having been as yet submitted.

For the purpose of the solution of the questions arising in this case, the facts may be taken to be as
follows: Juan Pons y Coll, a Spanish subject resident in the Philippine Islands, died on April 16, 1918, in
the city of Manila. The petitioner is the widow of the deceased and was at the time of her husband's death
residing in Palma de Mallorca in the Balearic Islands.

On April 19, 1918, the respondent Vicente Palmaroli, Consul General for Spain in the Philippine Islands,
produced in the Court of First Instance in the city of Manila a document dated on March 16, 1918,
purporting to be the will of Juan Pons y Coll, and asked that it be admitted to probate. Publication was
accordingly made, and on May 20, 1918, order was entered admitting the will to probate.

Owing to the great distance between Palma de Mallorca and the city of Manila and to the lack of
adequate means of communication between the two places — a difficulty then greatly exaggerated by
conditions incident to the European War — the petitioner received no information of the probate
proceedings until after November 14, 1918. She had, however, received information of the fact of her
husband's death on or before June 19, 1918, for upon that date an attorney employed by her in Palma de
Mallorca addressed a letter to Wolfson & Wolfson, attorneys in the city of Manila, requesting them to look
after the interests of the petitioner in the estate of her deceased husband. Said communication was not
received by the attorneys mentioned until November 11, 1918, when promptly began the investigations
necessary to enable them to act in the matter; and on November 29, 1918, they appeared in the Court of
First Instance in behalf of the petitioner and moved that the order of probate of May 20, 1918, be set
aside in order to allow the petitioner to enter opposition. This application was made under section 113 of
the Code of Civil Procedure and was denied by the Court of First Instance on the ground that more than
six months had elapsed since the date of the order of probate and prior to the filing of the motion.

The present application was thereupon made to the Supreme Court on December 21, 1918, under
section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as already stated.

The will to which reference has been made purports, for reasons stated therein, to deprive the petitioner
of participation in the testator's estate — a step which the test at or says he was authorized to take under
the foral regimen prevailing in the Balearic Islands. It is therefore, apparent that the probate of the will
was in fact prejudicial to the petitioner, as alleged; and the petitioner claims that, as a party interested in
the estate, she is entitled to be heard in the matter of the probate of the will, having been prevented from
appearing and contesting the original application by circumstances over which she had no control.
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The order of the Court of First Instance of May 20, 1918, against which relief is sought, is attacked by the
petitioner on grounds having relation chiefly to the formalities incident to the execution of the will. In the
first place it is said that if the will be considered with reference to our statutes generally applicable to wills,
it is void for failure to comply with the requirements of Act No. 2645 of the Philippine Legislature. In this
connection attention is directed to the fact that the will is not signed on the left margin of each page by the
attesting witnesses and the pages are not numbered as Act No. 2645 requires. In the second place it is
said that if the will in question be considered as the will of a Spanish subject, provable under the special
provisions of section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure, then it must be treated as void, for failure to
comply with various requirements — unnecessary to be here stated in detail — of the Spanish laws in
respect to the manner of execution of wills. As will be at once apparent from an examination of section
636 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if the will was in fact provable as the will of a Spanish subject, under
that section, and was admitted to probate as such, compliance with the requirements of our local laws
relative to the execution of wills was not necessary. In such case the provisions governing the execution
of the will are to be sought in the laws of the country of which the testator was a subject.

Another irregularity in the admission of the will in question to probate, as stated in the petition, is that the
document produced in court and actually proved as the will of the decedent was not the original but a
copy certified by the Spanish Consul General in this city from the records of his own office, the will having
been executed before him on April 16, 1918, pursuant to authority contained in the Treaty between the
United States and Spain proclaimed on April 20, 1903.

The question here presented in therefore this: Can a party who is interested in the estate of a deceased
person, and who has been prevented by inevitable conditions from opposing the probate of the will,
obtain from the Supreme Court, under section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an order for a
rehearing in the Court of First Instance, it being alleged that the will was not executed with the formalities
required by law and hence was improperly admitted to probate?

In the case of the Estate of Johnson (39 Phil. Rep., 156),we held that a Court of First Instance has the
power, under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to set aside an order admitting a will to probate
and to grant a rehearing of the application to admit the will, upon a showing from a person interested in
the estate to the effect that the order of probate was erroneous and that the applicant had been prevented
by conditions over which he had no control from appearing at the original hearing and opposing the
probate of the will. It was also suggested in Banco Español-Filipino vs. Palanca (37 Phil. Rep., 921) that
the remedy conceded in section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure is supplementary to that conceded in
section 113 of the same Code; and it was added that apart from these remedies there is no other means
recognized in our procedure whereby a defeated party can, by a proceeding in the same cause, procure a
judgment to be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation.

We shall now proceed to consider somewhat more closely the effect of the two sections of the Code of
Civil Procedure above cited, in relation to each other and with special reference to the facts now before
us. To this end it is desirable to confront the text of the provisions in question:

SEC. 113. Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a party or his legal
representative from a judgment, order, or other proceeding taken against him through his
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect: Provided, That application therefore be
made within a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six months after such judgment, order,
or proceeding was taken.

SEC. 513. When a judgment is rendered by a Court of First Instance upon default, and a party
thereto is unjustly deprived of a hearing by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, and
the Court of First Instance which rendered the judgment has finally adjourned so that no
adequate remedy exists in that court, the party so deprived of a hearing may present his petition
to the Supreme Court within sixty days after he first learns of the rendition of such judgment, and
not thereafter, setting forth the facts and praying to have such judgment set aside. . . .
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By comparing these two provisions it will be seen that the operative equity which is contemplated as the
basis of relief is similar, if not identical, in both cases, inasmuch as the "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or
excusable neglect, "contemplated in section 113, is substantially the same as the "fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence" of section 513. It is true that fraud is not mentioned as aground of relief
in section 113; but as was indicated in Mortera and Eceiza vs. West of Scotland Insurance Office, Ltd. (36
Phil. Rep., 994), if a judgment is procured by concealed fraudulent practices the party injured may
sometimes at least be relieved on the ground that there was an excusable neglect on his part in failing to
discover and defeat such practice. With this prefatory observation we proceed to consider the restrictions
placed upon the use of the remedy conceded in section 513.

The first point to which we direct our comment has reference to the lack of an adequate remedy in the
Court of First Instance. It is expressly declared in section 513 that the remedy granted thereby is available
only in case "the Court of First Instance which rendered the judgment has finally adjourned so that no
adequate remedy exists in that court." A moment's inspection of the entire section is sufficient to show
that the quoted words are not homogeneous with the remainder of the section, and moreover they are not
well adjusted to the sense and effect of section 113. The inference is plain that they were inserted in
section 513 probably by way of amendment and by a person other than the original author. The person
who wrote these words evidently supposed that by the mere fact of adjournment a Court of First Instance
loses the power to entertain an application for relief of the character here contemplated. It is quite
obvious, however, that the power granted in section 113 continues for six months regardless of the
adjournment of the court. In our judicial system a Court of First Instance exists in each province, and a
clerk is maintained at the place appointed for the holding of court, whose duty it is to receive and file
applications, petitions, and complaints of all sorts. Consequently when an application for relief against any
judgment is properly made under section 113, and filed in the court, the matter is before the judge for
action upon the convening of the next session. The mere fact of adjournment cannot really have the effect
of shortening the period of six months allowed in section 113. In many American jurisdictions, however,
the ending of the term of court terminates absolutely the power of the court over its judgments. To a
person whose mind is imbued with this idea, the words "When . . . the Court of First Instance which
rendered the judgment has finally adjourned" can only be understood as referring loosely to cases where
the Court of First Instance has by the affluxion of time lost all power to set aside or modify its judgment;
and this we consider to be its true meaning. The consequence is that the remedy conceded in section
513 is available, other conditions concurring, whenever the Court of First Instance is powerless to grant
relief, without regard to the six months limitation fixed in section 113. The sense of this construction may
perhaps be further elucidated by saying that the controlling idea is the want of adequate remedy in the
Court of First Instance; and the reference to final adjournment in section 513 is to be taken merely as
explanatory of the want of remedy in that court and not as embodying any absolute restriction upon the
remedy conceded in section 513.

It may be argued that the words "and the Court of First Instance which rendered the judgment has finally
adjourned so that no adequate remedy exists in that court" were intended to be applicable exclusively to
the case where the Court of First Instance might, if not already adjourned, grant relief under section 113,
but is prevented from so doing solely by reason of the fact of adjournment. This would seem at first blush
to be the literal sense of the words used, but it gives to the provision an application so narrow as to defeat
the manifest purpose of the legislator; for under section 113 the power of the Court of First Instance to
grant relief is limited to applications made within six months after entry of the judgment against which
relief is sought. If the meaning be as here suggested, the relief grantable by the Supreme Court under
section 513 would also be necessarily limited to applications made within six months, or at most, within
sixty days after the expiration of six months, and then only when it should appear that the lower court had
finally adjourned before the six months within which it could have granted relief had expired. In this view
the sole function served by section 513 is to make sure that a person may obtain relief in the Supreme
Court whenever the Court of First Instance had adjourned before six months after judgment entered; and
no relief could be granted by the Supreme Court upon applications made after the expiration of eight
months from the date of the judgment.
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We consider this interpretation incorrect. It can hardly be supposed that section 513 would have been
incorporated in the Code if the only idea was to enable a party having a right to relief in the Court of First
Instance under section 113 to direct his petition to the Supreme Court only when the Court of First
Instance has adjourned prior to the end of six months after judgment entered. If such were the idea, the
provision in question is, as we have already seen, superfluous. The real purpose of section 513 in our
opinion is to enable an injured party under the conditions stated to apply to the Supreme Court without
reference to the six months limitation expressed in section 113; and the expression "when the Court of
First Instance . . . has finally adjourned," as used in section 513, must not be understood as referring
exclusively to adjournment within six months after judgment entered.

It is generally recognized that if a statute is ambiguous and capable of more than one construction, the
literal meaning of the words used may be rejected if the result of adopting such meaning would be to
defeat the purpose of the legislature had in view. It is declared in article 1281 of the Civil Code that if the
words of a contract appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the contracting parties, the intention
shall prevail. This rule is there stated with respect to the interpretation of contracts; but the same idea
may be accepted, though guardedly, as applicable in the interpretation of statutes, and more especially
those of a remedial nature. Statutes of this kind are liberally construed to promote the object which the
legislature may be supposed to have had in view.

From what has been said it will be seen that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to entertain a petition of
the character of that now before us begins in point of time when the period has passed within which it was
competent for the Court of First Instance to entertain an application under section 113; and apart from the
requirement that the application must be made to the Supreme Court within two months after the
petitioner first learns of the rendition of judgment against which relief is sought, there is no absolute limit
to the period within which the application may be made. But of course if relief from a judgment is sought
by timely application in the Court of First Instance, and the application is there denied, no petition based
on the same ground will thereafter be entertained in the Supreme Court under section 513, as the proper
remedy in that case would be to appeal from the action of the Court of First Instance. (Rabajante vs. Moir
and Rances, 28 Phil. Rep., 161.)

Proceeding now to a further comparison of sections 113 and 513, it is noteworthy that while the power of
the Court of First Instance to grant relief under section 113 extends to the setting aside of any judgment,
order or proceeding whatever, the power of the Supreme Court under section 513 is limited to granting a
new trial upon judgments rendered upon default.

Now what is the meaning of "judgment rendered upon default," as used in section 513? The reference is
of course to the default mentioned in section 128 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Simon vs. Castro and
Castro, 6 Phil. Rep., 335,337.) A default, such as is there intended, can only arise in contentious litigation
where a party who has been impleaded as a defendant and served with process fails to appear at the
time required in the summons or to answer at the time provided by the rules of the court. The proceeding
to probate a will is not a contentious litigation in any sense, because nobody is impleaded or served with
process. It is a special proceeding, and although notice of the application is published, nobody is bound to
appear and no order for judgment by default, is ever entered. If the application is not opposed, the court
may allow the will on the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses only (sec. 631, Code Civ. Proc.),
provided none of the reasons specified in section 634 of the Code of Civil Procedure for disallowing the
will are found to exist. If any interested person opposes the probate, the court hears the testimony and
allows or disallows the will accordingly. From such judgment any interested person may appeal to the
Supreme Court within twenty days. (Sec. 781, Code Civ Proc.) Though the action taken by a Court of
First Instance in thus allowing or disallowing a will is properly denominated a judgment, it is not a
judgment rendered upon default even though no person appears to oppose the probate.

It is manifest from this that the remedy given in section 513 can have no application to the order of May
20, 1918, legalizing the will of Juan Pons y Coll; and this is necessarily fatal to the petition before us. This
consequence follows regardless of any irregularities that may have occurred in the Court of First Instance
in admitting the will to probate and regardless of any error which that court may have committed in the
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action taken upon the proof submitted at the hearing. It is not alleged that any fraud has been attempted
or committed, or that the document probated is any other than a testamentary memorial in which the
decedent actually gave expression to his desires with regard to the disposition of his property. But if fraud
had been charged — as, for instance, if it were alleged that the purported will is forged document — the
remedy, if any exists, would not be found in a proceeding under section 513, but in an original action in
the Court of First Instance. It thus becomes unneccessary to inquire whether the will in question was in
fact executed in conformity with the requirements of law — either of these Islands or of Spain.

As a result of this decision it cannot be denied that, without any fault on the part of the petitioner or her
attorneys, she has been deprived not only of the opportunity of opposing the will and appealing from the
order of probate but also of the opportunity of applying to the Court of First Instance for relief under
section 113. Even assuming that she could have procured the disallowance of the will by either of those
methods — a point upon which no pronouncement can here be made — it is obvious that the impossibility
of her thus obtaining relief was due to circumstances peculiar to this case; and the possibility of
occassional hardship cannot affect the validity of our procedure for the probate of wills (Estate of
Johnson, supra.)

A will is nothing more than a species of conveyance whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities
prescribed by law, to control in a certain degree the disposition of his property after his death. Out of
consideration for the important interests involved the execution and proof of wills has been surrounded by
numerous safeguards, among which is the provisions that after death of the testator his will may be
judicially established in court. The action of the court in admitting a will to probate has all the effect of a
judgment; and as such is entitled to full faith and credit in other courts. The proceeding by which this is
accomplished is considered to be in the nature of a proceeding in rem,and upon this idea the decree of
probate is held binding on all persons in interest, whether they appear to contest the probate or not. The
proceeding is not a contentious litigation; and though the persons in interest are given an opportunity to
appear and reasonable precautions are taken for publicity, they are not impleaded or required to answer.

As has been repeatedly stated in the decisions of this court, the probate of a will, while conclusive as to
its due execution, in no wise involves the intrinsic validity of its provisions. If, therefore, upon the
distribution of the estate of Juan Pons y Coll, it should appear that any provision of his will is contrary to
the law applicable to his case, the will must necessarily yield upon that point and the disposition made by
law must prevail. The petitioner is therefore free to appear in the Court of First Instance at the proper
juncture and discuss the questions of the validity of such provisions of the will as affect her interests
adversely; and so far as we can see, on the facts before us, this is her only recourse. But if the will in
question was in fact proved as the will of a Spanish subject under section 636 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the intrinsic validity of its provisions must be determined under the Spanish law applicable to
this testator.

After the resolution embodied in the preceding opinion had been adopted by the court, but before the
decision had been promulgated, the attorneys for the petitioner moved that an order be entered for the
submission of evidence and that the clerk of this court be appointed commissioner to take the same, upon
designation by him of the time and place therefor.

The step indicated would be proper if the facts stated in the petition had been found sufficient to entitle
the petitioner to relief, but inasmuch as the petition is in our opinion insufficient, the making of the order
suggested becomes unneccessary.

In this connection it may be well to estate that when a petition for relief in the exercise of our original
jurisdiction is presented to this court, we are accustomed to consider the case as being at all times before
us for the purpose of determining the legal sufficiency of the petition; and when it is found at any stage of
the proceeding that the allegations of the complaint are insufficient to entitle the petitioner to relief of any
sort, it is our practice to enter an order upon our own motion dismissing the petition. Where the defect
apparent in the petition is of a sort that might be cured by amendment, the order of dismissal is made
conditional upon the failure of the petitioner to amend within a period stated. On the other hand where the
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defect is manifestly incurable it is proper to make the order of dismissal absolute, and such appears to be
the correct practice.

In the course of the preceding discussion we have, for the purpose of explaining the situation more
clearly, permitted ourselves to refer to at least one detail not stated in the petition, as where we state that
the will purports to disinherit the petitioner. This fact, however, if not admitted, is incontrovertible and
apparent from the copy of the will exhibited with the answer. Moreover, the point that no decisive
influence on the decision. Our opinion therefore is to be taken as an expression of our opinion upon the
legal sufficiency of the petition exclusively upon the statements contained therein.

As will be discovered from the opinion, the inability of this court to grant relief in the case before us is
really due to the fact that the remedy conceded in section 513 admitting wills to probate. The defect from
which the petition suffers is therefore not curable by amendment and cannot be aided by the taking of
proof. The request for an order allowing proof to be submitted must therefore be denied, and judgment
absolute will be entered dismissing the petition with costs.

DY YIENG SEANGIO, G.R. Nos. 140371-72

BARBARA D. SEANGIO
and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO,
Petitioners, Present:

PUNO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her GARCIA, JJ.
capacity as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21,
Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO,
ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. Promulgated:
SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D.
SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO,
SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, November 27, 2006
BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and
JAMES D. SEANGIO,
Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari[1] with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order seeking the nullification of the orders, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the petition for probate on the ground of
preterition, in the consolidated cases, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396, and entitled,
In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Segundo C. Seangio v. Alfredo D. Seangio, et al. and In the Matter of the
Probate of the Will of Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio.
The facts of the cases are as follows:
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On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late
Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 9890870 of the RTC, and praying for the appointment of private
respondent Elisa D. SeangioSantos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.

Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They contended
that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a
general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control and supervision
over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of
the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated
September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the
purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate
proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will.

On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 9993396,
was filed by petitioners before the RTC. They likewise reiterated that the probate proceedings should take
precedence over SP. Proc. No. 9890870 because testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over
intestate proceedings.[2]

The document that petitioners refer to as Segundos holographic will is quoted, as follows:

Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana

Tantunin ng sinuman

Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at
nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at
anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa
akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia
Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon
gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw.

Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na
kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon
pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa
mga may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking.
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel
Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan
ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya
makoha mana.
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong
saksi. [3]
(signed)
Segundo Seangio

Nilagdaan sa harap namin

(signed)
Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)
Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi

(signed)
 8

ikatlong saksi

On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners motion, SP. Proc. No. 9890870 and SP. Proc. No. 9993396 were consolidated. [4]
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings[5] primarily on the
ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the
estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According
to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son,
Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee,
hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that
while procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from
delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face
of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1) generally, the authority of the
probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; 2) private respondents question
the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; 3) disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of a
decedent; and, 4) the rule on preterition does not apply because Segundos will does not constitute a universal heir or
heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs.[6]
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for probate proceedings:
A perusal of the document termed as will by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al.,
clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo and
Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies.
However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she
not being a compulsory heir in the direct line.
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would amount to an abuse
of discretion. The Supreme Court in the case of Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court [155 SCRA
100 (1987)] has made its position clear: for respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will
and allowed the case to progress when, on its face, the will appears to be intrinsically void would
have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added
futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the
intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was
resolved (underscoring supplied).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. Special Proceedings No. 9993396 is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.[7]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order dated October 14, 1999.
Petitioners contend that:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTIONAND DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS, DATED 10 AUGUST
1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999 (ATTACHMENTS A AND B HEREOF) CONSIDERING
THAT:

I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4
OF RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING
THE CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
 9

JURISDICTIONAL FACTS, DISMISSED THE TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED

GROUND THAT THE TESTATORS WILL IS VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE
EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
WILL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT THE AUTHORITY OF
PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY TO A DETERMINATION OF THE EXTRINSIC
VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE EXECUTION THEREOF, THE TESTATORS
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OR
SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW;

II
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY
TO RULE UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT IS
INDUBITABLE FROM THE FACE OF THE TESTATORS WILL THAT NO PRETERITON
EXISTS AND THAT THE WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND EXTRINSICALLY
VALID; AND,

III
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE
INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE
PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.

Petitioners argue, as follows:

First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which respectively
mandate the court to: a) fix the time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the
allowance thereof, and cause notice of such time and place to be published three weeks successively previous to the
appointed time in a newspaper of general circulation; and, b) cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatees
and devisees of the testator Segundo;

Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its title clearly
states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir. Thus, there is no
preterition in the decedents will and the holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void;

Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents alike, with the sole
exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the direct line of Segundo were preterited
in the holographic will since there was no institution of an heir;

Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both intrinsically and
extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing of the testate case; and,

Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to petitioners, and will render
nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.

The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners was dated, signed and written by him
in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of preterition, private respondents did not raise any issue as regards
the authenticity of the document.

The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundos intention of excluding his
eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by
Segundo.
 10

For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected through a will
wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated
by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of
maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of
a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code:
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and
descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:

(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the
testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law
prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found
groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the
spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence
causes the testator to make a will or to change one already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant who disinherit
such child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant;[8]
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.

Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a
holographic will.

A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by
the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and
need not be witnessed.

Segundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the
formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself.
An intent to dispose mortis causa[9] can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not
make an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of
disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator
Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo. [10]

Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the
limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are
designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law,
morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect. [11]
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the
present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. [12] In this regard, the
Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by
Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a
holographic will. Unless the will is probated,[13] the disinheritance cannot be given effect.[14]
 11

With regard to the issue on preterition,[15] the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line
were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Courts opinion, Segundos last expression to bequeath his estate to all
his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir[16] to the exclusion
of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did
not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation
between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.
Considering that the questioned document is Segundos holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over
intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall
pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus,
unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory. [17]
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be probated. It is
settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose.[18]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21,
dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside. Respondent judge is directed to reinstate and hear SP
Proc. No. 99-93396 for the allowance of the holographic will of Segundo Seangio. The intestate case or SP. Proc.
No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the termination of the aforesaid testate proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-4888 May 25, 1953

JOSE MERZA, petitioner,

vs.
PEDRO LOPEZ PORRAS, respondent.

Primicias, Abad, Mencies & Castillo for petitioner.

Moises Ma. Buhain for respondent.

TUAZON , J.:

This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals which affirmed an order of the Court of First Instance of
Zambales denying the probate of the last will and testament and
so-called codicil, identified as Exhibits A and B, of Pilar Montealegre, deceased. The testatrix was
survived by the husband and collateral relatives, some of whom, along with the husband, were
disinherited in Exhibit B for the reasons set forth therein.

The opposition to Exhibit A was predicated on alleged defects of the attestation clause. Written in the
local dialect known to the testatrix, the attestation clause, as translated into English in the record on
appeal, reads:

The foregoing instrument consisting of three pages, on the date above-mentioned, was executed,
signed and published by testatrix Pilar Montealegre and she declared that the said instrument is
her last will and testament; that in our presence and also in the very presence of the said testatrix
as likewise in the presence of two witnesses and the testatrix each of us three witnesses signed
this a testament.
 12

The opponent objected that this clause did not estate that the tetratrix and the witnesses had signed each
and every page of the will or that she had signed the instrument in the presence of the witnesses. The
Appellate Court dismissed the first objection, finding that "failure to estate in the attestation clause in
question that the testatrix and/or the witnesses had signed each and every page of Exhibit A were cured
by the fact that each one of the page of the instrument appears to be signed by the testatrix and the three
attesting witnesses (Nayve vs. Mojal, 47 Phil., 152, (1924); Ticson vs. Gorostiza, 57 Phil., (1932);
Leynes vs. Leynes, 40 Off. Gaz., 3rd Suppl. (October 18, 1939), 510, 528; Rallos vs. Rallos, 44 Off. Gaz.,
4938, 4940)." But granting the correctness of the premise, the court held the second objection well taken
and thus concluded: "The question whether the testatrix had signed in the presence of said witnesses can
not be verified upon physical examination of the instrument. Hence, the absence of the require statement
in said clause may not, pursuant to the decisions of the Supreme Court, be offset by proof aliunde even if
admitted without any objection."

The premise of the conclusion is, in our opinion, incorrect.

It must be admitted that the attestation clause was very poor drawn, its language exceedingly
ungrammatical to the point of being difficult to understand; but from a close examination of the whole
context in relation to its purpose the implication seems clear that the testatrix signed in the presence of
the witnesses. Considering that the witnesses' only business at hand was to sign and attest to the
testatrix's signing of the document, and that the only actors of the proceeding were the maker and the
witnesses acting and speaking collectively and in the first person, the phrase "in our presence," used as it
was in connection with the process of signing, can not imply anything but the testatrix signed before them.
No other inference is possible. The prepositional phrase "in our presence" denotes an active verb and the
verb a subject. The verb could not be other than signed and the subject no other than the testatrix.

The use of the word "also" is no less enlightening. It denotes that, as each of the witnesses sign in the
presence of the testatrix and of one another, so the testatrix sign in similar or like manner — in their
presence.

In consonance with the principle of the liberal interpretation, adhered to in numerous later decision of this
Court and affirmed and translated into inactment in the new Civil Code (Article 827), we are constrained
to hold the attestation clause under consideration sufficient and valid.

"Precision of language in the drafting of the attestation clause is desirable. However, it is not imperative
that a parrot-like copy of the word of the statue be made. It is sufficient if from the language employed it
can reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law expects of it."
(Ticson vs. Gorostiza, supra.)

"It could have been the intention of the legislature in providing for the essential safeguards in the
execution of a will to shackle the very right of the testamentary disposition which the law recognizes and
holds sacred." (Leynes vs.Leynes, supra.)

With reference of Exhibit B the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that the document having been
executed one day before Exhibit A could not be considered as a codicil "because a codicil, as the word
implies, is only an addition to, or modification of, the will." The Court of Appeals added that "the content of
Exhibit B are couched in the language of ordinarily used in a simple affidavit and as such, may not have
the legal effect and force to a testamentary disposition." Furthermore, the Court of Appeals observed,
disinheritance "may not be made in any instrument other than the will of Exhibit A, as expressly provided
for in article 849 of the Civil Code," and, "there being no disposition as to the disinheritance of the
oppositor, Pedro Lopez Porras (the surviving spouse), in the said Exhibit A, it is quite clear that he can
not be disinherited in any other instrument including Exhibit B, which is, as above stated, a simple
affidavit."
 13

Exhibit B does partake of the nature of a will. A will is defined in article 667 of the Civil code of Spain as
"the act by which a persons dispose of all his property or a portion of it," and in article 783 of the new Civil
Code as "an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a
certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death. Exhibit B comes within this
definition.

Being of testamentary character and having been made with all the formalities of law, Exhibit B is entitled
to probate as an independent testementary desposition. In the absence of any legal provision to the
contrary — and there is none in this jurisdiction — it is the general, well-established rule that two separate
and distinct wills may be probated if one does not revoke the other (68 C.J., 885) and provided that the
statutory requirements relative to the execution of wills have been complied with (Id. 881). As seen,
Exhibit B embodied all the requisites of a will, even free of such formal of literary imperfections as are
found in Exhibit A.

It also follows that Exhibit B is a legal and effective vehicle for excluding lawful heirs from testate or
intestate succession. Article 849 of the Civil Code of Spain does not, as the appealed decision seems to
insinuate, require that the disinheritance should be accomplished in the same instrument by which the
maker provides the disposition of his or her property after his or death. This article merely provides that
"disinheritance can be affected only by a will (any will) in which the legal cause upon which it is based is
expressly stated."

It is our judgment therefore that the instruments Exhibit A and B admitted to probate, subject of courts to
the right of the disinherited person under particle 850 to contest the disinheritance, and it is so ordered,
with costs against the appellee.

Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 82027 March 29, 1990

ROMARICO G. VITUG, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROWENA FAUSTINO-CORONA, respondents.

Rufino B. Javier Law Office for petitioner.

Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:

This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this Court 1 involving the probate of the two wills of the
late Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in New York, U. S.A., on November 10, 1980, naming private
respondent Rowena Faustino-Corona executrix. In our said decision, we upheld the appointment of
Nenita Alonte as co-special administrator of Mrs. Vitug's estate with her (Mrs. Vitug's) widower, petitioner
Romarico G. Vitug, pending probate.

On January 13, 1985, Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from the probate court to sell
certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his advances to the
estate in the sum of P667,731.66, plus interests, which he claimed were personal funds. As found by the
Court of Appeals, 2 the alleged advances consisted of P58,147.40 spent for the payment of estate tax,
P518,834.27 as deficiency estate tax, and P90,749.99 as "increment thereto." 3 According to Mr. Vitug, he
 14

withdrew the sums of P518,834.27 and P90,749.99 from savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of
America, Makati, Metro Manila.

On April 12, 1985, Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the same funds
withdrawn from savings account No. 35342-038 were conjugal partnership properties and part of the
estate, and hence, there was allegedly no ground for reimbursement. She also sought his ouster for
failure to include the sums in question for inventory and for "concealment of funds belonging to the
estate." 4

Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same through a
survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank on June 19, 1970. The agreement
provides:

We hereby agree with each other and with the BANK OF AMERICAN NATIONAL TRUST
AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION (hereinafter referred to as the BANK), that all money now
or hereafter deposited by us or any or either of us with the BANK in our joint savings
current account shall be the property of all or both of us and shall be payable to and
collectible or withdrawable by either or any of us during our lifetime, and after the death of
either or any of us shall belong to and be the sole property of the survivor or survivors,
and shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by such survivor or survivors.

We further agree with each other and the BANK that the receipt or check of either, any or
all of us during our lifetime, or the receipt or check of the survivor or survivors, for any
payment or withdrawal made for our above-mentioned account shall be valid and
sufficient release and discharge of the BANK for such payment or withdrawal. 5

The trial courts 6 upheld the validity of this agreement and granted "the motion to sell some of the estate
of Dolores L. Vitug, the proceeds of which shall be used to pay the personal funds of Romarico Vitug in
the total sum of P667,731.66 ... ." 7

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, in the petition for certiorari filed by the herein private
respondent, held that the above-quoted survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis
causa which "did not comply with the formalities of a valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil
Code," 8 and secondly, assuming that it is a mere donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation under
the provisions of Article 133 of the Civil Code. 9

The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals states:

WHEREFORE, the order of respondent Judge dated November 26, 1985 (Annex II,
petition) is hereby set aside insofar as it granted private respondent's motion to sell
certain properties of the estate of Dolores L. Vitug for reimbursement of his alleged
advances to the estate, but the same order is sustained in all other respects. In addition,
respondent Judge is directed to include provisionally the deposits in Savings Account No.
35342-038 with the Bank of America, Makati, in the inventory of actual properties
possessed by the spouses at the time of the decedent's death. With costs against private
respondent. 10

In his petition, Vitug, the surviving spouse, assails the appellate court's ruling on the strength of our
decisions in Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust Co. 11 and Macam v. Gatmaitan 12 in which we sustained
the validity of "survivorship agreements" and considering them as aleatory contracts. 13

The petition is meritorious.

 15

The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which should be embodied in a will. A
will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person
disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his
death." 14 In other words, the bequest or device must pertain to the testator. 15 In this case, the monies
subject of savings account No. 35342-038 were in the nature of conjugal funds In the case relied
on, Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust Co., 16 we rejected claims that a survivorship agreement purports
to deliver one party's separate properties in favor of the other, but simply, their joint holdings:

xxx xxx xxx

... Such conclusion is evidently predicated on the assumption that Stephenson was the
exclusive owner of the funds-deposited in the bank, which assumption was in turn based
on the facts (1) that the account was originally opened in the name of Stephenson alone
and (2) that Ana Rivera "served only as housemaid of the deceased." But it not
infrequently happens that a person deposits money in the bank in the name of another;
and in the instant case it also appears that Ana Rivera served her master for about
nineteen years without actually receiving her salary from him. The fact that subsequently
Stephenson transferred the account to the name of himself and/or Ana Rivera and
executed with the latter the survivorship agreement in question although there was no
relation of kinship between them but only that of master and servant, nullifies the
assumption that Stephenson was the exclusive owner of the bank account. In the
absence, then, of clear proof to the contrary, we must give full faith and credit to the
certificate of deposit which recites in effect that the funds in question belonged to Edgar
Stephenson and Ana Rivera; that they were joint (and several) owners thereof; and that
either of them could withdraw any part or the whole of said account during the lifetime of
both, and the balance, if any, upon the death of either, belonged to the survivor. 17

xxx xxx xxx

In Macam v. Gatmaitan, 18 it was held:

xxx xxx xxx

This Court is of the opinion that Exhibit C is an aleatory contract whereby, according to
article 1790 of the Civil Code, one of the parties or both reciprocally bind themselves to
give or do something as an equivalent for that which the other party is to give or do in
case of the occurrence of an event which is uncertain or will happen at an indeterminate
time. As already stated, Leonarda was the owner of the house and Juana of the Buick
automobile and most of the furniture. By virtue of Exhibit C, Juana would become the
owner of the house in case Leonarda died first, and Leonarda would become the owner
of the automobile and the furniture if Juana were to die first. In this manner Leonarda and
Juana reciprocally assigned their respective property to one another conditioned upon
who might die first, the time of death determining the event upon which the acquisition of
such right by the one or the other depended. This contract, as any other contract, is
binding upon the parties thereto. Inasmuch as Leonarda had died before Juana, the latter
thereupon acquired the ownership of the house, in the same manner as Leonarda would
have acquired the ownership of the automobile and of the furniture if Juana had died
first. 19

xxx xxx xxx

There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it must be presumed to
be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of the marita. relations. 20
 16

Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons, because it was to take
effect after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a donation between the spouses because it involved
no conveyance of a spouse's own properties to the other.

It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification petition of the conjugal partnership, as
held by the Court of Appeals, 21 by "mere stipulation" 22 and that it is no "cloak" 23 to circumvent the law on
conjugal property relations. Certainly, the spouses are not prohibited by law to invest conjugal property,
say, by way of a joint and several bank account, more commonly denominated in banking parlance as an
"and/or" account. In the case at bar, when the spouses Vitug opened savings account No. 35342-038,
they merely put what rightfully belonged to them in a money-making venture. They did not dispose of it in
favor of the other, which would have arguably been sanctionable as a prohibited donation. And since the
funds were conjugal, it can not be said that one spouse could have pressured the other in placing his or
her deposits in the money pool.

The validity of the contract seems debatable by reason of its "survivor-take-all" feature, but in reality, that
contract imposed a mere obligation with a term, the term being death. Such agreements are permitted by
the Civil Code. 24

Under Article 2010 of the Code:

ART. 2010. By an aleatory contract, one of the parties or both reciprocally bind
themselves to give or to do something in consideration of what the other shall give or do
upon the happening of an event which is uncertain, or which is to occur at an
indeterminate time.

Under the aforequoted provision, the fulfillment of an aleatory contract depends on either the happening
of an event which is (1) "uncertain," (2) "which is to occur at an indeterminate time." A survivorship
agreement, the sale of a sweepstake ticket, a transaction stipulating on the value of currency, and
insurance have been held to fall under the first category, while a contract for life annuity or pension under
Article 2021, et sequentia, has been categorized under the second. 25 In either case, the element of risk is
present. In the case at bar, the risk was the death of one party and survivorship of the other.

However, as we have warned:

xxx xxx xxx

But although the survivorship agreement is per se not contrary to law its operation or
effect may be violative of the law. For instance, if it be shown in a given case that such
agreement is a mere cloak to hide an inofficious donation, to transfer property in fraud of
creditors, or to defeat the legitime of a forced heir, it may be assailed and annulled upon
such grounds. No such vice has been imputed and established against the agreement
involved in this case. 26

xxx xxx xxx

There is no demonstration here that the survivorship agreement had been executed for such unlawful
purposes, or, as held by the respondent court, in order to frustrate our laws on wills, donations, and
conjugal partnership.

The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her husband, the latter
has acquired upon her death a vested right over the amounts under savings account No. 35342-038 of
the Bank of America. Insofar as the respondent court ordered their inclusion in the inventory of assets left
 17

by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error. Being the separate property of petitioner, it forms no
more part of the estate of the deceased.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court, dated June 29, 1987, and its resolution,
dated February 9, 1988, are SET ASIDE.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado JJ., concur.

Vitug v. CA
183 SCRA 755

FACTS:

Romarico Vitug and Nenita Alonte were co-administrators of Dolores Vitug’s (deceased) estate. Rowena Corona was
the executrix. Romarico, the deceased’s husband, filed a motion with the probate court asking for authority to sell
certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate to cover alleged advances to the estate, which he
claimed as personal funds. The advances were used to pay estate taxes.

Corona opposed the motion on ground that the advances came from a savings account which formed part of the
conjugal partnership properties and is part of the estate. Thus, there was no ground for reimbursement. Romarico
claims that the funds are his exclusive property, having been acquired through a survivorship agreement executed
with his late wife and the bank.

The agreement stated that after the death of either one of the spouses, the savings account shall belong to and be the
sole property of the survivor, and shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by such survivor.

The lower court upheld the validity of the agreement and granted the motion to sell. CA reversed stating that the
survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which did not comply with the formalities of a valid
will. Assuming that it was a donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation (donation between spouses).

ISSUE:

W/N the survivorship agreement was valid.

HELD:

YES. The conveyance is not mortis causa, which should be embodied in a will. A will is a personal, solemn, revocable
and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to
take effect after his death. The bequest or devise must pertain to the testator.

In this case, the savings account involved was in the nature of conjugal funds. Since it was not shown that the funds
belonged exclusively to one party, it is presumed to be conjugal.

It is also not a donation inter vivos because it was to take effect after the death of one party. It is also not a donation
between spouses because it involved no conveyance of a spouse’s own properties to the other.

It was an error to include the savings account in the inventory of the deceased’s assets because it is the separate
property of Romarico.

Thus, Romarico had the right to claim reimbursement.

 18

A will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his his property and
rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death.

Survivorship agreements are permitted by the NCC. However, its operation or effect must not be violative of the law
(i.e. used as a cloak to hide an inofficious donation or to transfer property in fraud of creditors or to defeat the
legitime of a forced heir).